ABSTRACT
Throughout the grand sweep of human history, it has often been the ability to adapt that has determined success or failure, survival or extinction. This same principle, which has shaped the evolution of all life on Earth, is vividly evident in the dynamics of human conflict, where victory seldom favors the strongest or the most numerous. Instead, it is those who can swiftly adjust to the shifting tides of warfare that come out ahead. Nowhere is this clearer than in the current war in Ukraine, which has emerged as a stark lesson in adaptation—a lesson the United States must heed if it wishes to maintain its status as a preeminent global military power. The pace of technological and strategic evolution today is staggering, and those who fail to keep up risk being outflanked, rendered obsolete before the first dust of battle even settles.
In the early stages of the Ukraine conflict, the United States supplied the Excalibur precision artillery shells to the Ukrainian forces, demonstrating a decisive technological advantage. For a brief moment, these advanced munitions gave Ukrainian troops a significant edge, but the rapid adaptation of Russian forces soon neutralized this advantage. What was once a powerful asset quickly lost its edge—an example of how, in modern warfare, both tactics and technologies must be continuously revised. The traditional U.S. defense model, however, is not built for this level of nimble adjustment. Rooted in extensive timelines, bureaucratic layers, and rigid procurement processes, it struggles against the demands of a battlefield that evolves not in years, but in days or even hours. Without a fundamental transformation in how it acquires and fields military capabilities, the U.S. may find its forces outmatched and its advanced technologies obsolete almost as soon as they are deployed.
To remain relevant and retain strategic advantage, the United States must undergo a paradigm shift. This means evolving beyond product-centric contracts and adopting a more fluid, outcome-focused approach. Imagine a military acquisition process that emphasizes adaptability and real-time innovation over the delivery of static products. It involves embedding engineers alongside troops to ensure immediate innovation, shifting to service contracts that provide capabilities rather than fixed items, and utilizing distributed, forward-deployed manufacturing to close the gap between need and supply. This trio of strategies—service-oriented contracting, embedded tactical innovation, and expeditionary production—offers a vision of adaptability that matches the demands of the modern battlefield.
Take Ukraine’s own rapid development in drone technology as an example. By leveraging distributed production methods, they achieved a tenfold increase in drone manufacturing in just one year, scaling from a mere seven domestically produced models in 2022 to sixty-seven in 2024. This achievement underscores the power of agility in wartime production—a model based not on centralized, cumbersome processes but on a distributed network of innovation involving private companies, international partnerships, and agile manufacturing practices. This flexibility provided Ukrainian forces with rapid, tactical advantages, turning an urgent need into an operational strength.
In contrast, the U.S. defense acquisition model remains hamstrung by the lengthy Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, a process designed to ensure that everything from weaponry to platforms is meticulously tested and guaranteed to meet military standards. However, these exacting standards, while producing reliable technologies, come at the cost of speed and flexibility—qualities that are now more critical than ever. In the time it takes for a new military technology to move from concept to deployment, adversaries have adapted, innovated, and found ways to neutralize its impact. Modern conflicts demand something different—an approach not about products but about providing continuous capabilities.
A critical part of this transformation involves placing engineers directly on the frontlines. In the past, engineers operated from the safety of distant labs and offices, far removed from the theater of conflict. But consider the power of having those who design and refine military technologies working side by side with the troops who use them. This proximity allows for on-the-spot adjustments, immediate responses to evolving challenges, and direct user feedback that drives innovation forward. Ukrainian forces have shown how effective this can be. By adapting drones in real-time—modifying civilian devices into military assets, reconfiguring targeting systems, and improvising new tactics—they kept pace with Russian adaptations, often outmaneuvering their adversaries by thinking and acting faster.
Equally important is the idea of expeditionary manufacturing. Imagine being able to produce critical parts, components, or even entire weapons systems close to the battlefield, drastically reducing the reliance on vulnerable supply chains that stretch back thousands of miles. Forward-deployed manufacturing units equipped with advanced additive manufacturing technology—like 3-D printing—can turn out specialized components as needs arise. No longer would soldiers need to wait weeks or months for a replacement part to be shipped from a central depot; instead, they could have it fabricated and in their hands within hours. The U.S. Navy has already experimented with 3-D printing on board ships, and similar concepts could be expanded to ground forces, with mobile manufacturing hubs traveling with or near operational units.
This vision of adaptability culminates in a new model for defense: Defense as a Service. It is a model that shifts away from acquiring specific products to acquiring evolving, adaptable capabilities. Contractors are no longer just builders who deliver a product and walk away; they become long-term partners, responsible for ensuring that the capabilities they provide can be continuously updated and adjusted as the battlefield evolves. Rather than delivering a fixed drone or a static piece of hardware, a contractor might provide “air superiority as a service”—a constantly evolving capability that adapts to the tactical and technological realities of the moment. This means designing contracts that focus on outcomes—what the military needs to achieve, not just what it wants to buy. The relationship between the military and its contractors shifts from one of transaction to one of partnership, focused on continuous improvement and adaptability.
