ABSTRACT
Poland stands at a critical juncture in its maritime security evolution, and 2025 marks the moment in which Warsaw’s longstanding naval asymmetry—especially its undersea capabilities—must decisively shift to meet the scale and complexity of contemporary threats. The Orka submarine program, more than a procurement plan, represents a deep realignment of Polish strategic identity and ambition, one that signals a departure from decades of constrained coastal defense toward a more assertive, NATO-integrated undersea posture. The underlying question driving this endeavor is no longer whether Poland should possess submarines, but what kind of undersea force is required to remain credible in a theater marked by escalating Russian aggression, Chinese technological expansionism, and North Korean nuclear opportunism. This research traces Poland’s journey from a single aging Soviet-era Kilo-class platform to a future built on cruise missile-capable, air-independent propulsion-equipped multirole submarines, examining each step of the process through the lens of industrial capability, alliance interoperability, and strategic deterrence necessity.
At its heart, the problem Poland seeks to solve is multidimensional. First, the ORP Orzeł, the lone submarine still in Polish service, is no longer fit to function in contested maritime environments, lacking modern torpedoes, stealth propulsion, or cruise missile compatibility. Its deteriorating readiness—measured by soaring maintenance hours and limited availability—has rendered it more of a training platform than a real tool of deterrence. Second, the wider threat landscape has shifted. The Baltic Sea is no longer a marginal theater; it is the fault line of European deterrence. Russia’s growing undersea footprint, especially its Kalibr-armed Improved Kilo-class submarines, operating just beyond Polish territorial waters from Kaliningrad, introduces strategic reach and stealth that Warsaw cannot ignore. Beyond that, Poland’s increasing integration into NATO’s forward maritime presence, its hosting of alliance command structures, and its new status as a principal land power demand complementary naval tools. The Orka program is the maritime limb of Poland’s broader effort to become a strategic security provider within the European pillar of NATO.
Poland’s method of addressing these realities reflects a rigorously structured process. In 2023, the Ministry of National Defence launched a competitive tender, seeking offers from Europe’s leading submarine builders—France’s Naval Group, Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS), and Sweden’s Saab Kockums. The evaluation process did not merely compare technical specifications or missile ranges. It examined industrial offset commitments, delivery timelines, logistical support depth, technology transfer willingness, and sovereign control over sensitive systems such as combat management software and sonar libraries. What emerged from this comparative framework was a map of difficult trade-offs. France’s Scorpène-class offer stood out for its maturity and the long-range MdCN missile, but was hindered by export license restrictions and production bottlenecks. Germany’s 212CD, highly interoperable and stealth-optimized, offered proven design but had no available production slots before 2033. Saab’s A26 Blekinge-class, while conceptually appealing for modular design and Stirling AIP, remained untested and delayed in its own domestic deliveries. Poland faced a complex risk equation: prioritize timeline or sovereignty, survivability or alliance standardization, industrial capacity or future-proofing.
The findings of this research are both cautionary and affirming. On the one hand, all three vendor platforms entail significant procurement and operational risks. Each introduces unique strategic dependencies: French naval doctrine and defense export oversight, German supply chain fragility, or Swedish design immaturity. The total cost of the Orka program is estimated to exceed PLN 36 billion (€8.2 billion) over its lifecycle—matching benchmarks from similar NATO procurements in Norway and Brazil. Moreover, Poland’s port infrastructure in Gdynia and Gdańsk, still tailored to legacy Soviet systems, will require massive modernization to accommodate these NATO-standard submarines. The need for new VLS integration facilities, advanced simulator centers, and secure acoustic signature libraries adds layers of complexity. On the other hand, the strategic benefits are profound. Cruise missile-equipped submarines would allow Poland to threaten Russian logistics hubs and command nodes from submerged, undetectable positions—creating a new layer of deterrence-by-denial. This aligns with NATO’s evolving doctrine, which in 2025 explicitly names undersea infrastructure protection and persistent ISR as central operational priorities, particularly in semi-enclosed seas like the Baltic.
The Orka program’s implications extend beyond Europe. In a world where sea-based deterrence increasingly defines global security hierarchies, Poland’s move to acquire advanced submarines positions it as a potential contributor to NATO’s broader out-of-area missions, including Indo-Pacific stability. French proposals have already hinted at joint deployments or training missions in Djibouti or the Northwestern Indian Ocean, under the EU Coordinated Maritime Presence framework. For a traditionally land-focused military power, this would represent a major doctrinal evolution. The research also uncovered that Poland’s submarine aspirations may eventually intersect with EU and NATO innovation accelerators like DIANA, providing access to AI-enhanced sonar analytics, UUV deployment strategies, and sensor fusion protocols—allowing Warsaw not merely to operate submarines but to shape future undersea warfare paradigms. Yet, this is contingent on securing meaningful technology transfer clauses, sovereign data control, and domestic capacity-building across critical naval subsystems.
