In the evolving landscape of global geopolitics, Greece occupies a pivotal position at the intersection of Western alliances, Chinese economic ambitions, and European Union (EU) integration. A decade ago, Greece was perceived by some as China’s potential “Trojan horse” within the EU, largely due to significant Chinese investments in strategic infrastructure, notably the Piraeus Port. By 2025, however, Greece’s foreign policy has undergone a marked shift, prioritizing deepened ties with the United States while maintaining a cautious, pragmatic engagement with China. This recalibration reflects a complex interplay of geopolitical, economic, and security considerations, shaped by Greece’s role as a NATO member, its economic recovery, and its strategic positioning within the EU. The dynamics of Sino-American competition, the EU’s evolving economic security framework, and Greece’s domestic priorities—such as its shipping industry and energy diversification—further complicate this balancing act.
Greece’s alignment with the United States has solidified over the past decade, driven by shared security interests and economic cooperation. The U.S.-Greece Strategic Dialogue, initiated in 2018, has become a cornerstone of bilateral relations, with annual ministerial-level meetings addressing defense, energy, and trade. The 2019 and 2021 updates to the Mutual Defence Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) expanded U.S. military access to Greek facilities, including the deep-water port at Souda Bay on Crete and the port of Alexandroupolis in northern Greece, which has emerged as a critical hub for NATO’s eastern flank since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. According to the U.S. Department of State, these updates have facilitated the stationing of U.S. forces and equipment, enhancing NATO’s operational capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece’s defense modernization further underscores this partnership, with significant procurements of U.S. military hardware. In 2023, the Greek Ministry of Defense reported contracts for F-16V fighter upgrades, MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, and a modernization package for S-70B Aegean Hawk helicopters, valued at over $2 billion. The Hellenic Air Force’s planned acquisition of F-35 jets, with deliveries expected by 2028, and Switchblade unmanned aerial vehicles further signal Greece’s commitment to interoperability with U.S. forces. These investments align with Greece’s 10-year defense procurement plan, which the Hellenic Ministry of Defense estimates will cost €10 billion by 2030.
Economic ties with the U.S. have also deepened. In 2022, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) provided a $125 million loan to ONEX Elefsis Shipyards, marking a significant investment in Greece’s maritime infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Commerce reported that U.S. FDI in Greece reached €5 billion in 2022, with major corporations such as Pfizer, Google, Microsoft, and Amazon establishing research and development facilities and data centers. Greek FDI in the U.S. was slightly higher at €5.3 billion, reflecting a balanced economic relationship. Trade data from the Hellenic Statistical Authority indicates that in 2023, Greece exported $4.2 billion in goods to the U.S., primarily in agricultural products and chemicals, while importing $1.8 billion, resulting in a trade surplus. The import of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the U.S. has grown steadily since 2022, with the International Energy Agency (IEA) noting that U.S. LNG accounted for 15% of Greece’s total gas imports in 2024, up from 10% in 2022. The operationalization of the Alexandroupolis floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) in October 2024, as reported by the Greek Ministry of Environment and Energy, has bolstered regional energy security by reducing dependence on Russian gas, aligning with U.S. and EU objectives.
In contrast, Greece’s economic relationship with China remains significant but increasingly cautious. China is Greece’s second-largest trading partner for goods, with bilateral trade reaching €732 billion in 2024, according to the European Commission. However, Greece’s trade deficit with China is substantial, with imports of €519 billion far outweighing exports of €213.3 billion. This imbalance, driven by Greece’s reliance on Chinese solar panels, electric vehicles (EVs), and electronic equipment, has prompted concerns in Athens. Chinese FDI in Greece, while notable, is concentrated in two major projects: the Piraeus Port Authority, where COSCO Shipping holds a 67% stake following a 2021 acquisition of an additional 16%, and a 20% stake by the State Grid Corporation of China in Ariadne Interconnection, acquired in November 2024. The Greek Ministry of Economy reported that Chinese FDI stock in Greece stood at $2.2 billion in 2022, significantly lower than U.S. investment. Greece’s participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), formalized in 2018, has not yielded additional projects beyond Piraeus, reflecting a cooling enthusiasm for Chinese investment. The Greek government’s decision to downgrade its representation at the 2023 Belt and Road Forum to ministerial level, as noted by the German Marshall Fund, underscores this shift.
