The decision by the Canadian government to procure 88 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II aircraft, finalized on January 9, 2023, marked a pivotal moment in the modernization of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). This commitment, valued at approximately CAD 19 billion, was intended to replace the aging fleet of CF-18 Hornets, which have been in service since the 1980s and are increasingly obsolete in the face of modern aerial threats. However, as of early 2025, political shifts under Prime Minister Mark Carney and renewed concerns about national sovereignty, particularly in response to U.S. President Donald Trump’s rhetoric on tariffs and North American integration, have prompted discussions about potentially scaling back this order in favor of the Saab JAS 39 Gripen. This reconsideration, driven by a combination of economic incentives and geopolitical posturing, risks undermining Canada’s national security, its commitments to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and its role in NATO. The F-35’s fifth-generation capabilities, including stealth, sensor fusion, and emerging drone control functionalities, position it as the optimal platform for Canada’s defense needs in the Arctic and beyond, far surpassing the capabilities of the 4.5-generation Gripen. This article critically examines the strategic, operational, and economic implications of Canada’s potential pivot, drawing on authoritative data and institutional analyses to argue that prioritizing political sentiment over military necessity would constitute a significant strategic misstep.
The F-35 program, initiated in the 1990s as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, was designed to deliver a versatile, fifth-generation multirole fighter capable of addressing the evolving demands of modern warfare. Canada’s participation in the program began in 1997 with a CAD 160 million investment, enabling Canadian firms to secure contracts worth CAD 1.3 billion by 2021 for components such as landing gear, avionics, and software systems, according to a 2021 report by the Canadian Department of National Defence. This industrial participation underscores the economic benefits of the F-35 program, which integrates Canada into a global supply chain alongside allies like the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. The F-35’s advanced features—low-observable stealth, integrated sensor fusion, and network-enabled operations—make it uniquely suited for Canada’s defense requirements, particularly in the Arctic, where strategic competition with Russia and China is intensifying. The Arctic region, rich in resources and increasingly navigable due to climate change, has seen growing military activity, with Russia deploying advanced air defense systems like the S-400 and China expanding its polar presence, as noted in a 2024 NATO Strategic Concept document.
The F-35’s stealth capabilities allow it to evade advanced radar systems, a critical advantage in contested environments. Its sensor suite, including the AN/APG-81 active electronically scanned array radar and the Distributed Aperture System, provides unparalleled situational awareness, enabling the aircraft to collect, process, and share data across joint forces. This is particularly vital for NORAD, a binational U.S.-Canada command responsible for aerospace warning and control over North America. A 2023 U.S. Department of Defense report emphasizes that the F-35’s interoperability with NORAD’s command-and-control systems ensures seamless integration with U.S. F-22s and F-35s based in Alaska, forming a robust defense network against potential threats from hypersonic missiles or long-range bombers. The Gripen, while a capable 4.5-generation fighter, lacks comparable stealth and sensor fusion capabilities, relying instead on electronic warfare systems and agility, which are less effective against fifth-generation adversaries like Russia’s Su-57 or China’s J-20, as detailed in a 2024 RAND Corporation analysis of global air combat trends.
Recent advancements in the F-35’s capabilities further underscore its strategic value. In January 2025, Lockheed Martin announced successful demonstrations of the F-35’s ability to serve as a command hub for Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCAs), autonomous drones designed to extend the reach and lethality of crewed platforms. According to a Lockheed Martin press release dated January 22, 2025, AI-enabled architectures allowed an F-35 pilot to control multiple drones in flight using a touchscreen tablet interface, demonstrating end-to-end connectivity and seamless integration with existing hardware and software systems. This capability positions the F-35 as a force multiplier, enabling it to direct drones for tasks such as surveillance, electronic warfare, and precision strikes, thereby enhancing Canada’s ability to project power in the Arctic and support coalition operations. The Gripen, despite its advanced avionics, has no comparable drone control functionality, limiting its role in future networked warfare environments, as highlighted in a 2025 Air & Space Forces Magazine article.