By adopting this approach, the U.S. military can transform how it responds to threats. It can shorten development cycles, field new technologies faster, and adapt to changes on the ground with a speed that matches or exceeds that of its adversaries. The traditional defense model—rooted in the slow cycles of procurement and the production of monolithic platforms—is ill-suited to an era where adaptability wins wars. Instead, what is needed is a military-industrial complex that is as nimble as it is powerful, as capable of innovation in the heat of battle as it is in the quiet of research labs.
The conflict in Ukraine has offered a glimpse of the future of warfare—a future where the side that adapts fastest has the upper hand. To maintain its dominance on the global stage, the United States must not only recognize this but fully embrace it, reimagining its defense posture for an era defined by rapid technological change and evolving threats. Defense as a Service is not just a shift in acquisition strategy; it is a new way of thinking about power projection, military readiness, and the role of technology in securing national interests. It is about ensuring that, when the moment of conflict comes, the U.S. military is not just prepared—it is ahead, ready to adapt, innovate, and win.
| Aspect | Summary |
|---|---|
| Historical Context | Adaptation has been the key to survival and success throughout history, in both evolution and human conflict. |
| Modern Example: Ukraine War | The war in Ukraine exemplifies rapid adaptation in warfare, where Ukrainian and Russian forces adapt their strategies and technologies swiftly. |
| U.S. Military Challenges | U.S. defense acquisition processes are rigid and slow, making it difficult for the military to adapt quickly to changing battlefield conditions. |
| Technological Edge Example | The Excalibur precision artillery initially gave Ukrainian forces an edge, but Russian forces quickly adapted, neutralizing its impact. |
| Need for Change in U.S. Approach | The U.S. must transition from product-centric contracts to service-oriented models, embracing adaptability and focusing on outcomes. |
| Key Strategies for Adaptation | Three main strategies include shifting to outcome-based contracts, embedding engineers on frontlines, and using distributed manufacturing. |
| Ukraine’s Drone Production | Ukraine achieved significant growth in drone manufacturing by adopting distributed production methods and international collaboration. |
| Shortcomings of Traditional Acquisition | The U.S. Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is slow, making U.S. forces vulnerable to rapid adversary innovations. |
| Embedded Engineers | Embedding engineers with troops allows for real-time tactical innovation, ensuring that equipment is adapted to meet evolving needs. |
| Expeditionary Manufacturing | Bringing manufacturing closer to the battlefield, through mobile units and 3-D printing, enables rapid prototyping and reduces logistical challenges. |
| Defense as a Service | A new paradigm focusing on acquiring adaptive capabilities rather than fixed products, treating contractors as partners for continuous improvement. |
| Outcomes-Based Contracts | Contracts should focus on achieving desired capabilities, allowing for continuous improvement and iteration based on battlefield needs. |
| Adaptation Lessons from Ukraine | The Ukraine conflict demonstrates the importance of rapid adaptation, as both sides continuously evolve their tactics and technologies. |
| Conclusion | To remain a global power, the U.S. military must adopt an adaptable, outcomes-focused defense model to match the pace of modern warfare and stay ahead of adversaries. |
Throughout the long arc of history, from prehistoric skirmishes to the grand conflicts of modernity, adaptation has often been the defining factor separating success from failure, survival from extinction. The evolutionary pressures that have shaped life on Earth also find resonance in the spheres of human competition—most evidently in war, where victory does not always belong to the strongest or the largest, but to those capable of adapting most swiftly to the shifting dynamics of the battlefield. This fundamental principle of adaptation is being starkly illustrated in the ongoing war in Ukraine, where both sides are demonstrating how rapid evolution in strategy, technology, and logistics can determine the outcome of battles and, ultimately, the conflict itself. It is a lesson the United States must learn with urgency if it is to maintain its position on the global stage as a preeminent military power. In this new era of warfare, where technology cycles are faster, and adversaries can adapt within weeks or even days, the U.S. defense establishment must evolve beyond traditional paradigms or risk falling behind.
The United States’ initial provision of Excalibur precision artillery shells to Ukrainian forces represented a technological edge that, for a time, gave Ukrainian troops significant capabilities on the battlefield. These advanced munitions were a stark reminder of the technological superiority that Western militaries often bring to conflicts. However, the rapidity with which Russian forces adapted to these munitions—effectively nullifying their advantages within a matter of weeks—demonstrates a broader and more troubling issue for U.S. military doctrine. In war, concepts of operations must be revised on an hourly basis, software recalibrated daily, and hardware continuously iterated upon. The traditional defense acquisition model of the United States, characterized by its inherent rigidity, top-down control, and extensive timelines, struggles to match the pace required by modern technological and tactical evolutions. The risks of such a discrepancy are enormous: in a major shooting war against a peer adversary, the U.S. might find that adversarial adaptation could render its military technology obsolete before the end of the initial skirmishes, leaving its forces vulnerable and outmatched.
