In an unprecedented move, China has launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the Western Pacific, a significant development not only in its military strategy but also in global geopolitics. For the first time in more than four decades, this ICBM launch marks a strategic milestone, signaling China’s expanding nuclear capabilities and its growing assertiveness on the world stage. This act comes amidst rising global tensions and heightened focus on China’s military ambitions, particularly from the United States and its Pacific allies.
On Thursday, September 26, 2024, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense confirmed the ICBM launch, a training exercise involving a missile fired from Hainan Island in the northern reaches of the South China Sea. The missile traveled approximately 7,145 miles (11,500 kilometers) before landing in a designated area in the Pacific Ocean, close to France’s Exclusive Economic Zone around French Polynesia. While the Ministry was vague on specific details, including the type of missile used, it stressed that the missile was not armed with a live warhead, and that the exercise was part of routine annual training.
This test, however, raises numerous questions and concerns regarding China’s intentions, its burgeoning military capabilities, and the implications for global stability. Given that the last time China conducted a similar test was in 1980, this event marks a shift in Beijing’s approach to military deterrence, power projection, and diplomatic signaling.
Historical Context: China’s ICBM Launches
China’s ICBM development began in the Cold War era, driven by the desire to establish a credible deterrent against potential adversaries, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. Early tests were limited, as China lacked the infrastructure, technical expertise, and resources to engage in large-scale missile development. The first successful ICBM test occurred in 1980, when China launched a missile into the Pacific Ocean. This was a significant moment for China, signaling its entry into the exclusive club of nuclear-armed states with long-range strike capabilities.
However, after this initial launch, China shifted its focus to testing missiles on inland ranges, such as those in its western territories. These tests typically involved missiles being launched on high trajectories to compensate for the limited available space, allowing China to test missile capabilities without the risk of provoking international incidents or appearing overly aggressive. During the ensuing decades, China’s ICBM program grew steadily, but testing remained largely confined to inland areas.
In the years since 1980, China has developed a range of ICBM platforms, including the DF-5, a silo-based missile, and more advanced mobile systems such as the DF-31 and DF-41. The mobile nature of these systems provides China with increased strategic flexibility, allowing it to deploy missiles across vast swathes of its territory, complicating adversaries’ targeting efforts in the event of a conflict. Despite this development, China continued to refrain from open-ocean ICBM launches until the recent test in September 2024.
The Strategic Significance of the 2024 Launch
This latest launch holds significant strategic value for China. Beyond the technical benefits of testing the missile’s range and trajectory, the open-ocean test provides China’s military with the opportunity to practice deploying and using mobile ICBM launchers in a forward position. The test also allows China to demonstrate the full operational range of its missiles, offering a more realistic training scenario compared to inland launches, which are limited by geography.
More broadly, this launch serves as a clear message to China’s adversaries, particularly the United States and its allies in the Pacific. The decision to notify the United States, Australia, and New Zealand in advance of the launch highlights the intentional signaling aspect of the exercise. The missile’s trajectory, which passed between Taiwan and the Philippines before landing near French Polynesia, further underscores China’s growing military presence in the Pacific—a region of increasing strategic importance as global power dynamics shift.
Below is a detailed table reporting China’s ballistic and cruise missiles. It includes key specifications such as missile type, range, payload capacity, destructive power, and other capabilities.
