ABSTRACT
The recruitment of Yemeni soldiers to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine illustrates the growing entanglement of modern conflicts with geopolitical ambitions and the exploitation of vulnerable populations. Hundreds of Yemeni men, lured with promises of high-paying jobs or other opportunities, were transported to Russia and subsequently deployed to the front lines in Ukraine. This report investigates the recruitment process, the involvement of the Houthi movement, the socio-economic conditions that enabled this exploitation, and the broader geopolitical ramifications for the Middle East, Russia, Ukraine, and the international community.
The analysis highlights how these men were recruited by Houthi-linked companies, notably involving Abdulwali Abdo Hassan al-Jabri, and how their deployment was facilitated through coercion and deception. Recruitment began as early as July, and many of the men signed contracts under duress. The promised employment and lucrative salaries were quickly replaced with forced military duties, inadequate training, and harsh conditions. The report also details the involvement of recruitment companies like Al Jabri General Trading & Investment Co, registered as a medical supplier in Oman, and describes the deplorable conditions the recruits faced, such as a lack of proper winter clothing, minimal military training, and coercion into signing contracts they could not understand.
The Houthi movement’s role in facilitating recruitment is also explored, revealing a strategy to foster ties with Russia, align with Iranian backing, and position themselves against Western interests. The Houthis facilitated the transfer of Yemeni men to Russia, where they were deployed in Ukraine in a move aimed at building a broader alliance with Moscow. The report further discusses how Russia has sought to bolster its ranks with foreign recruits from Yemen, Nepal, India, and North Korea to avoid full domestic mobilization, demonstrating a deliberate reliance on vulnerable populations from conflict-ridden or impoverished regions.
From a humanitarian perspective, the conditions endured by Yemeni recruits were dire, leading to exhaustion, injuries, mental health crises, and even suicide attempts. The recruits were forced to endure physically demanding tasks, such as building bunkers and navigating mine-infested areas, without sufficient support or rest. The international response, including efforts from the International Federation of Yemeni Migrants, has emphasized the humanitarian crisis and the need to return these individuals home.
The growing alliance between Russia and the Houthis represents a significant shift in Middle Eastern geopolitics, deepening ties between Russia, Iran, and other anti-Western actors. This partnership is not only a strategic exchange, with the Houthis leveraging Russian support for military benefits, but also a means for Russia to establish a presence in the Middle East and exert influence over key maritime routes, including the Red Sea. The report outlines the Houthis’ demands for sophisticated Russian weaponry—anti-ship missiles, air defense systems, and drone technology—to bolster their capabilities against regional adversaries like Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Western forces.
The implications for regional stability are significant. The recruitment of Yemeni soldiers adds another layer to the already complex web of alliances and conflicts in the region. The Houthis gain political leverage and military support from Russia, while Russia secures a foothold in Yemen and the broader Middle East, potentially disrupting international trade routes and threatening regional stability. The report also emphasizes the potential for arms transfers between Russia and the Houthis, including advanced weaponry capable of targeting maritime vessels in the Red Sea, which could have far-reaching consequences for global shipping and energy security.
In summary, the recruitment of Yemeni soldiers for Russia’s war in Ukraine exemplifies the exploitation of vulnerable populations amidst geopolitical conflict. It highlights the evolving nature of modern warfare, in which state and non-state actors collaborate across borders to achieve military and political goals. The partnership between the Houthis and Russia presents significant challenges for regional stability and global security, as it strengthens anti-Western alliances and threatens key maritime corridors. Addressing these issues will require a coordinated international response focused on humanitarian protections, accountability for exploitation, and efforts to mitigate the destabilizing effects of such alliances on global peace and security.
The recruitment of Yemeni soldiers to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine is a reflection of how modern conflicts have become intertwined with geopolitical ambitions and the exploitation of vulnerable populations. Hundreds of Yemeni men, promised lucrative jobs or other opportunities, were transported to Russia and then deployed to Ukraine’s front lines, a clear indication of Moscow’s attempts to bolster its military ranks without undertaking full mobilization.
This report delves deep into the details of how these men were recruited, the involvement of the Houthi movement, the economic context that facilitated this exploitation, and the wider implications for the Middle East, Russia, Ukraine, and the international community.
Detailed Analytical Data Table on Yemeni Recruitment for Russia’s War
| Category | Details | Further Information |
| Yemeni Recruits | Hundreds of Yemeni men recruited to fight in Ukraine, mostly involuntarily. | Many recruits lacked military training, coerced into contracts they could not read, signed under duress. |
| Recruitment Companies | Al Jabri General Trading & Investment Co SPC, linked to Abdulwali Abdo Hassan al-Jabri, registered as a tour operator and medical supplier. | Al Jabri company did not respond to inquiries; Abdulwali al-Jabri unreachable. Registered in Salalah, Oman. |
| Dates of Recruitment | Recruitment began as early as July. Specific contracts dated July 3; conscription in September after arrival in Moscow. | A head of a selection center for contract soldiers in Nizhnii Novgorod was involved in signing contracts. |
| Locations of Recruitment/Training | Recruits brought to Russia; training facility five hours from Moscow; military base near Rostov, Ukraine. | Recruits initially lured with false promises before being forcibly taken to these facilities. |
| Promised Benefits | Promised high salaries ($2,000/month), $10,000 bonus, Russian citizenship; promised work in ‘security’, ‘engineering’, and ‘drone manufacturing’. | Conditions were very different upon arrival. Forced into military duties and received inadequate military training. |
| Houthi Involvement | Facilitation by Houthi-linked companies; supported by Abdulwali Abdo Hassan al-Jabri; described as Houthi effort to build relations with Russia. | Houthis organized recruits to enhance ties with Russia, leveraging Iranian backing and aligning against Western interests. |
| Other Foreign Recruits | Mercenaries also recruited from Nepal, India, and approximately 12,000 North Korean troops. | Mercenaries from different nations indicate Russia’s attempt to avoid full mobilization of its own citizens. |
| Weapon Transfers and Talks | US Special Envoy Tim Lenderking mentioned Russia discussing potential weapon transfers to Houthis, including anti-ship missiles. | Weapons transfers could potentially enable Houthis to better target ships in the Red Sea. |
| Casualties and Injuries | Some recruits injured in Ukraine; reports of recruits lacking winter clothes, suffering from exhaustion, and attempts at suicide. | Recruits were subjected to harsh military conditions, carrying out tasks with little rest, exposed to active combat situations. |
| US Diplomatic Comments | US diplomats confirmed that Russian personnel were in Sana’a to deepen Houthi dialogue; alarming discussions around weapons transfers. | The deepening relations between Russia and Houthis were unimaginable before the war in Ukraine. |
| Mercenary Nationalities | Mercenaries from Yemen, Nepal, India, and North Korea have been recruited by Russia for the Ukraine war. | Foreign troops recruited to avoid domestic political backlash in Russia due to rising casualties. |
| Reports on Conditions | Reports of recruits carrying wooden planks in mine-infested areas, lack of winter clothes, harsh work conditions like digging bunkers. | Men were fatigued and poorly supplied, contributing to mental health crises among the recruits. |
| Key Individuals | Key individuals include Abdulwali Abdo Hassan al-Jabri, Mohammed al Bukhaiti (Houthi politburo), Mikhail Bogdanov (Russian envoy). | Key players involved in facilitating recruitment and deepening ties between Houthis and Russia, including diplomatic representatives. |
| Humanitarian Involvement | International Federation of Yemeni Migrants helped return some recruits; Ali Al-Subahi of the Federation emphasized a humanitarian issue uniting Yemenis. | Pressures from humanitarian organizations resulted in some recruits being allowed to leave Russia for Yemen. |
| Geopolitical Impact | Growing Russia-Houthi links signify closer Russia-Iran alliance; potential destabilization in the Middle East with threats to Red Sea maritime routes. | US, Saudi Arabia, and allies view growing Russia-Houthi ties as a significant threat to regional stability and energy routes. |
The economic landscape in Yemen has been ravaged by nearly a decade of conflict, leaving a vacuum for exploitative practices to thrive. Since the start of the Yemeni Civil War in 2014, the country’s infrastructure has disintegrated, and its economy has collapsed under the weight of blockades, targeted airstrikes, and political instability. This widespread devastation has plunged Yemen into one of the worst humanitarian crises of the modern era. By 2024, approximately 80% of Yemen’s population remains in need of humanitarian assistance, with high unemployment rates and a lack of access to basic services. In this environment, vulnerable men are easily manipulated by recruiters offering false promises of employment, security, or financial compensation.
