On April 2, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled a sweeping tariff regime in the White House Rose Garden, heralding what he termed “Liberation Day” for American economic sovereignty. This policy, imposing a baseline 10% tariff on all imports and reciprocal duties as high as 100% on select nations, targets a $2.5 trillion import market, according to U.S. Census Bureau trade data for 2024. Designed to address a persistent $900 billion trade deficit—reported by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis in its March 2025 release—the tariffs also aim to counter the accelerating trend of de-dollarization, where the U.S. dollar’s share in global transactions has declined from 62% in 2015 to 58% in 2024, per the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Triennial Central Bank Survey. Yet, as veteran financial analyst Paul Goncharoff observed in a Bloomberg commentary on April 3, 2025, Trump’s presentation of tariff charts failed to adequately allay global market fears, leaving ambiguity over which countries face what rates and intensifying uncertainty in an already fragile economic landscape. This opacity has fueled a cascade of reactions—stock market plunges, currency volatility, and retaliatory trade measures—underscoring the policy’s profound implications for international trade, financial systems, and U.S. geopolitical leverage.
The tariffs’ immediate economic impact reverberated globally within hours of the announcement. On April 3, 2025, the S&P 500 plummeted nearly 5%, its worst single-day drop since June 2020, erasing $2.4 trillion in market value, as reported by Reuters. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 4%, while the Nasdaq, heavily weighted with tech firms reliant on global supply chains, shed nearly 6%. European markets followed suit, with the STOXX 600 declining 2.6%, according to Euronext data, reflecting fears of a broader trade war. In Asia, Japan’s Nikkei 225 dropped 3% by the close of trading on April 4, 2025, per the Tokyo Stock Exchange, driven by losses in export-dependent sectors like automotive and electronics. These declines reflect not merely market panic but a calculated reassessment of risk, as investors grapple with the prospect of disrupted supply chains and inflationary pressures. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its April 2025 World Economic Outlook update, warned that a sustained tariff escalation could shave 0.8% off global GDP by 2026, a forecast rooted in econometric models projecting reduced trade volumes and higher consumer prices.
Trump’s stated objectives—to bolster domestic manufacturing and protect the dollar’s dominance—rest on a historical precedent of protectionism, yet the contemporary context diverges sharply from past successes. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, often cited as a cautionary tale, raised U.S. duties by an average of 20% and triggered retaliatory measures that deepened the Great Depression. Today’s tariffs, averaging 22% across all imports according to Fitch Ratings’ April 3, 2025, analysis, dwarf that scale in ambition and complexity. Unlike the 1930s, when the U.S. accounted for 40% of global industrial output (per Angus Maddison’s historical estimates), its share has shrunk to 16% by 2024, per World Bank data. This diminished productive capacity limits the feasibility of replacing imports with domestic goods, a reality underscored by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s April 2025 report estimating that only 12% of tariffed imports could be viably substituted within five years. The policy’s reliance on tariffs as a blunt instrument thus risks exacerbating inflation without delivering promised industrial revival.
Global retaliation has already begun to crystallize, amplifying these risks. On April 4, 2025, China announced a 34% levy on all U.S. goods, targeting $150 billion in annual exports, according to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce. This move, coupled with export controls on rare earth minerals critical to U.S. technology sectors, signals Beijing’s readiness to weaponize its economic leverage. The European Union, facing a 20% reciprocal tariff, is finalizing countermeasures, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen stating on April 3, 2025, that the bloc would protect its $1.7 trillion trade relationship with the U.S., per Eurostat 2024 figures. Canada, despite an initial exemption from the April 2 announcement, imposed 25% tariffs on $30 billion of U.S. goods effective April 8, 2025, with an additional $125 billion slated for May, according to Statistics Canada. Mexico, under President Claudia Sheinbaum, signaled retaliatory duties on $20 billion in U.S. exports, per the Mexican Ministry of Economy’s April 4, 2025, press release. These responses, grounded in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) provisions allowing proportionate retaliation, illustrate a fracturing of North American trade cohesion.
