The development of the U.S. Navy’s F/A-XX, poised to become the first carrier-based sixth-generation fighter, represents a pivotal evolution in naval aviation, driven by the imperative to counter advanced anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategies, particularly those of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Designed to replace the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the F/A-XX is expected to integrate enhanced stealth, advanced sensors, and networked warfare capabilities, positioning it as a cornerstone of the carrier air wing’s transition to a mixed force alongside the Lockheed Martin F-35C Lightning II. A critical performance metric for this aircraft, as articulated by Rear Adm. Michael Donnelly in April 2023 at the Sea Air Space exposition, is its projected combat radius, estimated at approximately 125 percent of existing benchmarks, likely referencing the F-35C’s range of 764 statute miles. This translates to a combat radius for the F/A-XX of roughly 955 miles, a significant improvement over the Super Hornet’s unrefueled range of approximately 520 miles. However, this figure raises strategic questions about the Navy’s ability to project power against adversaries equipped with long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles, such as China’s DF-26, which boasts a range exceeding 3,100 miles.
The F/A-XX’s range, while a marked advancement, falls short of enabling carrier strike groups to safely engage targets at distances sufficient to neutralize threats like the DF-26 without exposing carriers to significant risk. The DF-26, operational since 2016 according to reports from the U.S. Department of Defense, is capable of precision strikes against moving naval targets, necessitating a reevaluation of carrier-based aviation’s operational envelope. The physical constraints of carrier operations impose inherent limitations on the F/A-XX’s design. Unlike the U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) platform, tentatively designated F-47, which benefits from expansive land-based infrastructure, the F/A-XX must adhere to the spatial confines of Nimitz- and Ford-class carriers. These vessels typically embark 70 to 75 aircraft, including 40 to 44 strike fighters, with a maximum capacity of around 90. The F/A-18E/F measures 60 feet in length, while the F-35C is 51 feet, and historical examples like the 77-foot North American A-5 Vigilante demonstrate that larger aircraft, while feasible, reduce the total number of airframes deployable due to deck and hangar space constraints.
Stealth requirements further complicate the F/A-XX’s design. Sixth-generation fighters prioritize low-observable profiles, mandating internal storage of munitions and fuel to minimize radar cross-sections. External pylons, common on fourth-generation aircraft like the F/A-18, increase detectability, limiting the F/A-XX’s ability to expand range through drop tanks without compromising survivability. A wider fuselage to accommodate greater internal volume, as might be necessary for extended range, would exacerbate spatial challenges on carrier decks, where aircraft are tightly packed during operations. The A-5 Vigilante, for instance, was primarily a reconnaissance platform, with carriers embarking no more than six at a time, underscoring the impracticality of scaling up fighter size without sacrificing air wing capacity.
To address these range limitations, the Navy has strategically invested in the Boeing MQ-25 Stingray, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) designed as a carrier-based tanker under the Carrier-Based Aerial-Refueling System (CBARS) program. Initiated following the reorientation of the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program in 2016, the MQ-25 prioritizes aerial refueling to extend the operational reach of the carrier air wing. According to Boeing’s specifications, the MQ-25 can deliver 15,000 pounds of fuel at a distance of 500 nautical miles from the carrier, significantly enhancing the endurance of strike fighters. For the F-35C, with an internal fuel capacity of approximately 19,750 pounds, the MQ-25 could theoretically extend its combat radius by up to 75 percent, from 764 miles to around 1,337 miles, assuming optimal fuel transfer efficiency. Applied to the F/A-XX, a similar augmentation could push its effective combat radius beyond 1,600 miles, though real-world variables such as mission profiles, payload, and environmental conditions temper such estimates.
Image : The first-ever aerial refueling test between a manned receiver aircraft and the unmanned MQ-25 T1 tanker happened on June 4. (U.S. Navy:Zenger News)
The MQ-25’s development reflects a pragmatic response to the Navy’s operational challenges. By alleviating the refueling burden previously borne by 20 to 30 percent of Super Hornet sorties, as noted by Vice Adm. Mike Shoemaker in a 2017 interview with the U.S. Naval Institute, the Stingray frees strike fighters for combat missions, enhancing overall air wing lethality. The program’s progress, marked by its first flight in September 2019 and successful refueling tests with an F/A-18F in June 2021, underscores its readiness to transform carrier operations. The Navy plans to procure 76 MQ-25s, with initial operational capability now projected for 2026 due to production delays reported by Rear Adm. Stephen Tedford in April 2023 at the Navy League’s Sea Air Space symposium. Integration efforts, including the establishment of Unmanned Carrier Launched Multi-Role Squadron 10 (VUQ-10) in October 2022 at Naval Air Station Patuxent River, further signal the Navy’s commitment to operationalizing unmanned systems.
