In 2024, central banks across the globe collectively amassed 1,044.6 metric tons (MT) of gold, marking the third consecutive year in which purchases exceeded the 1,000 MT threshold, as reported by the World Gold Council (WGC). This remarkable milestone underscores a profound shift in the strategic priorities of monetary authorities, reflecting a more than twofold increase in the volume of gold acquisitions between 2021 and 2024. The share of gold in global gold and foreign exchange reserves has correspondingly risen, climbing from 12.9% in late 2021 to 15.3% by the end of 2023, and reaching an unprecedented 18.4% by the close of 2024. This escalation is not merely a statistical anomaly but a deliberate response to an intricate web of economic, geopolitical, and financial pressures reshaping the international monetary landscape. Forecasts from the WGC, supported by a 2024 survey indicating that 81% of central bankers anticipate further increases in global gold reserves over the ensuing 12 months, suggest that this trend is poised to persist, positioning central bank demand as a pivotal driver of gold markets in the foreseeable future. Among the nations leading this accumulation, the United States holds the largest stockpile at 8,133.46 MT, followed by Germany with 3,351.53 MT, Italy with 2,451.84 MT, France with 2,437 MT, Russia with 2,332.74 MT, China with 2,279.56 MT, Switzerland with 1,039.94 MT, India with 876.18 MT, Japan with 845.97 MT, and the Netherlands with 612.45 MT. These figures, meticulously compiled from authoritative sources such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the WGC, illuminate the scale and scope of this phenomenon, inviting a deeper exploration into its origins, mechanisms, and long-term ramifications.
The resurgence of gold as a cornerstone of central bank reserves traces its roots to a confluence of factors that have intensified since the early 21st century. Historically, gold served as the bedrock of the international monetary system under the gold standard, which prevailed until its abandonment in 1971 with the collapse of the Bretton Woods framework. In the decades that followed, central banks gradually reduced their reliance on the metal, favoring fiat currencies—chiefly the U.S. dollar—as the dominant medium for international reserves. By the late 1990s, gold’s share of global reserves had dwindled to below 10%, a reflection of confidence in dollar-denominated assets and the stability of the post-Cold War economic order. However, the financial crisis of 2008 marked a turning point, exposing vulnerabilities in this arrangement. The subsequent expansion of quantitative easing by major central banks, coupled with mounting sovereign debt levels and periodic currency devaluations, eroded trust in fiat systems. Against this backdrop, gold reemerged as a hedge against systemic risk, its allure bolstered by its intrinsic value, scarcity, and immunity to counterparty default. The data bears this out: prior to 2010, central banks were net sellers of gold, offloading an average of 400 MT annually between 1999 and 2009 under the Central Bank Gold Agreement (CBGA). Since 2010, however, they have transitioned to net buyers, accumulating over 8,800 MT in the intervening years, with the pace accelerating dramatically since 2021.
This shift is vividly illustrated by the trajectory of purchases over the past four years. In 2021, central banks acquired 463 MT of gold, a figure that, while significant, pales in comparison to the 1,082 MT purchased in 2022—the highest annual total on record. The following year, 2023, saw a slight decline to 1,037 MT, yet this remained the second-highest annual purchase in history. By 2024, the total reached 1,044.6 MT, cementing a three-year streak of acquisitions exceeding 1,000 MT, a feat unprecedented in modern financial annals. This more than twofold increase from 2021 to 2024 reflects not only a quantitative leap but a qualitative transformation in reserve management strategies. Emerging market central banks, in particular, have driven this surge, accounting for over 80% of net purchases in 2024, according to WGC estimates. The National Bank of Poland (NBP) emerged as the largest single buyer, adding 90 MT to its reserves, elevating its total to 448 MT—equivalent to 17% of its international reserves. The Central Bank of Turkey (CBRT) followed closely, increasing its official gold holdings (inclusive of Treasury stocks) by 75 MT to 589 MT, while the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) augmented its reserves by 73 MT, bringing its total to 876.18 MT, or 11% of its total reserves. These figures, corroborated by IMF IFS data as of December 2024, underscore the prominence of emerging economies in this gold rush, a trend that diverges sharply from the historical dominance of advanced economies in reserve accumulation.
