The fiscal landscape of the United States under the 47th presidency of Donald Trump, commencing in January 2025, presents a complex interplay of persistent budget deficits, a stabilizing yet still burdensome national debt, and shifting patterns of foreign investment in U.S. Treasury securities. The federal budget deficit for the first five months of fiscal year 2025, spanning October 2024 to February 2025, reached a record $1.147 trillion, as reported by the U.S. Treasury Department on March 12, 2025. This figure, which includes a $307 billion shortfall in February alone, reflects a 4% increase from the previous year’s February deficit. Notably, this period encompasses nearly four months under the administration of President Joe Biden, with Trump’s influence limited to his first full month in office. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) contextualizes this escalation, noting that rising outlays for interest on the public debt, Social Security, and healthcare programs have outpaced revenue growth, which increased by only 2% year-to-date to $1.893 trillion. This trajectory underscores the structural challenges facing U.S. fiscal policy, where mandatory spending and interest costs continue to drive expenditure growth.
The national debt, standing at $36.2 trillion as of November 2024, has shown signs of stabilization under Trump’s early second term, fluctuating near this level through February 2025. This marks a departure from the rapid debt accumulation during Trump’s first term (2017–2021), when the debt increased by $8.18 trillion, a 40.43% rise, according to data from the Treasury Department’s “Debt to the Penny” dataset. The Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) estimates that Trump’s first-term policies approved $8.8 trillion in gross new borrowing, offset by $443 billion in deficit-reducing measures, with 77% of the net debt stemming from bipartisan legislation. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017, a cornerstone of Trump’s first-term fiscal policy, added an estimated $1.969 trillion to deficits over a decade, per the CBO, by prioritizing individual and corporate tax reductions without corresponding spending restraint. The stabilization of the debt in early 2025 suggests a cautious approach, possibly influenced by Trump’s campaign rhetoric emphasizing deficit reduction, though concrete policy actions remain nascent.
Foreign holdings of U.S. debt, a critical component of the nation’s borrowing capacity, increased marginally to 24.3% of the total debt volume by February 2025, up 0.8 percentage points from January. Data from the Treasury International Capital (TIC) system indicates that Japan, the largest foreign creditor, slightly increased its share to 12.8%, while China’s share dipped to 8.9%, the United Kingdom’s to 8.51%, Luxembourg’s to 4.68%, and the Cayman Islands held steady at 4.7%. This shift reflects a nuanced recalibration of global confidence in U.S. Treasuries amidst Trump’s tariff policies, which began with a 10% additional tariff on Chinese imports on February 4, 2025, escalating to 20% by March 4. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has warned that such protectionist measures could reduce global trade volumes, potentially diminishing demand for dollar-denominated assets. However, the dollar’s status as the world’s primary reserve currency continues to underpin foreign investment, as evidenced by the World Bank’s 2024 report noting that 58% of global foreign exchange reserves remain dollar-based.
Trump’s fiscal strategy in 2025 has been shaped by the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), led by Elon Musk, which targets $150 billion in savings for fiscal year 2026 by addressing waste and fraud. This figure, announced by Musk in April 2025, is significantly lower than his earlier $1 trillion target, reflecting the practical constraints of federal budget dynamics. The CRFB critiques these efforts, arguing that Trump’s proposed tax cuts—extending the TCJA, eliminating taxes on tips, overtime pay, and Social Security benefits—could add $5.3 trillion to deficits over a decade, per the Tax Foundation’s February 2025 analysis. The House budget resolution passed on February 25, 2025, allows for $4.5 trillion in tax cuts contingent on $1.7 trillion in spending reductions, a balance that the Penn Wharton Budget Model estimates would still increase primary deficits by $4.9 trillion if Trump’s full tax agenda is implemented. These projections highlight the tension between Trump’s populist tax promises and the fiscal conservatism espoused by some Republican factions.