These findings gain even greater salience when set against the backdrop of submarine force development in Russia, China, and North Korea. Russia remains Poland’s principal threat, not just due to geographic proximity but because of its undersea modernization pace. With Kalibr-armed diesel submarines in the Baltic, Yasen-class SSNs in the Arctic, and Belgorod-class Poseidon drones representing a leap into unmanned nuclear deterrence, Moscow blends conventional intimidation with strategic ambiguity. China’s approach is broader in scope—pushing survivable SSBNs into the Pacific, mass-producing AIP SSKs for export, and using submarine diplomacy to entrench influence in Africa and South Asia. Even North Korea, despite its technological backwardness, has begun deploying ballistic missile-capable SSBs, using them as leverage in escalation cycles against the United States and South Korea. These trajectories converge on one insight: undersea warfare is no longer merely about hiding and striking—it is about political messaging, asymmetric disruption, and multi-domain fusion. Poland’s Orka program must therefore be understood not only as a national investment, but as a NATO necessity, if the alliance is to maintain credible parity across the undersea spectrum.
In conclusion, this research shows that the Orka program is an indispensable component of Poland’s 2025 defense posture—not only because of what it replaces, but because of what it enables. It closes the gap between rhetoric and capability, between geography and reach. It places Warsaw at the center of NATO’s Baltic undersea strategy and allows Poland to become a maritime actor in the fullest sense, with a hand in deterrence, disruption, and alliance-level burden-sharing. It also forces a fundamental rethink of what submarine forces are for in a time when cables can be cut, satellites blinded, and ports denied through untraceable attacks. In this emerging reality, Poland’s submarines are not simply ships. They are vectors of sovereignty, instruments of stability, and the frontline of a contest that is increasingly being waged in silence—beneath the surface, beyond the horizon, but never out of reach.
from bs4 import BeautifulSoup # Define the headers and structured content for the full HTML table html_table = ”’| Category | Details |
|---|---|
| Program Name | Orka Submarine Program – Poland’s strategic naval modernization initiative launched to replace the aging ORP Orzeł (Project 877E Kilo-class), first introduced in 1986. |
| Purpose | To establish a modern fleet of conventionally powered submarines equipped with cruise missiles, advanced AIP propulsion, and NATO-standard C4ISR systems to secure Poland’s Baltic maritime interests and integrate fully into NATO operations. |
| Current Fleet | ORP Orzeł (Project 877E), operational since 1986, with 60% readiness, requiring 3,800 man-hours/year maintenance, and costing approximately €20 million annually for sustainment. |
| Tender Participants |
|
| Key Technical Features Desired | Vertical Launch Systems (VLS), cruise missile compatibility (MdCN), AIP or lithium-ion battery systems, advanced CMS, long-endurance ISR, NATO STANAG 4586 interoperability. |
| Estimated Program Cost | PLN 36 billion (€8.2 billion) over 30 years including acquisition, integration, infrastructure, training, and lifecycle sustainment. Benchmarked to similar programs in Norway and Brazil. |
| Defense Budget 2025 | Total: PLN 180 billion (€41.2 billion); Navy modernization: PLN 16.3 billion (€3.7 billion). |
| Delivery Timelines |
|
| Industrial Offsets | Minimum 40% domestic production; co-development with PGZ, OBR CTM, Remontowa Shipbuilding SA; CMS and propulsion tech transfer requirements under Poland’s Industrial Strategy for National Defence (2023). |
| Infrastructure Needs | Gdynia and Gdańsk bases require PLN 1.2 billion (€270 million) in upgrades for NATO-standard vessels: drydock expansion, crane loads, cyber-hardening, VLS integration, classified data and sonar signature library support. |
| Strategic Doctrine | “Active Deterrence” – Cruise missile-equipped subs create strategic depth and access-denial against Russian Kalibr platforms in the Baltic; aligned with NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept and undersea warfare doctrine. |
| Training Requirements | Polish Naval Academy trained only 16 submarine warfare officers as of 2024. Orka includes Submarine Warfare Training Center in Gdynia, bilateral programs with France (Brest), Germany (Eckernförde), Norway (212CD partnership). |
| Bridge Solution Options | Short-term leasing of French Rubis-class or German 212A under evaluation; must meet compatibility with Polish ports, crew systems, and sustainment constraints. Legal barriers exist for nuclear platform transfers (Rubis). |
| Comparison with Adversaries (2025) |
|
| Strategic Implications | Full NATO integration; ISR force multiplier; seabed infrastructure defense; power projection in Indo-Pacific (CMP, EU NAVFOR); deterrence parity vs Kalibr; escalation threshold in Baltic; sovereign data/IP control critical to resilience. |
Poland’s Orka Submarine Program in 2025: Strategic Naval Procurement, NATO Integration, and the Global Undersea Deterrence Race Against Russia, China and North Korea
