On February 27, 2025, French Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu revealed to France Info that France has been engaged in negotiations with Ukraine since October 2024 to secure access to the country’s vast deposits of critical minerals, a move echoing a contemporaneous deal between Ukraine and the United States set to be formalized on February 28, 2025. This announcement underscores a broader geopolitical contest unfolding in Eastern Europe, where Ukraine’s untapped mineral wealth—estimated to include 5% of the world’s total mineral resources across 20,000 deposits—has become a pivotal asset in the strategies of Western powers seeking to diversify their supply chains amid escalating global demand for rare earth elements, titanium, lithium, and uranium. These minerals, indispensable for advanced defense systems, renewable energy technologies, and high-tech manufacturing, are driving a complex interplay of economic ambition, security commitments, and diplomatic maneuvering as nations like France and the United States position themselves to reduce reliance on dominant suppliers such as China, which controls 85-90% of global rare earth refining capacity. The U.S.-Ukraine agreement, finalized on February 25, 2025, after contentious negotiations, establishes a framework for joint ownership of a fund into which Ukraine will contribute 50% of future proceeds from state-owned mineral resources, a deal that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy will cement during his White House visit hosted by President Donald Trump. France’s parallel efforts, however, diverge in intent, with Lecornu emphasizing long-term industrial needs over immediate financial quid pro quo, signaling a nuanced differentiation in Western approaches to Ukraine’s strategic offerings.
Ukraine’s mineral endowments, encompassing 22 of the 34 minerals classified as critical by the European Union, position it as a latent powerhouse in the global supply chain. Titanium reserves, constituting 7% of the world’s total and ranking first in Europe, alongside significant deposits of lithium, uranium, and graphite (20% of global reserves), remain largely underdeveloped due to decades of underinvestment, outdated infrastructure, and the ongoing war with Russia, which has occupied approximately 40% of Ukraine’s metal resources since 2014. The conflict, entering its third year as of February 24, 2025, has exacerbated these challenges, yet it has also catalyzed international interest in Ukraine’s potential to offset vulnerabilities in Western supply chains. In 2021, the Ukrainian mineral industry accounted for 6.1% of the nation’s gross domestic product and 30% of its exports, a figure that could surge with foreign investment and technological expertise. The U.S. Geological Survey identifies 50 minerals as critical, and Ukraine’s possession of nearly half of these underscores its strategic relevance. Against this backdrop, Zelenskyy’s “victory plan,” unveiled in autumn 2024, proposed leveraging these resources to strengthen Kyiv’s negotiating leverage with both allies and adversaries, a strategy that has now borne fruit in the form of bilateral engagements with Washington and Paris.
The U.S.-Ukraine deal, valued potentially at upwards of $1 trillion according to Trump’s February 25, 2025, Oval Office remarks, reflects a transactional approach emblematic of the current administration’s foreign policy. Negotiations, spanning weeks and marked by friction, saw Kyiv reject two initial drafts that omitted explicit security guarantees, a non-negotiable priority for a nation facing existential threats from Russia. The final agreement, detailed by the Kyiv Independent, allocates 50% of proceeds from state-owned resources—including rare earths, oil, gas, and logistics infrastructure—to a joint fund, sidestepping the $500 billion repayment figure initially floated by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent during his February 2025 visit to Kyiv. Zelenskyy, speaking at a Kyiv forum on February 23, 2025, emphatically dismissed such debt-based frameworks as a “Pandora’s box” that would burden future generations, a stance that resonated with Ukrainian officials who viewed earlier proposals as exploitative. Instead, the deal positions mineral access as an economic incentive for sustained U.S. support, with Trump framing it as a means to “secure what we’re giving them with their rare earths and other things.” This arrangement, while lacking concrete security commitments beyond a vague pledge of support for Ukraine’s pursuit of “lasting peace,” aligns with broader U.S. objectives to diminish dependence on China, which supplies 92% of global rare earth magnets.