To ensure the continued relevance of U.S. military capabilities, a fundamental reimagining of defense acquisition and field operations is necessary—one that embraces adaptability, agility, and a focus on outcomes rather than products. Such an approach involves a trio of interconnected strategies: shifting from product-based contracts to outcome-oriented service contracts, embedding engineers on the frontlines for real-time tactical innovation, and developing distributed, expeditionary manufacturing capabilities. By reorienting its defense posture along these lines, the United States can not only keep pace with adversaries but also reclaim a position of strategic and operational superiority.
TABLE – Ukraine’s advancements in this domain
| Aspect | Details |
|---|---|
| Production Scale | As of October 2024, Ukraine produced 1.28 million drones, with an additional 366,940 expected by year’s end, totaling approximately 1.65 million units for 2024. Difesa UA |
| Manufacturing Growth | The drone production capacity increased tenfold in 2024 compared to 2023, attributed to investments up to $50 million and the involvement of around 200 companies in UAV production. Pravda |
| Diversity of Models | The number of domestically produced drone models approved for use expanded from 7 in 2022 to 67 in 2024, indicating a significant diversification in drone capabilities. Pravda |
| Distributed Manufacturing | Utilizing a decentralized production model, Ukraine has engaged numerous private companies and individual contributors, facilitating rapid scaling and innovation in drone technology. Jamestown |
| International Collaboration | Ukraine collaborates with countries such as the U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Poland, Czechia, Denmark, and Türkiye in joint manufacturing efforts, enhancing technological exchange and production efficiency. Jamestown |
| Technological Integration | The integration of AI and advanced software in drones has improved target detection and operational efficiency, with models like the AI-enabled Saker drone being approved for combat use. |
| Operational Impact | The mass production and deployment of drones have provided Ukraine with strategic advantages in surveillance, reconnaissance, and combat operations, allowing for effective responses to adversarial tactics. Jamestown |
This comprehensive overview illustrates how Ukraine’s adoption of distributed production methodologies has transformed its defense capabilities, setting a precedent for modern warfare strategies.
The Shortcomings of the Traditional Acquisition Model and the Need for Evolution
The shortcomings of the traditional defense acquisition model are increasingly evident in a rapidly evolving technological landscape. Historically, the United States has relied on a centralized, top-down approach to the acquisition of military technologies. This model is deeply rooted in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process, a system designed to ensure that every piece of equipment, every weapon, and every platform is meticulously specified, rigorously tested, and guaranteed to meet the exacting standards required by the armed forces. While this process undoubtedly produces high-quality results, it is also cumbersome, slow, and ill-suited to the demands of a modern, fast-paced battlefield environment.
To appreciate the scale of the problem, consider the timeframes involved in the JCIDS process. On average, this requirements process takes two years to complete, after which additional time is required to select a manufacturer, scale up production, and ultimately field the equipment. In many cases, the entire cycle—from initial identification of a need to the final delivery of a solution—can take upwards of a decade. This was exemplified by the U.S. Army’s procurement of a new sidearm, a process that spanned more than nine years and involved over 350 pages of specifications. By the time a new piece of equipment is fielded, it may already be obsolete, particularly in an environment where commercial off-the-shelf technologies are advancing at breakneck speed.
Adversaries have recognized this vulnerability and are increasingly leveraging commercially available technologies to gain an edge on the battlefield. Advances in drones, 3-D printing, and space-based imagery have made it possible for state and non-state actors alike to quickly adapt their capabilities, bypassing the traditional defense acquisition model in favor of a more agile approach. The conflict in Ukraine offers a clear illustration of this phenomenon: Ukrainian forces initially employed first-person-view drones to ram Russian drones out of the sky, prompting Russian forces to develop new tactics to counter this threat. In response, Ukrainian forces began equipping their drones with munitions and developing AI-based targeting systems, which led Russian operators to experiment with dazzle paint schemes to evade detection. This rapid cycle of innovation and counter-innovation highlights the pace at which modern adversaries are capable of adapting—a pace that the traditional U.S. acquisition model simply cannot match.
In contrast to this slow and rigid model, modern conflicts demand an acquisition approach that is as dynamic and adaptable as the battlefield itself. The United States must move beyond the product-based acquisition of specific technologies and instead focus on acquiring capabilities as services. By doing so, the military can ensure that its capabilities evolve in tandem with the changing demands of the battlefield, rather than being locked into static, outdated solutions.