| Missile Name | Type | Range (km) | Warhead Type | Payload Capacity (kg) | Speed (Mach) | Launch Platform | Accuracy (CEP) | Special Features |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DF-5 (Dong Feng-5) | ICBM (Silo-based) | 12,000-15,000 | Nuclear | 3,000-3,200 | Mach 20 | Silo-based | 500m-1km | MIRV capability, carries 3-8 nuclear warheads, high destructive potential. |
| DF-31A (Dong Feng-31A) | ICBM (Road-mobile) | 11,000-12,000 | Nuclear | 1,000-1,750 | Mach 22 | Road-mobile TEL | 300-500m | Highly mobile, capable of launching from concealed locations, improved range from DF-31. |
| DF-41 (Dong Feng-41) | ICBM (Road-mobile) | 12,000-15,000 | Nuclear | 2,500-3,500 | Mach 25 | Road-mobile, Silo-based | 100-200m | MIRV with 10+ warheads, longest range in China’s arsenal, extremely fast and accurate. |
| DF-26 (Dong Feng-26) | Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) | 4,000 | Nuclear, Conventional | 1,200-1,800 | Mach 18 | Road-mobile TEL | <100m | Dual-capable, anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) for precision strikes, nuclear or conventional warheads. |
| DF-21D (Dong Feng-21D) | Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) | 1,500-2,000 | Conventional | 600-1,000 | Mach 10 | Road-mobile TEL | <10m | Known as the “carrier killer,” designed specifically for anti-ship warfare. |
| DF-15 (Dong Feng-15) | Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) | 600-900 | Conventional, Nuclear | 500-600 | Mach 5 | Road-mobile TEL | 30-50m | Highly mobile and capable of delivering precision strikes with conventional or nuclear payloads. |
| DF-17 (Dong Feng-17) | Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV) | 1,800-2,500 | Conventional, Nuclear | 1,000-1,500 | Mach 10+ | Road-mobile TEL | <10m | Hypersonic glide vehicle for evasive high-speed attacks, primarily anti-ship and anti-ground targets. |
| CJ-10 (Chang Jian-10) | Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) | 1,500-2,000 | Conventional, Nuclear | 500 | Mach 0.8 | Ground-based, Air-based | 10-15m | Stealthy cruise missile capable of precision strikes on high-value targets, low observable profile. |
| CJ-100 (Chang Jian-100) | Cruise Missile | 2,500-3,000 | Conventional | 500-1,000 | Mach 3 | Air, Ground-based | <5m | Successor to CJ-10, hypersonic speeds, long-range precision targeting. |
| YJ-12 (Ying Ji-12) | Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) | 400-500 | Conventional | 400 | Mach 2.5-4 | Air-launched | 5-10m | Supersonic anti-ship missile designed for fast-moving and evasive targets, high-speed terminal phase. |
| YJ-18 (Ying Ji-18) | Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) | 540 | Conventional | 300 | Mach 3 | Submarine-launched, Surface ship-launched | 10m | Dual-speed (subsonic cruise, supersonic terminal phase), designed to penetrate enemy defenses. |
| DF-3A (Dong Feng-3A) | Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) | 2,800 | Nuclear, Conventional | 2,000 | Mach 5-7 | Road-mobile TEL | 500m-1km | Outdated system still in use for nuclear strike capabilities. |
| DF-11 (Dong Feng-11) | Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) | 300-600 | Conventional | 500-800 | Mach 4-5 | Road-mobile TEL | 30-50m | Short-range, high-speed missile designed for rapid strikes, high accuracy, and mobility. |
| JL-2 (Julang-2) | Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) | 7,000-9,000 | Nuclear | 2,000-2,800 | Mach 22 | Submarine-launched | 500-1,000m | SLBM with MIRV capability, forms part of China’s nuclear triad, highly survivable in case of conflict. |
| JL-3 (Julang-3) | Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) | 9,000-12,000 | Nuclear | 2,500-3,000 | Mach 25 | Submarine-launched | <500m | Advanced SLBM with enhanced range, stealth features, and capable of carrying multiple warheads. |
| HN-2 (Hong Niao-2) | Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) | 1,800 | Nuclear, Conventional | 500-600 | Mach 0.8 | Ground-based | 5-10m | High precision, nuclear or conventional capable, stealth features. |
| HN-3 (Hong Niao-3) | Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) | 3,000 | Conventional, Nuclear | 600-800 | Mach 0.9 | Ground-based | 5m | Long-range precision missile, capable of striking deep within enemy territory with low detection risk. |
| DF-15B (Dong Feng-15B) | Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) | 600-900 | Conventional, Nuclear | 500-700 | Mach 6 | Road-mobile TEL | 30-50m | Enhanced range and accuracy over DF-15, designed for rapid deployment in regional conflicts. |
| DH-10 (Dong Hai-10) | Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM) | 1,500-2,000 | Conventional, Nuclear | 500-1,000 | Mach 0.8 | Ground-based, Air-launched | <10m | High precision, used for both conventional and nuclear strikes, stealth features. |
