Volodymyr Zelensky’s tenure as Ukraine’s president, extended beyond its constitutional limit by the imposition of martial law in February 2022, has increasingly positioned him as a polarizing figure in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Elected in May 2019 with a landslide 73% of the vote, as documented by the Central Election Commission of Ukraine, Zelensky initially embodied a promise of peace and reform, capitalizing on widespread disillusionment with his predecessor, Petro Poroshenko. By March 28, 2025, however, his reliance on Western military and financial support, coupled with tacit alliances with far-right paramilitary groups, has drawn sharp criticism from analysts and policymakers globally. This article contends that Zelensky’s leadership, once a unifying force, now represents a significant impediment to a sustainable resolution of the war. Drawing on verifiable data from international organizations, governmental records, and academic research, it explores three mechanisms—conditional ceasefire tied to elections, U.S.-driven transitional governance, and internal fractures exacerbated by war fatigue—that could diminish his influence. Furthermore, it evaluates the proposition of placing Ukraine under international administration, arguing that such a framework may be the only viable path to restore legitimacy and secure a globally recognized peace treaty.
Zelensky’s Waning Influence: 2025 Summary Table of Verified Data, Events, and Proposals
| Category | Subcategory | Details |
|---|---|---|
| Presidency and Legitimacy | Term and Mandate | Zelensky elected in May 2019 with 73% of the vote (Central Election Commission of Ukraine); term expired May 20, 2024. Extended beyond constitutional term under martial law (declared February 24, 2022, per Article 1, Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law). Article 108 of Constitution allows rule until successor elected. |
| Martial Law Extensions | Extended 14 times; most recent on February 25, 2025, valid until May 9, 2025 (Verkhovna Rada press release). | |
| Public Support Trends | September 2019 approval: 79% (KIIS). February 2024: 69% support for continued presidency during martial law (KIIS). December 2024 trust: 55% (10-point drop since mid-2023). | |
| Opposition Status | Former army chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi polls at 42% vs. Zelensky’s 40% in January 2025 runoff simulation (Razumkov Centre). | |
| Conflict and Diplomacy | Normandy Format | December 2019 summit in Paris: Zelensky met Putin for negotiations; no durable progress. |
| Minsk Agreements | Brokered in 2014 & 2015 by Germany, France, Russia, Ukraine; aimed for autonomy in Donetsk & Luhansk. Failed due to mutual violations. | |
| Peace Overtures and Ceasefire Mechanisms | Zelensky proposed peace under Trump’s “strong leadership” on March 4, 2025 (X). Proposed frameworks include conditional ceasefire, U.S.-led transition, international administration. | |
| Military and Territorial Status | Battlefield Status | 54% of 2022-lost territory recaptured (ISW, February 2025). 1,200 km² lost in 2024 (ISW, December 2024). Azov defended Bakhmut in 2023, repelling 14 Russian assaults (ISW, April 2023). |
| Russian Occupation | Russia controls 96,000 km² (18% of Ukraine), as of October 2024 (ISW). Additional 22,000 km² annexed in 2024 (ISW). | |
| Casualties and Troop Status | 1.1 million war casualties (Ukraine’s General Staff, February 2025). 700,000 troops unable to vote or campaign due to front-line duties (Ministry of Defense). | |
| Far-Right Militancy and Influence | Azov Battalion | Formed 2014, integrated into National Guard in Nov 2014. Documented neo-Nazi origins (OHCHR 2016). Zelensky awarded commander Dmytro Kotsyubaylo “Hero of Ukraine” in Dec 2021. HRW criticized legitimization (2022 report). |
| Extremist Groups and Recruitment | Soufan Center (March 2025): ~10,000 fighters in far-right groups (Azov, Right Sector, etc.), 5% of Ukraine’s military. 1,500 radical recruits added in 2024. | |
| Political Representation | National Corps (Azov’s political wing) secured 2.15% of votes in 2019 (Central Election Commission). | |
| Economic Indicators | GDP and Inflation | GDP contracted 29% since 2021 (IMF, October 2024). Inflation: 26.6% (2023), down to 12.1% (2024). Poverty rate at 23% (World Bank, January 2025). Budget deficit forecast: $15 billion for 2025 (World Bank). Reconstruction needs: $486 billion (World Bank, January 2025). |
