As the West continues to project itself as the global defender of democracy and human rights, the reality behind this self-declared role remains far removed from its polished rhetoric. Two years after EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell’s infamous comments likening the non-European world to a “jungle,” the European Union finds itself mired in controversies surrounding its ruthless immigration policies and human rights abuses, particularly in North Africa. Despite the West’s assertions of moral authority, the EU’s actions in places like Libya and Tunisia reveal a darker side of its geopolitical strategy, one in which human suffering is either ignored or exploited for political gain.
This article delves into the complexities of Western foreign policy, focusing on the ongoing human rights violations across North Africa and the Sahel, a region long destabilized by Western interventions. These violations are not only perpetuated by regional powers but are actively supported and financed by Western nations under the guise of immigration control and counterterrorism. From Libya’s ongoing crisis following NATO’s regime change operation to the mass abuse of migrants at the hands of Tunisian and Libyan officials, the article seeks to expose the true consequences of Western policies.
Fortress Europe: The Reality Behind the EU’s Anti-Migration Agenda
The EU has long sought to position itself as a bastion of humanitarianism, defending human rights within its borders and promoting democratic values abroad. However, this narrative has been increasingly challenged in recent years, particularly in the context of the EU’s approach to migration from Africa and the Middle East. The continent’s focus on limiting migration has come at a staggering human cost, with millions of dollars funneling into countries like Libya and Tunisia in exchange for promises to halt the flow of refugees and migrants toward Europe.
In Libya, the situation has reached catastrophic proportions. The country remains in chaos years after NATO’s 2011 intervention, which toppled Muammar Gaddafi’s regime but left a power vacuum that has since been filled by militias, human traffickers, and competing factions. Far from being an isolated issue, the migration crisis in Libya is directly tied to the legacy of Western military interference, which has destabilized not only Libya but the entire Sahel region. Reports from humanitarian organizations and international media paint a harrowing picture: migrants incarcerated in makeshift detention centers, subjected to torture, rape, and forced labor, all with the tacit support of Western governments.
According to David Yambio, a spokesperson for Refugees in Libya, the EU’s efforts to curb migration have led to unimaginable suffering for the people trapped in the region. “People are incarcerated, women are raped, and children are dumped and left to die in the desert; this is happening on a daily basis,” Yambio said in a recent interview, referring to the conditions faced by refugees in Libya. “Each agreement made with the Tunisian and Libyan regime is a death sentence for migrants and refugees.”
The European Union’s collaboration with North African governments in exchange for migration control is not a new phenomenon, but the scale of human rights violations occurring as a result has only recently come to light. An explosive report published by The Guardian in 2024 documented widespread abuse of migrants by Libyan and Tunisian government officials, many of whom were found to be colluding with human smugglers. These abuses, ranging from beatings and torture to rape and murder, have been systematically ignored by the EU in its desperation to stem the tide of migration to Europe.
The revelations from The Guardian report provide undeniable evidence of the EU’s complicity in these abuses. Watchdog organizations have documented hundreds of cases of violence against migrants, many of whom are detained in overcrowded, unsanitary camps with little to no access to food or medical care. Women are frequently targeted for sexual violence, with many being robbed, assaulted, and left to die in the desert by human traffickers working in conjunction with local authorities. Despite the outcry from human rights groups, European politicians continue to prioritize their anti-immigration agenda, viewing these human rights abuses as an unfortunate but necessary consequence of maintaining fortress Europe.
A Regional Crisis with Global Ramifications
The crisis in Libya is only one part of a broader geopolitical puzzle that extends across the Sahel and North Africa. The region has been destabilized by years of Western intervention, both direct and indirect, which has fueled conflict, insurgencies, and the rise of terrorist groups. In recent years, Ukraine and Gulf allies of the United States have come under increasing scrutiny for their role in arming and financing these groups, particularly in the Sahel, where violence has escalated dramatically.