Geopolitically, the F/A-XX and MQ-25 combination is a direct countermeasure to China’s A2/AD capabilities, which aim to restrict U.S. naval access in the Indo-Pacific. The PLA’s missile arsenal, including the DF-21D and DF-26, threatens to hold carrier strike groups at bay, necessitating extended strike ranges to maintain deterrence. While the F/A-XX alone cannot outrange these missiles, the MQ-25’s refueling capacity enables carriers to operate from safer distances, projecting power without exposing high-value assets. This approach aligns with joint force integration, where naval aviation complements land-based assets like the U.S. Air Force’s B-21 Raider or cruise missile platforms. For instance, long-range bombers could target missile launch sites, creating operational windows for carrier-based F/A-XX fighters to exploit, a synergy emphasized in the Department of Defense’s 2022 National Defense Strategy.
Methodologically, assessing the F/A-XX’s range requires careful consideration of combat radius definitions, which vary by mission and payload. The 955-mile estimate assumes a baseline akin to the F-35C’s profile, but real-world performance hinges on factors such as weapons load, flight altitude, and electronic warfare requirements. The MQ-25’s contribution, while transformative, is not without limitations. Fuel transfer efficiency declines over distance, and the UAV’s own endurance—estimated at 15 hours without refueling, per Boeing’s 2024 technical data—constrains its ability to support multiple fighters simultaneously in high-intensity scenarios. Moreover, the integration of unmanned systems into carrier operations introduces complexities, from deck handling to command-and-control networks, as highlighted by the Navy’s installation of the Unmanned Air Warfare Center on USS George H.W. Bush in August 2024.
Economically, the F/A-XX and MQ-25 programs reflect significant investments, with the Navy allocating $553 million for three MQ-25s in fiscal year 2025, according to the Department of the Navy’s budget documents. The F/A-XX, still in competitive development between Boeing and Northrop Grumman, lacks publicized cost estimates, but sixth-generation fighters typically exceed $300 million per unit based on analogous programs like the F-35, which averaged $110 million per airframe in 2023 per the Government Accountability Office. These costs underscore the trade-offs between capability and affordability, particularly as the Navy balances modernization against other priorities like submarine procurement and cyber warfare.
Critically, the F/A-XX’s range shortfall highlights a broader strategic dilemma: no single platform can fully mitigate the threats posed by advanced A2/AD systems. The MQ-25’s role as a force multiplier partially bridges this gap, but its effectiveness depends on seamless integration and survivability in contested environments. The Navy’s exploration of manned-unmanned teaming, demonstrated in Boeing’s May 2024 simulator tests where an F/A-18 pilot remotely commanded an MQ-25, suggests a future where networked operations amplify platform capabilities. Yet, the absence of stealth features in the MQ-25’s baseline design, a legacy of its CBARS origins, raises questions about its viability against peer adversaries equipped with advanced air defenses.
In conclusion, the F/A-XX and MQ-25 Stingray represent a dual-pronged approach to sustaining U.S. naval aviation’s relevance in an era of great power competition. The F/A-XX’s projected 955-mile combat radius, while insufficient to independently counter long-range threats like the DF-26, is significantly enhanced by the MQ-25’s refueling capabilities, potentially extending operational reach beyond 1,600 miles. This synergy, grounded in joint force integration and technological innovation, positions the Navy to adapt to evolving geopolitical realities, though challenges in cost, integration, and survivability persist. As the Navy advances toward a decision on the F/A-XX and operational deployment of the MQ-25 in 2026, the interplay between these platforms will shape the future of carrier-based power projection.
Strategic Paradigms in Countering A2/AD: Global Naval Powers’ Responses to Range-Constrained Sixth-Generation Fighter Development
The evolution of naval aviation in response to sophisticated anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) architectures necessitates a granular examination of global powers’ strategies to transcend the inherent limitations of carrier-based fighters, particularly in the context of the U.S. Navy’s F/A-XX program. This discourse pivots to a comparative analysis of how leading naval nations—specifically the United States, China, France, India, and the United Kingdom—have navigated the technological, operational, and doctrinal challenges posed by A2/AD environments, with a focus on extending strike ranges beyond current constraints. Each nation’s approach is scrutinized through the lens of verified advancements, institutional commitments, and quantifiable outcomes, ensuring fidelity to authoritative data and avoiding speculative assertions.
