ABSTRACT

UNITAS 2025 (September 15–October 6, 2025) fielded a geographically distributed series of events along the United States East Coast—shore phases at Naval Station Mayport, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Naval Station Norfolk, and Naval Air Station Oceana, Dam Neck Annex, with at-sea operations in the Atlantic—to exercise combined maritime and littoral missions with partner nations and to advance hybrid fleet practices that pair unmanned and robotic systems with manned platforms, according to official releases from U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/U.S. 4th Fleet (UNITAS 2025 Final Planning Conference, June 2025; UNITAS 2025 Kicks Off, September 15, 2025). The closing took place aboard USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) at Norfolk, Virginia on October 6, 2025, as documented by DVIDS imagery and captions that record Rear Adm. Carlos Sardiello speaking at the ceremony and note participation by 26 partner nations (UNITAS 2025 Closing Ceremony, Oct. 6, 2025; SOUTHCOM Video, Oct. 6, 2025). Across these venues, hybrid force experimentation intersected with the Department of the Navy’s unmanned strategy pillars—manned-unmanned teaming, resilient command-and-control (C2), rigorous test and evaluation, responsible AI, and compliance with navigational law and environmental constraints—codified in the Department of the Navy Unmanned Campaign Framework (March 2021) and subsequent operational guidance (Unmanned Campaign Framework (Mar. 15, 2021); Navy–Marine Corps Unmanned Campaign Plan (Mar. 16, 2021)). The Chief of Naval Operations’ Navigation Plan 2024 situates autonomy as a capacity multiplier for distributed maritime operations and directs accelerated integration in carrier air wings, surface, and undersea forces (CNO Navigation Plan 2024 (Jan. 2024)), while Surface Warfare: The Competitive Edge 2.0 (January 8, 2025) converts that guidance into fleet-level implementation priorities for readiness, training, and material alignment (Competitive Edge 2.0 (Jan. 8, 2025)).

A primary hybrid-fleet integration challenge documented in official Navy material is collision-risk management and maritime deconfliction for unmanned surface and undersea vessels operating near manned ships and aircraft. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations identifies the 1972 COLREGS as the cornerstone of collision avoidance at sea and anchors obligations for naval platforms in mixed traffic scenarios, which directly informs unmanned operations that must behave predictably to manned navigators (NWP 1-14M (Mar. 2022)). Navy environmental planning documents for Atlantic training and testing detail how unmanned surface vessel (USV) and extra-large unmanned undersea vehicle (XLUUV) activities incorporate collision-avoidance systems and procedural controls, explicitly referencing COLREGS compliance during test and training evolutions (XLUUV/USV Draft EA/OEA (July 2024); AFTT Draft EIS Vol. II (2024–2025)). Earlier Navy technical communications and experimentation campaigns—such as the Unmanned Battle Problem 21 and autonomy programs documented by ONR, NAVSEA PMS 406, and U.S. 3rd Fleet—link manned-unmanned teaming to explicit objectives: demonstrable COLREGS compliance, interoperable control, and distributed sensing that expands maritime domain awareness without increasing manned risk (U.S. 3rd Fleet: Unmanned Battle Problem 21 (Apr. 19, 2021); NAVSEA PMS 406, SNA 2022 Brief (Jan. 12, 2022); NAVSEA PMS 406, SAS 2022 Brief (Apr. 5, 2022); ONR: Navy Seeks to Unleash the Potential of Unmanned Systems (June 17, 2021)). In the U.S. 5th Fleet, Task Force 59’s operationalization of manned-unmanned teaming since 2021—including the establishment of Task Group 59.1 and continuous mixed-formation experimentation—provides an operational laboratory whose practices influence broader fleet integration and inform exercises such as UNITAS (Navy.mil TG 59.1 (Jan. 16, 2024); CUSNC TF-59 News (Aug. 21, 2025)).

Command-and-control and data architecture requirements for unmanned systems scaled across a multinational exercise are shaped by DoD policy and emerging cybersecurity doctrine. DoD Directive 3000.09 (January 25, 2023) imposes rigorous verification and validation, supervision, and lawful use standards on autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, requiring developmental and operational testing conditions that reflect adversary action and ensuring “appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force” (DoDD 3000.09 (Jan. 25, 2023); DoD Release on 3000.09 Update (Jan. 25, 2023)). The DoD Artificial Intelligence Cybersecurity Risk Management Tailoring Guide (August 7, 2025) adds contemporary controls for AI pipelines, emphasizing secure model supply chains, telemetry, and red-team validation that are directly applicable when autonomous perception and navigation are subjected to congested electromagnetic and physical environments typical of large exercises (AI Cybersecurity RMT Guide (Aug. 7, 2025)). In the Department of the Navy innovation stack, the Intelligent Autonomous Systems strategy and Project Overmatch-related efforts promote network transport resilience and data-to-decision flow that enable the “speed of decision,” an imperative echoed across official Navy strategy documents from 2021–2025 (ONR IAS Strategy (Sept. 15, 2021); CNO Navigation Plan 2024 (Jan. 2024); Competitive Edge 2.0 (Jan. 8, 2025)).

UNITAS 2025’s official program materials identify a diverse mission set—amphibious landings, maritime security, and a live-fire SINKEX—that stress test C2, safety, and interoperability with multiple partners and agencies (4th Fleet Final Planning Conference (June 2025)). The scale and distribution of events across Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia created complex air-sea-land deconfliction problems, including airspace control near carrier and shore facilities, maritime traffic deconfliction for coalition formations, and range safety for live-fire evolutions. Navy environmental and training documents outline how range safety overlays, area clearances, and acoustic management for sonar and communications are synchronized with environmental compliance and operational safety, providing a template for unmanned traffic management within naval ranges (AFTT Draft EIS Vol. II (2024–2025); XLUUV/USV Draft EA/OEA (July 2024)). These controls are consistent with long-standing NATOPS standardization for flight safety in naval aviation, a body of doctrine that, while oriented toward manned operations, establishes hazard-management norms for mixed activities near airfields and carriers that are increasingly relevant to unmanned aircraft and deck-handling integration (NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions (Sept. 1, 2023)).

Carrier-centric hybrid operations receive special emphasis in Navy technical publications and aviation periodicals. Official Naval Aviation News issues and Navy briefs associate the MQ-25 program and related unmanned carrier integration activities with future manned-unmanned teaming inside the carrier air wing (CVW), stressing impacts on tanker offload, deck flow, and sortie generation that are directly applicable when a full multinational force participates around a carrier strike group during an exercise (Naval Aviation News, Summer 2021). Exercise documentation for UNITAS 2025 confirms USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) led allied and partner ships in a group sail during the period and conducted qualification events that interleaved with coalition activities (DVIDS Truman Unit Page (Sept. 26, 2025)). The combination of carrier flight operations, amphibious inserts, and distributed maritime fires with partner formations imposes measurable demands on spectrum management, link budget planning, and emissions control; Navy strategy documents frame these demands as drivers for resilient networks, automated routing, and AI-assisted sensor triage to exploit unmanned platform persistence while preserving manned platform survivability (CNO Navigation Plan 2024 (Jan. 2024); Competitive Edge 2.0 (Jan. 8, 2025)).

The multinational structure of UNITAS, with more than 20 planning-conference participants and 25–26 nations identified in official releases between February–October 2025, exposes integration seams at the standards and governance layers—message formats, link encryption modes, authority to operate, and safety case acceptance—requiring pre-exercise alignment and phased interoperability objectives. The UNITAS 2025 Initial Planning Conference materials and follow-on releases recorded by U.S. 4th Fleet indicate the deliberate sequencing of these steps, including final planning that locked the September 15–October 6, 2025 window and the East Coast basing plan (Initial Planning Conference (Feb. 14, 2025); Final Planning Conference (June 2025); Kicks Off (Sept. 15, 2025); To Be Held Across Multiple Locations (Aug. 13, 2025)). Within this governance frame, DoD policy on autonomy and responsible AI constrains system behavior and test regimens, while NEPA processes constrain where and how systems can be evaluated at sea and in littorals in order to protect marine life and other environmental resources, a dual compliance burden that any hybrid fleet must treat as a non-negotiable design parameter (DoDD 3000.09 (Jan. 25, 2023); AFTT Draft EIS (2024–2025); XLUUV/USV Draft EA/OEA (July 2024)).

Data-centricity emerges as the through-line in official Navy materials: unmanned systems enlarge the maritime sensor aperture and persistence, but operational utility depends on secure ingest, cross-platform data fusion, and human-over-the-loop supervision. Navy and ONR releases emphasize that autonomy complements, rather than replaces, manned assets and must elevate commanders’ situational awareness without increasing cognitive load, a design ethic echoed in DoD governance that requires demonstrable human judgment and robust V&V for AI-enabled behaviors (ONR: Unleash Unmanned Potential (June 17, 2021); DoDD 3000.09 (Jan. 25, 2023)). UNITAS 2025’s distributed design and the presence of a carrier strike group, amphibs, and coalition ships strengthened the case for standardized control interfaces and shared situational pictures. Official 4th Fleet releases and DVIDS records of the closing aboard CVN 75 supply the confirmed temporal and operational frame; the broader doctrine and policy corpus provides the tested set of constraints and enablers that govern large-scale hybrid fleet execution in practice (UNITAS 2025 Closing Ceremony, Oct. 6, 2025; Kicks Off (Sept. 15, 2025)).

Taken together, the verified official materials show that UNITAS 25 operationalized three mutually reinforcing lessons for hybrid fleets. First, legal-safety compliance and environmental stewardship—COLREGS, NATOPS, NEPA—must be engineered into autonomy stacks and range control from the outset; these are not administrative afterthoughts but operational design constraints evidenced across Navy publications and environmental documents in 2024–2025. Second, manned-unmanned teaming scales only with assured C2 and cyber-hardened AI pipelines; the August 7, 2025 DoD tailoring guide codifies how to implement those controls for current systems and exercises. Third, carrier-centric and amphibious scenarios intensify demands on deck flow, airspace, emissions control, and spectrum deconfliction; the Navy’s carrier integration work and CVN 75’s leadership during UNITAS provide an empirically anchored context for those demands. Each of these lessons is traceable to official documents and exercise records cited above, and each is necessary to realize the Department of the Navy’s vision in the Unmanned Campaign Framework and Navigation Plan 2024 that a hybrid fleet can expand capacity, distribute risk, and increase operational tempo without compromising safety or lawful use of force (Unmanned Campaign Framework (Mar. 15, 2021); CNO Navigation Plan 2024 (Jan. 2024)).

Blue Ops Launch by Red Cat Holdings: Revolutionizing Maritime Defense with Ukrainian-Inspired USVs in 2025

CHAPTER INDEX

A Clear and Simple Summary

1. Policy, Law, and Environmental Constraints Shaping Autonomous Integration in UNITAS 25
2. Command, Control, and Cybersecurity for Multinational Manned-Unmanned Teams
3. Carrier-Centric Hybrid Operations: Deck Flow, Airspace, and Spectrum During CVN 75 Events
4. Maritime Safety and Deconfliction: COLREGS-Compliant Behaviors for USV and XLUUV Near Manned Platforms
5. Data Pipelines and Human-Machine Teaming: From Sensor Aperture to Speed of Decision
6. From Experiment to Enduring Practice: Translating UNITAS 25 Outcomes into Fleet-Wide Implementation

A Clear and Simple Summary

This chapter presents a clear, non-technical summary of what the previous chapters explained. It is intended for people without specialized backgrounds so they can understand the key ideas, real examples, and why it matters for society and policy.

What is a “hybrid fleet”?

A hybrid fleet is a naval force in which unmanned vessels, drones, and robotic systems operate side by side with traditional human-crewed ships, aircraft, and submarines. The goal is to combine strengths — like endurance, persistence, and lower cost of robots — with human judgment, flexibility, and command capabilities.

In UNITAS 2025, a large multinational maritime exercise hosted by the U.S. Navy from September 15 to October 6, 2025, many nations tested how unmanned systems can integrate with manned forces. Public reports confirm that BigBear.ai and partner SMX participated by providing AI orchestration and sensor fusion across unmanned platforms, helping in situational awareness and decision support. (BigBear.ai press release, September 23, 2025)

Key Challenges in Integrating Robots with Ships and Crews

  1. Command, Control, and Data Security
    • Systems must authenticate who is sending commands or telemetry. The U.S. Department of Defense has published a Zero Trust Strategy (Nov 22, 2022) that says nothing is trusted by default, even inside networks.
    • For artificial intelligence (AI) components, there are controls for cyber-security, provenance, and safe operation. The DoD’s AI Cybersecurity Risk Management Tailoring Guide (Aug 7, 2025) applies to autonomy systems deployed at sea.
    • In multinational events, partner navies must federate their data systems safely, so that unmanned assets from different nations can exchange information without exposing vulnerabilities.
  2. Carrier Decks, Airspace, and Spectrum
    • Aircraft carriers operate with tight timing of takeoffs, landings, aircraft movement, and deck handling. Introducing unmanned systems requires careful choreography, compatible with existing flight rules (e.g., CNAF M-3710.7).
    • Spectrum (radio frequencies) is a limited resource. Control links and video feeds from robots must not interfere with ship communications, radars, or other systems. The U.S. DoD’s Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy (Oct 29, 2020) governs how to plan in congested electromagnetic environments.
  3. Safety at Sea and Collision Avoidance
    • The maritime rules known as COLREGs (Collision Regulations, 1972) apply to all vessels, including robotic ones. These rules define who must yield, how to cross, overtake, or avoid collision.
    • But COLREGs were designed for human decisions, with flexibility built in. That makes it hard to write fully deterministic software. Research works (e.g., control barrier function methods, “Hybrid Collision Avoidance” systems) show how robots can comply with COLREGs rules in real time.
    • In risky or ambiguous situations, the autonomy system must fall back safely (e.g., loiter or pause) and allow human override.
  4. Sensor Fusion and Decision Support
    • Robots carry sensors (radar, optical cameras, infrared, LiDAR, etc.). To understand their environment, these data must be merged (or “fused”) into a unified picture.
    • In UNITAS 2025, BigBear.ai’s announcement states that their AI orchestration will connect unmanned systems into a Common Operating Picture (COP), enabling real-time awareness across manned and unmanned platforms.
    • The fusion process must also guard against malicious data or spoofing. Techniques like trust weighting, anomaly detection, and provenance tracking help ensure the system makes safe, reliable decisions.
  5. Organizational, Personnel, and Logistics Systems
    • Operating many robots requires new job roles, training pathways, maintenance chains, supply lines, and modular support systems.
    • The U.S. Navy has established a new Robotics Warfare Specialist (RW) rating for sailors who operate, maintain, and manage robotic and autonomous systems (announced via NAVADMIN 036/24, public fact sheet).
      (Fact sheet on RW rating, March 2024)
    • In exercises like UNITAS 2025, logistical support must anticipate spare parts, software updates, calibration, and repair for robotic platforms deployed across different ships and nations.

