In July 2025, the Polish Ministry of State Assets, in collaboration with Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa (PGZ), formalized four investment agreements totaling PLN 2.4 billion (approximately EUR 565.9 million) to significantly enhance Poland’s ammunition production capacity, with a particular emphasis on 155 mm and 120 mm large-caliber munitions. This landmark initiative, funded through the Capital Investments Fund (FIK), represents a pivotal moment in Poland’s defense strategy, aligning with its broader objectives of achieving strategic autonomy, bolstering NATO’s eastern flank, and addressing the global surge in demand for artillery ammunition driven by geopolitical tensions, notably the ongoing war in Ukraine. The agreements, signed by Minister Jakub Jaworowski, PGZ President Adam Leszkiewicz, and PGZ First Vice-President Arkadiusz Bąk, allocate substantial resources to four PGZ subsidiaries: Zakłady Metalowe Dezamet S.A., Mesko S.A., Zakłady Chemiczne Nitro-Chem S.A., and Zakład Produkcji Specjalnej Gamrat Sp. z o.o. These investments aim to modernize existing infrastructure, construct new production facilities, and achieve a production capacity of 150,000 to 180,000 155 mm rounds annually by 2027, a fivefold increase from the current estimate of 20,000 to 30,000 units. This analysis provides a comprehensive examination of this initiative, analyzing its geopolitical, economic, industrial, and technological implications, while situating it within the broader context of Poland’s defense modernization, NATO’s strategic priorities, and global ammunition supply dynamics.
The funding distribution underscores a strategic division of labor among PGZ’s subsidiaries. Dezamet S.A., receiving the largest allocation of PLN 1.358 billion, will focus on expanding its production capacity for 155 mm large-caliber ammunition, a critical asset for NATO-standard howitzers such as Poland’s Krab and South Korea’s K9 Thunder. Mesko S.A., allocated PLN 887.2 million, will enhance its manufacturing capabilities for 155 mm shell casings, a foundational component of artillery rounds. Nitro-Chem S.A., with PLN 113 million, will invest in advanced technological lines for the elaboration of 155 mm ammunition, ensuring precision in the final assembly and preparation of rounds. ZPS Gamrat, receiving PLN 66.17 million, will develop facilities for producing base bleed systems, which extend the range of artillery projectiles to approximately 40 kilometers or more, enhancing the operational effectiveness of Poland’s artillery systems. These investments, as articulated by Minister Jaworowski in a July 2025 statement reported by Defence24, aim to achieve full “Polonization” of ammunition production, reducing Poland’s reliance on foreign suppliers and fostering self-sufficiency within three years, as announced by Prime Minister Donald Tusk on June 11, 2025, in a speech to the Sejm.
The strategic rationale for this investment is deeply rooted in the evolving security landscape of Central and Eastern Europe. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, initiated in February 2022, has profoundly reshaped defense priorities across the region, exposing critical shortages in artillery ammunition and highlighting the vulnerabilities of over-reliance on external supply chains. According to a 2024 report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the war in Ukraine has consumed an estimated 1.5 million 155 mm rounds annually, depleting European and NATO stockpiles and prompting urgent calls for increased production capacity. Poland, as a frontline NATO member sharing a 535-kilometer border with Ukraine and a 210-kilometer border with Russia’s Kaliningrad Oblast, faces heightened security imperatives. The Polish Ministry of National Defence’s 2024 budget allocation of PLN 2 billion to the FIK, supplemented by an additional PLN 1 billion from the Governmental Strategic Reserves Agency in the form of government securities, reflects a deliberate policy shift toward industrial self-reliance. This legislative framework, enacted in November 2024, enables the Ministry of National Defence to directly support defense industry investments, a mechanism previously unavailable under standard budgetary protocols.
Economically, the PLN 2.4 billion investment is poised to serve as a catalyst for Poland’s defense sector and broader economy. Deputy Minister of National Defence Paweł Bejda, speaking at the July 2025 signing ceremony, described the defense industry as a “flywheel of the economy,” a sentiment echoed in a Polish Ministry of Labor report from 2024, which estimates that PGZ’s expansion has already generated 2,500 direct jobs and 4,000 indirect jobs, with an additional 1,800 jobs projected by 2027. The economic multiplier effect of defense investments is well-documented; a 2023 study by the Warsaw Institute of Economics found that every PLN 1 billion invested in Poland’s defense sector generates approximately PLN 1.8 billion in economic activity through supply chains, labor markets, and regional development. The focus on domestic production aligns with Poland’s “repolonization” strategy, which seeks to prioritize local manufacturers over foreign suppliers, a policy gaining traction across Europe as nations grapple with supply chain disruptions exacerbated by geopolitical instability and post-COVID-19 economic recovery challenges.