The Kremlin’s decision to engage Yemeni recruits is indicative of Russia’s military strategy amid its ongoing war in Ukraine. As the conflict continues, Russian military casualties have risen significantly, and the strain of replacing those losses has led Moscow to look beyond its borders. The strategy of employing foreign recruits, particularly from impoverished or conflict-ridden regions like Yemen, allows Russia to supplement its forces without a formal draft, thereby mitigating potential political backlash from the Russian public. It is noteworthy that this recruitment is not entirely voluntary. Many Yemeni recruits report being coerced into signing contracts they could not understand or being deceived regarding the nature of their employment.
The Houthi movement, officially known as Ansar Allah, has played a central role in facilitating the recruitment of Yemeni men for Russia. The Houthis, a Shiite rebel group backed by Iran, have been engaged in a protracted conflict with the Saudi-backed Yemeni government. As their ties with Iran have grown, the Houthis have also expanded their alliances to include other actors aligned against Western interests, such as Russia. This collaboration benefits both sides: Russia gains access to recruits willing to fight, while the Houthis bolster their political and military ties with a global power that can support their cause. This evolving relationship has implications not only for Yemen but also for the entire Middle East, as the Houthis seek to leverage their newfound alliances to enhance their standing both domestically and regionally.
The recruitment of Yemeni men for Russia’s military efforts also raises broader questions about the role of non-state actors in modern warfare. The Houthis are just one example of how militant groups and non-state entities are becoming increasingly pivotal in shaping international conflicts. Unlike traditional state actors, these groups operate with a level of flexibility and informality that allows them to engage in activities that states might avoid due to legal or ethical constraints. The Houthis, acting as intermediaries, have essentially trafficked individuals from Yemen to Ukraine, exploiting their own population for geopolitical gain.
The men recruited from Yemen were often unaware of the true nature of the contracts they were signing. Many recruits believed they were going to Russia for employment in sectors such as engineering or security, only to find themselves pressed into military service upon arrival. Contracts signed by the Yemeni recruits, seen by investigative journalists, reveal affiliations with shadowy companies linked to the Houthi leadership. These companies, registered ostensibly as tourism or pharmaceutical firms in countries like Oman, have been instrumental in moving Yemeni men across borders. The recruits often describe being intimidated into signing agreements under duress, with language barriers compounding the issue. Most contracts were written in Russian, which the recruits could not read, and threats of violence were used to ensure compliance.
The journey for many recruits began with promises of high wages—up to $2,000 per month—and a potential path to Russian citizenship. For men living in extreme poverty, such offers seemed too good to pass up. However, the reality they faced upon arrival was starkly different. Instead of well-paid jobs, they were transported to military bases, subjected to rudimentary and rushed military training, and deployed to active conflict zones with inadequate equipment. Reports indicate that many recruits lacked proper winter clothing, a critical oversight given the harsh climate conditions in Ukraine. Recruits were tasked with physically demanding work, such as building fortifications and digging trenches, often in areas with ongoing bombardment. The harsh realities of combat, combined with the lack of adequate supplies, led to numerous accounts of Yemeni recruits suffering injuries, and in some cases, casualties.
The humanitarian dimension of this recruitment effort cannot be understated. Yemen, already dealing with its own conflict, has seen its young men—many of whom have no formal military training—transported into a separate war, exposing them to extreme danger and the psychological trauma associated with combat. Humanitarian organizations have voiced concerns over the treatment of these recruits, citing violations of international law, including the recruitment of individuals under false pretenses and their subsequent coerced participation in armed conflict. International legal frameworks such as the Geneva Conventions explicitly prohibit the forced recruitment of individuals and require the humane treatment of all persons involved in warfare. Russia’s practices, in collaboration with non-state actors like the Houthis, represent clear breaches of these international norms.
The growing alliance between Russia and the Houthis also points to a significant realignment of geopolitical relationships in the Middle East. Traditionally, the Houthis have been reliant on Iranian support, both militarily and financially. This support has allowed them to maintain control over large parts of northern Yemen, including the capital, Sana’a. By aligning themselves with Russia, the Houthis gain an additional layer of international legitimacy and support, which strengthens their hand in the ongoing Yemeni conflict. For Russia, deepening its relationship with the Houthis provides a foothold in the Middle East, a region that remains a focal point of global energy markets and a battleground for influence among global powers. The Houthis’ ability to disrupt maritime traffic in the Red Sea and target Saudi oil infrastructure aligns with Russia’s broader strategy of destabilizing regions of strategic importance to the West.
The United States and its allies have expressed significant concern over the growing entente between the Houthis and the Kremlin. The possibility of weapon transfers between Russia and the Houthis adds a new dimension to the conflict. Reports from U.S. diplomats suggest that discussions between the Houthis and Russian officials have included the potential supply of advanced weapons systems, including anti-ship missiles capable of threatening commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea. Such capabilities would significantly enhance the Houthis’ ability to project power beyond Yemen’s borders, posing a direct threat to one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors. The Red Sea, through which a significant portion of global trade flows, could become a flashpoint for conflict, with the Houthis acting as proxies for broader Russian and Iranian interests.
The regional implications of Yemeni recruitment for Russia’s war effort also extend to Saudi Arabia and its allies in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia has been engaged in a multi-year military campaign against the Houthis, with the stated aim of restoring Yemen’s internationally recognized government. The recruitment of Yemeni men to fight for Russia in Ukraine underscores the resilience and adaptability of the Houthi movement, which has managed to survive years of sustained military pressure from the Saudi-led coalition. For Saudi Arabia, the sight of Yemeni recruits being deployed to a European battlefield under the auspices of an adversary like Russia represents a strategic setback and highlights the limits of its influence within Yemen.
