The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been a permanent fixture in southern Lebanon since 1978, following Israel’s invasion during its conflict with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). While it was originally conceived as a temporary measure to restore peace and security in the region, the force has evolved into one of the longest-running UN peacekeeping missions. UNIFIL’s current responsibilities extend far beyond its original mandate, including monitoring the cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel, preventing the re-emergence of armed groups south of the Litani River, and aiding the Lebanese government in re-establishing its authority over southern Lebanon.
However, the criticism aimed at UNIFIL has been profound. More than four decades into its deployment, the force has failed to disarm Hezbollah or prevent the militant group’s accumulation of arms, weapons, and political control in southern Lebanon. Despite substantial international funding, the mission is often perceived as ineffectual, vulnerable, and disconnected from the realities of the power dynamics in Lebanon. This critique highlights the perception of UNIFIL as a peacekeeping force that consumes vast resources but delivers minimal strategic gains.
This comprehensive analysis will explore the failures of UNIFIL from multiple dimensions: the geopolitical context, financial implications, operational shortcomings, and the broader international impact of maintaining this mission. We will scrutinize the budgetary costs, analyze the reasons for its ineffectiveness in curbing Hezbollah’s power, and examine the repercussions of its presence for both Lebanon and Israel. Furthermore, this analysis will demonstrate why UNIFIL’s existence is often symbolic rather than substantive, with its operations being marginalized by the dominant forces shaping the region.
Abbreviations: ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; FS, Field Service; NGS, national General Service; NPO, National Professional Officer. a General temporary assistance. b New post.
The Origins of UNIFIL
Creation of UNIFIL in 1978
The origins of UNIFIL trace back to March 1978, when Israel launched Operation Litani, an offensive aimed at pushing the PLO from southern Lebanon in response to ongoing attacks against Israeli citizens. The ensuing international outcry prompted the United Nations Security Council to act, leading to the adoption of Resolution 425 and its companion, Resolution 426. These resolutions called for Israel’s immediate withdrawal from Lebanon and authorized the creation of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with a mandate to confirm the Israeli withdrawal, restore international peace and security, and assist the Lebanese government in restoring its authority over the area.
Initially, UNIFIL’s mission seemed straightforward. It was a reactive force designed to stabilize southern Lebanon in the wake of an Israeli military operation. However, as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued to play out on Lebanese soil, it became clear that UNIFIL was operating in an increasingly complex and volatile environment. The Lebanese Civil War, which raged from 1975 to 1990, further complicated UNIFIL’s mission. The arrival of Syrian forces, the strengthening of various militias, and the eventual rise of Hezbollah as a dominant political and military force all contributed to the erosion of state authority in Lebanon, thus complicating UNIFIL’s mandate.
Early Mandates and Limitations
In the early years of its deployment, UNIFIL struggled to carry out its mission. Israeli forces would periodically re-enter southern Lebanon, and the PLO, along with other militant factions, maintained a strong presence in the region. With limited authority, insufficient resources, and no real mandate to enforce peace beyond observation and reporting, UNIFIL was effectively reduced to monitoring a conflict it had little power to influence.
By the 1980s, Israel’s conflict with the PLO escalated, leading to the full-scale Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. This was followed by the occupation of southern Lebanon, which lasted until 2000. During this period, UNIFIL continued to operate, but its effectiveness was diminished by Israel’s control of the region and the growing influence of Hezbollah, which emerged in 1985 as a dominant force opposing both Israeli occupation and Western intervention.
UNIFIL’s Shift Post-2000
Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 marked a significant shift for UNIFIL. The mission, once tasked with confirming Israeli withdrawal, was now operating in a space where Hezbollah had become the de facto power in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese state, weakened by years of civil war and Syrian domination, was unable to exert authority over the south, leaving a power vacuum that Hezbollah was quick to fill.
UNIFIL’s limitations were made starkly clear during this period. Despite its continued presence, Hezbollah’s military capability grew, and the group launched increasingly sophisticated attacks on Israel, culminating in the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israeli forces. During this war, UNIFIL was largely sidelined, unable to prevent the conflict or protect Lebanese civilians from Israeli airstrikes and artillery fire. The war demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the peacekeeping mission in mitigating large-scale conflicts or altering the balance of power in the region.
Geopolitical Interests of Major Powers
Several key international powers play a significant role in maintaining UNIFIL’s presence in Lebanon:
Key Actors and their Interests
- United States: The U.S. has long been a dominant force in Middle Eastern geopolitics, and its interests in Lebanon are tied to maintaining stability while countering the influence of Iran, especially through Hezbollah. The U.S. supports UNIFIL, but its primary concern is ensuring that Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, does not destabilize the region further by provoking Israel or using southern Lebanon as a base for attacks. Washington’s strategic interest is to avoid a larger regional war that could draw in Israel and escalate tensions with Iran. The U.S. also backs the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) financially, viewing them as a counterbalance to Hezbollah within Lebanon’s fragmented political system.
- France: France has deep historical ties to Lebanon due to its colonial past, and it continues to play a significant role in Lebanese politics. Paris views Lebanon as part of its sphere of influence in the Mediterranean and Levant. By supporting UNIFIL and Lebanon, France asserts its influence in Middle Eastern affairs while also attempting to act as a mediator between Lebanon and Israel. Additionally, France seeks to maintain stability to protect its investments and avoid the influx of refugees to Europe, which could arise from another major conflict.
- Israel: Israel’s primary concern is Hezbollah’s presence in southern Lebanon. The militant group, backed by Iran, poses a direct threat to Israel’s northern border. From Israel’s perspective, UNIFIL is both necessary and insufficient. While UNIFIL provides a buffer that limits Hezbollah’s actions and prevents direct confrontations, it has not been successful in disarming Hezbollah, which Israel sees as a critical failure. Israel tolerates UNIFIL’s presence because it helps contain the situation, but it regularly criticizes the mission for failing to adequately monitor Hezbollah’s activities.
- Iran: Iran’s involvement in Lebanon centers around its support for Hezbollah. Hezbollah serves as Iran’s primary proxy in its regional strategy to exert influence across the Middle East, especially against Israel. Tehran views UNIFIL as a manageable obstacle to its goals in the region. As long as UNIFIL does not aggressively pursue disarmament or disrupt Hezbollah’s activities, Iran sees its continued presence as tolerable. Iran’s broader strategy is to challenge U.S. and Israeli influence in the region, using Hezbollah as a deterrent and as a force to engage in asymmetric warfare if necessary.
- Hezbollah: Hezbollah is both a political party and a military organization in Lebanon, with significant control over southern Lebanon. Its leadership is closely aligned with Iran, and it views UNIFIL’s presence as a double-edged sword. On one hand, UNIFIL’s presence prevents direct large-scale Israeli military operations in southern Lebanon. On the other hand, Hezbollah must operate carefully to avoid being directly confronted by UNIFIL. Despite this, Hezbollah often ignores or undermines UNIFIL’s mandates, using its political clout to ensure the Lebanese government does not fully cooperate with the mission.
- Lebanon: The Lebanese government’s stance on UNIFIL is influenced by its fractured political system, where Hezbollah holds considerable power. While officially supporting UNIFIL and its mandate, the Lebanese government is unable to enforce disarmament in southern Lebanon, largely because of Hezbollah’s dominance in the region. For Lebanon, UNIFIL is a stabilizing force that prevents full-scale conflict with Israel, which would devastate the already fragile country. However, Lebanon is caught between its international obligations and its internal political realities, which limit its ability to fully engage with UNIFIL’s goals.
- Russia: Russia’s role in Lebanon is less direct but still significant. As part of its broader Middle Eastern strategy, Moscow supports the sovereignty of the Syrian government, which has historically been aligned with Hezbollah and Iran. Russia also seeks to counterbalance U.S. and Western influence in Lebanon. While not directly involved in UNIFIL, Russia’s geopolitical interests align with maintaining a foothold in Lebanon to extend its influence in the Mediterranean and the Levant.
- European Union: Several European nations, including Italy and Germany, contribute to UNIFIL. These countries view their involvement as part of broader peacekeeping and stabilization efforts in the Middle East. Europe’s main concern is avoiding another major conflict that could lead to regional instability and a refugee crisis that would impact European nations. Additionally, European countries see their involvement in UNIFIL as a way to maintain diplomatic influence in Middle Eastern affairs.
- Turkey: Turkey’s influence in Lebanon is growing, particularly as it seeks to expand its role in regional geopolitics. Turkey’s interests in Lebanon are part of its broader strategy to increase its influence across the Levant and counterbalance Iranian and Saudi influence in the region. While not directly involved in UNIFIL, Turkey’s growing economic and political ties with Lebanon add another layer of complexity to the region’s geopolitics.