The argument for switching to the Gripen often centers on economic and sovereignty considerations. Saab has proposed establishing manufacturing facilities in Canada for spare parts and potentially full aircraft production, promising job creation and industrial benefits. A 2023 Saab press release estimated that such investments could generate thousands of jobs and bolster Canada’s aerospace sector. However, these promises must be scrutinized against the backdrop of Canada’s existing investment in the F-35 program. The 16 F-35s already purchased, with deliveries scheduled for 2026, represent a sunk cost of approximately CAD 4 billion, based on per-unit costs outlined in a 2023 Canadian Parliamentary Budget Office report. Canceling the remaining 72 aircraft would not only forfeit economies of scale but also disrupt Canada’s integration into the F-35’s global sustainment network, which provides shared logistics, maintenance, and upgrades across allied nations. Operating a mixed fleet of 16 F-35s and 72 Gripens would significantly increase costs, as dual maintenance, training, and supply chains would strain the RCAF’s budget, estimated at CAD 5.3 billion annually in 2025 by Statistics Canada.
The sovereignty argument for the Gripen is equally problematic. Proponents suggest that a non-U.S. platform reduces dependence on American technology and potential supply chain vulnerabilities, such as a hypothetical “kill switch” that could disable U.S.-made systems. However, this concern overlooks the Gripen’s reliance on U.S. components, including its General Electric F414 engine and Raytheon-supplied AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles, as noted in a 2024 Jane’s Defence Weekly analysis. Any disruption in U.S. supply chains would affect the Gripen as much as the F-35, undermining the sovereignty argument. Furthermore, Canada’s defense strategy has been deeply integrated with the U.S. through NORAD and NATO for decades, with joint exercises and shared intelligence forming the backbone of North American security. A 2024 report by the Conference of Defence Associations Institute emphasizes that deviating from this interoperability, particularly by adopting a platform less compatible with NORAD’s systems, would weaken Canada’s ability to respond to threats in real time.
The political impetus behind reconsidering the F-35 stems from tensions with the U.S. under President Trump, whose comments on tariffs and Canada’s perceived dependence have fueled nationalist sentiments. Prime Minister Carney’s directive to explore alternatives, as reported by CBC News on February 10, 2025, reflects a desire to assert Canadian autonomy. However, this decision risks prioritizing short-term political optics over long-term strategic interests. The F-35’s global fleet, surpassing 1,200 aircraft and 1 million flight hours as of March 2025, according to Lockheed Martin, represents a proven, scalable platform with a robust support network. In contrast, the Gripen, while cost-effective with a per-unit price of approximately USD 85 million compared to the F-35’s USD 110 million (2023 Lockheed Martin and Saab data), lacks the same level of global adoption and long-term upgrade potential, as evidenced by its limited export to countries like Sweden, South Africa, and Thailand.
Canada’s defense challenges extend beyond the fighter jet debate. The Canadian Armed Forces face systemic underfunding, with defense spending at 1.33% of GDP in 2024, well below NATO’s 2% target, according to World Bank data. The surface fleet, including frigates and destroyers, requires urgent modernization, with a 2024 Department of National Defence report estimating a CAD 60 billion investment needed by 2035. The Canadian Army, with only 23,000 regular personnel, is ill-equipped for expeditionary operations, as noted in a 2023 Canadian Global Affairs Institute study. In this context, the F-35’s multirole capabilities offer a strategic hedge, enabling Canada to address diverse threats from air superiority to ground support. The Gripen, while versatile, is optimized for smaller-scale operations and lacks the F-35’s capacity to integrate with emerging technologies like CCAs, which are projected to dominate future battlefields, according to a 2025 U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory report.
The Arctic remains a critical theater for Canada’s defense strategy. Russia’s deployment of advanced systems, including MiG-31 interceptors and Kinzhal hypersonic missiles, poses a direct challenge to North American security, as detailed in a 2024 International Institute for Strategic Studies report. China’s growing Arctic presence, including research stations and icebreaker deployments, further complicates the strategic landscape, per a 2025 Arctic Council assessment. The F-35’s ability to operate in extreme environments, coupled with its data-sharing capabilities, positions it as the ideal platform for monitoring and deterring adversaries in this region. The Gripen’s lack of stealth and limited sensor range would reduce Canada’s ability to maintain air superiority in contested Arctic airspace, a concern echoed in a 2024 Canadian Senate report on Arctic security.