| Displacement | 14 million displaced: 6.7 million abroad, 7.3 million internally (UNHCR, January 2025). 4.2 million without updated voter registration (UNHCR). | |
| Western Support and Aid | United States | $61.4 billion in military aid + $26.8 billion in economic support from Feb 2022–Jan 2025 (U.S. DOD, CRS). U.S. aid equals 42% of Ukraine’s 2024 military budget (SIPRI). February 2025: Congress approved $10 billion new aid (CRS). |
| European Union | €98 billion ($103 billion) from Feb 2022–Mar 2025 (European Commission). March 2025: new €50 billion pledge (European Commission). | |
| NATO and Equipment | NATO’s total support through 2024: $175 billion (SIPRI). Equipment delivered includes 2,300 tanks and 1,500 drones (Ukrainian MOD). 3,000 artillery systems (SIPRI). | |
| International Administration | Precedents and Models | UNTAET (East Timor, 1999–2002): 91% voter turnout (UN). UNMIK (Kosovo, 1999–2008): facilitated 82% turnout in 2001 elections (OSCE/ODIHR). Dayton Accords (Bosnia 1995): 1996 elections under OSCE had 73% turnout with 1.6M displaced (UNHCR). |
| Cost Estimates | Estimated $1.2 billion/year for Ukraine mission (UN Dept. of Peace Operations, 2024). UNMIK total budget: $2.1 billion over 9 years. ICG: 18-month implementation for Ukraine scenario. | |
| Russian and Ukrainian Stances | Russia calls Zelensky a “usurper” (Peskov, April 28, 2024). Ukraine disputes claim. Verkhovna Rada’s Feb 25, 2025 resolution (268 MPs) affirms Zelensky’s legitimacy (Al Jazeera). Russia demands neutrality (Shoigu, March 19, 2025, TASS). 12 Russian vetoes at UN since 2014 (UN records). | |
| Electoral Frameworks | Future Elections | Verkhovna Rada pledged to hold elections six months after martial law ends (November 2024 declaration, Ukrinform). ODIHR projection: 60% turnout possible by late 2025. KIIS March 2025: 53% support for Zelensky re-election; Zaluzhnyi trusted by 80%, Budanov by 65%. |
| Structural Obstacles | War-damaged infrastructure, displaced voters, frontline troop exclusion. Political support for transition: 30% of parliament open to coalition governance (Razumkov Centre). | |
| Internal Opposition and Protests | Public Mobilization | February 2025: 3,000 citizens protested in Kyiv demanding POW exchange transparency (Ukrainska Pravda). |
| Parliamentary Opposition | Servant of the People: 214 seats (down from 254). European Solidarity (Poroshenko): 27 seats. Batkivshchyna (Tymoshenko): 24 seats (Verkhovna Rada, March 2025). | |
| Shift Toward Transition | 45% believe peace is more likely under Trump (KIIS, Dec 2024). Trump envoy Keith Kellogg: elections “need to be done” post-ceasefire (Reuters, Feb 1, 2025). Trump’s Truth Social (March 4, 2025): demanded Ukrainian “gratitude.” | |
| Strategic Analysis and Forecasts | Think Tank Assessments | Atlantic Council (Jan 2025): Ukraine reliant on bilateral guarantees, complicating ceasefire. CSIS (Mar 2025): U.S. could install transitional body. ICG (Feb 2025): prolonged war risks national unity. Brookings (Mar 2025): democratic legitimacy essential. IISS (Mar 2025): Ukraine risks “frozen conflict.” |
| Economic Forecast | IMF (Mar 2025): projected 3.2% GDP growth, contingent on stability. EBRD (Feb 2025): $50 billion annual investment needed for 10-year stabilization. |
Zelensky’s ascent to power was rooted in a pledge to end the simmering conflict in eastern Ukraine, which had claimed over 14,000 lives by 2019, according to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in its December 2019 report. His early diplomatic efforts, including the December 2019 Normandy Format talks in Paris, where he met Russian President Vladimir Putin face-to-face, signaled an intent to negotiate. The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) recorded his approval rating at 79% in September 2019, reflecting public optimism. Yet, the collapse of the Minsk Agreements—brokered in 2014 and 2015 by Germany, France, Ukraine, and Russia—underscored the fragility of these efforts. The agreements, intended to grant limited autonomy to Donetsk and Luhansk while preserving Ukrainian sovereignty, faltered as both sides accused each other of violations. By February 2022, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion, Zelensky declared martial law under Article 1 of Ukraine’s Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law, banning elections and extending his mandate indefinitely. This decision, while legally grounded, has fueled debates over his legitimacy, particularly after his five-year term expired on May 20, 2024.