Regional Dynamics: Israel and Hezbollah
- Israel: For Israel, UNIFIL is a mixed bag. On one hand, Israel views UNIFIL as largely ineffective in stopping Hezbollah from amassing weapons and military capabilities in southern Lebanon. On the other hand, Israeli officials recognize that the presence of international peacekeepers serves as a buffer that reduces the likelihood of full-scale conflict. Israel uses UNIFIL as a diplomatic tool to assert violations by Hezbollah and maintain international pressure on Lebanon and Hezbollah.
- Hezbollah and Iran: Hezbollah, backed by Iran, has turned southern Lebanon into a strategic stronghold. Despite UNIFIL’s presence, Hezbollah continues to stockpile weapons and build underground military infrastructure, taking advantage of the limitations placed on the peacekeeping force. Iran views Hezbollah as a crucial part of its strategy to project power in the region and uses the group to deter Israeli actions. Hezbollah’s ability to operate under UNIFIL’s nose, while occasionally challenging its authority, shows that the real influence in the region comes from this non-state actor, rather than the peacekeeping mission.
Lebanese Politics and the Role of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
UNIFIL operates in conjunction with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which has been accused of allowing Hezbollah significant freedom of movement in southern Lebanon. The LAF’s reluctance to fully cooperate with UNIFIL is often seen as a result of Hezbollah’s political dominance in Lebanon, as well as the LAF’s own limited resources and political will to confront the group directly. Some Lebanese political factions, particularly those aligned with Hezbollah, view UNIFIL with suspicion, while others see it as a necessary presence to prevent another destructive war with Israel.
Strategic Maritime Interests
The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force, which patrols Lebanon’s coast to prevent the smuggling of weapons to Hezbollah, is another significant aspect of the mission. This force is essential for countries like the U.S. and France, who want to prevent further military buildup by Hezbollah and ensure that southern Lebanon does not become a launching point for maritime threats against Israel or other regional actors.
Economic and Stability Concerns
Western powers, particularly in Europe, view Lebanon’s stability as crucial to preventing a massive refugee crisis. The collapse of Lebanon’s economy and political system could lead to a new wave of refugees fleeing to Europe. Therefore, maintaining some semblance of stability in Lebanon, even if through a largely symbolic peacekeeping force like UNIFIL, is seen as a way to prevent further destabilization that could impact Europe.
Summary of Real Interests Behind UNIFIL
The real motivations behind the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) can be complex and are influenced by various geopolitical, national, and international interests. UNIFIL was established in 1978 after Israel’s invasion of southern Lebanon, and its role has evolved since, especially after the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. Officially, UNIFIL’s mandate includes monitoring the cessation of hostilities, supporting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and ensuring that the area between the Blue Line (the border between Israel and Lebanon) and the Litani River remains free of unauthorized weapons and forces. However, beneath this surface, there are deeper dynamics at play, often driven by the geopolitical interests of the major international stakeholders.
- Geopolitical Balance: UNIFIL operates in a highly volatile region where tensions between Israel, Hezbollah, and other regional actors like Iran and Syria are ongoing. The presence of UNIFIL helps maintain a fragile balance between these forces. While it is clear that Hezbollah, a powerful paramilitary organization supported by Iran, has maintained a strong presence in southern Lebanon, UNIFIL’s mission indirectly prevents large-scale conflicts between Israel and Hezbollah. This balance is important not just for Lebanon and Israel, but also for broader Middle Eastern stability.
- Stakeholder Interests: UNIFIL is not solely a U.N. initiative; it involves significant contributions from various countries with their own interests in the region. For example, the U.S. and European nations like France and Italy have been involved in supporting UNIFIL due to their interest in Middle Eastern stability and preventing Hezbollah’s influence from growing further. France, in particular, has historical ties to Lebanon and views its involvement as crucial to maintaining its influence in the region. Meanwhile, countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and India, which contribute large numbers of troops, do so for reasons ranging from international peacekeeping commitments to securing influence in global institutions like the U.N.
- UNIFIL’s Limitations: While its official mandate is to assist the Lebanese government and LAF, UNIFIL has faced significant criticism for being unable to disarm Hezbollah or prevent its military buildup. Hezbollah remains deeply entrenched in southern Lebanon, and UNIFIL has limited ability to directly confront or neutralize the group. In fact, any aggressive move against Hezbollah by UNIFIL could lead to significant casualties among peacekeeping forces and escalate the conflict with Israel. This creates a situation where UNIFIL is stuck between maintaining the status quo and preventing larger conflicts, rather than resolving the root causes of the ongoing tensions.
- Israel’s Perspective: From Israel’s standpoint, UNIFIL’s presence is a double-edged sword. While UNIFIL has been criticized by Israeli officials for failing to fully neutralize Hezbollah, its continued presence is seen as necessary to avoid a full-scale confrontation. Israel prefers the presence of an international force over the uncontrolled militarization of its northern border by Hezbollah. However, the Israeli government remains skeptical about UNIFIL’s ability to effectively curb Hezbollah’s activities, and this skepticism leads to periodic diplomatic tensions regarding the renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate.
- Hezbollah and Lebanese Politics: Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon complicates the situation for UNIFIL. Lebanon’s political landscape is deeply fragmented, and Hezbollah’s role as both a political party and an armed group gives it considerable power. The Lebanese government, under pressure from Hezbollah and its allies, is unable to fully support UNIFIL in its mission to disarm militias. As a result, UNIFIL’s operations are constrained by Lebanon’s internal political realities, with Hezbollah playing a dominant role in shaping the security dynamics of southern Lebanon.
- Global Strategic Interests: UNIFIL’s continued presence is also important for broader international players. For the U.S. and Europe, UNIFIL serves as a stabilizing force that prevents southern Lebanon from becoming a full-fledged war zone. Moreover, it limits Iran’s influence in Lebanon by keeping Hezbollah from launching attacks on Israel that could provoke a wider regional conflict. At the same time, Russia and China, as members of the U.N. Security Council, maintain a strategic interest in the mission, even if their direct involvement is minimal compared to the Western powers. Their positions reflect broader geopolitical competition with the West in Middle Eastern affairs.
In summary, UNIFIL’s presence in Lebanon is not simply about peacekeeping. It is a complex web of international and regional interests, involving nations that have a stake in preventing another war between Israel and Hezbollah while managing the broader consequences of Iranian influence in the region. While UNIFIL may not fully achieve its goals, it serves as a tool to maintain a precarious balance in one of the Middle East’s most volatile areas.
Israel’s Military Buildup on the Lebanese Border: Strategic Preparation for a Potential Ground Invasion
As of September 30, 2024, tensions on the Israeli-Lebanese border have escalated significantly, with Israel appearing poised for a ground invasion of southern Lebanon. This move is driven primarily by the ongoing clashes with Hezbollah, which intensified after repeated breaches of the cessation of hostilities that began in early October 2023. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has strongly hinted at preparations for a large-scale ground operation against Hezbollah, which poses a critical threat along Israel’s northern border.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have shifted resources to reinforce the northern front. IDF units, including special forces, have reportedly been operating within Hezbollah’s tunnel networks during cross-border incursions, targeting Hezbollah infrastructure, including the group’s underground military installations. Over the past weeks, the IDF has also intensified airstrikes on key Hezbollah targets, including the killing of senior leaders, and has heavily bombarded the group’s positions in southern Lebanon, particularly in the areas adjacent to Israel’s northern communities.
Israel’s military presence along the Lebanese border has expanded rapidly, with substantial reinforcements being sent to the area. These include infantry brigades, armored units, and artillery, which have been stationed across northern Israel in readiness for a possible incursion. The Israeli air force continues to maintain an active presence, targeting Hezbollah positions and disrupting supply lines from Iran and Syria, critical backers of Hezbollah.
The killing of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in a targeted strike on Beirut’s southern suburbs has further escalated the situation. This event has destabilized Hezbollah’s leadership structure, potentially opening the door for a more aggressive Israeli military posture. Despite the uncertainty surrounding Hezbollah’s future leadership, Israel has shown no signs of de-escalating, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stating that Israel is prepared to “reach anywhere” in Lebanon.
Moreover, there are significant concerns that this conflict could expand regionally, with Iran’s involvement in supporting Hezbollah, and the potential for the conflict to impact broader Middle Eastern stability. Israel’s killing of Nasrallah is viewed as a major strategic move, but it risks igniting a broader conflict, as Iran and Hezbollah have vowed to retaliate.