| Country/Organization | Initiative | Details |
|---|---|---|
| United States Department of Defense (DoD) | Additive Manufacturing (AM) Strategy | The DoD has implemented a comprehensive AM strategy to incorporate 3D printing technologies across military operations, aiming to improve production speed and flexibility. |
| Australian Army | Deployment of SPEE3D Technology | The Australian Army utilizes SPEE3D’s cold spray 3D printing technology to produce metal parts rapidly in the field, enhancing logistical efficiency and equipment maintenance. |
| British Army | Project Brokkr | The British Army employs 3D printing technology within mobile units to fabricate components for aging military vehicles, addressing supply chain challenges and reducing repair times. |
| French Defense Industry | Scaling Up Production | In response to increased demand, French defense companies like Nexter Systems have accelerated production of military equipment, such as Caesar self-propelled howitzers, by streamlining manufacturing processes. |
| Anduril Industries (USA) | Arsenal Manufacturing Platform | Anduril Industries has developed ‘Arsenal,’ a manufacturing platform designed to produce tens of thousands of autonomous weapons annually, leveraging AI and advanced manufacturing techniques. |
| Indian Government and Tata Advanced Systems | Private Military Aircraft Production | India inaugurated its first private military aircraft manufacturing plant in collaboration with Tata Advanced Systems and Airbus Spain, aiming to produce C-295 transport aircraft domestically. |
| Sciaky, Inc. (USA) | Electron Beam Additive Manufacturing (EBAM) | Sciaky, Inc. specializes in EBAM technology, producing large-scale metal components for aerospace and defense applications, including parts for the F-35 fighter jet. |
| European Defence Agency (EDA) | Additive Manufacturing in Defense | The EDA explores the use of additive manufacturing to reduce the logistical footprint of armed forces, focusing on rapid, localized production of parts during missions. |
These examples illustrate the global adoption of distributed manufacturing methodologies in the defense sector, enhancing operational efficiency and responsiveness to emerging threats.
Acquiring Services Over Products: A Shift Towards Outcomes-Based Contracts
One of the most fundamental changes required in U.S. defense acquisition is a shift from product-based contracts to outcome-oriented service contracts. Rather than specifying the exact nature of a solution—including its dimensions, capabilities, and components—the requirements process should instead focus on the desired end state. This shift would allow the U.S. military to specify what it wants to achieve—such as the ability to maintain air superiority in a contested environment—rather than how to achieve it.
Consider, for example, the use of drones in modern warfare. Rather than specifying the exact type of drone required, including its payload, sensors, and range, an outcomes-based approach would define the desired capability: the ability to clear adversarial drones from a given airspace. This would allow contractors to propose and develop a wide range of possible solutions, which could then be continuously adapted and updated to meet the changing requirements of the battlefield. Such an approach is inherently more flexible, allowing for the integration of new technologies and tactics as they become available, rather than being constrained by the initial specifications of a product-based contract.
The concept of acquiring capabilities as a service is not entirely new to the U.S. military. During the Global War on Terror, for example, Predator drones were operated by General Atomics contractors, providing a capability that could be continuously adapted to meet the needs of the military. More recently, the U.S. Coast Guard awarded Shield AI a contract to provide surveillance and reconnaissance as a service using its V-BAT platform. Similarly, Metrea, a company that describes itself as providing “effects as a service,” has a contract with U.S. Naval Air Systems Command to conduct aerial refueling operations for U.S. and allied aircraft. These examples demonstrate that the concept of acquiring capabilities as a service is both feasible and effective, and that it can provide a level of flexibility and adaptability that is simply not possible with product-based contracts.
Programs such as TITAN represent a step in the right direction, moving towards the fielding of hardware that is inherently software-defined and therefore primed for rapid adaptation. However, even TITAN remains too solution-oriented for the future fight. The requirements and contract structure for TITAN should have been designed with an outcomes-based approach in mind, laying the groundwork for replacing it with a more adaptable system as soon as battlefield conditions necessitate. Only an outcomes-oriented approach provides the foundation for infinite adaptation, ensuring that U.S. military capabilities can evolve as quickly as the battlefield demands.
Embedding Engineers on the Frontlines: Real-Time Adaptation Through Proximity
In addition to changing the way capabilities are acquired, the U.S. military must also change the way it develops and adapts those capabilities in the field. One of the most significant changes required is the embedding of engineers on the frontlines, working side by side with warfighters to develop and adapt technologies in real time. This approach transforms engineers from distant, disconnected developers into integral parts of the tactical team, enabling a level of responsiveness that aligns with the unpredictable nature of modern warfare.
The concept of embedding engineers on the frontlines is not entirely novel. Companies like Palantir have long relied on forward-deployed engineers to help end users get the most out of their platforms. These engineers work directly with users—often in conflict zones—to understand their needs, adapt the technology to meet those needs, and provide real-time support. This approach has proven highly effective, allowing Palantir to continuously improve its platform based on the feedback and experiences of its users.
In the context of military operations, embedding engineers on the frontlines would provide a similar level of adaptability. Engineers working directly with warfighters would be able to observe how equipment is used in the field, identify problems, and develop solutions on the spot. This would not only improve the effectiveness of the equipment but also ensure that it evolves in response to the changing conditions of the battlefield.