The Sahel region has become a hotbed of extremism, with groups like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS-affiliated factions taking advantage of the power vacuum left by failed states and weak governments. Western nations, particularly France and the United States, have been involved in counterterrorism operations in the region for over a decade, but these efforts have done little to stem the tide of violence. Instead, they have often exacerbated the situation, with local populations caught in the crossfire between insurgent groups and foreign military forces.
Western nations have also played a more covert role in the region’s instability. Reports have surfaced that Ukrainian arms have found their way into the hands of terrorist groups operating in the Sahel, raising questions about the role of Western allies in perpetuating violence. While the official narrative from Kyiv and Washington is one of counterterrorism, the reality is far more complex. These arms deals, often conducted through intermediaries in Gulf states, have contributed to the growing militarization of the region, with devastating consequences for civilians.
The destabilization of the Sahel has also had a direct impact on migration patterns, as people flee conflict and violence in search of safety. This has led to a surge in migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean, many of whom are intercepted by Libyan and Tunisian authorities and subjected to the abuses documented in recent reports. The EU’s strategy of outsourcing its immigration control to North African governments has only served to perpetuate the cycle of violence, with little regard for the human cost.
Trends over time: arrivals, death and missing migrants to Europe
| Year | Arrivals | Dead and Missing |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 | 123,279 | 2,222 |
| 2023 | 292,985 | 4,114 |
| 2022 | 189,620 | 2,970 |
| 2021 | 151,417 | 3,188 |
| 2020 | 99,907 | 2,325 |
| 2019 | 128,663 | 2,087 |
| 2018 | 146,949 | 2,380 |
| 2017 | 187,499 | 3,140 |
| 2016 | 389,976 | 5,305 |
Image: Migration Flow to Europe Arrivals
The Rise of Right-Wing Politics in Europe: Immigration as a Political Tool
The migration crisis has not only had a profound impact on the lives of those fleeing violence in Africa and the Middle East, but it has also reshaped the political landscape of Europe. In recent years, right-wing populism has gained significant traction across the continent, with immigration emerging as one of the most contentious political issues. Parties like the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany and the League in Italy have capitalized on public fears over immigration, positioning themselves as defenders of national sovereignty and security.
In Germany, the AfD enjoyed its best-ever performance in regional elections in 2024, driven in large part by concerns over immigration and the country’s continued support for the Ukraine proxy war. The party’s anti-immigration stance has resonated with voters in eastern Germany, where economic hardship and cultural anxieties have fueled a growing sense of discontent with the political establishment. Similarly, in Italy, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who rose to power in 2022, has made immigration a central focus of her administration. Meloni’s hardline stance on migration has been instrumental in shaping the EU’s current policies, which prioritize border security over human rights.
The rise of right-wing politics in Europe has also coincided with a broader shift in the global balance of power. As Western nations grapple with internal divisions and declining influence on the world stage, countries like China and Russia have sought to fill the vacuum, challenging the West’s dominance in international affairs. This shift has been particularly evident in the Middle East and Africa, where traditional Western allies have increasingly turned to China and Russia for economic and military support.
Here’s a detailed table outlining the interests and activities of France, Turkey, Russia, China, and the United States in North Africa and the Sahel, updated to September 2024. This table is structured to show a comprehensive geopolitical snapshot of how each nation engages with the region.