The motivations underpinning this aggressive stockpiling are multifaceted, rooted in both defensive and strategic imperatives. Chief among these is the quest for financial stability amid escalating geopolitical tensions and economic uncertainty. The protracted conflict in Ukraine, initiated in 2022, coupled with trade disputes between the United States and China, has heightened perceptions of risk, prompting central banks to diversify away from dollar-centric reserves. Gold’s role as a long-term store of value and inflation hedge—attributes cited by 85% of respondents in the WGC’s 2024 Central Bank Gold Reserves (CBGR) survey—offers a bulwark against currency volatility and purchasing power erosion. This is particularly salient for emerging markets, many of which face external debt pressures denominated in foreign currencies. For instance, Turkey’s CBRT has leveraged gold to offset the depreciation of the lira, which lost over 30% of its value against the dollar in 2024 alone, according to Bloomberg data. Similarly, India’s RBI has cited gold as a means to bolster confidence in its reserve portfolio, a stance articulated by former Governor Shaktikanta Das in April 2024, when he noted that periodic data releases would reflect ongoing accumulation efforts.
Beyond stability, gold serves as a geopolitical instrument, enabling nations to assert greater autonomy in an increasingly multipolar world. The People’s Bank of China (PBoC), which added 44 MT in 2024 to reach 2,279.56 MT, exemplifies this dynamic. After a six-month hiatus from May to October, the PBoC resumed purchases in November, signaling a calculated approach to reserve diversification amid trade frictions with the West. This aligns with broader trends observed in the WGC’s 2024 survey, where 62% of central bankers expressed optimism about gold’s future share of reserves, up from 46% in 2023, while views on the U.S. dollar grew more pessimistic. The dollar’s proportion of global reserves, which stood at 58.9% in Q4 2021 per IMF COFER data, declined to 54.7% by Q4 2024, a shift partly attributable to gold’s rising prominence. Russia, holding 2,332.74 MT, has similarly prioritized gold to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions, with its reserves now comprising over 25% of total international holdings—a stark increase from 19% in 2021. These examples illustrate how gold transcends its traditional economic function, emerging as a tool of statecraft in a fragmented global order.
The mechanics of this accumulation reveal a sophisticated interplay of policy, timing, and market dynamics. Central banks typically procure gold through a combination of direct purchases from domestic producers, international markets, and, in some cases, repatriation of existing stocks held abroad. The RBI, for instance, repatriated 100 MT from the United Kingdom in 2024, a move that, while not affecting net demand, underscored a preference for physical custody—a sentiment echoed by the Central Bank of Nigeria, which similarly relocated reserves. Poland’s NBP, under the stewardship of President Adam Glapiński, has pursued an explicit target of elevating gold to 20% of its reserves, a goal that, as of December 2024, stands at 17% following its 90 MT acquisition. This ambition, articulated in Glapiński’s public statements, reflects a broader trend among emerging market banks, which added 483 MT in the first half of 2024 alone, per WGC Gold Demand Trends data. Meanwhile, the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), a sovereign wealth fund, augmented its holdings by 25 MT, reaching 127 MT by Q3 2024, with gold constituting nearly 18% of its portfolio—an outlier among official sector institutions, which rarely disclose such activities.
Market conditions have both facilitated and constrained these purchases. The LBMA gold price, a benchmark for central bank transactions, averaged $2,474 per ounce in Q3 2024, a 28% increase year-over-year, before peaking at $2,882 in Q4, according to ICE Benchmark Administration figures. This rally, driven by central bank buying, ETF inflows, and macroeconomic uncertainty, has elevated the cost of accumulation, prompting tactical adjustments. The PBoC, for example, paused purchases between May and October 2024 as prices soared, resuming only when a November dip offered a window of opportunity—adding 5 MT that month. Conversely, the Central Bank of the Philippines sold 18 MT year-to-date through August, capitalizing on high prices to optimize its portfolio without compromising its strategic objectives, as noted in a September 2024 statement. These oscillations highlight a delicate balance: while rising prices amplify gold’s value within reserves—boosting its share from 15.3% to 18.4% between 2023 and 2024—they also test the fiscal capacity of central banks, particularly those in developing economies.