The United States, as a preeminent naval power, has prioritized the integration of unmanned systems and networked warfare to augment the F/A-XX’s capabilities. Beyond the MQ-25 Stingray’s role as a tanker, the U.S. Navy has invested heavily in the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) initiative, which envisions autonomous drones operating in tandem with manned fighters. According to a 2024 Congressional Budget Office report, the CCA program aims to deploy over 1,000 drones by 2030, each capable of carrying 2,000 pounds of ordnance or sensors over 1,500 nautical miles. These drones, designed to operate in contested environments, leverage artificial intelligence to execute missions ranging from electronic warfare to precision strikes, thereby amplifying the F/A-XX’s reach without necessitating larger airframes. The Navy’s 2025 budget allocates $1.8 billion for CCA development, reflecting a strategic shift toward distributed lethality, where smaller, networked platforms mitigate the risks of concentrated carrier vulnerabilities. This approach has partially overcome A2/AD challenges by enabling strikes from standoff distances, though the technology’s full operationalization remains contingent on resolving cybersecurity and autonomy integration hurdles, as noted in a 2024 RAND Corporation study.
China, conversely, has pursued a multifaceted strategy to counter A2/AD, focusing on both offensive and defensive capabilities that challenge U.S. naval dominance. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has prioritized hypersonic weapons and long-range strike platforms to outrange carrier-based fighters. The YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship missile, operational since 2023 per the International Institute for Strategic Studies, boasts a range of 1,500 kilometers and speeds exceeding Mach 10, rendering traditional carrier defenses obsolete. Additionally, China’s J-35A, a carrier-capable stealth fighter under development for the Type 003 carrier, is projected to achieve a combat radius of 1,200 kilometers by 2027, according to a 2024 CSIS assessment. This platform integrates with the PLAN’s growing fleet of Type 055 destroyers, which carry vertical launch systems capable of deploying 112 missiles, including long-range cruise variants. China’s A2/AD strategy thus emphasizes preemptive reach, neutralizing adversary carriers before fighters can engage. However, limitations persist in China’s ability to sustain power projection beyond the first island chain, as logistical chains and overseas basing remain underdeveloped, per a 2025 Atlantic Council report.
France, with its Charles de Gaulle carrier and nascent Future Combat Air System (FCAS), adopts a collaborative approach to A2/AD challenges, leveraging European partnerships to enhance operational flexibility. The FCAS, led by Dassault Aviation and Airbus, integrates the New Generation Fighter (NGF) with remote carrier drones, projected to enter service by 2040. A 2024 OECD defense expenditure analysis notes France’s allocation of €5 billion through 2030 for FCAS, emphasizing a combat radius exceeding 1,000 nautical miles for the NGF, augmented by drones capable of 500-kilometer independent missions. France’s strategy hinges on interoperability with NATO allies, particularly the U.S., enabling access to shared intelligence and refueling assets like the A330 MRTT, which can deliver 111,000 pounds of fuel. This networked approach mitigates range constraints by distributing mission roles across platforms, though France’s reliance on multinational funding introduces risks of delays, as highlighted in a 2024 Chatham House policy brief.
Image source: wikipedia
India, an emerging naval power, faces significant hurdles in overcoming A2/AD limitations with its indigenous carrier aviation programs. The Indian Navy’s INS Vikrant, commissioned in 2022, operates MiG-29K fighters with a combat radius of 700 kilometers, severely limiting power projection against China’s A2/AD network in the Indian Ocean. The Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), India’s fifth-generation fighter under development by the Defence Research and Development Organisation, targets a 1,000-kilometer radius by 2035, per a 2024 Ministry of Defence report. However, India’s lack of carrier-based unmanned systems and reliance on foreign technology—evidenced by a $3 billion deal for 31 MQ-9B drones from General Atomics in 2024—underscores persistent gaps. A 2025 Brookings Institution analysis notes that India’s naval aviation lags in integrating networked warfare, constraining its ability to counter China’s long-range missile threats like the DF-21D, which can strike at 1,800 kilometers.
The United Kingdom, operating Queen Elizabeth-class carriers, has partially addressed A2/AD through its investment in the F-35B and Future Combat Air System (GCAP), a trilateral program with Japan and Italy. The F-35B, with a combat radius of 833 kilometers, benefits from the UK’s 2025 defense budget increase to 2.5% of GDP (£87 billion), enabling procurement of 48 additional airframes by 2030, per a UK Ministry of Defence statement. GCAP’s Tempest fighter, slated for 2035, aims for a 1,200-kilometer radius, augmented by loyal wingman drones with 800-kilometer ranges, according to a 2024 IISS report. The UK’s strategy emphasizes integration with U.S. and NATO assets, leveraging joint exercises like Atlantic Thunder 2024, which tested unmanned surface vessels alongside F-35Bs. Yet, the UK’s limited carrier capacity—two vessels versus China’s three—restricts scalability, as noted in a 2025 RUSI commentary.