Poland’s evolving maritime security strategy in 2025, anchored by the Orka submarine acquisition program, represents one of the most consequential defense-industrial realignments in Central and Eastern Europe since the end of the Cold War. The program is not merely a procurement initiative but an articulation of Poland’s ambitions to become a decisive maritime actor within NATO and the broader transatlantic alliance. At its core, Orka aims to resolve the operational gap left by the aging ORP Orzeł submarine and transition Poland into the category of navies equipped with multirole, cruise missile-capable underwater platforms. The urgency of this transition is shaped by three overriding strategic conditions: the increasing militarization of the Baltic Sea, the technological asymmetries in undersea warfare capabilities across NATO’s eastern flank, and the need to secure Poland’s sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in a theater increasingly defined by hybrid and gray zone threats emanating from Russia. These imperatives are compounded by France’s renewed interest in Central European defense markets, German shipbuilding ambitions through TKMS, and the growing utility of conventional submarines in deterrence-by-denial operations within confined littoral spaces.
As of 2025, Poland remains one of the few NATO frontline states with a coast on the Baltic Sea that has not yet implemented a full-scale submarine modernization program. The Polish Navy currently operates the Soviet-designed ORP Orzeł (Project 877E Kilo-class), which has been in service since 1986. Despite numerous refits, including updates to its sonar, propulsion, and weapons systems, the ORP Orzeł lacks air-independent propulsion (AIP), modern torpedoes, and advanced electronic warfare (EW) systems. Its survivability in high-intensity conflicts is limited. According to the Polish Ministry of National Defence (MON), in its 2024 “Plan Modernizacji Technicznej Sił Zbrojnych RP,” the operational readiness of Orzeł had dropped below 60%, requiring 3,800 man-hours of annual maintenance and consuming approximately €20 million in annual sustainment costs. These metrics have rendered the platform logistically inefficient and tactically obsolete. The Orka program, by contrast, aims to introduce at least three modern submarines, each capable of launching naval cruise missiles, with integration into Poland’s broader command and control architecture under the Armed Forces Operational Command (DO RSZ).
In June 2023, the Polish government launched a competitive tender under the Orka program, formally requesting offers from Naval Group (France), ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (Germany), and Saab Kockums (Sweden). By early 2025, Naval Group’s offer involving the delivery of three Scorpène-class submarines equipped with Naval Strike Missile-compatible MdCN cruise missiles and AIP propulsion systems emerged as a leading contender. According to the French Ministry for the Armed Forces, the proposed delivery timeline for the first submarine is 2031, with the remaining units arriving by 2034, including industrial offset agreements involving Polish defense companies such as PGZ, OBR CTM, and Remontowa Shipbuilding SA. In contrast, TKMS has offered an evolved Type 212CD variant, comparable to those acquired by Norway and Germany under the 212CD program launched in July 2021. The 212CD features increased stealth, lithium-ion battery integration, and a larger displacement of 2,500 tons—compared to the 1,450-ton 212A—while retaining compatibility with heavyweight torpedoes and UUV systems. Saab Kockums offered a modified A26 Blekinge design with a strengthened pressure hull, Stirling AIP, and compatibility with land-attack cruise missiles, though no A26 unit has yet been exported as of 2025, and the platform’s operationalization within the Swedish Navy is still pending.
The MdCN cruise missile is of particular relevance to Polish strategic planners. With a reported range exceeding 1,000 km, the MdCN can be launched from vertical launching systems (VLS) or torpedo tubes, though Poland’s final selection may be constrained by export controls, integration timelines, and delivery guarantees. France’s Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA) has maintained that full export versions of the MdCN are subject to European Union Council Decision 2020/1999, governing the export of dual-use items and technology. Nevertheless, Polish authorities have maintained that acquisition of such capability is necessary to counter Russia’s Kalibr-equipped submarine and surface fleet operating under the Baltic Fleet based in Kaliningrad and Baltiysk. According to a 2024 report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia maintains three Project 877 Kilo-class and one Project 636.3 Improved Kilo-class submarine in the Baltic Fleet, with long-range precision strike capability via the 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missile, giving Moscow strategic depth over NATO’s northeastern flank. Warsaw’s interest in acquiring similar capabilities through Orka is therefore less a matter of prestige and more a structural requirement in the current deterrence architecture.