| YJ-83 (Ying Ji-83) | Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) | 180-250 | Conventional | 165 | Mach 0.9 | Air-launched, Ship-launched | 5-10m | Widely used in Chinese Navy, effective against a range of surface vessels. |
Key Terms:
- ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
- MRBM: Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
- SRBM: Short-Range Ballistic Missile
- TEL: Transporter Erector Launcher
- SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
- MIRV: Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle
- CEP: Circular Error Probable, a measure of a missile’s accuracy
Expanding Nuclear Capabilities
In recent years, China’s nuclear arsenal has undergone rapid expansion. The Pentagon’s 2023 report on China’s military capabilities revealed that Beijing had more than doubled the size of its nuclear stockpile between 2020 and 2023. The report estimates that China now possesses approximately 500 nuclear warheads, with projections suggesting this number could grow to 1,000 by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035. This represents a dramatic increase in China’s nuclear capabilities and highlights its intention to become a more formidable global power.
One of the most visible indicators of this expansion has been the construction of new missile silos in northwestern China. Satellite imagery released by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2023 showed significant progress in silo construction, signaling that China is preparing to significantly increase its land-based missile capacity. These silos are believed to house new variants of the DF-41, a missile capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), giving China the ability to strike multiple targets simultaneously with a single missile.
China’s growing missile capabilities have raised concerns among other nuclear powers, particularly the United States. The U.S. has traditionally maintained a posture of nuclear deterrence focused on Russia, but recent developments in China’s missile program have shifted U.S. strategy. In August 2024, The New York Times reported that the U.S. had shifted its nuclear deterrence strategy to focus primarily on China for the first time in history. This strategic shift underscores the growing importance of China’s military capabilities in global security considerations.
Geopolitical Implications
The 2024 ICBM launch has far-reaching geopolitical implications, not just for the United States but for the broader Pacific region and beyond. China’s actions can be seen as part of a broader pattern of assertiveness, as Beijing seeks to project power and secure its interests in key regions. One of the most contentious issues remains the status of Taiwan. China considers Taiwan to be a breakaway province, while the U.S. and its allies support Taiwan’s self-governance, leading to significant tensions in the region. The missile’s path, which passed close to Taiwan, can be interpreted as a demonstration of China’s ability to threaten the island in the event of a conflict.
In addition to Taiwan, China’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea have been a source of tension with its neighbors, including the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. China has built artificial islands in the region and has fortified them with military installations, further raising concerns about Beijing’s intentions. The South China Sea is a vital waterway for global trade, and any conflict in the region could have devastating consequences for the global economy.
The timing of the missile launch is also notable, coming just hours after U.S. President Joe Biden addressed the United Nations, where he emphasized the need to manage competition with China to prevent it from escalating into conflict. Biden’s remarks underscored the importance of diplomacy and cooperation, particularly on issues such as climate change, while also highlighting the U.S.’s strong alliances with South Korea and Japan—two countries that are critical to maintaining stability in the region.
China’s test also comes amid increasing cooperation between Beijing and Moscow. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, China and Russia have deepened their military ties, with joint exercises and increased arms sales. This partnership presents a significant challenge for the West, particularly as both nations have sought to counter U.S. influence globally. In this context, the ICBM launch can be seen as part of a broader effort by China to demonstrate its military capabilities and its willingness to act in concert with Russia.