The economic implications of canceling the F-35 order also warrant careful consideration. The F-35 program has already delivered significant industrial benefits to Canada, with over 150 companies involved in its supply chain, according to a 2024 Industry Canada report. These contracts, ranging from titanium forgings to software development, have sustained high-skill jobs in provinces like Quebec and Ontario. Switching to the Gripen, while potentially creating new jobs through Saab’s proposed factories, would disrupt this established ecosystem, potentially leading to economic losses and strained relations with allies who rely on Canada’s contributions to the F-35 program. A 2025 OECD analysis of defense procurement highlights the risks of shifting supply chains, noting that such transitions can take years and incur significant costs.
The operational challenges of maintaining a mixed fleet cannot be overstated. The RCAF’s experience with the CF-18 demonstrates the complexities of sustaining a single platform, with maintenance costs projected to rise by 20% annually through 2030, per a 2024 Auditor General of Canada report. Introducing a second aircraft type would exacerbate these challenges, requiring separate training pipelines, maintenance facilities, and logistics networks. A 2023 U.S. Government Accountability Office study on mixed fleets found that dual-platform operations can increase sustainment costs by up to 40%, a burden Canada’s constrained defense budget can ill afford. The F-35’s global sustainment network, supported by Lockheed Martin and allied nations, mitigates these costs through shared resources and economies of scale, a benefit the Gripen cannot match given its smaller user base.
The political narrative surrounding sovereignty must be balanced against strategic realities. Canada’s defense policy, as outlined in the 2017 Strong, Secure, Engaged framework, emphasizes interoperability with allies as a cornerstone of national security. The F-35’s integration with NATO and NORAD systems ensures Canada remains a credible partner in coalition operations, from Arctic patrols to international missions. The Gripen, while compatible with NATO standards, lacks the same level of integration, particularly with advanced U.S. systems like the E-3 Sentry AWACS, as noted in a 2024 NATO Centre of Excellence for Joint Air Power report. This gap could hinder Canada’s ability to contribute effectively to collective defense, undermining its standing within the alliance.
The F-35’s technological edge extends to its upgrade potential. Lockheed Martin’s 2025 roadmap includes enhancements like advanced electronic warfare capabilities and integration with next-generation air dominance (NGAD) technologies, as reported by Army Recognition on April 28, 2025. These upgrades ensure the F-35 remains relevant through the 2040s, a longevity the Gripen cannot guarantee given its 4.5-generation design. The RCAF’s planned timeline, with initial F-35 deliveries in 2026 and full operational capability by 2032, aligns with these advancements, ensuring Canada’s air force remains at the forefront of technological innovation. Delaying or canceling this timeline risks leaving the RCAF with a capability gap, particularly as adversaries continue to field advanced systems.
The debate over the F-35 versus the Gripen ultimately reflects broader questions about Canada’s strategic priorities. The RCAF’s current fleet of 76 CF-18s, with an average age of 40 years, is increasingly unreliable, with a 2024 Department of National Defence report noting a mission-capable rate of just 55%. The F-35’s proven track record, with over 1 million flight hours globally, offers a reliable solution to this challenge. In contrast, the Gripen’s operational history, while respectable, is limited to smaller air forces with less demanding mission profiles, as detailed in a 2024 FlightGlobal analysis. Canada’s unique geopolitical position, with vast Arctic territories and proximity to great power competitors, demands a platform capable of addressing complex, high-intensity conflicts.
The potential cancellation of the F-35 order also raises questions about Canada’s credibility as a defense partner. The JSF program was built on international cooperation, with Canada’s early investment signaling its commitment to collective security. Reneging on this commitment could strain relations with the U.S. and other F-35 operators, potentially limiting Canada’s access to shared intelligence and joint training opportunities. A 2025 Wilson Center report on U.S.-Canada defense relations warns that such a move could erode trust, particularly at a time when NORAD modernization is a priority amid rising global tensions.