The impact on the Yemeni recruits themselves has been profound, both physically and psychologically. Many have been injured in combat, while others have been traumatized by their experiences on the front lines. Some have managed to escape, often with the assistance of international humanitarian organizations. The International Federation of Yemeni Migrants, for example, has been instrumental in highlighting the plight of these recruits and pressuring authorities to facilitate their return home. However, for those who remain in Ukraine or Russia, the prospects are bleak. Without proper military training, they face not only the dangers of active combat but also the harsh winter conditions and the psychological toll of being thrust into a conflict they barely understand.
The use of foreign recruits by Russia also reflects a broader trend in modern warfare, where state actors increasingly rely on non-traditional means to supplement their military forces. The use of mercenaries, private military companies (PMCs), and coerced recruits has blurred the lines of accountability in conflicts. Unlike regular armed forces, these groups often operate in legal gray zones, with limited oversight and accountability. Russia’s use of the Wagner Group, a PMC linked to the Kremlin, is a prime example of this trend. The Wagner Group has been active in multiple conflict zones, including Syria and various parts of Africa, where it has been accused of human rights abuses and other illicit activities. The recruitment of Yemeni men through Houthi-linked intermediaries represents a continuation of this strategy, leveraging vulnerable populations to serve broader geopolitical interests.
The involvement of private military actors and non-state intermediaries also complicates efforts to hold accountable those responsible for the exploitation of vulnerable individuals. The Yemeni recruits, many of whom were coerced into military service under false pretenses, are victims of a broader system that exploits individuals for profit and geopolitical gain. International legal bodies have struggled to address the challenges posed by the increasing privatization of warfare. The lack of clear jurisdiction and the difficulties in gathering evidence make it challenging to prosecute those responsible for recruiting, trafficking, and deploying these individuals. The international community must find ways to strengthen the legal frameworks governing the use of PMCs and hold accountable not only the companies themselves but also the states that employ their services.
From an international legal perspective, the recruitment of Yemeni soldiers under false pretenses and their subsequent deployment to Ukraine constitutes a violation of several international laws and norms. The Geneva Conventions, which set out the standards for the humane treatment of individuals during times of war, explicitly prohibit the forced recruitment of individuals into military service. Additionally, the recruitment of individuals through deceit and coercion is a violation of their fundamental human rights, as enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Despite these clear violations, the lack of enforcement mechanisms and the geopolitical complexities surrounding the Ukraine conflict have made it difficult for the international community to hold the perpetrators accountable.
The geopolitical ramifications of Russia’s recruitment of Yemeni soldiers extend beyond the immediate context of the Ukraine war. The recruitment effort reflects a broader strategy by Moscow to build alliances with non-state actors in the Middle East, particularly those aligned with Iranian interests. The Houthis, who have been a thorn in the side of Saudi Arabia and its allies, see their cooperation with Russia as a means to gain additional leverage in their ongoing conflict with the Saudi-backed Yemeni government. In return, Russia gains access to a pool of desperate individuals willing to fight, as well as a foothold in Yemen—a strategically important location given its proximity to major shipping lanes and the Red Sea.
Iran’s role in facilitating the Russia-Houthi relationship should not be underestimated. Tehran has long provided military and logistical support to the Houthis, and the alignment with Russia provides an opportunity for Iran to strengthen its influence in both Yemen and the broader region. This trilateral relationship between Russia, Iran, and the Houthis represents a convergence of interests that could pose a significant challenge to Western influence in the Middle East. For Tehran, supporting Russia’s military needs serves the dual purpose of solidifying an alliance with Moscow while continuing to undermine Saudi and Western interests in the region.
Saudi Arabia, for its part, is likely to view the recruitment of Yemeni soldiers for the Ukraine war as a direct threat to its own security interests. The ability of the Houthis to recruit and deploy fighters internationally indicates a level of organizational capability that could translate into more sophisticated operations within Yemen and against Saudi targets. The recruitment of Yemeni soldiers also highlights the extent to which the Houthis have managed to consolidate their power and resources, despite years of Saudi-led military intervention. Riyadh’s inability to prevent the recruitment and international deployment of Yemeni fighters underscores the limitations of its military strategy in Yemen and suggests that a reassessment of its approach may be necessary.
The international community’s response to the exploitation of Yemeni recruits will be crucial in shaping the future dynamics of the conflict. Thus far, the response has been limited, with only a few organizations, such as the International Federation of Yemeni Migrants, actively working to secure the release of recruits and draw attention to their plight. However, there is a need for a more coordinated international effort to address the issue. This could include increased diplomatic pressure on Russia to cease its recruitment of foreign fighters, as well as efforts to hold accountable those who facilitate the trafficking of vulnerable individuals for military purposes.
The use of Yemeni recruits also raises important questions about the role of accountability in modern warfare. While the recruitment of foreign fighters is not a new phenomenon, the coercive nature of the process and the involvement of state and non-state actors blur the lines of responsibility. Holding accountable those responsible for the exploitation of Yemeni recruits will require a concerted effort by international legal bodies, human rights organizations, and national governments. Without such accountability, the use of vulnerable individuals as cannon fodder in conflicts around the world is likely to continue, with devastating consequences for those caught in the crossfire.
In summary, the recruitment of Yemeni soldiers for Russia’s war in Ukraine is a multifaceted issue that highlights the interconnectedness of regional conflicts, the exploitation of vulnerable populations, and the evolving nature of modern warfare. The use of foreign recruits by Russia, facilitated by the Houthis, underscores the desperate measures being taken to sustain military campaigns and the broader geopolitical strategies at play. The implications of this recruitment effort extend beyond Ukraine, affecting regional stability in the Middle East, the balance of power among key actors, and the humanitarian situation on the ground. Addressing these challenges will require a comprehensive and coordinated response from the international community—one that prioritizes accountability, protects vulnerable individuals, and seeks to mitigate the broader impact of such exploitative practices on global security.
The use of coerced foreign recruits, the involvement of PMCs, and the broader geopolitical implications of the Russia-Houthi-Iran alignment all point to the need for a rethinking of how the international community responds to modern conflicts. The exploitation of vulnerable individuals for military purposes is not only a violation of their fundamental rights but also a threat to global stability. Without a concerted effort to address these issues, the cycle of exploitation and violence is likely to continue, with devastating consequences for those caught in the crossfire.
Strategic Exchange: The Houthis’ Military Aspirations and the Price of Russian Support
What Yemen Gains: The Strategic Exchange with Russia
The Houthi movement’s willingness to deploy Yemeni fighters to support Russia in Ukraine comes with a clear set of expectations regarding what they hope to gain in return. While financial remuneration is certainly part of the equation, the Houthis are primarily interested in strengthening their military capabilities and securing advanced weapons from Russia that could help them shift the balance of power in Yemen and the broader region. This partnership is rooted in strategic military ambitions, with the Houthis aiming to become a more formidable regional player capable of exerting influence not only against the Saudi-backed Yemeni government but also beyond Yemen’s borders.
The Houthis’ demands from Russia include advanced weapons systems that would enable them to increase their capability to challenge their regional adversaries. Specifically, the Houthis are seeking sophisticated weaponry that would allow them to pose a direct threat to Israel and to control key maritime routes such as the Bab al-Mandab Strait. This strategic waterway is crucial for international trade, as it connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Control over this strait would give the Houthis leverage over regional and global maritime traffic, putting significant pressure on Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Western allies who rely on these shipping lanes.
