The vulnerability of Lebanon’s infrastructure to cyberattacks has become a critical concern in light of the country’s growing economic, political, and social crises. Over the past few years, Lebanon has seen the near-total collapse of its energy sector, particularly the state-run Electricité du Liban (EDL), which has led to widespread electricity shortages, water sanitation issues, and a dramatic rise in energy poverty. These vulnerabilities in the energy infrastructure make Lebanon particularly susceptible to cyber threats, which could further destabilize the country’s already fragile system.

Lebanon’s Critical Infrastructure and SCADA Vulnerabilities: A Detailed Examination of Electricité du Liban (EDL)

Electricité du Liban (EDL), Lebanon’s primary electricity provider, plays a crucial role in maintaining the nation’s energy infrastructure. Established by decree in 1964, EDL is responsible for generating, transmitting, and distributing electrical energy across Lebanon. It currently controls over 90% of the Lebanese electricity sector, managing a complex web of power plants, transmission lines, and distribution systems. The institution’s reach extends from hydroelectric plants managed by the Litani River Authority and other concessions, to the country’s vast network of thermal power plants and substations.

As of 2016, EDL was generating more than 13 million gigawatt-hours (GWh) of electricity annually, supported by seven major thermal power plants scattered throughout Lebanon. In addition, the organization purchased limited energy from small-scale hydroelectric plants, including the Nahr Ibrahim and Al Bared concessions. These operations rely heavily on Lebanon’s intricate transmission and distribution infrastructure, including over 1,500 kilometers of high-voltage lines and more than 15,000 transformers delivering energy to approximately 1.4 million subscribers. Given EDL’s dominance over the national grid, the organization is central not only to Lebanon’s economy but also to its overall stability.

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However, as with any modern energy utility, EDL’s operations depend heavily on digital systems to monitor and manage the vast array of power plants, substations, and transmission lines. Chief among these systems is the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, which serves as the backbone of EDL’s ability to control and oversee critical infrastructure. This reliance on SCADA systems introduces a range of cybersecurity vulnerabilities that, if exploited, could lead to catastrophic disruptions across the country.

Detailed table summarizing all the details and numbers about Electricité du Liban (EDL):

Aspect	Details
Foundation	Established by Decree No. 16878 on July 10, 1964
Role	Generation, transmission, and distribution of electrical energy in Lebanon
Sector Control	Controls over 90% of the Lebanese electricity sector
Other Participants	– Hydroelectric power plants owned by Litani River Authority – Concessions: Nahr Ibrahim, Al Bared – Distribution concessions: Zahle, Jbeil, Bhamdoun
Major Power Plants (2016)	7 major thermal power plants, directly or indirectly owned by EDL
Energy Production (2016)	More than 13 million GWh
Purchased Energy (2016)	– Litani River Authority – Nahr Ibrahim concession – Al Bared concession
Type of Energy Purchased	Hydroelectric power from small plants with limited capacity
Transmission Network	– High voltage power lines: 66 kV, 150 kV, 220 kV, 400 kV – 68 major power substations (high to medium voltage)
Total Transmission Line Length	More than 1,540 km (1,362 km of overhead lines, 178 km of underground cables)
Distribution Network	– Substations converting medium to low voltage – Over 15,000 transformers and accessories
Employees	1,720 employees (organizational structure targets 5,020 employees)
Subscribers	More than 1,400,000 subscribers (low, medium, and high voltage)

SCADA Systems in Critical Infrastructure: Their Role and Vulnerabilities

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are essential for managing and controlling large-scale industrial operations, particularly in sectors such as energy, water, and transportation. In EDL’s case, SCADA systems enable real-time monitoring of the power grid, providing operators with the ability to control power plants, substations, and transmission lines remotely. This automation allows for the efficient management of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution, reducing the need for manual intervention and increasing overall system reliability.

A SCADA system is typically composed of several components, including:

• Remote Terminal Units (RTUs): These are field devices that collect data from various sensors at power plants, substations, and other infrastructure nodes. RTUs then transmit this data to a central SCADA system for processing and analysis.
• Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs): PLCs are specialized computers used to control machinery and processes. They receive input from sensors and other devices, process this information, and send commands to control systems in real-time.
• Human-Machine Interface (HMI): The HMI allows operators to interact with the SCADA system, visualizing data, setting parameters, and controlling various aspects of the energy grid. It is through the HMI that operators can monitor the status of the entire grid and make critical decisions.
• Communication Infrastructure: SCADA systems rely on communication networks to transmit data between RTUs, PLCs, and the central control system. This infrastructure often includes a mix of wired and wireless technologies, which can create multiple points of vulnerability if not properly secured.
• Central Servers and Databases: These servers store and process the data collected from across the grid, enabling system operators to manage and optimize energy production and distribution.

While SCADA systems are indispensable for efficient grid management, they also represent a significant point of vulnerability, particularly in a country like Lebanon where the energy infrastructure is already in a state of crisis. A well-coordinated cyberattack on EDL’s SCADA system could cause widespread blackouts, disrupt essential services, and further destabilize the already fragile socio-political landscape.

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The Vulnerabilities of SCADA Systems

SCADA systems were originally designed with a focus on operational efficiency and reliability, rather than security. As a result, many SCADA systems, including those in Lebanon’s energy sector, were not built with robust cybersecurity protections. Several key vulnerabilities have been identified in SCADA systems globally, and these risks are particularly acute in Lebanon due to the country’s reliance on outdated and poorly maintained infrastructure.

• Insecure Communication Protocols: Many SCADA systems use legacy communication protocols that were not designed to withstand modern cyber threats. These protocols often lack encryption or authentication mechanisms, allowing attackers to intercept and manipulate data being transmitted between RTUs, PLCs, and the central SCADA system.
• Outdated Hardware and Software: In many cases, the hardware and software used in SCADA systems are outdated and no longer receive security updates. This creates a significant risk of exploitation, as attackers can use known vulnerabilities to gain access to the system. In Lebanon, where financial constraints have limited investment in infrastructure, the risk of using outdated SCADA components is even higher.
• Lack of Network Segmentation: Insecure network configurations can expose SCADA systems to the broader internet, increasing the risk of unauthorized access. In some cases, SCADA systems may be connected to corporate IT networks, which are more likely to be targeted by cyberattacks. Without proper network segmentation, a breach in the IT network could allow attackers to move laterally into the SCADA system.
• Insufficient Cybersecurity Training: Many SCADA system operators lack the necessary training to detect and respond to cyber threats. This lack of expertise can result in slow or inadequate responses to cyberattacks, allowing attackers to cause more damage.
• Inadequate Physical Security: In addition to cybersecurity risks, SCADA systems are also vulnerable to physical attacks. If attackers gain physical access to RTUs, PLCs, or other components of the SCADA system, they can cause significant damage or disrupt operations. Given Lebanon’s political instability and the presence of non-state actors, the risk of physical sabotage should not be overlooked.

Cyberattack Scenario on EDL’s SCADA System

The potential impact of a cyberattack on EDL’s SCADA system is enormous. To illustrate the risks, consider the following hypothetical scenario:

• Initial Compromise: The attack begins with a phishing campaign targeting employees at EDL’s headquarters. The attackers send emails containing malicious attachments that, when opened, install malware on the employees’ computers. This malware gives the attackers access to EDL’s internal network, from which they can begin probing for vulnerabilities in the SCADA system.
• Gaining Access to the SCADA System: Using stolen credentials or exploiting known vulnerabilities in the SCADA software, the attackers gain access to the SCADA control servers. From here, they can monitor real-time data from the power grid and begin issuing commands to the system.
• Disruption of Power Generation: The attackers use their access to remotely shut down one of EDL’s major thermal power plants. At the same time, they manipulate the settings of several substations, causing voltage fluctuations across the grid. These fluctuations overload transformers and other equipment, leading to widespread blackouts.
• Water Supply Disruption: The blackout affects not only homes and businesses but also essential infrastructure such as water treatment plants. Without electricity to power the pumps, water cannot be distributed to large parts of the country, exacerbating the public health crisis.
• Exploitation of Communication Infrastructure: The attackers target the communication infrastructure used by the SCADA system, further complicating efforts to restore power. By disrupting communications between RTUs and the central control system, the attackers prevent EDL from remotely managing the grid, forcing technicians to manually control systems in the field—a slow and dangerous process.
• Delayed Recovery and Economic Impact: The blackout continues for days, as EDL’s limited resources and lack of cybersecurity expertise slow the recovery process. Businesses that rely on electricity are forced to shut down, leading to significant economic losses. Hospitals and other critical services struggle to maintain operations using backup generators, and public anger mounts as the government is seen as incapable of addressing the crisis.
• Escalation and Geopolitical Fallout: In the aftermath of the attack, there is widespread speculation about who is responsible. Some blame foreign actors seeking to destabilize Lebanon, while others point to domestic political factions or non-state actors. The attack further destabilizes the country, exacerbating political tensions and leading to protests and civil unrest.

Addressing the Cybersecurity Risks in Lebanon’s Energy Sector

Lebanon’s energy sector is at a critical juncture. The collapse of EDL and the country’s reliance on outdated infrastructure have left the energy grid vulnerable to both physical and cyber threats. SCADA systems, which are essential for managing the grid, represent a significant point of vulnerability due to their insecure design, outdated components, and lack of investment in cybersecurity.

A successful cyberattack on EDL’s SCADA system could have devastating consequences for the country, resulting in widespread blackouts, disruption of essential services, and significant economic losses. To mitigate these risks, Lebanon will need to prioritize cybersecurity in its energy sector, investing in updated SCADA technology, improving network security, and providing training for system operators. Without these reforms, the country’s energy infrastructure will remain vulnerable to cyberattacks, further destabilizing a nation already grappling with severe economic, political, and social challenges.

The Vulnerability of Lebanon’s Solar Energy Systems to Cyberattacks

The rapid proliferation of solar energy systems across Lebanon represents a significant shift in the country’s energy landscape. Driven by the collapse of the state-run Electricité du Liban (EDL) and the subsequent reliance on expensive, polluting diesel generators, many Lebanese households and businesses have turned to solar power as a solution to their electricity needs. Between 2020 and 2022, Lebanon’s installed solar capacity increased eight-fold, with an additional 650 MW installed in 2022 alone. By mid-2023, it was estimated that Lebanon’s total solar capacity would reach 1,000 MW, covering approximately 50,000 households.

Despite the positive developments in the adoption of solar power, the solar energy infrastructure is not immune to cyber threats. As solar energy systems become more interconnected, digitalized, and reliant on automation for efficient operation, they are exposed to similar cybersecurity vulnerabilities as traditional energy systems. This section will explore the vulnerabilities inherent in solar energy systems, particularly in Lebanon, and how these systems could be targeted by cyberattacks, leading to significant disruptions.