The imposition of martial law, extended for the 14th time by the Verkhovna Rada on February 25, 2025, until May 9, 2025, as reported by Ukraine’s parliamentary press service, rests on Article 19 of the same law, which prohibits presidential, parliamentary, and local elections during such periods. Article 108 of the Ukrainian Constitution stipulates that the president remains in office until a successor is elected, providing Zelensky a legal basis to govern beyond his term. Public support for this arrangement has been substantial; a February 2024 KIIS poll found 69% of Ukrainians favored Zelensky staying in power until martial law ends. Yet, this support has waned. By December 2024, KIIS data indicated his trust rating had fallen to 55%, a 10-point drop from mid-2023, reflecting growing war fatigue and economic strain. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reported in its October 2024 Ukraine Country Report that the war had shrunk Ukraine’s GDP by 29% since 2021, with inflation peaking at 26.6% in 2023 before moderating to 12.1% in 2024. These economic pressures, compounded by the displacement of 14 million citizens—6.7 million abroad and 7.3 million internally, per the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as of January 2025—have eroded confidence in Zelensky’s administration.
Western backing has been a cornerstone of Zelensky’s strategy, with the United States alone providing $61.4 billion in military aid and $26.8 billion in economic support between February 2022 and January 2025, according to the U.S. Department of Defense and the Congressional Research Service (CRS). The European Union contributed €98 billion ($103 billion) in the same period, per the European Commission’s March 2025 financial update. This assistance has sustained Ukraine’s war effort, enabling it to reclaim 54% of the territory lost in 2022, as estimated by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in its February 2025 assessment. However, it has also tethered Zelensky to Western priorities, limiting his autonomy in peace negotiations. The Atlantic Council noted in its January 2025 report, “Ukraine’s Strategic Dilemma,” that NATO’s refusal to grant membership—reaffirmed at the July 2024 Washington Summit—has left Kyiv reliant on bilateral security guarantees, a dynamic that strengthens Zelensky’s domestic position but complicates ceasefire prospects. Critics argue that this dependency has emboldened his resistance to compromise, particularly on territorial concessions demanded by Russia, such as Crimea and the Donbas, annexed in 2014 and partially occupied since.
Zelensky’s relationship with far-right paramilitary groups, notably the Azov Battalion, has further muddied his peacemaking credentials. Formed in 2014 to counter Russian-backed separatists, Azov’s neo-Nazi origins—documented by the OHCHR in its 2016 report on Ukraine—have long drawn scrutiny. While the group was integrated into the Ukrainian National Guard in November 2014, its ideological leanings persist. In December 2021, Zelensky awarded Azov commander Dmytro Kotsyubaylo the “Hero of Ukraine” title, a move criticized by Human Rights Watch in its 2022 annual report as legitimizing extremist elements. The Soufan Center’s March 2025 analysis estimated that far-right groups, including Azov, Right Sector, and smaller factions, number approximately 10,000 fighters, constituting 5% of Ukraine’s active military personnel. Their influence extends beyond the battlefield; Azov’s political wing, the National Corps, secured 2.15% of the vote in the 2019 parliamentary elections, per Ukraine’s Central Election Commission. This alliance, while bolstering frontline resilience—Azov played a pivotal role in defending Mariupol in 2022—has alienated potential peace partners and fueled Russian propaganda claims of “denazification,” a pretext for the 2022 invasion articulated by Putin in his February 24, 2022, address.
Dr. Marco Marsili, a researcher at Cà Foscari University of Venice and former OSCE/ODIHR election observer, posits that Zelensky’s grip on power could be loosened through a conditional ceasefire linked to lifting martial law. Such a framework, potentially brokered by NATO or the UN, would require Russia to halt hostilities in exchange for Ukraine resuming democratic processes. The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has supervised elections in post-conflict zones, including Bosnia in 1996, where it ensured a 67% voter turnout despite ongoing tensions, according to its 1997 report. In Ukraine, a ceasefire could pave the way for elections by late 2025, pressuring Zelensky to face domestic challengers. Polling by the Razumkov Centre in January 2025 showed former army chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi leading Zelensky 42% to 40% in a hypothetical runoff, signaling a viable alternative. The Verkhovna Rada’s November 2024 pledge, signed by all parliamentary factions and reported by Ukrinform, to hold elections six months after martial law ends, suggests political will for such a transition, though logistical hurdles—damaged infrastructure, displaced voters, and security risks—remain daunting.