Greece’s cautious approach to China is shaped by both domestic and EU-level considerations. The EU’s 2019 strategic outlook, reaffirmed in 2023 by the European Council, frames China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival. This triadic approach has influenced Greece’s policies, particularly in light of the EU’s strengthened FDI screening mechanisms under Regulation 2019/452. Greece legislated its own FDI screening framework in May 2025, as reported by the Greek Ministry of Economy, aligning with EU requirements but adopting a narrow interpretation to minimize restrictions. This reflects Athens’ desire to maintain economic openness while addressing security concerns, particularly regarding Chinese investments in strategic sectors. The European Commission’s imposition of countervailing duties on Chinese EVs in October 2024, ranging from 17% to 35.3%, was supported by Greece’s abstention in the vote, a strategic move to avoid direct confrontation with Beijing while aligning with EU policy. The Bruegel think tank notes that Greece’s abstention, alongside 11 other member states, ensured the duties’ passage while signaling diplomatic restraint.
The EU’s broader economic security strategy, outlined in the European Commission’s January 2024 package, emphasizes de-risking from China through diversification and enhanced trade defenses. Greece’s economic recovery, with GDP growth of 2.3% in 2024 according to the Hellenic Statistical Authority, has reduced its reliance on Chinese capital compared to the post-2008 crisis era. The Greek government’s focus on attracting high-quality investments, as highlighted in a 2024 U.S. Department of State report, has prioritized U.S. and European partners. For instance, Greece’s “I Move Electrically” program, active since 2023, provides subsidies for EV purchases but has not favored Chinese manufacturers, reflecting alignment with EU efforts to protect domestic industries. The Greek Ministry of Environment and Energy reported that 12,000 EVs were registered in Greece in 2024, with European brands dominating the market.
Greece’s strategic positioning within the EU also intersects with the bloc’s evolving Indo-Pacific strategy, which seeks to counterbalance China’s regional influence. The EU’s 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy, as detailed by the European External Action Service (EEAS), emphasizes economic resilience, maritime security, and partnerships with ASEAN countries. Greece, while not a formal participant in this strategy due to its focus on regional priorities, indirectly contributes through its shipping industry, which accounts for 61% of the EU-owned merchant fleet, according to the European Community Shipowners’ Associations. The Greek shipping sector, valued at €150 billion annually, is a critical component of global trade routes, including those in the Indo-Pacific. However, Greece’s absence of a dedicated Indo-Pacific strategy, as noted by the Robert Schuman Foundation, stems from its preoccupation with Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean, where tensions over maritime boundaries persist.
The Russia-Ukraine war has further shaped Greece’s geopolitical stance. Athens has been a staunch supporter of Kyiv, providing humanitarian aid and military equipment, including BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, as reported by the Hellenic Ministry of Defense in 2023. The Greek government’s commitment to international law is partly driven by the displacement of the Greek diaspora in Ukraine, estimated at 90,000 by the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. China’s tacit support for Russia, including exports of dual-use goods, has raised concerns in the EU, as highlighted in a September 2024 EEAS statement. Greece, however, has remained silent on this issue, likely to avoid antagonizing Beijing. The second Trump administration’s shift toward a negotiated settlement in Ukraine, as reported by the Council on Foreign Relations in April 2025, has introduced uncertainty in Athens, given Greece’s alignment with U.S.-led NATO policies.
Greece’s role as a non-permanent UNSC member in 2025-26 places it in a delicate position, navigating the competing interests of the U.S., China, and Russia. The UNSC’s agenda, including discussions on Ukraine and Indo-Pacific security, requires Greece to balance its NATO commitments with diplomatic engagement with Beijing. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs has emphasized Athens’ commitment to the UN Charter’s principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, aligning with U.S. and EU positions. However, Greece’s economic ties with China necessitate a pragmatic approach, as evidenced by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ November 2023 visit to Beijing, where he advocated for increased Greek exports to address the trade deficit, according to the Greek Ministry of Economy.
The EIB’s strategic priorities, updated in 2024 to include defense and security, align with Greece’s advocacy for enhanced European defense capabilities. The EIB’s €450 billion investment plan for 2024-2029, as outlined in its Strategic Roadmap, prioritizes green transition, digitalization, and strategic autonomy. Greece has benefited from EIB financing for renewable energy projects, with €1.2 billion allocated in 2024 for solar and wind infrastructure, according to the EIB’s annual report. These investments support Greece’s phase-out of oil boilers by 2025, as mandated by the Greek Ministry of Environment and Energy, and align with the EU’s climate goals. However, Greece’s limited engagement with the EIB’s defense initiatives reflects its reliance on U.S. military support and its focus on regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Sino-American competition presents both opportunities and challenges for Greece. The U.S. Department of Defense’s inclusion of COSCO on a sanctions list in 2024, as reported by the Council on Foreign Relations, has raised concerns in Athens due to COSCO’s role in Piraeus. Greek shipping companies, which operate 20% of global tonnage, face additional pressures from U.S. tariffs on China-built ships, as noted in a 2024 European Community Shipowners’ Associations report. These tariffs, set at 25% under the Trump administration’s April 2025 “Liberation Day” policy, threaten the competitiveness of Greek firms, which rely on Chinese shipyards for cost-effective construction. Greece’s hiring of a Republican-affiliated lobbying firm in 2025, as reported by the German Marshall Fund, reflects efforts to navigate these tensions and maintain access to U.S. decision-makers.