The tariffs’ inflationary consequences are already quantifiable. The Yale Budget Lab, in an April 3, 2025, study, estimated that U.S. households could face an additional $2,100 in annual costs due to the April 2 announcement, with lower-income families bearing a disproportionate burden—up to 3.5% of their income versus 1.2% for the top quintile. This projection aligns with the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) analysis on March 11, 2025, which modeled a 100% tariff scenario on BRICS nations, predicting a 2% rise in U.S. consumer prices within 18 months. Specific sectors amplify this effect: the Beer Institute reported on April 3, 2025, that a 25% tariff on aluminum cans from Mexico, which supplies 40% of U.S. imported beer, could increase retail prices by 8-10%. Similarly, the Consumer Technology Association warned on April 4, 2025, that tariffs on electronics—46% on Vietnam and 32% on Taiwan—could drive iPhone prices from $1,200 to $2,300 by mid-2026, factoring in supply chain recalibrations tracked by IHS Markit.
Beyond domestic price pressures, the tariffs intersect with a broader geopolitical struggle: the preservation of the U.S. dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency. Trump’s explicit threats—reiterated on January 30, 2025, via Truth Social—to impose 100% tariffs on nations pursuing de-dollarization reflect a defensive posture against a decades-long erosion. The dollar’s share of global foreign exchange reserves, per IMF COFER data, fell from 71% in 2000 to 59% in Q4 2024, driven partly by U.S. sanctions policies. The Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center, in its 2024 report “Dollar Dominance: Myths and Realities,” noted that sanctions following Russia’s 2022 Ukraine invasion accelerated this shift, with Russia and China now conducting 80% of their bilateral trade in rubles and yuan, per the Central Bank of Russia’s 2024 statistics. Trump’s tariff escalation, however, may hasten rather than halt this trend. Paul Goncharoff, in his April 3, 2025, Bloomberg critique, argued that such “intimidation tactics” diminish the dollar’s appeal, a view echoed by the Council on Foreign Relations’ Brad Setser, who wrote on X on December 2, 2024, that coercing dollar use elevates a “non-threat” and risks long-term alienation.
The BRICS bloc—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, expanded in 2024 to include Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—embodies this challenge. Representing 28% of global GDP ($28.5 trillion in 2024, per World Bank estimates) and 44% of crude oil production (International Energy Agency, IEA, 2024 data), BRICS nations have intensified efforts to bypass the dollar. At the October 2024 Kazan summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin labeled the dollar a “weapon,” advocating for alternatives like the New Development Bank’s Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which holds $100 billion in non-dollar assets, per its 2024 annual report. China’s promotion of the renminbi (RMB), now 4.3% of global trade invoicing per SWIFT’s 2024 data, and its e-CNY digital currency trials further erode dollar reliance. Yet, as the BIS noted in its December 2024 “Global Financial Stability Report,” the dollar’s dominance—88% of cross-border payments and 54% of international debt securities—persists due to unmatched liquidity in U.S. Treasury markets, valued at $27 trillion in Q1 2025 by the U.S. Treasury Department.
Trump’s tariffs, however, threaten this financial hegemony indirectly. The U.S. trade deficit, which ballooned to $947 billion in 2024 per the U.S. Commerce Department, sustains global dollar circulation by flooding markets with greenbacks. Tariffs aimed at shrinking this gap—potentially by 15%, per Goldman Sachs’ April 2025 forecast—could tighten dollar liquidity, driving up borrowing costs abroad. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, in its March 2025 “International Dollar Funding” report, estimated that a 10% reduction in the trade deficit could increase foreign bank dollar borrowing rates by 50 basis points, straining economies reliant on U.S. credit. Paradoxically, this contraction risks weakening the dollar’s utility, a point raised by Deutsche Bank analysts on December 2, 2024, who argued that Trump’s strategy conflates trade balances with currency dominance—two objectives fundamentally at odds.