The importance of real-time adaptation cannot be overstated. In a modern conflict, the ability to quickly adapt to an adversary’s tactics can mean the difference between victory and defeat. By embedding engineers on the frontlines, the U.S. military can ensure that its equipment and capabilities are continuously evolving, rather than remaining static and vulnerable to adversarial adaptation.
There are, of course, risks associated with embedding engineers on the frontlines. The most obvious risk is the potential for casualties among civilian contractors, who may not have the same level of training or experience as military personnel. However, this risk must be weighed against the potential benefits of real-time adaptation. In a future conflict with a peer adversary, the ability to adapt quickly may be more important than the risk to individual personnel. Moreover, as has been demonstrated by war correspondents and Palantir’s forward-deployed engineers, there are individuals who are willing to take on this risk in order to contribute to the mission. The time has come for the United States to recognize that the challenges of modern warfare require an all-of-nation effort, and that means embedding engineers on the frontlines to ensure that U.S. forces have the capabilities they need to succeed.
Expeditionary Manufacturing: Closing the Gap Between Innovation and Implementation
The third pillar of a more adaptive defense posture is the development of expeditionary manufacturing capabilities—moving the means of production closer to the point of need. Traditional manufacturing, which often takes place in centralized factories far removed from the battlefield, is slow and inflexible. The process of designing, prototyping, testing, and manufacturing new equipment can take months or even years, during which time the battlefield conditions may have changed significantly. In contrast, expeditionary manufacturing allows for rapid prototyping, testing, and production of adapted technologies, shortening the feedback loop and ensuring that new solutions can be delivered to the frontlines in a matter of days rather than months.
Expeditionary manufacturing can take many forms, from mobile manufacturing units housed in shipping containers to forward-deployed factories on decommissioned naval vessels. For example, Firestorm, a company that produces modular small unmanned aerial systems, has developed a manufacturing process that can be housed in a shipping container and prepositioned near the point of need. This allows for rapid hardware and software modifications, ensuring that the systems can be adapted to meet the specific requirements of the battlefield. The U.S. military should develop similar capabilities across all platforms and mission sets, ensuring that it has the ability to rapidly adapt to changing conditions.
The U.S. Navy has already begun experimenting with 3-D printing on ships, demonstrating the potential for expeditionary manufacturing in a maritime environment. Similarly, the U.S. Air Force could explore the use of C-5 aircraft as mobile manufacturing hubs, capable of deploying to forward operating bases to support ground operations. The specific platform used for expeditionary manufacturing will vary depending on the theater of operations, but the underlying principle is the same: by moving the means of production closer to the frontlines, the U.S. military can ensure that it has the ability to rapidly develop and field new capabilities in response to changing conditions.
Expeditionary manufacturing also has the potential to address one of the most significant logistical challenges facing the U.S. military: the length and complexity of its supply chains. In a major conflict, the ability to rapidly resupply forces with the equipment and munitions they need is critical to maintaining operational momentum. By developing forward-deployed manufacturing capabilities, the U.S. military can reduce its reliance on long and vulnerable supply lines, ensuring that it has the ability to sustain operations even in contested environments.
A New Paradigm for Defense: Defense as a Service
The combination of outcomes-based acquisition, embedded engineers, and expeditionary manufacturing represents a fundamentally new paradigm for defense—a model that can be described as “Defense as a Service.” In this model, the focus is not on acquiring specific products or technologies but on acquiring capabilities that can be continuously adapted to meet the needs of the battlefield. This approach is inherently more flexible, allowing the military to respond to changes in the tactical environment in real time, rather than being constrained by the limitations of a product-based acquisition model.
Defense as a Service also represents a shift in the relationship between the military and its contractors. In a traditional product-based model, contractors are responsible for delivering a specific product, after which their involvement largely ends. In a service-based model, contractors become partners in the ongoing process of adaptation and innovation. They are responsible not only for delivering a capability but also for ensuring that it continues to meet the needs of the military as those needs evolve. This shift requires a new approach to contracting, one that emphasizes flexibility, adaptability, and a focus on outcomes rather than specifications.
The benefits of Defense as a Service are numerous. By focusing on outcomes rather than products, the U.S. military can ensure that it has the capabilities it needs to succeed in a rapidly changing environment. By embedding engineers on the frontlines, it can ensure that those capabilities are continuously adapted to meet the needs of the battlefield. And by developing expeditionary manufacturing capabilities, it can ensure that new solutions can be delivered to the frontlines in a matter of days rather than months. Together, these approaches provide the foundation for a more adaptive, resilient, and effective military—one that is capable of outpacing its adversaries in the race for adaptation.
The traditional defense acquisition model, with its focus on rigid specifications and lengthy development cycles, is ill-suited to the demands of modern warfare. In an environment where adversaries can adapt their tactics and technologies within weeks or even days, the U.S. military cannot afford to be constrained by a process that takes years to field new capabilities. Instead, it must embrace a new paradigm—one that is focused on outcomes, adaptability, and a continuous process of innovation.