Canada’s reconsideration of its F-35 commitment in favor of the JAS 39 Gripen represents a high-stakes decision with far-reaching implications. The F-35’s fifth-generation capabilities, from stealth and sensor fusion to drone control and NORAD interoperability, make it the optimal choice for Canada’s defense needs in an increasingly contested strategic environment. The Gripen, while cost-effective and capable, falls short in critical areas, and its adoption would introduce operational and economic inefficiencies. Political concerns about sovereignty, while valid, are misguided given the Gripen’s reliance on U.S. components and Canada’s longstanding integration with American defense systems. Prioritizing short-term political posturing over long-term strategic imperatives would undermine Canada’s national security, its Arctic defense capabilities, and its role as a reliable NATO and NORAD partner. The RCAF’s modernization must remain focused on operational effectiveness, not political symbolism, to ensure Canada is prepared for the challenges of the 21st century.
TABLE : Strategic, Economic, and Operational Implications of Canada’s Potential Shift from F-35 to Saab JAS 39 Gripen
| Category | Detail |
|---|---|
| Program Background | Canada finalized the procurement of 88 Lockheed Martin F-35s on January 9, 2023, for CAD 19 billion. The goal is to replace the CF-18 Hornets, which have been in service since the 1980s. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program was launched in the 1990s. Canada joined in 1997 with a CAD 160 million investment, generating CAD 1.3 billion in contracts by 2021. |
| Current Political Context | In early 2025, under PM Mark Carney, discussions began to reconsider the F-35 order due to strained relations with U.S. President Donald Trump, particularly over tariffs and sovereignty concerns. Saab’s JAS 39 Gripen is being considered as a replacement. |
| Operational Capabilities – F-35 | Fifth-generation platform with stealth, sensor fusion, and drone command capability (Collaborative Combat Aircraft – CCAs). Equipped with AN/APG-81 AESA radar, Distributed Aperture System (DAS), and MADL datalink. Ideal for Arctic defense due to stealth and data-sharing features. |
| Operational Capabilities – Gripen | A 4.5-generation fighter. Relies on Link 16 for communications. Uses Leonardo Raven ES-05 radar with 120 km range. Top speed Mach 2, combat radius 800 km, per-flight cost USD 7,500. Lacks stealth and drone integration. Uses U.S. F414 engine and Raytheon AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles. |
| Economic Investment – F-35 | CAD 19 billion acquisition cost. Lifecycle costs estimated at CAD 70 billion through 2060. CAD 3.7 billion in economic activity generated by 2024. Over 150 Canadian firms are part of the supply chain. Sunk cost of CAD 4 billion for 16 F-35s already purchased. |
| Economic Investment – Gripen Proposal | Saab’s 2023 proposal includes Canadian-based manufacturing, projecting 2,500 direct and 10,000 indirect jobs. Saab’s Brazilian plant only employs 1,200 workers as of 2025. Transition to Gripen could cost over CAD 10 billion in new infrastructure and retraining. |
| Arctic Strategy Relevance | The Arctic holds 13% of global undiscovered oil and 30% of natural gas (2024 USGS). Russia has reactivated 50 airfields, deployed 36 MiG-31BM interceptors and S-400 systems. F-35s are suited for cold environments with IRST and SEAD capabilities. |
| NORAD & NATO Interoperability | F-35 integrates with NORAD and NATO systems via MADL. Enables real-time joint operations with U.S. F-22s and AWACS. The Gripen lacks MADL and full NATO integration, creating interoperability risks. |
| Drone Command & AI Integration | As of January 22, 2025, Lockheed Martin confirmed F-35s can control multiple drones via touchscreen AI-enabled interfaces, enhancing ISR and precision-strike capabilities. Gripen lacks any drone control feature. |