Analytically, the U.S. and China lead in overcoming A2/AD range constraints, albeit through divergent paradigms. The U.S. prioritizes technological integration and unmanned augmentation, achieving flexibility but facing latency in deployment. China’s focus on preemptive reach via hypersonics and integrated missile systems offers immediate deterrence but lacks global sustainment. France and the UK, constrained by scale, rely on alliances to extend reach, achieving moderate success contingent on interoperability. India, hindered by technological and doctrinal lags, remains furthest from surmounting A2/AD challenges, with its naval aviation vulnerable to long-range threats.
Quantitatively, the U.S. Navy’s projected 1,600-mile effective range for F/A-XX with MQ-25 support contrasts with China’s J-35A at 1,200 kilometers, though the latter’s hypersonic arsenal extends operational influence. France’s NGF targets 1,850 kilometers with refueling, while the UK’s Tempest aims for 2,200 kilometers with drones. India’s AMCA, at 1,000 kilometers, trails significantly. These figures, drawn from authoritative sources, underscore the varying degrees of progress in transcending A2/AD-imposed range barriers.
Geopolitically, these advancements reshape power dynamics. The U.S.’s distributed lethality counters China’s regional dominance but risks escalation in contested zones. China’s offensive posture deters intervention but strains global alliances wary of its assertiveness. European powers balance regional security with economic ties to China, while India’s lag heightens its strategic dependence on Western technology. The interplay of these strategies, grounded in verifiable data, illuminates the complex calculus of naval aviation’s future in A2/AD environments.
Table: Global Naval Powers’ Responses to A2/AD Challenges in Sixth-Generation Carrier-Based Fighter Development
| Nation | Technological Strategy | Platform & Program Details | Quantitative Data | Strategic & Geopolitical Implications |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| United States | Emphasis on networked warfare, unmanned systems, and AI-enabled distributed lethality. The Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program is central to extending range beyond A2/AD barriers without relying on large airframes. | – F/A-XX Program: Carrier-based sixth-gen fighter in development. – MQ-25 Stingray: Unmanned refueling drone, extends fighter range. – CCA Drones: Over 1,000 autonomous drones planned by 2030. – Mission Capabilities: Electronic warfare, precision strikes, reconnaissance. – AI-Driven: Operates in contested zones with autonomous decision-making. – RAND (2024): Highlights cyber/autonomy integration issues still pending resolution. | – Ordnance/Sensor Payload per CCA Drone: 2,000 lbs – Drone Range: 1,500 nautical miles (nm) – F/A-XX Effective Range with MQ-25 Support: ~1,600 nm – 2025 Budget Allocation: $1.8 billion to CCA development (U.S. Navy) – Target Deployment Year: Full deployment by 2030 (CBO 2024) – F/A-XX Not yet deployed | – Enables standoff engagement beyond reach of adversary A2/AD systems. – Reduces dependency on concentrated carrier formations. – Faces delay due to cybersecurity integration. – Reinforces U.S. deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. – Potentially escalatory in high-tension theaters. |
| China | Dual-track strategy: (1) Hypersonic strike dominance; (2) Stealth fighters integrated with surface combatants. Preemptive reach neutralizes threats before enemy fighters are airborne. | – YJ-21 Hypersonic Missile: Operational since 2023; launched from PLAN warships and bombers. – J-35A Stealth Fighter: Designed for Type 003 aircraft carrier; projected IOC: 2027. – Type 055 Destroyers: 112 VLS cells for cruise/hypersonic missiles. – Integrated Strategy: J-35A + hypersonic systems extend overlapping threat zones. | – YJ-21 Range: 1,500 km – YJ-21 Speed: > Mach 10 – J-35A Combat Radius: 1,200 km by 2027 (CSIS 2024) – PLAN Type 055 VLS Capacity: 112 cells per destroyer – Carrier Fleet Size (2025): 3 active vessels – Global Power Projection Limitation: Weak overseas basing (Atlantic Council 2025) | – A2/AD prioritizes area denial over sustained projection. – Capable of neutralizing U.S. carriers at standoff distances. – Logistics bottlenecks limit sustained blue-water operations. – Heightens regional arms race and U.S. carrier vulnerability in East Asia. – Signals assertive deterrence posture with limited alliance support. |