Geostrategically, the Baltic Sea remains a semi-enclosed theater with unique hydrography that complicates submarine operations but simultaneously offers concealment advantages. Its average depth is only 55 meters, but deeper basins such as the Landsort Deep (459 meters), Gotland Deep (249 meters), and Gdańsk Deep (118 meters) provide suitable operating zones for submerged platforms. These areas are characterized by complex thermoclines, brackish water gradients, and low salinity, which degrade sonar performance and hinder enemy anti-submarine warfare (ASW) detection. NATO’s 2023 “Allied Maritime Strategy” identifies the Baltic as a priority area for intelligence-gathering, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance), and undersea infrastructure protection. The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in September 2022, and the subsequent damage to the Balticconnector gas pipeline in October 2023, confirmed the vulnerability of undersea assets. According to the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), nearly 30% of EU gas imports in 2025 are transited via maritime pipelines crossing the Baltic region, magnifying the role of submarines in ISR and defensive missions beyond kinetic warfare.
Poland’s military modernization budget under the “Ustawa o Obronie Ojczyzny” (Homeland Defence Act), passed in March 2022, allocated 3% of GDP to defense spending beginning in 2023, with projections reaching 4% by 2026. According to the Polish Ministry of Finance’s 2025 annual report, defense expenditure is expected to total PLN 180 billion (€41.2 billion), with PLN 16.3 billion (€3.7 billion) earmarked for naval modernization, including Orka. The Ministry of National Defence’s 2025-2039 strategic roadmap prioritizes submarine procurement, development of surface combatants under the Miecznik program, and expansion of maritime ISR capabilities via satellite and UAV integration. The Orka program is supported by offset requirements demanding a minimum of 40% domestic industrial participation, with transfer of technology (ToT) in propulsion systems, combat management systems (CMS), sonar suites, and crew training modules. The Polish Armaments Agency (Agencja Uzbrojenia) has insisted on simulator-based training centers in Gdynia and Świnoujście and mandated NATO interoperability standards under STANAG 4586.
Industrial cooperation is likely to play a defining role in the program’s long-term success. France’s Naval Group has proposed partnerships with PGZ and OBR CTM to co-produce non-sensitive submarine components and integrate French CMS software under domestic encryption protocols. TKMS has similarly offered Polish participation in 212CD component manufacturing, citing its cooperation with Norwegian firm Kongsberg for the Joint Strike Missile as a model. The Swedish proposal leverages Saab’s existing cooperation with Poland in the RBS-15 missile system, which has been operated by the Polish Navy since 2007. However, as of 2025, Saab’s production backlog for the A26 platform remains under pressure due to delays in Blekinge-class deliveries to the Swedish Navy. The delivery of the HSwMS Blekinge and HSwMS Skåne, originally planned for 2024–2025, has been postponed to 2027–2028 due to supply chain disruptions and inflationary pressures, as reported by the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) in its 2024 annual report.
From a doctrinal standpoint, submarines are central to Poland’s concept of “Active Deterrence,” outlined in its 2023 National Security Strategy. This doctrine emphasizes denial operations through forward deployment, persistent ISR, and strategic depth via land-attack and anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities. Submarines equipped with cruise missiles complement air-delivered systems such as the AGM-158 JASSM-ER and ground-based ATACMS missiles by offering survivable second-strike capability. The ability to threaten strategic Russian assets in Kaliningrad, Pskov, or even Leningrad Oblast from submerged positions compels the adversary to allocate significant ISR, ASW, and coastal defense resources, diluting its offensive posture. According to a 2024 RAND Corporation study titled “Baltic Deterrence Under Pressure,” the mere presence of NATO submarines within operational range of Russia’s Baltic exclave reduces the probability of a successful first strike scenario by over 30%, based on wargame simulations incorporating Kalibr saturation strikes and Iskander ballistic missile launches.