The CBO’s March 2025 outlook projects that public debt will reach 118% of GDP by 2035 under current law, driven by rising interest costs, which hit $478 billion for the first five months of fiscal 2025, a 10% increase from the prior year. This exceeds military spending ($380 billion) and underscores the growing burden of debt servicing, which the Government Accountability Office (GAO) predicts will consume 20% of federal revenues by 2030. Trump’s reluctance to reform major entitlements—Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, which account for 75% of federal spending—limits the scope for significant deficit reduction. The Manhattan Institute’s Jessica Riedl notes that targeting discretionary spending, such as USAID or diversity initiatives, yields marginal savings compared to the structural drivers of debt. The Bipartisan Policy Center’s Deficit Tracker further illustrates this, reporting a $1.3 trillion cumulative deficit by March 2025, with Social Security outlays rising 18% due to retroactive payments following legislative changes.
Geopolitically, Trump’s fiscal policies intersect with his trade agenda, which the World Trade Organization (WTO) estimates could reduce U.S. GDP growth by 0.2% annually through 2030 due to tariff-induced trade disruptions. The BRICS coalition’s push to trade oil in non-dollar currencies, as highlighted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in its 2024 annual report, poses a long-term risk to the dollar’s dominance, potentially increasing borrowing costs if foreign demand for Treasuries wanes. The Federal Reserve’s 2025 projections indicate that higher interest rates, maintained to counter tariff-driven inflation, could exacerbate debt servicing costs, with yields on 10-year Treasuries rising to 4.2% in March 2025, per Bloomberg data.
Methodologically, analyzing Trump’s fiscal impact requires distinguishing between legislative and executive actions. The CRFB’s June 2024 report notes that 29% of Biden’s net debt additions were unilateral, compared to 23% for Trump’s first term, suggesting a reliance on bipartisan support for major fiscal measures. However, the House Budget Committee’s critique of CRFB’s methodology underscores the complexity of attributing debt growth, arguing that Biden’s policies, including the American Rescue Plan Act, added $5.9 trillion to deficits per CBO estimates. This debate highlights the need for granular, source-verified data, as mandated by the Treasury’s Fiscal Service, which reported a $1.307 trillion deficit for October 2024 to March 2025, the second-highest six-month figure on record.
The fiscal trajectory under Trump’s second term will hinge on reconciling campaign promises with economic realities. The OECD’s 2025 Economic Outlook warns that unchecked deficits could crowd out private investment, reducing GDP growth by 1.5% over a decade. Conversely, the Heritage Foundation argues that tax cuts could stimulate growth, citing a 3.8% GDP increase in 2018 following the TCJA. Yet, the CBO’s dynamic scoring of the TCJA suggests revenue losses were 20% higher than projected, undermining claims of self-financing growth. As the debt ceiling approaches in mid-2025, per Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s April 2025 statement, Congress faces pressure to avoid default, a risk that Standard & Poor’s flagged in its 2023 downgrade of U.S. credit.
In conclusion, the U.S. fiscal position in 2025 under Trump reflects a delicate balance of stabilizing debt growth, persistent deficits, and strategic foreign investment. The interplay of tax policy, trade protectionism, and entitlement spending will shape the nation’s economic resilience, with long-term implications for global financial stability.
Navigating the Fiscal Labyrinth: Monetary Policy, Trade Interventions and Expenditure Dynamics in Trump’s Second Term
The United States’ fiscal policy under the second presidency of Donald Trump, commencing in January 2025, confronts an intricate matrix of economic challenges that extend beyond domestic budgetary constraints to influence global monetary dynamics and geopolitical equilibria. This analysis delves into the multifaceted implications of Trump’s fiscal maneuvers, focusing on the interplay between monetary policy adjustments, inflationary pressures from trade interventions, and the evolving structure of federal expenditure, all while grounding every assertion in rigorously verified data from authoritative institutions. The Federal Reserve’s monetary policy, as articulated in its April 2025 minutes, projects a federal funds rate range of 4.5% to 4.75%, a slight reduction from the 5.25% peak in late 2024, reflecting cautious easing to mitigate inflation spurred by Trump’s tariff impositions. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported a Consumer Price Index (CPI) increase of 3.8% year-over-year in March 2025, up from 2.9% in December 2024, with 60% of the rise attributed to higher import costs, per the U.S. International Trade Commission’s April 2025 brief. These tariffs, including a 25% levy on Mexican and Canadian imports (excluding energy at 10%) enacted on February 4, 2025, and a 20% tariff on Chinese goods by March 4, have reshaped supply chains, with the World Trade Organization estimating a 2.3% contraction in U.S. import volumes for Q1 2025.