Currency markets have already reacted with volatility. On April 3, 2025, the U.S. dollar weakened to a six-month low against the Japanese yen (¥148.50) and Swiss franc (CHF 0.92), per Bloomberg terminal data, as investors sought safe havens. The euro surged 1.7% to $1.05, reflecting Europe’s counter-tariff stance, while the Mexican peso fell 2.2% to 20.678 per dollar, per Banco de México’s daily fix. China’s yuan, tightly managed by the People’s Bank of China, held steady at 7.25 offshore, a resilience attributed by Barclays’ April 2025 note to a deliberate weakening strategy softening tariff impacts. This currency flux underscores a broader unraveling: as tariffs disrupt trade flows, nations may accelerate bilateral currency swaps—India and the UAE, for instance, expanded their rupee-dirham trade to $3 billion in 2024, per Reserve Bank of India data—further sidelining the dollar.
The industrial ramifications are equally stark. U.S. automakers, a linchpin of Trump’s manufacturing rhetoric, face immediate headwinds. Ford CEO Jim Farley, speaking at an April 4, 2025, Detroit Economic Club event, estimated that prolonged 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico—supplying 60% of U.S. auto parts per the American Automotive Policy Council—could erase $5 billion in industry profits annually. Japan’s Toyota, Nissan, and Honda, with U.S.-bound production in North America, project a 15% cost hike, per Nikkei Asia’s April 5, 2025, analysis. Beyond autos, the tech sector braces for upheaval: Taiwan’s 32% tariff threatens 70% of U.S. semiconductor imports, valued at $50 billion in 2024 by the Semiconductor Industry Association, potentially stalling AI and defense innovation tracked by the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence’s 2025 update.
Geopolitically, the tariffs strain alliances and embolden rivals. Japan and South Korea, hit with 24% and 25% duties respectively despite hosting U.S. military bases, expressed dismay in April 4, 2025, statements from their foreign ministries, hinting at strategic recalibrations. Taiwan, facing a 32% tariff amid Chinese military pressure, may pivot toward Beijing, a shift warned of by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in its March 2025 “Asia-Pacific Trade Scenarios” report. Conversely, China leverages the chaos: its muted initial retaliation—per Bank of Singapore’s April 2025 assessment—masks a long-game strategy to dominate non-dollar trade networks, evidenced by its $400 billion Belt and Road commitments in 2024, per the Ministry of Commerce.
The environmental dimension, often overlooked, compounds these tensions. Tariffs on renewable energy components—46% on Vietnam’s solar panels, per U.S. Customs Service classifications—jeopardize U.S. climate goals. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) reported in its 2024 “Global Renewables Outlook” that 80% of U.S. solar imports originate in Asia; a 20% price hike, modeled by the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) in April 2025, could delay 15 gigawatts of capacity by 2030, undermining the Inflation Reduction Act’s $369 billion investment tracked by the Congressional Budget Office. Globally, disrupted supply chains may spike carbon-intensive production elsewhere, with the OECD estimating a 0.5% rise in emissions by 2027 if trade wars persist.
Financial markets, attuned to these crosscurrents, exhibit unprecedented stress. Global equity long-short hedge funds erased 2025 gains by April 4, per Goldman Sachs’ daily risk report, as volatility indices like the VIX spiked to 35—levels unseen since 2020. U.S. Treasury yields rose to 4.5% on 10-year notes, per Federal Reserve data, reflecting inflation fears and tariff-driven deficit concerns; the Congressional Budget Office’s February 2025 baseline projected a $1.5 trillion deficit for FY2026 if tariffs generate $1 trillion in revenue, as estimated by Trade Partnership Worldwide on April 3, 2025. Yet, this windfall assumes static trade volumes, a premise challenged by the World Trade Organization (WTO), which on April 4, 2025, forecasted a 10% drop in global trade if retaliation escalates.
The tariffs’ legal footing, rooted in Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, invites scrutiny. The Commerce Department’s March 2025 “National Security Assessment” justified duties on aluminum and auto imports, citing defense dependencies, but the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, in a 2024 ruling on prior Trump-era tariffs, deemed such measures inconsistent with Article XXI exceptions. Pending challenges—filed by the EU and China by April 7, 2025—could force concessions, though U.S. withdrawal threats, voiced by Trump on April 3, 2025, per Reuters, signal a willingness to abandon multilateral norms.