Real Examples That Illustrate These Ideas

  • UNITAS 2025 & BigBear.ai: The public press release from BigBear.ai confirms that AI orchestration and sensor fusion technologies will be integrated into unmanned and hybrid fleet operations during this exercise. This shows that unmanned systems are not theoretical—they are being fielded now in real naval exercises.
  • Robotics Warfare Specialist rating: The Navy’s public announcement establishes that human operators will be officially responsible for robotic systems. This institutionally anchors their accountability and expertise.
  • Collision avoidance research: The publicly available academic works on COLREGs compliance (hybrid methods, barrier functions) provide concrete ways for robots to navigate at sea while respecting safety rules.

Why This Matters to Society, Policy, and Security

  • Cost and Risk Reduction: Robots can perform missions—such as surveillance, mine detection, or supply runs—in dangerous zones without risking human lives. If properly integrated, they can relieve expensive platforms from repetitive or high-risk tasks.
  • Military Effectiveness: A fleet that combines human and robotic systems can cover more area, respond faster, and better adapt to threats. That may change maritime deterrence balances.
  • Accountability and Trust: When decisions are automated, it becomes critical to maintain human oversight, clear responsibility, and auditability (i.e., logs, test records). This ensures that mistakes or accidents are traceable and that users trust the systems.
  • International Norms and Cooperation: Because exercises like UNITAS involve many nations, success depends on shared standards, protocols, and mutual trust. Misalignment in data rules, safety standards, or cybersecurity could block cooperation or spark conflicts.
  • Civil Oversight and Risk Mitigation: Governments and citizens need to know when these systems operate, how safe they are, how decisions are made, and what safeguards exist against misuse, failures, or escalation.

Step-by-Step Simplified Picture

  1. Basics — A hybrid fleet mixes robots and human platforms.
  2. Core challenge — Robots must obey security, safety, and communications rules just like human ships.
  3. Integration needs — Systems for command, data security, spectrum use, collision avoidance, and sensor fusion must all work together and respect rules.
  4. Human in the loop — Even when robots act autonomously, humans must be able to intervene, override, or audit decisions.
  5. Institutional change — New workforce roles, training, logistics support, and organizational structures are needed to make robots useful in real operations.
  6. Public interest — These issues matter for defense budgets, international partnerships, oversight, and national safety.

Final Thought

What we have learned is that operating fleets with robots alongside crews is no longer a distant goal. It is happening now in exercises like UNITAS 2025. But making it work in real operations requires careful engineering, new institutions, and cooperative standards — not magic. If done with rigor, safety, accountability, and transparency, hybrid fleets can extend human reach. If done poorly, they risk accidents, miscommunication, or escalation. Understanding these trade-offs is essential for elected officials, the public, and leadership who decide whether and how nations should adopt these capabilities.

Saronic Technologies’ Marauder Keel-Laying in Franklin, Louisiana on August 22, 2025: Industrial Mobilization, MUSV Architecture and the U.S. Autonomous Shipbuilding Base

Policy, Law and Environmental Constraints Shaping Autonomous Integration in UNITAS 25

Compliance with autonomous weapon system governance within the United States defense establishment rests on DoD Directive 3000.09 dated January 25, 2023, which mandates rigorous verification and validation, cyber survivability, and “appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force,” requirements that apply to autonomous and semi-autonomous systems fielded in large, mixed formations such as UNITAS 25; the directive’s current text and responsibilities for the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office and operational test authorities are published by the U.S. Department of Defense in the officially updated PDF and announcement page (DoD Directive 3000.09, January 25, 2023, DoD release, January 25, 2023). The legal standard articulated there binds combatant command employment and certification pathways by requiring developmental and operational testing in “realistic operational conditions, including potential adversary action,” a test environment that a multination exercise across multiple ranges and host facilities—Naval Station Mayport, Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Naval Station Norfolk, Naval Air Station Oceana, Dam Neck Annex—directly approximates, as scheduled between September 15, 2025 and October 6, 2025 in official U.S. 4th Fleet materials (UNITAS 2025 Initial Planning Conference, February 14, 2025, Final Planning Conference, June 27, 2025, Kicks Off, September 15, 2025).

Maritime collision-avoidance law is the fixed reference for safe mixed operations: the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs), promulgated by the International Maritime Organization, structures surface-ship conduct and traffic separation, and its amendments have entered into force on January 1, 2024 and are scheduled for January 1, 2026, per the IMO status documentation and convention pages (IMO COLREG overview, Convention page, List of the Conventions and their amendments, status document noting 2024 and 2026 amendments). Naval legal doctrine incorporates these obligations; NWP 1-14M—the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations—codifies lawful navigation and risk-of-collision norms applicable to naval vessels operating in mixed traffic and thus to unmanned surface vessels that must exhibit predictable, COLREGS-compliant behavior around manned platforms (NWP 1-14M, March 2022). Where autonomous surface craft operate with low observable signatures near carrier or amphibious task groups, the navigational regime imposes specific duties for lookout, safe speed, traffic separation scheme compliance, and narrow-channel conduct; those duties must be internalized by autonomy stacks, as COLREGS Parts B–D detail steering, lights, and signals and apply irrespective of the platform’s control mode, according to the IMO convention text and explanatory pages (IMO COLREG overview, COLREG convention page).

Environmental and range-safety governance under U.S. law conditions where and how unmanned systems can be tested and trained during multinational evolutions. The Department of the Navy’s Atlantic Fleet Training and Testing (AFTT) Draft Supplemental EIS/OEIS, issued September 2024, defines activity footprints, acoustic exposure modeling, and mitigation measures for Atlantic ranges that overlap with UNITAS 25 operating areas, as shown in the public draft volumes and the AFTT portal (AFTT DEIS/OEIS portal, AFTT Draft Supplemental EIS/OEIS Volume I, September 2024, Navy–Coast Guard press release on Draft Supplemental EIS, September 20, 2024). For specific unmanned platform categories, the Testing and Training of XLUUV and USV Draft EA/OEA dated July 5, 2024 establishes facilities and procedures at Naval Base Ventura County, Port Hueneme and elsewhere for Extra-Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles and Unmanned Surface Vessels, detailing collision-avoidance systems, launch/recovery workflows, and mitigation protocols; these programmatic measures translate to Atlantic events when such classes deploy inside a hybrid fleet (XLUUV/USV Draft EA/OEA, July 2024, Navy NEPA news, July 5, 2024). These environmental documents align with NOAA Fisheries regulatory frameworks that govern military readiness activities under the Marine Mammal Protection Act and Endangered Species Act; the MMPA incidental take authorization pages, ESA Section 7 consultation requirements, and region-specific biological opinions for naval ranges demonstrate the dual federal compliance structure required for Atlantic operations, with updated entries through January 16, 2025 and May 9, 2025 for significant range actions (NOAA Fisheries, MMPA Military Readiness ITAs, NOAA Fisheries, ITA overview updated July 3, 2025, ESA consultations topic page, Greater Atlantic ESA Section 7 opinions index, NOAA repository, PMSR ESA BiOp 2022, NOAA repository, NWTT ESA BiOp 2020, Hawaii–Southern California Training and Testing ITA page updated January 16, 2025, AFTT ITA regulatory notice received May 9, 2025). The compliance consequence is operational: unmanned behaviors that generate acoustic emissions or maneuver unpredictably in biologically sensitive windows must be engineered with mode-switching, geo-fencing, and abort criteria synchronized to range control directives published in these NEPA and NOAA documents, or missions risk regulatory noncompliance.

Aviation safety doctrine frames airspace and deck integration. NATOPS general flight and operating instructions, issued under Commander, Naval Air Forces authority, standardize air operations across platforms, and current publicly accessible references include the CNAF M-3710.7 manual dated January 15, 2023 and legacy baseline material; these doctrinal baselines constrain unmanned aircraft interface on carrier decks and adjacent airspace during multinational events where sortie sequencing, taxi routes, and launch-recovery windows intersect with unmanned logistics or ISR aircraft (CNAF M-3710.7, January 15, 2023, NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions, CNAF M-3710.7 legacy baseline). While UNITAS 25 is maritime-centric, carrier-led evolutions anchored by USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) on October 6, 2025 required airspace control procedures compatible with allied participants and deconflicted with low-signature unmanned platforms operating near the carrier; the event timing and multinational composition are confirmed in DVIDS artifacts and 4th Fleet news (DVIDS UNITAS 2025 Closing Ceremony video, October 6, 2025, DVIDS image set, October 6, 2025, UNITAS 2025 Kicks Off, September 15, 2025).

Strategic tasking for autonomy within the Department of the Navy originates from service-level guidance and is reinforced by surface force implementation documents. The Chief of Naval Operations Navigation Plan 2024 assigns the acceleration of robotic and autonomous systems to operationalize distributed maritime operations and sets measurable readiness targets, captured in the plan itself and the official one-page placemat; this guidance remained current into 2025, providing top-down justification for hybrid fleet experimentation in routine and flag-level exercises (CNO Navigation Plan 2024, PDF, NAVPLAN 2024 placemat, CNO NAVPLAN release, September 18, 2024). Surface-force execution priorities are captured in Surface Warfare: The Competitive Edge 2.0, dated January 8, 2025, which translates NAVPLAN 2024 imperatives into specific actions for readiness, training, and modernization using carrier, destroyer, amphibious, and logistics formations; the publicly posted PDF anchors claims regarding surface community commitments in 2025 (The Competitive Edge 2.0, January 8, 2025, SNA 2025 page). The doctrinal synthesis is straightforward: large multinational events can only absorb significant numbers of unmanned systems when service-level policy has already assigned budgetary and readiness weight to those systems, when platform-agnostic standards for safety and test exist, and when the environmental baselines and range controls authorize operations in specific times and places.

Cybersecurity and data-pipeline assurance received explicit late-2025 articulation in the DoD Artificial Intelligence Cybersecurity Risk Management Tailoring Guide dated August 7, 2025, a publicly available PDF that details supply-chain controls, telemetry, model provenance, and operational red-teaming practices for AI pipelines; the guide cross-references DoD Directive 3000.09 and relevant cybersecurity instructions, embedding autonomous behavior into a comprehensive cyber regime suitable for mixed fleet events where allied networks and coalition data must be protected and instrumented (AI Cybersecurity Risk Management Tailoring Guide, August 7, 2025). For a geographically distributed exercise such as UNITAS 25, where command nodes span multiple shore facilities and ships, cyber-resilient C2 and assured data flows—sensor ingest, platform telemetry, mission planning, and human-over-the-loop supervision—are operational gatekeepers; the 2025 tailoring guide materially advances fleet-suitable controls beyond earlier high-level principles by specifying how to tailor risk management to mission context.

Interoperability governance in multinational settings intersects with standards, authority to operate, and releasability constraints. The UNITAS 2025 planning conferences—initial in February 2025, mid in April 2025, final in June 2025—are documented within U.S. 4th Fleet public affairs releases and imagery that depict memoranda of understanding work and detail locations and mission types; these artifacts confirm the multi-site staging along the United States East Coast and set a policy context in which cross-domain solutions, crypto modes, and message-format alignment must be resolved before at-sea phases (Initial Planning Conference, February 14, 2025, Image gallery, February 12–14, 2025, Mid Planning Conference, April 11, 2025, Final Planning Conference, June 27, 2025, To Be Held Across Multiple Locations, August 13, 2025). Because unmanned maritime systems frequently operate via beyond-line-of-sight control links and exchange mission products with coalition partners, the releasability ceiling for data and control messages can throttle the practical density of unmanned assets in formation unless link standards and crypto are pre-aligned to avoid last-minute waivers; while detailed crypto configurations are not published, the existence of multiple planning conferences and explicit mentions of combined SINKEX and amphibious events in the 4th Fleet releases demonstrate that standards alignment constituted a deliberate precondition for the execution window.

Range governance couples environmental law and safety engineering with platform design. The AFTT draft supplemental EIS/OEIS provides acoustic thresholds, species distribution models, and mitigation measures such as shutdown zones and track offsets; these have direct implications for USV and XLUUV routing and duty cycles during periods of elevated marine mammal presence. NOAA Fisheries pages show that incidental take authorizations for AFTT 2025–2032 were in process as of May 9, 2025, and that other major naval range complexes have standing MMPA rules or letters of authorization; when unmanned assets with active sonars or high-speed surface profiles operate inside these envelopes, their control software must harmonize with real-time range control directives to enforce shutdowns and navigational constraints (AFTT DEIS Volume I, September 2024, AFTT ITA action, May 9, 2025, NOAA MMPA readiness ITAs portal). ESA Section 7 consultation doctrine requires federal agencies to consult NOAA Fisheries for actions that may affect listed species; in maritime training contexts, the NOAA repositories of biological opinions for Point Mugu Sea Range and Northwest Training and Testing demonstrate how action agencies and NOAA derive activity-specific, time-bounded determinations that include mitigation terms; the structure of those determinations informs analogous Atlantic decisions and thus the conditions under which unmanned assets may maneuver during UNITAS 25 (ESA consultations, PMSR ESA BiOp 2022, NWTT ESA BiOp 2020).

Safety and legality also converge in deck and flightline environments, where legacy manned standards govern mixed operations. NATOPS manuals treat hazard management for launch, recovery, taxiing, and hot-refuel operations; while the doctrine is written for manned aircraft, it furnishes the safety expectations that unmanned deck vehicles and aircraft must meet when operating in close proximity to human maintainers and aircrew. Publicly accessible NATOPS references and aeromedical standards remain valid into 2025; the cross-reference of CNAF M-3710.7 in the U.S. Navy Aeromedical Reference and Waiver Guide updated three months prior provides evidence that NATOPS standards are actively maintained and integrated across safety and medical governance, a prerequisite for any attempt to circulate unmanned aircraft or robotic handlers on crowded decks (CNAF M-3710.7, January 15, 2023, Aeromedical Reference and Waiver Guide, Aviation Physical Standards, updated mid-2025). Such materials set expectations for lighting, markings, marshalling, and emergency procedures that unmanned actors must not disrupt; where robotics are used topside for movement of stores or sensors, compliance requires predictable paths, brake-check logic, and human-override options compatible with NATOPS emergency response scripts.

Legal-policy baselines and environmental constraints must be fused into training objectives at the exercise-design stage. UNITAS 2025 planning artifacts—which identify a SINKEX, amphibious operations, and distributed maritime security events—imply a matrix of control measures that include COLREGS adherence, range safety overlays, and protected-species mitigation windows across the Atlantic operating boxes; the publicly posted timelines and locations confirm that participatory forces would have navigated coastal traffic schemes and near-shore approaches where Rule 10 traffic separation scheme conduct and Rule 6 safe speed determinations are paramount, as highlighted on the IMO COLREG pages (To Be Held Across Multiple Locations, August 13, 2025, COLREG preventing collisions page). Hybrid fleet safety also requires that unmanned vessels’ detect-and-avoid algorithms are tuned for mixed AIS environments and for wartime emissions control postures; while specific algorithmic settings are not published, the requirement to satisfy COLREGS Rules 5–8 (lookout, safe speed, risk of collision, action to avoid collision) and Part C (lights and shapes) can be inferred as strict constraints from the convention text cited above; failure to emulate compliant rule-based behavior would shift unacceptable risk onto manned navigators in congested approaches around Norfolk.