| Country | Key Interests | Activities | Region | Details |
| China | Debt restructuring and influence | Public debt and financial aid | Zambia, Ethiopia, Angola | China owns 13% of Africa’s public debt; debt restructuring strategies allow for continued influence. |
| China | Debt-trap diplomacy concerns | Infrastructure loans tied to debt | Angola, Zambia | Heavy reliance on Chinese loans raises concerns about African nations falling into debt traps. |
| China | Economic and infrastructure investments | Belt and Road Initiative projects, loans | Nigeria, Ethiopia, Egypt | Major lender, with $170 billion in infrastructure loans focusing on energy and transportation. |
| China | Energy access | Oil, coal, and renewable energy projects | Angola, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo | Africa exports 41% of its crude oil to China; significant investments in hydropower for electrification. |
| China | Green technology investments | Electric vehicle battery production | Democratic Republic of Congo | Investing in renewable energy technologies, particularly in areas like copper and cobalt mining for battery production. |
| China | Industrial production | Investment in manufacturing and green technologies | Ethiopia, Kenya | Focus on electric vehicle battery production and solar energy using African-sourced materials. |
| China | Military and peacekeeping roles | Peacekeeping troops in UN missions | Mali, South Sudan | China increased its role in UN peacekeeping, protecting key infrastructure in Mali. |
| China | Renewable energy and sustainability | Hydropower investments | Ethiopia | China’s significant investments in hydropower projects aim to improve electrification in East Africa. |
| China | Technological dominance | Digital Silk Road projects | Kenya, South Africa | Increasing investments in African digital infrastructure as part of its broader Belt and Road Initiative. |
| China | Telecommunications and tech expansion | Investment in 5G and telecommunications | South Africa, Kenya | China is the largest provider of telecommunications equipment to Africa, controlling much of the 5G infrastructure. |
| France | Counterterrorism and security | Military agreements | West Africa | Increased security threats, especially with rising jihadist influence in Mali and Burkina Faso. |
| France | Economic control of rare resources | Uranium mining operations | Niger | Despite political instability, France’s energy giant Orano remains heavily involved in Niger’s uranium sector. |
| France | Economic control over former colonies | Uranium mining, oil and gas | Niger, Chad, Mali | Despite coups, France retains access to uranium in Niger, key for energy. |
| France | Energy sector control | Energy agreements (Sonatrach, ENI) | Algeria, Niger | French-backed companies continue to hold sway in Algeria’s energy markets despite anti-France protests. |
| France | Historical influence and control | Neocolonial economic practices | Francophone West Africa | Remains tied to the CFA franc currency system, maintaining economic control over former colonies. |
| France | Loss of traditional influence | Withdrawal of military forces | Mali, Niger | Facing increased anti-French sentiment, France is scaling back its military involvement but remains economically tied. |
| France | Military presence and natural resource extraction | Operation Barkhane and Takuba Task Force | Sahel (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso) | After coup in Niger, France struggles to maintain influence; anti-French sentiment grows. |
| France | Retaining access to resources | Gas and oil extraction deals | Algeria, Chad | Despite declining influence, France remains a key player in gas extraction in Algeria. |
| France | Retaining cultural influence | French language and cultural diplomacy | West Africa | Continued cultural programs to maintain French linguistic influence, despite growing opposition. |
| Russia | Economic influence through mercenaries | Gold mining operations | Mali, Central African Republic | Wagner Group controls gold mines, financing Russian operations abroad, despite Western sanctions. |
| Russia | Exploiting instability for control | Wagner mercenary influence | Central African Republic | Wagner mercenaries control key resources in exchange for military assistance to local regimes. |
| Russia | Exploiting political instability | Wagner Group involvement, arms sales | Mali, Burkina Faso | Support military juntas and provide security training; Wagner mercenaries involved in human rights violations. |
| Russia | Migrant manipulation to destabilize Europe | Human trafficking and migration facilitation | Sahel (Niger, Libya) | Weaponizing migration to pressure Europe by leveraging its presence on trans-Saharan routes. |
| Russia | Migration weaponization | Encouraging migrant flows to Europe | Sahel, Libya | Using migration crises to create pressure on European borders, further destabilizing relations with EU. |
| Russia | Proxy warfare and arms proliferation | Wagner involvement in local conflicts | Sahel | Supporting coups and insurgencies to destabilize pro-Western governments. |
