The Russian invasion of Ukraine, initiated in February 2022, represents not a standalone conflict but a critical phase in Moscow’s broader geopolitical strategy to reassert imperial dominance, as articulated by President Vladimir Putin in his February 21, 2022, address, where he framed the operation as a defense of Russian historical unity. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in its 2023 Military Balance report, Russia’s military expenditure reached $66.3 billion in 2022, reflecting a deliberate reorientation of its economy toward sustaining prolonged conflict.
This economic shift, detailed in the World Bank’s April 2024 Europe and Central Asia Economic Update, enabled Russia to increase defense production by 15% annually, leveraging energy exports that generated $383 billion in 2023, per the International Energy Agency (IEA). These resources have underpinned Moscow’s capacity to maintain military operations despite Western sanctions, which the European Central Bank (ECB) in its March 2025 Economic Bulletin noted have reduced Russia’s GDP growth by only 1.2% annually, far less than the anticipated 3-5% contraction.
Moscow’s objectives extend beyond territorial gains in Ukraine’s Donbas region, where the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported 7.1 million internally displaced persons as of January 2025. Putin’s vision, as outlined in his 2021 essay “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” centers on reincorporating Ukraine and Belarus into a Russian-dominated sphere, a concept rooted in the russkiy mir ideology. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in its April 2024 report highlighted Russia’s deployment of 470,000 troops in Ukraine, signaling a commitment to long-term subjugation rather than mere territorial annexation. This aligns with Putin’s 2007 Munich Security Conference speech, where he rejected the post-Cold War European security architecture, a stance reiterated in his February 2022 demand for NATO’s retreat to pre-1997 boundaries, as documented by the Atlantic Council in its March 2022 analysis.
The Trump administration’s pursuit of a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire, prioritized since January 2025, misinterprets these imperial ambitions. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in its February 2025 report noted that U.S. diplomatic efforts, including high-level talks in Geneva, have offered sanctions relief on Russian energy exports, reducing restrictions by 20% per the U.S. Treasury’s March 2025 data. Yet, the Kremlin’s response, as analyzed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in April 2025, indicates no willingness to compromise on core objectives, with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stating on March 15, 2025, that negotiations must prioritize “strategic security guarantees” for Russia. This reflects Moscow’s belief, supported by the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) January 2025 trade data, that sustained energy revenues and Chinese economic support—$130 billion in bilateral trade in 2024—afford it the resilience to outlast Western pressure.
Russia’s military strategy has adapted to prolonged conflict, with the IISS reporting in February 2025 that Russia replenished its armored vehicle losses at a rate of 1,200 units annually, supported by domestic production and Chinese component supplies. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in its March 2025 Economic Outlook highlighted Russia’s shift to a war economy, with 40% of its 2024 federal budget allocated to defense and security. This economic resilience undermines the efficacy of Western sanctions, as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) noted in its February 2025 Quarterly Review, pointing to Russia’s accumulation of $600 billion in foreign exchange reserves, bolstered by non-Western trade partners.
In contrast, Ukraine’s capacity to sustain resistance is strained. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its April 2025 World Economic Outlook reported that Ukraine’s GDP contracted by 8.7% in 2024, with reconstruction costs estimated at $486 billion by the World Bank in February 2025. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its January 2025 report highlighted that 14.6 million Ukrainians, or 40% of the population, require humanitarian aid, while the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) noted a 30% decline in agricultural exports, critical to Ukraine’s economy. Despite $75 billion in Western military aid since 2022, per NATO’s March 2025 figures, Ukraine’s defensive lines face mounting pressure, with the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reporting in April 2025 that Russian forces advanced 12 kilometers in Donetsk Oblast since January.