Policy continuity between autonomy governance, environmental law, and operational guidance is evident in NAVPLAN 2024 and Competitive Edge 2.0. The 2024 plan’s call to “operationalize robotic and autonomous systems” implies that exercises such as UNITAS 25 are not isolated demonstrations but stepping stones to enduring force design; the January 8, 2025 surface force document explicitly cites the need to translate strategic direction into disciplined action across training and readiness lines, which, in a hybrid fleet context, means codifying manned–unmanned teaming in routine workups, composite training unit exercises, and multinational evolutions before deployment (CNO Navigation Plan 2024, Competitive Edge 2.0, January 8, 2025). The Navy Warfare Development Center’s strategic guidance for calendar year 2024 reinforces this trajectory by directing the advancement of concepts and experimentation to meet the National Defense Strategy priorities; in a hybrid fleet frame, that means iteration of TTPs for unmanned teaming and control architectures in complex electromagnetic and physical environments (NWDC CY24 Strategic Guidance, April 29, 2024).

Authority and responsibility distribution under DoD Directive 3000.09 has specific implications for exercise certification. The directive assigns roles to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, operational test and evaluation bodies, and component acquisition authorities, establishing that autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems are to be tested under realistic conditions and that commanders must ensure employment is consistent with law of war and approved concept of employment; these responsibilities are directly executable in an exercise setting where a mixture of pre-certified and experimental payloads and behaviors might be present, and the public PDF provides the authoritative language to which units and program offices are accountable (DoD Directive 3000.09, January 25, 2023). A corollary appears in the August 7, 2025 AI cybersecurity tailoring guide: mission owners must integrate supply-chain risk management, telemetry for model performance, and red-team validation into fielding and operations; in a multinational event this demands strict boundary protection and data labeling to avoid inadvertent disclosure while sustaining the “speed of decision” benefit cited by senior commanders (AI Cybersecurity Risk Management Tailoring Guide, August 7, 2025).

Publicly verifiable evidence ties the UNITAS 25 closing to USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) at Norfolk, Virginia on October 6, 2025, with DVIDS listing a closing video and images that state 26 partner nations participated; these records, together with U.S. 4th Fleet news stories, provide the temporal and organizational anchors necessary for policy analysis and ensure that legal and environmental frameworks discussed here are being applied to a clearly bounded operational context (DVIDS closing video, October 6, 2025, DVIDS image, October 6, 2025, U.S. 4th Fleet news index). The verified kickoff event at Naval Station Mayport on September 15, 2025 confirms the start date and location, tying the legal and environmental frameworks to concrete times and places (UNITAS 2025 Kicks Off, September 15, 2025).

A durable lesson for hybrid fleets is that policy and environmental constraints must be engineered as system requirements rather than treated as exogenous burdens. COLREGS compliance implies sensor suites and autonomy algorithms capable of reliable target detection, classification, and maneuver decisions that align with Rules 5–8 and Part C signals under a spectrum of visibility, traffic density, and sea states; NWP 1-14M elaborates lawful behavior that must be mirrored by code in USV navigational stacks (IMO COLREG pages, NWP 1-14M, March 2022). NEPA and NOAA processes impose geographically and seasonally variable constraints that autonomy planners must treat as inputs to mission planning; mitigation measures such as power-downs, route adjustments, or temporary shutdowns are part of executable doctrine rather than administrative afterthoughts, as shown in the AFTT DEIS and XLUUV/USV EA/OEA (AFTT DEIS Volume I, September 2024, XLUUV/USV Draft EA/OEA, July 2024). DoD autonomy and AI cybersecurity guidance requires end-to-end traceability for models and control software used in the field, which becomes acute when integrating dozens of autonomous systems from different vendors and services across allied networks; only by implementing the August 7, 2025 tailoring guidance can commanders credibly assert they are operating at the “speed of decision” without compromising integrity of decision inputs (AI Cybersecurity Risk Management Tailoring Guide, August 7, 2025).

Exercise governance also reveals a reproducible method: align policy, environmental, and operational constraints during planning cycles with explicit documentation and public transparency where appropriate. The UNITAS 2025 initial, mid, and final planning conferences show a cadence that creates space for standards reconciliation and legal-environmental approvals to land before execution windows; the public records on February 14, 2025, April 11, 2025, and June 27, 2025 demonstrate that schedule and scope were locked with sufficient lead time to integrate autonomous and robotic systems at scale (Initial Planning Conference, Mid Planning Conference, Final Planning Conference). The practice of publicly posting NEPA drafts and NOAA incidental take actions provides traceable constraints that engineers and planners can incorporate into autonomy settings and range control briefs without ambiguity; the AFTT pages and NOAA action notices explicitly enumerate the regulated activities and temporal bounds (AFTT portal, AFTT ITA action, May 9, 2025).

Documented end-state events close the loop. The verified closing ceremony aboard CVN 75 on October 6, 2025 and the kickoff at Mayport on September 15, 2025 provide the exercise’s temporal bracket; inside that bracket, the intersection of autonomy governance (DoD Directive 3000.09), navigational law (COLREGS), environmental compliance (AFTT DEIS, XLUUV/USV EA/OEA, NOAA MMPA/ESA processes), aviation and deck safety (NATOPS), and service strategy (NAVPLAN 2024, Competitive Edge 2.0) defines the policy space within which autonomous and robotic systems could be integrated without compromising safety, legality, or allied interoperability (DVIDS closing video, October 6, 2025, UNITAS 2025 Kicks Off, September 15, 2025, DoD Directive 3000.09, IMO COLREG pages, AFTT portal, XLUUV/USV Draft EA/OEA, AI Cybersecurity Tailoring Guide, August 7, 2025, NAVPLAN 2024, Competitive Edge 2.0).

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Command, Control, Data and Cybersecurity Architectures for Multinational Manned–Unmanned Maritime Teams

Coalition command-and-control design for integrating low-signature robotic platforms with carrier and surface combatant groups in UNITAS 25 required alignment to Zero Trust access control, federated data-exchange, and electromagnetic-spectrum policies already promulgated by the Department of Defense and NATO, because these frameworks set verifiable technical guardrails for authentication, authorization, telemetry integrity, and routing across national networks; the Department of Defense Zero Trust Strategy dated November 22, 2022 defines the target posture of “never trust, always verify” for the DoD Information Network with an objective of department-wide target-level implementation by Fiscal Year 2027, as codified in the strategy PDF and in the DoD CIO Zero Trust Capability Execution Roadmap dated December 9, 2024 that sequences capabilities across identity, devices, applications and workloads, data, and network environments (DoD Zero Trust Strategy, November 22, 2022, Zero Trust Capability Execution Roadmap, December 9, 2024). Technical interpretation of these imperatives for maritime task groups draws on NIST Special Publication 800-207 (Zero Trust Architecture, 2020) and NIST SP 800-207A (September 2023) that detail policy-decision points, continuous evaluation, context-aware access, and cloud-native micro-segmentation applicable to afloat networks and coalition enclaves; the publications describe patterns and controls to prevent implicit trust based on location or ownership, which are conditions frequently encountered when unmanned vessels and sensors join manned formations via expeditionary gateways or partner networks (NIST SP 800-207, 2020, NIST SP 800-207A, September 2023).

Financial and programmatic corroboration of command-and-control modernization is explicit in the Department of Defense Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2025 released March 11, 2024, which itemizes $1.4 billion for Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control and $1.8 billion for Artificial Intelligence lines to “deliver and adopt responsible AI/ML-enabled capabilities on secure and reliable platforms,” providing a monetary baseline for the networks and data services that carry unmanned telemetry and mission products in joint and multinational contexts; the figures are presented in the Comptroller’s official PDF (FY 2025 Budget Request, March 11, 2024). The doctrinal counterpart is the Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control Strategy issued March 17, 2022, which frames a joint approach for improved C2 and emphasizes iterative policy and organizational adaptation to employ innovative technologies while protecting decision advantage; the strategy release and the official press statement document governance and implementation sequencing at the Department of Defense level (JADC2 Strategy Summary, March 17, 2022, DoD Release on JADC2 Implementation Plan, March 17, 2022).

Access-control and telemetry-assurance requirements for autonomy software and decision pipelines received explicit late-2025 direction in the DoD Artificial Intelligence Cybersecurity Risk Management Tailoring Guide issued August 7, 2025, which tailors security and privacy controls for the acquisition, development, use, sustainment, monitoring, and disposal of AI systems and references model provenance, red-teaming, and data-lineage controls; this guidance binds manned–unmanned teaming when autonomy stacks or perception models contribute to tasking or navigation within a hybrid fleet and must be auditable and attack-resistant across coalition networks (AI Cybersecurity Risk Management Tailoring Guide, August 7, 2025). Complementary risk-management scaffolding for trustworthy AI is provided by the NIST Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework 1.0 dated January 26, 2023, which defines the Govern, Map, Measure, and Manage functions, and by the living NIST AI RMF Playbook that operationalizes actions for risk mitigation across the lifecycle; these public resources underpin coalition dialogues about acceptable telemetry handling, model update governance, and measurement of data drift affecting perception reliability at sea (NIST AI RMF 1.0, January 26, 2023, NIST AI RMF Playbook, maintained online).

Defensive cyber practices specific to AI deployment have been articulated in joint government advisories that are relevant to integrating third-party autonomy modules and data services in a coalition fleet. The National Security Agency announced on April 15, 2024 a Cybersecurity Information Sheet titled “Deploying AI Systems Securely: Best Practices for Deploying Secure and Resilient AI Systems,” which addresses deployment and operation of externally developed AI systems by National Security System owners and Defense Industrial Base entities; the advisory highlights verification of supply-chain integrity, hardening of runtime environments, and monitoring for model and data tampering (NSA Press Release, April 15, 2024). Follow-on guidance on May 22, 2025 by the NSA Artificial Intelligence Security Center issued joint recommendations on risks and best practices in AI data security, emphasizing digital signatures for data revisions, explicit data provenance, and the use of trusted infrastructure—controls that map to maritime autonomy pipelines where training or fine-tuning data and mission telemetry flow across coalition boundaries (NSA AISC Joint Guidance on AI Data Security, May 22, 2025). The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency has embedded AI into its Secure by Design programs and published an AI roadmap and implementation notes across 2024–2025 that call for lifecycle-embedded security, transparency, and accountability by manufacturers; these public materials provide aligned expectations for vendors contributing autonomy stacks and data services to allied flotillas (CISA Secure-by-Design overview, CISA Roadmap for AI, CISA Alert: Joint Guidance on Deploying AI Systems Securely, April 15, 2024, CISA AI program page). The United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre published “Guidelines for Secure AI System Development” on November 27, 2023 in cooperation with CISA, NSA, and international partners, framing secure-by-default development practices, post-deployment monitoring, update management, and information-sharing; this coalition-authored PDF supports harmonization of security baselines across partner nations that contribute unmanned capabilities to multinational events (NCSC Guidelines PDF, November 27, 2023, NCSC collection page).

Maritime manned–unmanned teaming in multinational formations also depends on spectrum access management and interference resilience. The Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy released October 29, 2020 defines an enterprise-wide approach to achieve freedom of action in congested, contested, and constrained electromagnetic environments by integrating Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations and Electronic Warfare; the Implementation Plan signed July 15, 2021 confirms governance and execution oversight at the departmental level, which subsequently guides fleet-level spectrum planning and deconfliction during exercises that concentrate unmanned telemetry links and beyond-line-of-sight control channels near carrier strike groups (DoD EMS Superiority Strategy, October 29, 2020, DoD Release on Implementation Plan, August 5, 2021). The DoD C3 Modernization Strategy underscores the same dependency by specifying **Goal ** 1 to “Develop and Implement Agile Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations,” linking assured access and maneuver in the spectrum to joint all-domain operations and resilient transport—conditions without which coalition C2 and unmanned control links remain brittle; the public PDF details governance to synchronize with related cloud, data, and AI strategies (DoD C3 Modernization Strategy). In parallel, the DoD CIO has published redacted feasibility assessments for mid-band sharing—such as the Emerging Mid-Band Radar Spectrum Sharing report (September 30, 2023) covering 3100–3450 MHz—that inform link-planning and interference-avoidance decisions for autonomy control and backhaul channels in coastal and range-adjacent areas used by naval task groups (DoD EMBRSS Feasibility Assessment, September 30, 2023).

Coalition interoperability frameworks define how national networks and applications federate for combined operations that incorporate unmanned telemetry and tasking. NATO’s Federated Mission Networking is presented by Allied Command Transformation as a governed framework for instantiating mission networks that federate NATO organizations, allies, and mission partners with reusable standards and processes; FMN spiral specifications and governance enable rapid formation of secure information-sharing environments compatible with national systems and thus serve as the coalition baseline into which maritime autonomy feeds can be integrated during combined events (ACT Federated Mission Networking page, NATO STO Educational Notes on FMN Spirals). NATO’s Data Strategy for the Alliance, approved May 5, 2025, and the Data Quality Framework for the Alliance, approved August 29, 2025, formalize requirements for data labeling, quality management, and interoperability, while NATO’s Data-Centric Reference Architecture launches (May 28, 2025) to guide enterprise-wide data management and exploitation; these official texts provide authoritative blueprints for tagging, protecting, and sharing sensor data, tracks, and decision products across a coalition maritime environment that includes unmanned contributors (Data Strategy for the Alliance, May 5, 2025, Data Quality Framework, August 29, 2025, Data-Centric Reference Architecture portal, May 28, 2025). Policy coherence on AI is maintained through the Summary of the NATO Artificial Intelligence Strategy dated October 22, 2021 and its revised AI strategy released July 10, 2024, which reiterate principles of responsible use and outline governance mechanisms such as the Data and AI Review Board; these official sites document a multinational governance environment into which UNITAS 25 partners can map their autonomy and data-protection practices during combined operations (NATO AI Strategy Summary, October 22, 2021, Revised AI Strategy, July 10, 2024).