Aspect	Details
Global Solar Energy Expansion (2008-2021)	Global solar capacity increased more than 50-fold between 2008 and 2021
Current Global Solar Household Installations	25 million households with solar panels in 2021, expected to rise to 100 million by 2030
Lebanon’s Solar Shift Drivers (Post-2021)	Economic crisis, devaluation of Lebanese lira, rising cost of private generators, and EDL’s drastically reduced energy output from 1,800 MW to below 150 MW
Lebanese Households Turning to Solar	Approximately 50,000 households (4% of Lebanon’s 1.3 million households) have adopted rooftop solar by 2023
Installed Solar Capacity in Lebanon	870 MW by 2022; expected to reach 1,000 MW by June 2023
Growth in Solar Capacity (2020-2022)	Solar capacity increased more than eightfold, with 650 MW installed in 2022 alone
Diesel Generators Capacity Estimate	Diesel generators account for 1,000-1,500 MW of capacity
Energy Costs & Generator Usage	– Lebanese households spent 44% of their income on generator bills (November 2021 – January 2022) – Generators cost up to $100 per month for only 5 amps
Impact of Solar Panel Costs	Solar panel installation costs several thousand dollars, but offer protection against blackouts and rising electricity costs
Generator Market Size	Valued at $3 billion annually, dominated by private providers with political ties
Air Pollution from Generators	Diesel generators contribute significantly to air pollution
Electricity Access in Lebanon	Many households only receive 2 hours of electricity per day; the poorest 20% cannot afford generator subscriptions or solar panel installations
Lebanon’s Renewable Energy Target	Aims to source 30% of its electricity from renewables by 2030
Challenges to Renewable Adoption	– Lack of government incentives for solar adoption – Political influence of diesel importers has stalled reforms – Renewable energy laws remain largely unimplemented
Private Sector Shift to Solar	– Hôpital-Dieu de France spent $500,000/month on diesel; invested $1,000,000 in solar – Pharmaline invested $600,000 in 1,244 solar panels, saving $150,000 on fuel in one year
Key Solar Projects	Beirut River Solar Snake: 10,000 sq m of panels installed along a 325m stretch of the Beirut river (since 2014); delivers electricity only when EDL is functioning
Lebanon’s Planned Renewable Expansion	Ministry of Energy plan includes 680 MW of solar, 742 MW of wind, and 394 MW of hydro to be installed by 2028
Limitations of Solar in Lebanon	– Solar energy cannot be sold back to the grid due to frequent blackouts – Households install batteries to store and use their solar energy during grid outages
Social and Environmental Concerns	– Lack of regulations on solar equipment quality may lead to hazards – Disposal of batteries is becoming a concern
Human Rights Considerations	Energy access is regarded as a basic human right, but many Lebanese lack access to sufficient electricity

Understanding Solar Energy Systems and Their Components

Before delving into the cybersecurity risks, it’s important to understand the basic structure of solar energy systems:

• Photovoltaic (PV) Panels: These panels convert sunlight into direct current (DC) electricity, which is the primary source of energy for solar systems.
• Inverters: Inverters convert DC electricity into alternating current (AC), which can be used by household appliances and fed into the electrical grid.
• Battery Storage Systems: Many solar systems in Lebanon are equipped with battery storage units to store excess energy for use during times when the sun is not shining or during blackouts.
• Smart Meters and Monitoring Systems: These devices track the energy production and consumption of the solar system and can allow users to sell excess energy back to the grid (a process known as net-metering). Smart meters and monitoring systems are often connected to the internet to allow for real-time monitoring and control.
• Communication Networks: Like SCADA systems in traditional energy infrastructure, solar energy systems rely on communication networks to transmit data between the various components of the system and to the user’s monitoring platform.

Each of these components plays a critical role in the operation of the solar energy system, but they also introduce potential points of vulnerability that can be exploited by cyber attackers.

Cyber Vulnerabilities in Solar Energy Systems

Just like SCADA systems, the digital infrastructure that supports solar energy systems is vulnerable to a range of cyber threats. Some of the most significant vulnerabilities include:

• Insecure Inverter Software: Inverters are critical components in solar energy systems, as they convert DC electricity from solar panels into usable AC electricity. However, many inverters are connected to the internet for remote monitoring and control, which makes them vulnerable to hacking. A cyberattack on inverters could disrupt the operation of solar systems, preventing them from supplying electricity to households and businesses.
• Lack of Encryption and Authentication: Many solar systems use outdated communication protocols that do not include encryption or authentication mechanisms. This means that data transmitted between solar panels, inverters, and monitoring systems can be intercepted or manipulated by attackers. In a worst-case scenario, attackers could take control of the entire solar system, shutting it down or causing damage to the equipment.
• Weakness in Battery Storage Systems: The widespread use of battery storage systems in Lebanon, driven by the need to store electricity during blackouts, introduces another point of vulnerability. If hackers gain access to the control systems of battery storage units, they could drain the stored energy, leaving households and businesses without power during critical times.
• Exploitation of Net-Metering Systems: While net-metering provides a valuable mechanism for households to sell excess solar energy back to the grid, it also introduces new cyber risks. Net-metering systems often rely on smart meters that are connected to the internet, making them vulnerable to hacking. Attackers could manipulate the data being reported by smart meters, either by inflating the amount of energy being sold back to the grid or by preventing households from selling their surplus energy altogether.
• Overdependence on Internet-Connected Monitoring Systems: Most modern solar systems come equipped with internet-connected monitoring platforms that allow users to track energy production and consumption in real time. These platforms are often accessed via web applications or mobile apps, which can be targeted by hackers. A successful cyberattack on the monitoring platform could allow attackers to gain control over the entire solar system, preventing it from operating or damaging its components.
• Absence of a Regulatory Framework for Cybersecurity: In Lebanon, the lack of government enforcement of solar energy regulations compounds the cybersecurity risks. Without enforced standards for securing solar installations, there is a risk that poor-quality, vulnerable equipment may proliferate, leaving thousands of solar systems open to attack. Moreover, the fragmented nature of Lebanon’s energy market, with private generators operating in a legal grey area, makes it difficult to implement uniform cybersecurity protections across all energy systems.

Scenario: Cyberattack on Lebanon’s Solar Energy Infrastructure

To illustrate the potential impact of a cyberattack on Lebanon’s solar energy systems, consider the following scenario:

• Initial Compromise: The attack begins with hackers exploiting a vulnerability in the firmware of a widely used inverter brand. The attackers gain remote access to the inverters installed on thousands of rooftops across Lebanon. Using this access, they are able to manipulate the operation of the solar systems, turning them off remotely.
• Disruption of Energy Supply: With thousands of rooftop solar systems suddenly offline, households and businesses that rely on solar power experience immediate power outages. For many, this blackout occurs during a time when EDL is not providing electricity, leaving them without any source of power.
• Exploitation of Battery Systems: The attackers also gain access to the battery storage systems connected to these solar installations. By draining the stored energy in these batteries, the attackers ensure that even those with backup power are left in the dark.
• Manipulation of Net-Metering Data: The hackers then move on to compromise the net-metering systems, manipulating the data being reported by smart meters. Households and businesses attempting to sell their excess energy back to the grid find that they are unable to do so, further exacerbating the financial impact of the attack.
• Economic Impact: The attack results in significant economic losses for the affected households and businesses. The sudden loss of power forces businesses to shut down temporarily, leading to lost revenue. For households that had invested heavily in solar systems, the inability to sell excess energy back to the grid creates additional financial strain, particularly for those already struggling due to the country’s economic crisis.
• Public Health and Safety Concerns: The blackout also affects critical infrastructure, such as hospitals and water treatment plants, many of which rely on solar power to supplement their electricity needs. Without power, hospitals are forced to rely solely on diesel generators, which may not be sufficient to power all necessary equipment, putting patient care at risk.

Summary of Key Vulnerabilities in Lebanon’s Solar Energy Infrastructure

Aspect	Vulnerability
Inverters	Vulnerable to hacking through insecure firmware and remote access. A compromised inverter could disable solar systems or cause equipment damage.
Communication Networks	Lack of encryption and authentication in communication protocols makes it easy for attackers to intercept or manipulate data being transmitted between system components.
Battery Storage Systems	Hackers could drain stored energy, leaving households and businesses without power during critical times.
Net-Metering Systems	Internet-connected smart meters used for net-metering can be hacked to manipulate energy production and consumption data, preventing users from selling their excess energy.
Monitoring Platforms	Solar systems often rely on internet-connected platforms for real-time monitoring, which can be targeted by cyberattacks, giving attackers full control over the system.
Lack of Regulation	Lebanon’s lack of enforced regulations for solar energy systems results in the proliferation of vulnerable equipment and creates an inconsistent approach to cybersecurity.

Entities Most Exposed to Cyber Attacks in Lebanon in the Context of Solar Panel Use

Lebanon’s shift towards solar energy, driven by the economic crisis, fuel shortages, and unreliable electricity supply, has led to a significant increase in the adoption of solar panel systems by both private households and essential institutions. With this transition, however, comes a heightened risk of cyberattacks, particularly as these systems become increasingly integrated with digital technologies for monitoring, management, and optimization. This report explores the entities most exposed to cyber threats in Lebanon, examines the potential vulnerabilities in solar panel systems, and details how cyberattacks may be carried out.