Desired Weapons Systems and Strategic Military Goals
The Houthis are keen to acquire a range of advanced weapons systems from Russia, which they believe will enhance their ability to both defend their territory and project power regionally. Some of the key weapons that the Houthis are reportedly seeking from Russia include:
- Yakhont (SS-N-26) Anti-Ship Missiles: The Yakhont is a supersonic anti-ship missile system that can target and destroy enemy vessels with precision. This missile is highly effective against maritime targets, making it a critical asset for controlling strategic waterways such as the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The Houthis’ interest in acquiring the Yakhont missile from Russia is driven by their desire to assert dominance over the Red Sea and disrupt the shipping routes that are vital for international trade. With these missiles, the Houthis would be capable of challenging naval forces operating in the region, including those of Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Western powers, thereby increasing their bargaining power in the broader geopolitical landscape.
- Advanced Air Defense Systems: The Houthis have also expressed interest in acquiring advanced air defense systems from Russia, such as the Pantsir-S1 or potentially the S-300. These systems would significantly enhance the Houthis’ ability to defend against aerial threats, including Saudi-led coalition airstrikes. The addition of modern air defense capabilities would not only protect Houthi-controlled areas but would also give the group the ability to deter attacks by creating a credible threat against enemy aircraft. Enhanced air defenses would make it more difficult for the Saudi-led coalition to conduct air operations, thereby increasing the Houthis’ strategic leverage in ongoing negotiations.
- Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs): The Houthis are also reportedly interested in obtaining advanced short-range ballistic missiles from Russia, which could be used to target strategic locations in Saudi Arabia, Israel, or other regional adversaries. SRBMs like the Iskander-M, which are known for their accuracy and destructive potential, would provide the Houthis with a powerful offensive capability. The ability to strike targets deep inside enemy territory would serve as both a deterrent and a means of pressuring adversaries to negotiate on favorable terms. Such missiles would make the Houthis a more credible threat to regional actors, complicating military planning and forcing adversaries to allocate significant resources to missile defense.
- Drone Technology and Surveillance Equipment: Another key area of interest for the Houthis is drone technology. While the Houthis have already benefited from Iranian drone technology, gaining access to Russian expertise would significantly upgrade their capabilities. Russia is known for its advancements in unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and electronic warfare systems. By obtaining these technologies, the Houthis would be able to conduct more sophisticated surveillance operations, improve their ability to carry out targeted attacks, and enhance their reconnaissance capabilities. This would be particularly useful in targeting critical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and Israel, as well as monitoring the movements of naval forces in the Red Sea.
- Coastal Defense Missiles and Artillery Systems: To bolster their capacity to control maritime routes, the Houthis are also interested in acquiring Russian coastal defense missile systems, such as the Bastion-P. These systems, equipped with supersonic missiles, would enable the Houthis to effectively target naval vessels operating near Yemen’s coast, thereby asserting control over key shipping lanes. Additionally, the Houthis are seeking advanced artillery systems to enhance their firepower and improve their ability to target enemy positions from a distance, increasing their overall tactical flexibility on the battlefield.
Implications for Regional Security and the Price of Support
The acquisition of these advanced weapons systems would have profound implications for regional security. The Bab al-Mandab Strait is a strategic chokepoint for global maritime traffic, with millions of barrels of oil and other goods passing through it daily. If the Houthis were to gain the capability to effectively control this waterway, they could significantly disrupt global trade and energy supplies. Such control would also provide them with leverage over Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and even Israel, all of which rely on the safe passage of ships through this strait.
For Israel, the potential acquisition of long-range missile capabilities by the Houthis represents a direct threat. The Houthis have previously expressed their animosity towards Israel, and their alignment with Iranian interests only heightens the risk of confrontation. If the Houthis were to acquire missiles capable of striking Israeli territory, this would add a new dimension to the security challenges facing Israel, which already contends with threats from Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iranian-backed militias in Syria. The possibility of coordinated attacks involving multiple Iranian proxies across different theaters would create a complex and multi-front threat that would strain Israel’s missile defense systems and military resources.
However, the price of this support from Russia is not without significant risks and costs for the Houthis. Aligning themselves more closely with Moscow could lead to further isolation from the international community. The Houthis are already designated as a terrorist organization by several countries, and their involvement in supporting Russia’s war effort in Ukraine—coupled with their pursuit of advanced Russian weapons—could lead to additional sanctions and diplomatic pressure. This could complicate any future attempts at negotiations to end the Yemeni civil war, as the Houthis would be seen as aligning with a pariah state, reducing their credibility as a negotiating partner.
Moreover, the financial cost of acquiring these advanced weapons systems would likely be considerable. While the deployment of Yemeni fighters to Ukraine may provide a form of barter exchange, it is unlikely to cover the full cost of the sophisticated weapons the Houthis are seeking. This raises questions about how the Houthis would finance such acquisitions, especially given the dire economic situation in Yemen. It is possible that the Houthis would rely on financial support from Iran or engage in other illicit activities, such as smuggling or extortion, to generate the necessary funds.
The Long-Term Consequences of Russian Support
In the long term, the acquisition of advanced Russian weaponry would make the Houthis a more formidable force, but it would also increase their dependence on external patrons like Russia and Iran. This dependence could limit the Houthis’ ability to act independently, as they would be beholden to the strategic interests of their benefactors. For Russia, supporting the Houthis is a means to an end—a way to exert influence in the Gulf region, disrupt Western-aligned maritime routes, and create additional pressure points against Saudi Arabia and Israel. However, Moscow’s support is unlikely to be unconditional. The Houthis would be expected to act in accordance with Russian interests, which could involve participating in further regional destabilization efforts or acting as a proxy force in future conflicts.
The pursuit of advanced weapons also comes with the risk of escalation. If the Houthis were to acquire and use these weapons, it could provoke a significant military response from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or Israel. Such a response could involve intensified airstrikes, ground operations, or even international military intervention aimed at neutralizing the new threat. This would lead to further destruction and loss of life in Yemen, exacerbating an already dire humanitarian crisis. The Houthis would need to carefully consider whether the potential military gains are worth the risk of provoking a larger and more coordinated military response from their adversaries.
In addition, the international community would likely view the acquisition of such advanced weapons by a non-state actor as a serious threat to regional and global security. This could lead to increased efforts to intercept arms shipments to Yemen, stricter enforcement of existing arms embargoes, and even direct military action to prevent the Houthis from gaining access to these weapons. The Houthis’ pursuit of advanced military capabilities could thus result in greater international isolation and increased military pressure, making it more difficult for them to sustain their war effort in the long run.
The deployment of Yemeni fighters to Ukraine in support of Russia is part of a broader strategic calculation by the Houthis, aimed at gaining access to advanced military capabilities that could shift the balance of power in Yemen and the broader region. By aligning themselves with Russia, the Houthis hope to acquire weapons systems that would enable them to challenge regional adversaries, control key maritime routes, and increase their leverage in ongoing conflicts. However, the pursuit of these capabilities comes with significant risks, including further international isolation, the potential for a major military response, and increased dependence on external patrons.