Maritime task-force experimentation with manned–unmanned teaming on partner networks in the U.S. 5th Fleet area provides a publicly documented reference model for communications pathways, authority, and telemetry handling relevant to Atlantic events. Task Force 59 established Task Group 59.1 on January 16, 2024 to focus on operational deployment of unmanned systems teamed with manned operators; subsequent iterations of Digital Talon through November 24–25, 2024 emphasized over-the-horizon communications between unmanned systems and demonstrated unmanned aircraft launch and recovery from unmanned surface vessels, with official narratives and imagery posted by Navy.mil and U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (TF 59 announces TG 59.1, January 16, 2024, CUSNC Digital Talon 3.0, November 24, 2024, Navy.mil Digital Talon 3.0, November 25, 2024). These public, theater-based records corroborate a pattern of federated link-management, mission-partner releasability, and data-sharing that informs how multinational Atlantic exercises can safely and effectively increase the density of unmanned contributors without compromising human safety or coalition information boundaries.

Data architecture for maritime autonomy integration relies on authoritative DoD data-governance texts that remain operative within 2025. The DoD Data Strategy published October 8, 2020 declares the department’s transformation to a data-centric enterprise and defines essential capabilities such as data governance, architecture, standards, and security; this baseline continues to underpin AI adoption and JADC2 data-fabric objectives referenced by later budget lines and strategic documents (DoD Data Strategy, October 8, 2020). The DoD Software Modernization Strategy issued February 2, 2022 establishes delivery of resilient software “at the speed of relevance,” aligning platform modernization with JADC2 and AI priorities and reinforcing the requirement for containerized, platform-agnostic delivery patterns suitable for shipboard and expeditionary environments; this strategy provides the acquisition and delivery model for autonomy-related control software and data services that must run afloat and ashore in coalition architectures (DoD Software Modernization Strategy, February 2, 2022). The Department of the Navy has continued policy execution through Information Superiority Vision 2.0 displayed publicly August 16, 2024, software modernization notes December 23, 2024, and subsequent policy updates including a software containerization policy posted July 31, 2025; these official pages corroborate service-level movement toward cloud-native, containerized applications and standardized telemetry pipelines compatible with Zero Trust and coalition sharing (DON Information Superiority Vision 2.0 page, August 16, 2024, Software Modernization in the DON, December 23, 2024, DON Software Containerization Policy, July 31, 2025).

Coalition partner enablement and standards literacy are directly addressed by the DoD CIO Standards Guide for Foreign Partners, updated February 7, 2024, which aggregates U.S. and international resources for cybersecurity, C3, and workforce development; the guide is a public reference intended to harmonize partner practices with DoD expectations and thereby reduce integration friction when national unmanned systems and data services enter a combined maritime exercise network (Standards Guide for Foreign Partners, February 7, 2024). NATO’s NISP Baseline 16 published September 5, 2024 likewise catalogs open and unclassified standards and profiles that guide interoperability and profiles alignment across NATO and partner networks; in aggregate, these texts inform selection of messaging, identity, and telemetry standards that manned and unmanned nodes must implement for coalition connectivity (NATO NISP Baseline 16, September 5, 2024). A complementary NATO architecture resource is the NATO Digital Backbone Reference Architecture document dated December 13, 2024 that describes connectivity and data transport from edge to decision-maker across domains, providing a doctrinal anchor for maritime data fabrics that carry autonomy telemetry and decision products into multinational decision loops (NATO Digital Backbone Reference Architecture, December 13, 2024).

Implementation experience for naval data fabrics and cross-domain maritime networking appears in official Navy and NAVWAR releases that situate fleet experimentation under the Project Overmatch umbrella. NAVWAR emphasized on October 29, 2024 that the AI ANTX Prize Challenge was conducted in support of Project Overmatch, a high-priority Department of the Navy initiative to interconnect platforms, weapons, and sensors within a Naval Operational Architecture integrated with JADC2; official Navy remarks March 17, 2023 by the Chief of Naval Operations likewise underscored Project Overmatch as the future bedrock of joint tactical networking, indicating the service’s continuity of effort toward a fabric suitable for hybrid fleets that include robotic contributors (NAVWAR release, October 29, 2024, CNO public remarks, March 17, 2023). The Department of the Navy Chief Technology Officer identified Priority Technology Areas on June 25, 2025, further aligning service investment toward data-centric, secure, and interoperable technologies, as posted on the official DON CIO site (DON CTO Priority Technology Areas, June 25, 2025).

Architecture, security control, and assessment baselines for coalition maritime networks carrying robotic telemetry and control are specified by NIST publications that federal programs routinely reference for accreditation. NIST SP 800-53 Revision 5 and SP 800-53A Revision 5 describe security and privacy controls and assessment procedures for federal systems, with SP 800-53B providing control baselines; these public documents define the catalog and assessment approach into which program-specific overlays for autonomy and maritime C2 can be composed, and they are cited in DoD tailoring documents for AI systems that must be trusted across coalition partners (NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5, 2020, NIST SP 800-53A Rev. 5, 2022, NIST SP 800-53B, 2020). NIST’s Cybersecurity White Paper “Planning for a Zero Trust Architecture” dated May 6, 2022 further explains planning steps for federal administrators implementing Zero Trust, including inventories, identity federation, policy decision and enforcement points, and telemetry requirements, which are directly applicable to seaborne coalition environments where identity and device attestation must transcend national boundaries (NIST CSWP 20, May 6, 2022).

Transport resilience for manned–unmanned maritime teams depends on diversified paths including satellite and terrestrial links, and DoD policy movement into private 5G environments attaches specific security requirements that affect expeditionary control stations and port facilities used during multinational events. The DoD Private 5G Deployment Strategy published November 14, 2024 sets out an addendum to the 2020 5G Strategy emphasizing secure, resilient, and agile networks designed for scalability and rapid reconstitution; these official elements inform design choices where unmanned control or high-rate sensor backhaul must traverse private 5G in training areas or ports with coalition access (DoD Private 5G Deployment Strategy, November 14, 2024). Maritime data-fabric and C2 strategies also inherit risk-management obligations for records and data retention, reflected in the DoD Records Strategy May 22, 2023, which commits to cloud and AI technologies for lifecycle management; when unmanned telemetry contributes to operational records in multinational exercises, these governance rules shape classification, retention, and releasability boundaries across partner networks (DoD Records Strategy, May 22, 2023).

Coalition-grade data governance and interoperability objectives are reinforced by NATO’s digital-transformation initiatives. The NATO Digital Transformation Implementation Strategy published February 20, 2025 states that a Digital Interoperability Framework will raise data quality and ICT service coherence across the enterprise, and official ACT pages reiterate that data exploitation policies and strategies align with the broader emerging-technology agenda; these public texts supply the institutional overlay that enables maritime nations to mesh data from unmanned and manned assets under shared governance (NATO Digital Transformation Implementation Strategy, February 20, 2025, ACT Digital Transformation page). Specific data-centric requirements—such as adoption of the NATO Core Metadata Standards, semantic mapping to a NATO Core Data Framework, and annual reporting to the Consultation, Command and Control Board—appear in the online Data-Centric Reference Architecture content that instructs standardization tasking authorities to enable interoperability-by-design, a necessary step for reliable cross-national exploitation of autonomy output (DCRA element on semantic interoperability). A supporting taxonomy for capability planning is publicly available in NATO’s Consultation, Command and Control Taxonomy baseline PDF dated September 12, 2019, which provides a common vocabulary for capability synchronization and facilitates mapping of unmanned C2 components within alliance planning documents (NATO C3 Taxonomy baseline, September 12, 2019).

Allied industry and government alignment on secure development and operations for AI is further substantiated by CISA’s Secure by Design program pages and 2024–2025 JCDC priorities that include making measurable progress toward secure-by-design technology and publishing collaborative playbooks for AI cybersecurity; these public releases delineate acceptable manufacturer practices and inform procurement and accreditation decisions for autonomy systems contributed to combined maritime operations (CISA Secure-by-Design resources, 2024 JCDC Priorities, CISA–JCDC AI Cybersecurity Collaboration Playbook, January 14, 2025, CISA AI Roadmap FAQs, CISA AI program page). The NCSC Annual Review 2024 confirms the Five Eyes collaboration with CISA, the AI Security Center, and the U.S. AI Safety Institute and restates the purpose of the November 2023 secure AI guidelines for global adoption; the official PDF documents the multinational consensus that development, deployment, and maintenance of AI demand rigorous cyber-safety controls, an imperative that extends directly to maritime autonomy employed in coalition exercises (NCSC Annual Review 2024, December 2, 2024, NCSC blog, November 27, 2023).

Transport, identity, and data-control layers are also shaped by Zero Trust Reference Architecture artifacts maintained by the DoD CIO. The Zero Trust Reference Architecture v2.0 (September 2022) documents mapping to NIST SP 800-207 and specifies capabilities for identity, credential, and access management, continuous monitoring, and micro-segmentation that are needed to gate unmanned device access and constrain east–west traffic within coalition enclaves; the official PDF is publicly accessible for reference by partner engineering teams configuring tactical networks to receive autonomy feeds (DoD Zero Trust Reference Architecture v2.0, September 2022). To ensure that these controls result in consistent, auditable deployments, the NIST assessment handbook SP 800-53A Rev. 5 provides procedures to verify that selected controls meet objectives, a requirement that becomes operationally relevant when coalition evaluators must attest to control efficacy before enabling data exchange from unmanned maritime assets in a mission network (NIST SP 800-53A Rev. 5, 2022).

Operational patterns from the U.S. 5th Fleet illustrate how coalition partners manage unmanned telemetry within governed networks and evolving doctrine. Official releases indicate that Task Group 59.1 conducted experimentation linking unmanned aircraft and unmanned surface vessels using over-the-horizon communications and tested autonomous launch and recovery; these documented events imply controlled employment of identity-federated gateways, message filtering for releasability, and resilience against electromagnetic interference—all practices that align with DoD spectrum and Zero Trust directives cited above without requiring inference beyond what public texts allow (CUSNC Digital Talon 3.0 news, November 24, 2024, Navy.mil Digital Talon 3.0, November 25, 2024, TF 59 establishes TG 59.1, January 16, 2024). Theater public pages also describe the multilateral IMX format, supporting the conclusion that partner-nation connectivity and standards are organized at scale in CENTCOM, a setting analogous to Atlantic coalition exercises for purposes of technical and policy alignment (CUSNC IMX overview, CUSNC IMX overview, additional).

Data-quality and metadata governance are receiving fresh NATO attention during 2025, with the newly adopted Data Quality Framework (August 29, 2025) and the Data Strategy for the Alliance (May 5, 2025) emphasizing quality attributes, labeling, and lifecycle management necessary for exploiting data at speed; the NATO online Data-Centric Reference Architecture content instructs authorities to incorporate NATO Core Metadata Standards and submit plans to the C3 Board, thereby formalizing accountability for cross-alliance data hygiene that maritime autonomy systems must satisfy to publish and consume data in mission networks (Data Quality Framework, August 29, 2025, Data Strategy for the Alliance, May 5, 2025, DCRA semantic-interoperability element). This alliance-level governance is reinforced by ACT statements that the Autonomy Implementation Plan and the Data and AI Review Board support responsible adoption aligned to NATO norms and international law, as published on ACT digital-transformation pages and NATO news posts, which together substantiate that policy mechanisms exist to evaluate autonomy and data-use within multinational operations without speculative linkage to outcomes beyond those documented (ACT Digital Transformation page, NATO news on revised AI strategy, July 10, 2024, NATO AI certification work, February 7, 2023).

The cumulative consequence of these verified frameworks for UNITAS 25-scale integration is that identity federation, device attestation, data-labeling, and policy-enforcement points must be engineered into every ingress by which unmanned platforms publish tracks, imagery, acoustic products, or health telemetry to the coalition fabric, with continuous evaluation of session context and dynamic authorization decisions as described in NIST SP 800-207 and the DoD Zero Trust corpus; without such engineering, unmanned contributors cannot operate at the “speed of decision” within coalition C2 loops while maintaining data integrity and lawful access boundaries. Infrastructure patterns described in the DoD Software Modernization Strategy and the Department of the Navy’s Information Superiority Vision 2.0 and containerization policy facilitate the required deployment model by emphasizing platform-agnostic, containerized services, automated pipelines, and telemetry collection for security analytics—practices that in turn simplify conformance with assessment and auditing under NIST SP 800-53A Rev. 5 (NIST SP 800-207, 2020, DoD Zero Trust Strategy, November 22, 2022, DoD Software Modernization Strategy, February 2, 2022, Information Superiority Vision 2.0, DON Software Containerization Policy, July 31, 2025, NIST SP 800-53A Rev. 5, 2022).

Because coalition maritime operations necessarily traverse congested spectrum, the Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy and associated C3 Modernization Strategy goals provide an external constraint on the density and mode of unmanned links near capital ships; program offices and fleet planners can cross-check permissible bands, sharing constraints, and interference mitigation tactics against the public EMBRSS feasibility assessment, then plan autonomy control frequencies, power, and time-division behavior accordingly to minimize contention with radar and communications systems aboard carriers and escorts, consistent with the DoD policy architecture (DoD EMS Superiority Strategy, October 29, 2020, EMBRSS Feasibility Assessment, September 30, 2023, DoD C3 Modernization Strategy). When unmanned systems operate from ports and littorals instrumented with private 5G, the November 14, 2024 Private 5G Deployment Strategy defines deployment, slicing, and security expectations consistent with Zero Trust, supplying a verifiable path to extend resilient backhaul to expeditionary control points used during multinational events (DoD Private 5G Deployment Strategy, November 14, 2024).

Collectively, these verified statutes, strategies, standards, and official narratives define an implementable architecture for coalition maritime manned–unmanned teaming: identity-centric Zero Trust access modeled on NIST SP 800-207 and DoD strategy; lifecycle AI security controls and provenance traceability aligned to the August 7, 2025 DoD AI Cybersecurity Tailoring Guide, NSA/CISA deployment guidance, and NIST AI RMF; spectrum-aware link planning under the EMSSS and C3 strategies; federated data-quality, metadata, and interoperability enforced by NATO’s Data Strategy, Data Quality Framework, and Data-Centric Reference Architecture; and deployment practices anchored in DoD software modernization and Department of the Navy information-superiority and containerization policies. Each element is publicly posted on official government or alliance websites and remains valid within September 2025, providing a traceable, standards-based blueprint for operating unmanned maritime capabilities inside a coalition C2 fabric at the demanded “speed of decision” without compromising cybersecurity, data integrity, or partner-nation interoperability (DoD Zero Trust Strategy, November 22, 2022, Zero Trust Capability Execution Roadmap, December 9, 2024, NIST SP 800-207, 2020, NIST SP 800-207A, September 2023, AI Cybersecurity Tailoring Guide, August 7, 2025, NIST AI RMF 1.0, January 26, 2023, NSA press release, April 15, 2024, CISA Secure-by-Design, NATO Data Strategy, May 5, 2025, NATO Data Quality Framework, August 29, 2025, DCRA portal, ACT FMN overview, DoD EMS Superiority Strategy, October 29, 2020, DoD C3 Modernization Strategy, DoD Private 5G Deployment Strategy, November 14, 2024, FY 2025 Budget Request, March 11, 2024, Navy.mil TF 59 TG 59.1, January 16, 2024, CUSNC Digital Talon 3.0, NAVWAR Overmatch note, October 29, 2024, DON ISV 2.0, DON containerization policy, July 31, 2025).

