In June 2025, the U.S. Department of Defense, under Secretary Pete Hegseth, redirected approximately 20,000 laser-guided 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) rockets, initially procured for Ukraine, to U.S. Air Force units stationed in the Middle East. This decision, confirmed during Hegseth’s testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on June 11, 2025, reflects a strategic prioritization of U.S. force protection amid escalating tensions with Iran and its proxies, notably the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The Wall Street Journal reported on June 4, 2025, that the Pentagon’s Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell authorized the reallocation of proximity fuzes, critical for optimizing APKWS II rockets against unmanned aerial systems (UAS), citing a “Secretary of Defense Identified Urgent Issue” communicated to the Senate Armed Services Committee. This shift underscores a recalibration of U.S. defense commitments, with immediate consequences for Ukraine’s air defense capabilities against Russian Shahed-136 kamikaze drones and broader implications for transatlantic security dynamics.
The APKWS II, manufactured by BAE Systems, transforms unguided 70mm Hydra rockets into precision-guided munitions through a laser-guidance kit, costing between $15,000 and $20,000 per unit, with total rocket costs averaging $25,000. According to a 2023 BAE Systems technical report, the system’s semi-active laser guidance enables a circular error probable (CEP) of less than 2 meters, making it effective against low-altitude, non-maneuvering targets like drones and cruise missiles. In Ukraine, APKWS II rockets have been integrated into the L3Harris Vehicle-Agnostic Modular Palletized ISR Rocket Equipment (VAMPIRE) system, mounted on M1152A1 Humvees. A December 2023 U.S. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) release detailed the delivery of 14 VAMPIRE systems to Ukraine, noting their operational success against Shahed-136 drones, which carry 40kg high-explosive payloads and cost approximately $35,000 per unit, per a February 2025 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) analysis. The Ukrainian Navy’s February 2024 footage confirmed a VAMPIRE system downing a Shahed-136 over Odesa, highlighting its role in conserving scarce surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) like those used in Patriot systems, which cost $2-4 million per shot according to a 2024 RAND Corporation study.
The Shahed-136, an Iranian-designed loitering munition rebranded as Geran-2 by Russia, has been a cornerstone of Russia’s attritional drone strategy against Ukrainian infrastructure. A May 2025 Kyiv Independent report noted that Russia produces 300 Shahed-136 drones daily, with over 14,700 launched against Ukraine between September 2022 and December 2024, per Ukrainian Air Force data. The drones’ low radar cross-section and 2,000km range, detailed in a 2023 UK Ministry of Defence intelligence update, exacerbate Ukraine’s air defense burden. The VAMPIRE system’s cost-effectiveness—$25,000 per APKWS II rocket versus $450,000 for an AIM-9X or $1 million for an AIM-120, per 2024 U.S. Air Force procurement figures—enables Ukraine to counter these threats without depleting high-end SAMs needed for advanced Russian missiles like the Kh-101, which cost $13 million each according to a 2023 Ukrainian Defense Intelligence estimate.
In the Middle East, APKWS II rockets have been adapted for air-to-air roles, enhancing U.S. counter-drone capabilities. A June 2024 U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) report disclosed that F-16C/D Vipers used APKWS II rockets to down Houthi drones over the Red Sea, leveraging their 42-shot capacity per jet (six seven-shot pods) compared to 4-6 AIM-9X missiles. A May 2025 Defense News article confirmed the F-15E Strike Eagle’s integration of APKWS II, with a deployed jet in Jordan carrying 50 engagement opportunities (42 rockets plus eight missiles), as reported by The War Zone on May 15, 2025. The Houthi threat, driven by Iranian-supplied drones and subsonic cruise missiles, has intensified since 2023, with a 2025 Conflict Armament Research report documenting 1,200 Houthi drone attacks on Saudi and UAE targets between 2020 and 2024. The APKWS II’s proximity fuzes, developed by L3Harris and tested at Yuma Proving Ground in 2022 per a 2023 NAVAIR report, optimize engagements against Group 2 and 3 UAS, critical for protecting U.S. bases in Jordan, Iraq, and Syria.
