The United States Department of Defense (DoD) stands at a pivotal juncture in its pursuit of advanced nuclear energy to bolster military readiness and energy security. The pressing need for reliable, resilient power at domestic military installations, coupled with the strategic imperative to reduce dependence on vulnerable commercial grids, necessitates a recalibration of DoD’s nuclear energy initiatives. While the Project Pele mobile microreactor program has achieved notable technological milestones, its operational limitations render it impractical for the dynamic demands of modern military operations. Instead, prioritizing fixed microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs) at domestic installations offers a viable pathway to enhance energy reliability, support critical missions, and catalyze a globally competitive U.S. nuclear industry. This strategic shift aligns with the Trump administration’s directive to unleash domestic energy resources, as articulated in the January 20, 2025, executive order emphasizing nuclear energy development. Drawing on verified data from authoritative sources, including the Department of Energy (DOE), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and peer-reviewed studies, this article critically examines the limitations of Project Pele, evaluates the potential of fixed reactor initiatives, and proposes a funding realignment to realize a transformative nuclear energy framework for U.S. military installations.
The urgency for enhanced energy resilience at domestic military installations stems from escalating vulnerabilities in the U.S. electrical grid. A 2023 DOE report highlighted that 99 percent of DoD installations rely on commercial grids increasingly strained by surging demand from artificial intelligence (AI) data centers and semiconductor manufacturing. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects a 15 percent increase in U.S. electricity consumption by 2030, driven by these sectors, with data centers alone expected to consume 8 percent of national power by 2030, up from 3 percent in 2022. Concurrently, extreme weather events, exacerbated by climate variability, have intensified grid disruptions. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) reported 28 weather-related disasters in 2023, each exceeding $1 billion in damages, many causing prolonged outages. For military installations, such disruptions jeopardize mission-critical operations, including cyber warfare, drone coordination, and logistics support for overseas deployments. A 2021 DoD study underscored that power outages at domestic bases can cascade to forward-operating units, compromising global force readiness.
Against this backdrop, the DoD’s pursuit of nuclear energy solutions is both timely and strategic. Nuclear power offers unparalleled reliability, operating continuously without the intermittency of renewables or the logistical vulnerabilities of fossil fuel supply chains. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) notes that nuclear reactors achieve capacity factors exceeding 90 percent, compared to 35 percent for solar and 25 percent for wind. For military applications, this reliability is critical to sustaining uninterrupted operations. Moreover, nuclear energy aligns with national security objectives to reduce reliance on foreign energy imports, a priority reinforced by the 2024 Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, which banned Russian enriched uranium and allocated $2.72 billion to bolster domestic uranium supply chains, as reported by the White House on May 29, 2024.
Project Pele, initiated in 2019 by the DoD’s Strategic Capabilities Office, aimed to address operational energy needs through a transportable microreactor. Designed to produce 1 to 5 megawatts (MW) of power, the reactor was envisioned as a mobile solution to replace diesel generators in forward-operating environments, reducing the vulnerability of fuel convoys. The program, developed by BWX Technologies, broke ground at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) in September 2024, with testing slated for 2026. Posts on X from @GovNuclear on September 24, 2024, and March 23, 2025, highlight the project’s ambition to demonstrate a high-temperature gas reactor using tristructural isotropic (TRISO) fuel, a robust ceramic-encased fuel form enhancing safety. The DoD has invested over $500 million in Project Pele, as noted in a 2024 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, reflecting significant congressional support.
Despite its technological advancements, Project Pele faces insurmountable operational constraints. The reactor’s design, constrained by the need for air transport via a C-17 aircraft, necessitates heavy radiation shielding, resulting in a setup time of three days and a teardown time of seven days, as detailed in a 2021 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study. This timeline is incompatible with the rapid mobility required by modern U.S. forces, which often relocate within hours in contested environments. The NAS study further noted that the reactor’s 1 MW capacity, reduced from an initial 5 MW target, is insufficient for larger forward bases with energy demands exceeding 10 MW, such as those supporting air operations or radar systems. Deploying multiple reactors to meet higher loads introduces additional safety, security, and logistical complexities, undermining the simplicity critical in combat zones.
Moreover, the focus on mobility compromises the reactor’s scalability and cost-effectiveness. The DOE’s 2024 Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program report indicates that fixed microreactors, ranging from 3 to 10 MW, achieve economies of scale more readily than mobile designs, with levelized costs of electricity (LCOE) estimated at $70–$100 per megawatt-hour (MWh) compared to $150–$200/MWh for mobile reactors. The high cost of Project Pele’s specialized shielding and transport infrastructure further erodes its economic viability. A 2023 INL analysis concluded that mobile reactors face heightened regulatory scrutiny from the NRC due to their deployment in diverse environments, complicating licensing and increasing costs. These factors collectively suggest that Project Pele, while a technological feat, is misaligned with the DoD’s broader energy security objectives.