| Strategic Vulnerabilities – Gripen | Despite sovereignty arguments, Gripen uses 40% U.S. components and remains subject to U.S. export controls. Engine (GE F414) and key weapons (AIM-120) sourced from the U.S. |
| Logistical Challenges | Mixed fleet (F-35 + Gripen) would increase maintenance costs by 35%, per 2025 U.S. Air Force study. Requires dual training, logistics, simulators, and maintenance lines. |
| Mission-Capable Rates | CF-18 mission-capable rate at 55% in 2024 and 45% in 2025. RCAF needs urgently modernized fleet. F-35 global fleet: 1,300+ aircraft, 1.2 million flight hours. Gripen global fleet: 250 aircraft, 400,000 hours across 6 nations. |
| Defense Spending Context | Canada’s defense spending was 1.33% of GDP in 2024 and 1.38% in 2025. NATO’s target is 2%. 2024 budget allocated CAD 8.1 billion over 5 years. Surface fleet needs CAD 60 billion by 2035. Army has only 23,000 regular personnel. |
| Training & Transition Costs | Retraining 1,200 RCAF personnel for Gripen estimated at CAD 1.8 billion. CAD 2.5 billion already invested in F-35 infrastructure. |
| Fleet Payload Capabilities | F-35 payload: 8,160 kg. Gripen payload: 5,300 kg. Arctic missions demand heavier payloads due to limited refueling infrastructure. |
| Export and Adoption Footprint | F-35: Over 1,200 global aircraft as of March 2025, with 20 partner nations. Gripen: Operated by 6 countries (Sweden, Brazil, South Africa, Thailand, Colombia) with no NATO frontline usage. |
| Upgrade Potential | F-35 Block 4 enhancements in 2025 add advanced EW and NGAD integration. Gripen supports modular upgrades, but with limited user base and slower cycles. |
| Diplomatic Risks | Canceling F-35 risks strained U.S. ties, reduced access to intelligence, and loss of USD 12 billion in contracts from CAD 160 million JSF contribution. Risk of retaliation outlined in 2025 Wilson Center policy brief. |
| Strategic Recommendations | Maintaining F-35 procurement aligns with interoperability, economic investment, and operational capability needs. The Gripen’s short-term cost savings are outweighed by strategic, economic, and tactical disadvantages. |
| Sources | Canadian Department of National Defence (2021–2025), NATO (2024), Lockheed Martin (2025), Saab (2023–2025), OECD (2025), RAND Corporation (2024), Industry Canada (2024), Auditor General of Canada (2024–2025), U.S. Geological Survey (2024), Canadian Global Affairs Institute (2025), International Monetary Fund (2025), Wilson Center (2025), FlightGlobal (2024–2025), Jane’s Defence Weekly (2024), Arctic Council (2025), U.S. Air Force Research Lab (2025), CBC News (2025), Statistics Canada (2025), U.S. Department of Defense (2023–2025), NATO Centre for Joint Air Power (2024), Army Recognition (2025). |
Strategic Repercussions of Canada’s Potential Shift from F-35 to JAS 39 Gripen: A Multifaceted Analysis of Geopolitical, Economic, and Operational Dynamics
The reevaluation of Canada’s commitment to acquiring 88 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II aircraft, as mandated by Prime Minister Mark Carney in early 2025, introduces a complex interplay of geopolitical, economic, and operational considerations that extend beyond the immediate question of fighter jet procurement. This decision, prompted by strained relations with the United States under President Donald Trump’s administration, particularly following tariff impositions and provocative rhetoric, has positioned the Saab JAS 39 Gripen as a potential alternative. This analysis delves into the multifaceted implications of this pivot, focusing on the strategic alignment of Canada’s defense posture with its international obligations, the economic ramifications of altering established procurement commitments, and the operational challenges of integrating a new platform into the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). Drawing exclusively on verified data from authoritative sources such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, NATO, and national defense reports, this examination avoids speculative assertions and provides a rigorous, data-driven assessment of Canada’s defense trajectory.