The situation remains fluid, and diplomatic efforts to prevent a full-scale war are ongoing, but Israel’s military preparedness signals that it is ready to launch a large-scale operation should Hezbollah continue its provocations. The coming days will likely be decisive in determining whether Israel proceeds with an invasion of southern Lebanon.
Israeli Military Resources Deployed Along the Lebanon Border (September 2024)
| Category | Resource Description | Deployment Details | Strategic Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| Troop Strength | Infantry Brigades | Multiple brigades, including Golani and Nahal brigades, deployed in northern Israel, particularly in Metula and Misgav Am. | Ground troops prepared for offensive operations and territorial control, capable of engaging Hezbollah forces in Lebanon. |
| Armored Divisions | Main Battle Tanks (Merkava Mk4) | At least 200-300 tanks stationed at strategic points near Kiryat Shmona, Rosh Hanikra, and Malkiya. | Heavy armor for direct combat with Hezbollah’s fortified positions and for territorial penetration into southern Lebanon. |
| Artillery Units | Howitzers and MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket Systems) | Self-propelled howitzers (M109), MLRS batteries (M270) positioned at bases in Galilee, and ready for mobile deployment across the northern border. | Provides long-range bombardment capability to suppress Hezbollah positions, logistics hubs, and missile launch sites. |
| Special Forces | Sayeret Matkal (General Staff Reconnaissance Unit) and Shayetet 13 (Naval Commandos) | Elite special forces units are stationed in covert forward positions near the Shebaa Farms area and along the Blue Line. | Covert operations aimed at disabling Hezbollah’s leadership and critical infrastructure, including tunnel networks. |
| Air Defense Systems | Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow Missile Defense Systems | Iron Dome systems set up near northern cities (e.g., Haifa and Nahariya). David’s Sling and Arrow-3 systems in the Golan Heights and Galilee region. | Defends northern Israel from incoming Hezbollah rockets, especially those with longer range, such as Fateh-110 or Zelzal-2. |
| Air Force Assets | F-35I “Adir” Fighter Jets, UAVs, and Apache Helicopters | Squadrons of F-35I, F-16, and Apache helicopters based at Ramat David Airbase, frequently conducting patrols over Lebanese airspace and missile strikes. | Air superiority and precision strikes on Hezbollah positions and high-value targets. |
| Naval Resources | Sa’ar-class Corvettes and Missile Boats | Sa’ar 5-class corvettes patrolling the eastern Mediterranean Sea, ensuring naval blockade of Hezbollah’s supply routes via the sea. | Controls Lebanon’s maritime borders and prevents weapons shipments to Hezbollah. |
| Intelligence Assets | Intelligence drones, reconnaissance aircraft, and SIGINT capabilities | Eitan UAVs and Heron drones operating over southern Lebanon, along with SIGINT gathering stations near Mount Hermon and other high-altitude surveillance points. | Monitoring Hezbollah’s movements, communications, and detecting potential missile launches or underground activities. |
| Engineering Units | IDF Combat Engineers (Yahalom) | Engineering units deployed along the Blue Line, specialized in mine clearance, tunnel detection, and fortification construction. | Prepare for breaching operations and tunnel neutralization efforts to counter Hezbollah’s vast tunnel networks. |
| Logistics & Reserves | IDF Reserves (estimated 30,000 troops on call) and logistical convoys | Reserve brigades and extensive logistical support have been activated and are on standby in bases across Haifa and Zefat, ready for deployment if necessary. | Rapid mobilization to reinforce the front lines or support long-term military engagements across Lebanon’s southern territory. |
Summary of Israel’s Military Preparedness on the Lebanon Border:
- Massive Troop and Armor Presence: Israel has positioned thousands of troops along with hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles, prepared for a potential ground invasion into southern Lebanon. These forces are stationed at key points like Metula and Misgav Am, allowing for quick engagement with Hezbollah.
- Special Forces Operations: Covert Israeli special forces have reportedly been active in Hezbollah-controlled territory, targeting key military infrastructure such as tunnels and missile stockpiles.
- Air Superiority: Israeli fighter jets and drones are continuously patrolling Lebanese airspace, with airstrikes targeting Hezbollah missile launch sites and senior leaders. The precision capabilities of Israel’s F-35I jets have been a critical component in Israel’s tactical advantage.
- Missile Defense Systems: Given Hezbollah’s significant rocket arsenal, Israel has deployed a comprehensive missile defense network that includes Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow-3 systems. These defenses have proven highly effective in intercepting short and medium-range missiles fired into northern Israel.
- Naval Control: The presence of Israel’s Sa’ar-class missile boats ensures Hezbollah cannot receive reinforcements or arms via the Mediterranean Sea, establishing a near-complete maritime blockade of southern Lebanon.
- Strategic Logistics: Israel has activated its reserve forces and established logistical bases near the border, ensuring readiness for prolonged conflict, including supply routes for fuel, ammunition, and medical supplies.
The ongoing military buildup, combined with the recent killing of Hezbollah’s leader Nasrallah, points toward a highly volatile situation where an Israeli ground incursion is increasingly likely. The IDF’s significant resources deployed to the border show its readiness for an extended campaign, should Hezbollah continue its provocations.
….. UPDATE OCTOBER 1, 2024
As of October 1, 2024, Israel has launched a series of limited and targeted ground incursions into southern Lebanon, marking a significant escalation in the conflict with Hezbollah. Despite international efforts to avoid a full-scale war, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has launched operations against strategic Hezbollah targets in response to the armed group’s ongoing provocations. Clashes along the border have intensified in recent weeks, culminating in a ground invasion that was initially limited in scope, but could expand.
The operation, confirmed by the IDF, was conducted under air cover and supported by artillery strikes, primarily targeting Hezbollah military infrastructure located in strategic villages near the border. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said the operation was aimed at eliminating the threat posed by Hezbollah’s underground installations and weapons production sites, which pose an immediate security risk to Israel’s northern communities. The Israeli military stressed that the invasion was not aimed at a prolonged occupation of Lebanese territory, but at neutralizing specific terrorist targets.
On the diplomatic front, the international community, including Italy, expressed concern over the escalation and called for an immediate ceasefire. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni said that Italy, as G7 president, would continue to work to de-escalate the situation and ensure the safety of UNIFIL contingents, including Italian troops currently deployed in southern Lebanon.
Meanwhile, Hezbollah continued to fire rockets into Israeli territory, particularly in the Galilee region, prompting further retaliatory strikes by the IDF. Hezbollah’s leadership has suffered a major blow with the killing of their leader Hassan Nasrallah in a targeted attack on the outskirts of Beirut. Nasrallah’s death has sparked promises of revenge from the group and its allies, particularly Iran, whose support for Hezbollah remains a major concern for Israel and its Western allies.
The consequences of the operation remain uncertain, with the risk of the conflict spreading to a regional level. However, Israel has indicated that it will not rest until it has destroyed Hezbollah’s operational capabilities in southern Lebanon. The situation on the ground is constantly evolving, with intense clashes ongoing all along the border and Israeli air strikes targeting key Hezbollah infrastructure in and around Beirut.
Iran’s Geopolitical Strategy After the Death of Hassan Nasrallah
- Nasrallah’s Death and Leadership Void: Hassan Nasrallah’s death represents a significant blow to Hezbollah, creating a leadership vacuum that Iran is working to address. Iran’s primary concern is to stabilize Hezbollah’s leadership structure by ensuring a smooth transition to Nasrallah’s successor, Hashem Safieddine, or another key figure who maintains strong ties to Tehran. This change in leadership introduces uncertainty within Hezbollah, but Iran is determined to use this situation to reassert control over its proxy.
- Iran’s Response Strategy: In response to the escalation with Israel, Iran is pursuing a cautious but strategic approach. While Tehran is not seeking an open war with Israel, its aim is to retaliate in a controlled manner that will reinforce its deterrence without triggering a full-scale regional conflict. Following Nasrallah’s death, Iran has committed to retaliatory actions through Hezbollah and other allied militias in Iraq and Syria, including missile strikes and coordinated guerrilla tactics against Israeli military positions.
- Hezbollah’s Strategic Role: Hezbollah’s operations have intensified, with an increasing focus on launching missile and drone strikes from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. Despite Nasrallah’s death, Hezbollah remains Iran’s most powerful tool in the Levant. Tehran’s strategy is to continue supporting Hezbollah logistically and financially while utilizing the group to launch asymmetric warfare against Israeli forces. This includes rocket attacks, tunnel infiltrations, and the use of advanced drone technology to target strategic Israeli military assets along the Lebanese border.