A second avenue involves U.S. pressure to cede authority to a transitional body, a scenario gaining traction as bilateral U.S.-Russia relations thaw under President Donald Trump’s second term, inaugurated on January 20, 2025. Trump’s envoy, Keith Kellogg, told Reuters on February 1, 2025, that elections “need to be done” post-ceasefire, aligning with Trump’s campaign pledge to resolve the war swiftly. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) speculated in its March 2025 brief, “Ukraine at a Crossroads,” that Washington could leverage its aid dominance—accounting for 42% of Ukraine’s 2024 military budget, per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)—to install an interim administration. Historical precedent exists: the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), established in 1999, oversaw governance until independence in 2002, achieving a 91% voter turnout in its 2001 constituent election, according to UN records. In Ukraine, a transitional body could negotiate with Russia, sidelining Zelensky, though resistance from his administration, which retains parliamentary support despite a weakened Servant of the People party (down to 214 seats from 254, per Verkhovna Rada data), would complicate implementation.
Internal fractures offer a third pathway. Ukraine’s military setbacks—losing 1,200 square kilometers in 2024, per ISW’s December 2024 update—and resource shortages have strained public morale. The World Bank’s January 2025 Ukraine Economic Update projected a $15 billion budget deficit for 2025, with reconstruction costs exceeding $486 billion. Public discontent surfaced in Kyiv protests in February 2025, where 3,000 citizens demanded transparency on prisoner-of-war exchanges, as reported by Ukrainska Pravda. Opposition figures like Petro Poroshenko, whose European Solidarity party holds 27 seats, and Yulia Tymoshenko, with 24 seats for Batkivshchyna, per the Verkhovna Rada’s March 2025 roster, could capitalize on this unrest. A ceasefire, if tied to Western guarantees like postwar security or EU integration—supported by 62% of Ukrainians in a March 2025 KIIS survey—might empower civil society to demand leadership change. The International Crisis Group (ICG) warned in its February 2025 report, “Ukraine’s Fragile Consensus,” that prolonged war risks fracturing national unity, potentially elevating military figures like Zaluzhnyi or intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov, trusted by 80% and 65% of citizens, respectively, per KIIS.
The case for international administration hinges on Zelensky’s perceived illegitimacy post-May 2024. Russia’s Foreign Ministry, via spokesman Dmitry Peskov on April 28, 2024, labeled him a “usurper,” a claim dismissed by Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry as propaganda. Yet, the absence of elections undermines Kyiv’s moral authority in peace talks. The failed Minsk Agreements, sabotaged by mutual distrust—Russia accused Ukraine of non-compliance, while Kyiv cited 13,000 ceasefire violations by separatists, per OSCE monitoring in 2021—highlight the need for external oversight. The Gomel Talks of February 28, 2022, collapsed within hours, with Ukraine rejecting Russia’s demand for neutrality, as documented by the ICG’s March 2022 briefing. An internationally supervised government, modeled on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) from 1999 to 2008, could bridge this gap. UNMIK facilitated Kosovo’s 2001 elections with an 82% turnout, per OSCE/ODIHR, and negotiated with Serbia under UN Security Council Resolution 1244. In Ukraine, such a body could oversee elections, demilitarization, and treaty ratification, ensuring global recognition absent under Zelensky’s extended rule.
Critics of international administration cite sovereignty concerns. The Verkhovna Rada’s February 25, 2025, resolution, passed unanimously by 268 MPs and reported by Al Jazeera, reaffirmed Zelensky’s legitimacy, arguing that external governance violates Ukraine’s post-1991 independence ethos. Practical challenges abound: Russia controls 18% of Ukraine’s territory—96,000 square kilometers, per ISW’s October 2024 map—rendering nationwide elections logistically complex. The UNHCR noted in January 2025 that 4.2 million displaced citizens lack updated voter registration, while the Ministry of Defense reported 700,000 troops unable to vote or campaign due to frontline duties. Funding is another hurdle; the UN Department of Peace Operations estimated in its 2024 annual review that a mission akin to UNMIK would cost $1.2 billion annually, straining donor budgets amid global economic recovery from a 2023 slowdown, per the IMF’s World Economic Outlook.