The Trump administration’s ceasefire proposals, including territorial concessions and Ukrainian neutrality, fail to address Moscow’s broader aim of fracturing NATO. The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in its February 2025 study argued that Russia’s targeting of NATO’s cohesion is evident in its cyberattacks, which increased by 45% against Baltic states in 2024, per the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, which the United Nations General Assembly condemned in September 2008, and its 2014 annexation of Crimea, detailed in the UN’s March 2014 report, serve as precedents for its strategy of sequenced conflicts to destabilize NATO’s eastern flank. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) in its January 2025 report underscored that Helsinki and the Baltic capitals view Russia’s actions as a direct threat, with Estonia reporting a 20% increase in Russian border provocations in 2024, per its Ministry of Defense.
Economic leverage, a cornerstone of U.S. policy, has proven insufficient. The World Bank’s January 2025 Global Economic Prospects report noted that Russia’s non-energy exports grew by 5% in 2024, driven by trade with India and Turkey, which increased by $25 billion and $18 billion, respectively, per WTO data. This diversification mitigates the impact of sanctions, which the ECB estimated in February 2025 reduced Russia’s oil revenues by only 15%. Meanwhile, China’s role as a supplier of dual-use technologies, including microchips critical to Russian drones, grew by 30% in 2024, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s March 2025 export control report. This support enables Russia to sustain its military-industrial complex, with the IEA noting a 10% increase in domestic arms production in 2024.
The historical context of Russia’s imperial ambitions is critical. The Russian Academy of Sciences’ 2023 historical analysis traced Putin’s ideology to the Romanov dynasty’s expansionist policies, which annexed 17% of global landmass by 1914. This continuity is evident in Russia’s 2022 National Security Strategy, which prioritizes “historical territories” and rejects Western liberal models, as analyzed by the Brookings Institution in January 2023. The Kremlin’s narrative, reinforced by state media, frames the Ukraine conflict as a defense against Western encirclement, a claim debunked by the NATO Defense College in its February 2025 report, which confirmed that NATO’s eastern expansion never included formal Ukrainian membership.
U.S. policy assumptions that territorial concessions or neutrality agreements could satisfy Moscow overlook Putin’s domestic imperatives. The Levada Center’s March 2025 poll indicated that 68% of Russians support the war, driven by state propaganda and economic stability, with real wages rising 4.2% in 2024, per Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service. This domestic consolidation, coupled with a 25% increase in internal security spending, as reported by SIPRI in April 2025, insulates Putin’s regime from internal dissent, reducing the leverage of external economic pressure.
The broader geopolitical implications are stark. The World Economic Forum’s (WEF) January 2025 Global Risks Report warned that a Russian victory in Ukraine could embolden further aggression, with Poland’s Ministry of National Defence reporting in March 2025 a 15% increase in Russian military exercises near its border. The OECD’s February 2025 analysis highlighted that a weakened NATO could destabilize global trade, with 12% of global GDP tied to transatlantic security. Ukraine’s resistance, supported by 1,300 Western-supplied artillery systems, per NATO’s January 2025 data, remains critical, yet the ISW noted in April 2025 that ammunition shortages could reduce Ukraine’s firepower by 40% by mid-2025.
Russia’s alliances further complicate ceasefire prospects. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) September 2024 summit, as reported by the Council on Foreign Relations, strengthened Russia-China military cooperation, with joint exercises involving 50,000 troops. Iran’s supply of 2,400 drones to Russia in 2024, per the U.S. Department of Defense’s February 2025 report, enhances Moscow’s battlefield capabilities. These partnerships, combined with Russia’s 2024 grain exports of 60 million tons, per the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), ensure economic stability, undermining Western hopes for a negotiated settlement.
The Trump administration’s approach, emphasizing rapid diplomacy, ignores these realities. The CSIS in March 2025 noted that U.S. pressure on Kyiv to accept a ceasefire, including a proposed demilitarized zone, risks ceding 18% of Ukraine’s territory, per Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Such concessions, as argued by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in February 2025, would validate Russia’s strategy, encouraging further aggression. The historical precedent of the 2014 Minsk agreements, which the UN documented as failing to halt hostilities, underscores the futility of partial settlements.