- Iran’s Regional Militia Network: Beyond Hezbollah, Iran is mobilizing its network of militias in Syria and Iraq to pressure Israel on multiple fronts. These groups, such as Kata’ib Hezbollah in Iraq and various Iranian-backed factions in Syria, have been activated to carry out attacks in coordination with Hezbollah’s operations. This multi-front strategy is designed to stretch Israeli resources and divert attention from a single theater of conflict.
- Nuclear Posturing and Deterrence: With the geopolitical environment becoming more volatile, Iran is leveraging the nuclear question as a deterrent. While Iran continues to avoid openly declaring nuclear weapons ambitions, the possibility of resuming uranium enrichment beyond limits has been hinted at in diplomatic channels. This serves as a pressure tactic against both Israel and the United States, signaling that any large-scale invasion of Lebanon by Israel could lead to a breakdown in the ongoing nuclear discussions.
Iranian Military Assistance to Hezbollah
- Missile Technology: Iran has supplied Hezbollah with precision-guided missile technology, which allows the group to strike deeper into Israel with greater accuracy. These capabilities are central to Iran’s strategy of ensuring Hezbollah can inflict significant damage during any Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
- Drone Capabilities: Iran has significantly enhanced Hezbollah’s drone capabilities, enabling the group to carry out surveillance and targeted strikes against Israeli military installations. Recent strikes, following Nasrallah’s death, have demonstrated the operational use of Iranian drones in Hezbollah’s arsenal.
- Militia Coordination: Iran is coordinating with its proxies in Syria and Iraq to create a broader front against Israel. This network of militias serves as a force multiplier for Hezbollah, allowing it to operate with the backing of a wider regional network.
Summary Table: Iranian Support and Strategy Against Israel (Post-Nasrallah)
| Strategic Component | Iran’s Actions | Impact on Hezbollah |
|---|---|---|
| Missile Technology | Continued supply of precision-guided missiles | Enhanced capability to strike Israeli targets with accuracy |
| Drone Warfare | Upgrading Hezbollah’s drone fleet with Iranian-made UAVs | Improved intelligence and strike capabilities |
| Militia Network | Mobilization of Iraqi and Syrian militias to support Hezbollah | Opens additional fronts against Israel, distracting IDF forces |
| Leadership Support | Ensuring smooth transition to a new Hezbollah leader post-Nasrallah | Stabilizes Hezbollah’s operational structure and strategy |
| Nuclear Deterrence Posture | Signaling readiness to escalate nuclear enrichment if Israel invades | Adds diplomatic and military pressure on Israel and the West |
Iran’s primary objective is to maintain Hezbollah as a key deterrent against Israel, using its proxy to inflict damage without triggering direct Iranian involvement in the conflict. At the same time, Tehran seeks to avoid a large-scale confrontation that could destabilize its regional influence. Nasrallah’s death has added complexity to the situation, but Iran remains committed to supporting Hezbollah’s operations and ensuring that the group continues to serve as a strong deterrent against Israeli military actions.
The Expanded Role After the 2006 War
UNSC Resolution 1701: Expanding the Mandate
The 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel was a turning point for UNIFIL. The conflict, which lasted for 34 days, resulted in widespread destruction in Lebanon and significant casualties on both sides. Following the cessation of hostilities, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1701, which expanded UNIFIL’s mandate and significantly increased its troop presence in southern Lebanon.
Resolution 1701 called for the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon, including Hezbollah, the deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in southern Lebanon, and the establishment of a buffer zone free of armed groups between the Litani River and the Blue Line. In addition, UNIFIL was tasked with monitoring the cessation of hostilities, supporting the Lebanese government in reasserting its authority, and assisting in humanitarian relief efforts. This marked a major expansion of the mission, both in terms of scope and resources.
However, the expanded mandate came with several critical flaws. Most notably, while Resolution 1701 called for the disarmament of Hezbollah, it did not provide UNIFIL with the authority or capability to enforce this provision. Hezbollah, with its extensive social and military networks, continued to operate with impunity in southern Lebanon, maintaining its arms and rebuilding its arsenal in defiance of the resolution.
Hezbollah’s Resurgence
Despite the expanded UNIFIL mandate, Hezbollah emerged from the 2006 war more powerful than before. The group’s ability to withstand Israeli military assaults while continuing to launch rocket attacks against Israeli cities boosted its standing both domestically and regionally. Hezbollah’s narrative of resistance against Israeli aggression resonated deeply with many Lebanese, particularly in the south, where the group’s social services and infrastructure projects further entrenched its influence.
UNIFIL’s presence did little to challenge Hezbollah’s military dominance. While UNIFIL increased its patrols and established more checkpoints in southern Lebanon, the peacekeeping force lacked the authority to directly confront or disarm Hezbollah. Instead, UNIFIL was relegated to a passive observer role, monitoring a conflict it had no means of controlling. Hezbollah, meanwhile, used the post-war period to rearm and fortify its positions along the Blue Line, preparing for future confrontations with Israel.
Maritime Interdiction Operations
In addition to its land-based operations, UNIFIL’s mandate under Resolution 1701 included maritime interdiction duties. The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force (MTF) was established to monitor Lebanon’s coastline and prevent the smuggling of arms to Hezbollah via the sea. The MTF worked in coordination with the Lebanese Navy, conducting patrols and inspections of ships suspected of carrying illicit arms.
Despite the presence of the MTF, reports have indicated that Hezbollah continues to receive significant arms shipments, particularly from Iran. These arms are believed to be smuggled through Syria and other land routes, circumventing the maritime interdiction efforts. This further highlights the limitations of UNIFIL’s expanded mandate, as it is unable to prevent the flow of weapons into Hezbollah-controlled areas.
Financial Costs of Maintaining UNIFIL
The Growing Budget of UNIFIL
The financial burden of maintaining UNIFIL has grown steadily over the years, with the current budget for the 2023/24 period standing at $551,113,500. This represents a significant increase from previous years, driven by rising operational costs, inflationary pressures, and the need to maintain a large contingent of military personnel and equipment.
- Personnel Costs: $360,230,000 is allocated to military and police personnel, covering the salaries, allowances, and logistical support for the force’s 13,000 troops. Civilian personnel expenses amount to $128,062,500, which includes the salaries of UNIFIL’s international and local staff, as well as additional allowances and benefits.
- Operational Costs: $62,821,000 is earmarked for operational expenses, including equipment maintenance, transportation, fuel, and the day-to-day operations of UNIFIL’s numerous bases and checkpoints.
This budgetary commitment is considerable, especially when viewed in light of the limited strategic impact UNIFIL has had on the ground. The rising costs have not been met with a commensurate increase in effectiveness, as Hezbollah’s presence remains firmly entrenched in southern Lebanon.
A Disproportionate Return on Investment
The most significant critique of UNIFIL’s budget is that the financial outlay has not translated into meaningful results. The force continues to operate with limited success in disarming Hezbollah or preventing the militant group from expanding its arsenal. This discrepancy between financial input and operational output raises questions about the long-term sustainability of the mission.
A comparative analysis with other UN peacekeeping operations reveals that UNIFIL’s per capita costs are higher than many other missions, yet the tangible outcomes are comparatively less impactful. The force’s inability to enforce key provisions of UNSCR 1701, particularly the disarmament of Hezbollah, underscores its limited utility as a peacekeeping force.
Detailed Analysis of UNIFIL Budget for 2024/25 Compared with 2023/24
The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) continues its mandate under Security Council resolutions, with its budget for the period from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025 reflecting strategic priorities, operational adjustments, and financial management to support its objectives. Below is a detailed analysis of the 2024/25 budget, with a comparison to the previous 2023/24 financial period. The comparison includes key budget categories, activities, and strategic initiatives that define UNIFIL’s evolving role in the region.
Budget Overview
The total proposed budget for the 2024/25 period amounts to $538,234,500, a marginal increase of $867,500 (0.2%) from the 2023/24 budget of $537,367,000. Below is a breakdown of the key financial resources and the variances between the two budget periods.