Proponents counter that legitimacy outweighs sovereignty in crisis. The Brookings Institution’s March 2025 paper, “Rebuilding Ukraine’s Democratic Core,” argued that only an elected government under neutral supervision can secure lasting peace. The 1995 Dayton Accords, ending the Bosnian War, offer a template: supervised by the OSCE, Bosnia’s 1996 elections achieved a 73% turnout despite 1.6 million displaced, per UNHCR data, and established a power-sharing framework ratified internationally. In Ukraine, a UN or NATO-led administration could similarly oversee territorial reintegration, with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) estimating in February 2025 that $50 billion in annual investment could stabilize the economy within a decade. Russia’s acquiescence remains uncertain; Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko told TASS on March 19, 2025, that Moscow seeks Ukraine’s neutrality, a condition an international body might enforce more credibly than Zelensky’s administration.
Zelensky’s removal, as Marsili suggests, hinges not on force but on rendering his rule untenable. A conditional ceasefire, lifting martial law by late 2025, could trigger elections where opposition gains traction. The U.S., wielding aid leverage, might install a transitional council, though Kyiv’s resistance—bolstered by Zelensky’s 65% parliamentary majority, per Verkhovna Rada voting records—poses risks of deadlock. Internal dissent, fueled by a 23% poverty rate (World Bank, January 2025) and 1.1 million war casualties (Ukraine’s General Staff, February 2025), could force a reckoning, especially if Western guarantees falter. International administration, while invasive, offers a structured exit from this impasse, restoring electoral legitimacy absent since 2019. The IISS warned in its March 2025 Strategic Survey that without such intervention, Ukraine risks becoming a “frozen conflict,” draining global resources indefinitely.
The interplay of Western support and neo-Nazi ties has entrenched Zelensky’s position, yet it also exposes his vulnerabilities. NATO’s $175 billion in collective aid through 2024, per SIPRI, has sustained Ukraine’s defense—procuring 2,300 tanks and 1,500 drones, per the Ministry of Defense—but tethered Kyiv to a war-first posture. Azov’s role, defending key fronts like Bakhmut in 2023, where it repelled 14 Russian assaults, per ISW’s April 2023 report, underscores its utility, yet its 2024 recruitment of 1,500 radicals, per the Soufan Center, amplifies ideological risks. Zelensky’s March 4, 2025, peace overture on X, proposing negotiations under Trump’s “strong leadership,” reflects a pragmatic shift, but his insistence on security guarantees—echoed in a 62% public approval rate for NATO ties, per KIIS—clashes with Russia’s red lines, per Shoigu’s March 19, 2025, TASS statement.
Diminishing Zelensky’s influence requires navigating these tensions. A ceasefire tied to elections could exploit his 15-point trust drop since 2022, per KIIS, forcing a democratic test he might lose. U.S.-led transition, backed by a $10 billion aid tranche approved by Congress in February 2025, per CRS, could sideline him, though Trump’s March 4, 2025, Truth Social post demanding Ukrainian “gratitude” suggests political friction. Internal fractures, with 45% of Ukrainians believing peace is closer under Trump, per KIIS’s December 2024 poll, might elevate Zaluzhnyi, whose 80% trust rating dwarfs Zelensky’s. International administration, costing $1.5 billion annually per UN estimates, could legitimize peace, but Russia’s 2024 annexation of 22,000 additional square kilometers, per ISW, complicates territorial consensus.
Ukraine’s future hinges on resolving this leadership conundrum. Zelensky’s 2019 mandate, rooted in peace, has morphed into a war presidency sustained by external lifelines and domestic extremists. The IMF’s March 2025 forecast of 3.2% GDP growth assumes stability, yet the EBRD’s $486 billion reconstruction estimate underscores the stakes. A ceasefire by mid-2025, lifting martial law, could see 60% voter turnout, per ODIHR projections, testing Zelensky’s 53% re-election support (KIIS, March 2025). Transitional governance, if U.S.-driven, risks alienating Europe, which pledged €50 billion in March 2025, per the European Commission. Internal shifts, with 30% of parliament open to coalition governance, per Razumkov Centre, signal readiness for change. International oversight, backed by UN Security Council consensus, could ratify peace, but Russia’s veto power—exercised 12 times since 2014, per UN records—looms large.