In contrast, fixed microreactors and SMRs at domestic installations offer a compelling alternative. The Air Force’s microreactor project at Eielson Air Force Base, initiated in 2020, aims to deploy a 3–10 MW reactor by 2027, as reported by the DOE on July 9, 2024. The Army’s Advanced Nuclear Power for Installations program, launched in 2024 in collaboration with the Defense Innovation Unit, has selected eight companies for demonstration contracts, targeting reactors to power critical missions within microgrids isolated from commercial grids. The Navy’s 2024 initiative explores SMRs up to 300 MW, capable of supplying entire bases and surrounding communities, as noted in an October 9, 2024, American Nuclear Society (ANS) report. These programs leverage existing infrastructure, reducing capital costs by 15–35 percent compared to greenfield projects, according to a 2022 DOE study on coal-to-nuclear transitions.
The strategic advantages of fixed reactors are manifold. First, they address the immediate energy reliability needs of domestic installations. A 2023 DoD energy resilience assessment found that 40 percent of installations lack sufficient backup power to sustain critical missions during outages exceeding 48 hours. Fixed microreactors, integrated into on-base microgrids, can provide continuous power, mitigating this risk. Second, they support the Trump administration’s vision for energy-intensive commercial applications on military land. The administration’s January 20, 2025, executive order encourages siting AI data centers and rare earth refineries on DoD installations to expedite permitting. A 2024 World Economic Forum (WEF) report estimates that AI data centers require 50–100 MW of constant power, a demand nuclear reactors can reliably meet without load shedding.
Third, fixed reactor programs align with bipartisan reforms to streamline NRC licensing. The ADVANCE Act, signed into law on July 9, 2024, as reported by the DOE, reduces licensing fees, authorizes increased NRC staffing, and introduces prize competitions to incentivize first-mover deployments. The NRC’s 2024 licensing status dashboards, cited in a May 29, 2024, White House fact sheet, enhance transparency and expedite reviews for advanced reactors. These reforms lower barriers for fixed reactor projects, which operate in controlled environments, compared to mobile reactors requiring flexible licensing for varied deployment scenarios.
A critical enabler of these initiatives is the domestic production of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), enriched to 5–20 percent U-235. HALEU is essential for most advanced reactors, offering higher efficiency and longer core life, as outlined in a December 2, 2024, DOE explainer. The DOE’s HALEU Availability Program, funded with $700 million from the Inflation Reduction Act, has made significant strides. Centrus Energy Corporation produced 100 kilograms of HALEU in 2023 and aims for 900 kilograms annually by 2025, as reported in a May 29, 2024, White House summit summary. The DOE’s $2.7 billion investment in domestic uranium enrichment, announced on July 9, 2024, further strengthens the supply chain, reducing reliance on Russian imports, which previously accounted for 20 percent of U.S. enriched uranium, according to a 2024 DOE report.
Realigning DoD funding from Project Pele to fixed reactor initiatives is a prudent step to capitalize on these developments. The CRS report notes that Project Pele’s $500 million investment has yielded valuable insights, including advancements in TRISO fuel and reactor safety systems, which can be applied to fixed designs. However, continued funding for a program constrained by physical and operational limitations risks diverting resources from more viable solutions. The Army’s demonstration contracts, valued at $100 million in 2024, and the Air Force’s Eielson project, budgeted at $300 million, require sustained investment to progress from prototyping to deployment. The Navy’s SMR initiative, still in early planning, could benefit from an estimated $1 billion over five years to achieve operational status, based on DOE cost projections for similar projects.
This funding shift would also stimulate the U.S. nuclear industry, aligning with the Trump administration’s goal of energy dominance. A 2024 OECD report projects that global nuclear capacity must triple by 2050 to meet net-zero targets, creating a $500–$740 billion market. Domestic reactor deployments at DoD installations can serve as a proving ground, de-risking technologies for commercial adoption. The DOE’s 2024 coal-to-nuclear study estimates that converting 80 percent of U.S. coal sites to nuclear could add 250 gigawatts (GW) of capacity, creating 650 permanent jobs per site. Military-led projects can catalyze this transition, leveraging existing workforce skills and infrastructure.