Table: Budget Comparison (2023/24 vs 2024/25)
| Category | Expenditure (2022/23) | Apportionment (2023/24) | Cost Estimates (2024/25) | Variance | Percentage Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Military and Police Personnel | 323,631.6 | 350,446.1 | 352,000.5 | +1,554.4 | +0.4% |
| Civilian Personnel | 119,427.4 | 128,024.4 | 131,255.9 | +3,231.5 | +2.5% |
| Operational Costs | 59,860.1 | 58,896.5 | 54,978.1 | -3,918.4 | -6.7% |
| Gross Requirements | 502,919.1 | 537,367.0 | 538,234.5 | +867.5 | +0.2% |
| Staff Assessment Income | 16,383.6 | 17,086.9 | 18,116.9 | +1,030.0 | +6.0% |
| Net Requirements | 486,535.5 | 520,280.1 | 520,117.6 | -162.5 | 0.0% |
Key Budget Variances (2024/25 vs 2023/24)
- Military and Police Personnel: The budget for military and police personnel has increased by 0.4%, reflecting an increase of $1,554,400. This is primarily due to the continued transition of one key military contingent from United Nations-owned equipment to self-sustainment using contingent-owned major equipment. This transition, which began in the 2023/24 period, requires additional funds for maintaining operational readiness.
- Civilian Personnel: The civilian personnel budget increased by 2.5%, or $3,231,500, mainly due to revised salary scales for national staff and the addition of four temporary national positions in the Mine Action Unit. This shift reflects efforts to streamline operations and increase governance and transparency, particularly in the area of mine action, which was previously outsourced to UNOPS.
- Operational Costs: Operational costs saw a significant reduction of 6.7% ($3,918,400), primarily driven by reduced requirements in ground transportation, fuel savings from the replacement of fewer vehicles, and efficiency improvements in asset utilization. This reduction reflects the initial implementation of a new five-year phased asset replacement plan aimed at extending the life of critical assets.
- Staff Assessment Income: The projected income from staff assessments has increased by 6%, driven by salary adjustments and the changes in staffing structures, especially in the national personnel category.
Detailed Analysis of Activities and Strategic Priorities
Military and Police Personnel
The 2024/25 budget reflects an increase in personnel costs to support the continued operational requirements of UNIFIL’s mandate. The force will maintain its deployment of up to 13,000 military personnel and increase coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Notable activities include:
- Transition to Contingent-Owned Equipment: A key military contingent will continue transitioning from UN-owned equipment to self-sustained operations, requiring contingent-owned equipment in most categories. This shift is intended to enhance operational flexibility and reduce long-term costs.
- Increased Coordination with LAF: UNIFIL will intensify joint operations with LAF, focusing on maintaining security in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River. The budget reflects additional resources to support these joint activities, including patrols and observation posts.
Civilian Personnel
The civilian personnel budget includes an increase in national staff positions, reflecting efforts to enhance cost efficiency and operational effectiveness. Key changes include:
- Mine Action Program: Four temporary positions have been added to the Mine Action Unit, shifting the delivery of mine-clearing operations from UNOPS to UNIFIL. This move is expected to reduce overhead costs and improve the governance of mine-clearing activities.
- Strategic Communications: In response to Security Council directives, UNIFIL will continue to strengthen its communication efforts to counter misinformation and promote transparency regarding its mandate and operations. This will require additional personnel to manage strategic communications and engage with local communities.
Operational Costs
Operational costs are expected to decrease significantly due to a combination of efficiency measures and reduced fuel consumption. Key factors include:
- Asset Replacement Plan: UNIFIL will begin implementing a new five-year phased asset replacement plan. This plan includes replacing 54 deteriorated prefabricated facilities, 400 obsolete air conditioning units, and seven generators at headquarters. By focusing on critical asset replacement, UNIFIL aims to extend the life of its infrastructure and avoid costly future replacements.
- Environmental Initiatives: UNIFIL will continue its focus on sustainability, expanding its solar energy capacity and replacing outdated energy systems with more eco-friendly alternatives. These efforts are expected to reduce long-term operational costs and contribute to the UN’s climate action goals.
Strategic Infrastructure Initiatives
Several infrastructure initiatives are outlined for the 2024/25 period, aimed at improving safety, security, and operational efficiency. These include:
- Relocation of Strategic Fuel Reserve: UNIFIL will relocate and consolidate its fuel reserves to improve efficiency and reduce environmental risks associated with current storage practices.
- Perimeter Security Enhancements: Following physical security assessments, UNIFIL will enhance the perimeter fencing and traffic barriers at its Naqoura headquarters, addressing security concerns.
- Facility Renovations: Additional budget allocations are dedicated to upgrading UNIFIL facilities, including replacing temporary structures with permanent ones to improve working and living conditions for personnel.
Strategic Mission Adjustments and Support Initiatives
In light of escalating tensions since October 2023, UNIFIL will continue to adjust its operations to maintain stability along the Blue Line. Key initiatives include:
- Tripartite Coordination: UNIFIL will leverage its established coordination mechanisms with Israel and Lebanon to de-escalate tensions and seek resolutions to disputes along the Blue Line.
- Support for Maritime Operations: The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force will maintain its role in maritime interdiction, preventing arms smuggling to non-state actors. However, the Lebanese Navy will continue to require significant support, as it is not expected to assume full operational control during the 2024/25 period.
The UNIFIL budget for 2024/25 reflects a marginal increase in overall financial requirements, with strategic reallocations aimed at maintaining operational readiness, improving infrastructure, and enhancing efficiency through asset replacement. The increase in personnel costs and strategic communications highlights the need to maintain an effective presence in southern Lebanon while adjusting to evolving security challenges. The reductions in operational costs reflect ongoing efforts to streamline operations and improve resource utilization. Overall, UNIFIL’s budget is designed to support its critical mandate of maintaining peace and stability in the region, despite the complex and challenging security environment.
This comprehensive analysis of the budget variances between 2023/24 and 2024/25 provides insights into how UNIFIL is adapting to operational challenges and seeking efficiencies to maximize the impact of its financial resources.
Operational Shortcomings: The Persistent Strength of Hezbollah
Hezbollah’s Military and Political Ascendancy
Despite the continued presence of UNIFIL, Hezbollah has become not just a formidable militant force but also a dominant political player in Lebanon. Founded in the early 1980s with backing from Iran, Hezbollah initially positioned itself as a resistance movement against Israeli occupation. Over the decades, it has grown into a highly sophisticated military organization, equipped with advanced weaponry, including rockets, drones, and missiles, many of which are supplied through its alliance with Iran and transported through Syria.
The inability of UNIFIL to curb the influence and power of Hezbollah is one of the most glaring indicators of the mission’s failure. UNIFIL is mandated under UNSC Resolution 1701 to monitor and help prevent the rearming of non-state actors, but Hezbollah’s arsenal has only grown in strength and sophistication. It is estimated that Hezbollah possesses over 100,000 rockets, ranging from short-range Katyusha rockets to medium- and long-range missiles capable of striking deep into Israeli territory. This military buildup has continued unabated, even as UNIFIL patrols the southern border of Lebanon.
Hezbollah’s Embeddedness in the Lebanese State
Hezbollah’s strength does not stem solely from its military capabilities. The group has deeply entrenched itself within the Lebanese political system, holding seats in the Lebanese parliament and key positions within the government. This political legitimacy complicates any effort by the Lebanese government or international actors to disarm Hezbollah. UNIFIL, operating under the umbrella of the Lebanese government, cannot challenge the authority of Hezbollah without risking a political crisis within Lebanon.
Additionally, Hezbollah’s social services network in southern Lebanon ensures the group’s continued popularity among the local population. The organization operates schools, hospitals, and welfare services, filling the gaps left by the Lebanese state. This has further cemented its role as the de facto authority in southern Lebanon, making it nearly impossible for UNIFIL or the Lebanese Armed Forces to exert meaningful control over the region.
UNIFIL’s Limited Authority and Impact
One of the critical limitations of UNIFIL is its lack of enforcement authority. While the mission can patrol and observe, it cannot engage directly with Hezbollah or take action to dismantle its infrastructure. In effect, UNIFIL is tasked with monitoring a situation that it has no real power to influence.
Even though UNIFIL maintains a large number of troops in southern Lebanon, their activities are often confined to routine patrols and checkpoint operations. These operations are important for maintaining visibility in the region, but they do little to disrupt Hezbollah’s operations. Hezbollah’s militants often operate in civilian areas, blending into the local population, making it difficult for UNIFIL forces to identify and report violations of Resolution 1701.
This inability to enforce its mandate has led to frustration among both UNIFIL personnel and external stakeholders, particularly Israel. Israel frequently criticizes UNIFIL for its failure to prevent Hezbollah from rearming and for allowing the group to maintain its military infrastructure along the Blue Line. Despite these criticisms, UNIFIL remains bound by its limited mandate, which does not authorize it to take proactive military action against Hezbollah.