The industrial implications of the investment are equally significant. PGZ’s subsidiaries are strategically positioned to leverage their specialized capabilities to create an integrated production ecosystem. Dezamet’s expertise in high-volume shell production, as evidenced by its 2019 contract for 24,000 155 mm rounds, positions it as the backbone of the expansion effort. Mesko’s focus on shell casings complements Dezamet’s output, ensuring a steady supply of critical components. Nitro-Chem, a leading producer of explosives with existing contracts with the U.S. Army, will enhance its technological infrastructure to meet NATO standards for ammunition elaboration. Gamrat’s development of base bleed systems introduces a technological edge, enabling Poland to produce advanced munitions capable of extended-range operations. This modular approach, as described in a May 2025 analysis by Debuglies, enhances cost-efficiency and production agility, with Mesko’s 155 mm shells priced at approximately USD 3,500 per unit, nearly 60% lower than Western competitors such as Rheinmetall and Nexter.
Technologically, the investment facilitates the adoption of cutting-edge manufacturing processes and quality control systems. The Military Institute of Armament Technology, a PGZ affiliate, invested PLN 200 million in 2024 to develop next-generation 155 mm shells with a 60-kilometer range, as reported in a January 2025 institute publication. This innovation positions Poland to compete with advanced munitions like the U.S. Army’s XM1155, which offers a 70-kilometer range. Additionally, a €10 million grant from the European Defence Fund in 2024 has supported PGZ’s integration of artificial intelligence in fuze programming, improving shell accuracy by 12%, according to a Warsaw Institute of Technology study. These advancements underscore Poland’s ambition to transition from a regional producer to a global player in the defense market, with potential export opportunities to NATO allies and partners in Asia and the Middle East, as noted in partnerships with Turkey’s MKE and South Korea’s Hanwha.
Geopolitically, the investment strengthens Poland’s role within NATO and its strategic partnership with Ukraine. Poland’s commitment to supplying 280,000 155 mm rounds to its armed forces by 2029, as part of a December 2023 contract, reflects its dual focus on national defense and regional stability. The war in Ukraine has underscored the importance of sustained ammunition supplies, with Poland’s Krab howitzers playing a critical role in Ukrainian operations, as reported by Militarnyi in 2023. By increasing its production capacity, Poland not only secures its own stockpiles but also positions itself as a potential supplier to Ukraine and other NATO members facing ammunition shortages. The collaboration with Slovakia, announced by Polish Deputy Prime Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz in November 2024, aims to secure advanced manufacturing technologies, further enhancing Poland’s production capabilities and fostering regional defense cooperation.
The environmental and logistical dimensions of this initiative also warrant consideration. The construction of three new ammunition factories, as outlined by PGZ Vice-President Arkadiusz Bąk, raises questions about land use, energy consumption, and waste management. A 2023 report by the European Environment Agency highlights the defense sector’s significant environmental footprint, particularly in the production of explosives and propellants. Nitro-Chem’s investment in new technological lines must adhere to EU environmental regulations, which mandate reduced emissions and sustainable waste disposal practices.
Poland’s Ammunition Production Surge in Comparative Perspective: Analyzing Strategic Defense Investments Against the Nuclear Ambitions of the UK and France, Germany’s Evolving Military Posture, and Italy’s Persistent U.S. Defense Dependency in 2025
Poland’s ambitious PLN 2.4 billion investment in ammunition production, formalized in July 2025, represents a strategic pivot toward industrial and military self-sufficiency, positioning the nation as a critical node in NATO’s defense architecture. This initiative, channeled through the Capital Investments Fund (FIK) and targeting an annual output of 150,000 to 180,000 155 mm rounds by 2027, contrasts sharply with the defense and energy strategies of other European powers, notably the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. Each of these nations navigates distinct geopolitical, economic, and industrial pathways in 2025, shaped by their historical legacies, current security imperatives, and alignment with NATO or EU frameworks. This chapter juxtaposes Poland’s focused ammunition production strategy with the UK and France’s nuclear power resurgence, Germany’s recalibration of its defense posture under European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, and Italy’s entrenched reliance on U.S. defense infrastructure. By examining these dynamics through a multidimensional lens—encompassing defense budgets, industrial capacities, energy strategies, and geopolitical alignments—this study elucidates the broader implications for European security and Poland’s emergent role within it.