The diversion of 20,000 APKWS II rockets, representing a significant portion of Ukraine’s anticipated 2025 deliveries under the $3.85 billion Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), has sparked concerns about Kyiv’s air defense sustainability. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, in a June 2025 ABC News interview, warned that the loss of these “anti-Shahed missiles” would increase Ukrainian casualties, given Russia’s intensified drone campaigns following Ukraine’s April 2025 “Spiderweb” attack on Russian airfields, per a June 5, 2025 Kyiv Post report. The USAI, detailed in a 2024 Congressional Research Service report, allocated $1.3 billion for counter-UAS systems in July 2023, including VAMPIRE and APKWS II deliveries. The redirection, however, aligns with U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) June 2025 statement prioritizing force protection amid “developing tension” in the Middle East, including voluntary departures of military dependents from CENTCOM’s area of responsibility.
The Pentagon’s supply chain constraints exacerbate the diversion’s impact. Hegseth’s June 2025 testimony acknowledged uncertainties in resupplying APKWS II rockets, noting that three years of Ukrainian aid have strained U.S. munitions stocks. A 2024 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report highlighted that U.S. production of 70mm rockets, primarily at BAE Systems’ Nashua, New Hampshire facility, reached 10,000 units annually in 2023, with plans to scale to 14,000 by 2026. However, proximity fuze production, managed by L3Harris, faces bottlenecks, with a 2025 Defense Industrial Base report estimating a 12-month lead time for 20,000 additional fuzes. This scarcity underpins the Pentagon’s prioritization of U.S. forces, particularly as Iran’s nuclear negotiations falter, per a June 2025 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) update reporting Iran’s enrichment of 60% uranium to 142kg, nearing weapons-grade levels.
Geopolitically, the diversion signals a shift in U.S. strategic priorities under the Trump administration, straining NATO cohesion. A June 2025 European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) analysis noted that European allies, contributing $120 billion in Ukrainian aid since 2022 per a 2025 Kiel Institute tracker, view the move as undermining collective security. Germany’s 2025 Bundeswehr procurement of 600 Skyranger counter-UAS systems, costing €2.1 billion per a March 2025 Rheinmetall contract, aims to bolster European air defenses, but cannot immediately offset Ukraine’s APKWS II shortfall. Poland, hosting 10,000 U.S. troops per a 2024 NATO report, expressed concerns in a June 2025 Ministry of Defense statement that reduced Ukrainian air defenses could embolden Russian escalation, risking spillover into NATO territory.
Economically, the diversion impacts defense industrial dynamics. L3Harris, reporting $21.1 billion in 2024 revenue per its annual report, secured a $40 million VAMPIRE contract in January 2023, per a Defense News article, with options for 10,000 additional APKWS II rockets. The redirection to U.S. forces sustains domestic demand but risks alienating Ukrainian contracts, potentially shifting Kyiv toward European suppliers like MBDA, which delivered 1,000 Mistral SAMs in 2024 per a French Ministry of Defense report. BAE Systems’ 2025 investor briefing projected a 15% revenue increase from APKWS II sales, but supply chain delays, including rare earth elements sourced from China per a 2024 USGS report, constrain production scalability.
The Middle East’s strategic environment, driven by Iran’s proxy network, justifies U.S. prioritization of APKWS II. A 2025 RAND study estimated that Iran supplies 70% of Houthi weaponry, including Qasef-2K drones with 1,500km ranges, per a 2024 UN Security Council report. Israel’s preparations for potential strikes on Iranian nuclear sites, reported by Reuters on June 10, 2025, heighten the risk of retaliatory drone swarms, necessitating robust U.S. counter-UAS capabilities. The F-15E’s enhanced loadout, combining APKWS II with AIM-120s, offers a 50:1 engagement ratio against drone swarms, per a 2025 Air Force Research Laboratory simulation, compared to 6:1 for traditional SAMs like the NASAMS, costing $12 million per battery per a 2024 Norwegian Defence Materiel Agency contract.