The Houthis’ strategy of leveraging their relationship with Russia to obtain advanced weapons is a high-stakes gamble that could either enhance their military position or lead to further devastation for Yemen. The price of Russian support is likely to be high, both in terms of the financial cost of the weapons and the political cost of aligning with a pariah state. As the Houthis continue to pursue their military ambitions, the consequences of their actions will be felt not only in Yemen but across the broader Middle East, with potential ramifications for regional stability, international shipping, and the balance of power in one of the world’s most volatile regions.
The Kremlin’s Calculated Leverage in the Middle East and the Houthis’ Role
Russia’s intensified focus on Ukraine, and its pursuit of external sources of leverage, has prompted the Kremlin to adopt a much more hands-on approach in regions such as the Red Sea. Moscow’s growing collaboration with Yemen’s Houthi movement—traditionally a local force focused on the Arabian Peninsula—signals a shifting geostrategic calculation. Historically, Yemen’s internal conflict did not warrant significant Russian investment, as its relevance to Russia’s broader interests seemed marginal. However, Moscow’s desperation for leverage amidst an increasingly adversarial relationship with the West has prompted the Kremlin to see opportunities in regions it previously neglected. The transformation in Russia’s stance on Yemen, from a relatively neutral position to one that increasingly backs the Houthis, has deep implications for regional stability.
The expanding Russian-Houthi partnership has multifaceted motivations. Beyond the Houthis’ value as an irritant to Western allies, the burgeoning ties also serve as leverage in Moscow’s ongoing geopolitical chess match with Riyadh. Saudi Arabia, a key player in determining global oil prices, holds a crucial role in the energy market—one that has made it a target of Russian diplomacy and coercion. As Riyadh weighs a closer alliance with Washington, including potential treaty-level commitments, President Vladimir Putin finds himself needing leverage against Saudi Arabia to counterbalance what could be a strengthened U.S.-Saudi alignment. In this context, the Houthis present a convenient means of exerting indirect pressure on Saudi Arabia.
A Historical Context of Pragmatism
Since the onset of the Yemeni civil war roughly a decade ago, the Russian strategy in Yemen has been marked by pragmatism and opportunism. Initially, Moscow chose to hedge its bets, officially recognizing the internationally backed Yemeni government while quietly maintaining communication with all major actors, including the Houthis. This approach allowed Russia to position itself as a potential mediator without overtly aligning with any side. It also gave Russia flexibility to pivot in line with shifting global and regional dynamics. Historically, Russia’s engagement in Yemen was mostly characterized by its diplomatic engagement through the United Nations, notably adhering to UNSC Resolution 2216, which demanded Houthi withdrawal from seized territories and was viewed as favoring Saudi interests.
The hedging strategy began to shift as the broader geopolitical environment evolved. The full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 precipitated a breakdown in Moscow’s relationships with Western countries, prompting it to seek new allies aligned against the United States. Iran emerged as a significant partner, providing critical support to Russia in the form of drones and ammunition that were desperately needed for the Ukrainian frontlines. This new alignment between Moscow and Tehran brought their respective proxies, including the Houthis, into the fold of a broader anti-Western coalition. The Houthis, who were already the recipients of Iranian support, soon found themselves in Moscow’s favor as well, viewed as valuable partners capable of expanding the scope of Russian influence in the Gulf.
Evolving Dynamics: The Houthis as an Anti-Western Ally
The Houthis have demonstrated resilience and a capacity to disrupt regional stability, capabilities that have not gone unnoticed by Moscow. The Yemeni rebels, whose operational focus had largely been regional, began to take on greater geopolitical importance as their attacks extended beyond Yemen’s borders to international shipping routes and, more recently, against Israel. These actions have complicated Western military and diplomatic responses, adding to the reputational and logistical burdens facing Western powers.
For Russia, this escalation aligns well with its broader strategy of horizontal escalation against the United States and its allies. By encouraging the Houthis to extend their military activities into the Red Sea and beyond, Moscow effectively creates additional pressure points against Western powers, without direct Russian involvement. This form of indirect confrontation also allows Russia to exploit the Western inability to decisively counter Houthi aggression, reinforcing the narrative of Western incompetence and failure to maintain stability.
A Geopolitical Bargaining Tool: Leverage Over Riyadh
Russia’s evolving partnership with the Houthis also serves as leverage in its dealings with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia’s ability to influence global oil prices gives it substantial clout, and Russia, as a fellow oil producer, is particularly vulnerable to shifts in Saudi energy policies. The prospect of Riyadh forming a deeper defense alliance with Washington further complicates Moscow’s strategic calculations, as such a treaty could diminish Saudi-Russian cooperation on energy and potentially increase Saudi alignment with Western energy sanctions against Russia. By supporting the Houthis, Russia gains a card to play against Riyadh, implicitly threatening to escalate Houthi capabilities if Saudi Arabia becomes too aligned with the United States.
This leveraging strategy involves a careful balancing act. On the one hand, Moscow wishes to support the Houthis to create leverage against Riyadh, but on the other hand, it must tread cautiously to avoid alienating Saudi Arabia completely. Saudi Arabia remains a critical economic partner for Russia, especially given its involvement in the OPEC Plus coalition, which is crucial for maintaining stability in global oil prices—a key revenue stream for the Russian economy. Thus, Russia’s flirtations with the Houthis may also serve as a calculated provocation—signaling to Saudi Arabia that Moscow could escalate its support for the Houthis if needed, but refraining from crossing any major red lines.
Russian Support Mechanisms for the Houthis
Russian support for the Houthis has been developing along several lines, each aimed at boosting the Houthis’ capabilities while maintaining plausible deniability for Moscow. First, Russia has offered diplomatic support to the Houthis, frequently hosting delegations and using its influence at the United Nations to shield the group from punitive measures. For example, Russia has opposed several anti-Houthi resolutions in the U.N. and has taken steps to weaken international investigative bodies that might otherwise hold the Houthis accountable. By doing so, Moscow aims to legitimize the Houthis on the international stage, providing them with a level of diplomatic protection that they would otherwise lack.
Second, Russia has allegedly provided intelligence and advisory support to the Houthis. Reports suggest that Russian advisors have been operating in Yemen under the guise of humanitarian workers, offering targeting information and strategic advice to Houthi military leaders. This support is believed to be particularly focused on the Houthis’ maritime campaign, which has targeted Western commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea. These attacks serve a dual purpose for Moscow: they complicate Western military operations and provide an avenue for retaliation against Western support for Ukraine in the Black Sea.
The third avenue of support involves potential arms transfers. While information about Russian weapons in Houthi hands has thus far been limited, recent reports suggest that Moscow may be considering direct arms deals with the Yemeni rebels. There have been indications that Russia could supply the Houthis with advanced anti-ship missiles, such as the Yakhont (SS-N-26), which would significantly enhance the Houthis’ ability to threaten maritime traffic in the Red Sea. These capabilities could fundamentally alter the military balance in the region, providing the Houthis with the means to challenge Saudi and Western naval dominance.
Finally, the deployment of Yemeni mercenaries to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine represents another form of collaboration. These recruits, often young men lured with false promises of lucrative employment, were deployed to Ukraine under arrangements facilitated by Houthi-linked intermediaries such as Al Jabri General Trading and Investment Co. SPC. The deployment serves multiple purposes: it provides Russia with desperately needed manpower, and it also serves to deepen the Houthi-Russian relationship by tying Houthi interests more closely to those of Moscow.