The global distribution of gold reserves further illuminates this narrative. The United States, with 8,133.46 MT, remains the unrivaled leader, its holdings valued at over $630 billion at a $2,200 per ounce price point in Q1 2024, per WGC calculations. Stored primarily in “deep storage” facilities such as Fort Knox, Denver, and West Point, this stockpile represents a legacy of post-World War II economic hegemony, with minimal net purchases in recent decades. Germany’s 3,351.53 MT, held largely at the Bundesbank, reflects a similar stability, though it sold 1 MT in 2024 for coin-minting purposes. In contrast, Italy (2,451.84 MT) and France (2,437 MT) have maintained static reserves, their gold constituting 65% and 60% of total reserves, respectively—a testament to conservative reserve policies among Eurozone nations. Switzerland’s 1,039.94 MT, managed by the Swiss National Bank, positions it as a key player among smaller economies, its gold share steady at 6% of reserves despite a strong franc. Japan (845.97 MT) and the Netherlands (612.45 MT) round out the top ten, their holdings dwarfed by emerging market upstarts like India and Russia, whose aggressive buying reflects a reorientation of global financial power.
This reorientation is not without its detractors. Critics argue that the pivot to gold diverts resources from productive investments, locking capital in a non-yielding asset at a time when infrastructure and technology demand funding. The opportunity cost of Poland’s 90 MT purchase, valued at approximately $260 million at Q4 2024 prices, could have financed significant domestic projects, a point raised by Polish economists in 2024 debates. Yet proponents counter that gold’s liquidity—evidenced by its $382 billion demand value in 2024, per WGC Gold Demand Trends—ensures its utility in crisis scenarios, a view reinforced by its performance during the 2008 downturn, when prices rose 25% amid equity collapses. The WGC’s 2024 CBGR survey bolsters this defense, with 81% of respondents expecting reserve growth, driven by factors such as domestic gold production (e.g., Uzbekistan’s 11 MT addition) and financial market concerns, including inflation rates that hit 6.8% globally in 2024, per IMF estimates.
The broader economic implications of this trend are profound. Central bank purchases, totaling 1,045 MT in 2024 per preliminary WGC data, accounted for 21% of annual gold demand (4,974 MT), eclipsing jewelry (1,877 MT) and technology (326 MT) sectors. This demand, coupled with ETF inflows of 1,180 MT—the highest in four years—propelled gold’s value to a record $382 billion, a 25% increase from 2023. Mine production, up 6% year-over-year to 3,700 MT, and recycling (1,274 MT) struggled to keep pace, tightening supply and amplifying price pressures. A hypothetical chart of quarterly demand illustrates this: Q1 2024 saw 290 MT of central bank purchases, the highest first-quarter total since 2000, followed by 183 MT in Q2, 186 MT in Q3, and a staggering 333 MT in Q4—a surge reflecting year-end strategic stockpiling. This concentration risks market distortions, as smaller buyers, such as jewelers in India (down 2% to 600 MT), face affordability constraints, while Western ETF investors, buoyed by anticipated U.S. rate cuts, reenter the fray after three years of outflows.
Looking ahead, the trajectory of central bank gold accumulation hinges on several variables. The WGC forecasts sustained demand, albeit potentially below the 1,000 MT threshold, as high prices temper buying enthusiasm—a prediction echoed by 29% of CBGR respondents planning increases in 2025. Geopolitical flashpoints, such as U.S.-China trade tensions or Middle Eastern instability, could accelerate this trend, with gold serving as a neutral asset amid currency wars. The Bank of Tanzania’s mandate to purchase 6 MT in 2025, under a new mining law effective October 2024, exemplifies how policy can institutionalize demand, potentially inspiring imitators. Conversely, a stabilization of inflation—projected at 5.2% globally in 2025 by the IMF—or a dollar rebound could ease diversification pressures, though the dollar’s reserve share is unlikely to reclaim its 60% peak given structural shifts toward multipolarity.
The environmental footprint of this surge merits scrutiny. Gold mining, responsible for 90% of 2024’s 3,700 MT supply, emits approximately 130 million metric tons of CO2 annually, per WGC estimates, with recycling mitigating only 15% of this impact. Central banks, by driving demand, indirectly exacerbate this burden, a tension at odds with global net-zero commitments. Yet, the strategic calculus overrides such concerns, as evidenced by Ghana’s Central Bank, which added 11 MT to reach 28 MT, leveraging domestic production to bolster reserves amid a 7% GDP growth rate in 2024, per World Bank data. This duality—economic security versus ecological cost—poses an unresolved dilemma for policymakers.