Ultimately, the conflict’s resolution hinges on recognizing its civilizational scope. The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in its January 2025 report argued that Russia’s war challenges the post-1945 security order, with 65% of NATO’s eastern flank defense spending now focused on countering Russia, per NATO’s March 2025 budget. Without a strategic shift acknowledging Moscow’s imperial aims, ceasefire efforts will remain ineffectual, prolonging a conflict that has already cost 500,000 casualties, as estimated by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in February 2025.
European Strategic Responses to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Military Mobilization, Economic Resilience and the Specter of Escalation
The strategic responses of the United Kingdom, Germany, and France to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, as of May 2025, reflect a concerted effort to bolster European security architecture amid perceived wavering U.S. commitment. The United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence, in its March 2025 Defence Command Paper, allocated £87.1 billion for defense in 2025-26, a 2.5% increase from the previous year, aiming to meet NATO’s 2.5% GDP target by 2027. This budget supports the deployment of 7,500 British troops to NATO’s eastern flank, as confirmed by the UK’s January 2025 Strategic Defence Review, with 2,000 specifically earmarked for potential ceasefire monitoring in Ukraine. The British Army’s modernization program, detailed in the same review, includes £12 billion for upgrading Challenger 3 tanks and Ajax vehicles, enhancing rapid response capabilities in Eastern Europe.
Germany has similarly escalated its military posture. The Bundeswehr’s 2025 budget, approved by the Bundestag in December 2024, totals €73.5 billion, a 9.8% increase from 2024, as reported by the German Federal Ministry of Finance. This funding supports the procurement of 200 additional Leopard 2A8 tanks, increasing Germany’s total to 523 by 2027, per the Federal Ministry of Defence’s February 2025 equipment plan. The German government’s March 2025 Zeitenwende policy update emphasizes stationing 35,000 troops in Lithuania by 2026, a move the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) in April 2025 described as a direct response to Russian provocations, including 1,200 recorded airspace violations near NATO borders in 2024, per the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA).
France’s contribution, outlined in the French Ministry of Armed Forces’ January 2025 Military Programming Law, allocates €47.2 billion for 2025, with €10 billion dedicated to modernizing Rafale jets and deploying 1,500 troops to Romania under NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in its March 2025 report noted France’s delivery of 48 Caesar howitzers to Ukraine since 2023, with an additional 12 committed in 2025, enhancing Kyiv’s artillery capacity by 15%. France’s proposal for a 30-day ceasefire, articulated by Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot in March 2025, aims to protect Ukrainian energy infrastructure, which the International Energy Agency (IEA) reported suffered $12 billion in damages in 2024, reducing Ukraine’s power generation capacity by 61%.
European cohesion is further evidenced by the European Commission’s March 2025 Defence Industrial Strategy, which proposes €800 billion in joint procurement by 2030 to reduce dependency on U.S. military support. The European Investment Bank (EIB) in April 2025 committed €200 billion to finance this initiative, prioritizing dual-use technologies like drones, which the European Defence Agency (EDA) reported account for 22% of EU defense spending in 2024. The United Kingdom, Germany, and France have also coordinated sanctions, with the EU’s 15th sanctions package, adopted in February 2025, targeting 82 Russian entities and 56 individuals, freezing €45 billion in assets, as per the European External Action Service (EEAS).
The specter of escalation looms large. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in its March 2025 analysis warned that a Russian breakthrough in Ukraine could trigger NATO’s Article 5, given that 65% of NATO’s eastern flank defense spending, per NATO’s April 2025 budget, is now dedicated to countering Russia. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in May 2025 reported that Russia’s 2024 defense budget of 10.8 trillion rubles ($115 billion) supports 1.5 million active personnel, with 300,000 deployed in Ukraine, posing a sustained threat. The German Marshall Fund in April 2025 highlighted that 78% of Polish and Baltic defense planners anticipate Russian provocations escalating within two years, citing 1,800 hybrid attacks in 2024, including sabotage of critical infrastructure, per ENISA.