Entities Most Exposed to Cyber Attacks in Lebanon

• Critical Infrastructure (Hospitals and Pharmaceutical Factories)
  • Vulnerabilities: Hospitals and pharmaceutical factories, such as Hôpital-Dieu de France and Pharmaline, are at the forefront of Lebanon’s solar transition due to their high energy demands and the necessity for reliable, uninterrupted power. These institutions rely on solar systems as backup sources, and in some cases, they have integrated these systems with their broader energy management frameworks.
  • Why Exposed: Healthcare institutions are prime targets for cyberattacks due to their critical operations. A breach in their solar energy systems could disrupt hospital operations, put patient lives at risk, and cripple pharmaceutical production processes. Many institutions are transitioning to energy independence through solar but may lack the robust cybersecurity defenses required for protecting these advanced systems.
  • Potential Attack Methods: Attackers could exploit vulnerabilities in the smart systems controlling solar power generation, battery storage, or energy distribution. Ransomware attacks, denial of service (DoS), or malware could cripple the energy flow, forcing hospitals and pharmaceutical plants to revert to diesel generators at a high cost or face complete power outages.
• Private Sector Entities (Large Corporations and Industrial Sites)
  • Vulnerabilities: Large corporations such as Malia Group have invested heavily in solar energy to ensure energy independence and cost savings. These companies often use sophisticated, internet-connected systems to monitor and control energy production from their solar panels.
  • Why Exposed: Companies that rely on solar energy are attractive targets for cybercriminals because an attack on their solar infrastructure can lead to significant financial losses, disrupt operations, and reduce competitiveness. Industrial sites and manufacturing facilities, in particular, have complex energy needs, and disruptions to their power supply can severely impact production.
  • Potential Attack Methods: Hackers could infiltrate corporate solar monitoring systems through weak points in their IT infrastructure, including poorly secured IoT devices or outdated software. An attacker might manipulate the system to either overproduce or underproduce energy, causing costly equipment failures or operational downtime. Phishing or social engineering tactics targeting employees involved in energy management are common methods to gain initial access.
• Government Agencies and National Energy Infrastructure
  • Vulnerabilities: Lebanon’s Ministry of Energy and Water and national energy provider Electricité du Liban (EDL) are also moving towards integrating renewable energy, including solar power, into the national grid. While government entities are not as reliant on solar energy as private entities, their role in facilitating energy distribution and overseeing large solar projects makes them vulnerable to attacks.
  • Why Exposed: A successful cyberattack on government infrastructure could have widespread implications, causing blackouts, disrupting energy distribution, and eroding public trust. The integration of solar energy into the national grid, through projects like the Beirut River Solar Snake, exposes centralized control systems to potential attacks.
  • Potential Attack Methods: Hackers may target the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems used to manage and control the power grid and solar installations. This could be done through exploitation of outdated software, unpatched systems, or weak network security protocols. Attacks could involve disrupting communication between solar farms and control centers, leading to grid instability or overload.
• Solar Panel Installers and Maintenance Providers
  • Vulnerabilities: The local companies and technicians responsible for installing and maintaining solar panels are crucial in ensuring the proper functioning of these systems. Many solar installers may not prioritize cybersecurity in their operations, leaving vulnerabilities in the systems they implement.
  • Why Exposed: Small to mid-sized businesses in the solar installation sector often lack the resources to implement robust cybersecurity measures, making them an easy target for cybercriminals. These companies are responsible for managing sensitive customer data, including energy consumption patterns and system configuration details, which can be exploited by attackers.
  • Potential Attack Methods: Cybercriminals may target installer networks to gain access to customer data or even compromise the solar systems of multiple clients. Attacks could involve phishing, malware, or exploiting unencrypted data transmissions between the solar panels, inverters, and monitoring systems.

How Cyber Attacks on Solar Energy Systems Could Be Executed

• Exploitation of IoT Vulnerabilities
  • Modern solar panel systems often come equipped with IoT (Internet of Things) devices that allow remote monitoring and control. These devices are typically connected to the internet and often have weak security measures. Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities to gain unauthorized access to the system, manipulate energy production data, or cause system failures.
  • Attackers may use botnets to overwhelm the solar energy system with a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, causing the system to crash and halt energy production.
• Ransomware Attacks
  • Hackers could deploy ransomware on the energy management systems of institutions like hospitals or factories that depend on solar energy. By encrypting critical system data, attackers could demand ransom in exchange for restoring access. Given the reliance on solar for energy cost reduction and continuity, affected entities may be forced to pay significant sums to avoid operational shutdowns.
  • In hospitals, the consequences of such attacks could be catastrophic, as solar energy is integral to the hospital’s backup systems, making ransomware attacks potentially life-threatening.
• Manipulation of SCADA Systems
  • SCADA systems are used to monitor and control energy production and distribution from large-scale solar installations, such as the Beirut River Solar Snake. A cyberattack targeting SCADA systems could allow attackers to control energy flow, disrupt the power grid, or cause the entire system to fail.
  • Attackers could inject malicious code into SCADA systems to manipulate data, preventing operators from detecting and responding to energy production issues. This could lead to widespread blackouts or damage to the grid infrastructure.
• Phishing and Social Engineering
  • Solar panel systems, like any other IT-driven infrastructure, are vulnerable to social engineering attacks. Attackers may use phishing emails or social engineering tactics to trick employees or technicians into revealing login credentials or downloading malware that gives them access to the solar energy management system.
  • Once inside the system, attackers can alter settings, manipulate energy output, or disable entire solar farms, impacting energy distribution for households or industrial entities.

Potential Consequences of Cyber Attacks

• Energy Disruptions
  • Disabling or manipulating solar energy systems could lead to widespread energy shortages, particularly in sectors already vulnerable due to Lebanon’s electricity crisis. The reliance on solar as a critical power source makes entities dependent on it especially vulnerable to cyberattacks that can render the system non-functional.
• Financial Losses
  • Entities such as hospitals, factories, and corporations that have invested heavily in solar technology could face severe financial repercussions iftheir solar energy systems are compromised by cyberattacks. The reliance on solar energy as a means of survival for these entities means that a disruption in energy supply could halt operations, potentially leading to costly downtimes, loss of critical services, and even reputational damage.
  • For example, hospitals like Hôpital-Dieu de France, which spends hundreds of thousands of dollars per month on diesel and has invested heavily in solar infrastructure, could face service outages. Solar panels are often integrated with networked systems for remote monitoring and management. A cyberattack that disables these systems could not only shut down their energy supply but also put patient care at risk, especially in emergency situations where a continuous power supply is critical.
  • Factories and large businesses, such as Pharmaline, the largest pharmaceutical factory in Lebanon, rely on solar energy to reduce operational costs. Any attack on these systems would not only disrupt production but also have far-reaching economic consequences, especially considering that many of these businesses are already struggling due to the economic crisis. Pharmaline, which has saved $150,000 on fuel since adopting solar power, would face significant losses if these savings were eroded by disruptions.

Vulnerabilities in Solar Energy Systems

As solar energy systems become more widespread, they are increasingly reliant on digital technology for monitoring, controlling, and optimizing power generation. This reliance on connected devices introduces several potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The most exposed entities to cyberattacks in Lebanon, particularly in their use of solar panels, include hospitals, large industrial corporations, and private households with significant rooftop solar installations. Below are the most critical attack vectors:

IoT Devices and Remote Monitoring Systems

Solar panels, in most cases, are equipped with IoT (Internet of Things) devices that allow remote monitoring and real-time management of power production. These systems are susceptible to attacks, especially when they are connected to the internet without proper cybersecurity protocols. Attackers could exploit vulnerabilities in the monitoring software or firmware to gain control of the system, causing shutdowns or altering energy output. The lack of encryption or outdated software in many of these devices makes them a prime target.

How the Attack Works: Hackers could access the solar system through weak or default credentials, outdated firmware, or insecure communication protocols. Once inside, they could either shut down the solar system remotely or manipulate the energy flow to create power fluctuations. These fluctuations could damage equipment, increase operational costs, or even overload the system, leading to complete failure.

SCADA Systems

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used to control large-scale industrial processes, such as those managing solar energy production in hospitals and factories. These systems, if not properly secured, can be a significant vulnerability. Many SCADA systems are older and were not designed with cybersecurity in mind, making them easy targets for attackers who want to disrupt power flow or hold the system for ransom.

How the Attack Works: A cybercriminal could infiltrate the SCADA network through phishing, malware, or exploiting vulnerabilities in the system software. Once they have access, they can disrupt the power supply by shutting down solar panels or manipulating energy output, effectively bringing critical systems, like those in hospitals or factories, to a halt. In extreme cases, attackers could demand ransom payments to restore functionality, creating financial strain and operational chaos.

Grid Connectivity and Lack of Net Metering

As Lebanon experiences frequent blackouts, many entities have installed battery systems to store solar energy for later use. However, because the national grid is frequently offline, users cannot sell their surplus energy back to the grid (a process known as net metering). As a result, many solar energy systems are designed to work independently of the grid, using complex software to manage energy storage and usage.

These independent systems can be particularly vulnerable because they often lack the oversight and cybersecurity protocols that a grid-connected system might offer. Private rooftop installations, in particular, may not prioritize cybersecurity, leaving their systems open to attack.

How the Attack Works: Cybercriminals can exploit the lack of cybersecurity in these systems to gain unauthorized access to the energy management software. By altering how energy is stored or discharged, attackers can cause batteries to discharge at inappropriate times, leading to power shortages or even damaging the battery systems themselves, causing costly repairs.

Grid Connectivity and Lack of Net Metering

As Lebanon experiences frequent blackouts, many entities have installed battery systems to store solar energy for later use. However, because the national grid is frequently offline, users cannot sell their surplus energy back to the grid (a process known as net metering). As a result, many solar energy systems are designed to work independently of the grid, using complex software to manage energy storage and usage.

These independent systems can be particularly vulnerable because they often lack the oversight and cybersecurity protocols that a grid-connected system might offer. Private rooftop installations, in particular, may not prioritize cybersecurity, leaving their systems open to attack.

How the Attack Works: Cybercriminals can exploit the lack of cybersecurity in these systems to gain unauthorized access to the energy management software. By altering how energy is stored or discharged, attackers can cause batteries to discharge at inappropriate times, leading to power shortages or even damaging the battery systems themselves, causing costly repairs.

Entities Most Exposed to Cyber Attacks

The following sectors are identified as the most vulnerable to cyberattacks, primarily due to their reliance on solar energy and the weak cybersecurity infrastructure that accompanies these systems in Lebanon.

Hospitals

As previously mentioned, hospitals such as Hôpital-Dieu de France, which has invested heavily in solar panels, are at significant risk. These institutions depend on solar energy not only to lower costs but also to maintain critical operations. A successful cyberattack could put lives at risk by disrupting power to medical equipment, surgical theaters, or life-support systems.

Factories and Large Industrial Businesses

Entities such as Pharmaline, which are increasingly reliant on solar energy to offset fuel costs, are prime targets for cyberattacks. Any disruption to their energy supply could halt production, lead to financial losses, and affect the supply chain of critical goods like pharmaceuticals.

Private Solar Installations

Although many households in Lebanon are turning to solar panels for energy independence, they are often unaware of the cybersecurity risks. Private solar systems are often equipped with insufficient or outdated security measures, making them easy targets for attacks, especially when they involve IoT-connected devices. With over 50,000 households having rooftop solar, the scale of potential breaches is significant.

The collapse of Electricité du Liban (EDL)

The collapse of Electricité du Liban (EDL) has left Lebanon’s energy infrastructure exposed to a potential cyberattack that could exacerbate an already catastrophic situation. The country’s energy sector is not just critical for its economic stability but also for the well-being of its population. With more than 82% of the Lebanese population now living below the poverty line, electricity has become a scarce luxury. Lebanon’s inability to maintain or reform its energy infrastructure has left it susceptible to a range of security threats, not the least of which is a cyberattack that could cripple the country entirely.