The concept of Defense as a Service represents a fundamental shift in the way the U.S. military acquires and fields capabilities. It is a model that recognizes the need for flexibility, agility, and a focus on outcomes rather than products. It is a model that leverages the expertise of contractors not just as suppliers but as partners in the ongoing process of adaptation and innovation. And it is a model that ensures that the U.S. military has the capabilities it needs to succeed in a rapidly changing environment.
As the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated, the pace of adaptation on the modern battlefield is faster than ever before. Adversaries are leveraging commercially available technologies to develop new tactics and capabilities, and they are doing so in a matter of weeks or even days. In this environment, the traditional defense acquisition model is simply too slow. The U.S. military must be able to adapt at the same pace as its adversaries, if not faster, and that requires a fundamentally new approach to defense acquisition and field operations.
By embracing Defense as a Service, the U.S. military can ensure that it is prepared for the challenges of modern warfare. It can ensure that it has the ability to rapidly develop, field, and adapt capabilities in response to changing conditions. And it can ensure that it remains a step ahead of its adversaries in the race for adaptation—a race that, in the end, may determine the outcome of future conflicts.
Embedding Engineers on the Battlefield: Lessons from Ukraine and Historical Precedents
The notion of embedding engineers directly on the battlefield is a radical departure from traditional defense operational structures, but it is also a necessary one if the United States hopes to maintain technological superiority in an era defined by rapid adaptation and fluid battle dynamics. The concept revolves around placing those individuals most capable of adapting systems and solutions—the engineers—directly within the sphere of conflict where the systems are being employed. This eliminates the often-bureaucratic feedback loop that involves field observations being communicated back to the central engineering teams before necessary modifications are implemented. Instead, solutions are conceived, designed, tested, and implemented directly at the front, thereby vastly compressing the timelines for battlefield adaptation.
To understand the significance of embedding engineers, it is instructive to examine both historical precedents and modern developments. During World War II, the operational adaptability of U.S. forces was partly attributed to the presence of mechanics, technicians, and engineers within mobile units. These specialists were capable of conducting in-field repairs and modifications, particularly for the Sherman tanks used in Europe and North Africa. Although the technology of the time was less sophisticated compared to today’s high-tech battlefield, the principle was the same: enabling rapid innovation at the point of need to overcome emerging challenges.
Fast forward to the conflict in Ukraine, which has highlighted the incredible benefits of real-time, proximal engineering. Ukrainian forces, often operating at significant disadvantages in terms of resources compared to Russian forces, have leveraged the power of on-the-ground modification to turn civilian drones into potent military assets, outfitting them with munitions and upgrading targeting software to improve effectiveness. Engineers embedded with fighting units have been instrumental in enabling this kind of quick adaptation. The rapid development of drone swarms capable of overwhelming Russian defenses is an example of how being able to assess immediate needs and deploy solutions within hours can profoundly alter battlefield outcomes. By ensuring that the individuals capable of implementing these changes are embedded directly with the fighting units, Ukrainian forces have bypassed the traditional delays associated with a central command structure, providing them with an adaptability edge that continues to prove decisive.
The United States military, with its vast resources and advanced technologies, stands to benefit enormously from the adoption of this principle on a broader scale. The presence of forward-deployed engineers not only enables quick fixes and upgrades to hardware systems but also creates a channel for software updates to be implemented in real time. Modern warfare increasingly relies on the integration of software solutions—whether for drone targeting, logistics optimization, or information warfare. Having engineers present on the front lines means software can be updated directly in response to the tactics and strategies of adversaries, allowing U.S. forces to continually modify and improve upon their operational software suites based on real-time battlefield data. This approach mimics how commercial software companies such as Palantir deploy “forward engineers” who work side by side with clients, understanding their needs and adapting software solutions on the fly to meet the evolving requirements of the user.
However, embedding engineers within operational units also raises significant challenges that must be overcome for the approach to be feasible and effective. The most immediate concern is the safety of the engineers themselves, as placing them in harm’s way significantly increases their risk of becoming casualties. These engineers, who are civilians and whose skillsets may not necessarily include the survival skills of trained soldiers, would require specialized training to ensure that they can operate effectively in a combat environment while not detracting from the mission focus of the units they are embedded with. Furthermore, logistical support for such embedded personnel would need to be robust—ensuring that engineers have not only the necessary tools and resources to do their jobs but also adequate protection in the form of defensive equipment and the presence of trained security personnel.
Despite these challenges, the potential benefits far outweigh the risks. Embedding engineers provides a level of operational flexibility that the current acquisition model is unable to match. It enables iterative development and rapid prototyping of new solutions that respond directly to adversary adaptations and battlefield conditions. By fostering a culture of real-time responsiveness, the U.S. military could ensure that its warfighters are equipped with the most relevant and up-to-date technologies and tactics—something that is simply not achievable through the traditional, centralized process of defense technology development and acquisition.