Unmanned Maritime Warfare: Ukraine’s Magura V7 USV and the Evolution of Asymmetric Tactics in the Black Sea Conflict

Carrier-Centric Hybrid Operations: Deck Flow, Airspace, and Spectrum During CVN 75 Events

Carrier flight-deck orchestration that integrates low-signature unmanned contributors alongside manned squadrons depends on codified procedures and risk controls that remain authoritative across United States naval aviation, beginning with CNAF M-3710.7 general flight and operating instructions dated January 15, 2023, which prescribe standardized crew duties, operational risk management, and air operations governance applicable to all naval aircraft and related activities; the officially published manual is publicly accessible and establishes the baseline for safe sequencing, marshalling, and emergency response on and around the flight deck (CNAF M-3710.7, January 15, 2023). A companion official document from Chief of Naval Air Training retains legacy distribution of the same instruction and embeds explicit cross-references to NATOPS standardization, reinforcing that flight-deck and air-operations discipline bind both manned and unmanned aviation in carrier environments (NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions (CNAF M-3710.7 legacy baseline)). During UNITAS 2025, these rules governed operations around USS Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) at Norfolk, Virginia, as verified by the publicly posted closing ceremony video and imagery dated October 6, 2025, which identify the event on the carrier’s flight deck with multinational attendance (UNITAS 2025 Closing Ceremony Video, October 6, 2025, UNITAS 2025 Closing Ceremony Image, October 6, 2025). The opening ceremony at Naval Station Mayport on September 15, 2025 bounds the operating window and confirms that carrier-centric evolutions were nested inside a geographically distributed series of events along the United States East Coast (UNITAS 2025 Kicks Off at Naval Station Mayport, September 15, 2025).

Air wing flow on a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is paced by launch-and-recovery cycles that must absorb unmanned aircraft and robotic deck equipment without compromising human safety or sortie generation. The official risk-communication and training literature published by Naval Safety Command and Commander, Naval Air Forces Pacific underscores that the flight deck is an inherently hazardous environment requiring disciplined choreography, standardized signals, and clearly designated safe lanes; the publicly released “Flight Deck Awareness” guide compiles hazards, near-miss patterns, and mitigation behaviors for yellow-shirt directors, brown-shirt plane captains, and other ratings, and serves as an evidence-based safety doctrine that any robotic deck handler or unmanned aircraft taxi logic must harmonize with to avoid novel collision vectors (Naval Safety Command Flight Deck Awareness (official PDF), Naval Aviation Safety Program Reference Links (official compilation)). In mixed formations, the governing premise remains that unmanned actors must behave predictably within human-established patterns, yielding to standardized hand signals, deck markings, and NATOPS pace lines; deviation imposes unacceptable risk on manned maintainers and aircrew. The rigor of these controls becomes especially visible during high-tempo cycles around a closing ceremony or public event, where additional personnel and foreign delegations may be present on the flight deck, amplifying the necessity of fixed marshalling paths and positive control zones consistent with CNAF M-3710.7 sections on crowd control and hazard mitigation (CNAF M-3710.7, January 15, 2023).

Carrier integration of unmanned aviation is framed by an explicitly documented program of record: Unmanned Carrier Aviation (MQ-25). Naval Air Systems Command provides an official program page confirming that the tanker-role unmanned system is intended to increase the range and endurance of the carrier air wing and detailing integration across deck handling, air traffic control, and mission systems (NAVAIR: Unmanned Carrier Aviation — MQ-25 (program page), NAVAIR MQ-25 program portal). Historical carrier environment demonstrations and early deck handling events, publicly posted by Navy.mil in December 2021, further validate the trajectory of pairing unmanned deck integration with manned air wing cycles under NATOPS oversight, thereby establishing a concrete and verifiable precedent for carrier-centric hybrid operations that is directly relevant when multinational observers and partners are present during a large exercise (Navy Completes Initial Carrier Demo for MQ-25 Program, December 20, 2021). Although the detailed carrier flight/hangar deck NATOPS manuals for CV and CVN (e.g., NAVAIR 00-80T-105 and NAVAIR 00-80T-120) are cataloged on the official Airworthiness site and referenced by current Marine Corps publications for operations with CVN platforms, many sub-pages require credentialed access; where the official Airworthiness indexes are publicly viewable, they confirm the governing text titles and version control, while Marine Corps tactical publications provide public cross-references that corroborate the existence and applicability of those manuals to operations involving CVN flight decks (Naval Safety Command reference index confirming NAVAIR 00-80T-120, MCTP 13-10L (SECURED) with CVN NATOPS references, recent public release).

Airspace control surrounding a deployed or pier-side carrier during a multinational event must respect standardized procedures derived from CNAF M-3710.7 and promulgated across fleet air traffic control and range control entities. The instruction requires air boss-led coordination for departure and recovery windows, standard communications formats, and positive altitude and lateral separation, all of which become more complex when low-signature unmanned air vehicles operate concurrently with manned patterns. The doctrine mandates explicit hazard-abatement planning via operational risk management, a requirement that scales directly to any unmanned asset whose detect-and-avoid logic or data link latency could generate non-deterministic behaviors in the pattern; these constraints are spelled out in the publicly accessible manual and remain authoritative across 2025 (CNAF M-3710.7, January 15, 2023, NATOPS legacy baseline). Concurrently, the public record confirms that UNITAS 2025 used multiple east-coast venues, creating additional coordination seams among shore-based air stations and adjacent restricted areas; the official U.S. 4th Fleet kickoff release on September 15, 2025 documents the Naval Station Mayport ceremony and multinational presence, and the DVIDS closing artifacts on October 6, 2025 verify the presence of allied personnel aboard CVN 75, which together evidence the need for multi-node airspace and deck-flow synchronization inside the exercise window (UNITAS 2025 Kicks Off, September 15, 2025, UNITAS 2025 Closing Ceremony Video, October 6, 2025).

Hybrid carrier operations impose demanding emissions-control and spectrum-management requirements because unmanned telemetry, navigation, and control links cluster around the flight deck and adjacent sea space. The Department of Defense Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy dated October 29, 2020 establishes department-wide goals to integrate Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations and Electronic Warfare, emphasizing dynamic spectrum access, interference resilience, and joint governance; the official PDF remains the controlling enterprise strategy in 2025 for planning afloat link budgets, frequency assignments, time-division regimes, and interference-mitigation tactics around a carrier operating in congested littoral corridors (DoD Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy, October 29, 2020). The significance of disciplined implementation is corroborated by the Government Accountability Office testimony report GAO-21-440T which, while published in April 2021, documents prior shortfalls and reinforces the necessity of institutionally enforced spectrum governance to support operations that require simultaneous radar, communications, and control links at scale in mixed formations (GAO-21-440T, Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations, April 30, 2021). The carrier-centric scenario at Norfolk during October 2025 therefore entailed deliberate electromagnetic planning to ensure that unmanned control channels and video backhaul neither degraded flight-critical shipboard systems nor created fratricide risk among coalition radios operating in proximity.

Maritime safety law inflects deck-flow and airspace control through the obligation to manage ship movements and small craft traffic around the carrier in accordance with collision-avoidance rules. Although surface navigation governance was analyzed elsewhere, the carrier-area context introduces a specific complication: escort maneuvering and small craft control in narrow approaches where low-signature unmanned surface vessels may be operating tasking profiles near the wake and turbulence of an operating carrier. Because UNITAS 2025 culminated aboard CVN 75 at Norfolk on October 6, 2025, the set-piece events implied measured shiphandling and exclusion-zone enforcement validated by publicly posted imagery and video; while detailed exclusion diagrams are not published for public release, the discipline demanded by CNAF M-3710.7 for air operations and by the department-level spectrum strategy for link control provides the documented scaffolding for safe hybrid operations under multinational observation (UNITAS 2025 Closing Ceremony Image, October 6, 2025, DoD Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy, October 29, 2020, CNAF M-3710.7, January 15, 2023).

Deck-flow integration of unmanned actors also depends on maintenance, support equipment interfacing, and safe-parking geometry compatible with blast, heat, and jet efflux envelopes. The publicly released CNAF M-3710.7 stresses hazard controls for hot brakes, intake suction, and tailpipe danger areas, and requires explicit training on jet blast and prop-wash hazards; unmanned deck vehicles must maintain standoff distances and brake-check logic within these envelopes to avoid novel adjacency risks during respotting and pre-launch checks. Official safety guides reiterate that predictable motion, standardized markings, and assertive chock and chain discipline reduce mishaps; consequently, autonomous tractors or robotic skids introduced during demonstrations around October 2025 are bound to behave within those envelopes to remain compatible with deck choreography documented in the official safety publications (CNAF M-3710.7, Naval Safety Command Flight Deck Awareness). Because the official NAVAIR carrier NATOPS volumes are cataloged and cross-referenced by current Marine Corps doctrine, their existence and authority for deck handling and hangar operations are publicly corroborated even where line-by-line procedures require credentialed access; integration during UNITAS 2025 therefore rests on an auditable chain of official doctrine rather than ad-hoc demonstrations (MCTP 13-10L (SECURED), Naval Safety Command reference index).

Air wing tempo during multinational evolutions around a carrier hinges on sortie generation rates that benefit from offload augmentation by an organic tanker; NAVAIR’s official program pages confirm the mission of MQ-25 to extend strike range and endurance, which in operational terms frees manned strike assets from recovery cycles tied to tanking or compresses cycle times by enabling earlier rendezvous with a deck-integrated unmanned tanker. Publicly posted program information documents deck handling integration and compatibility, including control station concepts and deck flow considerations required for safe placement in the launch and recovery sequence; these verified sources thereby support the conclusion that unmanned aviation can be inserted into carrier operations with measurable benefits, provided that NATOPS discipline and spectrum governance remain strictly observed (NAVAIR: Unmanned Carrier Aviation — MQ-25, NAVAIR MQ-25 portal, Navy.mil MQ-25 carrier demo, December 20, 2021).

Coalition presence aboard CVN 75 during October 2025 introduces additional scrutiny on emissions and interference mitigation because partner communications equipment and cameras create incidental emitters. The Department of Defense spectrum strategy recognizes coalition electromagnetic planning as a necessary condition for maneuver and assures that freedom of action depends on synchronization among platform emitters, radars, and tactical data links; the strategy’s emphasis on integrating Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations with operational planning is directly applicable to a closing ceremony and concurrent at-sea evolutions that concentrate emitters alongside unmanned telemetry and control links within confined waters (DoD Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy, October 29, 2020, GAO-21-440T, April 30, 2021). Where private 5G or pier-side terrestrial networks are used for logistics or public affairs carriage during port periods, the DoD’s official Private 5G Deployment Strategy dated November 14, 2024 specifies security expectations—network slicing, device identity, and continuous monitoring—that align with Zero Trust and reduce the risk that non-mission traffic interferes with safety-critical ship systems or unmanned control channels (DoD Private 5G Deployment Strategy, November 14, 2024).

The carrier command team’s orchestration of unmanned actors must also reflect data- and cyber-assurance controls documented in August 7, 2025 guidance for AI cybersecurity risk management. The Department of Defense Chief Information Officer’s official tailoring guide requires provenance controls, red-team validation, and telemetry for model performance and degradation, which bear directly on shipboard deployment of perception and navigation models that feed into manned decision cycles for deck sequencing, taxi clearance, and wave-off criteria; the text is explicit that AI system lifecycles encompass acquisition through disposal, dictating the log and audit expectations for any model whose output may influence carrier operations (DoD AI Cybersecurity Risk Management Tailoring Guide, August 7, 2025). Complementary guidance from National Security Agency and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency emphasizes secure deployment for externally developed AI systems, supply-chain vetting, and runtime hardening, controls that apply when unmanned deck vehicles or perception subsystems originate from partner nations or third-party vendors in a multinational exercise (NSA Press Release on “Deploying AI Systems Securely,” April 15, 2024, CISA Joint Guidance on Deploying AI Systems Securely, April 15, 2024).

Sequencing unmanned operations within carrier cycles demands a shared operational picture that can display low-signature tracks, deck status, and control-link health to the air boss, handler teams, and watch officers. The doctrinal requirement for standardized communications and positive control derives from CNAF M-3710.7, and the enterprise-level requirement for resilient transport and data fusion derives from the Department of Defense spectrum strategy and related C3 modernization guidance; in practice, the carrier’s combat direction center and primary flight control must see unmanned system state in real time with clear guardrails for abort criteria and go/no-go thresholds, or deck-flow synchronization breaks down. The publicly accessible texts cited here provide the verifiable prescription for identity, message, and spectrum governance without speculating beyond the published doctrine (CNAF M-3710.7, DoD Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy).

Carrier-centric hybrid operations in a multinational setting are also bounded by training and certification practices that ensure ships hosting flight operations remain within aviation facility standards before and during exercises. Department-level instructions (e.g., OPNAVINST 3120.35L, publicly posted March 30, 2018) assign responsibilities for aviation facility operation and inspection, linking ship configuration, crash and salvage readiness, lighting, and communications to eligibility for routine flight operations; these requirements, while not disclosing granular ship arrangements, identify the governance layer that constrains any novel unmanned deck activity and ensures that safety case integrity is preserved when foreign observers and partner detachments embark during an exercise (OPNAVINST 3120.35L, March 30, 2018). The existence of this instruction in the public domain confirms the policy chain from department to ship and supplies an authoritative foundation for stating that carrier participants in UNITAS 2025 operated within recognized aviation facility governance.

The temporal bracketing of UNITAS 2025—opening on September 15, 2025 at Naval Station Mayport and closing on October 6, 2025 aboard CVN 75—creates a finite evaluation period in which deck-flow, airspace, and spectrum practices can be assessed against authoritative doctrine and strategy. Public releases from **U.S. Naval Forces Southern Command/**U.S. 4th Fleet verify the start event and locations, while DVIDS artifacts verify the closing on the carrier; from these publicly accessible anchors, the cited official manuals and strategies supply the verifiable constraints and enablers for hybrid carrier operations that incorporate unmanned aviation and robotic deck systems without compromising safety or electromagnetic coexistence (UNITAS 2025 Kicks Off, September 15, 2025, UNITAS 2025 Closing Ceremony Video, October 6, 2025, CNAF M-3710.7, DoD Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy, NAVAIR MQ-25).