China’s soft power initiatives in Greece, including five Confucius Institutes and academic exchanges, aim to cultivate a favorable image, as detailed in a 2023 report by the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. However, Greece’s response has been tempered by U.S. counter-efforts, such as the establishment of a Columbia University Global Centre in Athens in 2023. The Greek government’s rejection of a Chinese proposal for an EV bus assembly plant in October 2023, as noted by the Atlantic Council, underscores Athens’ sensitivity to U.S. concerns about Chinese influence in strategic sectors. This decision reflects Greece’s broader strategy of diversification, with strengthened ties to India and Japan through initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), which the Indian Ministry of External Affairs projects could facilitate $20 billion in trade by 2030.
Greece’s economic recovery has bolstered its agency in navigating global powers. The Athens Stock Exchange’s 12% growth in 2023, as reported by the Hellenic Statistical Authority, and Greece’s investment-grade rating from Fitch in 2023 have attracted diverse investors. The Greek government’s digitalization efforts, including a portal for business registration, have streamlined FDI processes, as noted in a 2024 OECD report. However, bureaucratic inefficiencies and a slow judicial system, as highlighted by the U.S. Department of State, continue to pose challenges. Greece’s FDI screening mechanism, while compliant with EU regulations, is designed to minimize disruptions, reflecting Athens’ pragmatic approach to balancing security and economic openness.
The EU’s tariffs on Chinese EVs, implemented in October 2024, have sparked debates within Greece’s business community. The Hellenic Federation of Enterprises warned that these tariffs could increase consumer prices by 10%, impacting Greece’s green transition. Conversely, the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association reported that the tariffs protect 15,000 jobs in the EU’s automotive sector. Greece’s abstention in the vote reflects its effort to avoid alienating China while supporting EU cohesion. The EU’s broader trade strategy, as outlined in a July 2025 European Commission report, aims to reduce the trade deficit with China, which reached €305.8 billion in 2024, through reciprocity and WTO-compliant measures.
Greece’s shipping industry, a global leader, faces unique challenges in the context of Sino-American competition. The International Maritime Organization estimates that Greek-owned vessels carry 15% of global cargo, with significant exposure to Indo-Pacific trade routes. The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), set to expand in 2026, could increase costs for Greek shippers reliant on Chinese steel, as noted in a 2025 Chatham House report. Greece’s advocacy for green shipping, highlighted at the 2024 Our Ocean Conference, aligns with EIB priorities but requires substantial investment, estimated at €50 billion by 2030 by the Greek Ministry of Maritime Affairs.
Greece’s strategic pivot in 2025 reflects a nuanced approach to navigating U.S. alignment, Chinese engagement, and EU integration. The deepening of U.S.-Greece ties, driven by defense and economic cooperation, contrasts with a cautious approach to China, constrained by EU policies and domestic priorities. Greece’s role in the UNSC, its shipping industry’s global influence, and its economic recovery provide leverage, but challenges remain in balancing competing powers and addressing regional tensions. As global geopolitical dynamics evolve, Greece’s ability to maintain this delicate balance will shape its role in the EU and beyond.
Greece’s Strategic Pivot in 2025: Balancing U.S. Alignment, Chinese Engagement, and European Integration Amid Global Geopolitical Shifts
In the evolving landscape of global geopolitics, Greece occupies a pivotal position at the intersection of Western alliances, Chinese economic ambitions, and European Union (EU) integration. A decade ago, Greece was perceived by some as China’s potential “Trojan horse” within the EU, largely due to significant Chinese investments in strategic infrastructure, notably the Piraeus Port. By 2025, however, Greece’s foreign policy has undergone a marked shift, prioritizing deepened ties with the United States while maintaining a cautious, pragmatic engagement with China. This recalibration reflects a complex interplay of geopolitical, economic, and security considerations, shaped by Greece’s role as a NATO member, its economic recovery, and its strategic positioning within the EU. The dynamics of Sino-American competition, the EU’s evolving economic security framework, and Greece’s domestic priorities—such as its shipping industry and energy diversification—further complicate this balancing act. This article examines Greece’s strategic navigation of these relationships, focusing on its alignment with the U.S., its measured approach to Chinese investment, and its integration into EU policies, including foreign direct investment (FDI) screening mechanisms, the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) strategic priorities, and the EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Greece’s role as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2025-26, alongside the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and shifting U.S. policies under the second Trump administration, adds further layers of complexity to Athens’ foreign policy calculus.