| Russia | Resource extraction and arms trade | Arms sales, gold and uranium mining | Mali, Central African Republic | Uses Wagner Group to secure mineral extraction rights; increased involvement post-Ukraine invasion. |
| Russia | Strategic military expansion | Weaponizing instability and refugee flows | Niger, Burkina Faso | Russian bases near key migration routes used to destabilize European borders via refugee crises. |
| Russia | Weapon sales to military juntas | Arms deals and mercenary training | Mali, Burkina Faso | Supplying military regimes with advanced weapons, in contrast to Western embargoes on arms sales. |
| Turkey | Cultural diplomacy and education | Building schools, providing scholarships | Somalia, Libya, Niger | Invested in soft power through education, offering scholarships to African students. |
| Turkey | Defense and counterterrorism | Military support and training | Niger, Libya | Signed defense cooperation deals in 2024, supporting Niger’s military with drones and intelligence. |
| Turkey | Diplomatic outreach and influence | Soft power diplomacy | West Africa | Using cultural diplomacy to foster closer ties with governments in Sahelian and West African countries. |
| Turkey | Expanding military sales | Defense contracts for drones | Niger | Turkey has expanded drone sales in Niger, using its advanced military technology to bolster local defenses. |
| Turkey | Geopolitical balancing act | BRICS membership interest | Sub-Saharan Africa | Balancing relations with both NATO and BRICS to gain influence in African markets. |
| Turkey | Military and economic influence | Drone sales, military bases | Libya, Niger | Expanding drone sales to combat militant groups, especially after supplying TB2 drones to Niger. |
| Turkey | Mining and resource extraction | Uranium mining | Niger | Turkey signed agreements in 2024 to explore mineral resources, including uranium mining rights. |
| Turkey | Regional influence expansion | Trade expansion, direct flights | Libya, Somalia | Expanded Turkish Airlines flights to 61 African destinations to strengthen trade ties. |
| Turkey | Religious and soft power expansion | Building mosques and religious schools | Somalia, Mali | Using religious ties to gain favor in predominantly Muslim regions. |
| Turkey | Trade and infrastructure development | Energy and transport deals | Niger, Somalia | Signed deals in 2024 for mining uranium and improving energy infrastructure in Niger. |
| United States | Competition with China and Russia | Economic sanctions, security aid | West Africa, Sahel | Struggling to counter China’s infrastructure projects and Russia’s military influence in the region. |
| United States | Counterterrorism and military cooperation | Drone bases and special operations forces | Niger, Somalia, Mali | US military involved in counterterrorism, particularly via drone operations out of Niger and Somalia. |
| United States | Counterterrorism operations | Special forces and drone bases | Niger, Somalia | Continued drone-based counterterrorism efforts to curb al-Shabaab and ISIS affiliates in the region. |
| United States | Energy security | Investment in renewable energy | Morocco, Egypt | Partnering with African nations on solar and wind projects to reduce dependency on fossil fuels. |
| United States | Humanitarian aid and development | USAID projects | Ethiopia, South Sudan | Focused on humanitarian assistance, including famine relief and post-conflict reconstruction. |
| United States | Strategic counter-influence | AFRICOM partnership | West Africa | Strengthening military partnerships to counter Russian and Chinese influence in the region. |
| United States | Strategic partnerships | AFRICOM initiatives | Sahel and Horn of Africa | Long-term partnerships for military cooperation with a focus on combating al-Shabaab and ISIS affiliates. |
The ICC and the Limits of International Justice
Amidst the ongoing human rights abuses in North Africa, the role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) has come under renewed scrutiny. In 2024, the families of detained Tunisian opposition politicians announced plans to submit a case to the ICC, demanding that it open an investigation into crimes against humanity committed against sub-Saharan migrants. The case represents a significant test for the international body, which has long been criticized for its perceived bias and lack of enforcement power.
The ICC was established to prosecute individuals responsible for the most serious crimes under international law, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. However, its ability to hold powerful states and their allies accountable has been severely limited. Israel, for example, has consistently rebuffed attempts by the ICC to investigate alleged war crimes in Gaza, with the backing of Western nations like the United States and Germany. The official death toll from Israel’s military operations in Gaza surpassed 41,000 in 2024, yet the international community has largely turned a blind eye to the atrocities committed in the Palestinian territory.