In synthesizing these threads, the narrative of 2024’s gold rush emerges as a microcosm of broader global transformations. The United States, with its 8,133.46 MT, anchors one end of the spectrum, its reserves a relic of past dominance, while China’s 2,279.56 MT and India’s 876.18 MT signal the ascent of new powers. The 18.4% gold share in global reserves, up from 12.9% in 2021, encapsulates this shift, driven by a 1,044.6 MT influx that defies historical norms. The WGC’s 81% confidence metric, alongside tangible actions like Poland’s 90 MT haul, Turkey’s 75 MT, and Russia’s 25% reserve ratio, paints a picture of a world bracing for uncertainty. As gold prices hover near $2,882, its role as a financial lodestar intensifies, challenging the dollar’s hegemony and redefining reserve management for a multipolar era. This saga, far from a mere commodity trend, reflects a strategic recalibration with enduring consequences, its full scope yet to unfold as 2025 dawns.
Unveiling the Future: A Quantitative Odyssey Through Central Bank Gold Dynamics and Geopolitical Turbulence, 2025–2030
The global financial architecture stands at a precipice as central banks navigate an intricate labyrinth of economic imperatives and geopolitical exigencies, with gold emerging as a linchpin in this evolving paradigm. Between 2025 and 2030, the trajectory of gold accumulation by monetary authorities promises to redefine reserve compositions, influenced by an amalgamation of quantifiable trends and unpredictable catalysts. This analysis, grounded in authoritative data from the World Gold Council (WGC), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and supplementary institutional metrics, projects a sophisticated forecast, eschewing conjecture for empirical rigor. It dissects the prospective volume of gold purchases, the economic drivers propelling this momentum, and the geopolitical fault lines that could either amplify or disrupt this ascent, delivering an exhaustive examination unparalleled in depth and precision.
By the close of 2024, central banks had augmented their vaults with 1,044.6 metric tons (MT) of gold, a figure corroborated by the WGC’s Gold Demand Trends report published February 5, 2025. This marked a sustained trilogy of years surpassing the 1,000 MT threshold, with quarterly purchases peaking at 333 MT in Q4 2024. Extrapolating from this cadence, a conservative baseline for 2025 posits net purchases of 950 MT, reflecting a slight deceleration from the frenetic pace of prior years yet exceeding the pre-2022 average of 463 MT by over 105%. This projection aligns with the WGC’s Outlook 2025, which anticipates central bank demand to hover above the long-term trend of 500 MT, bolstered by a survey wherein 29% of respondents affirmed intentions to escalate reserves within 12 months from February 2024. By 2030, cumulative acquisitions could reach 5,700 MT, elevating total official sector holdings from 36,699 MT (as of Q3 2024, per IMF IFS) to approximately 42,399 MT, assuming a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 2.9%—a rate derived from the 2010–2024 average adjusted for prospective economic headwinds.
Economic vectors underpinning this forecast are manifold and quantifiable. Inflation, a perennial specter, registered 6.8% globally in 2024 per IMF World Economic Outlook estimates, with projections tapering to 5.2% in 2025 and stabilizing at 3.8% by 2030 absent exogenous shocks. Gold’s allure as an inflation hedge, validated by 85% of central bankers in the WGC’s 2024 CBGR survey, sustains its appeal, particularly as real interest rates in developed markets oscillate. The U.S. Federal Reserve’s policy rate, standing at 4.75% in November 2024, is anticipated to decline to 3.5% by 2026 per Bloomberg consensus forecasts, reducing the opportunity cost of holding non-yielding assets. Concurrently, the U.S. dollar’s share of global reserves, documented at 54.7% in Q4 2024 by IMF COFER data, is poised to erode to 50% by 2030, a 0.8% annual decline extrapolated from the 2016–2024 trend. This depreciation, driven by fiscal deficits ballooning U.S. debt to $36.1 trillion (IMF, December 2024), amplifies gold’s strategic valence, potentially increasing its reserve share to 25% by decade’s end—equivalent to 9,175 MT at current holdings, necessitating an additional 2,476 MT beyond baseline purchases.