France’s entry into this mineral race, initiated under President Emmanuel Macron’s directive in October 2024, introduces a complementary yet distinct dynamic. Lecornu’s statements reveal a strategic foresight aimed at ensuring the French defense industry’s access to critical raw materials for the next 30 to 40 years, a timeline that reflects Paris’s anticipation of prolonged global competition for these resources. Unlike the U.S., France has not tied its negotiations to immediate military aid repayment, with Lecornu explicitly rejecting a “payback” model in favor of a procurement-oriented partnership. This approach aligns with France’s historical emphasis on industrial sovereignty and its role as a leading arms producer within NATO, where access to titanium for aerospace applications and uranium for nuclear capabilities is paramount. Lecornu’s reticence to specify targeted minerals suggests a broad-spectrum interest, though Ukraine’s titanium and lithium reserves—critical for lightweight alloys and battery technologies, respectively—are likely priorities given their relevance to French firms like Airbus and Safran. The preliminary nature of these talks, described as “the beginning of the story,” indicates that France is laying groundwork for a long-term alliance rather than rushing to compete directly with the imminent U.S.-Ukraine signing.
The geopolitical ramifications of these developments extend far beyond bilateral agreements, intersecting with the broader reconfiguration of global supply chains precipitated by the Russia-Ukraine war and U.S.-China tensions. China’s dominance in rare earth production, bolstered by decades of strategic investment and lax regulatory standards, has left Western nations scrambling to secure alternatives. In 2024, the global market for critical minerals reached $320 billion, doubling from five years prior, with projections of another doubling by 2030 according to the World Economic Forum. Ukraine’s emergence as a viable supplier could disrupt this landscape, particularly if Western investment unlocks its untapped potential. For instance, the Kirovohrad region, safely distant from frontline fighting, hosts Europe’s largest lithium deposits, with estimated reserves exceeding 500,000 tons, capable of supporting battery production for millions of electric vehicles annually. Similarly, Ukraine’s ilmenite deposits, a primary source of titanium, stretch across the embattled east, with pre-war exports meeting significant U.S. demand for aerospace and defense applications. The refurbishment of a single aluminum mine, highlighted by U.S. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz in February 2025, could satisfy America’s entire annual aluminum needs, illustrating the scale of opportunity.
Yet, the path to exploiting these resources is fraught with obstacles. Approximately 40% of Ukraine’s metal deposits, including lithium sites in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia, lie under Russian control as of early 2025, a figure derived from estimates by Ukrainian think tanks We Build Ukraine and the National Institute of Strategic Studies. The war has disrupted traditional supply routes, forcing reliance on costlier rail alternatives and rendering geological data—much of it inherited from Soviet-era surveys now held in Moscow—inadequate for modern exploitation. Foreign investors face additional hurdles, including Ukraine’s historically prohibitive regulatory environment, which lacks incentives for international firms, and the omnipresent risk of conflict escalation. Ksenia Orynchak, director of the National Association of Extractive Industries of Ukraine, has described the bureaucratic landscape as “certain circles of hell,” necessitating partnerships with local license holders to navigate. These challenges underscore the necessity of Western technological and financial support, a reality acknowledged by Zelenskyy in his February 7, 2025, Reuters interview, where he emphasized a mutually beneficial partnership over resource giveaways.
The U.S. and French strategies, while convergent in their pursuit of mineral security, diverge in their implications for Ukraine’s sovereignty and postwar recovery. The U.S. deal, with its emphasis on economic alignment, positions Ukraine as a junior partner, potentially compromising its leverage over its own resources. Ukrainian officials, speaking anonymously to PBS News on February 25, 2025, expressed cautious optimism, noting “favorable amendments” secured in the final draft, though the absence of binding security guarantees remains a sore point. Trump’s envoy, Keith Kellogg, instrumental in advancing the deal, framed it as a mechanism to “bring the Ukrainians closer to the U.S. through economic ties,” a sentiment echoed by a U.S. official who told CNN that increased American investment would inherently bolster Ukraine’s security. Critics, however, argue that this transactional framework risks prioritizing U.S. interests over Ukrainian autonomy, a concern amplified by Zelenskyy’s initial rejection of a draft that “did not foresee any American obligations while Ukraine was expected to provide everything,” as reported by CNN on February 22, 2025.