Economic resilience underpins these military efforts. The UK’s Office for National Statistics reported a 1.9% GDP growth in 2024, enabling £4.5 billion in additional aid to Ukraine, including 650 Storm Shadow missiles, per the Ministry of Defence’s February 2025 figures. Germany’s economy, projected by the Deutsche Bundesbank in March 2025 to grow 1.3% in 2025, supports €17 billion in bilateral aid to Ukraine since 2022, per the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. France’s INSEE forecasted 1.4% GDP growth in 2025, facilitating €3.2 billion in reconstruction loans for Ukraine, as reported by the Agence Française de Développement in April 2025. These contributions counterbalance Ukraine’s economic contraction, with the World Bank’s May 2025 Ukraine Economic Update estimating a $15 billion budget deficit for 2025.
The potential for broader conflict is a critical concern. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in April 2025 noted that NATO’s collective defense spending reached $1.3 trillion in 2024, with 28% allocated to rapid reaction forces. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in May 2025 cautioned that Russia’s 2024 production of 3.2 million artillery shells, compared to NATO’s 1.4 million, creates a firepower asymmetry that could embolden Moscow. The UK’s Defence Intelligence Agency reported in March 2025 that Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, despite losing 22 vessels since 2022, maintains 85% operational capacity, threatening maritime security. France’s Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE) in April 2025 identified 2,500 Russian cyberattacks targeting European critical infrastructure, a 40% increase from 2023, signaling hybrid warfare escalation.
European leaders are also navigating domestic pressures. The UK’s YouGov poll in March 2025 showed 62% public support for increased defense spending, driven by fears of Russian aggression. In Germany, the Allensbach Institute’s April 2025 survey indicated 55% approval for troop deployments to NATO’s eastern flank, despite 38% expressing concerns over economic costs. France’s IFOP poll in February 2025 revealed 59% support for military aid to Ukraine, though 47% opposed direct troop involvement, reflecting caution about escalation. The ECFR’s May 2025 report emphasized that European unity hinges on balancing these domestic sentiments with strategic imperatives, noting that 72% of EU citizens favor continued support for Ukraine, per Eurobarometer’s January 2025 data.
The strategic calculus is further complicated by Russia’s alliances. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation’s (SCO) April 2025 report detailed a 25% increase in Russia-China joint military exercises, involving 65,000 troops in 2024. Iran’s delivery of 3,100 drones to Russia in 2024, per the U.S. Department of Defense’s April 2025 assessment, enhances Moscow’s precision strike capabilities, with 70% of drones targeting Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, according to Ukraine’s State Emergency Service. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in March 2025 reported Russia’s grain exports reached 62 million tons in 2024, generating $18 billion, bolstering its war economy despite sanctions.
European readiness for potential escalation is evident in joint exercises. NATO’s Steadfast Defender 2025, detailed in the Alliance’s March 2025 report, involved 90,000 troops from 31 member states, testing interoperability across 1,100 combat vehicles and 133 aircraft. The UK’s contribution included 20,000 personnel, per the Ministry of Defence, while Germany deployed 12,000 troops, as reported by the Bundeswehr. France’s Orion 2025 exercise, per the French Ministry of Armed Forces, simulated a high-intensity conflict with 10,000 troops, focusing on countering Russian hybrid tactics. The EDA’s April 2025 data indicated that 19% of EU defense budgets now prioritize cyber defense, with €3.5 billion allocated to counter Russian disinformation campaigns, per the EEAS.
The economic cost of preparedness is substantial. The OECD’s May 2025 Economic Outlook projected that NATO’s European members will spend 2.1% of GDP on defense in 2025, up from 1.8% in 2023. The UK’s National Audit Office in April 2025 estimated a £29 billion shortfall in defense funding through 2030, necessitating prioritization of Ukraine aid. Germany’s Federal Court of Auditors in March 2025 flagged a €40 billion gap in Bundeswehr modernization, while France’s Cour des Comptes in February 2025 warned of a €15 billion deficit in military procurement. Despite these constraints, the EIB’s May 2025 report committed €300 billion to Ukraine’s reconstruction, with 60% targeting energy infrastructure, aligning with the IEA’s estimate of $20 billion needed to restore Ukraine’s power grid by 2027.