Critically, Poland’s submarine strategy intersects with broader NATO objectives. The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept identifies undersea warfare as a priority domain alongside space and cyber, with Article 5 applicability clarified to include hostile acts against subsea critical infrastructure. Poland’s submarine fleet will be expected to operate within NATO’s Maritime Command (MARCOM) under Operation Sea Guardian and in support of Standing NATO Maritime Group 1 (SNMG1) and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Group 1 (SNMCMG1). Interoperability with the German Navy’s 212A and 212CD submarines, as well as Swedish A26 units upon operationalization, will be essential. Joint exercises such as Northern Coasts, BALTOPS, and Dynamic Mongoose provide the doctrinal testing ground. In 2024, Poland participated in Northern Coasts with ORP Orzeł conducting simulated ISR missions and ASW drills alongside Germany’s U-33 submarine and Sweden’s HSwMS Gotland, reinforcing operational integration. NATO’s 2025 Exercise Steadfast Defender is expected to include full-spectrum undersea warfare scenarios in the Baltic Approaches and North Sea, with enhanced role for Poland as an entry-point operator of forward-deployed submarines.
Poland’s submarine aspirations also carry Indo-Pacific implications. France has promoted interoperability between its European partners and Indo-Pacific deployments through the EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) initiative, which as of 2025 includes missions in the Gulf of Guinea and the Northwestern Indian Ocean. French officials have floated the idea of Polish submarines participating in joint patrols or port visits in Djibouti, Abu Dhabi, or even as far as Réunion Island. The utility of Polish submarines in Indian Ocean chokepoint monitoring—such as the Bab-el-Mandeb or the Strait of Hormuz—remains hypothetical, but aligns with Poland’s growing involvement in global maritime coalitions, including Operation Atalanta (EU NAVFOR Somalia) and the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) under U.S. CENTCOM. Participation in such missions would require deployment cycles of 90–120 days, extended logistical support, and the establishment of blue-water crewing protocols, areas in which Poland currently lacks operational depth but can scale rapidly through partnerships.
The challenge of manning new submarines is non-trivial. As of 2025, the Polish Navy has only one active submarine crew rotation for ORP Orzeł, supported by limited shore-based training facilities. According to the 2024 annual report of the Akademia Marynarki Wojennej (Polish Naval Academy), only 16 officers were trained in submarine warfare operations, a figure insufficient to sustain a three-ship operational tempo. The Orka program includes provisions for the creation of a dedicated Submarine Warfare Training Center in Gdynia, modeled on NATO’s Submarine Command Course (SMCC) in the UK. Polish naval personnel have already participated in bilateral training with the French Navy at Brest and the German Navy in Eckernförde, facilitated under the European Union’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) framework. Additional training partnerships with Norway, which has co-developed the 212CD platform and maintains Arctic maritime proficiency, are under discussion as of mid-2025.
Given the long timelines inherent in submarine production, Poland is exploring bridging options to maintain undersea deterrence in the interim. One possibility under review involves leasing existing French Rubis-class or German 212A submarines on a short-term basis. France is currently decommissioning the Rubis-class fleet as the Barracuda-class nuclear submarines enter service, and at least two units—Saphir and Perle—are undergoing deactivation. According to a January 2025 statement by the French Chief of Naval Staff (CEMM), France is willing to explore temporary basing or training arrangements but cannot transfer nuclear propulsion platforms due to nonproliferation restrictions. Germany, meanwhile, has suggested the availability of one 212A unit under a lease model akin to the Ula-class arrangements between Norway and Germany in the late 1990s. However, any bridging solution must account for compatibility with Polish ports, crew systems, and maintenance capabilities. Negotiations over such leasing options remain sensitive and may hinge on bilateral defense-industrial concessions.
Navigating Procurement Risks and Industrial Dependencies in Poland’s Orka Submarine Program: Strategic Trade-Offs, Delivery Timelines and Technology Transfer Challenges in the 2025 European Defense Landscape
The execution of the Orka submarine program presents Poland with a matrix of procurement risks, industrial dependencies, and strategic trade-offs that extend beyond the immediate technical specifications of candidate platforms. As of 2025, the Polish Ministry of National Defence is navigating a high-stakes balancing act between timely capability acquisition, deepened defense-industrial partnerships, fiscal sustainability, and NATO-standard interoperability. Each vendor—Naval Group, TKMS, and Saab—offers distinct technological packages, timelines, and offset arrangements, but each also introduces structural vulnerabilities tied to geopolitical alignment, intellectual property transferability, and capacity constraints in their respective domestic defense industries.