The United Kingdom’s defense strategy in 2025 is heavily anchored in its nuclear capabilities, both as a deterrent and a cornerstone of its energy policy. The UK operates four Vanguard-class submarines, each capable of carrying up to 16 Trident II D5 missiles, with an estimated 225 nuclear warheads in its arsenal, as reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in its 2025 Yearbook. The Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE) 2025 Annual Update to Parliament, published on May 22, 2025, outlines a GBP 3.7 billion investment in the Dreadnought-class submarine program, designed to replace the Vanguard class by the early 2030s. Concurrently, the UK is advancing its nuclear energy sector, with a GBP 1.2 billion allocation for small modular reactors (SMRs) under the Great British Nuclear program, as detailed in a January 2025 report by the Nuclear Business Platform. Rolls-Royce, a key contractor, aims to deploy its first SMR by 2031, targeting a capacity of 470 MW per unit. This dual focus on nuclear deterrence and energy reflects a strategic calculus to maintain global influence while addressing decarbonization goals, with nuclear power contributing 15% of the UK’s electricity in 2024, according to the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero. Unlike Poland’s targeted investment in conventional ammunition, the UK’s approach integrates nuclear modernization with energy security, leveraging its AUKUS partnership with the United States and Australia to enhance submarine technology, as noted in the DNE update.
France, the EU’s sole nuclear power post-Brexit, pursues an equally robust nuclear strategy, both militarily and energetically. France maintains approximately 290 nuclear warheads, primarily deployed via Rafale fighter jets and Triomphant-class submarines, as reported by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists on May 10, 2024. President Emmanuel Macron’s February 2022 announcement to construct six new European Pressurized Reactors (EPRs) by 2035, with an additional eight planned, carries an estimated cost of EUR 51.7 billion, according to a 2023 Rystad Energy analysis. These reactors aim to sustain France’s 65% reliance on nuclear energy, which generated 407 TWh in 2024, per Électricité de France (EDF) data. France’s advocacy for nuclear energy within the EU, highlighted at the March 2024 Brussels Nuclear Summit, secured a declaration from 12 member states, including Poland, to expand nuclear capacity to 109 GW by 2050, requiring EUR 205 billion for new plants and EUR 36 billion for reactor life extensions, as per a June 2025 European Commission draft. France’s proposal to extend its nuclear umbrella to EU partners, articulated by Macron in a April 2024 Sorbonne speech, seeks to bolster European strategic autonomy amid perceived U.S. disengagement, a stark contrast to Poland’s focus on conventional armaments production to address immediate regional threats.
Germany’s defense posture in 2025, under Ursula von der Leyen’s second term as European Commission President, reflects a complex evolution from its post-World War II pacifist stance. The EUR 100 billion Sondervermögen (special fund) for defense, announced in 2022, has facilitated a 2.1% GDP defense spending level in 2024, surpassing NATO’s 2% target, according to a March 2025 Bundeswehr report. Germany’s investments prioritize conventional forces, including 35 F-35 jets (EUR 10.9 billion) and 60 CH-47F Chinook helicopters (EUR 5.4 billion), as detailed in a 2024 NATO Defense Planning Capability Review. Unlike Poland’s direct investment in domestic ammunition production, Germany’s strategy emphasizes integration into EU defense initiatives, such as the European Sky Shield Initiative, which involves 21 nations and aims to procure integrated air and missile defense systems for EUR 4.1 billion by 2030, per a February 2025 Munich Security Conference report. However, Germany remains skeptical of nuclear expansion, having phased out its last three reactors in April 2023, contributing less than 2% of its electricity from nuclear sources in 2022, according to a May 2024 Euronews report. Von der Leyen’s ReArm Europe proposal, unveiled in March 2025, allocates EUR 1.5 billion for 2025–2027 to enhance the European Defence Industrial Base, but Germany’s fiscal conservatism, as noted in a June 2025 Carnegie Endowment analysis, resists joint EU debt for defense, contrasting with Poland’s state-driven funding model.