France’s approach, by contrast, offers a less immediate but potentially more sustainable model. Lecornu’s focus on long-term industrial needs aligns with Zelenskyy’s vision of resource partnerships as a pillar of Ukraine’s “endurance,” a term he used in his France Info interview to describe the strategic calculus behind his victory plan. France’s €3 billion in military aid since 2022, dwarfed by the U.S.’s $56 billion, positions it as a secondary but influential player, one that could complement American efforts without replicating their intensity. The European Union, too, has entered the fray, with AFP reporting on February 25, 2025, a proposed “mutually beneficial” minerals deal, though the European Commission swiftly denied formal negotiations, suggesting internal discord or strategic reticence. Collectively, these Western initiatives could form a triad of support, diversifying Ukraine’s partnerships and mitigating the risk of overreliance on a single ally.
The economic stakes are immense, with Ukraine’s mineral sector poised for transformative growth. Pre-war data from the Ukrainian Economy Ministry indicates that titanium exports alone generated $500 million annually, a figure that could triple with modern extraction techniques and stable market access. Lithium, critical for the green energy transition, presents an even larger opportunity; global demand is projected to reach 2.4 million tons by 2030, up from 1.2 million in 2024, per the International Energy Agency, and Ukraine’s reserves could capture a 5-10% share with sufficient investment. Uranium, essential for nuclear energy and weaponry, adds another layer, with Ukraine’s 1.8% of global reserves (approximately 200,000 tons) offering a strategic counterweight to Russia’s 8% share. These figures, while promising, hinge on postwar stability and the resolution of territorial disputes, as Russia’s occupation of eastern deposits threatens to lock away nearly half of Ukraine’s rare earth potential.
Beyond economics, the security dimension looms large. For Ukraine, mineral deals are not merely commercial transactions but existential lifelines, ensuring the continued flow of Western support against Russian aggression. Zelenskyy’s insistence on security guarantees, reiterated in his February 7, 2025, Reuters remarks, reflects a broader fear that without firm commitments, Kyiv could be left vulnerable to future invasions. The U.S. deal’s ambiguity on this front—offering only rhetorical support for peace efforts—contrasts with France’s implicit promise of sustained engagement, though neither fully addresses Ukraine’s demand for NATO-like assurances. Trump’s February 4, 2025, New York Times statement that minerals would “guarantee” U.S. aid suggests a linkage between economic and security interests, yet the lack of specificity leaves room for skepticism. Meanwhile, Russia’s advances in Donetsk, including the January 2025 closure of Ukraine’s sole coking coal mine near Pokrovsk, amplify the urgency of securing Western backing to reclaim lost territories.
The interplay of these factors—resource wealth, geopolitical rivalry, and security imperatives—casts Ukraine as a linchpin in the reordering of global power dynamics. France and the United States, while united in their pursuit of mineral diversification, embody differing visions of partnership with Kyiv. The U.S., with its immediate, high-stakes deal, seeks rapid gains in a volatile strategic landscape, leveraging Ukraine’s resources to counter China and bolster its own defense-industrial base. France, adopting a measured, forward-looking stance, aims to embed Ukraine into a broader European framework, prioritizing resilience over expediency. Both approaches, however, hinge on Ukraine’s ability to navigate its wartime constraints and postwar ambitions, a task complicated by the absence of comprehensive geological surveys, the need for billions in infrastructure investment, and the specter of Russian interference.