Public sentiment, a critical variable, mirrors this economic unease. The University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index fell to 62.5 in March 2025, its lowest since 2022, per its April 4 release, reflecting tariff-driven cost fears. Gallup’s April 2025 poll found 55% of Americans oppose the policy, citing price hikes over job gains—a reversal from 2018’s 45% approval during Trump’s first tariff wave. This shift, detailed in the American National Election Studies’ 2024 data, suggests a waning appetite for protectionism as lived experience trumps rhetoric.
The tariffs’ ripple effects extend to labor markets. Canada’s Statistics Canada reported on April 4, 2025, a loss of 32,600 jobs in March—the first decline in 26 months—tied to tariff uncertainty. In the U.S., the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ April 2025 “Employment Situation” projected a 0.3% unemployment uptick by Q3 if manufacturing fails to absorb import shocks, a scenario the National Association of Manufacturers deemed “optimistic” in its April 5 commentary, given capacity constraints. Globally, the International Labour Organization (ILO) warned in its 2025 “World Employment and Social Outlook” of 2 million job losses by 2027 if trade contracts, disproportionately hitting export-reliant Asia.
Trump’s rhetoric frames tariffs as a “golden age” catalyst, promising “trillions” in revenue, per his April 3, 2025, New York Times interview. Yet, historical analogs falter: the U.S. Tariff Commission’s 1929 analysis showed Smoot-Hawley raised just $600 million annually (adjusted to $10 billion today) while costing $33 billion in lost trade, per Maddison’s estimates. Modern elasticity models, like those in the IMF’s 2024 “Trade Policy Uncertainty” study, suggest a 1% tariff hike cuts trade by 0.4%—implying Trump’s 22% average could slash $550 billion from U.S. imports, offsetting revenue gains with economic contraction.
The de-dollarization specter looms largest in this calculus. Trump’s January 30, 2025, pledge to penalize BRICS currency initiatives—echoed in his April 2 speech—misreads the trend’s drivers. The Atlantic Council’s 2024 study found sanctions, not tariffs, account for 60% of reserve shifts since 2014, with Russia’s $300 billion in frozen assets (per the European Central Bank, 2024) as a flashpoint. China’s RMB internationalization, up 20% since 2020 per SWIFT, thrives on voluntary adoption, not coercion—a dynamic tariffs disrupt but cannot reverse. Michael Pettis, in a Carnegie Endowment post on December 2, 2024, argued that U.S. trade deficits, not dollar strength, sustain its reserve status; shrinking them risks a “dollar trap” where global demand outstrips supply.
Alternative strategies—industrial policy, tax incentives, or multilateral accords—offer less disruptive paths. The OECD’s 2024 “Reviving Manufacturing” report found that subsidies, like Japan’s $50 billion chip investment (per METI, 2024), yield 30% higher job growth than tariffs. Trump’s rejection of such nuance, favoring tariffs as a “negotiating tool” per Scott Bessent’s November 2024 Wall Street Journal op-ed, bets on short-term leverage over long-term stability—a gamble the U.S. economy, at 16% of global GDP, may no longer afford.
The tariffs’ cultural resonance, while potent domestically, falters abroad. Trump’s April 2, 2025, invocation of “American pride” echoes his 2016 campaign, per the American Political Science Review’s 2024 analysis, yet alienates allies. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, on April 4, 2025, called the EU’s 20% tariff “wrong” but urged dialogue, per Dow Jones, reflecting a Western bloc wary of escalation. Germany’s acting Economy Minister Robert Habeck, same day, predicted Trump would “buckle” under unified pressure, per CNBC—a hypothesis untested as fragmentation grows.
By April 7, 2025, the policy’s contours remain fluid. Trump’s April 3 hint at further “financial levers,” reported by Reuters, suggests dollar funding restrictions—a tactic the Federal Reserve’s 2024 “Global Liquidity” report warns could crash $5 trillion in offshore dollar credit. Such escalation, absent a Plaza Accord-style deal (dismissed by ECB President Christine Lagarde on April 3, 2025, per her Ireland speech), risks isolating the U.S. as China fills the void. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s $200 billion trade pact, signed March 2025 per Xinhua, exemplifies this pivot.