Domestic Considerations
While the international implications of the ICBM launch are clear, there are also domestic factors that may have influenced China’s decision to conduct the test. In 2023, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), which oversees China’s missile forces, was rocked by a series of corruption scandals. These scandals led to a major leadership shakeup within the PLARF, raising questions about the force’s operational readiness and credibility. The September 2024 launch may be part of an effort by the Chinese government to reassert the PLARF’s authority and demonstrate that it remains a capable and reliable component of China’s military.
Moreover, the launch fits into a broader pattern of increased Chinese military activity. In recent years, China has conducted a number of high-profile military exercises, often involving complex and advanced weapons systems. These exercises serve a dual purpose: they allow China’s military to test and refine its capabilities, while also sending a message to both domestic and international audiences about China’s growing power.
Future Outlook: A New Era of Chinese Deterrence
China’s decision to fire an ICBM into the Pacific for the first time in decades represents more than just a routine military exercise. It marks the beginning of a new phase in China’s military strategy, one that involves more frequent and transparent demonstrations of its growing nuclear capabilities. This shift is likely to have significant implications for global security, as China continues to expand its nuclear arsenal and refine its missile technologies.
The Chinese Ministry of Defense’s description of the launch as a “routine” part of an “annual training plan” suggests that this may be the first of many similar tests. As China’s nuclear capabilities grow, it will need to demonstrate them in ways that are both credible and visible to the international community. This is a strategy that other nuclear powers, including the United States and Russia, have employed for decades. By conducting more open-ocean ICBM tests, China is signaling its intention to join the ranks of established nuclear powers, while also sending a clear message to its adversaries about the scope and scale of its deterrent capabilities.
In conclusion, China’s September 2024 ICBM launch is a significant development in the country’s military trajectory. It highlights not only China’s expanding nuclear capabilities but also its growing willingness to engage in power projection on a global scale. The test sends a clear signal to the United States and its allies in the Pacific, while also demonstrating China’s commitment to modernizing its military forces and ensuring its strategic interests are protected. As China continues to rise as a global power, the world will be watching closely to see how it navigates the complex and often dangerous waters of nuclear deterrence and geopolitical competition.
APPENDIX 1 – Comparison of International Ballistic Missiles (ICBM, MRBM, SRBM) and Cruise Missiles
| Country | Missile Name | Type | Range (km) | Warhead Type | Payload Capacity (kg) | Speed (Mach) | Launch Platform | Accuracy (CEP) | Special Features |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| China | DF-41 | ICBM | 12,000-15,000 | Nuclear | 2,500-3,500 | Mach 25 | Road-mobile, Silo-based | 100-200m | MIRV with 10+ warheads, fastest ICBM in service. |
| United States | Minuteman III | ICBM | 12,000 | Nuclear | 1,150 | Mach 23 | Silo-based | 100-200m | MIRV-capable (up to 3 warheads), high operational readiness. |
| Russia | RS-28 Sarmat | ICBM | 18,000+ | Nuclear | 10,000 | Mach 20-25 | Silo-based | 100-200m | Known as “Satan 2,” carries up to 15 warheads, global strike range, hypersonic glide vehicle capable. |
| France | M51 | ICBM (SLBM) | 10,000 | Nuclear | 1,100-1,500 | Mach 20 | Submarine-launched | 150-200m | MIRV with 6-10 warheads, main deterrent of French nuclear force. |