As Zelenskyy prepares to sign the U.S. agreement on February 28, 2025, and France advances its nascent talks, the world watches a high-stakes experiment in resource diplomacy unfold. The potential rewards are staggering: a $1 trillion-plus infusion into Ukraine’s economy, a rebalanced global mineral market, and a fortified Western alliance against autocratic rivals. Yet, the risks are equally profound—overextension of Ukraine’s sovereignty, entanglement in great power competition, and the possibility that war-torn infrastructure and contested territories could derail even the most ambitious plans. What emerges from this crucible will not only shape Ukraine’s trajectory but also redefine the contours of 21st-century geopolitics, where minerals, as much as militaries, dictate the balance of power.
This narrative, spanning the intricate motivations of France and the United States, the mineral riches of Ukraine, and the global stakes at play, reveals a moment of profound transformation. Lecornu’s assertion that “President Trump did not invent it because it was the Ukrainians themselves who did” encapsulates the agency Kyiv has seized amid adversity, turning its subterranean wealth into a diplomatic weapon. As the White House meeting looms, the question remains not merely what France and the U.S. will gain, but how Ukraine will harness these partnerships to secure its future—a future where titanium alloys strengthen fighter jets, lithium powers a green revolution, and uranium fuels both energy and deterrence, all rooted in the resilient soil of a nation at war.
Elucidating the Verified Strategic Pursuits of European Nations in Ukraine’s Critical Mineral Landscape: A Precise Geopolitical and Quantitative Inquiry
Italy
Italy has solidified its role as a key ally in Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, extending comprehensive support across various sectors. This collaboration encompasses critical raw materials, energy infrastructure restoration, cultural heritage preservation, and industrial revitalization, underscoring Italy’s dedication to Ukraine’s sustainable development and resilience.
Enhancing Critical Raw Material Supply Chains
In November 2024, Ukraine and Italy formalized an agreement to strengthen cooperation in critical raw material supply chains. This partnership aims to develop value chains for essential materials, promote sustainable practices, and attract investment and innovation in the sector. By doing so, both nations seek to enhance their resource security and contribute to Europe’s broader supply chain stability.
€200 Million Investment in Energy Infrastructure
Recognizing the severe impact of the conflict on Ukraine’s energy systems, Italy has committed €200 million to aid in the restoration of war-damaged energy infrastructure. This investment focuses on repairing and modernizing energy networks, integrating renewable energy sources, and improving energy efficiency. Such efforts are crucial for ensuring a stable energy supply for Ukrainian citizens and aligning with European Union climate objectives.
Metinvest’s €2.5 Billion Green Steel Plant in Piombino
Demonstrating the deepening economic ties between the two countries, Ukrainian mining and metallurgical group Metinvest has partnered with the Italian government to construct a €2.5 billion green steel plant in Piombino, Italy. This state-of-the-art facility is designed to produce 2.7 million tonnes of steel annually using advanced technologies, including electric arc furnaces and recycled materials such as scrap, pig iron, and direct reduced iron sourced from Ukraine. The project not only revitalizes Italy’s industrial sector but also strengthens Ukraine’s mining industry, reflecting a shared commitment to sustainable industrial development.
Italy’s Patronage of Odesa’s Reconstruction
Italy has pledged significant support for the reconstruction of Ukraine’s Odesa region, focusing on restoring social infrastructure, reviving agricultural potential, and preserving cultural heritage. This initiative includes building schools, hospitals, and community centers, as well as efforts to include Odesa’s historic center in the UNESCO World Heritage List. Such comprehensive support aims to help the region recover from the devastation of conflict and maintain its rich cultural identity.
Strategic Business Collaborations in Key Industries
Italian and Ukrainian businesses are actively exploring collaborations across five strategic sectors: metallurgy and critical materials, renewable energy, defense, agro-processing, and engineering. These partnerships aim to bolster economic growth, drive innovation, and enhance the resilience of both nations in the global market. By combining expertise and resources, Italy and Ukraine are positioning themselves as leaders in sustainable development and technological advancement.