The Imperative of Distributed Manufacturing: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Increasing Responsiveness
While embedding engineers is one crucial component of building an adaptive force, another critical aspect is rethinking how military hardware is produced and delivered to the battlefield. Traditionally, military manufacturing has relied on centralized facilities—massive factories located far from conflict zones, where components are meticulously crafted, assembled, and tested before being shipped to military bases around the world. This centralized model has been a source of efficiency in the production of high-quality equipment but also represents a major vulnerability in the face of increasingly sophisticated threats from peer and near-peer adversaries.
The centralization of manufacturing creates several key vulnerabilities. First, it makes the production process susceptible to disruption, either through physical attacks on the manufacturing facilities themselves or through disruptions to the complex logistics networks required to move finished products from the factory to the frontlines. This vulnerability is especially concerning given the current global geopolitical climate, where supply chain disruptions have become an increasingly common occurrence due to natural disasters, pandemics, and geopolitical tensions. Second, centralized manufacturing creates long lead times between the identification of a need and the deployment of a solution, which is incompatible with the pace of modern warfare, where the tactical environment can change dramatically in the span of days or even hours.
The solution to these challenges lies in distributed, expeditionary manufacturing—bringing the means of production closer to the point of use, enabling rapid prototyping, testing, and fielding of new capabilities in response to real-time needs. Distributed manufacturing has the potential to transform how military capabilities are generated, providing a level of responsiveness that the current model simply cannot achieve. By establishing mobile, modular manufacturing units that can be deployed in theater, the military could drastically shorten the time required to bring new technologies from the drawing board to the battlefield.
Advances in additive manufacturing—commonly known as 3-D printing—have been a game-changer in this regard. The ability to fabricate parts on demand, using raw materials that can be easily transported to forward-deployed locations, means that military units can produce the components they need without waiting for resupply from a central depot. For example, if a new type of drone payload is needed to counter an emerging threat, it could be designed at a central engineering hub, with the design files then transmitted electronically to a forward-deployed manufacturing facility. There, the payload could be fabricated using 3-D printers, assembled, and delivered to the frontlines within a matter of days.
This approach has already been tested in limited capacities, with the U.S. Navy experimenting with 3-D printing on board ships to produce replacement parts for critical systems, reducing the need to carry vast inventories of spare parts or to wait for resupply from shore facilities. Similarly, the U.S. Air Force has begun to explore the concept of using C-5 transport aircraft as mobile manufacturing hubs, capable of deploying to forward operating bases and producing parts and equipment as needed to support ongoing operations.
One of the most compelling examples of distributed manufacturing in action is Firestorm’s approach to modular unmanned aerial systems. Firestorm has developed small drone platforms that can be easily modified using interchangeable components, allowing the drones to be adapted for a variety of mission types. What sets Firestorm apart, however, is its manufacturing model: the company has developed containerized manufacturing units that can be deployed to forward locations, allowing new drones to be produced and modified in close proximity to the point of use. This dramatically reduces the time required to field new capabilities, enabling rapid iteration and adaptation in response to changing battlefield conditions.
The adoption of distributed manufacturing is not without its challenges. First and foremost, there are significant logistical considerations involved in establishing and maintaining forward-deployed manufacturing facilities. These units would need to be equipped with the necessary machinery, raw materials, and technical expertise to produce a wide range of components and systems. They would also need to be mobile and resilient, capable of being relocated quickly in response to changes in the tactical environment and capable of operating under austere conditions.
Moreover, distributed manufacturing requires a shift in mindset for both the military and its contractors. The traditional model of mass production in a central location is deeply ingrained in the defense industrial base, and moving to a more flexible, distributed approach will require significant changes to existing processes and practices. Contractors will need to be willing to develop modular, easily manufacturable designs that can be produced using a variety of methods, rather than relying on the bespoke, highly specialized manufacturing techniques that have characterized much of the defense industry to date.
Nevertheless, the potential benefits of distributed manufacturing are immense. By bringing the means of production closer to the battlefield, the military can ensure that it has the ability to rapidly develop, field, and adapt capabilities in response to changing conditions. This approach not only reduces the logistical burden of transporting finished products from a central factory to the frontlines but also provides a level of flexibility and adaptability that is essential for success in modern warfare.
The Evolution of Military Contracting: From Static Products to Dynamic Services
The shift towards outcomes-based acquisition and Defense as a Service represents a fundamental reimagining of the relationship between the military and its contractors. In the traditional model, the role of contractors has been to deliver a specific product or capability, after which their involvement largely ends. The military specifies what it wants, the contractor builds it, and the military takes delivery. This model has been effective in producing high-quality, reliable equipment, but it is ill-suited to the demands of a rapidly changing battlefield where adaptability and responsiveness are paramount.