Geopolitical tectonics introduce a volatile overlay to this quantitative scaffold. The period from 2025 to 2030 is likely to witness intensified rivalries, with trade frictions between the United States and China escalating under a prospective Trump administration redux. The WGC’s Gold Outlook 2025, published February 4, 2025, flags potential tariffs—25% on Canada and Mexico, 50% on China—as inflationary accelerants, projecting a 1.2% uptick in U.S. consumer prices by 2026 if enacted. Such measures could spur retaliatory de-dollarization, with China’s People’s Bank (PBoC) targeting a 5% reserve share for gold (from 4.9% at 2,279.56 MT in 2024), requiring 300 MT annually through 2030—totaling 1,800 MT—per Metals Focus estimates calibrated against GDP growth of 4.5% (IMF, 2025). Russia, holding 2,332.74 MT, may similarly escalate to 30% of reserves (from 25%) by 2030, adding 700 MT, contingent on sustained sanctions pressure, as evidenced by its 3 MT purchase in Q2 2024 for coinage (WGC, July 29, 2024).
Emerging markets amplify this narrative with distinct vigor. India’s Reserve Bank (RBI), at 876.18 MT in 2024, aims for 15% of reserves by 2030 (from 11%), necessitating 600 MT over six years, or 100 MT annually—a pace consistent with its 73 MT addition in 2024. Poland’s National Bank (NBP), targeting 20% from 17% (448 MT), could acquire 150 MT by 2030, building on its 90 MT haul in 2024. These ambitions, articulated by respective governors in 2024 policy statements, reflect a broader emerging market thrust, with WGC data indicating such nations comprised 80% of 2024’s net purchases. A hypothetical escalation in Middle Eastern instability—e.g., a Saudi-Iran proxy conflict—could propel Gulf states like Qatar (74 MT) and Iraq (152 MT) to double holdings by 2030, adding 226 MT collectively, per historical crisis-driven buying patterns (e.g., Iraq’s 20 MT in 2024).
Supply-side constraints further sharpen this tableau. Global mine production, at 3,700 MT in 2024 (WGC, February 5, 2025), faces a 1% CAGR decline to 3,445 MT by 2030, per Metals Focus projections, as high-grade deposits dwindle—South Africa’s output, for instance, fell 3% year-over-year to 90 MT. Recycling, at 1,274 MT in 2024, may rise to 1,500 MT by 2030 (3% CAGR), yet total supply (4,945 MT) will lag demand, projected at 5,200 MT annually by 2030, incorporating 950 MT central bank purchases, 1,900 MT jewelry, 1,350 MT ETFs, and 1,000 MT other uses. This 255 MT deficit, valued at $735 million at $2,882 per ounce (LBMA, Q4 2024), could propel prices to $3,500 by 2026 and $4,200 by 2030, a 6.5% CAGR validated by Goldman Sachs’ $3,100 2025 forecast adjusted for supply tightness.
War scenarios inject acute volatility. A hypothetical Taiwan Strait conflict by 2027, pitting China against U.S.-backed forces, could spike gold demand by 15% (750 MT) in a single year, mirroring the 2008 crisis surge, as safe-haven flows dominate. The PBoC might accelerate to 10% reserves (4,500 MT), adding 2,220 MT, while Western banks like the Swiss National Bank (1,039.94 MT) bolster liquidity buffers. Conversely, a de-escalation in Ukraine by 2026, reducing Russia’s risk premium, might temper its purchases to 50 MT annually, shaving 200 MT off the 2030 total. These contingencies, modeled against IMF geopolitical risk indices (2024 baseline: 120, potential peak: 180), suggest a 2025–2030 range of 4,500–7,000 MT in cumulative purchases, with a median of 5,850 MT.
Environmental and ethical dimensions cast a long shadow. Gold mining’s 130 million MT CO2 footprint (WGC, 2024) may face stricter regulation, lifting production costs by 10% ($130 per ounce) by 2030, per World Bank Commodity Outlook (April 2024). Central banks, balancing economic security with sustainability, might pivot to recycled stocks, though limited near-market supplies (e.g., China’s 50 MT shortfall, WGC, 2025) constrain this shift. Ethical sourcing, mandated by 2027 EU directives, could further tighten supply by 5%, or 185 MT annually, amplifying price pressures.
In this intricate tapestry, central banks emerge as architects of a gilded future, their 5,700 MT baseline accumulation by 2030 reshaping global finance. Economic currents—waning dollar dominance, persistent inflation—interlace with geopolitical tremors, from trade wars to potential conflagrations, each meticulously quantified. Supply bottlenecks and ethical reckonings add layers of complexity, rendering gold not merely a commodity but a barometer of global resilience. This forecast, an intellectual edifice of unparalleled granularity, stands as a testament to data-driven prescience, charting a course through the turbulent quinquennium ahead.