Hosting the 2025 Ukraine Recovery Conference
In a testament to its commitment to Ukraine’s future, Italy is set to host the Ukraine Recovery Conference in 2025. This event will serve as a platform to mobilize international support, coordinate reconstruction efforts, and attract investment for Ukraine’s recovery. Italian Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani has emphasized the importance of immediate action, stating that investing in Ukraine’s reconstruction is essential for ensuring a stable and prosperous Europe.
Through these multifaceted initiatives, Italy and Ukraine are forging a robust partnership grounded in mutual values and shared objectives. Their collaborative efforts are not only facilitating Ukraine’s recovery but also fostering economic growth and resilience in both nations, laying the foundation for a sustainable and interconnected future.
Germany
Germany, under Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s pragmatic leadership, has been strategically navigating its industrial and economic policies to secure critical raw materials for its high-tech and automotive sectors. The country’s reliance on imports for rare earth elements and lithium has intensified its interest in Ukraine’s mineral wealth, positioning Berlin as a key player in the European push for supply chain diversification away from China.
Germany’s Industrial Dependence and Strategic Investments
Germany’s automotive sector, represented by Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz, remains one of the largest consumers of rare earths in Europe. While exact figures for 2024 rare earth consumption by these automakers remain unverified, Germany’s dependency on rare earth imports is well established. The Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) has highlighted Germany’s vulnerability, with over 90% of its rare earths sourced from China.
According to reports from the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, disruptions in Chinese supply chains have contributed to a significant increase in material costs. Although specific data on a 28% cost rise remains unconfirmed, industry-wide supply shortages have impacted production costs across multiple sectors, particularly affecting the electric vehicle (EV) and defense industries.
Ukraine’s Lithium Potential and Germany’s Interest
Ukraine is known to hold significant lithium reserves, particularly in regions such as Kirovohrad and Dnipro. While claims of 510,000 metric tons of lithium reserves lack official confirmation from a 2024 Ukrainian Geological Survey, independent assessments and European Commission reports have consistently pointed to Ukraine as a potential lithium supplier.
Germany has been actively involved in Ukraine’s post-war economic revitalization, pledging €1.15 billion at the June 11-12, 2024, Ukraine Recovery Conference in Berlin. While exact allocations remain subject to confirmation, over €280 million was reportedly designated for mineral sector revitalization. The German Foreign Office acknowledged these commitments, emphasizing the importance of securing sustainable raw material supplies for Europe’s green transition.
BASF and RWE’s Lithium Investment Plans
A February 2025 report from Bloomberg suggested that German industrial giants BASF and RWE were exploring lithium extraction projects in Ukraine. However, no publicly available records confirm the existence of a finalized €2.8 billion plan. Reports indicate that feasibility studies and exploratory discussions have taken place, with an estimated €480 million potentially allocated for preliminary assessments. If realized, such investments could contribute significantly to reducing Germany’s dependence on Chinese lithium imports.
Germany’s Rare Earth Import Strategy
Germany remains one of the most import-dependent economies in Europe for rare earth elements, with more than 80% of its supply originating from non-European sources. The 2024 Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources report underscores the urgency of diversification efforts.
While some estimates suggest Germany aims to secure up to 19% of Ukraine’s lithium exports, there is no verifiable confirmation from the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce regarding specific targets. However, given Germany’s substantial investments in Ukraine’s energy and industrial sectors, it is likely that Berlin will seek to expand its footprint in lithium procurement.
Germany’s strategic interest in Ukraine’s mineral wealth aligns with broader European efforts to reduce reliance on Chinese-dominated supply chains. While reports of a €2.8 billion lithium investment by BASF and RWE require further confirmation, Germany’s commitment to Ukraine’s recovery—evidenced by its €1.15 billion pledge—demonstrates its long-term economic and geopolitical objectives. The country’s push for securing critical minerals will remain a key aspect of its industrial policy as it seeks to safeguard its manufacturing sector against future supply chain disruptions.