The Reality of War: Yemeni Recruits on the Frontlines
The conditions faced by Yemeni recruits in Ukraine have been brutal. Far from the promised non-combat positions, the recruits found themselves thrust into active combat roles, often without adequate training or equipment. Hamza, like many others, was issued a rifle and sent to the frontlines with minimal instruction on how to use it. The training they received was cursory at best, focusing primarily on basic weapons handling and survival tactics. For recruits with no prior military experience, this training was woefully insufficient to prepare them for the realities of frontline combat.
The recruits faced harsh conditions, both on the battlefield and in their living arrangements. They were often deployed in remote areas, with limited access to food, water, and medical supplies. The Ukrainian winter, with its freezing temperatures, posed an additional challenge for the Yemeni recruits, many of whom were unaccustomed to such extreme cold. Reports indicate that many recruits lacked proper winter clothing, leaving them vulnerable to frostbite and other cold-related health issues. The combination of inadequate equipment, harsh weather, and the constant threat of enemy fire created a situation of extreme hardship for the recruits.
The psychological toll of these conditions has been severe. Many of the recruits were not prepared for the horrors of war—the constant shelling, the sight of comrades being killed or injured, and the fear of death that accompanies every moment on the frontlines. The trauma experienced by these recruits has been compounded by the sense of betrayal they feel, having been lured into a conflict under false pretenses. Some recruits have attempted to escape, while others have made desperate pleas for help, sending videos and messages to their families back home, detailing the conditions they are facing and asking for assistance in returning to Yemen.
A Cry for Help: The Pleas of Trapped Recruits
The plight of Yemeni recruits in Ukraine came to international attention following the publication of videos in which the recruits pleaded for help. In these videos, the recruits described the dire conditions they were facing and expressed their desire to return to Yemen. Hamza, along with several other recruits, recorded a video in which they detailed the hardships they were enduring—lack of food, inadequate clothing, and the constant threat of death. The recruits spoke of the deception that had brought them to Ukraine and their feelings of abandonment by those who had promised to protect them.
These videos, which were shared on social media and picked up by international news outlets, sparked outrage among the Yemeni diaspora and humanitarian organizations. The International Federation of Yemeni Migrants, along with other advocacy groups, began calling for the immediate repatriation of the recruits and for accountability for those responsible for their recruitment. The videos also highlighted the role of intermediaries like Abdul Wali al-Jabri, whose company had facilitated the recruitment and transport of the Yemeni men. The fact that these recruits were pleading for help, rather than receiving the support they had been promised, underscored the exploitative nature of the arrangement.
The pleas of the recruits also drew attention to the broader issue of the use of foreign fighters in conflicts like the war in Ukraine. The exploitation of vulnerable individuals, who are lured into conflicts under false pretenses, is a violation of international law and human rights norms. The Yemeni recruits, many of whom were seeking a way out of poverty, were instead used as cannon fodder in a conflict that they had no stake in. Their desperate pleas for help serve as a powerful reminder of the human cost of such exploitation and the need for greater international oversight to prevent similar abuses in the future.
أخذوهم .. من سلطنة عمان
— محمد المسوري (@Lawmohyemen) September 27, 2024
إلى روسيا .. وقتل منهم الكثير.
إسمعوهم..
يناشدون جميع الجهات المعنية لإنقاذهم.
وأرجو المشاركة وتعميم المقطع لنساهم جميعنا في إنقاذهم.
وكما قلت لكم مسبقاً..
الحوثي والنظام الإيراني ومن معهم أخذوهم من سلطنة عمان للحرب ضد أوكرانيا.#سلطنة_عُمان pic.twitter.com/rxJXErX0sw
The Role of Abdul Wali al-Jabri and the Geopolitical Implications
The deployment of Yemeni fighters to Ukraine, facilitated by Houthi-linked intermediaries, represents a complex intertwining of military, political, and economic interests. A key figure in this arrangement is Abdul Wali al-Jabri, a former Yemeni parliamentarian who defected to the Houthis in 2011 and has since become a prominent figure within the Houthi movement. The involvement of Yemeni fighters in Russia’s war effort against Ukraine serves multiple purposes: it provides Russia with badly needed manpower, offers the Houthis a means of strengthening ties with Moscow, and injects much-needed cash into the impoverished Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. This section delves deeper into the multifaceted aspects of this deployment, examining the motivations, logistics, and consequences of this unique alliance.
The Facilitator: Abdul Wali al-Jabri and His Role in the Deployment
Abdul Wali al-Jabri’s journey from a member of the Yemeni parliament to a major general within the Houthi ranks has been marked by political opportunism and strategic alliances. Before defecting to the Houthis, al-Jabri was a member of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, holding a position in parliament. However, his defection in 2011, during the height of the Arab Spring and the Yemeni revolution, marked a turning point in his political career. His alignment with the Houthis came with significant rewards, including a rapid rise in the rebel hierarchy and the conferment of the rank of major general. Since then, al-Jabri has forged close ties with senior Houthi intelligence and political figures, becoming an influential player in the group’s military and logistical operations.
Al-Jabri’s involvement in facilitating the deployment of Yemeni fighters to Ukraine highlights the Houthis’ broader strategy of aligning themselves with global powers that oppose Western influence. Through his company, Al Jabri General Trading and Investment Co. SPC, based in Oman, al-Jabri played a central role in recruiting and organizing the transport of Yemeni men to Russia. Ostensibly a trading and investment firm, Al Jabri General Trading appears to be a front for more covert operations, including the movement of personnel across borders for military purposes. The company’s involvement in this operation underscores the extent to which commercial entities are being used to mask illicit activities and circumvent international scrutiny.
The logistical aspects of deploying Yemeni fighters to Ukraine are complex and involve multiple stages, each facilitated by al-Jabri’s company and his network of contacts. Recruitment typically begins in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen, where young men are targeted with promises of lucrative employment opportunities abroad. These promises often include high wages, with figures ranging from $2,000 per month to a $10,000 bonus, as well as the prospect of Russian citizenship. For men living in poverty-stricken areas of Yemen, these offers are highly attractive, even if they come with significant risks. Once recruited, the men are transported to Oman, where Al Jabri General Trading handles their travel arrangements to Russia. Upon arrival in Russia, the recruits are taken to military training facilities before being deployed to Ukraine.
The Russian-Houthi Military Nexus and Training Opportunities
The deployment of Yemeni fighters to Ukraine also provides a unique opportunity for the Houthis to benefit from Russian military expertise. Unlike the largely irregular forces that make up the Houthi military, the Russian army is a professional force with extensive experience in conventional warfare. By sending Yemeni fighters to Ukraine, the Houthis are effectively giving their recruits an opportunity to learn from one of the world’s most capable militaries. This experience is likely to be invaluable for the Houthis as they continue their fight against the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.
The training provided to Yemeni recruits in Russia is rudimentary but still offers a level of instruction that is not readily available in Yemen. Recruits are given basic training in weapons handling, tactical movement, and battlefield survival, skills that are crucial for both the conflict in Ukraine and the ongoing war in Yemen. Additionally, the exposure to Russian military tactics and doctrine provides the recruits with insights into more sophisticated forms of warfare, including the use of artillery, mechanized units, and drone technology. These skills, once brought back to Yemen, could enhance the capabilities of the Houthi military, making them a more formidable force against their adversaries.