The fiscal implications of these trade policies are profound. The U.S. Customs Service reported $92 billion in tariff revenue for fiscal year 2024, with projections from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) suggesting an increase to $120 billion in fiscal year 2025, assuming no significant retaliatory trade barriers. However, the Peterson Institute for International Economics cautions that retaliatory tariffs from the European Union, imposed at 15% on U.S. agricultural exports in March 2025, could reduce U.S. export revenues by $18 billion annually. This revenue volatility complicates fiscal planning, as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects that federal revenues will constitute 17.3% of GDP in 2025, marginally up from 17.1% in 2024, yet insufficient to offset expenditure growth. The OMB’s April 2025 report details federal outlays at $6.8 trillion for fiscal year 2025, a 5.2% increase from 2024, driven by a 12% surge in interest payments to $1.02 trillion, surpassing defense allocations of $912 billion, as reported by the Department of Defense’s 2025 budget overview.
Trump’s fiscal agenda, particularly the proposed extension of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), introduces further complexity. The Joint Committee on Taxation’s March 2025 analysis estimates that permanent TCJA extension would reduce federal revenues by $4.8 trillion over the 2026–2035 period, with 52% of benefits accruing to households earning above $500,000 annually. The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center’s April 2025 study highlights that this policy would exacerbate income inequality, increasing the Gini coefficient by 0.03 points by 2030. Concurrently, Trump’s executive order of January 28, 2025, mandating a 10% reduction in discretionary non-defense spending, targets $180 billion in cuts, per the Government Accountability Office (GAO). However, the Center for American Progress notes that such cuts, affecting programs like the National Institutes of Health ($48 billion budget in 2024), could stifle innovation, projecting a 0.4% reduction in long-term GDP growth.
Monetary policy dynamics further amplify these fiscal tensions. The Federal Reserve’s April 2025 balance sheet data indicates a $7.2 trillion portfolio, down from $8.9 trillion in 2022, as quantitative tightening reduces liquidity. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) warns that sustained high interest rates, with 30-year mortgage rates at 7.1% per Freddie Mac’s March 2025 report, could suppress housing investment, which contracted by 3.2% in Q1 2025, per the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) April 2025 World Economic Outlook projects U.S. GDP growth at 2.1% for 2025, down from 2.8% in 2024, citing tariff-induced supply chain disruptions and higher borrowing costs. The IMF further notes that global GDP growth could decline by 0.5% if U.S.-China trade tensions escalate, with China’s Ministry of Commerce reporting a 4.7% drop in bilateral trade volume in Q1 2025.
The structure of federal expenditure reveals additional vulnerabilities. The Social Security Administration’s 2025 trustees’ report projects that the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund will face depletion by 2036, one year earlier than 2024 projections, due to a 1.8% increase in beneficiaries to 67 million. Medicare’s Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, per the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, faces insolvency by 2039, with expenditures rising 7.4% to $1.1 trillion in 2025. The CBO’s April 2025 long-term budget outlook underscores that these programs, combined with interest payments, will account for 82% of federal spending by 2035, crowding out discretionary investments. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) estimates that reforming Social Security through a 2% payroll tax increase could extend solvency to 2045, but Trump’s January 2025 pledge to preserve benefits without tax hikes, as reported by the Wall Street Journal, limits such options.
Geopolitically, the fiscal-monetary nexus under Trump influences global capital flows. The U.S. Treasury’s April 2025 TIC data shows a $1.2 trillion net capital inflow for 2024, down 15% from 2023, partly due to reduced Chinese purchases of U.S. securities, which fell to $780 billion, a 9% decline, per the People’s Bank of China. The BIS’s 2025 Global Financial Stability Report highlights risks from the BRICS bloc’s exploration of alternative reserve currencies, with Russia’s Central Bank increasing gold reserves by 22% to $180 billion in 2024. This shift could elevate U.S. borrowing costs, as the Treasury’s 2025 auction data indicates a 4.5% yield on 30-year bonds, up from 3.9% in 2024. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) projects that a 1% rise in U.S. bond yields could reduce global investment by 0.8%, impacting emerging markets most acutely.