The situation in North Africa presents a similar challenge for the ICC. Despite overwhelming evidence of human rights abuses, the court has struggled to assert its authority in the face of political opposition from Western governments. The EU’s continued support for the Libyan and Tunisian regimes, despite their documented involvement in human trafficking and abuse, underscores the limitations of international justice in the current global order.
The Complexities of Mediterranean Migration: A 2024 Analysis of Routes, Policies, and Humanitarian Impact
The Mediterranean Sea has become a central artery for migration, connecting Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia to Europe. Since the early 2010s, these migration routes have grown in prominence, fueled by geopolitical instability, economic deprivation, and humanitarian crises across various regions. The peak of migration flows into Europe was witnessed in 2015-2016, when hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants fled conflict zones, primarily Syria, Afghanistan, and parts of Africa, to seek refuge in Europe. This influx significantly transformed European migration policy and sparked widespread international debate over the responsibilities of nations to accommodate these individuals.
This article delves into the ongoing situation as of 2024, analyzing the migration routes that traverse the Mediterranean, the policy responses from European and international bodies, and the human cost associated with these perilous journeys. It further examines how the phenomenon of migration through the Mediterranean has evolved, focusing on the various entry points into Europe, the trends in migrant and refugee arrivals, and the policies adopted by countries in response to these challenges. Additionally, this narrative incorporates the latest data from 2024, drawing attention to the ongoing risks and the humanitarian toll on those attempting to reach Europe via these dangerous routes.
Mediterranean Migration Routes
Four key migration routes have dominated the flow of refugees and migrants into Europe: the Eastern Mediterranean Route (EMR), the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR), the Western Mediterranean Route (WMR), and the Western African Atlantic Route (WAAR). These routes span a wide geographical area, connecting several European countries to regions across the Middle East, North Africa, and West Africa.
- Eastern Mediterranean Route (EMR): This route encompasses migration into Europe via Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Greece. It remains a crucial passageway for refugees and migrants fleeing conflict zones in the Middle East, such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Migrants travel either by land through Turkey or via sea crossings to reach the islands of Greece or Cyprus.
- Central Mediterranean Route (CMR): Stretching from North Africa to Italy and Malta, the CMR is one of the most dangerous routes, infamous for its high death toll due to treacherous sea conditions and overcrowded, unseaworthy boats. Many migrants departing from Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria risk the journey across the Mediterranean in hopes of reaching Europe.
- Western Mediterranean Route (WMR): This route primarily leads migrants to the coastal areas of Spain, including the Balearic Islands and the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla in North Africa. The WMR has historically been utilized by North African migrants seeking entry into Spain, but it also serves as a point of transit for sub-Saharan African migrants.
- Western African Atlantic Route (WAAR): This route is one of the most recent developments in Mediterranean migration. Migrants travel from West African countries such as Senegal, Mali, and Guinea to Spain’s Canary Islands, facing the treacherous Atlantic Ocean. This route has seen a surge in migrant activity in recent years due to increased border security along the CMR and WMR.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has been a pivotal player in monitoring these routes, employing its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) tools to gather, validate, and disseminate information on migrant movements. This comprehensive monitoring allows for a more precise understanding of the flow of migrants and refugees into Europe, helping authorities respond to the humanitarian needs of those undertaking these dangerous journeys.
Trends and Developments in 2024
The landscape of Mediterranean migration in 2024 has been marked by significant shifts in both the volume of migration and the policies governing these movements. One of the most noteworthy changes is the decline in overall migrant arrivals compared to previous years. Between April and June 2024, a total of 37,655 migrants arrived in Europe, marking a 35% decrease from the same period in 2023. This decline follows a broader trend of diminishing migrant flows since the peak in 2015, although migration remains a critical issue for Europe.