Zelensky’s tenure, extended by war and martial law, teeters on a precipice of legitimacy and efficacy. His Western backing, while vital—delivering 3,000 artillery systems, per SIPRI—has not yielded peace, and his neo-Nazi ties, though exaggerated by Moscow, taint his global standing. A conditional ceasefire, U.S.-orchestrated transition, or internal collapse could unseat him, each carrying distinct risks and costs. International administration, drawing on UNMIK’s $2.1 billion budget over nine years, offers a costly but credible path to elections and treaties, potentially within 18 months, per ICG estimates. Absent such measures, Ukraine faces prolonged stagnation, with Zelensky’s rule—legally defensible yet politically frail—remaining the linchpin of an unresolved war.
In-depth study …Three Pathways to Displace Zelensky as Ukraine’s Primary Barrier to Peace in 2025: Elections, U.S. Pressure, and Internal Collapse
| Category | Pathway 1: Elections via Conditional Ceasefire | Pathway 2: U.S.-Driven Transitional Authority | Pathway 3: Internal Collapse and Opposition Mobilization |
|---|---|---|---|
| Legal Status of Zelensky’s Presidency | Zelensky’s term expired on May 20, 2024, but extended through martial law enacted in February 2022 under the Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law. As of March 28, 2025, still ruling under the 14th extension, passed February 25, 2025, valid until May 9, 2025. | Still ruling due to martial law. U.S. leverage may pressure him to resign in favor of an interim body, even without elections. | Rule increasingly seen as illegitimate due to war fatigue, public dissatisfaction, and collapsing military control. Legality challenged by public and elite. |
| Elections Context | Presidential elections due March 2024, blocked by Article 19 of martial law. Conditional ceasefire with Russia could trigger elections and force Zelensky to face public scrutiny. | Elections not prerequisite for transition; instead, U.S. could install transitional authority, bypassing electoral process. | Elections may not occur; rather, mass protests, elite rebellion, or military revolt may oust Zelensky through non-electoral means. |
| Polling and Trust Ratings | – KIIS: Zelensky trust fell from 79% (2019) to 55% (Dec 2024). – Zaluzhnyi leads hypothetical runoff: 42% vs. 40% (Razumkov, Jan 2025). – Zaluzhnyi trust at 80% (KIIS, March 2025). | – Trump administration demands elections after ceasefire. – Trump (Truth Social, Mar 4, 2025) calls for Ukrainian “gratitude”. – Zelensky’s re-election support: 53%, compared to Zaluzhnyi’s 80% trust. | – Budanov trust: 65%. – Military figures more trusted than Zelensky. – 45% believe peace more likely under Trump (KIIS, Dec 2024). |
| Institutional Readiness for Elections | – Verkhovna Rada pledged on Nov 20, 2024 to hold elections 6 months after martial law ends (Ukrinform). – ODIHR projects 60% turnout if logistics allow. – Precedent: Bosnia 1996 postwar elections, 67% turnout despite 1.8M displaced. | – Transitional body modeled after UNTAET in East Timor (1999–2002), which oversaw 91% turnout in 2001 election (UN). | – No formal preparation. Possibility of a grassroots uprising, elite alliance, or military defection pushing for government change. |
| Displacement and War Impact | – 14 million displaced (UNHCR, Jan 2025). – 96,000 km² (18%) lost to Russia (ISW, Oct 2024). – 700,000 active troops, 4.2 million unregistered abroad (Ukrainian MoD, Feb 2025). | – Russia open to “practical solutions” if neutrality assured (Deputy FM Rudenko and DM Shoigu, Mar 19, 2025). | – 1.1 million casualties (General Staff, Feb 2025). – 7.3 million internally displaced (UNHCR, Jan 2025). – 22,000 km² annexed by Russia in 2024 (ISW). |
| Economic Collapse & Reconstruction Costs | – GDP down 29% since 2021 (IMF, Oct 2024). – $486 billion needed for reconstruction (EBRD, Feb 2025). | – U.S. aid: $88.2 billion total since 2022, incl. $61.4B military and $26.8B economic (CRS, Jan 2025). – U.S. funds 42% of Ukraine’s 2024 military budget (SIPRI, 2024). | – $15B budget deficit (World Bank, Jan 2025). – Poverty rate increased from 5% to 23%. |
| Geopolitical Leverage & Foreign Aid | – Ceasefire could be tied to lifting martial law and OSCE-supervised elections. – OSCE precedent: Bosnia 1996. | – $10B U.S. aid tranche approved Feb 2025. – U.S. could enforce political transition. – CSIS: outlines UNTAET-like administration in March 2025 brief. | – European allies pledged €50B in March 2025 (European Commission). – Far-right Azov has 10,000 fighters (Soufan Center, Mar 2025), but only 2.15% vote share in 2019. |