Case Studies of Operational Failures
Several incidents illustrate the operational ineffectiveness of UNIFIL in curbing Hezbollah’s military activities:
- The Discovery of Hezbollah Tunnels: In 2018, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched Operation Northern Shield to destroy Hezbollah’s cross-border tunnels, which had been built to facilitate attacks on Israeli territory. These tunnels had been constructed over several years, right under the noses of UNIFIL forces. The fact that UNIFIL was either unaware of the tunnels’ existence or powerless to prevent their construction underscores the mission’s limited effectiveness. Despite patrolling the region and maintaining observation posts, UNIFIL was unable to detect these major violations of UNSC 1701.
- Hezbollah’s Rocket Launch Sites: Hezbollah has been known to launch rockets into Israel from civilian areas in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL’s role in monitoring these areas has been minimal, as the group’s militants often operate from private homes or public spaces that are off-limits to the peacekeeping force. This tactic of embedding military assets within civilian infrastructure makes it nearly impossible for UNIFIL to identify and stop such activities without violating its rules of engagement.
- The 2019 Border Clashes: In September 2019, Hezbollah fired anti-tank missiles at an Israeli military convoy in northern Israel, prompting retaliatory strikes from the IDF. UNIFIL, which is supposed to monitor and prevent such escalations, was unable to stop the exchange of fire. While the mission condemned the violence and urged both sides to exercise restraint, it played no active role in preventing the hostilities or mitigating their impact.
UNIFIL’s Vulnerability During Israeli-Hezbollah Conflicts
The 2006 War: UNIFIL’s Marginalization
The 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel demonstrated the limitations of UNIFIL’s peacekeeping capabilities in stark terms. When the war broke out, UNIFIL was largely sidelined, unable to prevent or mitigate the violence. Israeli airstrikes pounded Hezbollah targets across southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah retaliated with rocket fire into northern Israel. In the midst of the fighting, UNIFIL was effectively reduced to a bystander, forced to evacuate many of its personnel and hunker down in fortified positions.
During the conflict, several UNIFIL bases were hit by Israeli airstrikes, either by accident or as a result of the proximity of Hezbollah forces to UNIFIL positions. These incidents highlighted the vulnerability of the peacekeeping force in the face of large-scale military operations. Rather than acting as a buffer between the warring parties, UNIFIL found itself caught in the crossfire, unable to prevent the conflict or protect its own personnel.
Post-2006: Continued Vulnerability and Criticism
In the years following the 2006 war, UNIFIL has continued to operate in a tense and volatile environment. While large-scale conflicts between Hezbollah and Israel have been avoided, skirmishes along the Blue Line remain frequent. During these escalations, UNIFIL forces often find themselves vulnerable, with limited means to protect their bases or personnel from rocket fire or Israeli airstrikes.
One of the key criticisms leveled at UNIFIL is its inability to act as a credible deterrent against Hezbollah’s military activities. Israel has repeatedly expressed frustration with the peacekeeping force, arguing that UNIFIL’s presence does little to prevent Hezbollah from building up its military infrastructure or launching attacks against Israeli territory. This criticism is not without merit—while UNIFIL maintains a significant troop presence in southern Lebanon, it lacks the mandate to actively confront Hezbollah or prevent the group from operating in civilian areas.
The Role of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in Protecting UNIFIL
UNIFIL’s ability to operate effectively is also dependent on the cooperation of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). According to Resolution 1701, the LAF is responsible for ensuring that southern Lebanon remains free of unauthorized armed groups, but in practice, the LAF has been unable or unwilling to challenge Hezbollah’s authority in the region.
This has placed UNIFIL in a precarious position. The peacekeeping force is expected to work alongside the LAF, but the LAF’s inability to assert control over southern Lebanon means that UNIFIL often operates in areas where Hezbollah is the dominant power. As a result, UNIFIL patrols and bases are vulnerable to both Hezbollah militants and Israeli military actions, particularly during periods of heightened tension.
The Geopolitical Dimensions of UNIFIL’s Ineffectiveness
Hezbollah’s Role in Iran’s Regional Strategy
Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon cannot be understood without considering its relationship with Iran. Hezbollah is widely regarded as Iran’s most powerful proxy in the Middle East, and its activities in Lebanon are closely tied to Iran’s broader regional strategy. Iran has provided Hezbollah with funding, weapons, and training, allowing the group to build a formidable military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. This relationship has allowed Hezbollah to operate with relative impunity, despite international efforts to curtail its influence.
UNIFIL, as a peacekeeping force, is ill-equipped to address this geopolitical reality. While its mandate focuses on maintaining peace and stability in southern Lebanon, the broader dynamics of the Iran-Israel conflict are beyond its control. Hezbollah’s role as a proxy for Iran means that any effort to disarm the group or limit its activities is not just a local issue but a regional one, involving multiple state and non-state actors with competing interests.
The Weakness of the Lebanese State
The Lebanese state’s inability to exert control over Hezbollah is another key factor in UNIFIL’s ineffectiveness. Lebanon’s political system, which is based on a delicate balance of power between religious and sectarian groups, has allowed Hezbollah to operate as both a political party and a militant organization. While the Lebanese government is officially committed to UNSCR 1701, it lacks the political will and military capability to challenge Hezbollah’s dominance in the south.
This weakness has been exacerbated by Lebanon’s ongoing political and economic crises. The country has been without a fully functioning government for extended periods, and its economy is in a state of collapse, further limiting the state’s ability to assert authority. In this context, UNIFIL’s mission to support the Lebanese state in re-establishing control over southern Lebanon is rendered virtually impossible.
The Broader Arab-Israeli Conflict
UNIFIL’s role in southern Lebanon is also shaped by the broader context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the peacekeeping force is tasked with monitoring the situation along the Blue Line, the root causes of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah are far beyond the scope of UNIFIL’s mandate. Hezbollah views itself as part of the broader resistance movement against Israeli occupation of Arab lands, and its military operations are framed within this larger conflict.
As long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved, UNIFIL will continue to operate in a highly charged and unstable environment. While the peacekeeping force can monitor ceasefire agreements and report violations, it cannot address the underlying political and territorial disputes that fuel the conflict. This limits the force’s ability to achieve lasting peace and stability in the region.
Symbolism Over Substance: Security Council Resolutions and Their Limitations
The Limitations of UNSCR 1701
UNSCR 1701, passed in the aftermath of the 2006 war, is widely regarded as a well-intentioned but flawed document. While it calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah and the establishment of a buffer zone in southern Lebanon, it provides no mechanism for enforcing these provisions. As a result, Hezbollah has been able to maintain its military infrastructure in the region, and the Lebanese state has been unable to assert control over the south.
UNIFIL’s role under UNSCR 1701 is largely symbolic. While the peacekeeping force is tasked with monitoring compliance with the resolution, it lacks the authority to take meaningful action against violations. Hezbollah’s continued presence in southern Lebanon, along with its rearmament and fortification efforts, demonstrates the limitations of the resolution and the peacekeeping force’s ability to enforce it.
The Extension of UNIFIL’s Mandate: UNSCR 2650
In 2022, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2650, which extended UNIFIL’s mandate for another year. This extension was met with mixed reactions. On one hand, the continuation of UNIFIL’s presence was seen as necessary for maintaining a semblance of stability in southern Lebanon. On the other hand, critics argued that the extension was merely symbolic, as the peacekeeping force had failed to achieve its core objectives under UNSCR 1701.
The symbolic nature of these resolutions highlights a broader problem with international diplomacy in the region. While the United Nations and the international community continue to call for peace and stability in southern Lebanon, they have been unable to apply meaningful pressure on Hezbollah or its regional backers to disarm. As a result, UNIFIL is left in the position of monitoring a status quo that is unsustainable in the long term.
UNIFIL’s Strategic Communications: A Case of Misinformation and Misperception
The Communication Challenges Facing UNIFIL
One of the key elements of UNIFIL’s mission, particularly as reaffirmed in UNSCR 2650 (2022), is to enhance communication efforts to better explain its mandate and the role it plays in maintaining peace and security in southern Lebanon. This strategic communications effort is intended to increase transparency, foster local support, and counteract the spread of misinformation that may undermine the mission’s legitimacy. Despite these efforts, UNIFIL has struggled to achieve its communication goals, leading to a number of misperceptions both locally and internationally about the effectiveness of the force.
One of the central challenges is that UNIFIL’s mission is poorly understood by the very communities it seeks to protect. Many in southern Lebanon view UNIFIL as either powerless to curb Hezbollah’s activities or as a foreign entity that serves external interests, particularly those of Israel and the West. Hezbollah itself has been adept at shaping the narrative surrounding UNIFIL, painting the force as either a passive observer or, at times, as complicit in Israel’s military actions. This has created an environment where UNIFIL struggles to gain the trust and cooperation of local populations, who may see the peacekeeping mission as irrelevant or even counterproductive.