The carrier deck is the most unforgiving test of hybrid fleet claims because every mis-sequenced taxi, late cut, or unexpected link dropout becomes a proximate hazard. The public doctrine makes the acceptance criteria clear: standardized marshalling, briefed respot plans, fixed safe lanes, positive control of emitters, and telemetry visible to the air boss and handler teams. The verified NAVAIR program pages affirm that MQ-25 integration targets those criteria; the official safety publications and CNAF instructions provide the enforceable behavioral contract for manned and unmanned actors; and the department-level spectrum strategy imposes emissions discipline congruent with a crowded pier-side ceremony and sea-space evolutions. Because each cited element is an official publication or artifact posted on a recognized government or defense platform and remains live as of October 9, 2025, these sources collectively substantiate that carrier-centric hybrid operations during UNITAS 2025 were bounded by a mature, publicly verifiable body of doctrine and strategy that scales unmanned contributions without compromising human safety, procedural discipline, or electromagnetic deconfliction (UNITAS 2025 Kicks Off, September 15, 2025, UNITAS 2025 Closing Ceremony Image, October 6, 2025, CNAF M-3710.7, Naval Safety Command reference index, NAVAIR: Unmanned Carrier Aviation — MQ-25, DoD Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy, DoD Private 5G Deployment Strategy, November 14, 2024, NSA AI Security Press Release, April 15, 2024, CISA Joint Guidance on Deploying AI Systems Securely, April 15, 2024, Navy.mil MQ-25 carrier demo, December 20, 2021).

Maritime Safety and Deconfliction: COLREG-Compliant Behaviors for USV and XLUUV Near Manned Platforms

The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs 1972) remain the dominant normative instrument for maritime safety, prescribing rules of encounter, overtaking, crossing, safe speed, and actions to avoid collision applicable to all vessels. Publicly available documents from the U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center list the full text of the Navigation Rules, including Rule 2 on responsibility and Rule 8 on action to avoid collision, and include a special provision in § 82.7 regarding sidelights for unmanned barges, though the broader scope for unmanned systems must interpret these existing rules in new operational contexts. The PDF of the navigation rules is accessible via the USCG NavCen site.(navcen.uscg.gov)

Contemporary scholarship highlights that COLREGs were not written for autonomous systems and thus impose both structural and interpretative challenges. In “Towards a New Horizon: 1972 COLREG in the Era of Autonomous” (2024), the authors argue that COLREGs’ allowance for human judgment and discretionary maneuver conflicts with algorithmic determinism, making some rules inherently ambiguous for fully autonomous vessels.(tandfonline.com) A review article “A review on COLREGs-compliant navigation of autonomous surface vehicles” categorizes three stages of collision avoidance—detection, decision, and replanning—and notes that learning-based methods are increasingly used to embed COLREGs constraints into autonomy stacks, but that gaps remain in generalization and interpretability.(sciencedirect.com)

In operational naval contexts, RAND Corporation issued a study titled U.S. Navy Employment Options for Unmanned Surface Vehicles (2019), publicly available as PDF, which examines constraints and risk mitigation for USV integration into Navy formations. Among its technical discussions, the study uses COLREGs as normative guardrails and simulates behavior of unmanned systems interacting with manned traffic, recommending conservative margins, hierarchical avoidance logic, and fallback modes to safe loitering in complex or ambiguous encounters.(rand.org)

To regulate maritime autonomous system trials domestically, the U.S. Coast Guard issued Policy Letter CG-CVC 22-01 on February 16, 2022, providing guidelines for “human-supervised testing of remote controlled and autonomous systems on vessels,” including stipulations that such trials must not reduce required manning, must comply with existing legal obligations, and must be coordinated with port and area authorities; the policy letter is published in PDF form on the Coast Guard site.(dco.uscg.mil) These instructions emphasize that while COLREGs remain applicable to test vessels, uncertainty in application to unmanned systems demands rigorous oversight in trials.

Operational collision-avoidance logic for USVs and autonomous surface vehicles (ASVs) typically combines a hybrid architecture: situation classification (identifying crossing, head-on, overtaking), rule selection, trajectory formulation, and decision execution. A three-layered hybrid system as described in “Hybrid Collision Avoidance for ASVs Compliant with COLREGs Rules 8 and 13-17” (2019) uses a high-level planner for energy-optimal paths, a mid-level model predictive controller (MPC) enforcing COLREGs constraints, and an emergency branch for immediate evasive action—each mapped to specific COLREGs rules such as Rule 13 (overtaking), Rule 14 (head-on), Rule 15 (crossing), Rule 16 (action by give-way), and Rule 17 (action by stand-on). That publicly archived arXiv work describes the system logic, test scenarios, and avoidance efficacy without relying on unpublished or proprietary data.(arxiv.org)

Recent advances refine these control systems with control barrier functions (CBFs) tailored to naval kinematic constraints. The 2025 preprint “Efficient COLREGs-Compliant Collision Avoidance using Turning Circle-based Control Barrier Function” presents a computational method where left and right turning circles are used to define barrier constraints ensuring safe maneuvering in compliance with COLREGs, avoiding trajectory optimization overhead. That work, accessible via arXiv, demonstrates that uncrewed vessels can satisfy encounter rules while minimizing computational cost.(arxiv.org)

In enforced path planning research, models such as VORRT-COLREGs (hybrid of velocity obstacles and RRT) generate COLREGs-compliant trajectories in dynamic settings, balancing global routing and local avoidance behavior. That technique and its evaluation under traffic separation schemes are described in a 2021 arXiv submission.(arxiv.org)

In dynamic follow-target operations, “COLREGs-Compliant Target Following for an Unmanned Surface Vehicle in Dynamic Environments” describes a Monte Carlo–based prediction of target vessel future path and integrated grid-map planning that respects COLREGs rules for interaction, enabling an unmanned craft to follow a surface ship while avoiding collisions in multi-actor environments. The PDF is publicly archived.(ri.cmu.edu)

Regarding real-time path planning under constraints of terrain, weather, and intermittent communication, “Unmanned Surface Vehicle Collision Avoidance Path Planning in Restricted Waters Using Multi-Objective Optimisation Complying with COLREGs” demonstrates another architecture for USV navigation in constrained channels, embedding COLREGs constraints and terrain/weather models. That article is published in PMC and accessible publicly.(PMC)

In simulation frameworks, “Aeolus Ocean — A simulation environment for the autonomous COLREG-compliant navigation of Unmanned Surface Vehicles using Deep Reinforcement Learning and maritime object detection” is available on arXiv. That project develops a virtual environment in which deep reinforcement learning agents are trained for COLREGs-aware navigation, validating robustness under varying sea states and encounter dynamics.(arxiv.org)

Legal status of unmanned naval vessels also intersects deconfliction. A CIMSEC article “Unmanned Maritime Systems and Warships: Interpretations Under the Law of the Sea” explores whether unmanned vessels can satisfy definitions of warships under UNCLOS, especially regarding command authority, external marks, and crewed discipline, concluding that traditional warship definitions pose challenges for uncrewed platforms. That public essay discusses implications for how unmanned units might operate near manned platforms in legal regimes.(cimsec.org)

Domestically, U.S. regulatory frameworks for autonomous shipping are under review. The GAO report “Coast Guard: Autonomous Ships and Efforts to Regulate Them” (August 2024) assesses how existing legal structures—such as requirement for crew, liability norms, and navigational responsibilities—strain adoption of unmanned vessels. The GAO report is publicly posted as a PDF.(gao.gov)

From the perspective of naval doctrine, Surface Warfare: The Competitive Edge 2.0 published January 8, 2025 includes references to unmanned surface vessel integration initiatives and sea-control experimentation, citing the importance of USV interoperability, maneuver deconfliction, and safety case development. The document is publicly posted in PDF form.(surfpac.navy.mil)

Because COLREGs include flexibility and discretion (for example, Rule 2’s “special circumstances” and the requirement to depart from the rules when necessary to avoid immediate danger), autonomy systems must embed fallback logic or safe-state fallback when rule application is ambiguous or contradictory. The Norton Rose Fulbright analysis “The Collision Regulations and Autonomous Shipping” describes that the subjective standard of “ordinary practice of seamen” in Rule 2 complicates deterministic programming; the article is publicly available.(nortonrosefulbright.com)

Practical implementation of unmanned deconfliction in hybrid formations must also contend with sensor latency, uncertainty, and imperfect data. Academic work shows that although path planners may compute nominally compliant maneuvers, real-world execution error, communication delays, and mismatch between modeled and actual dynamics may lead to residual risk. For example, the control barrier function technique cited assumes perfect state knowledge whereas real systems must bound uncertainty and mitigate error drift.(arxiv.org)

In formations where multiple USVs or XLUUVs operate near high-value manned vessels, hierarchical collision-avoidance priorities must be enforced. Naval risk doctrine implies that unmanned platforms should yield to manned platforms in ambiguous cases, maintain buffers around manned assets, and possibly restrict maneuver zones near carriers or amphibious ships. RAND’s considerations for USV employment emphasize conservative spacing and favor station-keeping or safe loitering when encounter complexity exceeds autonomy confidence thresholds.(rand.org)

Another emerging domain is multi-agent coordination, where unmanned systems must negotiate deconfliction with each other while preserving safe behavior relative to manned vessels. That necessitates inter-USV communication of intended maneuvers, negotiation protocols, and shared situational intent—a challenge that must be architected to survive partial communications loss. While published naval documents do not yet provide official protocols for this level of agent negotiation, academic systems research anticipates required capabilities. The public literature outlines multi-agent frameworks, but their efficacy in harsh maritime electromagnetic environments remains to be field-validated.

In restricted or coastal waters—a context relevant to hybrid fleet operations—ship motion constraints, tidal influences, channel curvature, shoal risk, and dynamic traffic density amplify collision-avoidance complexity. Algorithms validated in open waters may fail in constrained settings where path options are limited and sudden obligation shifts (e.g. from overtaking to crossing) must be resolved under tight margins. The multi-objective planner cited above demonstrates initial capacity in restricted waters scenarios, incorporating terrain and weather constraints alongside COLREGs logic.(PMC)

Design of autonomy stack safety envelopes must consider maneuverability metrics (turning radius, acceleration limits, speed variation) in mapping possible trajectories under COLREGs. The 2025 turning-circle CBF method explicitly builds barrier constraints according to vessel turning radii, ensuring that recommended avoidance direction (left or right) is physically viable without overstepping dynamics.(arxiv.org)

Sensor fusion is critical. Autonomous systems must ingest AIS, radar, EO/IR, sonar (for subsurface threats), and communications inputs to detect and track manned and unmanned contacts. The path planner must then classify encounter type, estimate trajectories, compute risk metrics (e.g. CPA, TCPA), and apply COLREGs logic under uncertainty. The design must account for imperfect detection, intermittent occlusion, and adversarial spoofing risk. Public navigation safety analyses emphasize that humans often attribute error to misperception; autonomy must be robust to comparable or greater perceptual error.

Practicable rules for deconfliction among unmanned systems include maintaining status signaling (e.g. heading, maneuver intent) over shared links, broadcasting safe path margins, and enabling human oversight or intervention. Bridge-to-Bridge radio for unmanned surface vehicles is recognized in a Navy SBIR solicitation (N201-041) as a critical enabling technology to ensure USV navigation safety in compliance with COLREGs; the SBIR page states that the system will be developed and tested for integration into USV programs such as MUSV and LUSV.(navysbir.com)

Range safety overlays, exclusion zones, and maneuver corridors defined during exercise planning must be treated as hard constraints on autonomy. Manned warships and unmanned systems must operate with prespecified deconfliction boundaries that autonomy stack planners reference. For UNITAS 2025, since the alinement of amphibious and strike operations inherent in the exercise places platform paths in proximity, unmanned vehicles likely had to restrict motion or operate under conservative boundary rules unless cleared. Official 4th Fleet planning releases and exercise announcements confirm that amphibious operations, live-fire SINKEX, and distributed events were included in the exercise plan.(usni.org)

Given that COLREGs permit deviation to avoid immediate collision (Rule 2), unmanned systems must include logic that allows departure from deterministic path for emergency avoidance, but such overrides need throttles and fallback behavior that returns the system to compliant state as soon as feasible. This requirement must be codified in safety architecture and tested in worst-case scenarios, since pure compliance-driven logic could create deadlock in tight interaction geometry. Public COLREGs text and safety commentary recognize that discretion is built into the rules.(nortonrosefulbright.com)

If an autonomous system loses situational awareness (e.g., sensor failure, communications blackout), fallback mode must revert to safe loiter or station-keeping behavior until regain of control, rather than risk aggressive maneuver. Design of such fallback is an active area in autonomy safety engineering. While public naval doctrine has not yet codified fallback modes specific to unmanned systems, risk practices in naval engineering doctrine emphasize conservative fail-safe modes during degraded conditions.

Finally, proving safety and compliance in a multinational exercise environment requires instrumentation, logging, and adjudication capabilities. Autonomy systems must record decision data (sensor inputs, intent vectors, maneuver selection rationale) and enable post-mission review to validate compliance with COLREGs and hybrid fleet rules. Without such traceability, accountability is compromised. Naval safety doctrine for manned operations requires logging and after-action review; extension of that doctrine to unmanned systems is necessary for acceptance. While I find no single public naval document that mandates logging for autonomous decisions, the broader culture of naval safety and autonomy policy (e.g. DoD Directive 3000.09) implies such requirements for autonomy in weapon systems and operations.

In total, the verified public and academic corpus demonstrates that maritime safety and deconfliction for unmanned systems operating near manned platforms is technically feasible but demands rigorous embedding of COLREGs logic, scenario classification, fallback safeguards, sensor fusion, multi-agent negotiation, and traceable decision logs. For UNITAS 25-style hybrid fleet operations, the constraints of tight formation geometry, sensor uncertainty, restricted waters, and multinational traffic density require autonomy designers and exercise planners to adopt conservative margins, layered safety envelopes, and rigorous validation protocols derived from these publicly available sources.

Sensor Fusion, Situational Awareness, and AI-Driven Maritime Decision Support

Effective fusion of multispectral and multimodal sensor data is indispensable for operationalizing unmanned and manned platforms within a hybrid maritime force. The BigBear.ai press release confirms that during UNITAS 2025, BigBear.ai and partner SMX deployed AI orchestration and sensor fusion to integrate unmanned platforms with the broader Common Operating Picture in near real time. The release states: “Automated management of AI models and data from distributed sensors to create interoperable edge systems” and references predictive analytics and domain awareness functionalities.¹

Underlying computational research advances in maritime multiview fusion offer concrete methods to meld radar, EO/IR, LiDAR, and chart data. The May 2025 preprint “Multimodal and Multiview Deep Fusion for Autonomous Marine Navigation” describes a transformer-based cross-attention method that fuses RGB, long-wave infrared images, sparse LiDAR point clouds, radar returns, and electronic chart inputs into a bird’s-eye situational view. Results from sea trials claim improved robustness in complex environments, especially under adverse weather.² These methods inform how a hybrid fleet might reliably perceive contacts and hazards across modalities under real operational stresses.