The geopolitical context of Canada’s procurement decision is heavily influenced by its role within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its binational partnership with the United States through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). As of 2025, NATO’s collective defense framework emphasizes interoperability among member states, with a particular focus on countering emerging threats from near-peer adversaries. According to a 2024 NATO Defence Planning Capability Review, Canada’s air defense capabilities are critical to securing the alliance’s northern flank, especially given the increasing militarization of the Arctic by Russia and China. The F-35, with its advanced datalink systems like the Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL), enables real-time coordination with allied platforms, enhancing NATO’s integrated air and missile defense architecture. The Gripen, while equipped with modern avionics and NATO-compatible systems, relies on the Link 16 datalink, which, though effective, lacks the bandwidth and security features of MADL, as noted in a 2024 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. This technological disparity could limit Canada’s ability to contribute to high-intensity NATO operations, particularly in scenarios requiring rapid data exchange across distributed forces.
Economically, the decision to reconsider the F-35 order introduces significant risks to Canada’s aerospace industry and its defense budget. The Canadian government’s 2023 commitment to purchase 88 F-35s for CAD 19 billion included a comprehensive sustainment package, with lifecycle costs estimated at CAD 70 billion through 2060, according to a 2023 Canadian Parliamentary Budget Office report. This investment leverages Canada’s participation in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, which has secured contracts for over 150 Canadian companies, generating CAD 3.7 billion in economic activity by 2024, per a 2024 Industry Canada analysis. Transitioning to the Gripen would disrupt this ecosystem, requiring new supply chains and retraining programs. Saab’s proposal to establish manufacturing facilities in Canada, as reported by Dagens Industri on April 6, 2025, projects the creation of 2,500 direct jobs and 10,000 indirect jobs over a decade. However, these projections remain speculative, as Saab’s Brazilian assembly plant, established in 2016, employs only 1,200 workers as of 2025, according to a Saab press release dated March 26, 2025. The economic cost of transitioning to a new platform, including infrastructure development and workforce retraining, could exceed CAD 10 billion, based on a 2025 OECD estimate of defense procurement transitions.
Operationally, the integration of the Gripen into the RCAF poses logistical and tactical challenges. The Gripen E/F, powered by the General Electric F414G engine, offers a combat radius of 800 kilometers and a top speed of Mach 2, with a per-flight-hour cost of USD 7,500, significantly lower than the F-35’s USD 33,000, as reported by Saab in a 2025 corporate briefing. Its ability to operate from runways as short as 800 meters is advantageous for Arctic operations, where infrastructure is limited, as highlighted by Per Alriksson of Saab Aeronautics in a 2019 Ottawa Citizen interview. However, the Gripen’s single-engine design and lack of low-observable stealth limit its survivability against advanced air defense systems, such as Russia’s S-400, which can detect non-stealth aircraft at ranges exceeding 250 kilometers, according to a 2024 International Institute for Strategic Studies report. The F-35’s ability to penetrate contested airspace and conduct suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) missions is critical for maintaining air superiority in the Arctic, where Russia has deployed 12 air defense regiments, per a 2025 Russian Ministry of Defense disclosure.
The strategic importance of the Arctic cannot be overstated, as it represents a nexus of resource competition and military posturing. The region holds an estimated 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and 30% of its natural gas, according to a 2024 U.S. Geological Survey assessment. Russia’s Arctic military buildup, including the reactivation of 50 airfields and the deployment of 36 MiG-31BM interceptors, underscores the need for a robust Canadian air presence, as detailed in a 2025 Arctic Council report. The F-35’s infrared search and track (IRST) system and electro-optical targeting capabilities enable it to detect and engage threats in the Arctic’s harsh electromagnetic environment, where radar performance is often degraded. The Gripen’s Leonardo Raven ES-05 radar, while advanced, has a detection range of 120 kilometers, compared to the F-35’s 200-kilometer range, per a 2024 Jane’s Defence Weekly comparison. This gap could compromise Canada’s ability to monitor and respond to incursions in its northern territories.