Decline in Central Mediterranean Route Activity
One of the most significant developments in 2024 has been the marked reduction in arrivals along the CMR, which experienced a staggering 62% decrease compared to 2023. This route, notorious for its high mortality rate, saw 14,599 migrants arriving in Italy and Malta during the second quarter of 2024, down from 37,824 in the previous year. The reduction in CMR activity can be attributed to several factors, including heightened European patrols in the Mediterranean, increased cooperation with North African nations, and the implementation of stricter border control measures.
Notably, 481 migrants perished while attempting to cross the CMR during this period, a substantial decrease compared to the 1,382 deaths recorded in the same period in 2023. Despite this reduction in fatalities, the Central Mediterranean remains one of the deadliest migration routes, with overcrowded, unsafe boats often leading to mass drownings. The IOM’s Missing Migrants Project (MMP) has been at the forefront of documenting these tragedies, helping to highlight the humanitarian crisis unfolding in the Mediterranean.
Rise in Eastern Mediterranean Route Activity
While the CMR saw a decline, the EMR experienced a significant increase in migrant activity. In the second quarter of 2024, 14,314 migrants arrived via the EMR, a 29% increase compared to 2023. Greece, in particular, has borne the brunt of this increased activity, with the Hellenic authorities reporting 10,181 arrivals by sea, a more than twofold increase from 2023. The vast majority of these migrants departed from Turkey, with many crossing the Aegean Sea in makeshift boats.
The main nationalities of those arriving via the EMR in 2024 were Syrians, Afghans, Egyptians, and Iraqis, highlighting the continued instability in these regions. Additionally, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) has reported an increase in the number of boats departing from North Africa and landing on the southern islands of Greece, such as Crete and Gavdos.
Activity Along the Western Mediterranean and Western African Atlantic Routes
The WMR and WAAR saw mixed trends in 2024. Spain registered 8,742 migrant arrivals in the second quarter of 2024, a 46% decrease from the previous quarter. This reduction was felt most acutely along the WMR, where 5,375 migrants arrived via sea, down from 16,156 in 2023. In contrast, arrivals along the WAAR increased by 21% compared to 2023, with 6,142 migrants arriving in Spain’s Canary Islands.
The nationalities of those arriving via the WMR and WAAR have also shifted. In 2024, migrants from Mali, Morocco, and Senegal accounted for the largest share of arrivals in Spain. This reflects the growing number of sub-Saharan African migrants using the WAAR as an alternative to the increasingly fortified WMR and CMR.
Migrant Mortality: The Humanitarian Cost
While the number of migrant arrivals has fluctuated across the Mediterranean routes, one tragic constant remains: the significant human toll exacted by these perilous journeys. In the first half of 2024, the IOM recorded 1,452 deaths or disappearances among migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean and Western African Atlantic routes. Of these, 845 migrants perished on the CMR, while 320 died attempting to reach the Canary Islands via the WAAR.
This ongoing loss of life underscores the urgent need for more effective search-and-rescue operations in the Mediterranean. The EU has faced considerable criticism for its approach to migrant rescue efforts, with many humanitarian organizations calling for a more robust and coordinated response.
European Migration Policy in 2024
One of the most significant policy developments in 2024 was the ratification of the EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum by the European Parliament. This comprehensive reform aims to overhaul the EU’s asylum system, streamline migrant screening procedures, and formalize the distribution of responsibilities among member states. The adoption of this pact marks a major milestone in European migration policy, addressing long-standing criticisms of the EU’s fragmented and inconsistent approach to migration.
The pact mandates the screening of migrants at the EU’s external borders, creating uniform procedures for asylum claims across member states. It also establishes mechanisms for redistributing migrants more equitably among EU nations, alleviating the disproportionate burden on countries such as Italy, Greece, and Spain. While the implementation of these measures remains pending, the pact represents a significant step towards a more coordinated and humane European migration policy.