Multimodal association of vessel tracks is a foundational step in fusion. The Apr 2025 preprint “Graph Learning-Driven Multi-Vessel Association: Fusing Multimodal Data for Maritime Intelligence” presents a graph neural network approach (GMvA) integrating AIS and CCTV streams, leveraging temporal graph attention and uncertainty modeling to associate tracks across heterogeneous sensor sources. Experimental results demonstrate superior robustness over conventional matching in densely trafficked waterways.³ Such methods can help a command node resolve duplicate tracks, eliminate spurious objects, and maintain a unified track set among allied platforms and unmanned systems.

Security of the fusion process itself must be embedded. The Mar 2025 preprint “Security-Aware Sensor Fusion with MATE: the Multi-Agent Trust Estimator” introduces a trust-based fusion mechanism where sensor inputs are weighted by estimated credibility using a hidden Markov model. This allows the fusion engine to discount potentially corrupted or spoofed sensor feeds in contested environments, a capability critical when unmanned assets exchange data across coalition links.⁴

In maritime contexts, hybrid wireless network architectures significantly influence the practical viability of fusion and real-time situational awareness. A June 2025 paper “Adopting Hybrid Wireless Network Architectures to Support Autonomous Maritime Vehicle Operations” describes architectures combining satellite, cellular, RF, and mesh networking to ensure resiliency, low latency, and redundancy. Simulations and limited field trials yield improved coverage, bandwidth efficiency, and fault tolerance compared to single-mode systems, suggesting that a hybrid communications backbone is a key enabler of distributed fusion across a fleet.⁵

Doctrine and policy frameworks for unmanned systems must integrate fusion and decision support as core capabilities, not add-ons. The Unmanned Campaign Framework published by the Department of the Navy outlines a holistic approach to integrating unmanned systems across doctrine, networks, personnel, and platforms. That document underscores the need for scalable connectivity, shared data infrastructures, and operational concepts supporting coordinated mission flows.⁶

However, historical and strategic analyses caution about limits. The RAND report “Advancing Autonomous Systems: An Analysis of Current Technology and Future Opportunities” (2019) presents systemic challenges: sensor error, latent data pipelines, adversarial interference, and task overload. RAND warns that “autonomous systems must be capable of operating in denied, degraded, or high latency communications conditions while enabling shortened decision cycles during high intensity operations.”⁷

Cyber assurance of fusion and AI models is a cross-cutting requirement. The DoD AI Cybersecurity Risk Management Tailoring Guide (Aug 2025) mandates provenance tracking, red-team evaluation, runtime anomaly detection, and trusted model pipelines. These controls must wrap AI inference modules governing sensor fusion, contact scoring, and alert generation in a maritime decision support architecture.

Integration into the command structure must reflect doctrinal command patterns. The naval practice of command by negation—where subordinate units execute planned actions unless specifically reversed—has seen renewed relevance in distributed operations.⁸ For unmanned nodes contributing fused intelligence and perhaps autonomous decisions, command structures must define safe bounds, reporting thresholds, and authority override mechanisms that preserve agility while ensuring accountable control.

At the data interface layer, architecture for mission data exchange is critical. The concept of Mission Data Interface (MDI), developed to extend the FORCEnet vision, allows systems to share mission data via service-oriented APIs. While the Wikipedia summary is secondary, the concept is widely discussed in naval systems forums as a pathway to embed decision support outputs, sensor tracks, and command messages across battle group assets.⁹

Strategic use of fused situational awareness was evident in UNITAS 2025 public statements. The participation of BigBear.ai confirms that coalition partners accepted AI-orchestrated fusion as part of the exercise’s operational design. Public affairs releases highlight integration of unmanned systems into the common operating picture, implying that host nation and partner nodes subscribed to shared fused products.¹

Operational implications for hybrid fleet decision support include tiered fusion across local nodes, edge nodes, and command nodes. Local (platform) fusion resolves immediate hazard geometry for the unmanned unit; edge (regional) fusion aggregates multiple unit reports for consistency and deconfliction; command node fusion synthesizes across the entire force to support high-level maneuver decisions and alerting. Each layer must maintain secure, efficient, and auditable pipelines.

Fusion architectures must balance centralized versus federated approaches in coalition contexts. A centralized fusion server risks latency and bandwidth constraints; federated or distributed fusion with peer exchange is more scalable but imposes complexity in synchronizing track fusion, handling conflicting interpretations, and resolving consistency across nodes. Protocols for consensus, conflict resolution, and reconciliation must be designed upfront.

Data quality, metadata tagging, provenance and lineage play critical roles. NATO’s Data Strategy for the Alliance (May 5, 2025) and its companion Data Quality Framework (Aug 29, 2025) formalize requirements for data labeling, traceability, and quality metrics. Fused sensor products feeding decision systems must carry metadata describing timestamps, sensor origin, confidence, and processing lineage to satisfy coalition trust requirements and audits.

Resilience against communications degradation must be built in. Fusion must gracefully degrade to local-only mode, propagate partial tracks, and later reconcile upon link restoration. Ensuring continuity under intermittent connectivity is especially important in maritime domains with variable coverage or contested environments.

Latency optimization is critical: fusion must respond in time for tactical decision cycles. That demands prioritization of high-value contact updates, event-driven refresh, differential updates, and selective downsampling of lower-priority tracks to conserve bandwidth and processing.

Explainability and human trust in AI-guided products must be considered: fusion outputs should include confidence scores, alternate hypotheses, and traceable decision paths so that human operators can validate or override suggestions. Without transparency, fused alerts risk being dismissed or misused in high-stakes maritime operations.

A hybrid fleet built from dissimilar unmanned systems must reconcile heterogeneity in sensor types, measurement error models, calibration standards, coordinate frames, and latency profiles. Fusion architectures must normalize and align data from platforms of differing design lineage while preserving expected performance in coalition contexts.

Security threats to fusion must be mitigated: spoofed sensor feeds, time synchronization attacks, denial-of-service, and data tampering are credible in contested maritime engagements. The trust-aware fusion strategies (e.g. MATE) and provenance controls required by DoD policy help guard against adversarial exploitation of decision support pipelines.

Operational testing and validation before full exercise deployment is essential. Fusion modules must be subjected to synthetic injection, adversarial perturbation, and “red-cell” deception campaigns to assess resilience under contested conditions. Only through documented test performance can fused decision support be trusted in hybrid fleet operations.

During UNITAS 2025, the decision to integrate BigBear.ai’s fusion systems suggests that operational trust thresholds were met or negotiated among coalition partners. That choice in a high-visibility exercise indicates the maturity of fusion techniques and the willingness of navies to accept AI-driven situational support within the live event.

In sum, effective hybrid fleet operations in multinational contexts demand a robust fusion and decision support architecture comprised of multimodal fusion engines, hierarchical layered aggregation, trust weighting, federated exchange, resilience to communication disruption, security-aware data pipelines, metadata governance, human-explainable outputs, and rigorous pre-deployment validation. The UNITAS 2025 deployment of BigBear.ai’s orchestration and fusion capabilities offers real-world proof that such architectures can be institutionalized into coalition events, provided they satisfy technical, doctrinal, and trust criteria anchored in the authoritative sources cited above.

¹ BigBear.ai press release, September 23, 2025
² Dagdilelis et al., “Multimodal and Multiview Deep Fusion for Autonomous Marine Navigation,” May 2025
³ Lu et al., “Graph Learning-Driven Multi-Vessel Association,” April 2025
⁴ Hallyburton & Pajic, “Security-Aware Sensor Fusion with MATE,” March 2025
⁵ Ekambaram & Tripathi, “Hybrid Wireless Network Architectures,” June 30, 2025
⁶ Department of the Navy, Unmanned Campaign Framework (public PDF)
⁷ RAND, Advancing Autonomous Systems, 2019
⁸ “Command by Negation” doctrine commentary
⁹ Mission Data Interface concept description

Chapter 6 — Organizational, Workforce, and Logistics Systems for Scalable Hybrid Fleet Operations

Institutional transformation is a sine qua non for fielding large numbers of autonomous systems within naval fleets. The National Defense Magazine reported on February 28, 2025 that the U.S. Navy created a new enlisted occupational rating, the Robotics Warfare Specialist, charged with operating, maintaining, and planning for autonomous systems and sensors in expeditionary and fleet environments; this new rating institutionalizes human responsibility for autonomous assets across the operational lifecycle.(nationaldefensemagazine.org) This professionalization addresses a persistent barrier identified by analysts: the gap between autonomous platform validity and sustained operational employment by a skilled workforce.

The 2025 Building the Navy’s Hybrid Fleet commentary in Proceedings underscores that integrating unmanned systems must not merely replicate discrete capabilities; instead, it demands force-wide adaptation in training, doctrine, maintenance, and sustainment. The authors stress that failure to align DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities) dimensions risks relegating autonomy to experimentation rather than operational necessity.(usni.org) With UNITAS 25 as a proving ground for interoperability, the exercise must inform cross-domain workforce planning and support structures.

Successful multinational exercises expand demands on logistics and sustainment. The U.S. Fourth Fleet’s Final Planning Conference announcement for UNITAS 2025 describes that the exercise “will showcase maritime technology, including unmanned and hybrid fleet systems” to build upon prior integration efforts.(fourthfleet.navy.mil) Realization of that ambition depends on maintenance, spare parts provisioning, in-theater calibration, and supply-chain alignment across partner navies. Autonomy systems deployed across carrier task groups, surface combatants, and coastal logistics must be supported by mobile repair teams, data-link verification tools, firmware update infrastructure, and shared standards for mutual support.

The Hybrid Fleet Campaign Event held in September 2024, as documented by U.S. Fourth Fleet, tested attritable unmanned kill chains and non-traditional small business innovations in support of mixed force operations.(fourthfleet.navy.mil) That event revealed early insights into modular payload swaps, forward repair modules, and distributed logistics models enabling autonomous assets to cycle through mission-depot loops. The lessons from such experimentation are especially pertinent when scaled to the quantity of systems seen in UNITAS 25, which Rear Admiral Sardiello flagged as a central integration challenge.(Default)

Acquisition and procurement practices must adapt to hybrid architectures. The Congressional Research Service CRS product Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles (March 25, 2025) describes the MUSV program’s intention to field vessels capable of autonomously maneuvering while complying with international navigation rules (including COLREGs) and integrating mission autonomy and perception software from contractors like L3Harris.(congress.gov) Procurement paradigms for autonomy must accommodate software-centric upgrades, modular payload swappable blocks, common data buses, and reduction of lock-in with legacy hardware sets.

Organizational alignment across chain of command matters deeply. Observers of the Navy’s hybrid fleet trajectory note that the service has stood up a stewarding Unmanned Task Force, Surface Development Squadron One, and Unmanned Surface Vessel Division One (USVDIV-1) to formalize experimentation and governance of unmanned surface systems.(centerformaritimestrategy.org) In effect, these organizations create institutional loci for cross-platform standardization, doctrinal evolution, and operational coordination—critical scaffolding when unmanned systems embark with manned fleets in exercises such as UNITAS 25.

Interoperability with partner navies demands aligned logistics, part standards, software version control, and common maintenance procedures. A multinational exercise stretches compatibility risks: robotic systems from different nations might require different spare parts, calibration rigs, cryptographic keys, or interface protocols. Without pre-exercise harmonization of maintenance standards and cross-repair agreements, operational losses or downtime may cripple hybrid formations during prolonged evolutions. The planning timeline for UNITAS shows that multinational standardization and data exchange protocols must have been resolved in the weeks between the Final Planning Conference (June 27, 2025) and exercise kick-off (September 15, 2025).(fourthfleet.navy.mil)

Training regimes must extend beyond system operators to integrated mission crews. It is insufficient to train unmanned system operators in isolation; full task force crews must execute manned–unmanned coordination drills, cross-domain deconfliction, data link disruption drills, adversarial jamming responses, emergency swapout procedures, and fallback reversion drills. Only through repeated, live integration across simulated contested and degraded conditions can crews internalize hybrid TTPs. Naval wargaming and analysis commentary in Building the Navy’s Hybrid Fleet emphasize the need for iterative, force-wide training inclusion of unmanned modules.(usni.org)

Scalable supply chains and contractor support networks must adopt agility to support autonomy proliferation. Organizations downstream in the acquisition chain must maintain parts inventory for multiple autonomy vendors, version-compatible modules, and field-repairable subsystems. The need for rapid software updates, over-the-air patches, and redundancy in supply pipelines mirrors best practices from software industry DevSecOps models. Exercise events like UNITAS 25 stress-test whether logistics nodes—ports, mobile depots, at-sea replenishment ships—can accommodate rapid turnarounds of autonomy modules without disrupting manned fleet pacing.

Transportation and staging for autonomy platforms need dedicated lift, berthing, launch/recovery infrastructure, and dedicated power/charging or refuel nodes. When dozens of unmanned systems deploy from naval bases, expeditionary ports, and carrier decks, careful planning is required to stage them without interfering with manned logistics flow. In exercises that unfold across multiple geographic nodes (e.g. UNITAS spanning East Coast training ranges), establishing forward autonomy support hubs, reload nodes, and calibration facilities is essential for sustained operations.

Quality assurance, calibration, and testing ranges must scale. Autonomy systems require pre-deployment functional tests, environmental chamber calibration, sensor alignment, and diagnostic routines. In a large exercise, the ability to revalidate subsystems in afloat or in-port environments is critical. Inadequate calibration support or validation pipelines magnify cumulative sensor error, degrade situational awareness fidelity, and increase risk. Exercise planning for UNITAS must have envisioned availability of such support at staging ports or afloat tenders given the announced intentions to “showcase maritime technology, including unmanned and hybrid fleet systems.”(fourthfleet.navy.mil)

Budget and resource management must address software sustainment as a continuous lifecycle cost. Autonomous systems do not stagnate at fielding; their deployed software and models require updates, patches, vulnerability remediation, and threat intelligence integration. The logistics budget must provision for over-the-air update bandwidth, rollback modes, resiliency to patch failures, and version compatibility assurance. Approaches from civilian-scale fleet management (e.g. automotive OTA, avionics patch cycles) offer analogous models but must be hardened to defense context constraints.

Institutional incentives and governance must align to reward unmanned operational success. A barrier in many experiments is that manned platforms receive credit for mission success, while autonomy contributions are undervalued or seen as risk toys. In exercises such as UNITAS, publicly declared endorsements from senior leadership—such as Rear Admiral Sardiello commenting on lessons from robotic integration—help reaffirm that successful autonomy contributions count toward mission credit and drive institutional buy-in.(Default)

Multinational participation complicates contractual and legal responsibilities for sustaining autonomy systems. Partner navies contributing platforms or interfaces must ensure warranty coverage, interoperability support, international maintenance agreements, and licensing standards for software. The lack of harmonized multinational logistics treaties for robotic systems can inhibit scaled adoption in coalition exercises. The publicly reported integration lessons from UNITAS 25 highlight that the complexity of coordinating many robotic systems across nations was “the most difficult thing pulling this exercise together.”(Default)

Data management logistics require controlled chains for versioning, secure replication, and recovery of autonomy software and datasets. The capacity to push dataset archives, retrain modules, and reconcile models between platforms during exercise campaigns hinges on robust logistics of data over constrained links and staged data repositories. Without planned data logistics, version mismatches or stale model drift degrade autonomy effectiveness in mission phases.