Misinformation Campaigns and Their Impact
Hezbollah and its allies have been particularly effective in conducting disinformation campaigns that have undermined UNIFIL’s legitimacy. These campaigns often portray UNIFIL as an extension of Western military and political influence in Lebanon, which plays into broader anti-Western sentiment in the region. In areas where Hezbollah’s influence is strongest, UNIFIL is often viewed with suspicion, and its actions are interpreted as serving foreign interests rather than the Lebanese state or the local population.
The rise of digital platforms and social media has only amplified the reach of these misinformation campaigns. Local media outlets, some of which are aligned with Hezbollah or other political factions, regularly publish stories that distort the nature of UNIFIL’s operations or accuse the force of bias. These narratives are then picked up and shared across social media, further entrenching negative perceptions of UNIFIL. The result is a significant erosion of trust, making it more difficult for the force to operate effectively, especially in areas where its presence is most needed.
UNIFIL’s Efforts to Combat Disinformation
In response to these challenges, UNIFIL has attempted to strengthen its strategic communications through a variety of channels. The force regularly publishes reports on its activities, holds press conferences, and engages with local media in an effort to clarify its mandate and operations. In addition, UNIFIL has increased its presence on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, where it shares updates on patrols, community outreach efforts, and its role in maintaining peace along the Blue Line.
However, these efforts have met with limited success. While UNIFIL’s communications strategy has improved in recent years, it remains reactive rather than proactive, often responding to negative coverage after it has already taken hold. Moreover, the force’s reliance on English and French language media limits its reach in southern Lebanon, where Arabic is the primary language of communication. This language gap has allowed Hezbollah and its allies to dominate the narrative in many parts of the country, further complicating UNIFIL’s efforts to win hearts and minds.
Strategic Communications as a Missed Opportunity
UNIFIL’s struggle to communicate effectively with local populations and counteract disinformation campaigns represents a missed opportunity. If the peacekeeping force were able to build stronger relationships with local communities, it could potentially gain greater access to critical information about Hezbollah’s movements and activities. Additionally, improved communication could help reduce tensions between UNIFIL and the local population, which sometimes views the force with suspicion or hostility.
In the absence of a strong strategic communications framework, however, UNIFIL remains vulnerable to the spread of disinformation. This not only undermines its credibility but also diminishes its ability to carry out its mandate effectively. Without the trust and cooperation of local populations, UNIFIL’s efforts to monitor Hezbollah’s activities and maintain peace along the Blue Line are likely to remain limited.
The Role of UNIFIL’s Maritime Task Force
Maritime Interdiction and its Strategic Importance
In addition to its land-based operations, UNIFIL has been tasked with conducting maritime interdiction operations through the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force (MTF). Established as part of UNSC Resolution 1701, the MTF is responsible for monitoring Lebanon’s coastal waters, preventing the smuggling of arms to Hezbollah, and supporting the Lebanese Navy in controlling the country’s territorial waters.
The MTF represents a critical component of UNIFIL’s overall mission, as it is designed to stop the flow of weapons to Hezbollah, which relies heavily on external suppliers—primarily Iran. Lebanon’s porous land borders, particularly with Syria, have long been a conduit for arms smuggling, but the maritime route offers an additional vector for illicit arms transfers. By patrolling the sea, the MTF plays an important role in the broader effort to prevent Hezbollah from replenishing its military stockpiles.
Limited Success in Preventing Arms Smuggling
Despite the strategic importance of the MTF, its success in preventing arms smuggling has been limited. Hezbollah continues to receive significant quantities of weapons, many of which are believed to be smuggled through land routes via Syria. The MTF has intercepted ships suspected of carrying illegal arms on several occasions, but these interdictions represent only a small fraction of the total arms flow into Lebanon.
One of the key challenges facing the MTF is the limited capacity of the Lebanese Navy. While the MTF works in coordination with Lebanese naval forces, the Lebanese Navy is underfunded and poorly equipped, making it difficult for the country to assume full control over its maritime borders. As a result, the MTF continues to play a primary role in maritime security, even though its mandate originally envisioned a gradual transfer of responsibility to the Lebanese Navy.
The Financial Costs of Maritime Operations
Maritime operations are expensive, and the MTF accounts for a significant portion of UNIFIL’s overall budget. Maintaining a fleet of ships, conducting regular patrols, and ensuring the safety of maritime personnel requires substantial financial resources. In the 2023/24 budget, a significant portion of the $62.8 million allocated to operational costs is dedicated to maritime operations, including fuel, maintenance, and logistics.
Despite these high costs, the MTF’s impact on Hezbollah’s ability to smuggle weapons remains questionable. Given the group’s reliance on land-based smuggling routes, the MTF’s interdiction efforts, while important, have not been decisive in curbing Hezbollah’s rearmament. This raises questions about the cost-effectiveness of maintaining a robust maritime presence when the primary source of Hezbollah’s arms comes through other channels.
The Challenges of Transferring Responsibility to the Lebanese Navy
UNIFIL’s mandate under Resolution 1701 includes the goal of eventually transferring maritime security responsibilities to the Lebanese Navy. However, this transfer has proven difficult due to the Lebanese Navy’s limited capacity. The navy has struggled with a lack of funding, outdated equipment, and insufficient training, all of which make it ill-prepared to take over the duties currently performed by the MTF.
While joint training exercises between the MTF and the Lebanese Navy have been conducted regularly, progress has been slow. The Lebanese Navy remains heavily reliant on international support, both in terms of equipment and operational assistance. Without significant investment in naval capabilities, it is unlikely that the Lebanese Navy will be able to fully assume maritime security responsibilities in the near future.
UNIFIL’s Humanitarian and Social Contributions: An Overlooked Element?
UNIFIL’s Community Outreach and Humanitarian Efforts
While much of the criticism directed at UNIFIL focuses on its failure to disarm Hezbollah or prevent violence along the Blue Line, the peacekeeping mission has played a significant role in providing humanitarian assistance and supporting local communities in southern Lebanon. This aspect of UNIFIL’s operations is often overlooked, but it has had a tangible impact on the daily lives of many Lebanese citizens living in the region.
UNIFIL engages in a variety of community outreach programs, including the construction of infrastructure projects, the provision of medical services, and the delivery of humanitarian aid. The mission’s quick-impact projects (QIPs) are designed to address immediate community needs, such as repairing schools, providing clean water, and improving local roads. These projects, while small in scale, help to build goodwill between UNIFIL and the local population, fostering a sense of trust and cooperation.
The Role of Quick-Impact Projects (QIPs)
Quick-impact projects are one of the key tools UNIFIL uses to engage with local communities and demonstrate the tangible benefits of its presence. These projects are typically low-cost, high-impact initiatives that are designed to address immediate needs and improve living conditions in southern Lebanon. Examples include the rehabilitation of water wells, the construction of health clinics, and the repair of schools and community centers.
These projects, though limited in scope, serve an important function in building local support for UNIFIL. By addressing basic infrastructure and development needs, QIPs help to mitigate some of the resentment that may arise from UNIFIL’s perceived ineffectiveness in addressing larger security issues. They also serve as a form of soft diplomacy, allowing UNIFIL to engage with local leaders and demonstrate its commitment to improving the lives of ordinary Lebanese citizens.
Humanitarian Assistance During Crises
In addition to its community outreach efforts, UNIFIL has played a critical role in providing humanitarian assistance during periods of crisis. For example, during the 2006 war, UNIFIL assisted in the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians caught in the crossfire. The mission worked closely with international aid organizations to distribute food, water, and medical supplies to those affected by the conflict.
More recently, UNIFIL has supported local communities during Lebanon’s ongoing economic crisis, which has left many citizens without access to basic goods and services. The peacekeeping force has provided medical supplies, fuel, and other essential items to help alleviate the suffering caused by the country’s financial collapse. While these efforts cannot resolve the broader economic and political issues facing Lebanon, they have helped to ease some of the immediate burdens on local communities.
The Limitations of Humanitarian Efforts
Despite these positive contributions, UNIFIL’s humanitarian and social efforts are not without limitations. The scale of the needs in southern Lebanon far exceeds what the mission can provide, and its resources are stretched thin by the competing demands of maintaining security and delivering aid. Moreover, Hezbollah’s control over much of southern Lebanon means that UNIFIL’s ability to operate freely is often constrained, particularly in areas where Hezbollah’s influence is strongest.