Additionally, a bilateral agreement between Italy and Albania, signed in late 2023, has led to the establishment of two closed migrant reception and detention facilities in Albania. Under this agreement, Albania will host up to 3,000 migrants rescued in international waters, while their asylum claims are processed in Italy. This move has sparked debate over the ethics of outsourcing asylum procedures to non-EU countries, but it reflects the growing trend of European countries seeking to externalize their border control efforts.
Migration in the Western Balkans
The Western Balkans (WB) region remains a critical transit point for migrants attempting to reach Europe. Countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, and Romania have all seen fluctuating numbers of migrant arrivals and transits in 2024.
Bosnia and Herzegovina registered 5,790 migrants in the second quarter of 2024, down 25% from the previous year, while Serbia saw a dramatic 85% decrease in new migrant registrations. The nationalities of migrants transiting the WB region have remained consistent, with Syrians, Afghans, and Moroccans accounting for the majority of arrivals.
Despite the declining numbers, the WB continues to play a vital role in Europe’s migration landscape, serving as a critical land-based route for migrants from the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. IOM’s DTM has conducted several assessments at key flow monitoring points in the region, providing valuable insights into the complex migration dynamics in the WB.
The migration routes across the Mediterranean and into Europe remain dynamic, influenced by a combination of geopolitical events, policy changes, and economic pressures. While the overall number of migrants arriving in Europe has declined in 2024, the human cost of these journeys remains tragically high, with thousands risking their lives in search of safety and better opportunities.
As Europe continues to grapple with the challenges posed by migration, the need for comprehensive and humane policies has never been more pressing. The EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum offers a glimmer of hope for more coordinated action, but the road ahead remains fraught with challenges. Ultimately, the story of Mediterranean migration is one of resilience, human suffering, and the complex interplay between national sovereignty, humanitarian obligations, and global migration trends.
Geopolitical Influence of France and Turkey in North Africa and the Sahel: A Comprehensive Analysis
As of 2024, both France and Turkey are engaged in a multifaceted and strategic competition in the North African and Sahel regions, each aiming to consolidate their influence through a blend of military, economic, and diplomatic channels. Their involvement, however, is fraught with contradictions, regional instability, and growing challenges from emerging global powers such as Russia and China, as well as from local actors.
France’s Waning Influence and Its Struggle for Relevance
France’s historical role in Africa, particularly in the Sahel and North Africa, has been deeply rooted in its colonial legacy. However, the geopolitical landscape has significantly shifted in recent years, leading to a sharp decline in French influence, especially following the failures of its military interventions and the rise of local opposition to French presence.
France’s 2011 NATO-backed intervention in Libya, which led to the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, is a pivotal example of its geopolitical miscalculations. While the initial intervention was framed as a mission to stabilize the region, the aftermath led to Libya’s descent into civil war and opened doors for other foreign actors, including Turkey and Russia. France’s support for Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar—who attempted to take control of Tripoli—further escalated tensions, dividing Europe and damaging France’s regional standing.
In the Sahel, France’s Operation Barkhane, launched to combat jihadist groups, has proven increasingly ineffective. Despite initial successes, jihadist insurgencies have resurged, and military coups in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have shifted political allegiances away from Paris. Anti-French sentiment has surged across the Sahel, with new military juntas seeking alternative alliances, particularly with Russia’s Wagner Group. This shift signals the erosion of France’s once-dominant influence in the region.
France’s strategic recalibration in response to this decline includes the establishment of the Takuba Task Force, a multilateral military effort designed to maintain France’s grip in the region. However, this initiative has raised concerns among European allies, many of whom view it as a last-ditch attempt by France to retain control. Local populations in Mali and Niger have protested French presence, further illustrating the complex and multilayered crises in the Sahel, where military solutions alone are no longer viable.