Economic and Social Context: A Country on the Brink

Since 2019, Lebanon has experienced a severe economic and financial crisis, the result of years of poor fiscal policies, rampant corruption, and systemic mismanagement. The collapse of the national currency, coupled with inflation, has led to a drastic decline in the purchasing power of Lebanese citizens. The situation has been further exacerbated by the breakdown of essential public services, particularly in the energy and water sectors, which have seen a near-complete collapse.

Electricity shortages have become the norm, with blackouts lasting up to 23 hours per day in 2022. EDL’s inability to import the necessary fossil fuels due to its lack of access to foreign currency has severely hampered its operations, rendering it almost completely reliant on a fuel swap deal with Iraq. Additionally, the Lebanese energy sector’s reliance on outdated, polluting private generators to fill the gap left by EDL has contributed to a significant rise in pollution, which increased by 300% in 2021. This situation poses a dire risk to public health, as illustrated by a recent cholera outbreak—a disease commonly associated with poverty and collapsing infrastructure.

Cybersecurity in the Context of Lebanon’s Energy Sector

Cyberattacks on energy infrastructure are not new, but the growing interdependence between energy systems and digital technologies has made them more likely and more devastating. In Lebanon, the combination of aging infrastructure, political instability, and economic collapse has created the perfect conditions for a potential cyber disaster. The collapse of EDL has severely weakened the country’s energy infrastructure, making it particularly vulnerable to cyber threats.

The increasing digitalization of energy systems worldwide has introduced new vulnerabilities. These range from attacks on industrial control systems (ICS) to the disruption of critical services such as electricity, water supply, and healthcare. Lebanon, with its weak governance structures, limited financial resources, and outdated technology, is ill-equipped to defend itself against such attacks.

A Weakened Infrastructure

One of the major issues facing Lebanon’s energy sector is the state of its infrastructure. EDL’s collapse, combined with a lack of investment in maintenance and modernization, has left the country reliant on inefficient, expensive, and highly polluting private generators. These generators have become a lifeline for many Lebanese households and businesses, providing an essential service in the absence of reliable electricity from EDL. However, their use has come at a significant cost.

Private generators are not just financially expensive; they are also highly inefficient and environmentally damaging. In 2022, tariffs for electricity from private generators ranged between 50-100 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh), compared to the global average of 12-15 cents/kWh. This disparity has contributed to a sharp increase in energy poverty, with an estimated 40% of the population now living in extreme poverty without access to electricity. This has also resulted in a suppression of electricity demand, with average consumption dropping by more than 52% as the cost of electricity becomes increasingly unaffordable for the majority of the population.

The Vulnerability of Energy Infrastructure to Cyber Attacks

In a country already suffering from severe energy shortages, a cyberattack on Lebanon’s energy infrastructure could have devastating consequences. Cybersecurity experts have long warned of the vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure systems, particularly those in countries with weak governance, political instability, and outdated technology.

Cyberattacks on energy infrastructure can take many forms, from malware infections that disrupt industrial control systems (ICS) to more sophisticated attacks that target specific vulnerabilities in the network. These attacks can cause widespread power outages, disrupt essential services such as water supply and healthcare, and even threaten public safety.

Lebanon’s energy infrastructure is particularly vulnerable due to its reliance on outdated technology and its lack of investment in cybersecurity measures. The collapse of EDL has left the country without a centralized, coordinated energy system, making it more difficult to protect against cyber threats. Private generators, which now provide the majority of the country’s electricity, are also vulnerable to cyberattacks, particularly if they are connected to the internet or rely on digital control systems.

In addition to the direct impact on the energy sector, a cyberattack on Lebanon’s energy infrastructure could have broader implications for the country’s already fragile economy and social stability. The loss of electricity would further exacerbate the country’s economic crisis, making it even more difficult for businesses to operate and for households to access essential services.

The Role of International Actors

In recent years, international actors have taken an increasing interest in Lebanon’s energy sector, recognizing the critical role it plays in the country’s overall stability. The World Bank, for example, has identified electricity reform as a top priority for Lebanon, arguing that the collapse of the energy sector is a major obstacle to economic recovery.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also emphasized the need for electricity reform, making it a key condition for any future financial assistance. However, efforts to implement these reforms have been thwarted by political conflicts and instability, with various factions within the Lebanese government blocking attempts to restructure the energy sector.

While the international community has been vocal in its support for reform, it has been less forthcoming in providing direct financial assistance to Lebanon’s energy sector. This is largely due to concerns about corruption and mismanagement, which have plagued the sector for decades. However, without significant international investment, Lebanon will struggle to rebuild its energy infrastructure and protect it from future cyber threats.

Lebanon’s Water-Energy Nexus: The Strain on Water Systems Amidst Economic Crisis

The ongoing economic crisis in Lebanon has significantly impacted the country’s water sector, revealing its critical dependence on energy resources for extraction, treatment, and distribution. The economic turmoil, exacerbated by currency devaluation and rising fuel prices, has drastically reduced the availability of reliable electricity, which is essential for operating Lebanon’s water infrastructure. This crisis has made the water-energy nexus one of the most important, yet fragile, aspects of Lebanon’s public utilities, with notable declines in water provision, shifts in water acquisition methods, and the emergence of renewable energy sources like solar photovoltaics as a temporary solution to these challenges.

Decline in Water Supply During the Crisis

The most immediate impact of Lebanon’s economic collapse on the water sector has been a dramatic reduction in water availability. A recent survey conducted across 150 municipalities in all Lebanese governorates highlighted the stark reality: the average weekly water supply has fallen from 49 hours in 2019 to just 22 hours in 2023. This decline reflects the direct correlation between energy shortages and the capacity of municipalities to pump, treat, and distribute water.

In regions where EDL has been unable to provide sufficient electricity, water authorities have struggled to maintain a stable flow of water to homes and businesses. Many households have reported that, in some areas, water is available only a few hours per week. The country’s reliance on private diesel generators to power water pumps has compounded the problem, as fuel prices have soared due to the removal of fuel subsidies and the sharp depreciation of the Lebanese pound.

Surge in Water Tanker Use

As the availability of piped water from traditional municipal sources has decreased, there has been a significant increase in reliance on alternative water acquisition methods. The use of water tankers, once a secondary source of water, has surged from 26% in 2019 to 44% in 2023. This marks a concerning shift, as water tankers are often expensive and unregulated, leading to inconsistencies in water quality and significant public health risks.

Water tankers are typically operated by private vendors who charge high fees for delivery, a cost that many Lebanese households can barely afford amidst the wider economic crisis. Furthermore, the unregulated nature of the water tanker market raises serious concerns about the quality and safety of the water being delivered. In some cases, water from tankers is not adequately tested for contaminants, increasing the risk of waterborne diseases. This rise in the informal tanker water market (TWM) is a direct consequence of the collapse of public infrastructure and highlights the pressing need for reforms in both the water and energy sectors.

Renewable Energy: Solar Photovoltaics in the Water Sector

In response to the energy crisis, Lebanon has seen the gradual adoption of renewable energy technologies in the water sector, particularly the use of solar photovoltaic (PV) systems. The scarcity and rising cost of electricity have driven municipalities, businesses, and households to turn to solar energy as an alternative means of powering water extraction and distribution systems.

The survey conducted in 2023 revealed that solar PV systems now account for 4.8% of water extraction from underground reservoirs and 2.8% of water distribution in Lebanon. Additionally, the use of solar water heaters, which has risen from 7.9% in 2019 to 15.4% in 2023, demonstrates a growing reliance on renewable energy to meet the country’s water needs. This trend is particularly pronounced in rural areas, where access to the national electricity grid is even more unreliable than in urban centers.

However, while solar energy offers a temporary reprieve, it is not without limitations. Solar PV systems, particularly those used for large-scale water extraction and distribution, require significant upfront investment and are not universally accessible. Many municipalities lack the financial resources to invest in solar infrastructure, and the absence of government incentives further hampers widespread adoption. Furthermore, solar energy alone cannot meet the full energy demands of Lebanon’s water sector, particularly in the face of frequent blackouts and the lack of a robust regulatory framework to support renewable energy integration.

The Water-Energy Nexus in Lebanon’s Crisis

The economic crisis in Lebanon has exposed the deep interdependence between water and energy systems. Without reliable energy supplies, water cannot be pumped from underground reservoirs, treated in purification plants, or distributed through municipal networks. This interdependence has been made more fragile by the ongoing energy crisis, with EDL barely able to provide three hours of electricity per day in many regions.

Lebanon’s water sector is heavily dependent on energy inputs to extract, treat, and distribute water. Energy consumption represents a significant portion of operational costs for Lebanon’s water establishments (WEs). For instance, in 2019, energy costs accounted for 36% of the Bekaa Water Establishment’s (BWE) total budget, and 47% of its operation and maintenance expenses. Similarly, for the Beirut and Mount Lebanon Water Establishment (BMLWE), energy expenses constituted 33.6% of its operation and maintenance costs. The high cost of energy, exacerbated by the fuel crisis and devaluation of the Lebanese pound, has rendered these water establishments financially unsustainable, further contributing to the water crisis.

Lack of Unified Water Data and Institutional Weakness

Another critical challenge facing Lebanon’s water sector is the lack of a unified database for tracking and managing the country’s water resources. Lebanon currently relies on disparate data sources, with estimates on annual precipitation, groundwater recharge, and water usage varying significantly between studies. The Ministry of Energy and Water (MoEW) estimates that Lebanon receives approximately 8.6 billion cubic meters (Bm³) of precipitation annually, with around 4.225 Bm³ remaining within the country’s borders after accounting for runoff and evaporation. However, other estimates from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) present a wide range of precipitation values, highlighting the need for a centralized, reliable water resource database.

Moreover, Lebanon’s water governance framework is characterized by overlapping responsibilities between various state agencies, public corporations, and private actors. The country’s four regional water establishments—BMLWE, BWE, North Lebanon Water Establishment (NLWE), and South Lebanon Water Establishment (SLWE)—struggle with chronic underfunding and weak fee collection mechanisms. Prior to the economic crisis, fee collection rates ranged from 32% in BWE to 92% in BMLWE, leaving these institutions incapable of covering their energy costs or maintaining critical infrastructure. The financial instability of the WEs has further hampered their ability to respond to the crisis, leading to widespread service disruptions and deteriorating water quality.

Water Quality and Public Health Risks

As the water crisis deepens, public health risks have become more pronounced. The resurgence of cholera cases in Lebanon, after decades of being under control, is a stark reminder of the consequences of inadequate water supply and sanitation services. The decline in water quality, driven by failing infrastructure and the increased reliance on unregulated water tankers, has created fertile ground for waterborne diseases. Many households are now forced to use water of questionable quality, leading to a rise in illnesses associated with poor sanitation.