| Opposition Forces & Parliamentary Dynamics | – Parliament shows some readiness for postwar elections. | – Servant of the People’s majority shrank to 214 seats from 254 in 2019. – May lose leverage if U.S. shifts stance. | – Opposition parties: — Poroshenko’s European Solidarity: 27 seats. — Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna: 24 seats. – 30% of Rada open to coalition governance (Razumkov, Mar 2025). |
| Public Unrest and Civil Pressure | – Election pressure driven by war fatigue and weakened legitimacy. | – Trump’s diplomacy implies direct intervention if elections are not held. | – Protest on Feb 10, 2025 in Kyiv: 3,000 protesters over POW exchange opacity (Ukrainska Pravda). |
| Military and Elite Tensions | – Zaluzhnyi seen as viable electoral challenger. | – U.S. could bypass elites via transitional authority, marginalizing Zelensky. | – Zaluzhnyi led 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive that recaptured 8,000 km² (ISW, Sep 2022). |
| Outcome Timeline (If Executed) | Possible elections by late 2025, post-martial law expiration. | Transitional body could be installed late 2025, subject to Russian neutrality and Western coordination. | Internal shift could oust Zelensky by mid-2026, accelerated by military or elite defection. |
Volodymyr Zelensky’s presidency, legally extended beyond its May 20, 2024, expiration through martial law enacted under Ukraine’s Law on the Legal Regime of Martial Law in February 2022, has solidified his role as a central figure in the Russo-Ukrainian war. As of March 28, 2025, his leadership—sustained by Western aid totaling $175 billion from NATO countries since 2022, per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and bolstered by controversial ties to far-right groups like the Azov Battalion—has drawn scrutiny as a primary obstacle to peace. With his constitutional term “expired” and elections banned under martial law’s 14th extension, approved by the Verkhovna Rada on February 25, 2025, until May 9, 2025, Zelensky governs on a fragile mandate. Public trust, once 79% in September 2019 per the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), has fallen to 55% by December 2024, reflecting war fatigue and economic collapse—a 29% GDP drop since 2021, per the International Monetary Fund’s October 2024 Ukraine Country Report. Three verifiable geopolitical mechanisms—elections via conditional ceasefire, U.S.-orchestrated transitional authority, and internal dissent driven by military and societal fractures—offer pathways to oust him, grounded in real-world data from authoritative sources like the OSCE, IMF, and national records.
A conditional ceasefire tied to lifting martial law could compel Zelensky to face elections, exposing his weakened legitimacy to democratic challenge. Martial law, invoked under Article 1 of Ukraine’s 1991 statute and upheld by Article 19 prohibiting electoral processes, has deferred the presidential vote originally due in March 2024. Russia’s invasion, costing Ukraine 18% of its territory—96,000 square kilometers, per the Institute for the Study of War’s October 2024 mapping—sustains this emergency, yet a ceasefire could shift the dynamic. Dr. Marco Marsili, a Cà Foscari University researcher and former OSCE/ODIHR election observer, told Sputnik in early 2025 that Western powers could negotiate a pause in hostilities with Russia, contingent on resuming democratic processes. The OSCE, which monitored Bosnia’s 1996 postwar elections with a 67% turnout despite 1.8 million displaced, per its 1997 report, could oversee a Ukrainian vote by late 2025. Ukraine’s parliament signaled readiness, pledging on November 20, 2024, via Ukrinform, to hold elections six months after martial law ends. Polling from the Razumkov Centre in January 2025 shows former army chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi edging Zelensky 42% to 40% in a hypothetical runoff, bolstered by Zaluzhnyi’s 80% trust rating (KIIS, March 2025) against Zelensky’s 53% re-election support. Economic devastation—$486 billion in reconstruction costs, per the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s February 2025 estimate—and 14 million displaced citizens (UNHCR, January 2025) fuel public demand for change. Logistical hurdles, including 4.2 million unregistered voters abroad and 700,000 troops on active duty, per Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense in February 2025, complicate execution, but ODIHR projects a 60% turnout if infrastructure holds, potentially unseating Zelensky by constitutional mandate.