Geopolitically, prioritizing fixed reactors enhances U.S. energy security and influence. The 2024 multilateral commitment at COP28, involving the U.S., Canada, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom, pledged $4.2 billion to develop a Russian-free uranium supply chain, as noted in a December 30, 2024, DOE report. DoD’s leadership in HALEU-fueled reactors positions the U.S. to set global standards for safety and nonproliferation, countering the dominance of Russian and Chinese state-owned nuclear enterprises. A 2020 Department of Commerce report warned that U.S. nuclear technology lags behind these competitors, risking strategic influence in a critical sector.
Methodologically, the DoD must adopt a competitive, multi-design approach to reactor development. The Army’s selection of eight companies for demonstration contracts exemplifies this strategy, fostering innovation and resilience. The DOE’s Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program, which allocated $3.2 billion to two SMR projects in 2020, demonstrates that upfront investment can reduce long-term costs by 20–30 percent, as reported in a 2023 INL study. The DoD should emulate this model, funding multiple prototypes to establish a diverse reactor portfolio meeting stringent safety and performance criteria.
Critically, the DoD must coordinate with the DOE and NRC to streamline regulatory and supply chain pathways. The 2021 Executive Order on Promoting Small Modular Reactors, issued by the Trump administration, directed interagency collaboration to advance HALEU production and reactor licensing. Building on this, the DoD can leverage the NRC’s modernized licensing framework for non-light-water reactors, implemented in 2024, to expedite approvals. The DOE’s partnerships with national labs, such as INL’s work on HALEU recycling, can ensure fuel availability, with INL targeting 10 metric tons of HALEU by 2030, as reported on December 2, 2024.
The economic implications of this shift are significant. A 2024 WEF analysis estimates that nuclear energy projects generate $1.50 in economic output per dollar invested, compared to $1.20 for renewables. For DoD installations, fixed reactors can reduce energy costs, currently averaging $0.15 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) for commercial grid power, to $0.07–$0.10/kWh, based on DOE LCOE projections. These savings can be reinvested into mission-critical capabilities, enhancing fiscal efficiency.
Environmentally, fixed reactors align with global decarbonization goals. The IAEA’s 2024 report projects that nuclear power could reduce global CO2 emissions by 1.5 gigatons annually by 2050 if capacity triples. For DoD, adopting carbon-free nuclear energy supports the administration’s energy independence agenda while mitigating climate-related risks to installations, such as flooding and heatwaves, documented in a 2023 NOAA study.
In conclusion, the DoD’s nuclear energy strategy must pivot from the operationally constrained Project Pele to fixed microreactors and SMRs at domestic installations. This realignment addresses immediate energy reliability needs, supports strategic commercial applications, and positions the U.S. as a global leader in nuclear technology. By reallocating Project Pele’s funding to the Air Force, Army, and Navy’s installation-focused programs, the DoD can leverage bipartisan regulatory reforms, secure HALEU supply chains, and foster a competitive reactor portfolio. The Trump administration and Congress must act decisively to sustain this momentum, ensuring that the DoD’s nuclear breakthrough delivers lasting strategic and economic dividends. The path forward demands rigorous investment, interagency coordination, and a commitment to technological excellence, rooted in the lessons of Project Pele and the promise of a resilient nuclear future.
Geopolitical Implications of Trump’s Data Policies on the U.S. Nuclear Sector: Securing Radioactive Materials and Critical Minerals for Microreactors and Small Modular Reactors
The Trump administration’s data policies, introduced in early 2025, emphasize the rapid deployment of energy-intensive infrastructure, particularly artificial intelligence (AI) data centers, to bolster U.S. technological and economic leadership. These policies, articulated in the January 20, 2025, Executive Order on Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, incentivize the co-location of data centers with reliable, carbon-free energy sources, notably nuclear microreactors and small modular reactors (SMRs). This strategic pivot amplifies the geopolitical significance of the U.S. nuclear sector, as it necessitates securing radioactive materials, such as high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), and critical minerals, including rare earth elements and lithium, essential for reactor construction and operation. The global competition for these resources, coupled with the administration’s push for energy dominance, reshapes international alliances, trade dynamics, and security frameworks. Drawing on authoritative sources, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), and the World Bank, this analysis evaluates the geopolitical implications of these policies, focusing on supply chain vulnerabilities, strategic partnerships, and the U.S.’s position in the global nuclear market.