Turkey’s Expanding Role: Soft Power and Military Maneuvers
Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has steadily expanded its influence in the region over the past decade, leveraging a combination of religious and cultural diplomacy, economic investments, and military support. Unlike France, which is burdened by its colonial past, Turkey has been able to position itself as a “clean” actor, untainted by a history of exploitation in Africa. Ankara’s efforts are seen by some as a counterbalance to France’s neocolonial approach, particularly in countries like Libya, where Turkey’s military intervention in 2020 was instrumental in preventing the fall of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA).
Turkey’s broader involvement in the Sahel is part of a calculated expansion that began with the establishment of the 1998 Africa Action Plan and was further entrenched by the Africa Partnership Plan of 2013. The country has invested in numerous infrastructure projects, launched Turkish Airlines flights to connect African capitals with Ankara, and provided humanitarian aid through organizations like the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA). Turkey has also established military ties with various Sahelian nations, including providing drones and weapons to help combat insurgencies.
A critical part of Turkey’s strategy is soft power, particularly in education and religion. Turkey has built schools, funded scholarships for African students, and engaged in cultural diplomacy to foster ties with local governments. Ankara has effectively used this approach to build long-term relationships that could pay geopolitical dividends as France’s influence continues to wane.
However, despite its rapid gains, Turkey faces significant challenges. Its economic and military footprint in the Sahel remains relatively modest compared to other powers like Russia, and its ability to sustain long-term engagement is constrained by domestic economic issues and geopolitical limitations. Moreover, Ankara’s growing presence has provoked concern among some European nations and Gulf states, particularly the UAE, which views Turkish expansion as a threat to its own regional ambitions.
Strategic Rivalry and Future Outlook
Both France and Turkey are part of a broader geopolitical rivalry in Africa, where they are competing not only with each other but also with powers like Russia and China. Russia has capitalized on anti-French sentiment in countries like Mali, where the presence of Russian mercenaries is on the rise. China, meanwhile, is using its Belt and Road Initiative to strengthen economic ties across Africa, providing an alternative to Western-dominated financial models.
In North Africa, Turkey’s rivalry with France is particularly acute in Libya, where both countries have backed opposing sides in the civil war. France’s support for Haftar and Turkey’s backing of the GNA have put the two nations at odds, further complicating their NATO alliance and destabilizing the region. This rivalry extends beyond Libya, as both countries seek to influence broader regional dynamics in the Mediterranean and across the Sahel.
In conclusion, while France attempts to preserve its traditional sphere of influence in North Africa and the Sahel, it faces mounting opposition from local governments and rival global powers. Turkey, although a newer player, has successfully leveraged its soft power and military assets to expand its presence. The region is becoming an increasingly contested arena where both nations will continue to vie for influence, but neither can dominate unchallenged. The geopolitical landscape in the Sahel and North Africa remains fluid, with unpredictable shifts likely in the near future as local actors and foreign powers adjust to the rapidly changing dynamics.
The West’s Moral Dilemma
The contradictions at the heart of Western foreign policy are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. While the West continues to present itself as the global champion of democracy and human rights, its actions in North Africa and the Sahel tell a different story. From the EU’s complicity in human rights abuses in Libya and Tunisia to the destabilizing impact of Western arms deals in the Sahel, the evidence suggests that the West’s role in the world remains as destructive as ever.
As migration continues to dominate the political agenda in Europe, the human cost of fortress Europe cannot be overlooked. The rise of right-wing populism across the continent has further entrenched the EU’s anti-immigration policies, with little regard for the suffering of those trapped in North African detention centers. Meanwhile, the international community’s failure to hold powerful states accountable for their actions has only deepened the sense of injustice felt by millions of people across the globe.
In the face of these challenges, the West must confront its moral dilemma. If it truly wishes to uphold the values of democracy and human rights, it must be willing to reckon with the consequences of its own actions. This means ending the cycle of violence and exploitation that has defined its relationships with countries in Africa and the Middle East, and taking responsibility for the human suffering it has helped to create.