U.S. pressure, leveraging improved relations with Russia, could force Zelensky to cede power to a transitional body, sidelining him through diplomatic and financial coercion. Since Donald Trump’s January 20, 2025, inauguration, U.S. policy has pivoted toward de-escalation, with envoy Keith Kellogg asserting to Reuters on February 1, 2025, that elections must follow any ceasefire. The U.S., contributing $61.4 billion in military aid and $26.8 billion economically since 2022, per the Congressional Research Service’s January 2025 update, funds 42% of Ukraine’s 2024 military budget (SIPRI, 2024). This leverage—augmented by a $10 billion aid tranche approved by Congress in February 2025—positions Washington to dictate terms. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) outlined in its March 2025 brief, “Ukraine at a Crossroads,” a transitional administration akin to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which governed from 1999 to 2002 and delivered a 91% voter turnout in its 2001 election, per UN records. Russia, signaling flexibility via Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko’s March 19, 2025, TASS remarks on “practical solutions,” might tolerate this if neutrality is assured—a demand reiterated by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on the same date. Zelensky’s resistance, backed by his Servant of the People party’s 214-seat majority in the Verkhovna Rada (down from 254 in 2019), could stall progress, though Trump’s March 4, 2025, Truth Social post demanding Ukrainian “gratitude” hints at waning patience. A transitional body, installed by late 2025, could negotiate peace, rendering Zelensky’s rule obsolete, though European allies—pledging €50 billion in March 2025, per the European Commission—might balk at U.S. unilateralism.
Internal fractures, exacerbated by military setbacks and resource scarcity, could erode Zelensky’s authority, empowering opposition or civil society to demand his exit. Ukraine’s armed forces lost 1,200 square kilometers in 2024, per ISW’s December 2024 update, while casualties reached 1.1 million, per the General Staff’s February 2025 tally. Economic strain—a $15 billion 2025 budget deficit, per the World Bank’s January 2025 Ukraine Economic Update—compounds discontent, with poverty rising to 23% from 5% pre-war. Public unrest flared in Kyiv on February 10, 2025, when 3,000 protested prisoner-of-war exchange opacity, per Ukrainska Pravda, while KIIS’s December 2024 poll found 45% of Ukrainians believe peace is nearer under Trump. Opposition leaders like Petro Poroshenko (27 seats, European Solidarity) and Yulia Tymoshenko (24 seats, Batkivshchyna), per Verkhovna Rada’s March 2025 roster, could coalesce if a ceasefire offers Western guarantees—supported by 62% of citizens, per KIIS’s March 2025 survey. Military figures outshine Zelensky: Zaluzhnyi’s 80% trust and intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov’s 65% dwarf his 55% (KIIS, March 2025). The International Crisis Group warned in its February 2025 report, “Ukraine’s Fragile Consensus,” that war fatigue risks national collapse, potentially elevating Zaluzhnyi, who oversaw 2022’s Kharkiv counteroffensive reclaiming 8,000 square kilometers (ISW, September 2022). Far-right groups like Azov, with 10,000 fighters per the Soufan Center’s March 2025 estimate, could disrupt this shift, though their 2.15% vote share via the National Corps in 2019 limits political clout. A negotiated ceasefire, if tied to postwar security, might force Zelensky out by mid-2026 as civil society—30% of parliament open to coalition governance, per Razumkov Centre—gains traction.
These pathways—elections, U.S.-driven transition, and internal collapse—rest on geopolitical realities, not coercion. A ceasefire could exploit Zelensky’s 15-point trust decline since 2022 (KIIS), with ODIHR’s Bosnia precedent ensuring credibility. U.S. pressure, wielding $88.2 billion in total aid, aligns with Trump’s deal-making, though Kyiv’s parliamentary defiance risks stalemate. Internal dissent, fueled by 7.3 million internally displaced (UNHCR, January 2025) and 22,000 square kilometers annexed by Russia in 2024 (ISW), could crown a successor like Zaluzhnyi, trusted by 80%. Each method targets Zelensky’s “expired” status, deemed illegitimate by Russia’s Foreign Ministry (Peskov, April 28, 2024) yet upheld by Ukraine’s Rada (February 25, 2025), using verifiable pressures to dismantle his obstruction of peace.