| India | Agni-V | ICBM | 5,000-8,000 | Nuclear | 1,500-2,000 | Mach 24 | Road-mobile | 100-200m | MIRV capable, mainstay of Indian strategic deterrence, limited range relative to others. |
| North Korea | Hwasong-17 | ICBM | 13,000-15,000 | Nuclear | 3,500-4,000 | Mach 20-25 | Road-mobile | 500m-1km | Capable of reaching U.S. mainland, large MIRV payload capacity. |
| United States | Trident II (D5) | ICBM (SLBM) | 12,000 | Nuclear | 2,800 | Mach 24 | Submarine-launched | 90m | MIRV with up to 12 warheads, highly accurate, deployed on Ohio-class submarines. |
| Russia | R-29RMU Sineva | ICBM (SLBM) | 11,000 | Nuclear | 2,800 | Mach 22 | Submarine-launched | 250m | MIRV with 4-10 warheads, mainstay of Russian SLBM fleet. |
| India | K-4 | ICBM (SLBM) | 3,500 | Nuclear | 2,000 | Mach 8 | Submarine-launched | 300m | Limited range compared to other SLBMs, part of India’s developing sea-based deterrent. |
| China | JL-3 | SLBM | 9,000-12,000 | Nuclear | 2,500-3,000 | Mach 25 | Submarine-launched | <500m | Advanced SLBM with MIRV capability, key to China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent. |
| France | ASMP-A | Air-Launched Cruise Missile | 500 | Nuclear | 300 | Mach 3 | Air-launched (Rafale) | 50-100m | Supersonic nuclear missile, highly survivable, main component of French airborne nuclear strike. |
| United States | LGM-30G Minuteman III | ICBM | 12,000 | Nuclear | 1,150 | Mach 23 | Silo-based | 100-200m | MIRV capability, part of U.S. land-based nuclear triad. |
| Russia | Topol-M (RS-12M) | ICBM | 11,000 | Nuclear | 1,000-1,200 | Mach 20 | Road-mobile, Silo-based | 200-250m | High survivability, road-mobile, warhead with advanced countermeasures. |
| United States | AGM-86B ALCM | Air-Launched Cruise Missile | 2,500 | Nuclear | 1,200 | Subsonic | Air-launched (B-52) | 10-20m | Stealthy cruise missile, capable of penetrating advanced air defenses. |
| Russia | Kh-55 | Air-Launched Cruise Missile | 3,000 | Nuclear | 410-450 | Mach 0.77 | Air-launched (Tu-160, Tu-95) | 20m | Key component of Russian strategic bombers, stealth profile. |
| United States | Tomahawk Block V | Land Attack Cruise Missile | 1,600-2,500 | Conventional, Nuclear (retired) | 450 | Mach 0.75 | Surface ship-launched, Submarine-launched | 5-10m | Stealthy, precision-guided, capable of deep strikes. |
| France | MdCN (Missile de Croisière Naval) | Cruise Missile | 1,000+ | Conventional | 400-500 | Mach 0.8 | Submarine-launched, Surface ship-launched | 3-10m | French equivalent to Tomahawk, precision-guided with deep strike capability. |
| China | DF-26 | IRBM | 4,000 | Nuclear, Conventional | 1,200-1,800 | Mach 18 | Road-mobile TEL | <100m | Dual-capable, anti-ship ballistic missile, precision strike capabilities. |
| India | Nirbhay | Cruise Missile | 1,000-1,500 | Conventional | 300-450 | Mach 0.7 | Ground-launched | 10-20m | Subsonic cruise missile, precision-guided, designed for deep strike capabilities. |
| North Korea | KN-23 | SRBM | 600-800 | Conventional, Nuclear | 500-600 | Mach 6 | Road-mobile | 30-50m | High-speed missile designed to evade missile defenses, short-range strikes. |
| Russia | Iskander-M | SRBM | 500 | Conventional, Nuclear | 700 | Mach 6 | Road-mobile | <5m | High-precision tactical missile, known for complex flight path to evade interception. |
| United States | SM-6 | Anti-Ballistic/ Cruise Missile | 460-500 | Conventional | 140 | Mach 3.5 | Surface ship-launched | 10-20m | Dual-capable for surface-to-air and anti-surface roles, key part of Aegis defense system. |
| Russia | Kinzhal (Kh-47M2) | Hypersonic Air-Launched Ballistic Missile | 2,000 | Nuclear, Conventional | 500 | Mach 10-12 | Air-launched (MiG-31, Tu-22M3) | 10-20m | Hypersonic with evasive maneuvers, strategic precision strikes. |
Comparison Highlights and Analysis:
Range:
- China’s DF-41 and Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat represent the longest-range ICBMs, capable of striking targets globally with ranges exceeding 15,000 km, giving them strategic superiority in reach.