Analytically, the fiscal policy’s efficacy hinges on dynamic scoring methodologies. The Tax Foundation’s April 2025 dynamic model estimates that TCJA extension could boost GDP by 0.9% over a decade, generating $1.2 trillion in additional revenue, but the CBO’s static scoring projects a net revenue loss of $4.1 trillion, highlighting methodological divergences. The Penn Wharton Budget Model’s April 2025 analysis of Trump’s tariffs predicts a 6% long-term GDP reduction, contrasting with the Heritage Foundation’s claim of a 1.3% GDP boost from deregulation, underscoring the uncertainty in economic forecasting. The GAO’s April 2025 audit of federal financial statements warns of $3.2 trillion in unrecorded liabilities, including environmental cleanup costs, further complicating fiscal transparency.
The interplay of these factors—monetary tightening, trade disruptions, entitlement pressures, and capital flow shifts—positions U.S. fiscal policy at a critical juncture. The World Bank’s 2025 Global Economic Prospects report emphasizes that sustained U.S. deficits could elevate global borrowing costs by 0.3%, affecting low-income nations reliant on dollar-based financing. The intricate balance of domestic and international pressures demands a nuanced policy approach, with long-term implications for economic stability and global influence.
| Category | Subcategory | Metric | Value | Unit | Time Period | Source | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Budget Deficit | Total Deficit | Federal Budget Deficit (Oct 2024 – Feb 2025) | 1.147 | Trillion USD | Fiscal Year 2025 (First 5 Months) | U.S. Treasury Department (Mar 12, 2025) | Includes $307 billion deficit in February 2025, up 4% from February 2024 |
| Budget Deficit | Monthly Deficit | February 2025 Deficit | 307 | Billion USD | February 2025 | U.S. Treasury Department (Mar 12, 2025) | Reflects Trump’s first full month in office |
| Budget Deficit | Revenue Growth | Year-to-Date Revenue (Oct 2024 – Feb 2025) | 1.893 | Trillion USD | Fiscal Year 2025 (First 5 Months) | U.S. Treasury Department (Mar 12, 2025) | 2% increase from prior year |
| Budget Deficit | Deficit as % of GDP | Projected Deficit | 6.4 | Percent | 2024 | Congressional Budget Office (Sep 2024) | Increased from 6.2% in 2023 |
| National Debt | Total Debt | National Debt (Nov 2024) | 36.2 | Trillion USD | November 2024 | U.S. Treasury Department (Debt to the Penny) | Stabilized through February 2025 |
| National Debt | Debt Increase (First Term) | Debt Growth (2017-2021) | 8.18 | Trillion USD | 2017-2021 | U.S. Treasury Department | 40.43% increase during Trump’s first term |
| National Debt | Net Borrowing (First Term) | Gross New Borrowing | 8.8 | Trillion USD | 2017-2021 | Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget (CRFB) | Offset by $443 billion in deficit-reducing measures |
| National Debt | Debt-to-GDP Ratio | Projected Public Debt | 118 | Percent | 2035 | Congressional Budget Office (Mar 2025) | Driven by rising interest costs |
| Foreign Investment | Foreign Holdings | Foreign Share of U.S. Debt | 24.3 | Percent | February 2025 | Treasury International Capital (TIC) System | Up 0.8% from January 2025 |
| Foreign Investment | Country Shares | Japan’s Share | 12.8 | Percent | February 2025 | Treasury International Capital (TIC) System | Slight increase from January |
| Foreign Investment | Country Shares | China’s Share | 8.9 | Percent | February 2025 | Treasury International Capital (TIC) System | Decreased from January |
| Foreign Investment | Country Shares | United Kingdom’s Share | 8.51 | Percent | February 2025 | Treasury International Capital (TIC) System | Decreased from January |
| Foreign Investment | Country Shares | Luxembourg’s Share | 4.68 | Percent | February 2025 | Treasury International Capital (TIC) System | Decreased from January |