Greece’s alignment with the United States has solidified over the past decade, driven by shared security interests and economic cooperation. The U.S.-Greece Strategic Dialogue, initiated in 2018, has become a cornerstone of bilateral relations, with annual ministerial-level meetings addressing defense, energy, and trade. The 2019 and 2021 updates to the Mutual Defence Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) expanded U.S. military access to Greek facilities, including the deep-water port at Souda Bay on Crete and the port of Alexandroupolis in northern Greece, which has emerged as a critical hub for NATO’s eastern flank since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. According to the U.S. Department of State, these updates have facilitated the stationing of U.S. forces and equipment, enhancing NATO’s operational capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece’s defense modernization further underscores this partnership, with significant procurements of U.S. military hardware. In 2023, the Greek Ministry of Defense reported contracts for F-16V fighter upgrades, MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, and a modernization package for S-70B Aegean Hawk helicopters, valued at over $2 billion. The Hellenic Air Force’s planned acquisition of F-35 jets, with deliveries expected by 2028, and Switchblade unmanned aerial vehicles further signal Greece’s commitment to interoperability with U.S. forces. These investments align with Greece’s 10-year defense procurement plan, which the Hellenic Ministry of Defense estimates will cost €10 billion by 2030.
Economic ties with the U.S. have also deepened. In 2022, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) provided a $125 million loan to ONEX Elefsis Shipyards, marking a significant investment in Greece’s maritime infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Commerce reported that U.S. FDI in Greece reached €5 billion in 2022, with major corporations such as Pfizer, Google, Microsoft, and Amazon establishing research and development facilities and data centers. Greek FDI in the U.S. was slightly higher at €5.3 billion, reflecting a balanced economic relationship. Trade data from the Hellenic Statistical Authority indicates that in 2023, Greece exported $4.2 billion in goods to the U.S., primarily in agricultural products and chemicals, while importing $1.8 billion, resulting in a trade surplus. The import of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the U.S. has grown steadily since 2022, with the International Energy Agency (IEA) noting that U.S. LNG accounted for 15% of Greece’s total gas imports in 2024, up from 10% in 2022. The operationalization of the Alexandroupolis floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) in October 2024, as reported by the Greek Ministry of Environment and Energy, has bolstered regional energy security by reducing dependence on Russian gas, aligning with U.S. and EU objectives.
In contrast, Greece’s economic relationship with China remains significant but increasingly cautious. China is Greece’s second-largest trading partner for goods, with bilateral trade reaching €732 billion in 2024, according to the European Commission. However, Greece’s trade deficit with China is substantial, with imports of €519 billion far outweighing exports of €213.3 billion. This imbalance, driven by Greece’s reliance on Chinese solar panels, electric vehicles (EVs), and electronic equipment, has prompted concerns in Athens. Chinese FDI in Greece, while notable, is concentrated in two major projects: the Piraeus Port Authority, where COSCO Shipping holds a 67% stake following a 2021 acquisition of an additional 16%, and a 20% stake by the State Grid Corporation of China in Ariadne Interconnection, acquired in November 2024. The Greek Ministry of Economy reported that Chinese FDI stock in Greece stood at $2.2 billion in 2022, significantly lower than U.S. investment. Greece’s participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), formalized in 2018, has not yielded additional projects beyond Piraeus, reflecting a cooling enthusiasm for Chinese investment. The Greek government’s decision to downgrade its representation at the 2023 Belt and Road Forum to ministerial level, as noted by the German Marshall Fund, underscores this shift.
Greece’s cautious approach to China is shaped by both domestic and EU-level considerations. The EU’s 2019 strategic outlook, reaffirmed in 2023 by the European Council, frames China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival. This triadic approach has influenced Greece’s policies, particularly in light of the EU’s strengthened FDI screening mechanisms under Regulation 2019/452. Greece legislated its own FDI screening framework in May 2025, as reported by the Greek Ministry of Economy, aligning with EU requirements but adopting a narrow interpretation to minimize restrictions. This reflects Athens’ desire to maintain economic openness while addressing security concerns, particularly regarding Chinese investments in strategic sectors. The European Commission’s imposition of countervailing duties on Chinese EVs in October 2024, ranging from 17% to 35.3%, was supported by Greece’s abstention in the vote, a strategic move to avoid direct confrontation with Beijing while aligning with EU policy. The Bruegel think tank notes that Greece’s abstention, alongside 11 other member states, ensured the duties’ passage while signaling diplomatic restraint.