In contrast, an outcomes-based approach treats military capabilities as dynamic services that must evolve over time in response to changing needs. Contractors are no longer just suppliers—they are partners in the ongoing process of adaptation and innovation. Their responsibility does not end with the delivery of a product; rather, they are accountable for ensuring that the capability they provide continues to meet the needs of the military as those needs evolve. This requires a new approach to contracting, one that emphasizes flexibility, adaptability, and a focus on outcomes rather than specifications.
One of the key advantages of an outcomes-based approach is that it allows for the continuous improvement of capabilities over time. Rather than being locked into a specific solution that may quickly become outdated, the military can work with contractors to develop, test, and implement incremental improvements in response to battlefield feedback. This iterative approach is more akin to how software is developed and maintained in the commercial sector, where new features and updates are continuously rolled out to meet the changing needs of users.
The TITAN program is an example of how the U.S. military is beginning to embrace this approach. TITAN is a ground-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system that is designed to be highly adaptable, with a software-defined architecture that allows for rapid updates and the integration of new capabilities as they become available. The program represents a significant departure from the traditional model of ISR systems, which have often been characterized by fixed hardware and lengthy development cycles. By adopting a software-defined approach, TITAN is able to evolve in response to the changing needs of the battlefield, providing a level of flexibility and adaptability that is essential for modern warfare.
However, even TITAN falls short of fully embracing an outcomes-based approach. The requirements for the program were still defined in terms of specific capabilities and performance metrics, rather than in terms of the outcomes that the military hopes to achieve. In the future, programs like TITAN should be designed with an outcomes-based approach from the outset, with the goal of providing a capability that can be continuously adapted and improved over time. This requires a fundamental shift in how requirements are defined, how contracts are structured, and how contractors are incentivized to deliver value.
An outcomes-based approach also requires a new way of thinking about risk and accountability. In the traditional model, contractors are responsible for delivering a product that meets the specifications defined by the military. If the product does not perform as expected, the contractor may be held accountable, but the risk is largely borne by the military. In an outcomes-based model, contractors are accountable not only for delivering a product but also for ensuring that the product continues to meet the needs of the military over time. This means that contractors must be willing to take on a greater share of the risk associated with the development and deployment of new capabilities, and they must be incentivized to deliver value over the long term.
One way to achieve this is through the use of performance-based contracts, which tie contractor compensation to the achievement of specific outcomes. Rather than being paid based on the number of units produced or the hours worked, contractors are paid based on the value they deliver to the military. This approach aligns the incentives of the contractor with the goals of the military, ensuring that both parties are working towards the same objectives. Performance-based contracts have been used successfully in the commercial sector, particularly in industries such as aerospace and telecommunications, and they have the potential to transform how military capabilities are acquired and fielded.
The adoption of an outcomes-based approach also has implications for how the military manages its relationships with contractors. In the traditional model, the relationship between the military and its contractors is often adversarial, with each side seeking to maximize its own interests. This can lead to inefficiencies, delays, and a lack of trust between the parties. In contrast, an outcomes-based approach requires a more collaborative relationship, with both parties working together towards a common goal. This requires a level of transparency and trust that is not always present in the current system, but it is essential for the successful implementation of Defense as a Service.
Defense as a Service: A New Vision for Military Capability
The concept of Defense as a Service represents a fundamental shift in how the U.S. military acquires, fields, and maintains its capabilities. It is a model that recognizes the need for flexibility, adaptability, and a focus on outcomes rather than products. It is a model that leverages the expertise of contractors not just as suppliers but as partners in the ongoing process of adaptation and innovation. And it is a model that ensures that the U.S. military has the capabilities it needs to succeed in a rapidly changing environment.
At its core, Defense as a Service is about shifting the focus from products to outcomes. Rather than specifying the exact nature of a solution—including its dimensions, capabilities, and components—the military defines the desired end state and works with contractors to achieve that outcome. This approach allows for the continuous improvement of capabilities over time, ensuring that the military is always equipped with the most relevant and up-to-date technologies and tactics.
The adoption of Defense as a Service also represents a shift in the relationship between the military and its contractors. In a traditional product-based model, contractors are responsible for delivering a specific product, after which their involvement largely ends. In a service-based model, contractors become partners in the ongoing process of adaptation and innovation. They are responsible not only for delivering a capability but also for ensuring that it continues to meet the needs of the military as those needs evolve. This shift requires a new approach to contracting, one that emphasizes flexibility, adaptability, and a focus on outcomes rather than specifications.
The benefits of Defense as a Service are numerous. By focusing on outcomes rather than products, the U.S. military can ensure that it has the capabilities it needs to succeed in a rapidly changing environment. By embedding engineers on the frontlines, it can ensure that those capabilities are continuously adapted to meet the needs of the battlefield. And by developing expeditionary manufacturing capabilities, it can ensure that new solutions can be delivered to the frontlines in a matter of days rather than months. Together, these approaches provide the foundation for a more adaptive, resilient, and effective military—one that is capable of outpacing its adversaries in the race for adaptation.