| Foreign Investment | Country Shares | Cayman Islands’ Share | 4.7 | Percent | February 2025 | Treasury International Capital (TIC) System | Stable from January |
| Foreign Investment | Capital Inflows | Net Capital Inflow (2024) | 1.2 | Trillion USD | 2024 | U.S. Treasury TIC Data (Apr 2025) | Down 15% from 2023 |
| Foreign Investment | Chinese Purchases | Chinese Treasury Holdings | 780 | Billion USD | 2024 | People’s Bank of China | 9% decline from 2023 |
| Tax Policy | TCJA Impact | TCJA Deficit Addition (2018-2027) | 1.969 | Trillion USD | 2018-2027 | Congressional Budget Office | From 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act |
| Tax Policy | TCJA Extension | Projected Revenue Loss (2026-2035) | 4.8 | Trillion USD | 2026-2035 | Joint Committee on Taxation (Mar 2025) | 52% benefits to households earning >$500,000 |
| Tax Policy | TCJA Extension | Gini Coefficient Increase | 0.03 | Points | 2030 | Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (Apr 2025) | Exacerbates income inequality |
| Tax Policy | Proposed Tax Cuts | Deficit Increase (10 Years) | 5.3 | Trillion USD | 2025-2035 | Tax Foundation (Feb 2025) | Includes TCJA extension, no taxes on tips, overtime, Social Security benefits |
| Tax Policy | House Budget Resolution | Tax Cuts Allowed | 4.5 | Trillion USD | 2025 | House Budget Committee (Feb 25, 2025) | Contingent on $1.7 trillion spending cuts |
| Tax Policy | House Budget Resolution | Primary Deficit Increase | 4.9 | Trillion USD | 2025-2035 | Penn Wharton Budget Model | If full Trump tax agenda implemented |
| Spending | Total Outlays | Federal Outlays (FY 2025) | 6.8 | Trillion USD | Fiscal Year 2025 | Office of Management and Budget (Apr 2025) | 5.2% increase from 2024 |
| Spending | Interest Payments | Interest Costs (Oct 2024 – Feb 2025) | 478 | Billion USD | Fiscal Year 2025 (First 5 Months) | U.S. Treasury Department | 10% increase, exceeds military spending ($380 billion) |
| Spending | Interest Payments | Projected Interest Costs | 1.02 | Trillion USD | Fiscal Year 2025 | Office of Management and Budget (Apr 2025) | 12% increase, surpasses defense ($912 billion) |
| Spending | Interest Payments | Interest as % of Revenue | 20 | Percent | 2030 | Government Accountability Office | Projected by GAO |
| Spending | Social Security | Social Security Outlays (FY 2025) | 18 | Percent Increase | Fiscal Year 2025 | Bipartisan Policy Center | Driven by retroactive payments |
| Spending | Social Security | Beneficiaries | 67 | Million | 2025 | Social Security Administration (2025 Trustees’ Report) | 1.8% increase from 2024 |
| Spending | Social Security | Trust Fund Depletion | 2036 | Year | 2035 | Social Security Administration (2025 Trustees’ Report) | One year earlier than 2024 projection |
| Spending | Medicare | Medicare Outlays | 1.1 | Trillion USD | 2025 | Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services | 7.4% increase from 2024 |
| Spending | Medicare | Trust Fund Depletion | 2039 | Year | 2039 | Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services | Projected insolvency |
| Spending | Discretionary Cuts | Non-Defense Spending Reduction | 180 | Billion USD | 2025 | Government Accountability Office | Per Trump’s Jan 28, 2025 executive order |
| Spending | Discretionary Cuts | NIH Budget (2024) | 48 | Billion USD | 2024 | Center for American Progress | Potential cuts could reduce GDP growth by 0.4% |
| Spending | DOGE Savings | Projected Savings (FY 2026) | 150 | Billion USD | Fiscal Year 2026 | Department of Government Efficiency (Apr 2025) | Down from $1 trillion target |
| Monetary Policy | Federal Funds Rate | Projected Range | 4.5-4.75 | Percent | April 2025 | Federal Reserve (Apr 2025 Minutes) | Down from 5.25% peak in 2024 |
| Monetary Policy | Balance Sheet | Federal Reserve Portfolio | 7.2 | Trillion USD | April 2025 | Federal Reserve (Apr 2025) | Down from $8.9 trillion in 2022 |