The EU’s broader economic security strategy, outlined in the European Commission’s January 2024 package, emphasizes de-risking from China through diversification and enhanced trade defenses. Greece’s economic recovery, with GDP growth of 2.3% in 2024 according to the Hellenic Statistical Authority, has reduced its reliance on Chinese capital compared to the post-2008 crisis era. The Greek government’s focus on attracting high-quality investments, as highlighted in a 2024 U.S. Department of State report, has prioritized U.S. and European partners. For instance, Greece’s “I Move Electrically” program, active since 2023, provides subsidies for EV purchases but has not favored Chinese manufacturers, reflecting alignment with EU efforts to protect domestic industries. The Greek Ministry of Environment and Energy reported that 12,000 EVs were registered in Greece in 2024, with European brands dominating the market.
Greece’s strategic positioning within the EU also intersects with the bloc’s evolving Indo-Pacific strategy, which seeks to counterbalance China’s regional influence. The EU’s 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy, as detailed by the European External Action Service (EEAS), emphasizes economic resilience, maritime security, and partnerships with ASEAN countries. Greece, while not a formal participant in this strategy due to its focus on regional priorities, indirectly contributes through its shipping industry, which accounts for 61% of the EU-owned merchant fleet, according to the European Community Shipowners’ Associations. The Greek shipping sector, valued at €150 billion annually, is a critical component of global trade routes, including those in the Indo-Pacific. However, Greece’s absence of a dedicated Indo-Pacific strategy, as noted by the Robert Schuman Foundation, stems from its preoccupation with Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean, where tensions over maritime boundaries persist.
The Russia-Ukraine war has further shaped Greece’s geopolitical stance. Athens has been a staunch supporter of Kyiv, providing humanitarian aid and military equipment, including BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, as reported by the Hellenic Ministry of Defense in 2023. The Greek government’s commitment to international law is partly driven by the displacement of the Greek diaspora in Ukraine, estimated at 90,000 by the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs. China’s tacit support for Russia, including exports of dual-use goods, has raised concerns in the EU, as highlighted in a September 2024 EEAS statement. Greece, however, has remained silent on this issue, likely to avoid antagonizing Beijing. The second Trump administration’s shift toward a negotiated settlement in Ukraine, as reported by the Council on Foreign Relations in April 2025, has introduced uncertainty in Athens, given Greece’s alignment with U.S.-led NATO policies.
Greece’s role as a non-permanent UNSC member in 2025-26 places it in a delicate position, navigating the competing interests of the U.S., China, and Russia. The UNSC’s agenda, including discussions on Ukraine and Indo-Pacific security, requires Greece to balance its NATO commitments with diplomatic engagement with Beijing. The Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs has emphasized Athens’ commitment to the UN Charter’s principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, aligning with U.S. and EU positions. However, Greece’s economic ties with China necessitate a pragmatic approach, as evidenced by Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ November 2023 visit to Beijing, where he advocated for increased Greek exports to address the trade deficit, according to the Greek Ministry of Economy.
The EIB’s strategic priorities, updated in 2024 to include defense and security, align with Greece’s advocacy for enhanced European defense capabilities. The EIB’s €450 billion investment plan for 2024-2029, as outlined in its Strategic Roadmap, prioritizes green transition, digitalization, and strategic autonomy. Greece has benefited from EIB financing for renewable energy projects, with €1.2 billion allocated in 2024 for solar and wind infrastructure, according to the EIB’s annual report. These investments support Greece’s phase-out of oil boilers by 2025, as mandated by the Greek Ministry of Environment and Energy, and align with the EU’s climate goals. However, Greece’s limited engagement with the EIB’s defense initiatives reflects its reliance on U.S. military support and its focus on regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Sino-American competition presents both opportunities and challenges for Greece. The U.S. Department of Defense’s inclusion of COSCO on a sanctions list in 2024, as reported by the Council on Foreign Relations, has raised concerns in Athens due to COSCO’s role in Piraeus. Greek shipping companies, which operate 20% of global tonnage, face additional pressures from U.S. tariffs on China-built ships, as noted in a 2024 European Community Shipowners’ Associations report. These tariffs, set at 25% under the Trump administration’s April 2025 “Liberation Day” policy, threaten the competitiveness of Greek firms, which rely on Chinese shipyards for cost-effective construction. Greece’s hiring of a Republican-affiliated lobbying firm in 2025, as reported by the German Marshall Fund, reflects efforts to navigate these tensions and maintain access to U.S. decision-makers.
China’s soft power initiatives in Greece, including five Confucius Institutes and academic exchanges, aim to cultivate a favorable image, as detailed in a 2023 report by the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy. However, Greece’s response has been tempered by U.S. counter-efforts, such as the establishment of a Columbia University Global Centre in Athens in 2023. The Greek government’s rejection of a Chinese proposal for an EV bus assembly plant in October 2023, as noted by the Atlantic Council, underscores Athens’ sensitivity to U.S. concerns about Chinese influence in strategic sectors. This decision reflects Greece’s broader strategy of diversification, with strengthened ties to India and Japan through initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), which the Indian Ministry of External Affairs projects could facilitate $20 billion in trade by 2030.