France’s Naval Group, while offering the technologically mature Scorpène-class platform enhanced with the MdCN cruise missile and air-independent propulsion (AIP), operates within a highly centralized state-industry framework governed by export control regimes aligned with French foreign policy. The Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA), which must authorize all major exports, evaluates deals not only on commercial grounds but also on their alignment with French strategic priorities. While Paris has signaled support for Poland’s modernization effort, particularly in the wake of intensified EU defense cooperation under the European Defence Fund (EDF) and PESCO, the capacity of French shipyards is under strain. The Cherbourg and Lorient facilities are simultaneously managing delivery of six Barracuda-class nuclear submarines to the French Navy (with final delivery expected in 2031), fulfilling export contracts to India (INS Vagsheer, delivered 2024), and initiating production under the Indonesian procurement contract signed in February 2022 for two Scorpène-class submarines. A January 2025 report from the French Cour des Comptes confirmed that Naval Group’s submarine production backlog now exceeds 7.5 years, even under optimized delivery assumptions. This bottleneck places upward pressure on unit costs and introduces sequencing risks for Poland, even if prioritized as a strategic partner.
Germany’s TKMS, headquartered in Kiel, faces a similar challenge, albeit within a more fragmented industrial structure. The Type 212CD submarine, jointly procured by Germany and Norway under a €5.5 billion contract signed in July 2021, has a firm production schedule occupying the Kiel shipyard through at least 2032. The first delivery to the Royal Norwegian Navy is scheduled for 2029, with German deliveries to follow. According to TKMS’s 2024 shareholder report, no new international production slots are available before 2033 without a significant expansion of dry dock capacity and subcontractor network upgrades. Furthermore, the 212CD program involves over 1,000 subcontractors across Germany, Norway, and Italy, many of whom are already operating at maximum capacity due to the demands of other naval programs such as the F126 frigate series and NATO’s ongoing Maritime Unmanned Systems Initiative. Consequently, TKMS’s ability to accommodate Polish customization requests—particularly concerning vertical launch systems (VLS), Polish-coded combat management software, or bespoke sonar—remains limited. German export policy also imposes legal constraints, particularly under the War Weapons Control Act (Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz), which requires parliamentary approval for weapons systems with offensive land-strike capabilities, complicating the MdCN or equivalent cruise missile integration.
Saab’s A26 Blekinge-class, while attractive from a stealth and modularity standpoint, remains unproven in operational service and is affected by production slippages tied to Sweden’s defense budget and export limitations. The Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV), in its 2024 annual performance report, acknowledged an 18-month delay in the delivery of HSwMS Blekinge and HSwMS Skåne to the Royal Swedish Navy, citing pandemic-era supply chain disruptions and inflationary cost overruns. Saab’s Kockums shipyard in Karlskrona has yet to finalize export-grade variants of the A26, and as of early 2025, no foreign navy has placed a firm order. Poland would therefore be assuming first-of-type risk, accepting that the offered product exists only as a prototype or advanced development model. The risk is amplified by Saab’s relatively limited global naval footprint compared to TKMS or Naval Group, and by the Swedish government’s sensitivity to technology transfer in advanced hull design and Stirling AIP systems. Although Sweden joined NATO in 2024, full alignment of its defense export licensing regime with NATO’s STANAG frameworks is still ongoing, creating legal uncertainties around the transfer of sensitive design schematics and sonar algorithms to Poland’s PGZ consortium.
Cost considerations further complicate the calculus. While official bid values have not been disclosed due to procurement secrecy under Poland’s “Ustawa o Informacjach Niejawnych” (Classified Information Act), defense economists from the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) estimate that a complete Orka program, including platform acquisition, weapons integration, training, infrastructure modernization, and lifecycle sustainment over 30 years, could exceed PLN 36 billion (€8.2 billion). This figure is consistent with cost benchmarks from comparable European submarine programs. Norway’s 212CD program, for instance, includes an estimated lifetime cost of NOK 84 billion (€7.4 billion), while France’s Scorpène exports to Brazil (ProSub) reached over €8.5 billion including the construction of a dedicated naval base and shipyard in Itaguaí. Poland’s per-unit cost will depend heavily on its success in negotiating industrial offsets and achieving economies of scale through modular construction and local subcomponent production.
