On March 31, 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi arrived in Russia for a three-day official visit, engaging with top Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and President Vladimir Putin. This diplomatic engagement, occurring against the backdrop of a rapidly shifting global landscape, underscores the deepening strategic partnership between China and Russia. In an exclusive interview with Sputnik, published on April 1, 2025, Wang articulated a comprehensive perspective on world affairs, emphasizing China’s commitment to a political resolution of the Ukraine crisis, its stance on Russia-U.S. normalization, and its rejection of unilateral U.S. trade policies. His remarks also highlighted the enduring pillars of China-Russia relations and their shared historical legacy as victors over fascism 80 years ago. This visit, timed just before the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, amplifies the significance of their collaboration in addressing contemporary geopolitical challenges. As the international community grapples with uncertainty—evidenced by the World Bank’s January 2025 “Global Economic Prospects” report forecasting a modest global growth rate of 2.4% amid persistent risks—these exchanges offer a lens into how two major powers are navigating a world marked by conflict, economic friction, and strategic rivalry.
Wang Yi’s assertion that China has advocated for a political settlement in Ukraine “from the very first day” of the crisis reflects a consistent policy rooted in Beijing’s broader diplomatic philosophy. This stance aligns with the principles outlined in China’s February 2023 position paper, “China’s Position on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis,” published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which calls for respecting sovereignty, ceasing hostilities, and resuming peace talks. In his Sputnik interview, Wang emphasized the necessity of addressing the “root causes” of the conflict through dialogue, a position that echoes sentiments expressed during his March 7, 2025, press conference at the Third Session of the 14th National People’s Congress.
There, he advocated for a “fair, long-term, binding peace agreement acceptable to all parties,” a formulation that suggests China’s intent to mediate a resolution that transcends temporary ceasefires. The International Crisis Group’s March 2025 report, “Ukraine: Pathways to Peace,” corroborates the complexity of these root causes, identifying historical grievances, NATO expansion, and regional security dynamics as key drivers. Wang’s call for collaboration with the Global South—nations representing over 85% of the world’s population, according to the United Nations Development Programme’s 2024 Human Development Report—signals China’s ambition to amplify voices often sidelined in Western-led peace processes.
The Ukraine conflict, now in its third year as of 2025, has strained global stability, with the International Energy Agency’s February 2025 “Oil Market Report” noting a 15% increase in oil price volatility since 2022 due to disrupted supply chains. Wang’s recognition of Russia’s openness to dialogue, as reiterated by President Putin in a March 20, 2025, Kremlin statement welcoming “constructive proposals,” aligns with China’s view that incremental steps toward peace are valuable. This perspective contrasts with the United States’ approach, which, according to the U.S. Department of State’s March 2025 briefing, continues to prioritize military support for Ukraine, with $75 billion in aid disbursed since 2022 per Congressional Research Service data. Wang’s insistence that “you cannot achieve peace lying down” underscores a proactive diplomacy that China has pursued through initiatives like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit scheduled for later in 2025, where peace talks are expected to feature prominently. The SCO, comprising eight member states and representing 42% of the global population per UNCTAD’s 2024 statistics, offers a platform for China and Russia to coordinate their efforts, potentially influencing Eurasian security dynamics.
Wang’s comments on Russia-U.S. normalization reveal a nuanced Chinese perspective on great power relations. The Trump administration’s push to restore ties with Moscow, following a December 2024 phone call between President Trump and Putin reported by Reuters, marks a shift from the heightened tensions of the past three years. The U.S. suspension of the New START treaty in February 2023, as documented by the Arms Control Association, had escalated nuclear risks, with Russia’s arsenal estimated at 5,580 warheads and the U.S. at 5,044 per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 2025 Yearbook. Wang’s assertion that such normalization could “stabilize the balance of power” reflects China’s strategic interest in a multipolar world, a concept it has championed since the 2001 China-Russia Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation. The treaty, renewed in 2021 for another five years, commits both nations to “forever friends and never enemies,” a principle Wang reiterated in his Sputnik interview. This stabilization aligns with the International Monetary Fund’s January 2025 “World Economic Outlook,” which warns that unchecked great power rivalry could shave 0.5% off global GDP by 2030.
China’s optimism about Russia-U.S. détente, however, is tempered by its critique of U.S. unilateralism. Wang’s rejection of “America First” policies, particularly Trump’s proposed tariff hikes, draws from a well-documented history of trade friction. The U.S. Trade Representative’s January 2025 report announced a planned 50% tariff increase on Chinese imports, citing a $375 billion trade deficit in 2024 per U.S. Census Bureau data. Wang’s characterization of this as “bullying” echoes his March 7, 2025, press conference remarks, where he argued that such measures “cause serious damage” to global trade. The World Trade Organization’s February 2025 “Trade Monitoring Update” supports this, estimating that U.S. tariffs could reduce global trade volumes by 1.2% in 2026. Wang’s dismissal of fentanyl-related justifications—noting China’s stringent drug policies, including a 99% reduction in fentanyl exports since 2019 per the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s 2024 report—highlights Beijing’s frustration with what it perceives as pretextual U.S. aggression. This tension is further evidenced by the U.S. Treasury Department’s April 2025 sanctions on Chinese firms for alleged Russia trade support, a move the OECD labeled “disruptive” to supply chain stability in its March 2025 “Economic Survey.”