Greece’s economic recovery has bolstered its agency in navigating global powers. The Athens Stock Exchange’s 12% growth in 2023, as reported by the Hellenic Statistical Authority, and Greece’s investment-grade rating from Fitch in 2023 have attracted diverse investors. The Greek government’s digitalization efforts, including a portal for business registration, have streamlined FDI processes, as noted in a 2024 OECD report. However, bureaucratic inefficiencies and a slow judicial system, as highlighted by the U.S. Department of State, continue to pose challenges. Greece’s FDI screening mechanism, while compliant with EU regulations, is designed to minimize disruptions, reflecting Athens’ pragmatic approach to balancing security and economic openness.
The EU’s tariffs on Chinese EVs, implemented in October 2024, have sparked debates within Greece’s business community. The Hellenic Federation of Enterprises warned that these tariffs could increase consumer prices by 10%, impacting Greece’s green transition. Conversely, the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association reported that the tariffs protect 15,000 jobs in the EU’s automotive sector. Greece’s abstention in the vote reflects its effort to avoid alienating China while supporting EU cohesion. The EU’s broader trade strategy, as outlined in a July 2025 European Commission report, aims to reduce the trade deficit with China, which reached €305.8 billion in 2024, through reciprocity and WTO-compliant measures.
Greece’s shipping industry, a global leader, faces unique challenges in the context of Sino-American competition. The International Maritime Organization estimates that Greek-owned vessels carry 15% of global cargo, with significant exposure to Indo-Pacific trade routes. The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), set to expand in 2026, could increase costs for Greek shippers reliant on Chinese steel, as noted in a 2025 Chatham House report. Greece’s advocacy for green shipping, highlighted at the 2024 Our Ocean Conference, aligns with EIB priorities but requires substantial investment, estimated at €50 billion by 2030 by the Greek Ministry of Maritime Affairs.
In conclusion, Greece’s strategic pivot in 2025 reflects a nuanced approach to navigating U.S. alignment, Chinese engagement, and EU integration. The deepening of U.S.-Greece ties, driven by defense and economic cooperation, contrasts with a cautious approach to China, constrained by EU policies and domestic priorities. Greece’s role in the UNSC, its shipping industry’s global influence, and its economic recovery provide leverage, but challenges remain in balancing competing powers and addressing regional tensions. As global geopolitical dynamics evolve, Greece’s ability to maintain this delicate balance will shape its role in the EU and beyond.
| Category | Subcategory | Details | Data Source | Year |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| U.S.-Greece Relations | Strategic Dialogue | The U.S.-Greece Strategic Dialogue, initiated in 2018, serves as a cornerstone of bilateral relations, facilitating annual ministerial-level discussions on defense, energy, and trade to enhance cooperation and align strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. | U.S. Department of State | 2018 |
| Mutual Defence Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) | The MDCA, originally signed in 1990, was updated in 2019 and 2021 to expand U.S. military access to Greek facilities, including Souda Bay on Crete and the port of Alexandroupolis, which has become a critical hub for NATO’s eastern flank since 2022, supporting the stationing of U.S. forces and equipment. | U.S. Department of State | 2019, 2021 | |
| Defense Procurement | Greece’s defense modernization includes contracts valued at over $2 billion for F-16V fighter upgrades, MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, and S-70B Aegean Hawk helicopter modernization. The Hellenic Air Force plans to acquire F-35 jets by 2028 and Switchblade unmanned aerial vehicles, aligning with a €10 billion 10-year defense procurement plan. | Greek Ministry of Defense | 2023, 2030 | |
| U.S. FDI in Greece | In 2022, U.S. foreign direct investment in Greece reached €5 billion, with major investments from corporations such as Pfizer, Google, Microsoft, and Amazon in research and development facilities and data centers, strengthening Greece’s high-tech sector. | U.S. Department of Commerce | 2022 | |
| Greek FDI in the U.S. | Greek foreign direct investment in the U.S. amounted to €5.3 billion in 2022, reflecting a balanced economic relationship driven by mutual investments in strategic sectors. | U.S. Department of Commerce | 2022 | |
| Trade Balance | In 2023, Greece exported $4.2 billion in goods to the U.S., primarily agricultural products and chemicals, while importing $1.8 billion, resulting in a trade surplus. This surplus underscores Greece’s competitive export market in the U.S. | Hellenic Statistical Authority | 2023 | |
| LNG Imports | U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports to Greece accounted for 15% of total gas imports in 2024, up from 10% in 2022, contributing to energy diversification and reducing reliance on Russian gas. | International Energy Agency | 2024 | |