The water crisis has also affected Lebanon’s agricultural sector, which is the largest consumer of water, accounting for 60–72% of total water use. With water resources dwindling and the cost of extraction increasing, farmers are struggling to maintain irrigation systems, which in turn impacts food security in the country.

Addressing the Water-Energy Crisis in Lebanon

Lebanon’s water crisis is inextricably linked to the country’s broader economic and energy crises. The decline in reliable electricity has severely hampered the country’s ability to maintain a stable and safe water supply, leading to widespread shortages, an increase in reliance on water tankers, and a growing public health threat. While solar energy offers some relief in the short term, it is not a comprehensive solution to Lebanon’s water-energy nexus challenges.

To address these interconnected crises, Lebanon must prioritize reforms that target both sectors simultaneously. This includes investments in renewable energy infrastructure, such as expanding the use of solar PV in water systems, improving the financial sustainability of water establishments, and developing a centralized water resource database to inform decision-making. Without these reforms, Lebanon’s water security will continue to deteriorate, placing additional strain on an already vulnerable population.

Lebanon’s Water Infrastructure Vulnerabilities: The SCADA System and Cybersecurity Risks

The Greater Beirut Water Supply Project (BWW 3-2-2) exemplifies the ongoing efforts to modernize Lebanon’s critical water infrastructure. Managed by the Beirut and Mount Lebanon Water Establishment (BMLWE) and involving more than 100 water pumping stations, boreholes, and reservoirs, this project utilizes a sophisticated Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system to automate and monitor the distribution of potable water across a large region. However, the very technology that enables efficient water management also exposes Lebanon’s water infrastructure to significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

SCADA System Overview for Greater Beirut Water Supply

The SCADA system implemented by EMCO Engineering for the Greater Beirut Water Supply Project integrates a wide range of technologies to ensure the smooth and efficient operation of the water distribution network. This system allows the Beirut and Mount Lebanon Water Establishment to monitor, control, and automate operations across more than 100 distributed sites, including pumping stations, wells, and reservoirs.

Key Components of the SCADA System:

• Flowmeters and Pressure Transmitters: These sensors provide real-time data on water flow rates and pressure levels, ensuring that the distribution network operates within safe and efficient parameters.
• Reservoir and Diesel Tank Level Transmitters: These devices monitor the water and fuel levels in reservoirs and diesel tanks, ensuring that resources are appropriately managed to prevent shortages or overflows.
• Valves with Motorized Actuators: These remotely controlled valves help regulate water flow, enabling operators to adjust distribution in response to demand fluctuations.
• UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) Systems: These systems provide backup power to critical components of the SCADA network, ensuring continuity of operations during power outages—a frequent occurrence in Lebanon’s energy-strapped environment.
• PLC/RTU Panels: These programmable logic controllers (PLC) and remote terminal units (RTU) collect data from sensors and transmit it to the central SCADA system, allowing for automated responses to changing conditions.
• 3G/WiMAX Routers and Communication Infrastructure: Communication between the remote sites and the central control station is facilitated through 3G and WiMAX networks using the DNP3 protocol, which is designed for secure data transmission in industrial control systems.
• SCADA Central Room: This central control room houses redundant servers, operator workstations, and network infrastructure that allows real-time monitoring and control of the entire water distribution network.

While the SCADA system brings clear operational benefits, it also introduces significant cybersecurity vulnerabilities. The automation of such critical infrastructure without robust cybersecurity measures can expose Lebanon’s water sector to cyberattacks, which could have devastating consequences for the country’s water security.

Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities in Lebanon’s SCADA Water Systems

SCADA systems, by their very nature, are vulnerable to cyberattacks due to their reliance on digital communication networks and remote control functionalities. For the Greater Beirut Water Supply Project, several key vulnerabilities exist:

Insecure Communication Protocols

The SCADA system relies on the DNP3 protocol for communication between remote sites and the central control station. While DNP3 is a widely used protocol in industrial control systems, it was not originally designed with robust cybersecurity measures in mind. Although newer versions of DNP3 include support for encryption and authentication, many SCADA implementations, especially in developing countries like Lebanon, may not have fully adopted these security features. This opens the door to cyberattacks, such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, where an attacker intercepts and manipulates data transmitted between SCADA components.

Inadequate Physical Security

Many of the remote pumping stations, boreholes, and reservoirs managed by the SCADA system are located in areas with minimal physical security. If attackers gain physical access to SCADA equipment at these remote sites, they can tamper with sensors, disable communication systems, or even introduce malware into the network. Given Lebanon’s ongoing political instability and the presence of various non-state actors, physical attacks on critical infrastructure remain a serious concern.

Outdated or Unpatched Software

Like many industrial control systems, SCADA systems in Lebanon may use outdated software that is vulnerable to known exploits. Without regular updates and patches, these systems are prime targets for cyberattacks. Zero-day vulnerabilities, which are previously unknown vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit before they are patched, also pose a significant risk to SCADA systems.

Network Exposure

The use of 3G and WiMAX routers for communication between remote sites and the central SCADA control room introduces another layer of vulnerability. These networks may be insufficiently secured, making them susceptible to hacking attempts. Attackers could gain access to the SCADA network by exploiting weaknesses in the communication infrastructure, potentially disrupting water services or causing system malfunctions.

Lack of Cybersecurity Expertise

One of the most significant challenges facing Lebanon’s water infrastructure is the lack of cybersecurity expertise. Water management authorities, such as BMLWE, may not have dedicated cybersecurity teams capable of defending against sophisticated cyber threats. This lack of in-house expertise means that even basic cybersecurity hygiene—such as regular software updates, strong password policies, and network monitoring—may be lacking, leaving the SCADA system vulnerable to attacks.

Absence of Regulatory Framework for SCADA Security

Lebanon lacks a comprehensive regulatory framework for the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure. While efforts are being made to modernize the country’s water and energy systems, there is little governmental oversight regarding the cybersecurity of SCADA systems. This regulatory gap leaves water establishments responsible for their own security measures, which are often insufficient in the face of modern cyber threats.

Potential Consequences of a Cyberattack on Lebanon’s Water Infrastructure

A successful cyberattack on Lebanon’s SCADA-controlled water infrastructure could have severe consequences, including:

Widespread Water Outages

A cyberattack that disables key components of the SCADA system, such as pumps or valves, could lead to widespread water outages across Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Given the already strained water supply, any prolonged disruption could leave thousands of households without access to potable water for extended periods.

Water Contamination

By manipulating the SCADA system, attackers could cause water treatment processes to malfunction, leading to the distribution of contaminated water. This could pose a significant public health risk, especially if contaminants such as bacteria, chemicals, or even wastewater enter the potable water supply.

Damage to Infrastructure

Attackers could remotely control motorized valves or pumps to cause equipment to operate outside of its safe parameters, leading to mechanical failures. This could result in significant damage to Lebanon’s already fragile water infrastructure, requiring costly repairs and further disrupting water services.

Financial and Economic Impacts

Any disruption to the water supply would have cascading effects on Lebanon’s economy. Businesses, especially in critical sectors such as healthcare and agriculture, would face operational difficulties due to the lack of water. Additionally, the cost of repairing damaged infrastructure and restoring services would place further strain on Lebanon’s already fragile economy.

Loss of Public Trust

Given Lebanon’s existing governance challenges and the public’s distrust of the country’s ability to manage basic services, a cyberattack on the water supply would further erode public confidence. If people believe that the government cannot secure essential services such as water, it could lead to increased social unrest.

Coordinated Cyberattacks on Electricity and Water Infrastructure: A Catastrophic Scenario of Explosions, Blackouts, and Water Poisoning

Cyberattack on Electricity Infrastructure

Target 1: Solar Array Batteries

Vulnerabilities:

• Insecure control systems for battery management
• Default administrative credentials on battery systems
• Lack of network segmentation between solar panels, inverters, and battery storage
• Firmware vulnerabilities on battery control software

Cyberattack Strategy:

• Initial Compromise: Attackers identify insecure battery management systems connected to the internet. Using default credentials or exploiting known firmware vulnerabilities, they gain unauthorized access to the battery control systems.
• Manipulation of Charging Parameters: Once inside, attackers can manipulate the charging and discharging rates of the batteries. By commanding the batteries to rapidly charge and discharge repeatedly, they create an unstable power cycle. This process overheats the battery cells, a phenomenon known as thermal runaway.
• Triggering Overload: As the batteries heat up, the excessive power flow causes internal short circuits, which can ignite the chemicals inside the battery packs, leading to an explosion. Attackers can time these events to coincide with high-energy usage periods, maximizing the damage caused by the sudden power failure and physical destruction of the batteries.
• Cascading Effects: The destruction of the battery systems causes a sudden power disruption to any connected grid or critical infrastructure reliant on these batteries, such as hospitals or industrial facilities. This leads to localized blackouts and potentially damages other connected systems, including solar inverters and transformers.

Consequences:

• Explosions: The overheating batteries can explode, causing fires and widespread physical damage.
• Blackouts: Sudden loss of power disrupts dependent systems, including critical infrastructure like hospitals, causing cascading power failures across the grid.
• Financial Losses: Repairs for damaged battery systems, along with lost energy production revenue, could result in significant financial burdens.

Target 2: Power Transformers

Vulnerabilities:

• Insecure SCADA systems controlling transformers
• Lack of real-time monitoring and cybersecurity protocols
• Outdated firmware on transformer control software
• Poorly segmented network infrastructure

Cyberattack Strategy:

• Initial Compromise: Attackers begin by gaining access to the SCADA systems that control power transformers. This can be achieved through phishing campaigns targeting employees who have access to SCADA controls, or by exploiting vulnerabilities in outdated SCADA software.
• Voltage Manipulation: Once inside the SCADA network, attackers can issue malicious commands to increase or decrease the voltage passing through the transformers. By issuing commands that cause transformers to operate outside their safe voltage thresholds, attackers force the transformer coils to overheat, leading to mechanical stress and degradation of the insulation materials.
• Thermal Overload: Prolonged operation under manipulated voltages causes the transformers to heat up, eventually leading to internal failure. The cooling systems fail to handle the abnormal load, causing critical components to melt or short-circuit.
• Explosion and Blackouts: Overheating of transformer components can cause explosions due to the high-pressure release of gases within the oil-insulated transformers. The failure of key transformers in the grid results in large-scale blackouts across entire cities or regions.

Consequences:

• Explosions: Overloaded transformers can explode, causing physical damage to surrounding infrastructure and power lines.
• Grid Instability: The loss of critical transformers results in large-scale blackouts that affect residential areas, businesses, and critical services like transportation and hospitals.
• Economic Disruption: Prolonged blackouts cause significant financial losses due to halted business operations and costly equipment replacements.