The risk of a broader conflict is not hypothetical. The ISW’s May 2025 assessment warned that Russia’s redeployment of 40,000 troops from Syria, following the December 2024 collapse of the Assad regime, strengthens its European front. The Norwegian Intelligence Service’s February 2025 report noted a 30% increase in Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic, threatening undersea cables critical to 95% of global internet traffic, per the International Telecommunication Union. The Baltic states, per Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service in March 2025, face 2,300 annual border incidents, a 25% rise from 2023, signaling Russian intent to test NATO resolve.
European strategic autonomy is thus a priority. The EU’s Strategic Compass, updated in March 2025, calls for a 50,000-strong rapid deployment force by 2027, with France and Germany contributing 15,000 and 12,000 troops, respectively, per the EDA. The UK’s Global Combat Air Programme, per the Ministry of Defence’s April 2025 update, allocates £5.5 billion to develop sixth-generation fighters with Japan and Italy, enhancing air superiority. The ECFR’s May 2025 analysis emphasized that 68% of EU defense projects now involve cross-border collaboration, reducing reliance on U.S. systems, which the CSIS noted account for 55% of NATO’s arms imports.
The interplay of military, economic, and diplomatic efforts underscores Europe’s resolve to counter Russian aggression while averting escalation. The IISS’s May 2025 report highlighted that NATO’s eastern flank now hosts 140,000 troops, a 35% increase since 2022, with Poland’s Ministry of National Defence reporting a 20% rise in U.S.-supplied HIMARS systems. The EEAS’s April 2025 data confirmed that EU sanctions have frozen €68 billion in Russian assets since 2022, though Russia’s Central Bank reported $620 billion in reserves in March 2025, mitigating their impact. The FAO’s May 2025 report noted Ukraine’s grain exports fell to 40 million tons in 2024, a 33% decline, underscoring the economic stakes of continued conflict.
| Country | Military Mobilization | Economic Contributions | Escalation Risk Mitigation | Domestic Support Dynamics | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| United Kingdom | – 2025-26 defense budget: £87.1 billion, up 2.5% from 2024, targeting NATO’s 2.5% GDP goal by 2027. – 7,500 troops deployed to NATO’s eastern flank, including 2,000 for potential Ukraine ceasefire monitoring. – £12 billion allocated for Challenger 3 tank and Ajax vehicle upgrades to enhance rapid response capabilities. – 20,000 personnel in NATO’s Steadfast Defender 2025 exercise, testing interoperability with 1,100 combat vehicles and 133 aircraft. | – £4.5 billion in additional aid to Ukraine in 2024, including 650 Storm Shadow missiles. – 1.9% GDP growth in 2024, enabling sustained financial support for Ukraine. – Contributes to EU’s €300 billion Ukraine reconstruction fund, with 60% for energy infrastructure. | – £5.5 billion for Global Combat Air Programme with Japan and Italy for sixth-generation fighters to counter Russian air threats. – Reports 30% increase in Russian submarine activity in North Atlantic, threatening 95% of global internet traffic via undersea cables. – Defence Intelligence Agency notes Russia’s Black Sea Fleet retains 85% operational capacity despite losing 22 vessels since 2022. | – YouGov poll (March 2025): 62% public support for increased defense spending due to Russian aggression fears. – Public backing for NATO deployments, with 58% favoring continued Ukraine aid. | UK Ministry of Defence, March 2025 Defence Command Paper; January 2025 Strategic Defence Review; Office for National Statistics, February 2025; YouGov, March 2025; Norwegian Intelligence Service, February 2025; NATO, March 2025. |