The Trump administration’s data policies prioritize siting AI data centers on federal lands, including Department of Defense (DoD) installations, to expedite permitting and leverage existing infrastructure. A February 18, 2025, analysis by Inside Energy & Environment notes that data centers require 50–100 megawatts (MW) of constant, zero-carbon power, making nuclear reactors an ideal match due to their 90 percent capacity factor, as reported by the IAEA in 2024. This demand accelerates the deployment of microreactors (up to 20 MW) and SMRs (20–300 MW), which offer factory-built modularity and scalability, as outlined in a 2024 DOE report. However, the production of these reactors hinges on access to HALEU, enriched to 5–20 percent U-235, and critical minerals like neodymium, dysprosium, and lithium, used in reactor magnets and control systems. The geopolitical challenge lies in securing these resources amidst global supply chain constraints and competing national interests.
The U.S.’s reliance on foreign radioactive materials poses a significant vulnerability. In 2023, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) reported that 95 percent of U.S. uranium concentrate was imported, with Russia supplying 20 percent of enriched uranium. The 2024 Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, effective August 2024, banned these imports, allocating $2.72 billion to domestic enrichment capacity. By December 2024, Centrus Energy Corporation scaled HALEU production to 350 kilograms annually, targeting 900 kilograms by 2026, according to a DOE update. Despite this progress, the U.S. remains years from self-sufficiency. The IAEA’s 2024 nuclear fuel cycle report projects global HALEU demand to reach 3,000 metric tons by 2035, driven by advanced reactor deployments, intensifying competition with China and Russia, which dominate uranium enrichment. China’s 2024 addition of 10 new reactors, as noted by BloombergNEF, underscores its aggressive nuclear expansion, potentially monopolizing global fuel supplies.
Critical minerals present an equally complex challenge. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 2024 Mineral Commodity Summaries indicate that the U.S. imports 90 percent of its rare earth elements, with China controlling 80 percent of global production. Lithium, critical for reactor battery systems, is 50 percent imported, primarily from Chile and Australia. The World Economic Forum’s 2024 energy transition report highlights that geopolitical tensions, such as export restrictions by China, could disrupt these supply chains, inflating costs and delaying reactor projects. The Trump administration’s push to domesticate mineral supply chains, as outlined in a March 7, 2025, Atlantic Council report, involves streamlining permitting and incentivizing extraction, but faces environmental and regulatory hurdles. For instance, the proposed Resolution Copper mine in Arizona, backed by Rio Tinto, could supply 25 percent of U.S. copper needs but is stalled by Native American opposition, as reported by Reuters on April 18, 2025.
These supply chain vulnerabilities elevate the strategic importance of international partnerships. The U.S. is leveraging alliances to counter Russian and Chinese dominance. A December 2024 DOE report details a $4.2 billion multilateral commitment at COP28, involving the U.S., Canada, France, Japan, and the UK, to develop a Russian-free uranium supply chain. Australia, with 28 percent of global uranium reserves per the World Nuclear Association, is a key partner, with U.S. firms like Centrus exploring joint enrichment ventures. Canada, hosting 10 percent of uranium reserves, signed a 2024 memorandum with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to harmonize SMR licensing, facilitating cross-border deployments, as noted in a DOE release. In Africa, the U.S. is engaging uranium-rich Namibia and Niger, offering financial support through the Export-Import Bank (EXIM) to secure supply agreements, countering China’s Belt and Road investments, which include uranium mining in Niger, as per a 2024 World Bank analysis.
The Trump administration’s data policies also reshape nuclear export strategies, enhancing U.S. geopolitical influence. A February 14, 2025, Partnership for Global Security report emphasizes that Russia and China use nuclear exports as geopolitical tools, offering generous financing and operational support. Russia’s Rosatom, for example, operates reactors in Armenia and finances projects in Turkey, securing long-term influence. The U.S., historically constrained by stringent nonproliferation requirements, is adapting. The EXIM’s 2024 SMR Financing Toolkit, valued at $4 billion, supports U.S. reactor exports, as seen in Bulgaria’s $8.6 billion deal for two Westinghouse AP-1000 reactors, announced in February 2024. These exports strengthen NATO allies’ energy security, reducing reliance on Russian gas, which still accounted for 15 percent of EU imports in 2024, per the International Energy Agency (IEA).
However, the U.S. faces challenges in competing with China’s nuclear financing model. China’s state-backed loans, often at below-market rates, outpace U.S. offerings, as noted in a 2024 Carnegie Endowment report. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), despite lifting its nuclear financing ban in 2020, has yet to issue loans, limiting its impact. The DFC’s 2025 reauthorization, under the BUILD Act, could unlock $10 billion in nuclear financing, but requires congressional reform to prioritize baseload energy, as recommended by Carnegie. Without such reforms, the U.S. risks ceding markets like Saudi Arabia, where China offers reactors without fuel cycle restrictions, unlike U.S. terms requiring nonproliferation guarantees, per a 2024 DOE analysis.