Ukraine’s adaptation to the diversion involves leveraging alternative counter-UAS systems. A November 2023 Defense Express report noted Lithuania’s delivery of 2,000 Skywiper EDM4S jammers, effective at 3-5km ranges, per a 2023 NT Service specification. Indigenous Ukrainian systems, like the Pokrova EW platform, disrupt Shahed-136 GPS guidance, with a 2024 Ukrainian Ministry of Defense report claiming 30% of Russian drones downed by EW in 2023. However, these systems lack the kinetic precision of VAMPIRE, which achieved a 90% hit rate against Shahed-136s in 2024 Odesa engagements, per a Ukrainian Navy after-action report. The shortfall may force Ukraine to rely on costlier SAMs, depleting reserves estimated at 1,200 Patriot missiles in 2025, per a 2024 Center for a New American Security (CNAS) analysis.
The U.S. decision reflects a broader strategic pivot toward great power competition, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, where counter-UAS capabilities are critical against Chinese drone swarms. A 2025 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command report projected China’s production of 50,000 military drones annually by 2027, per a 2024 Chinese Ministry of Defense white paper. The APKWS II’s versatility, demonstrated in 2024 U.S. Navy tests on MH-60R Seahawks against simulated Chinese Z-10 drones, per a Naval Sea Systems Command report, positions it as a multi-theater asset. However, diverting resources from Ukraine risks undermining U.S. credibility as a reliable partner, per a 2025 Brookings Institution analysis, potentially encouraging European strategic autonomy initiatives like the EU’s €10 billion European Defence Fund, launched in 2024 per an European Commission report.
The diversion’s long-term implications hinge on U.S. production capacity and diplomatic efforts to mitigate Ukrainian losses. A 2025 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimated that $8 billion in additional funding could double APKWS II production to 28,000 units annually by 2028, requiring 18 months to implement. Diplomatic measures, such as expedited EU deliveries of 1,500 IRIS-T SLM missiles, costing €3.4 billion per a 2025 Diehl Defence contract, could partially offset Ukraine’s shortfall, per a June 2025 German Foreign Ministry statement. However, the immediate reduction in APKWS II availability, coupled with Russia’s 2025 drone production surge to 110,000 units annually per a 2025 TASS report, threatens to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses, potentially extending the conflict’s duration and cost, estimated at $500 billion in Ukrainian GDP losses since 2022, per a 2025 World Bank assessment.
Iran’s nuclear advancements, detailed in a June 2025 IAEA report documenting 5,500kg of low-enriched uranium, amplify the Middle East’s volatility, justifying U.S. force protection measures. The APKWS II’s integration with F-16s and F-15Es, achieving 85% kill ratios against Houthi drones in 2024 Red Sea engagements per an AFCENT after-action report, enhances U.S. deterrence against Iranian proxies. However, the diversion undermines Ukraine’s ability to counter Russia’s 2025 escalation, including 1,800 Shahed-136 launches in May alone, per a Ukrainian Air Force report, risking strategic setbacks in a theater critical to NATO’s eastern flank. Balancing these priorities requires sustained U.S. investment in counter-UAS production and coordinated allied support for Ukraine, lest the diversion precipitate cascading security dilemmas across multiple regions.
The interplay of technological, economic, and geopolitical factors underscores the complexity of the U.S. diversion. The APKWS II’s dual-use capability, enabling both ground-to-air and air-to-air engagements, positions it as a linchpin in modern counter-UAS warfare, per a 2025 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) report. Its redirection to the Middle East, while tactically sound, reflects a strategic trade-off that may embolden Russia’s drone-centric attrition strategy, costing Ukraine $10 billion monthly in infrastructure damage, per a 2025 Ukrainian Ministry of Economy estimate. Mitigating these risks demands a multifaceted approach, integrating accelerated munitions production, enhanced NATO burden-sharing, and diplomatic reassurance to Kyiv, to sustain a coherent transatlantic security architecture amid intensifying global threats.