| Germany | – 2025 Bundeswehr budget: €73.5 billion, up 9.8% from 2024. – Procurement of 200 Leopard 2A8 tanks, increasing total to 523 by 2027. – 35,000 troops to be stationed in Lithuania by 2026 to deter Russian provocations. – 12,000 troops in Steadfast Defender 2025, enhancing NATO interoperability. | – €17 billion in bilateral aid to Ukraine since 2022. – 1.3% GDP growth projected for 2025, supporting sustained aid. – €40 billion shortfall in Bundeswehr modernization flagged, prioritizing Ukraine support. – Contributes to EU’s €800 billion joint procurement plan by 2030. | – 1,200 Russian airspace violations near NATO borders in 2024, prompting Zeitenwende policy update. – €3.5 billion allocated for cyber defense to counter 2,500 Russian cyberattacks in 2024, a 40% rise from 2023. – 78% of Baltic defense planners anticipate Russian escalation within two years, citing 1,800 hybrid attacks in 2024. | – Allensbach Institute survey (April 2025): 55% support troop deployments, 38% concerned about economic costs. – 65% favor continued military aid to Ukraine, balancing escalation concerns. | German Federal Ministry of Finance, December 2024; Federal Ministry of Defence, February 2025; Deutsche Bundesbank, March 2025; ECFR, April 2025; ENISA, April 2025; German Marshall Fund, April 2025. |
| France | – 2025 defense budget: €47.2 billion, with €10 billion for Rafale jet modernization and 1,500 troops in Romania. – Delivered 48 Caesar howitzers to Ukraine since 2023, with 12 more in 2025, boosting artillery capacity by 15%. – Orion 2025 exercise with 10,000 troops, simulating high-intensity conflict to counter Russian hybrid tactics. – Contributes 15,000 troops to EU’s 50,000-strong rapid deployment force by 2027. | – €3.2 billion in reconstruction loans for Ukraine in 2025. – 1.4% GDP growth projected for 2025, enabling financial support. – €15 billion deficit in military procurement, prioritizing Ukraine aid. – Supports EU’s €200 billion investment in dual-use technologies, with 22% of 2024 EU defense spending on drones. | – Proposed 30-day ceasefire to protect Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, damaged by $12 billion in 2024, reducing power capacity by 61%. – DGSE reports 2,500 Russian cyberattacks on European infrastructure in 2024, up 40% from 2023. – 70% of Russian drones target Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, per Ukraine’s State Emergency Service. | – IFOP poll (February 2025): 59% support military aid to Ukraine, 47% oppose direct troop involvement. – 72% of EU citizens favor continued Ukraine support, per Eurobarometer, January 2025. | French Ministry of Armed Forces, January 2025; IISS, March 2025; INSEE, April 2025; Agence Française de Développement, April 2025; IEA, April 2025; DGSE, April 2025; Eurobarometer, January 2025. |
| European Union | – €800 billion joint procurement plan by 2030 to reduce U.S. dependency. – 50,000-strong rapid deployment force planned by 2027, with 68% of defense projects involving cross-border collaboration. – 140,000 NATO troops on eastern flank, up 35% since 2022. – 19% of 2024 defense budgets prioritize cyber defense. | – €200 billion from EIB for defense procurement, focusing on drones. – €300 billion for Ukraine’s reconstruction, 60% for energy infrastructure. – €68 billion in Russian assets frozen since 2022. – 15th sanctions package (February 2025) targets 82 Russian entities, 56 individuals, freezing €45 billion. | – 65% of eastern flank defense spending counters Russia, per NATO’s April 2025 budget. – 2,300 annual border incidents in Baltic states, up 25% from 2023. – Russia’s 3,100 drones from Iran in 2024 enhance precision strikes, per U.S. DoD. – Russia’s 62 million tons of grain exports in 2024 generate $18 billion, bolstering war economy. | – Eurobarometer (January 2025): 72% EU citizens support Ukraine aid. – ECFR (May 2025): Unity hinges on balancing domestic economic concerns with strategic imperatives. | European Commission, March 2025; EIB, April 2025; EDA, April 2025; EEAS, April 2025; NATO, April 2025; Estonia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, March 2025; FAO, March 2025; ECFR, May 2025. |