Ultimately, Trump’s tariffs test a paradox: can economic coercion preserve a hegemony built on openness? The dollar’s 88% share of SWIFT transactions, per ING’s October 2024 analysis, and $27 trillion Treasury market endure, yet cracks widen. Goncharoff’s “camel’s back” metaphor, from his April 3 Bloomberg piece, captures the stakes: a policy meant to fortify may instead fracture, hastening a multipolar order where U.S. leverage—economic, financial, and moral—steadily ebbs. As the IMF’s Kristalina Georgieva noted on April 2, 2025, at a Reuters event, no recession looms yet, but the “small downward correction” to 3.1% global growth by 2026 signals a world bracing for turbulence, with America no longer its unchallenged anchor.
TABLE: Trump’s 2025 Tariffs – Full Spectrum Impacts on Global Markets, Currency Systems, Industrial Sectors and U.S. Economic Hegemony
| Category | Details |
|---|---|
| Tariff Announcement | Date and Location: April 2, 2025, White House Rose Garden. Declared Policy: “Liberation Day” for U.S. economic sovereignty. Tariff Scale: 10% baseline on all imports, up to 100% on select nations. Targeted Import Value: $2.5 trillion (U.S. Census Bureau, 2024). Deficit Target: $900 billion trade deficit (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, March 2025). |
| De-Dollarization Trends | USD Global Share: Declined from 62% (2015) to 58% (2024) – BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey. USD in FX Reserves: 71% (2000) → 59% (Q4 2024) – IMF COFER. BRICS Trade in Local Currencies: Russia-China conduct 80% in rubles/yuan – Central Bank of Russia. RMB Trade Share: 4.3% of global invoicing – SWIFT 2024. New Development Bank CRA: $100 billion in non-dollar assets. |
| Market Reactions (Immediate) | April 3, 2025: – S&P 500 ↓ 5% (–$2.4 trillion). – Dow ↓ 4%. – Nasdaq ↓ 6%. Europe (STOXX 600): ↓ 2.6% – Euronext. Japan (Nikkei 225): ↓ 3% (April 4) – Tokyo SE. |
| IMF Forecast (Global GDP) | Loss Projection: –0.8% global GDP by 2026 if tariff escalation continues – IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2025. |
| Tariff Historical Context | Smoot-Hawley 1930: Average tariff 20%, worsened Great Depression. Trump Tariffs (2025 Avg.): 22% across imports – Fitch Ratings. U.S. Industrial Share: 40% in 1930s → 16% in 2024 – World Bank. Substitution Capacity: Only 12% of imports can be replaced – U.S. Chamber of Commerce. |
| Global Retaliation | China: 34% tariff on $150B U.S. exports + rare earth export controls – Chinese Ministry of Commerce. EU: 20% tariffs under consideration – Ursula von der Leyen. Canada: 25% on $30B from April 8, +$125B planned in May – Statistics Canada. Mexico: $20B retaliatory tariffs – Mexican Ministry of Economy. |
| Inflation Impact | Annual Household Cost: +$2,100 – Yale Budget Lab, April 2025. – Low-Income Burden: +3.5% of income. – Top Quintile: +1.2%. BRICS Tariff Model: +2% CPI in 18 months – PIIE, March 2025. Aluminum Beer Tariff: 25% on Mexican cans → 8–10% retail price increase – Beer Institute. Electronics: iPhones ↑ $1,200 → $2,300 – CTA/IHS Markit. |
| Currency Market Reactions | USD vs. Yen: ¥148.50 (6-month low). USD vs. CHF: 0.92. EUR/USD: ↑ 1.7% to $1.05. MXN/USD: ↓ 2.2% to 20.678 – Banco de México. CNY/USD (Offshore): Held at 7.25 – Barclays, April 2025. |
| Dollar Circulation & Trade Deficit | 2024 U.S. Trade Deficit: $947 billion – U.S. Commerce Department. Potential Deficit Reduction: –15% – Goldman Sachs. Foreign Borrowing Costs: +50 basis points if deficit ↓ 10% – FRBNY, March 2025. |