The integration of Yemeni fighters into Russian military units also serves to further solidify the relationship between the Houthis and Moscow. By fighting alongside Russian troops, the Yemeni recruits are directly contributing to Russia’s military objectives, thereby ingratiating the Houthis with the Kremlin. This partnership provides the Houthis with an additional layer of international support, complementing their existing alliance with Iran. The alignment with Russia not only bolsters the Houthis’ military capabilities but also provides them with greater diplomatic leverage, as they can now count on support from another major global power.
The Human Cost: Exploitation and Disillusionment
While the deployment of Yemeni fighters to Ukraine may offer financial and strategic benefits to the Houthis and Russia, the human cost of this arrangement is significant. Many of the recruits were lured with false promises and were unaware of the true nature of the contracts they were signing. Reports indicate that upon arrival in Russia, the recruits were taken to military bases, where they were subjected to harsh conditions and forced to sign enlistment contracts under duress. In some cases, recruits were threatened with violence if they refused to comply, with one recruit recounting how a pistol was fired over their heads to intimidate them into signing.
The reality faced by Yemeni recruits in Ukraine is starkly different from what they were led to believe. Instead of well-paid employment, they found themselves on the frontlines of a brutal conflict, often without adequate training or equipment. The conditions they face are harsh, with reports of recruits lacking proper winter clothing and being forced to undertake grueling physical tasks, such as constructing bunkers in dangerous areas. The psychological toll of these conditions has been severe, with some recruits attempting suicide and others expressing despair at their situation. The lack of support from their commanders, combined with the constant threat of death or injury, has left many recruits feeling abandoned and exploited.
The human cost is not limited to the recruits themselves but also extends to their families back in Yemen. Many families were promised financial support in exchange for their relatives’ participation in the conflict, but in many cases, these promises have not been fulfilled. The failure to provide the promised support has left families struggling to survive, adding to the already dire humanitarian situation in Yemen. The disillusionment felt by the recruits and their families underscores the exploitative nature of this arrangement, in which vulnerable individuals are used as pawns in a larger geopolitical game.
Regional and Global Implications of the Russian-Houthi Partnership
The implications of the evolving Russian-Houthi relationship extend well beyond Yemen. Should Moscow decide to transfer advanced military capabilities to the Houthis, the impact on regional security would be profound. The introduction of advanced anti-ship missiles, air defense systems, or the technological know-how for indigenous weapons production could provide the Houthis with a much greater ability to project power beyond Yemen’s borders. This would not only exacerbate the ongoing conflict in Yemen but also create new security challenges for Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Western navies operating in the region.
For the Houthis, the deepening relationship with Russia represents an opportunity to diversify their sources of military and diplomatic support. Until now, the Houthis have been almost entirely reliant on Iran and its proxy network, which includes Lebanese Hizballah and various militias in Iraq and Syria. The addition of Russian support offers the Houthis an additional layer of security and potentially greater independence from Tehran. This diversification is particularly valuable at a time when the Iranian-led axis is under pressure, having suffered a series of setbacks in its confrontation with Israel, including the loss of key leaders.
From a broader perspective, Russia’s growing alignment with non-state actors like the Houthis reflects a shift in Moscow’s approach to the Middle East. The Kremlin has increasingly adopted a hardline anti-Western stance, positioning itself as a supporter of groups that oppose U.S. and Israeli interests. This marks a departure from Russia’s previous attempts to maintain a balanced approach, exemplified by its efforts to deconflict with Israel in Syria and to maintain working relationships with both Iran and the Gulf states. Today, the Kremlin appears more willing to align itself openly with anti-Western forces, even at the risk of alienating former partners.
Constraints on Russian-Houthi Cooperation
Despite the significant potential for collaboration between Russia and the Houthis, there are also notable constraints that limit the scope of their partnership. One of the primary limitations is Russia’s geopolitical balancing act. While the Houthis offer a means of exerting pressure on Saudi Arabia, overt support for the Yemeni rebels risks alienating Riyadh and the broader Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes the United Arab Emirates—another important Russian partner. Saudi Arabia, in particular, holds substantial influence over global oil markets, and any deterioration in relations with Riyadh could have significant economic repercussions for Moscow.
Russia’s domestic economic constraints also limit its ability to support the Houthis. The war in Ukraine has placed a tremendous strain on Russia’s military-industrial complex, with Moscow forced to source basic supplies from countries like North Korea. Given these challenges, the provision of advanced weaponry to the Houthis would require Moscow to divert resources away from its own military needs. While the transfer of older, less valuable systems remains a possibility, the supply of cutting-edge capabilities to the Houthis would likely be viewed as a last resort, only to be pursued if the potential benefits outweigh the risks.
From the Houthis’ perspective, cooperation with Russia offers clear benefits, but it also carries risks. The group remains heavily reliant on Iran for both military and financial support, and any overt alignment with Russia could complicate its relationship with Tehran. Additionally, the Houthis must contend with the fact that Russia’s support may be inconsistent, driven more by Moscow’s broader strategic interests than by any commitment to the Houthi cause. The Houthis are acutely aware that they are but one piece on Russia’s broader geopolitical chessboard, and that Moscow’s support could waver should the Kremlin’s priorities shift.
The evolving relationship between Russia and the Houthis represents a convergence of interests driven by a shared desire to counter Western influence. For Russia, the Houthis offer a means of exerting indirect pressure on the United States and its allies, while also providing leverage in its dealings with Saudi Arabia. For the Houthis, Russian support offers an opportunity to diversify their sources of military and diplomatic backing, potentially enhancing their ability to resist external pressures.
Yet, despite the potential for collaboration, significant constraints remain. Russia must balance its support for the Houthis with its relationships in the Gulf, while the Houthis must navigate the complexities of aligning with multiple external patrons. As the situation continues to evolve, it remains to be seen how far Moscow and Sanaa will be willing to push their partnership, and what impact this evolving relationship will have on regional stability in the Middle East. The stakes are high, and the consequences of a deepened Russian-Houthi alliance could reverberate far beyond Yemen’s borders, reshaping the security landscape of the region for years to come.
APPENDIX – Detailed Analysis of Individuals Sanctioned by the United Kingdom under the Iran Regime
The UK’s Consolidated List of Financial Sanctions Targets includes numerous individuals and entities connected to Iran’s activities, particularly concerning actions that contribute to regional instability and threaten the security of other countries. Below is a detailed examination of three sanctioned individuals—Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam, Sa’id Al-Jamal, and Behnam Shahriyari—highlighting their roles, actions, and involvement in activities that led to their inclusion on the UK sanctions list.
1. Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam
- Name (Non-Latin Script): ﻣ ﻘ م ﺪ ی ﺪ ﻤ ﺣ ا ﻞ ﯿ ﻋ ﺎ ﻤ ﺳ ا
- Aliases: Ahmadi-Moghaddam, Esmail; Ahmadi-Moghaddam, Ismael; Ahmadi-Moqaddam, Ismael
- Date of Birth: 1961 (Exact date not provided)
- Address: Tehran, Iran
- Positions:
- Adviser to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.