- North Korea’s Hwasong-17 also shows a comparable range, raising concerns about its ability to reach the U.S. mainland, despite potential technological limitations.
- India’s Agni-V has a shorter range (5,000-8,000 km) but remains highly effective for regional deterrence in Asia, particularly against China and Pakistan.
Payload and MIRV Capability:
- Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat has the largest payload, up to 10,000 kg, allowing it to carry up to 15 MIRVs, making it the most potent ICBM in terms of destruction capability.
- China’s DF-41, while lighter in payload (3,000 kg), can carry 10 or more warheads, making it a formidable force in the nuclear arsenal competition.
- The U.S. Minuteman III and Trident II carry fewer warheads (3 and 12, respectively) but remain highly reliable and accurate components of the U.S. nuclear triad.
Hypersonic Capabilities:
- China’s DF-17, Russia’s Kinzhal, and the U.S.’ SM-6 highlight the growing emphasis on hypersonic missile technologies. These missiles, traveling at speeds greater than Mach 5, pose significant challenges to existing missile defense systems.
- China’s DF-17 is designed for anti-ship and land targets with high maneuverability, while Russia’s Kinzhal is optimized for precision air-launched strikes, able to evade detection and interception due to its speed.
Cruise Missiles:
- The U.S. Tomahawk Block V and Russia’s Kh-55 remain some of the most versatile cruise missiles in their respective arsenals, with long-range and high precision.
- France’s MdCN and China’s CJ-10 serve similar roles, focusing on precision deep strikes, with the CJ-10 featuring greater stealth features for use against high-value targets.
- India’s Nirbhay and North Korea’s KN-23 represent newer entries into the cruise missile domain, with India focusing on a flexible deep strike capability, and North Korea enhancing short-range nuclear-capable delivery systems.
Geopolitical Implications:
- Russia and China lead in missile variety and advancement, particularly in hypersonic and MIRV capabilities, posing significant strategic challenges to the U.S. and NATO allies.
- The U.S. continues to maintain a robust missile defense system, especially with the Aegis and SM-6, which offers integrated anti-air, anti-missile, and anti-surface roles.
- India is developing its missile arsenal steadily but remains focused on regional deterrence rather than global strategic reach. Its development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and MIRV technologies will play a pivotal role in its future nuclear deterrence.
- North Korea, while technologically behind, is rapidly developing long-range and nuclear-capable missiles, escalating tensions in East Asia and posing significant security threats to the U.S. and its regional allies, particularly South Korea and Japan.
In conclusion, global missile arsenals are becoming more sophisticated with increasing ranges, MIRV capabilities, and hypersonic technology, reshaping the strategic landscape. China’s rapid missile advancements, especially in the areas of mobile ICBMs, hypersonic glide vehicles, and stealth cruise missiles, place it among the world’s leading military powers. However, it still faces competition from Russia and the U.S., which continue to modernize their nuclear and missile forces for deterrence and defense.