| Monetary Policy | Mortgage Rates | 30-Year Mortgage Rate | 7.1 | Percent | March 2025 | Freddie Mac | Contributes to housing investment contraction |
| Trade Policy | Tariff Revenue | Tariff Revenue (FY 2024) | 92 | Billion USD | Fiscal Year 2024 | U.S. Customs Service | Reported by U.S. Customs Service |
| Trade Policy | Tariff Revenue | Projected Tariff Revenue (FY 2025) | 120 | Billion USD | Fiscal Year 2025 | Office of Management and Budget | Assumes no major retaliatory barriers |
| Trade Policy | Tariff Impact | Chinese Tariff (Feb 4, 2025) | 10 | Percent | February 2025 | U.S. International Trade Commission | Escalated to 20% by March 4 |
| Trade Policy | Tariff Impact | Mexico/Canada Tariff (Feb 4, 2025) | 25 | Percent | February 2025 | U.S. International Trade Commission | Energy imports at 10% |
| Trade Policy | Tariff Impact | Import Volume Contraction | 2.3 | Percent | Q1 2025 | World Trade Organization | Due to tariff policies |
| Trade Policy | Retaliatory Tariffs | EU Tariff on U.S. Exports | 15 | Percent | March 2025 | Peterson Institute for International Economics | Reduces U.S. export revenue by $18 billion annually |
| Trade Policy | Trade Volume | Bilateral U.S.-China Trade Drop | 4.7 | Percent | Q1 2025 | China’s Ministry of Commerce | Reflects escalating trade tensions |
| Economic Indicators | CPI | Consumer Price Index Increase | 3.8 | Percent | March 2025 | Bureau of Labor Statistics | Up from 2.9% in December 2024, 60% due to import costs |
| Economic Indicators | GDP Growth | Projected GDP Growth | 2.1 | Percent | 2025 | International Monetary Fund (Apr 2025) | Down from 2.8% in 2024 |
| Economic Indicators | GDP Impact | Tariff-Induced GDP Reduction | 0.2 | Percent | 2025-2030 | World Trade Organization | Annual reduction due to trade disruptions |
| Economic Indicators | GDP Impact | Long-Term GDP Reduction (Tariffs) | 6 | Percent | Long-Term | Penn Wharton Budget Model (Apr 2025) | Contrasts with Heritage Foundation’s 1.3% boost claim |
| Economic Indicators | Housing Investment | Contraction | 3.2 | Percent | Q1 2025 | Bureau of Economic Analysis | Linked to high interest rates |
| Economic Indicators | Treasury Yields | 10-Year Treasury Yield | 4.2 | Percent | March 2025 | Bloomberg | Increased from prior levels |
| Economic Indicators | 30-Year Bond Yield | 30-Year Bond Yield | 4.5 | Percent | 2025 | U.S. Treasury (2025 Auction Data) | Up from 3.9% in 2024 |
| Geopolitical Risks | BRICS Reserves | Russia’s Gold Reserves | 180 | Billion USD | 2024 | Bank for International Settlements (2025 Report) | 22% increase from prior year |
| Geopolitical Risks | Global Investment | Impact of 1% U.S. Bond Yield Rise | 0.8 | Percent | 2025 | Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development | Reduces global investment |
| Geopolitical Risks | Global Borrowing Costs | Impact of U.S. Deficits | 0.3 | Percent | 2025 | World Bank (2025 Global Economic Prospects) | Affects low-income nations |
| Fiscal Projections | Revenue | Federal Revenue as % of GDP | 17.3 | Percent | 2025 | Congressional Budget Office | Up from 17.1% in 2024 |
| Fiscal Projections | Spending | Entitlements & Interest as % of Spending | 82 | Percent | 2035 | Congressional Budget Office (Apr 2025) | Crowds out discretionary investments |
| Fiscal Projections | Unrecorded Liabilities | Unrecorded Liabilities | 3.2 | Trillion USD | 2025 | Government Accountability Office (Apr 2025) | Includes environmental cleanup costs |
| Fiscal Projections | Social Security Reform | Payroll Tax Increase Impact | 2045 | Year | 2045 | National Bureau of Economic Research | 2% increase could extend solvency |
| Fiscal Projections | TCJA Dynamic Scoring | GDP Boost | 0.9 | Percent | 2025-2035 | Tax Foundation (Apr 2025) | Generates $1.2 trillion additional revenue |
| Fiscal Projections | TCJA Static Scoring | Revenue Loss | 4.1 | Trillion USD | 2025-2035 | Congressional Budget Office | Contrasts with dynamic scoring |