Another critical variable is the compatibility of foreign platforms with Poland’s legacy naval infrastructure. ORP Orzeł is currently docked and maintained at Naval Port Gdynia and the Remontowa Shipyard in Gdańsk. Both facilities were originally configured to support Soviet-era hull dimensions and nuclear safety clearance protocols. The shift to NATO-standard conventional submarines with larger displacement, different power generation systems, and Western combat data links will require extensive retooling. According to the 2025 strategic audit by Poland’s Supreme Audit Office (NIK), modernization of Gdynia’s Submarine Base will require a minimum investment of PLN 1.2 billion (€270 million) to meet safety, electrical compatibility, crane load-bearing, and cyberhardening requirements. This excludes the cost of building a VLS integration and maintenance facility, which may be necessary if Poland selects vertical-launch capable submarines with land-attack missile payloads. Furthermore, the development of training simulators, secure classified data link networks (e.g., LINK-22), and encrypted acoustic libraries will require coordination with NATO’s Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) and compliance with U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) in the event of any U.S.-origin components.
From a strategic technology transfer standpoint, Poland’s ability to secure sovereign control over combat systems, sonar libraries, and propulsion maintenance is a key concern. Poland’s 2023 “Industrial Strategy for National Defence” mandates that all major procurements exceeding €1 billion include a domestic IP retention clause for at least 60% of software components and 40% of physical subassemblies. France has shown some willingness to comply, having negotiated similar terms with Brazil and India. TKMS has historically resisted deeper software code sharing, citing intellectual property risks and liability concerns under German law. Sweden’s smaller defense industrial base offers greater flexibility, but only insofar as the recipient country shares aligned cyber and data governance standards. As of 2025, Poland is still negotiating bilateral cybersecurity protocols with Sweden and Germany to ensure encryption compatibility for submarine CMS software and sonar signature libraries.
The Orka program also interacts with broader regional dynamics involving the European Defence Fund (EDF) and NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). Poland’s industrial participation in the EDF-financed European Patrol Corvette (EPC) program, as well as its submission of undersea surveillance proposals to DIANA in 2024, signals an effort to integrate submarine acquisition into wider innovation ecosystems. The opportunity for collaborative R&D in AI-enhanced sonar, unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) deployment, and acoustic signal analysis may allow Poland to extract additional long-term value from the Orka investment. However, EDF financing is contingent on transnational industrial cooperation and at least three EU member states participating in any co-funded project, limiting Poland’s flexibility to pursue purely bilateral arrangements.
In addition to hardware and software challenges, strategic perception must also be considered. The introduction of cruise missile-capable submarines into the Polish Navy is likely to provoke a reaction from Moscow, particularly if coupled with forward-deployed NATO maritime ISR assets in the Baltic Sea. Russia’s 2024 Naval Doctrine emphasized preemptive ISR suppression and rapid response to NATO undersea activity in proximity to Kaliningrad. The Russian Baltic Fleet, headquartered in Baltiysk, has increased its coastal defense drills and deployed Bastion-P anti-ship missile systems on a near-permanent basis along the Kaliningrad coast. According to the Russian Ministry of Defence’s 2025 strategic forecast, the presence of NATO submarines equipped with strategic-range cruise missiles within 500 km of Kaliningrad will be treated as a “red-line threshold” requiring “reciprocal force posture adjustment,” potentially including the temporary forward-basing of Iskander-M missile systems. Polish acquisition of such submarines may thus raise the strategic profile of the Baltic as a nuclear threshold theater, especially if Warsaw exercises the MdCN missile’s full range against targets deep in Russia’s interior.
The complexity of the Orka program underscores the high-stakes nature of Poland’s maritime ambitions and the broader implications for NATO’s deterrence posture. As the next segment will examine, the program’s success will ultimately depend not only on the selection of a vendor or platform, but on Warsaw’s ability to embed the submarines within an integrated C4ISR ecosystem, sustain operational readiness over decades, and extract technological value that fortifies national resilience against long-term hybrid threats.
Comparative Submarine Strategies of Russia, China, and North Korea in 2025: Implications for Polish Maritime Security, NATO Readiness and Global Undersea Deterrence Dynamics
In 2025, the maritime defense trajectories of Russia, China, and North Korea present a formidable and asymmetric challenge to Western undersea deterrence, especially for NATO’s eastern flank and maritime allies like Poland. These three states have pursued divergent but increasingly aggressive submarine development strategies that serve both conventional military objectives and strategic signaling functions. Their investment in stealth, missile delivery platforms, and nuclear propulsion is reshaping global deterrence doctrines and undermining existing assumptions about escalation thresholds. For Poland, the Orka program must be evaluated not in isolation, but in the context of these adversarial undersea force evolutions that threaten to outpace or destabilize NATO’s submarine response architecture.