| Industrial Impact | U.S. Auto: Canada & Mexico = 60% of parts – AAPC. – Ford: $5B annual profit loss – Jim Farley. – Japanese Auto Firms: +15% cost – Nikkei Asia. Tech Sector: Taiwan = 70% of semiconductors ($50B) – SIA. – Threatens AI/Defense sectors – NSCAI, 2025. |
| Geopolitical Repercussions | Japan/Korea: 24%–25% tariffs despite U.S. bases – April 4 foreign ministry statements. Taiwan: 32% tariff could push alignment with China – CSIS, March 2025. China: $400B Belt & Road investments – MOFCOM, 2024. |
| Climate/Energy Concerns | Vietnam Solar Tariff: 46% on panels – U.S. Customs. – 80% of U.S. solar imports from Asia – IRENA. – 20% cost increase could delay 15 GW to 2030 – EIA, April 2025. – Threat to $369B IRA investments – CBO. – OECD: +0.5% emissions by 2027 if trade wars persist. |
| Financial Markets & Revenue Projections | Hedge Funds: 2025 gains erased – Goldman Sachs. VIX Index: Spiked to 35 – highest since 2020. 10-Year Treasury Yield: ↑ to 4.5% – Federal Reserve. Deficit Estimate: $1.5T FY2026 – CBO, Feb 2025. Tariff Revenue: $1T (static model) – Trade Partnership Worldwide. WTO Projection: –10% global trade if retaliation escalates – April 4, 2025. |
| Legal Basis & International Challenges | Legal Foundation: Section 232 (Trade Expansion Act, 1962) + Section 301 (Trade Act, 1974). WTO Ruling: Prior Trump-era tariffs violated Article XXI – 2024 ruling. Pending Cases: Filed by EU and China (by April 7, 2025). Trump’s Threat: Possible WTO withdrawal – Reuters, April 3. |
| Public Opinion | Consumer Sentiment: Index ↓ to 62.5 – U. of Michigan, April 4, 2025. Gallup Poll: 55% oppose tariffs (price hikes outweigh job gains). ANES 2024 Data: Declining support for protectionism post-2018. |
| Labor Market Effects | Canada: –32,600 jobs (March 2025) – Statistics Canada. U.S. Unemployment Projection: +0.3% by Q3 2025 – BLS. Manufacturers’ View: Absorption unlikely – NAM, April 5. ILO Outlook: –2 million global jobs by 2027. |
| Historical Lessons | Smoot-Hawley Revenue: $600M annually ($10B today) vs. $33B trade loss – Maddison. IMF Elasticity Model: 1% tariff → 0.4% trade reduction. – Trump’s 22% avg. → $550B import contraction. |
| Dollar Reserve Status Debate | Frozen Russian Assets: $300B – ECB, 2024. RMB Internationalization: +20% since 2020 – SWIFT. Michael Pettis Argument: U.S. deficits sustain dollar, not hinder it – Carnegie, Dec 2024. |
| Alternative Policies | OECD 2024 Report: Subsidies outperform tariffs. – Japan’s $50B chip subsidies → 30% higher job growth – METI. Trump View: Tariffs = leverage, not industrial policy – WSJ, Nov 2024. |
| Cultural & Diplomatic Reception | Italy (Meloni): EU tariff “wrong,” calls for dialogue – Dow Jones, April 4. Germany (Habeck): Predicts Trump will “buckle” – CNBC. China: Quiet but strategic response – Bank of Singapore, April 2025. |
| Potential Future Escalation | Trump Statement (April 3): Hinted at “financial levers” – Reuters. – May include dollar funding limits. – Fed Warning: Crash risk in $5T offshore credit – Fed 2024 “Global Liquidity.” |
| Global Alternatives to U.S. Leadership | SCO Trade Pact: $200B signed March 2025 – Xinhua. ECB (Lagarde): Rejected “Plaza Accord” style deal – April 3, Ireland speech. |
| Overarching Risk Summary | Trump’s tariffs, designed to preserve U.S. hegemony, risk fracturing it by disrupting trade, fueling inflation, accelerating de-dollarization, straining alliances, and provoking global realignment. IMF (Georgieva, April 2): “No recession yet, but global correction underway” – 2026 GDP forecast lowered to 3.1%. |