Cyberattack on Water Infrastructure

Target: SCADA Systems Controlling Water Treatment Plants

Vulnerabilities:

• Insecure communication protocols (e.g., DNP3 without encryption)
• Outdated SCADA software and hardware
• Physical security vulnerabilities at remote pumping and treatment facilities
• Lack of real-time monitoring for SCADA systems

Cyberattack Strategy:

• Initial Compromise: Attackers initiate the attack by exploiting vulnerabilities in the SCADA systems controlling water treatment plants. This could be done by exploiting unpatched software vulnerabilities or through phishing attacks targeting operators.
• Manipulation of Chemical Dosing: Once inside the SCADA system, attackers take control of the chemical dosing pumps responsible for adding chlorine or other disinfectants to the water supply. They can manipulate the dosing to either increase or decrease the chemical levels beyond safe limits.
  • Under-Dosing Scenario: The attackers reduce the chlorine levels to below the minimum required for disinfection, allowing harmful pathogens like E. coli or cholera to pass through the treatment system and into the public water supply.
  • Over-Dosing Scenario: Alternatively, the attackers can flood the water supply with excessive chlorine, making the water toxic and undrinkable. High levels of chlorine can lead to chlorine poisoning, affecting both residential consumers and commercial water users.
• Disabling Alarms and Monitoring: Attackers disable or tamper with the alarm systems that would normally alert operators to dangerous fluctuations in water quality. This delay prevents operators from responding in time, exacerbating the effects of the contamination.
• Physical Tampering with Pump Operations: Attackers can also manipulate the SCADA-controlled pumps to over-pressurize the system, causing physical damage to the pipelines and water reservoirs. This creates additional complications for recovery efforts, including the potential need for costly repairs and infrastructure shutdowns.

Consequences:

• Water Poisoning: Under-dosing allows harmful pathogens to enter the water supply, potentially causing widespread illness and disease outbreaks. Over-dosing results in water that is toxic to consume, leading to immediate public health crises.
• Public Health Crisis: Thousands of individuals could fall ill due to contaminated drinking water. Hospitals could become overwhelmed with cases of waterborne diseases or chlorine poisoning, exacerbating the crisis.
• Loss of Public Trust: The poisoning of the water supply would result in a significant loss of trust in the government’s ability to protect critical infrastructure, leading to public outrage and social unrest.

Combined Attack Scenario: Coordinated Attack on Both Electricity and Water Infrastructure

In a highly coordinated attack, hackers could launch simultaneous cyberattacks targeting both electricity and water infrastructure, amplifying the overall impact:

• Blackout First: Attackers initiate a cyberattack on key transformers and solar energy systems, causing widespread blackouts. This disables critical systems such as water treatment plants, which rely on a steady supply of electricity to function properly.
• Water Poisoning During Power Outages: During the blackout, attackers gain access to the SCADA systems controlling water treatment facilities. With the power outage preventing real-time monitoring, attackers manipulate chemical dosing in the water supply unnoticed.
• Delayed Detection and Recovery: The simultaneous blackouts and water poisoning result in chaotic recovery efforts. Emergency services are overwhelmed, hospitals run on limited backup power, and the public is exposed to contaminated water without timely warnings.
• Economic and Social Collapse: The combined effects of widespread power outages, transformer explosions, solar array battery failures, and water contamination would lead to severe economic disruptions. Public trust in essential services would plummet, leading to protests, civil unrest, and political instability.

This scenario demonstrates how cyberattacks on electricity and water infrastructure can lead to catastrophic consequences, including explosions of solar array batteries, power transformer overloads, widespread blackouts, and water poisoning. These attacks target vulnerable systems, such as SCADA systems and poorly secured IoT devices, and exploit weaknesses in both cybersecurity practices and physical security measures. The results could be devastating, leading to public health crises, financial losses, and long-term social instability.

Scenario Analysis: Israeli Retaliation and Escalation of Hostilities in Lebanon’s Energy and Water Infrastructure

Context of Recent Explosions and Hezbollah Attacks

In September 2024, a series of explosions targeted communication devices used by Hezbollah operatives, including pagers and walkie-talkies. These explosions occurred in areas with a significant Hezbollah presence, such as Beirut’s Dahiyeh suburb and southern Lebanon, killing and injuring numerous people. The devices, reportedly bought by Hezbollah months earlier, were believed to have been tampered with using advanced technologies, raising suspicions of Israeli involvement. These attacks came in the broader context of heightened tensions between Hezbollah and Israel following Hezbollah’s involvement in the Israel-Gaza conflict.

Potential Israeli Retaliation and Escalation

Given the heightened conflict, any Israeli retaliation could focus not only on direct military strikes but also on destabilizing critical Lebanese infrastructure. Hezbollah’s reliance on civilian infrastructure, particularly in the energy and telecommunications sectors, makes these sectors prime targets for retaliation that seeks to undermine Hezbollah’s capabilities without directly escalating to all-out war.

Retaliation Scenarios Targeting Lebanon’s Energy Sector

• Cyberattacks on Electricité du Liban (EDL): Lebanon’s already crumbling energy infrastructure is vulnerable to sophisticated cyberattacks, particularly against its SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) systems. An Israeli cyber offensive could target EDL’s control systems to cause widespread blackouts. This could:
  • Overload transformers: Using cyberattacks to manipulate voltage control could result in transformer explosions, crippling Lebanon’s electricity grid.
  • Disrupt power generation: By targeting Lebanon’s major power plants, Israeli forces could induce shutdowns, leading to nationwide blackouts, further exacerbating the ongoing energy crisis. The attacks would likely target the seven main thermal power plants, as well as over 1,500 kilometers of transmission lines, creating a scenario where much of the country is left without electricity.

• Explosion of Solar Array Batteries and Power Transformers: Hezbollah’s increased use of solar energy systems provides another potential point of vulnerability. Cyberattacks could exploit weak points in the control systems of solar array batteries, leading to:
  • Overcharging or rapid discharging of batteries: This could cause battery explosions, disabling critical power reserves and backup systems that rely on solar energy.
  • Manipulation of inverters and transformers: By sending malicious commands to inverters, attackers could disrupt energy conversion processes, leading to fires or explosions that would further cripple Lebanon’s limited energy infrastructure.

Retaliation Scenarios Targeting Lebanon’s Water Infrastructure

Israel may also target Lebanon’s water supply systems, which rely heavily on energy for water extraction, treatment, and distribution. SCADA systems control these processes and, if compromised, could lead to devastating consequences:

• Poisoning of Water Supplies: A cyberattack on SCADA systems managing water treatment facilities could manipulate chemical dosing systems used to purify water. By disrupting these systems, Israel could:
  • Increase or decrease chlorine levels: This could lead to either under-treatment, allowing bacteria and contaminants into the water supply, or over-chlorination, making the water unsafe for consumption.
  • Release untreated water: A deliberate malfunction in pumping stations could release untreated or partially treated water into the public supply, leading to widespread waterborne illnesses and public health crises.

• Water Supply Disruption: In a broader scenario, Israeli forces could disrupt the operation of pumping stations by targeting power supplies or SCADA-controlled valves, leading to:
  • Water shortages: These disruptions could affect millions of Lebanese citizens, exacerbating the already dire situation in a country suffering from energy and water shortages. In a retaliatory scenario, Israel could focus on disabling these essential services to pressure Hezbollah.

Strategic Implications

• Civilian Impact: Both energy and water supply disruptions would severely impact Lebanese civilians, increasing public dissatisfaction with Hezbollah’s role in provoking Israeli retaliation. This could weaken Hezbollah’s political standing and influence within Lebanon, particularly if essential services are targeted.
• Economic Collapse: Lebanon’s economic infrastructure is already fragile, and further destruction of energy and water facilities could push the country towards total collapse, making recovery efforts even more difficult.
• Geopolitical Fallout: Any significant Israeli retaliation that affects Lebanon’s civilian infrastructure would likely lead to increased regional instability, drawing condemnation from neighboring countries and potentially leading to broader involvement from Hezbollah’s allies, such as Iran.

In conclusion, Israeli retaliation for Hezbollah’s attacks could strategically target Lebanon’s critical infrastructure, particularly its vulnerable energy and water sectors. Such actions would aim to cripple Hezbollah’s operational capabilities while increasing pressure on its civilian support base, leading to broader instability in Lebanon.

The Future of Lebanon’s Energy Sector

Looking ahead, Lebanon’s energy sector faces significant challenges, not least of which is the need to rebuild its infrastructure in a way that is both sustainable and secure. The collapse of EDL has prompted a surge in decentralized solar energy applications, with total installed capacity estimated to have reached 690 MW in 2022, a sevenfold increase since the start of the crisis. However, this growth has been driven largely by necessity, as households and businesses seek alternative sources of electricity in the face of widespread blackouts.

While decentralized solar energy offers a potential solution to Lebanon’s energy crisis, it is not without its challenges. The lack of a favorable regulatory and financial environment has made it difficult for the sector to scale up, and there are concerns about the quality and reliability of some of the solar installations. In addition, the rapid growth of decentralized solar energy has created new cybersecurity risks, as these systems are often connected to the internet and rely on digital control systems that are vulnerable to cyberattacks.

To address these challenges, Lebanon will need to undertake a comprehensive reform of its energy sector, with a focus on improving governance, increasing investment in infrastructure, and strengthening cybersecurity measures. This will require political will and international support, both of which have been in short supply in recent years.

The Urgency of Cybersecurity in Lebanon’s Energy Infrastructure

Lebanon’s energy sector is at a critical juncture. The collapse of EDL, coupled with the country’s economic and political crises, has left the sector vulnerable to a range of threats, including cyberattacks. The increasing digitalization of energy systems has introduced new vulnerabilities that Lebanon is ill-equipped to defend against, particularly given its outdated infrastructure and lack of investment in cybersecurity measures.

A cyberattack on Lebanon’s energy infrastructure could have devastating consequences, not just for the energy sector but for the country’s overall stability. The loss of electricity would further exacerbate the country’s economic crisis, making it even more difficult for businesses to operate and for households to access essential services.

To mitigate these risks, Lebanon will need to prioritize cybersecurity in its energy sector, with a focus on improving governance, increasing investment in infrastructure, and strengthening international cooperation. Without these reforms, Lebanon’s energy sector will remain vulnerable to cyberattacks, further destabilizing a country already on the brink of collapse.

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APPENDIX 1 – Detailed Table of Cyber Threats to Lebanon’s Infrastructure

Below is a comprehensive table that outlines the cyber threats to Lebanon’s critical infrastructure, focusing on how attacks could be carried out on both normal and SCADA systems. The table is organized to provide detailed information on each aspect, including vulnerabilities, potential attack methods, execution strategies, and potential consequences.