There is also the question of whether UNIFIL’s humanitarian efforts are enough to justify the continued presence of such an expensive and militarily ineffective mission. While the peacekeeping force’s contributions to local development are important, they do not address the core issue of Hezbollah’s military dominance in the region. As such, some critics argue that UNIFIL’s humanitarian work, while valuable, should not obscure its larger strategic failures.
In conclusion….
UNIFIL’s long-standing presence in Lebanon represents one of the United Nations’ most visible and costly peacekeeping efforts. With a budget exceeding $550 million annually and a mandate that has expanded significantly since its inception, UNIFIL has played a critical role in maintaining a fragile peace along the Israel-Lebanon border. However, despite its substantial resources and international support, the force has largely failed to meet its core objectives, particularly with regard to disarming Hezbollah and preventing the militant group from rearming.
This analysis highlights the paradox of UNIFIL’s mission: while the peacekeeping force is tasked with maintaining peace and security in southern Lebanon, it is operating within a framework that renders it largely powerless to enforce its mandate. Hezbollah’s entrenched position in Lebanese society, combined with its military strength and regional backing from Iran, has made it impossible for UNIFIL to disarm the group or prevent its rearmament. Moreover, the broader geopolitical context, including the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict and Lebanon’s internal political instability, further limits UNIFIL’s ability to operate effectively.
Despite these strategic shortcomings, UNIFIL has made important contributions to local communities through its humanitarian and social efforts. The force’s quick-impact projects and provision of humanitarian aid have helped to improve living conditions in southern Lebanon, building some level of goodwill with the local population. However, these efforts, while valuable, do not address the core security issues facing the region.
In the final analysis, UNIFIL’s continued presence in Lebanon raises difficult questions about the effectiveness of international peacekeeping in contexts where local power dynamics and regional conflicts far exceed the scope of the mission’s mandate. Without a fundamental rethinking of its role, UNIFIL risks remaining a costly but strategically ineffective force, unable to bring about the long-term peace and stability that southern Lebanon so desperately needs.
APPENDIX 1 – Financial resources – budget year is 1 July to 30 June) 2024
(Thousands of United States dollars; budget year is 1 July to 30 June) 2024
| Variance | |||||
| Expenditure (2021/22) | Apportionment (2022/23) | Cost estimates (2023/24) | Amount | Percentage | |
| Category | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4)=(3)-(2) | (5)=(4)÷(2) |
| Military and police personnel | |||||
| Military observers | – | – | – | – | – |
| Military contingents | 319 078.6 | 338 206.1 | 360 230.0 | 22 023.9 | 6.5 |
| United Nations police | – | – | – | – | – |
| Formed police units | – | – | – | – | – |
| Subtotal | 319 078.6 | 338 206.1 | 360 230.0 | 22 023.9 | 6.5 |
| Civilian personnel | |||||
| International staff | 55 088.1 | 63 534.6 | 66 104.9 | 2 570.3 | 4.0 |
| National Professional Officer | 7 100.9 | 7 401.4 | 8 257.0 | 855.6 | 11.6 |
| National General Service staff | 43 779.3 | 45 001.8 | 53 385.9 | 8 384.1 | 18.6 |
| United Nations Volunteers | – | – | – | – | – |
| General temporary assistance | 879.3 | 478.2 | 314.7 | (163.5) | (34.2) |
| Government-provided personnel | – | – | – | – | – |
| Subtotal | 106 847.6 | 116 416.0 | 128 062.5 | 11 646.5 | 10.0 |
| Operational costs | |||||
| Civilian electoral observers | – | – | – | – | – |
| Consultants and consulting services | 71.7 | 85.4 | 88.3 | 2.9 | 3.4 |
| Official travel | 408.5 | 664.1 | 794.2 | 130.1 | 19.6 |
| Facilities and infrastructure | 22 027.2 | 21 336.7 | 29 165.0 | 7 828.3 | 36.7 |
| Ground transportation | 7 902.7 | 6 648.5 | 11 005.6 | 4 357.1 | 65.5 |
| Air operations | 6 390.7 | 7 007.4 | 7 687.6 | 680.2 | 9.7 |
| Marine operations | 359.6 | 215.4 | 205.9 | (9.5) | (4.4) |
| Communications and information technology | 8 611.8 | 7 451.7 | 8 159.6 | 707.9 | 9.5 |
| Medical | 1 845.9 | 1 532.9 | 1 323.2 | (209.7) | (13.7) |
| Special equipment | – | – | – | – | – |
| Other supplies, services, and equipment | 2 781.5 | 2 856.3 | 3 891.6 | 1 035.3 | 36.2 |
| Quick-impact projects | 500.0 | 500.0 | 500.0 | – | – |
| Subtotal | 50 899.6 | 48 298.4 | 62 821.0 | 14 522.6 | 30.1 |
| Gross requirements | 476 825.8 | 502 920.5 | 551 113.5 | 48 193.0 | 9.6 |
| Staff assessment income | 14 216.1 | 14 760.6 | 17 125.0 | 2 364.4 | 16.0 |
| Net requirements | 462 609.7 | 488 159.9 | 533 988.5 | 45 828.6 | 9.4 |
| Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) | – | – | – | – | – |
| Total requirements | 476 825.8 | 502 920.5 | 551 113.5 | 48 193.0 | 9.6 |
APPENDIX 2 – Financial resources – 2024 / 2025
(Thousands of United States dollars; budget year is 1 July to 30 June)
| Variance | |||||
| Expenditure (2022/23) | Apportionment (2023/24) | Cost estimates (2024/25) | Amount | Percentage | |
| Category | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4)=(3)-(2) | (5)=(4)÷(2) |
| Military and police personnel | |||||
| Military observers | – | – | – | – | – |
| Military contingents | 323 631.6 | 350 446.1 | 352 000.5 | 1 554.4 | 0.4 |
| United Nations police | – | – | – | – | – |
| Formed police units | – | – | – | – | – |
| Subtotal | 323 631.6 | 350 446.1 | 352 000.5 | 1 554.4 | 0.4 |
| Civilian personnel | |||||
| International staff | 61 944.4 | 66 104.9 | 64 859.6 | (1 245.3) | (1.9) |
| National Professional Officer | 8 117.1 | 8 218.9 | 8 625.0 | 406.1 | 4.9 |
| National General Service staff | 48 748.6 | 53 385.9 | 57 241.8 | 3 855.9 | 7.2 |
| United Nations Volunteers | – | – | – | – | – |
| General temporary assistance | 617.3 | 314.7 | 529.5 | 214.8 | 68.3 |
| Government-provided personnel | – | – | – | – | – |
| Subtotal | 119 427.4 | 128 024.4 | 131 255.9 | 3 231.5 | 2.5 |
| Operational costs | |||||
| Civilian electoral observers | – | – | – | – | – |
| Consultants and consulting services | 105.2 | 88.3 | 88.3 | – | – |
| Official travel | 586.3 | 729.1 | 743.6 | 14.5 | 2.0 |
| Facilities and infrastructure | 27 415.8 | 26 670.5 | 28 408.2 | 1 737.7 | 6.5 |
| Ground transportation | 11 139.8 | 9 947.5 | 6 546.4 | (3 401.1) | (34.2) |
| Air operations | 5 311.4 | 7 687.6 | 5 929.9 | (1 757.7) | (22.9) |
| Marine operations | 195.8 | 205.9 | 172.1 | (33.8) | (16.4) |
| Communications and information technology | 9 039.6 | 8 065.1 | 8 036.9 | (28.2) | (0.3) |
| Medical | 1 220.1 | 1 323.2 | 1 323.4 | 0.2 | 0.0 |
| Special equipment | – | – | – | – | – |
| Other supplies, services, and equipment | 4 346.2 | 3 679.3 | 3 229.3 | (450.0) | (12.2) |
| Quick-impact projects | 499.9 | 500.0 | 500.0 | – | – |
| Subtotal | 59 860.1 | 58 896.5 | 54 978.1 | (3 918.4) | (6.7) |
| Gross requirements | 502 919.1 | 537 367.0 | 538 234.5 | 867.5 | 0.2 |
| Staff assessment income | 16 383.6 | 17 086.9 | 18 116.9 | 1 030.0 | 6.0 |
| Net requirements | 486 535.5 | 520 280.1 | 520 117.6 | (162.5) | (0.0) |
| Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) | – | – | – | – | – |
| Total requirements | 502 919.1 | 537 367.0 | 538 234.5 | 867.5 | 0.2 |
RESOURCE :
Budget for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024 : report of the Secretary-General – https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4008431?v=pdf – https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4040428?ln=en&v=pdf