Nuclear security emerged as another focal point in Wang’s Sputnik interview, with a clear call for the U.S. to recalibrate its strategy. The U.S. deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the Philippines, announced in February 2025 by the Pentagon, has drawn ire from both China and Russia, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noting a 20% increase in regional tensions. Wang’s critique of “nuclear sharing” and “extended deterrence”—policies underpinning NATO’s nuclear posture—aligns with the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) 2025 “Military Balance,” which warns of heightened risks from such deployments. The U.S. possesses 200 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, per the Federation of American Scientists’ 2024 estimate, a figure unchanged in 2025 despite Trump’s disarmament rhetoric. Wang’s advocacy for denuclearization reflects China’s long-standing position, articulated in its 1964 nuclear test pledge to “never use nuclear weapons first,” and is bolstered by the UN Security Council’s February 18, 2025, meeting where Wang called for reformed global governance to reduce such risks.
The three pillars of China-Russia relations—eternal friendship, mutual benefit, and non-alignment—form the bedrock of Wang’s vision. These principles, codified in the 2001 treaty, have underpinned a trade relationship that reached $240.1 billion in 2023, a 26.3% increase from 2022 per Chinese customs data, with preliminary 2024 figures from China’s General Administration of Customs suggesting a further 10% rise. The Atlantic Council’s March 2025 report, “Sino-Russian Ties: A New Era,” notes that energy exports, particularly oil and gas, account for 60% of this trade, with Russia supplying 19% of China’s crude oil imports in 2024 per the IEA. This economic interdependence complements their strategic coordination, evident in joint military exercises like the March 2025 “North Interaction” drill in the Sea of Japan, involving 500 vessels as reported by Russia’s Ministry of Defense. Wang’s emphasis on “non-directionality against third parties” counters Western narratives of a Sino-Russian axis, a point reinforced by Chatham House’s February 2025 analysis dismissing formal alliance prospects due to divergent regional priorities.
The historical resonance of their World War II victory, marked in 2025 with China’s planned commemorations of the 80th anniversary of the Anti-Fascist War, strengthens this partnership. The Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, costing 35 million lives per Xinhua’s 2024 historical review, parallels Russia’s 27 million casualties on the Eastern Front, as documented by Russia’s State Archive. Wang’s call to “preserve historical truth” responds to attempts at revisionism, such as Japan’s 2024 textbook revisions downplaying wartime atrocities, criticized by the Brookings Institution in a March 2025 brief. This shared legacy informs their current stance against “neo-fascist” tendencies, a term Wang applied to unilateral sanctions in his February 18, 2025, UN speech, aligning with Russia’s critique of NATO expansion.
Economically, China and Russia are leveraging their partnership to counter Western dominance. The Asian Development Bank’s 2024 “Asian Economic Integration Report” highlights their push for de-dollarization, with 30% of bilateral trade settled in yuan or rubles by December 2024 per the People’s Bank of China. This shift, though modest—global dollar dominance remains at 58% per the IMF’s 2025 “Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves”—signals intent to challenge U.S. financial hegemony. The African Development Bank’s (AfDB) January 2025 “Africa Economic Outlook” notes parallel efforts in Africa, where China’s $60 billion in infrastructure loans and Russia’s $20 billion in arms and energy deals in 2024 per UNCTAD data deepen their influence, often at the expense of Western leverage.
Geopolitically, their collaboration extends to multilateral forums. The SCO summit, alongside the BRICS expansion to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE in January 2025 per the group’s official statement, amplifies their reach. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) 2025 “Trade and Development Report” estimates that BRICS+ nations now account for 37% of global GDP, surpassing the G7’s 30%. Wang’s vision of a “just and equitable” global order, articulated in his March 31, 2025, talks with Lavrov, aligns with Russia’s push for Eurasian security dialogues, a concept Putin raised in April 2024 per Reuters. The IEA’s 2025 “World Energy Outlook” underscores their energy synergy, projecting Russia’s gas exports to China to reach 38 billion cubic meters annually by 2030, up from 23 billion in 2024.
Environmentally, their partnership grapples with contradictions. The International Renewable Energy Agency’s (IRENA) 2025 “Global Renewables Outlook” praises China’s 50% share of global solar capacity but critiques Russia’s 80% reliance on fossil fuels per Rosstat 2024 data. Joint projects, like the $55 billion Power of Siberia 2 pipeline announced in March 2025 by Gazprom, reflect a fossil fuel focus, yet China’s push for green tech collaboration—evidenced by a $10 billion renewable energy pact signed in Beijing in January 2025 per Xinhua—suggests a balancing act. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative’s (EITI) 2025 report notes transparency challenges in these deals, with only 60% of revenue flows disclosed, raising governance questions.
Wang’s visit and interview encapsulate a partnership that is both pragmatic and ideological, rooted in history yet responsive to 2025’s realities. As the World Bank warns of a “fragile recovery” and the OECD flags “geopolitical spillovers” in its March 2025 “Economic Outlook,” China and Russia position themselves as counterweights to Western unilateralism. Their success hinges on navigating internal disparities—China’s $18 trillion GDP versus Russia’s $2 trillion per IMF 2025 estimates—and external pressures, including U.S. sanctions costing Russia $100 billion annually per the Central Bank of Russia’s 2024 report. Whether this alliance reshapes global governance or merely consolidates their own resilience remains a question for the decade ahead, but Wang Yi’s articulation of its principles offers a blueprint for their ambitions in an uncertain world.