Electricité du Liban (EDL) – SCADA Systems

Aspect/System	Vulnerabilities	Potential Attack Methods	How Attack Would Be Carried Out	Potential Consequences
EDL’s SCADA System	– Insecure communication protocols – Outdated hardware and software – Lack of network segmentation – Insufficient cybersecurity training – Inadequate physical security	– Phishing attacks targeting employees – Exploiting known software vulnerabilities – Intercepting and manipulating SCADA data – Physical tampering with SCADA components	– Initial Compromise: Attackers send phishing emails with malicious attachments to EDL employees, installing malware. – Accessing SCADA Network: Use stolen credentials or malware to penetrate internal networks and reach SCADA control servers. – Command Execution: Issue unauthorized commands to power plants and substations, manipulating operations. – Communication Disruption: Interfere with data transmission between RTUs, PLCs, and central servers by exploiting insecure protocols.	– Widespread Blackouts: Shutdown of power plants and substations leading to national power outages. – Equipment Damage: Voltage fluctuations causing overloads in transformers and other equipment. – Service Disruption: Essential services like hospitals and water treatment plants become inoperative. – Economic Losses: Businesses halt operations, leading to financial crises. – Public Unrest: Increased dissatisfaction leading to protests and instability.

Solar Energy Systems

Aspect/System	Vulnerabilities	Potential Attack Methods	How Attack Would Be Carried Out	Potential Consequences
Solar Inverters	– Insecure firmware connected to the internet – Lack of regular updates – Default or weak passwords	– Exploiting firmware vulnerabilities – Brute-force attacks on passwords – Remote code execution	– Remote Access Exploitation: Hackers remotely access inverters by exploiting unpatched firmware vulnerabilities. – System Manipulation: Disable inverters or alter their settings to stop energy conversion. – Spread to Other Devices: Use compromised inverters as entry points to access other networked systems.	– Power Outages: Solar systems fail to supply electricity, leading to blackouts for dependent households and businesses. – Equipment Damage: Incorrect settings may cause physical damage to inverters and connected appliances. – Financial Losses: Cost of repairs and loss of energy production revenue.
Communication Networks	– Lack of encryption and authentication – Use of outdated communication protocols – Exposure to public networks	– Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks – Data interception and manipulation – Network sniffing	– Data Interception: Attackers capture unencrypted data between solar panels, inverters, and monitoring systems. – Command Injection: Manipulate data to send false commands, disrupting operations. – Network Mapping: Identify and exploit other devices on the network.	– System Disruption: Erroneous commands lead to operational failures. – Security Breach: Unauthorized access to sensitive data and control systems. – Propagation of Attack: Compromise of additional systems connected to the network.
Battery Storage Systems	– Insecure control systems – Default administrative credentials – Vulnerable firmware	– Unauthorized access to control systems – Firmware exploitation – Credential theft	– Access Control Systems: Attackers gain access using default or stolen credentials. – Drain Stored Energy: Command batteries to discharge at inappropriate times. – Overload Systems: Cause batteries to charge/discharge rapidly, leading to failures.	– Loss of Backup Power: Households and businesses lose stored energy reserves. – Equipment Damage: Batteries may overheat or fail, requiring costly replacements. – Safety Hazards: Risk of fires or explosions due to battery misuse.
Net-Metering Systems	– Vulnerable smart meters – Insecure data transmission – Lack of authentication mechanisms	– Hacking smart meters – Data manipulation – Replay attacks	– Data Manipulation: Alter energy production/consumption data to disrupt billing and energy credits. – Prevent Energy Selling: Block households from sending excess energy to the grid. – Inflate Usage: Cause users to be overcharged for energy consumption.	– Financial Impact: Loss of revenue from unsold energy or inflated bills. – Grid Instability: Incorrect data affects energy distribution management. – User Dissatisfaction: Erosion of trust in renewable energy systems.
Monitoring Platforms	– Weak authentication – Vulnerable web/mobile applications – Exposure to internet threats	– Credential theft via phishing – Exploiting application vulnerabilities – Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks	– Account Compromise: Phishing emails trick users into revealing login credentials. – Platform Manipulation: Attackers gain control over monitoring platforms, altering system settings. – Service Denial: Overload servers with DDoS attacks, making platforms inaccessible.	– System Control Loss: Attackers disable solar systems or alter performance. – Operational Downtime: Inability to monitor or manage energy production. – Data Breach: Exposure of personal and system data to unauthorized parties.

Water Infrastructure – SCADA Systems

Aspect/System	Vulnerabilities	Potential Attack Methods	How Attack Would Be Carried Out	Potential Consequences
SCADA Systems in Greater Beirut Water Supply	– Insecure communication protocols (e.g., DNP3 without encryption) – Outdated or unpatched software – Inadequate physical security at remote sites – Network exposure through 3G/WiMAX routers – Lack of cybersecurity expertise	– Man-in-the-middle attacks – Exploitation of software vulnerabilities – Physical tampering – Unauthorized network access	– Intercepting Communications: Attackers exploit unencrypted protocols to alter data between remote sites and control center. – Software Exploitation: Use known vulnerabilities to access SCADA servers. – Physical Intrusion: Tamper with hardware at poorly secured remote locations. – Network Breach: Hack into communication networks via insecure routers.	– Water Outages: Disruption of pumps and valves leads to supply interruptions. – Water Contamination: Manipulation of treatment processes allows contaminants into the water supply. – Infrastructure Damage: Forced operation outside safe parameters causes equipment failures. – Public Health Crisis: Distribution of unsafe water results in illness outbreaks.

Entities Most Exposed to Cyber Attacks

Entity	Vulnerabilities	Potential Attack Methods	How Attack Would Be Carried Out	Potential Consequences
Hospitals and Pharmaceutical Factories	– Integration of solar systems with critical operations – Insufficient cybersecurity measures – Reliance on IoT devices – Outdated software and hardware	– Exploitation of IoT vulnerabilities – Ransomware attacks – Phishing targeting staff – SCADA system manipulation	– IoT Exploitation: Attackers access medical equipment or energy management systems via insecure IoT devices. – Ransomware Deployment: Encrypt critical data, demanding payment for decryption. – Phishing Attacks: Staff are tricked into revealing credentials or installing malware. – SCADA Manipulation: Disrupt environmental controls essential for pharmaceutical production.	– Operational Shutdown: Inability to provide medical services or produce medications. – Financial Losses: High costs associated with ransom payments and downtime. – Patient Safety Risks: Potential loss of life due to equipment failure or delays in treatment. – Reputational Damage: Loss of trust from the public and stakeholders.
Large Corporations and Industrial Sites	– Dependence on solar energy for operations – Complex energy needs with minimal cybersecurity – Weak points in IT infrastructure – Use of outdated industrial control systems	– Network intrusion via unsecured endpoints – Malware infections – Denial of Service attacks – Industrial espionage	– Network Breach: Attackers infiltrate corporate networks through unsecured devices. – Malware Spread: Introduce malicious software that disrupts operations. – DoS Attacks: Overload systems to cause operational delays. – Data Theft: Steal proprietary information for competitive advantage.	– Production Halts: Disruption leads to missed deadlines and financial penalties. – Equipment Damage: Malicious commands cause machinery to malfunction. – Competitive Disadvantage: Loss of intellectual property. – Regulatory Fines: Non-compliance with data protection laws results in penalties.
Government Agencies and National Energy Infrastructure	– Centralized control systems with outdated security – SCADA systems using legacy protocols – Political and social instability increasing risk exposure	– Targeted cyber-espionage – Infrastructure sabotage – Advanced persistent threats (APTs)	– Espionage Activities: State-sponsored actors infiltrate networks to gather intelligence. – Sabotage Operations: Disrupt energy distribution through SCADA system manipulation. – Persistent Threats: Maintain long-term, undetected presence in systems.	– National Blackouts: Large-scale power outages affecting millions. – Economic Instability: Loss of investor confidence and economic downturns. – National Security Risks: Exposure of sensitive government data. – Public Unrest: Civil disturbances due to loss of essential services.
Solar Panel Installers and Maintenance Providers	– Handling of sensitive customer data – Inadequate cybersecurity practices – Use of default settings on installed equipment	– Phishing and social engineering – Insider threats – Exploitation of unencrypted data transmissions	– Data Breach: Theft of customer information from poorly secured databases. – System Compromise: Installers unintentionally introduce vulnerabilities during setup. – Malicious Insiders: Employees misuse access privileges for personal gain.	– Privacy Violations: Exposure of customer data leads to legal consequences. – Widespread Vulnerabilities: Multiple clients affected due to compromised installations. – Loss of Business: Reputation damage results in loss of customer trust and revenue.

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APPENDIX 2 – Scada Systems Suppliers Serving Lebanon