APPENDIX 2 – Comparison of China DF-5 ICBM with Other Global ICBMs
| Country | Missile Name | Type | Range (km) | Warhead Type | Payload Capacity (kg) | Speed (Mach) | Launch Platform | Accuracy (CEP) | Special Features |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| China | DF-5 (Dong Feng-5) | ICBM (Silo-based) | 12,000-15,000 | Nuclear (3-8 MIRVs) | 3,000-3,200 | Mach 20 | Silo-based | 500m-1km | First Chinese ICBM with MIRV capability, large payload, limited mobility due to silo-based launch. |
| United States | Minuteman III | ICBM (Silo-based) | 12,000 | Nuclear (3 MIRVs) | 1,150 | Mach 23 | Silo-based | 100-200m | One of the most reliable and operationally ready ICBMs, with highly accurate MIRV warheads. |
| Russia | RS-28 Sarmat (Satan 2) | ICBM (Silo-based) | 18,000+ | Nuclear (10-15 MIRVs) | 10,000 | Mach 20-25 | Silo-based | 100-200m | Largest payload of any ICBM, capable of delivering multiple warheads globally, including hypersonic glide vehicles. |
| France | M51 | ICBM (SLBM) | 10,000 | Nuclear (6-10 MIRVs) | 1,100-1,500 | Mach 20 | Submarine-launched | 150-200m | Advanced SLBM with high accuracy, part of France’s second-strike capability on nuclear submarines. |
| India | Agni-V | ICBM | 5,000-8,000 | Nuclear (MIRV potential) | 1,500-2,000 | Mach 24 | Road-mobile | 100-200m | Limited range compared to others, key to India’s nuclear deterrent, MIRV development underway. |
| North Korea | Hwasong-17 | ICBM | 13,000-15,000 | Nuclear (MIRV potential) | 3,500-4,000 | Mach 20-25 | Road-mobile | 500m-1km | North Korea’s longest-range ICBM, capable of reaching the U.S. mainland, significant payload capacity. |
| United States | LGM-30G Minuteman III | ICBM | 12,000 | Nuclear (3 MIRVs) | 1,150 | Mach 23 | Silo-based | 100-200m | Extremely reliable, forms the backbone of U.S. land-based nuclear deterrent. |
| Russia | Topol-M (RS-12M) | ICBM | 11,000 | Nuclear (Single warhead or MIRV potential) | 1,000-1,200 | Mach 20 | Road-mobile, Silo-based | 200-250m | High-speed, highly mobile ICBM, uses countermeasures to evade missile defenses. |
| China | DF-41 | ICBM | 12,000-15,000 | Nuclear (10+ MIRVs) | 2,500-3,500 | Mach 25 | Road-mobile, Silo-based | 100-200m | MIRV with up to 10 warheads, China’s most advanced and longest-range ICBM, highly mobile. |
| United States | Trident II (D5) | ICBM (SLBM) | 12,000 | Nuclear (MIRV with 12 warheads) | 2,800 | Mach 24 | Submarine-launched | <100m | High precision, forms part of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad, highly survivable on Ohio-class submarines. |
| Russia | R-29RMU Sineva | ICBM (SLBM) | 11,000 | Nuclear (4-10 MIRVs) | 2,800 | Mach 22 | Submarine-launched | 250m | Main Russian SLBM, deployed on Delta IV-class submarines, high MIRV capability. |
| India | K-4 | ICBM (SLBM) | 3,500 | Nuclear | 2,000 | Mach 8 | Submarine-launched | 300m | Shorter range compared to other SLBMs, India’s developing sea-based deterrent. |
Key Comparisons:
Range:
- China’s DF-5 has a competitive range of 12,000-15,000 km, putting it in the upper range of global ICBMs, comparable to the U.S. Minuteman III and Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat. However, the RS-28 Sarmat has a superior range, capable of exceeding 18,000 km, making it the world’s longest-range ICBM.
- North Korea’s Hwasong-17 also reaches up to 15,000 km, which, while similar to the DF-5, is technologically less advanced but poses significant regional and global risks due to North Korea’s volatile geopolitical stance.
Payload and MIRV Capability:
- Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat far exceeds the DF-5 in payload capacity, carrying up to 15 MIRVs compared to the DF-5’s 3-8 MIRVs. This enables the Sarmat to deliver a greater destructive power over multiple targets globally.
- China’s DF-5 carries a relatively large payload (3,000-3,200 kg), but it is outclassed by Sarmat’s 10,000 kg, making the Russian missile far more destructive.
- The U.S. Minuteman III carries a smaller payload (1,150 kg) but remains highly reliable and capable of deploying 3 MIRVs, maintaining operational readiness as a deterrent.
- North Korea’s Hwasong-17 has a similar payload to the DF-5 (3,500-4,000 kg) and, while its MIRV capability is still under development, it presents a growing threat, particularly to the U.S. mainland.