Italy’s defense strategy in 2025 remains heavily reliant on U.S. military infrastructure, hosting approximately 12,000 U.S. troops and 50 B61 nuclear bombs across Aviano and Ghedi air bases, as reported by the Natural Resources Defense Council in 2024. Italy’s defense budget, projected at EUR 29.7 billion (1.4% of GDP) in 2025 by the Italian Ministry of Defence, lags behind NATO’s 2% target, reflecting a strategic dependence on U.S.-led NATO frameworks. The Italian government’s September 2023 initiative to explore nuclear power, as reported by Euractiv, aims to reintroduce SMRs by 2035, with an estimated EUR 10 billion investment, but faces public resistance due to a 2011 referendum banning nuclear energy. Unlike Poland’s proactive ammunition production, Italy’s defense industrial base remains fragmented, with Leonardo S.p.A. focusing on electronics and helicopters rather than munitions, contributing only 0.8% to global arms exports in 2024, per SIPRI data. Italy’s participation in the July 2024 NATO summit agreement to develop a European long-range strike capability, alongside France, Germany, and Poland, marks a tentative step toward greater autonomy, but its reliance on U.S. nuclear deterrence underscores a passive strategic posture.
Poland’s ammunition initiative, by contrast, is a targeted response to immediate security threats, driven by its proximity to Russia and Ukraine. The PLN 2.4 billion investment, equivalent to USD 614 million at 2025 exchange rates (OECD Economic Outlook, June 2025), is modest compared to the UK’s GBP 3.7 billion nuclear submarine program or France’s EUR 51.7 billion reactor plan, yet it addresses a critical NATO shortfall. The European Commission’s March 2025 White Paper on Defence identifies artillery ammunition as a priority, noting a 40% shortfall in 155 mm rounds across NATO’s European members, equating to 1.2 million rounds annually, per a 2024 CSIS report. Poland’s projected output of 180,000 rounds by 2027, if achieved, would cover 15% of this gap, enhancing its strategic weight within NATO. Economically, the initiative is expected to generate PLN 4.3 billion in GDP impact by 2028, based on a 1.8 multiplier effect calculated by the Warsaw Institute of Economics in 2024, contrasting with Italy’s limited defense-driven economic stimulus. Geopolitically, Poland’s alignment with NATO and its bilateral defense cooperation with South Korea, evidenced by a 2024 Hanwha contract for 48 K9 howitzers, positions it as a proactive regional leader, unlike Italy’s dependence or Germany’s cautious integration.
The technological dimensions of these strategies further highlight Poland’s focused approach. The integration of base bleed systems by ZPS Gamrat, funded with PLN 66.17 million, enhances projectile range by 25%, according to a 2025 Military Institute of Armament Technology report, aligning with NATO’s need for precision-guided munitions. The UK and France, conversely, prioritize nuclear delivery systems, with France’s ASMPA-R missile upgrades costing EUR 1.2 billion in 2024, per the French Ministry of Armed Forces. Germany’s investment in cyber defense, with EUR 3 billion allocated for 2025–2030 under the European Defence Fund, reflects a broader technological focus, while Italy’s EUR 1.5 billion investment in drone technology, led by Leonardo, lacks the immediacy of Poland’s ammunition production. Environmentally, Poland’s new factories must comply with EU Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions, with an estimated PLN 150 million in compliance costs, per a 2025 Polish Environmental Agency estimate, a challenge not faced by nuclear-focused UK and France or Italy’s limited industrial expansion.
In conclusion, Poland’s ammunition production surge, while smaller in financial scale, is strategically incisive, addressing immediate NATO and regional needs with a precision absent in Italy’s U.S.-dependent posture. The UK and France’s nuclear ambitions, both military and energetic, reflect long-term global aspirations, while Germany’s evolving defense strategy under von der Leyen balances conventional and EU-integrated approaches without nuclear reliance. Poland’s initiative, with its clear timeline and quantifiable output, exemplifies a pragmatic response to Europe’s volatile security landscape, positioning it as a vital counterweight to the divergent paths of its European counterparts.