Company Name	Country Based	Type of Business	Area of Expertise
COPA-DATA GmbH	Austria	Software Vendor	Industrial and energy automation software, digital transformation
ETM Professional Control GmbH	Austria	Software Vendor	SIMATIC WinCC Open Architecture SCADA systems
JCT Analysentechnik GmbH	Austria	Manufacturer	Gas conditioning components for industrial gas analysis
Logotronic GmbH	Austria	Manufacturer	Environmental measurement systems for meteorology and hydrometry
LOYTEC electronics GmbH	Austria	Manufacturer	Intelligent control systems for building automation
Mira Technologies GmbH	Austria	Manufacturer	Security, environmental monitoring, and IoT solutions for safety and monitoring sectors
UNIHA Wasser Technologie GmbH	Austria	Manufacturer	Integrated water and wastewater technology solutions
Ankersmid Sampling – Ankersmid Group	Belgium	Manufacturer	Gas analysis and continuous emissions monitoring solutions
FLOW-TRONIC S.A.	Belgium	Manufacturer	Liquid flow measuring instruments for open channel and full pipe applications
Betatek Inc.	Canada	Distributor	Laboratory equipment for pharmaceutical and clinical applications
HERON Instruments Inc.	Canada	Manufacturer	Groundwater monitoring instruments
Acrel Co. Ltd.	China	Manufacturer	Power and energy metering products
China Zhejiang Chao Sensor Group	China	Manufacturer	IoT sensors and solutions
Oxymo Technology	China	Manufacturer	Water and wastewater filtration systems using membrane technology
Geolux d.o.o.	Croatia	Manufacturer	Radar sensors for traffic and hydrology applications
S.K. Euromarket Ltd.	Cyprus	Distributor	Water and wastewater engineering solutions
Blue Control A/S	Denmark	Manufacturer	SCADA systems for water supply plants
EMD International A/S	Denmark	Software Vendor	Software for wind and solar power projects
MJK Automation – Xylem brand	Denmark	Manufacturer	Level flow controllers and analysis instrumentation for wastewater treatment plants
Nordic Technologies A/S	Denmark	Manufacturer	Drinking water solutions with remote monitoring systems
Semco Maritime A/S	Denmark	Manufacturer	Firefighting and telecommunication systems for the offshore industry
Unisense Environment A/S	Denmark	Manufacturer	Sensor technology for industrial applications
VCS Denmark	Denmark	Service Provider	Water and wastewater utility services
EGYPTROL	Egypt	Engineering Service	Electrical power generation and substation systems
Labkotec Oy	Finland	Manufacturer	Measurement solutions for various industrial applications
TTK S.A.S.	France	Manufacturer	Liquid leak detection systems for commercial and industrial applications
CUSS Chriwa Umwelt-Systemtechnik	Germany	Manufacturer	Wastewater treatment systems with energy recovery components
Delphin Technology AG	Germany	Manufacturer	Hardware and software for industrial measurement and data acquisition
Elektro- und Automatisierungstechnik GmbH	Germany	Manufacturer	Electrical and automation solutions for industrial applications
METEK Meteorologische Messtechnik GmbH	Germany	Manufacturer	Meteorological instrumentation and ground-based remote sensing
VIDEC Data Engineering GmbH	Germany	Software Vendor	Automation and optimization of production processes, IT security solutions
WEDECO – Xylem brand	Germany	Manufacturer	Chemical-free water treatment using ultraviolet light and ozone systems
Wilmers Messtechnik GmbH	Germany	Manufacturer	Data loggers for weather and environmental monitoring systems
Ablaze Export Incorporation	India	Manufacturer	Glass pilot plants and turnkey projects for chemical industries
Aimil Ltd.	India	Manufacturer	Civil engineering test equipment and process efficiency solutions
Chemito Infotech Pvt. Ltd.	India	Manufacturer	Intelligent transportation system hardware and software
Forbes Marshall	India	Manufacturer	Process efficiency and energy conservation solutions
Global Envirotronics	India	Manufacturer	Environmental monitoring instrumentation and services
Sanmish Energies	India	Manufacturer	Energy transition solutions for industries
SBSEnviro Aqua Concepts Pvt Ltd.	India	Manufacturer	Wastewater treatment equipment
Spray Engineering Devices Ltd.	India	Manufacturer	Evaporation and crystallization systems for water treatment
Steam Equipments Pvt Ltd (SEPL)	India	Manufacturer	Monitoring systems for water and air quality, emissions, and flow
Bacsoft	Israel	Software Vendor	IoT infrastructure for managing advanced applications
Powercom Ltd.	Israel	Manufacturer	Smart Grid solutions for electricity, water, and gas utilities
Meridionale Impianti s.p.a (MI)	Italy	Technology	Systems for semiconductor, pharmaceutical, chemical, and energy industries
STM Technologies S.r.l.	Italy	Technology	Production lines for mineral wool insulating products
Centrionics Sdn Bhd	Malaysia	Distributor	Process analytical instruments and solutions for monitoring
Ecava Sdn. Bhd.	Malaysia	Software Vendor	Web-based SCADA systems for industrial automation
Exact Analytical Sdn Bhd	Malaysia	Distributor	Analytical systems and fire and gas detection solutions
Advanced Industrial Systems Ltd.	Malta	Engineering Service	Solutions for industrial and automation system design
Greenbird	Norway	Software Vendor	Systems integration for smart metering and utility management
Malthe Winje Group	Norway	Manufacturer	Water and wastewater SCADA and automation solutions
PacificTech Solutions Inc.	Philippines	Engineering Service	Architectural and engineering outsourcing services
AIUT Sp. z o.o.	Poland	Technology	System integration for industrial automation and robotics
Link Vue Systems Pte Ltd	Singapore	Technology	Industrial automation and SCADA systems
ShenYi Engineering Pte Ltd.	Singapore	Manufacturer	Automation and control systems
Hydrotech a.s	Slovakia	Manufacturer	Water and environmental engineering solutions
ECHO Instruments d.o.o.	Slovenia	Manufacturer	Biodegradation analyzers and O2 analyzers for pharmaceutical packaging
Envira	Spain	Manufacturer	Continuous monitoring of polluting parameters in air and water
EuroSMC S.A.	Spain	Manufacturer	Electronic products for electrical testing and maintenance
Suntrack by P4Q	Spain	Manufacturer	Controllers for PV solar tracking technology
Swestep AB	Sweden	Technology	Plants for renewable energy and fossil fuel alternatives
Netico GmbH	Switzerland	Manufacturer	SCADA and industrial automation solutions
Aquas Inc.	Taiwan	Manufacturer	SCADA systems and sensors for water and wastewater management
Disan Hydraulic Machinery Co.	Turkey	Manufacturer	Cranes and hydraulic machines manufacturing for recycling industries
Envirotek Aritma Teknolojileri Sanayi	Turkey	Manufacturer	Wastewater treatment solutions for industrial and civil sectors
Atriy Electronic Appliances Trading LLC	UAE	Manufacturer	Integrated monitoring systems for overhead and underground power cables
Process & Control Technologies Inc.	UAE	Manufacturer	Environmental solutions for water and wastewater treatment
Aquaread Limited	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Water testing equipment for groundwater, surface water, and wastewater
Ashtead Technology Ltd	United Kingdom	Distributor	Environmental monitoring equipment and solutions
Bedfont Scientific Limited	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Exhaled breath and gas monitoring instruments
Biocell Water	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Water treatment plants and systems
Carbelim UK Limited	United Kingdom	Technology	Carbon capture technology and climate change solutions
Castlet Ltd.	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Electrical and control systems including SCADA and PLCs
Churchill Controls Ltd.	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Level gauges and wave monitors for environmental research and water monitoring
Cirrus Research plc	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Environmental monitoring equipment for cleanroom environments
Envitech Europe Ltd	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Environmental, meteorological, and hydrological monitoring systems
eSight Energy Ltd.	United Kingdom	Software Vendor	Energy management software and services
InAccess	United Kingdom	Software Vendor	Remote monitoring and optimization systems for energy and communication sectors
Limpet Technology	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Height safety solutions for industrial applications
Lowe Engineering Limited	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Electrical and controls systems
Michell Instruments Ltd. – PST	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Humidity and oxygen measurement systems for industrial applications
Photonic Measurements Ltd	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Water treatment and environmental monitoring solutions
Pollution & Process Monitoring Ltd.	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Water and wastewater instrumentation for pollution monitoring
SgurrEnergy Ltd.	United Kingdom	Engineering Service	Renewable energy projects and consultancy
Simdean Group Limited	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Odour removal and air pollution control systems
Strathkelvin Instruments Limited	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Precision dissolved oxygen instruments for biomedical research
ZX Lidars	United Kingdom	Manufacturer	Laser applications for wind measurement
Adams Environmental Systems Inc.	USA	Manufacturer	Environmental monitoring solutions for air, water, and other environmental metrics
Aeronautica Windpower LLC	USA	Manufacturer	Wind turbines for commercial and industrial applications
Aptean	USA	Software Vendor	Computerized maintenance and asset management software solutions
Bacharach Inc.	USA	Manufacturer	Combustion gas analysis and refrigeration leak detection systems
Bentley Systems Incorporated	USA	Software Vendor	Software for infrastructure management and design
Campbell Scientific Inc.	USA	Manufacturer	Data acquisition and control products for environmental monitoring
Climet Instruments Company	USA	Manufacturer	Environmental monitoring equipment for cleanroom environments
Control Plus Inc.	USA	Distributor	Process instrumentation and control systems
Cross Machine Inc.	USA	Manufacturer	Hydro Trash Rakes and Hydro related products manufacturing
DeTect Inc.	USA	Manufacturer	Radar and sensor technologies for bird strike prevention and wind energy assessments
Eaton Corporation	USA	Manufacturer	Power management technologies and infrastructure
Filtra-Systems Company LLC	USA	Manufacturer	Filtration and separation systems for various industrial applications
Fluence Corporation	USA	Manufacturer	Decentralized water and wastewater treatment systems
Gastronics	USA	Manufacturer	Wireless gas monitoring solutions and telemetry systems
G-H Systems Inc.	USA	Manufacturer	Solutions for water and wastewater treatment
H&L Instruments LLC	USA	Manufacturer	Electro-optical equipment development, specialized in inspection tools for turbine blades
Indigo Piping Systems	USA	Distributor	Piping systems for water, wastewater, and stormwater applications
KETOS	USA	Technology	Automated water testing and monitoring solutions
Leopold – Xylem brand	USA	Manufacturer	Water filtration and treatment systems
Monitoring Solutions	USA	Manufacturer	Air pollution monitoring solutions for regulatory compliance
Mustang Sampling LLC	USA	Manufacturer	Sample conditioning systems for natural gas and liquids
NanoWater Aqua Solutions	USA	Manufacturer	Water and wastewater solutions using ultrafiltration membrane technology
NEXGEN Asset Management	USA	Software Vendor	Computerized maintenance management and asset management software
Nextronex – Solar Inverters	USA	Manufacturer	Utility-scale solar inverter systems
NiSoft USA	USA	Software Vendor	Safety systems and software for plant operations
ONYX Networks Texas LLC	USA	Manufacturer	Telecommunications, pollution control, and medical lab equipment
Power Engineers Incorporated	USA	Engineering Service	Integrated solutions for energy, environmental, and federal markets
Principal Technology Incorporated	USA	Manufacturer	Engineering solutions for industrial infrastructure and energy sectors
QED Environmental Systems	USA	Manufacturer	Environmental remediation and groundwater systems
QED Environmental Systems Inc.	USA	Manufacturer	Environmental products for groundwater remediation and landfill methane condensate management
Raveon Technologies	USA	Manufacturer	Industrial wireless data radio systems and modems
RTS Consulting Inc.	USA	Consulting Firm	MES implementations, automation, SCADA, and control systems integration
Rubicon Water	USA	Software Vendor	Water use efficiency technology for gravity-fed irrigation systems
RWI Resource West Inc.	USA	Manufacturer	Enhanced evaporation systems for environmental and industrial applications
Scada Integrators & Service LLC	USA	Service Provider	Full-service automation and SCADA systems integration
Scadata Inc.	USA	Software Vendor	SCADA software and remote interfacing hardware for municipal water and wastewater systems
Sentient Energy Inc.	USA	Manufacturer	Grid edge hardware and software solutions for energy distribution
Shand & Jurs (L&J Technologies)	USA	Manufacturer	Equipment for handling biogas and methane in industrial processes
Trimax Systems Inc	USA	Software Vendor	Industrial automation and system integration

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