| Alexandroupolis FSRU | The floating storage and regasification unit (FSRU) in Alexandroupolis became operational in October 2024, enhancing energy security in Central and Southeast Europe by facilitating LNG imports and reducing dependence on Russian gas supplies. | Greek Ministry of Environment and Energy | 2024 | |
| ONEX Shipyard Investment | In 2022, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation provided a $125 million loan to ONEX Elefsis Shipyards, supporting the revitalization of Greece’s maritime infrastructure and enhancing its shipbuilding capacity. | U.S. International Development Finance Corporation | 2022 | |
| U.S. Tariffs Impact | U.S. tariffs on China-built ships, introduced in April 2025 at a 25% rate under the “Liberation Day” policy, impact 18% of Greece’s fleet constructed in Chinese shipyards, posing challenges to the competitiveness of Greek shipping companies. | U.S. Trade Representative | 2025 | |
| COSCO Sanctions | The U.S. Department of Defense included COSCO Shipping on a sanctions list in 2024 due to alleged ties to the People’s Liberation Army, raising concerns in Greece about the impact on COSCO’s 67% stake in the Piraeus Port Authority. | Council on Foreign Relations | 2024 | |
| Lobbying Efforts | In 2025, Greece engaged a Republican-affiliated lobbying firm to navigate tensions arising from U.S. sanctions and tariffs, ensuring continued access to U.S. decision-makers and maintaining strong bilateral relations. | German Marshall Fund | 2025 | |
| Columbia University Global Centre | In 2023, Columbia University established a Global Centre in Athens, fostering academic cooperation and countering China’s soft power initiatives, such as the five Confucius Institutes in Greece. | Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy | 2023 | |
| UNSC Role | As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2025-26, Greece navigates competing U.S., Chinese, and Russian interests, emphasizing sovereignty and territorial integrity in line with the UN Charter. | Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 2025-2026 | |
| China-Greece Relations | Trade Volume | In 2024, bilateral trade between Greece and China reached €732 billion, with Greece importing €519 billion in goods, primarily solar panels, electric vehicles, and electronics, and exporting €213.3 billion, resulting in a significant trade deficit. | European Commission | 2024 |
| Chinese FDI in Greece | Chinese foreign direct investment in Greece totaled $2.2 billion in 2022, concentrated in the Piraeus Port Authority (67% stake by COSCO Shipping) and a 20% stake by the State Grid Corporation of China in Ariadne Interconnection, acquired in November 2024. | Greek Ministry of Economy | 2022, 2024 | |
| Piraeus Port Stake | In 2021, COSCO Shipping increased its stake in the Piraeus Port Authority to 67% through an additional 16% acquisition, making Piraeus a key hub in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, though no further BRI projects have materialized in Greece. | Greek Ministry of Economy | 2021 | |
| Belt and Road Initiative | Greece joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2018, but its participation has been limited to the Piraeus project, with downgraded representation at the 2023 Belt and Road Forum to ministerial level, signaling reduced enthusiasm. | German Marshall Fund | 2018, 2023 | |
| Trade Deficit Concerns | During Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ November 2023 visit to Beijing, increasing Greek exports to China was a key focus to address the €305.7 billion trade deficit, driven by heavy reliance on Chinese equipment for Greece’s green and digital transitions. | Greek Ministry of Economy | 2023 | |
| Chinese Soft Power | China operates five Confucius Institutes in Greece and fosters academic exchanges, aiming to build a favorable image, though Greece’s response is tempered by U.S. counter-initiatives and EU security concerns. | Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy | 2023 | |
| EV Assembly Plant Proposal | In October 2023, Greece rejected a Chinese proposal to host an electric vehicle bus assembly plant, citing potential U.S. objections and aligning with EU economic security strategies to reduce reliance on Chinese investments. | Atlantic Council | 2023 | |
| Diplomatic Engagements | High-level visits, including PRC top diplomat Wang Yi in 2021 and Zhao Leji in 2024, emphasized diplomatic niceties, with Greece urging COSCO to fulfill contractual obligations for Piraeus infrastructure improvements. | Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 2021, 2024 | |
| Crime Cooperation Agreement | In December 2024, Greece and China signed a cooperation agreement on combating organized crime, financial crimes, drug trafficking, and managing illegal migration, though an earlier extradition treaty from 2019 remains unratified. | Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 2024 | |
| EU-China Trade Strategy | The EU’s 2025 trade strategy aims to reduce the €305.8 billion trade deficit with China through reciprocity and WTO-compliant measures, with Greece supporting this approach while maintaining diplomatic relations with Beijing. | European Commission | 2025 | |
| EU Integration and Policies | EU-China Strategic Outlook | The EU’s 2019 strategic outlook, reaffirmed in 2023, frames China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival, influencing Greece’s cautious approach to Chinese investments and trade relations. | European Council | 2019, 2023 |