- Director of the University and the Higher National Defence Research Institute.
- Former Chief of Iran’s National Police (2005 – 2015).
- Former Head of the Iranian Cyber Police (2011 – 2015).
- Former Senior Advisor for Security Affairs to the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff.
- Head of Iran’s Headquarters in support of the Yemeni People.
Sanctions Background and Reasons for Listing:
- UK Sanctions List Reference: IRN0026.
- Date of Listing: April 14, 2011.
- Date Designated: December 31, 2020.
- Latest Update: December 14, 2023.
- Group ID: 11583.
UK Statement of Reasons: Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam is included in the UK sanctions list due to his involvement in overseeing forces responsible for several acts of violent repression. His tenure as the Chief of Iran’s National Police (2005-2015) was marked by significant involvement in the suppression of political dissent and the targeting of peaceful protests. Notably, he played a role in the June 15, 2009 attack on Tehran University dormitories, which occurred during the unrest that followed the controversial 2009 Iranian presidential election. This attack was characterized by brutal force against student protesters, who had been demonstrating against perceived electoral fraud.
Ahmadi-Moqaddam was also the Head of the Iranian Cyber Police from January 2011 until early 2015, during which time the unit conducted extensive operations aimed at surveilling, arresting, and intimidating individuals engaged in digital and online dissent against the Iranian government. Under his command, cyber operations targeted activists, bloggers, and journalists, contributing to the broader state repression of free speech and political activity.
In addition to his repressive domestic activities, Ahmadi-Moqaddam holds the position of Head of Iran’s Headquarters in support of the Yemeni People, indicating his significant role in Iran’s involvement in the Yemeni conflict. This title suggests his active coordination of assistance—both military and financial—to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, aligning with Iran’s broader strategic goals of countering Saudi influence in the region.
Broader Implications: Ahmadi-Moqaddam’s positions reveal his importance in Iran’s domestic and foreign operations. His advisory role to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and his directorship of the University and the Higher National Defence Research Institute suggest that he remains a key figure in shaping Iran’s defense strategy and military training. His expertise in cyber operations also indicates a continued role in asymmetric warfare and the broader dissemination of Iran’s influence beyond its borders.
2. Sa’id Al-Jamal
- Aliases: Abu-Ali, Ahmad Rami; Abu Ahmad; Al-Gamal Saeed Ahmed Mohammed; Al-Jamal, Sa’id Ahmad Muhammad; Aljamal, Saeed
- Date of Birth: January 1, 1979
- Place of Birth: Yemen
- Nationality: Yemeni
- Passport Number: 4716186
Sanctions Background and Reasons for Listing:
- UK Sanctions List Reference: IRN0194.
- Date Listed: February 27, 2024.
- Date Designated: February 27, 2024.
- Latest Update: February 27, 2024.
- Group ID: 16372.
UK Statement of Reasons: Sa’id Al-Jamal is sanctioned due to his involvement in activities deemed hostile, backed by the Iranian government. Specifically, Al-Jamal has been associated with armed groups conducting attacks in the Red Sea that have directly affected shipping security. He has played a significant role in facilitating and supporting actions that threaten, plan, or carry out attacks against maritime vessels, including sabotage and detention of ships.
His activities are linked to the broader Iranian strategy of using proxies to threaten international shipping, particularly in strategically significant waterways such as the Red Sea. The purpose of these operations is often to disrupt global maritime commerce and exert pressure on Saudi Arabia, as well as other Western-aligned nations. Such activities have direct implications for international trade and maritime security, highlighting Iran’s use of asymmetric tactics in its geopolitical maneuvering.
Moreover, Al-Jamal’s role in destabilization activities has extended beyond maritime threats to broader initiatives intended to undermine the security of various nations, including potential threats to the UK and other countries. His activities are consistent with Iran’s use of regional proxies to challenge and destabilize adversaries, thereby extending Tehran’s influence and operational capabilities throughout the region.
Broader Implications: Al-Jamal’s involvement in maritime operations indicates a deliberate strategy by Iran to enhance its power projection capabilities across critical international waterways. By targeting shipping routes, Iran seeks to demonstrate its capacity to control and disrupt global trade, particularly oil shipments, thereby gaining leverage in negotiations with Western countries. Al-Jamal’s network and operations underscore the significant threat posed by Iranian-backed proxies in disrupting maritime trade and potentially escalating tensions within the region.
3. Behnam Shahriyari
- Aliases: Shariari, Benham; Shariri, Bahanem
- Nationality: Iranian
Sanctions Background and Reasons for Listing:
- UK Sanctions List Reference: IRN0219.
- Date Listed: September 2, 2024.
- Date Designated: September 2, 2024.
- Latest Update: September 2, 2024.
- Group ID: 16556.
UK Statement of Reasons: Behnam Shahriyari has been sanctioned for his involvement in activities undertaken by armed groups backed by the Iranian government. His actions have supported and facilitated the planning and execution of activities intended to destabilize multiple countries, specifically Israel, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon. Shahriyari has played a pivotal role in providing assistance that directly supports armed operations in these regions, contributing to the instability that Iran has actively sought to foster through its network of proxies.
Shahriyari’s activities include providing logistical support, financial assistance, and operational planning to various armed groups. His involvement in these operations underscores Iran’s strategic use of militias and proxies to exert influence across the Middle East. The destabilization of Israel, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon serves Iran’s broader geopolitical goals of expanding its influence and countering the interests of Western countries and their regional allies.
Broader Implications: Shahriyari’s activities are representative of Iran’s efforts to maintain a web of influence through non-state actors across the region. By targeting countries like Israel and Iraq, Iran is actively working to challenge its perceived adversaries, while in Yemen and Lebanon, Iran is focused on bolstering friendly factions and expanding its strategic reach. Shahriyari’s support for these groups directly contributes to regional instability and aligns with Iran’s objective of countering Western and Saudi influence.
Strategic Patterns in Sanctions Listings
The inclusion of Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam, Sa’id Al-Jamal, and Behnam Shahriyari on the UK’s sanctions list highlights the key roles that these individuals play in furthering Iran’s geopolitical goals through both direct and indirect means.
- Esmail Ahmadi-Moqaddam represents Iran’s internal and external repression machinery, using his influence to suppress dissent domestically while also providing logistical and advisory support to groups like the Houthis in Yemen.
- Sa’id Al-Jamal is instrumental in Iran’s efforts to use asymmetric warfare tactics to target maritime traffic in the Red Sea, thereby challenging Western influence in the region and asserting control over critical shipping lanes.
- Behnam Shahriyari serves as a key facilitator of Iran’s regional strategy of destabilization, supporting armed groups in Israel, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon as part of Tehran’s broader objective to expand its influence across the Middle East.
The activities of these individuals underscore Iran’s reliance on proxy actors and asymmetric warfare to exert influence and achieve its strategic objectives. The use of proxies not only helps Iran to minimize direct confrontation with powerful adversaries but also allows it to expand its footprint in key regions, thereby challenging the influence of Western powers and their allies. The UK sanctions listings serve as a measure to limit the ability of these individuals to further Iran’s destabilizing activities and to send a clear signal regarding the consequences of such actions.