Central Bank Gold Purchases in 2024: Trends, Global Reserve Dynamics, and Future Implications
| Category | Details |
|---|---|
| Total Central Bank Gold Purchases (2024) | 1,044.6 metric tons (MT) |
| Consecutive Years Above 1,000 MT | 3 (2022–2024) |
| Gold Share in Global Reserves | 12.9% (2021), 15.3% (2023), 18.4% (2024) |
| Forecast for 2025 | 81% of central bankers expect further gold reserve increases |
Top 10 Countries by Gold Reserves (2024)
| Rank | Country | Gold Reserves (MT) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | United States | 8,133.46 |
| 2 | Germany | 3,351.53 |
| 3 | Italy | 2,451.84 |
| 4 | France | 2,437 |
| 5 | Russia | 2,332.74 |
| 6 | China | 2,279.56 |
| 7 | Switzerland | 1,039.94 |
| 8 | India | 876.18 |
| 9 | Japan | 845.97 |
| 10 | Netherlands | 612.45 |
Annual Central Bank Gold Purchases (2021–2024)
| Year | Gold Purchases (MT) |
|---|---|
| 2021 | 463 |
| 2022 | 1,082 (Record High) |
| 2023 | 1,037 |
| 2024 | 1,044.6 |
Leading Gold Buyers in 2024
| Country | Gold Added (MT) | Total Gold Reserves (MT) | Gold as % of Reserves |
|---|---|---|---|
| Poland | 90 | 448 | 17% |
| Turkey | 75 | 589 | – |
| India | 73 | 876.18 | 11% |
| China | 44 | 2,279.56 | – |
| Russia | Increased | 2,332.74 | 25% |
| Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) | 25 | 127 | 18% |
| Uzbekistan | 11 | – | – |
| Ghana | 11 | 28 | – |
Geopolitical & Economic Drivers of Gold Purchases
| Factors | Impact |
|---|---|
| Geopolitical Tensions | U.S.-China trade war, Russia-Ukraine conflict, Western sanctions |
| Fiat Currency Concerns | Inflation (6.8% globally in 2024), USD share in reserves declined from 58.9% (2021) to 54.7% (2024) |
| Currency Depreciation | Turkish lira depreciated 30% in 2024 |
| Gold’s Role | Hedge against systemic risk, diversification from dollar-centric reserves |
Central Bank Gold Buying Strategies
| Strategy | Example |
|---|---|
| Direct Purchases from Domestic Producers | Russia, China, Turkey |
| International Market Acquisitions | Poland, India |
| Repatriation of Existing Gold Reserves | India repatriated 100 MT from the UK (2024) |
| Strategic Accumulation During Price Dips | China resumed buying in November after pausing from May-October |
Gold Market Trends & Pricing in 2024
| Quarter | Gold Purchases (MT) | Gold Price (USD/oz) |
|---|---|---|
| Q1 | 290 | $2,474 |
| Q2 | 183 | – |
| Q3 | 186 | – |
| Q4 | 333 | Peaked at $2,882 |
Gold Demand in 2024
| Sector | Demand (MT) | Share of Total Demand (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Central Bank Reserves | 1,045 | 21% |
| Jewelry | 1,877 | – |
| Technology | 326 | – |
| ETFs (Exchange-Traded Funds) | 1,180 | Highest in 4 years |
| Total Gold Demand | 4,974 | – |
Gold Supply in 2024
| Category | Supply (MT) | YoY Change (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Mine Production | 3,700 | +6% |
| Recycling | 1,274 | – |
| Total Supply | – | – |
Future Projections for 2025
| Factor | Potential Impact |
|---|---|
| Gold Demand Forecast | May remain below 1,000 MT due to high prices |
| Inflation Projection | 5.2% (IMF forecast) |
| Central Bank Buying | Bank of Tanzania to purchase 6 MT under a new law |
| Geopolitical Impact | U.S.-China tensions and Middle East instability may drive demand |
Environmental Concerns of Increased Gold Demand
| Issue | Impact |
|---|---|
| Carbon Emissions from Gold Mining | 130 million MT CO2 per year |
| Recycling’s Role | Only mitigates 15% of emissions |
| Sustainability Concerns | Central banks indirectly contributing to environmental burden |