| FDI Screening Mechanism | Greece implemented an FDI screening mechanism in May 2025, aligning with EU Regulation 2019/452 but adopting a narrow interpretation to minimize restrictions, balancing economic openness with security concerns. | Greek Ministry of Economy | 2025 | |
| EU EV Tariffs | In October 2024, the EU imposed countervailing duties on Chinese electric vehicles ranging from 17% to 35.3%, with Greece abstaining in the vote to avoid direct confrontation with Beijing while supporting EU cohesion. | Bruegel | 2024 | |
| Economic Security Strategy | The European Commission’s January 2024 economic security package emphasizes de-risking from China through diversification and trade defenses, influencing Greece’s preference for U.S. and European investments. | European Commission | 2024 | |
| GDP Growth | Greece’s GDP grew by 2.3% in 2024, reducing reliance on Chinese capital and enabling a focus on high-quality investments from the U.S. and EU, supported by Recovery and Resilience Funds. | Hellenic Statistical Authority | 2024 | |
| EV Market | In 2024, Greece registered 12,000 electric vehicles, with European brands dominating due to subsidies under the “I Move Electrically” program, aligning with EU efforts to protect domestic industries. | Greek Ministry of Environment and Energy | 2024 | |
| Indo-Pacific Strategy | The EU’s 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy emphasizes economic resilience and maritime security, with Greece contributing indirectly through its shipping industry, though its focus remains on regional priorities like Turkey. | European External Action Service | 2021 | |
| EIB Strategic Priorities | The European Investment Bank’s 2024-2029 €450 billion investment plan prioritizes green transition, digitalization, and defense, with Greece receiving €1.2 billion in 2024 for renewable energy projects. | European Investment Bank | 2024 | |
| Oil Boiler Phase-Out | Greece mandated the phase-out of oil boilers by 2025, supported by EIB-financed renewable energy projects, aligning with the EU’s climate goals and reducing fossil fuel dependence. | Greek Ministry of Environment and Energy | 2025 | |
| Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism | The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, set to expand in 2026, may increase costs for Greek shippers reliant on Chinese steel, impacting the shipping industry’s €150 billion annual value. | Chatham House | 2026 | |
| Regional and Global Context | Russia-Ukraine War | Greece has supported Ukraine with humanitarian aid and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles since 2023, driven by the displacement of the 90,000-strong Greek diaspora in Ukraine and commitment to international law. | Hellenic Ministry of Defense, Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 2023 |
| China’s Russia Support | China’s exports of dual-use goods to Russia, noted in a September 2024 EEAS statement, have raised EU concerns, but Greece remains silent to avoid antagonizing Beijing. | European External Action Service | 2024 | |
| Trump Administration Policy | The second Trump administration’s shift toward a negotiated settlement in Ukraine, reported in April 2025, introduces uncertainty for Greece, given its alignment with U.S.-led NATO policies. | Council on Foreign Relations | 2025 | |
| Diversification Strategy | Greece pursues economic diversification through ties with India and Japan, with the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) projected to facilitate $20 billion in trade by 2030, as an alternative to China’s BRI. | Indian Ministry of External Affairs | 2030 | |
| Shipping Industry Scale | Greece’s shipping industry, accounting for 61% of the EU-owned merchant fleet and 20% of global tonnage, operates 5,520 vessels valued at €150 billion, carrying 15% of global cargo. | European Community Shipowners’ Associations, International Maritime Organization | 2024 | |
| Green Shipping Investment | Greece’s advocacy for green shipping, highlighted at the 2024 Our Ocean Conference, requires €50 billion by 2030 to meet decarbonization goals, aligning with EU and IMO sustainability targets. | Greek Ministry of Maritime Affairs | 2030 | |
| Economic Recovery and Infrastructure | Athens Stock Exchange | The Athens Stock Exchange grew by 12% in 2023, reflecting economic recovery and attracting diverse investors, supported by Greece’s investment-grade rating from Fitch in 2023. | Hellenic Statistical Authority, Fitch | 2023 |
| Digitalization Efforts | Greece’s digitalization initiatives, including a business registration portal, have streamlined FDI processes, though bureaucratic inefficiencies and a slow judicial system remain challenges. | OECD, U.S. Department of State | 2024 | |
| EV Tariffs Impact | The Hellenic Federation of Enterprises warned that EU tariffs on Chinese EVs could increase consumer prices by 10%, while the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association noted that these tariffs protect 15,000 EU automotive jobs. | Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association | 2024 | |
| Turkey Tensions | Greece’s absence of a dedicated Indo-Pacific strategy is attributed to its focus on tensions with Turkey over maritime boundaries, prioritizing regional stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. | Robert Schuman Foundation | 2025 |