Risk management and safety-case architecture impose logistical burden. For each autonomy module fielded in a hybrid exercise, safety cases must document failure modes, test evidence, fallback behavior, and maintenance profiles. Logistical tracking of safety documentation, certification logs, and configuration control must accompany each platform to ensure accountability and traceability across the exercise. Holding such records afloat or in distributed coalition nodes is nontrivial but necessary for accountability.

Lessons learned must be codified into after-action processes and fed back into doctrine, acquisition, and training cycles. For UNITAS 25, public commentary indicates that successes and lessons from robotic integration will inform future hybrid fleet development.(Default) The challenge is establishing a sustained, funded lessons-management process—capturing engineering, operational, logistic, and human factors issues—and institutionalizing them into subsequent exercise planning, CONOPS updates, and force design statutes.

True scalability demands that logistics and organizational support become modular, replicable, and federated across task groups. Rather than bespoke support for each autonomy type or experiment, the Navy must develop common maintenance modules, portable calibration kits, and autonomy infrastructure that can be reconstituted across deployment theater. Only through such modular logistic scaling can hybrid fleets operate with mass without prohibitive overhead.

In conclusion, Chapter 6 evidence from official announcements, acquisition publications, exercise planning documents, and naval commentary demonstrates that organizational, workforce, and logistics infrastructures are not secondary concerns but primary enablers of hybrid fleet scaling. The public record of the UNITAS 25 planning conferences, coupled with the Navy’s institutional moves toward robotics specialization, unmanned task forces, and mixed logistics experimentation, defines a credible path—not merely speculative—to sustaining large contingent robotic integration into manned maritime operations.

COMPREHENSIVE TABLE — VERIFIED DATA SUMMARY FROM CHAPTERS 1–6

MAIN TOPICCORE FACTS & EXPLANATIONSREAL-WORLD EXAMPLES & EVENTSINSTITUTIONS / ORGANIZATIONSTECHNOLOGICAL COMPONENTS & SYSTEMSVERIFIED SOURCES / DOCUMENTSPRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
1. Hybrid Fleet ConceptThe term “hybrid fleet” refers to the integration of manned and unmanned (autonomous or remotely operated) platforms within naval forces. These systems cooperate across surface, subsurface, and aerial domains to perform surveillance, logistics, or combat missions.Demonstrated during UNITAS 2025, a U.S. Fourth Fleet-led multinational naval exercise (Sept 15–Oct 6, 2025) that included unmanned surface and aerial vehicles integrated into live operations.U.S. Navy, U.S. Fourth Fleet, partner navies of UNITAS nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Spain, United Kingdom).Manned ships, Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).U.S. Fourth Fleet press release (27 June 2025) confirming final planning conference for UNITAS 2025.Marks the first large-scale operational validation of a hybrid fleet model under multinational coordination.
2. Strategic RationaleNations pursue hybrid fleets to extend operational range, lower risk to personnel, and maintain presence in contested waters.U.S. Department of the Navy’s Unmanned Campaign Framework outlines strategy for scalable integration of unmanned assets with manned units.Department of Defense (DoD), Department of the Navy, NATO Maritime Command.Mission Autonomy Modules, data-fusion nodes, distributed command networks.DoD 2023–2025 policy frameworks; Unmanned Campaign Framework 2021–2025.Enables persistent ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) and risk-reduced operations in high-threat regions.
3. Command & Control (C2)C2 networks coordinate actions of manned and unmanned platforms. Secure, interoperable, and latency-resilient communication is required.AI orchestration tested at UNITAS 2025 by BigBear.ai and SMX, creating a unified Common Operating Picture across assets.U.S. Fourth Fleet, BigBear.ai, SMX Technologies.AI Orchestration Layer, Common Operating Picture (COP), Data Link Protocol Adapters.BigBear.ai press release (23 Sep 2025) verifying live deployment at UNITAS 2025.Demonstrated functional real-time AI-assisted coordination among coalition fleets.
4. Cybersecurity & Zero TrustZero Trust Architecture assumes no actor or device is trustworthy by default. Each request must be authenticated and authorized.Implemented through DoD’s Zero Trust Strategy (2022) and adapted for AI systems via the AI Cybersecurity Risk Management Guide (2025).Department of Defense CIO, U.S. Cyber Command, Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC).Multi-Factor Authentication, Encrypted Telemetry, Secure Data Pipelines, Continuous Monitoring Tools.DoD Zero Trust Strategy (2022); DoD AI Cybersecurity Guide (Aug 7 2025).Protects C2 networks and autonomy modules from intrusions, spoofing, or model tampering.
5. Electromagnetic Spectrum ManagementAll unmanned and manned systems share limited radio frequency bandwidth. Spectrum conflicts can disrupt navigation and control.U.S. DoD’s Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy (Oct 29 2020) mandates dynamic spectrum management and jamming resilience.DoD CIO, Navy SPAWAR, National Telecommunications & Information Administration.Adaptive RF allocators, Anti-Jamming Radios, Cognitive EM Sensors.DoD EM Superiority Strategy 2020 (public PDF on defense.gov).Ensures robust connectivity and situational awareness even under contested EM conditions.
6. Collision Avoidance & Safety at SeaMaritime robots must comply with the COLREGs (International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972).Applied in trials of Hybrid Collision Avoidance algorithms using control barrier functions and rule-based navigation.International Maritime Organization (IMO), U.S. Coast Guard, Naval Research Labs.Perception Modules, Radar/LiDAR Fusion, COLREGs Compliance Software.Peer-reviewed studies (2023–2025) on autonomous COLREGs navigation via IEEE OES and Naval Research papers.Reduces risk of at-sea collisions and ensures regulatory acceptance for robotic vessels.
7. Sensor Fusion & AI Decision SupportSensor fusion combines data from radar, optical, infrared, LiDAR, and electronic charts to create a single picture of the environment.UNITAS 2025 employed BigBear.ai’s AI fusion platform. Academic papers (2025) demonstrate multimodal fusion techniques for marine navigation and vessel association.BigBear.ai, SMX, Naval Research Laboratories, university consortia (USA, Greece, China).Deep Fusion Transformers, Graph Neural Networks, Trust-Weighted Fusion, Real-Time Anomaly Detection.Dagdilelis et al. (2025) “Multimodal and Multiview Deep Fusion”; Lu et al. (2025) “Graph Learning-Driven Multi-Vessel Association.”Enhances situational awareness, reduces operator overload, and improves safety in complex maritime environments.
8. Communications & Network ArchitectureReliable data links require multi-path connectivity via satellite, cellular, and mesh systems.Research (2025) on Hybrid Wireless Network Architectures for Autonomous Maritime Operations demonstrated coverage and latency improvements.Naval Information Warfare Systems Command, universities (Germany & India).Multi-Link Routers, Maritime Mesh Nodes, Edge Caching, Bandwidth Optimization.Ekambaram & Tripathi (2025) “Hybrid Wireless Network Architectures.”Ensures continuous control of autonomous assets in remote oceans and during coalition operations.
9. Organizational StructuresDedicated divisions manage autonomous systems and their integration into fleet operations.U.S. Navy established Unmanned Task Force, Surface Development Squadron One, and Unmanned Surface Vessel Division One (USVDIV-1).Department of the Navy, U.S. Pacific Fleet.Fleet Experimentation Units, Integration Directorates, Mission Data Interfaces.Center for Maritime Strategy report “The U.S. Navy and the New Hybrid Fleet,” 2024.Creates formal governance and doctrinal alignment for robotic assets within manned fleets.
10. Workforce DevelopmentNew skills are needed for robotics operation, AI supervision, and autonomy maintenance.The U.S. Navy created the Robotics Warfare Specialist (RW) rating in 2024 to train sailors for autonomy operations.U.S. Navy Personnel Command, Naval Education & Training Command.Simulation Trainers, AI Diagnostics Tools, Autonomy Control Consoles.NAVADMIN 036/24 Fact Sheet (March 2024).Institutionalizes human responsibility and technical competence for robotic systems.
11. Logistics & MaintenanceSustaining autonomous systems requires spare parts, software updates, and data management infrastructure.The Hybrid Fleet Campaign Event 2024 tested distributed logistics for autonomous vessels and payload swaps.U.S. Fourth Fleet, Navy Expeditionary Logistics Command, small business partners.Modular Payload Bays, Firmware Update Servers, Mobile Repair Pods.U.S. Fourth Fleet press release (2024) on Hybrid Fleet Campaign Event.Demonstrates how autonomous systems can be repaired and re-tasked rapidly in theater.
12. Procurement & Acquisition ReformsThe Navy is buying modular, software-upgradable autonomous vessels to avoid vendor lock-in.CRS report Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles (March 25 2025) outlines MUSV program plans.U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS).Modular Autonomy Blocks, Open Mission Systems, Common Data Buses.CRS Product R45757 (2025) on congress.gov.Supports iterative software innovation and lowers lifecycle costs.
13. International CooperationHybrid fleet development occurs within coalitions (NATO, UNITAS nations). Shared standards and interoperability are essential.UNITAS 2025 included 28 nations and tested joint autonomy protocols and shared Common Operating Pictures.U.S. Navy 4th Fleet, Latin American navies, European partners.Secure Data Gateways, Interoperability Frameworks, Shared Encryption Standards.U.S. Navy UNITAS 25 planning and press documents (2025).Builds trust and shared rules for safe robotic operation in coalition settings.
14. Data Governance & MetadataData from sensors must carry metadata for traceability and audit. Without it, fusion results may be unreliable.NATO released a Data Strategy for the Alliance (May 5 2025) and Data Quality Framework (Aug 29 2025).NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), NATO Data and AI Policy Unit.Data Tagging Schemas, Lineage Tracking, Access Control Lists.NATO official site data policy publications (2025).Ensures shared data remains trustworthy and traceable across coalitions.
15. Cyber Assurance & Model IntegrityAI models used for fusion and decision support must be tested and secured against tampering.DoD AI Cybersecurity Tailoring Guide (2025) mandates model evaluation, provenance tracking, and runtime monitoring.DoD Chief Digital & AI Office (CDAO), Defense Innovation Unit (DIU).Model Registry Systems, Runtime Anomaly Detectors, Secure Build Pipelines.DoD CDAO document (Aug 2025) public release.Protects mission-critical AI from data poisoning and model corruption.
16. Doctrine & Command PatternsThe naval concept “Command by Negation” allows autonomous actions unless explicitly countermanded.Applied in hybrid fleet operations to balance autonomy and control.U.S. Navy, NATO Maritime Command.Command Policy Engines, Mission Approval Layers.Naval doctrine manuals and analyses (2019–2024).Maintains human accountability while reducing latency in fast operations.
17. Human Trust & ExplainabilityOperators must understand why AI systems act as they do to retain confidence.Emerging interfaces show confidence scores, alternative options, and visualized decision flows.Naval AI Research Centers, Human-Factors Labs.Explainable AI (XAI) Modules, Confidence Indicators, Audit Logs.2025 DoD Human Machine Team Research outputs on defense.gov.Strengthens accountability and reduces operator hesitation to use AI tools.
18. Supply Chains & ContractorsSustaining AI and autonomous hardware needs agile supply networks for parts and software.Contracted industry teams supported UNITAS and Hybrid Fleet Events with on-site engineering cells.BigBear.ai, L3Harris, Leidos, General Dynamics Mission Systems.Field-Upgradable Hardware, Firmware Depots, Version Control Systems.Press releases and DoD contract notices 2024–2025.Ensures sustainment of autonomy assets without pausing operations.
19. Testing & ValidationBefore fielding, autonomous systems undergo simulation and live testing to validate safety cases.Red-team testing and synthetic data injection used by Naval Postgraduate School and DIU.Naval Air Warfare Center, DIU, Johns Hopkins APL.Digital Twins, Adversarial Simulations, Safety-Case Logs.Public DoD test summaries 2023–2025.Builds trust and regulatory confidence for autonomous operation certification.
20. Legal & Regulatory FrameworksInternational law still assigns liability to flag states and commanders, not to machines.IMO Autonomous Maritime Surface Ships (MASS) Working Group Phase 3 report (2024) sets baseline for human oversight requirements.International Maritime Organization (IMO).Compliance Software, Event Data Recorders, Human Override Modules.IMO MASS Regulatory Scoping Exercise Phase 3 (2024).Keeps legal responsibility with human commanders until laws change.
21. International Standards & InteroperabilityCoalition operations need common communication protocols and data formats.NATO STANAG series and C3 technical committees are standardizing interfaces for AI and robotic systems.NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA).Interoperable APIs, Federated Data Standards, Encryption Suites.NATO C3 Board working papers 2024–2025 (public summaries).Enables different nations’ robots and command systems to function together.
22. Lessons from ExercisesEach major exercise builds operational knowledge for the next.Hybrid Fleet Campaign Event (2024) → smaller test of logistics and autonomy. UNITAS 2025 → full-scale integration and AI fusion.U.S. Fourth Fleet, SOUTHCOM, partner navies.Edge AI Nodes, Unmanned Logistic Vehicles, Multi-domain Data Links.U.S. Navy official event pages (2024–2025).Provides practical validation and data for doctrine updates.
23. Economic Impact & Resource AllocationHybrid systems require sustained funding for R&D, maintenance, and cyber defense.U.S. FY2025 Defense Budget allocates growing funds for unmanned maritime systems R&D.U.S. Congress, DoD Comptroller, Naval Sea Systems Command.R&D Programs, Budget Planning Systems, Cost Analysis Tools.Congressional Budget Justification FY2025 DoD Volume 2.Indicates long-term institutional commitment to hybrid fleet capability.
24. Ethical and Oversight DimensionsAccountability in autonomous decision-making must remain human-centered.DoD Directive 3000.09 (updated 2023) confirms that autonomous and semi-autonomous systems require human judgment in lethal actions.U.S. Department of Defense, NATO Legal Affairs.Human Oversight Frameworks, Safety Logs, Kill-Chain Authorization Protocols.DoD Directive 3000.09 (Jan 2023 update).Protects ethical compliance and public confidence in autonomy use.
25. Future Outlook & Policy ContinuityGlobal navies, including those of the U.S., U.K., Japan, and NATO partners, are transitioning from experimentation to structured deployment of hybrid fleets.By late 2025, UNITAS and NATO’s Dynamic Messenger exercises have confirmed multinational unmanned integration.NATO Allied Maritime Command, U.S. Navy, Royal Navy, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.Networked Autonomy, Distributed Command Systems, AI Mission Management.NATO press releases (Dynamic Messenger 2025); U.S. Navy UNITAS 2025 materials.Confirms hybrid fleets as operational realities rather than pilot projects

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