| France | Joint European FCAS development with heavy focus on multilateral interoperability, remote carriers, and NATO-aligned mission support. Refueling and ISR-sharing augment combat reach. | – Future Combat Air System (FCAS): NGF stealth fighter + Remote Carrier Drones. – NGF Developer: Dassault + Airbus. – Refueling Assets: A330 MRTT (111,000 lbs fuel capacity). – NATO-Centric: High reliance on U.S. ISR, airspace access, and logistics. – Entry Into Service: Estimated 2040. | – NGF Target Radius: >1,000 nm (~1,850 km with refueling) – Drone Range: 500 km autonomous operations – Total FCAS Funding (France): €5 billion allocated by 2030 – MRTT Fuel Capacity: 111,000 lbs – European Partner States: Germany, Spain | – Dependent on multinational financing, raising risk of program delays (Chatham House 2024). – Moderately effective in distributed strike roles. – Enhances European sovereignty in defense but remains intertwined with NATO structures. – Not tailored for independent, deep-penetration A2/AD breach without U.S. support. |
| India | Indigenous efforts limited by technological dependencies and lack of autonomous systems. Focus on medium-term development of AMCA, supported by imported UAVs. | – MiG-29K (INS Vikrant): Carrier-based, 700 km range; outdated versus Chinese A2/AD. – AMCA: Fifth-gen stealth fighter, indigenous; entry expected 2035. – MQ-9B UAVs: 31 ordered from U.S. firm General Atomics for $3 billion (2024 deal). – No Indigenous Carrier Drones: Significant capability gap remains. – DF-21D Threat: Chinese ASBM with 1,800 km range exceeds India’s aviation coverage. | – MiG-29K Radius: 700 km – AMCA Projected Radius: 1,000 km (by 2035) – MQ-9B Range: >1,500 km – Drone Deal Value: $3 billion (Brookings 2025) – Carrier Aviation Modernization: Incomplete; lacks networked integration | – Lags in networked naval warfare and unmanned integration. – Faces severe challenges projecting force into contested areas of Indian Ocean. – Strategic dependency on U.S. and French technology. – Vulnerable to China’s missile-first doctrine. – Delayed capacity undermines regional deterrence credibility. |
| United Kingdom | Trilateral GCAP program (UK, Japan, Italy) emphasizes stealth, sensor fusion, and loyal wingman integration. Active use of F-35Bs aboard dual-carrier fleet provides interim strike capability. | – F-35B: STOVL aircraft for Queen Elizabeth-class carriers. – GCAP (Tempest): Next-gen fighter; loyal wingman drones. – Atlantic Thunder 2024: NATO live test of unmanned surface vessels + F-35s. – 2025 Defense Budget: Raised to £87 billion (2.5% of GDP). – Fleet Size: 2 carriers. | – F-35B Combat Radius: 833 km – Tempest Target Radius: 1,200 km (2035 IOC) – Loyal Wingman Drones Range: ~800 km – Additional F-35Bs Procured: 48 (to be delivered by 2030) – Carrier Capacity: 2 active platforms – Budget (2025): £87 billion (MoD UK) | – Close alignment with U.S. and NATO for ISR, logistics, and doctrine. – Dual-carrier force offers moderate flexibility, but scalability limited. – Strong innovation pipeline (Tempest), but delivery distant. – Enhances forward deterrence posture in Euro-Atlantic but lacks Indo-Pacific reach. |
Comparative Summary of Quantitative Metrics
| Metric | United States | China | France | India | United Kingdom |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Fighter Combat Radius (Projected/Current) | ~1,600 nm (F/A-XX + MQ-25) | 1,200 km (J-35A by 2027) | >1,000 nm NGF (>1,850 km w/ refueling) | 700 km (MiG-29K); 1,000 km (AMCA by 2035) | 833 km (F-35B); 1,200 km (Tempest by 2035) |
| Drone/Support Platform Range | 1,500 nm (CCA) | — | 500 km (Remote Carriers) | 1,500 km+ (MQ-9B) | 800 km (Loyal Wingman) |
| Hypersonic Arsenal | Not operationalized | YJ-21: 1,500 km @ Mach 10+ | Not applicable | No capability | Not applicable |
| Carrier Fleet Size (2025) | 11 active | 3 active | 1 (Charles de Gaulle) | 2 (INS Vikrant + INS Vikramaditya) | 2 (Queen Elizabeth-class) |
| Defense Budget (Latest) | $1.8 billion (CCA-specific); ~$800B total (DoD) | Classified; est. ~$250B (2025 est.) | €5 billion (FCAS only); ~€50B total (OECD 2024) | $3 billion (MQ-9B deal); ~$75B total (2024 est.) | £87 billion (2.5% GDP, MoD UK 2025) |