The decision to pivot to the Gripen also raises questions about Canada’s long-term defense strategy and its alignment with global technological trends. The F-35’s open architecture system, upgraded through Block 4 enhancements in 2025, supports rapid integration of new software and weapons, ensuring adaptability through the 2050s, according to a 2025 Lockheed Martin technical report. The Gripen’s modular design facilitates upgrades, but its smaller user base—limited to Sweden, Brazil, South Africa, Thailand, and potentially Colombia—restricts its access to a global sustainment network, as noted in a 2025 FlightGlobal analysis. This disparity could leave the RCAF reliant on a niche supply chain, increasing vulnerability to disruptions. For instance, Brazil’s Gripen fleet experienced a 15% reduction in readiness in 2024 due to delays in F414G engine deliveries, per a 2025 Brazilian Air Force report.
Canada’s defense spending, at 1.38% of GDP in 2025 according to Statistics Canada, remains a limiting factor. The government’s 2024 budget allocated CAD 8.1 billion over five years to bolster the Canadian Armed Forces, yet this falls short of NATO’s 2% GDP target, as reported by the International Monetary Fund in 2025. Diverting resources to establish a new fighter program would strain this budget, particularly given the CAD 2.5 billion already invested in F-35 infrastructure, such as training facilities and simulators, per a 2024 Department of National Defence update. The Gripen’s lower acquisition cost—USD 85 million per unit versus the F-35’s USD 110 million, based on 2023 Saab and Lockheed Martin data—offers short-term savings, but these are offset by the long-term costs of transitioning logistics and retraining 1,200 RCAF personnel, estimated at CAD 1.8 billion by a 2025 Canadian Global Affairs Institute study.
The diplomatic ramifications of altering the F-35 commitment extend to Canada’s standing within NATO and its bilateral relationship with the United States. The JSF program, involving 20 partner nations, relies on shared investments to reduce costs, with Canada’s CAD 160 million contribution securing access to USD 12 billion in contracts through 2035, according to a 2024 U.S. Department of Defense report. Canceling the remaining 72 F-35s could prompt retaliatory measures, such as restricted access to U.S. training facilities or intelligence-sharing networks, as warned in a 2025 Wilson Center policy brief. Moreover, the Gripen’s reliance on U.S.-made components, including 40% of its avionics by value, subjects it to U.S. export controls, undermining claims of enhanced sovereignty, as noted by defense analyst Martin Shadwick in a 2025 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation interview.
The RCAF’s operational readiness, already strained by the CF-18’s 45% mission-capable rate in 2025, per a 2025 Auditor General of Canada report, cannot afford further delays. The F-35’s global fleet, exceeding 1,300 aircraft and 1.2 million flight hours by April 2025, offers a proven platform with established logistics, as reported by Lockheed Martin. In contrast, the Gripen’s operational history, while reliable, is limited to 250 aircraft across six nations, with a cumulative 400,000 flight hours, per a 2025 Saab corporate report. This disparity underscores the F-35’s maturity and scalability, critical for addressing Canada’s expansive 9.98 million square kilometer territory, including its 243,000-kilometer Arctic coastline, as documented by Natural Resources Canada in 2025.
The potential adoption of a mixed fleet—16 F-35s alongside Gripens—introduces additional complexities. A 2025 U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory study estimates that mixed fleets increase maintenance costs by 35% due to divergent supply chains and training requirements. For Canada, this could translate to an additional CAD 1.2 billion annually, based on the RCAF’s 2025 sustainment budget of CAD 5.5 billion. Furthermore, the Gripen’s single-engine design, while fuel-efficient, limits its payload capacity to 5,300 kilograms compared to the F-35’s 8,160 kilograms, per a 2024 FlightGlobal specification sheet. This constraint could hinder the RCAF’s ability to conduct long-range strike missions, particularly in the Arctic, where refueling infrastructure is scarce.
In conclusion, Canada’s potential shift from the F-35 to the Gripen reflects a confluence of geopolitical tensions, economic pressures, and operational imperatives. The F-35’s superior technological capabilities, alignment with NATO and NORAD requirements, and established economic benefits outweigh the Gripen’s cost advantages and Arctic-specific features. A pivot to the Gripen risks fragmenting Canada’s defense posture, increasing costs, and diminishing its strategic credibility. The RCAF’s modernization must prioritize interoperability, scalability, and resilience to ensure Canada’s sovereignty and security in an era of intensifying global competition.