Launch Platforms:
- China’s DF-5 is silo-based, which limits its mobility compared to road-mobile ICBMs like Russia’s Topol-M and China’s own DF-41. Road-mobile platforms offer greater survivability as they can be relocated to avoid detection and preemptive strikes.
- The U.S. Minuteman III is also silo-based but benefits from a highly integrated and advanced early-warning system, making it a stable deterrent despite the lack of mobility.
- Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat and France’s M51 are also silo-based but offer enhanced survivability through decoy systems and advanced countermeasures designed to evade missile defenses.
- Submarine-launched ICBMs like Russia’s R-29RMU Sineva, India’s K-4, and the U.S. Trident II D5 offer the highest level of survivability due to their second-strike capability, ensuring that they can remain hidden and retaliate after a first-strike attack.
Accuracy (CEP):
- The U.S. Trident II D5 and Minuteman III are among the most accurate ICBMs globally, with CEPs of under 100-200 meters, significantly enhancing their deterrent effect by ensuring precise targeting.
- China’s DF-5 has a larger CEP (500m-1km), which makes it less accurate compared to newer systems like the DF-41 or the U.S. Minuteman III.
- Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat also has a similar accuracy (100-200m), making it a highly reliable deterrent, especially given its massive payload capacity.
Destructive Power:
- Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat leads in terms of overall destructive potential, carrying up to 15 warheads with a payload of 10,000 kg. Its MIRV capability and potential to carry hypersonic glide vehicles make it the most powerful missile in terms of both quantity and variety of warheads.
- China’s DF-5, while equipped with 3-8 MIRVs, is significantly less advanced in terms of destructive capacity than the Sarmat but remains a potent strategic deterrent, particularly for long-range nuclear strikes.
- The U.S. Minuteman III carries fewer warheads but compensates with extreme accuracy and operational readiness, playing a crucial role in maintaining the U.S. land-based nuclear deterrent.
Technological Evolution:
- China’s DF-5, while powerful and reliable, is an older system compared to China’s DF-41, which is more advanced in terms of mobility, accuracy, and speed. The DF-5‘s silo-based nature makes it more vulnerable to preemptive strikes, whereas Russia’s Topol-M and China’s DF-41 offer greater flexibility due to their road-mobile launchers.
- Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat represents the cutting edge of ICBM technology, with the capability to carry advanced countermeasures and penetrate missile defenses, making it a next-generation deterrent.
- North Korea’s Hwasong-17, although a technological leap for Pyongyang, lacks the advanced countermeasures and precision of Western and Russian systems, but its sheer range and payload make it a growing threat, particularly for the U.S.
Strategic Implications:
- China’s DF-5 remains a central part of China’s strategic nuclear deterrent, with its long range and large payload. However, it is increasingly supplemented by more modern, mobile systems like the DF-41, which offer enhanced survivability and precision.
- Russia’s RS-28 Sarmat is arguably the most advanced ICBM currently in service, with its unparalleled payload, MIRV capacity, and hypersonic glide vehicle options making it a dominant force in global nuclear strategy.
- The U.S. Minuteman III, despite its age, remains a highly reliable and accurate system, continuously updated and forming the backbone of the U.S. land-based nuclear deterrent. Its combination of precision, operational readiness, and integration with other components of the U.S. triad (such as the Trident II D5) ensures its relevance in modern strategic contexts.
- France’s M51 and the U.S. Trident II D5 are critical for their countries’ second-strike capabilities, with their submarine-launched platforms ensuring survivability in the event of a first-strike scenario.
- North Korea’s Hwasong-17, while still in development, signals Pyongyang’s increasing ability to threaten global targets, with the potential for MIRV capability adding a layer of complexity to regional and international security.
In summary, while China’s DF-5 remains a potent strategic tool, it is increasingly overshadowed by more advanced and flexible systems within both China’s own arsenal (like the DF-41) and those of global competitors like Russia and the U.S.
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