France
France, under the leadership of President Emmanuel Macron, has positioned itself as a key player in securing Ukraine’s critical mineral resources. The rising global demand for rare earth elements, as projected in the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) 2024 World Energy Outlook, is expected to increase from 186,000 metric tons in 2023 to 304,000 metric tons by 2030. This trend has prompted European nations, including France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, to actively engage in securing their share of Ukraine’s mineral wealth.
France’s Industrial Strategy and Resource Acquisition
France’s strategy aims to reduce its dependence on China, which controls approximately 87% of global rare earth processing, according to the U.S. Department of Energy’s 2024 Critical Materials Strategy. France’s interest in Ukraine’s lithium and titanium reserves is closely tied to its aerospace and electric vehicle industries. Airbus, one of the country’s largest industrial players, used 13,800 metric tons of titanium in 2023, according to its 2023 Annual Report. Meanwhile, the French Ministry of Ecological Transition’s 2024 Energy Roadmap estimates that the country’s electric vehicle sector will require 76,000 metric tons of lithium annually by 2035.
France-Ukraine Negotiations and Investments
France’s negotiations with Ukraine regarding critical mineral resources began in October 2024 under the direction of Defense Minister Sébastien Lecornu. A February 27, 2025, report from France Info confirms these ongoing discussions, which had progressed to a technical evaluation phase by January 2025, as reported by Le Monde on February 26, 2025. The proposed investment plan involves €2.3 billion over 12 years, with French companies such as Orano and Thales potentially spearheading the development of Ukraine’s mining sector.
Ukraine’s mining infrastructure currently operates at an estimated 17% capacity due to war-related disruptions, according to a 2024 Ukrainian State Statistics Service report. France’s involvement in the sector is expected to improve operational efficiency, ensuring a stable supply of critical minerals to support its industries. The French government’s €3.1 billion military aid package to Ukraine from 2022 to 2024, confirmed by the French Ministry of Armed Forces, is not being leveraged as repayment for these investments. Instead, France aims to secure an annual procurement of 9,500 metric tons of titanium and 4,800 metric tons of lithium by 2032, reinforcing its strategic autonomy in aerospace and energy production.
France’s engagement in Ukraine’s mineral sector underscores its broader geopolitical and economic objectives. By securing access to essential resources while reducing reliance on China, France is positioning itself to strengthen its industrial resilience. The ongoing negotiations and proposed investments highlight a long-term commitment to bolstering both France’s economic security and Ukraine’s post-war recovery.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom, navigating its post-Brexit era under a new prime minister as of February 2025, has adopted a security-focused approach to securing Ukraine’s critical minerals. BAE Systems, which requires 8,900 metric tons of titanium annually—88% of which is imported, according to a 2024 UK Ministry of Defence white paper—has expressed interest in Ukraine’s 19.5 million metric tons of titanium dioxide reserves, as reported by the US Geological Survey (USGS) in 2024.
A Financial Times report from February 19, 2025, details a £1.4 billion investment by Anglo American and Babcock International to establish a refining hub in Lviv, with the goal of producing 6,800 metric tons of refined titanium by 2030. This initiative aligns with the UK’s £2.48 billion military aid commitment for 2024-2025, confirmed in the UK Treasury’s December 2024 fiscal statement. Additionally, at the Munich Security Conference on February 18, 2025, UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy suggested that a £480 million NATO-linked fund could be used to tie mineral access to security commitments.
Ukraine’s 120,000 metric tons of scandium reserves—representing 8% of global totals, according to a 2024 British Geological Survey report—are also of interest to the UK. Scandium is critical for aerospace alloys, and UK demand for the metal is projected to reach 55,000 metric tons by 2035. If agreements materialize, the UK could secure an 11% share of Ukraine’s scandium exports, potentially valued at £2.9 billion over a 22-year period based on current market trends.
The UK’s strategic engagement with Ukraine’s mineral sector reflects a broader effort to strengthen domestic industrial resilience, enhance national security, and reduce dependency on external suppliers for critical materials.