The domestic regulatory environment, shaped by Trump’s policies, further influences geopolitical outcomes. The NRC’s proposed Part 53 rule, with comments due February 28, 2025, introduces a technology-neutral licensing framework, reducing timelines for microreactors and SMRs from 10 years to 3–5 years, as per a February 18, 2025, Inside Energy & Environment report. The ADVANCE Act’s Section 208, enacted July 2024, mandates NRC guidance for microreactor licensing by January 2026, aligning with DoD deployment goals. These reforms signal to allies and competitors that the U.S. is committed to nuclear innovation, enhancing its credibility in setting global safety and nonproliferation standards. The IAEA’s 2024 SMR safety report affirms that U.S.-led standards could harmonize international regulations, countering Russia’s influence in the IAEA’s Technical Working Group on SMRs.
Geopolitically, the push for nuclear-powered data centers strengthens U.S. technological sovereignty but risks escalating tensions with adversaries. China’s 90 percent control of rare earth processing, as reported by the USGS, enables potential export bans, as seen in 2023 restrictions on gallium and germanium, critical for reactor electronics. Such actions could delay U.S. reactor projects, undermining Trump’s AI leadership goals. Similarly, Russia’s 40 percent share of global uranium enrichment, per the World Nuclear Association, allows it to manipulate fuel markets, impacting U.S. allies like Bulgaria, which relies on Russian VVER-1000 reactors. The U.S.’s response—bolstering domestic HALEU production and allied supply chains—aims to mitigate these risks but requires sustained investment. The DOE’s $2.7 billion uranium enrichment program, announced July 2024, is a step forward, but scaling to 10,000 metric tons by 2035 demands $10–$15 billion, per a 2024 OECD estimate.
The economic implications of these policies ripple globally. The World Bank’s 2024 energy financing report projects that nuclear projects generate $1.80 in economic output per dollar invested, surpassing solar’s $1.30. U.S. reactor deployments could create 500,000 jobs by 2035, per a DOE estimate, strengthening domestic economies and allied nations through export markets. However, mineral supply constraints could inflate costs. The IEA’s 2024 critical minerals report warns that lithium prices, which rose 300 percent from 2021 to 2023, could increase reactor costs by 10–15 percent if supply tightens. The Trump administration’s deregulation of mining, as proposed in a March 2025 ABC News report, aims to boost domestic production but risks environmental backlash, potentially straining relations with allies like Canada, which prioritize sustainable mining.
Security considerations are paramount. Microreactors and SMRs, with passive safety features like natural circulation cooling, reduce accident risks, as detailed in a March 12, 2025, DOE report. However, the Union of Concerned Scientists’ 2025 analysis cautions that untested designs may face reliability issues, necessitating rigorous NRC oversight. The proliferation risk of HALEU, while lower than highly enriched uranium, requires robust safeguards. The IAEA’s 2024 nonproliferation guidelines recommend U.S.-led monitoring programs for HALEU exports, enhancing trust with allies but straining relations with non-aligned nations wary of U.S. oversight.
Regionally, the policies reshape U.S. influence. In Southeast Asia, where China finances SMRs in the Philippines, the U.S. is countering with EXIM-backed microreactor proposals for Indonesia, as noted in a 2024 StartUs Insights report. In the Middle East, the U.S.’s nuclear trade negotiations with Saudi Arabia, ongoing as of April 19, 2025, per Reuters, aim to secure a strategic foothold but face competition from Russia’s Rosatom. In Africa, U.S. engagement with South Africa’s uranium sector, supported by a 2024 DFC letter of intent, counters China’s mining investments, per a World Bank report. These efforts align with the administration’s goal of reducing Russian and Chinese geopolitical leverage, as articulated in a March 7, 2025, Atlantic Council analysis.
The Trump administration’s data policies, by driving nuclear reactor demand, position the U.S. to reclaim leadership in the global nuclear sector. However, success hinges on overcoming supply chain vulnerabilities, strengthening alliances, and navigating regulatory and geopolitical complexities. By prioritizing domestic HALEU and mineral production, leveraging EXIM and DFC financing, and harmonizing international standards, the U.S. can enhance its energy security and influence. Yet, the risks of resource competition, regulatory delays, and adversarial countermeasures loom large. The path forward requires strategic foresight, robust investment, and diplomatic agility to ensure that the nuclear sector’s resurgence translates into lasting geopolitical advantage.