Russia’s submarine modernization remains the most immediate and proximate concern for Poland, given its direct presence in the Baltic Sea and its broader Northern and Pacific Fleet operations. As of 2025, Russia maintains the world’s second-largest submarine force after the United States, with approximately 64 active submarines across its fleets, according to data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in its 2025 “Military Balance.” This includes 11 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), 17 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), and 36 diesel-electric submarines (SSKs), many of which are armed with the Kalibr and Oniks missile systems. The Baltic Fleet, though the smallest of Russia’s four naval formations, operates at least four submarines: two Project 877 Kilo-class and two upgraded Project 636.3 Improved Kilo-class boats. These units are equipped with 3M-14 Kalibr land-attack cruise missiles with a range of up to 2,500 km, representing a persistent strategic threat to Poland and the entire NATO northeastern flank.
Of equal concern is Russia’s strategic use of its Northern Fleet, particularly its Yasen-class (Project 885M) and Borei-A-class (Project 955A) submarines, which are undergoing deployment cycles to the Arctic and North Atlantic. The Yasen-M platform, the most advanced nuclear-powered guided missile submarine in Russia’s arsenal, is armed with Kalibr, Oniks, and the new 3M22 Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile, which reportedly reached initial operational capability in late 2024, as confirmed by the Russian MoD. The Yasen-class’s ability to operate in the North Sea and beyond with virtually undetectable acoustic signatures increases its strategic reach and complicates NATO’s ability to monitor second-strike platforms. Moreover, Russia’s “Status-6” Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater drone, carried by the Belgorod-class submarine (Project 09852), entered limited service in 2024 and represents a novel asymmetric threat designed to evade conventional ASW systems. Although not directly relevant to Baltic operations, the development of autonomous or semi-autonomous undersea platforms has enormous implications for undersea infrastructure and gray zone operations, including sabotage of pipelines or sensor cables — risks that Poland must now incorporate into its own deterrence architecture.
By contrast, China’s submarine strategy is global in scope but increasingly focused on regional dominance and second-strike survivability. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) maintains an undersea fleet of approximately 65 submarines as of 2025, including six Type 094 Jin-class SSBNs, 12 Type 093 Shang-class SSNs, and over 40 conventionally powered SSKs, according to the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2024 “China Military Power Report.” The Type 094 SSBNs are equipped with JL-2 and JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), the latter boasting a range exceeding 10,000 km. The newer Type 096 SSBN, reportedly under development with quieter propulsion and longer-range missiles, is expected to enter service after 2026 and may serve as China’s true sea-based second-strike capability.
China has also rapidly diversified its conventional submarine fleet with exports and deployments in the Indian Ocean and Pacific. The Type 039A/B Yuan-class SSKs, equipped with AIP systems and land-attack cruise missile capabilities, are now the backbone of PLAN’s littoral warfare force. Several units have been deployed to the South China Sea, where they routinely shadow U.S. and allied vessels. In addition, China has exported SSK variants to Pakistan (Hangor-class), Bangladesh, and Thailand, indicating a strategy of building regional undersea influence through export diplomacy and platform proliferation. For Poland, the relevance lies in the precedent of vertical integration: China uses its submarine exports to gain access to foreign naval infrastructure, potentially replicate cyber vulnerabilities, and extend maritime surveillance through ostensibly civilian logistics chains. While China does not yet project its submarine force into the Baltic, its growing political and industrial presence in European ports — notably Piraeus and the Adriatic — suggests future ambitions that could complicate NATO’s southern maritime posture.
North Korea’s submarine force, while comparatively rudimentary, represents an outsized threat due to its deliberate opacity, missile integration, and utility in asymmetric warfare. As of 2025, the Korean People’s Navy operates between 60 and 70 submarines, the majority of which are outdated Romeo-class diesel boats or smaller Sang-O and Yugo-class mini-submarines. These vessels serve coastal infiltration and special forces insertion roles but are not considered survivable in contested waters. However, Pyongyang’s development of the Gorae-class ballistic missile submarine (SSB) and the new “Hero Kim Kun Ok”-class SSB, unveiled in September 2023 and further tested in 2024, represents a strategic shift. The latter platform reportedly launched a solid-fuel Pukguksong-3 SLBM during a submerged test in March 2025, confirmed by satellite imagery and analysis from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.
These new submarines do not rival U.S. or Russian SSBNs in range, stealth, or survivability, but their potential to deliver nuclear or conventional warheads into South Korean or Japanese territory from submerged positions significantly complicates deterrence calculations in Northeast Asia. Additionally, North Korea has increasingly experimented with autonomous undersea platforms, including the Haeil-2 underwater drone, claimed to be capable of carrying a nuclear payload, though independent verification remains incomplete. For Poland and NATO planners, North Korea’s example is illustrative of how small or mid-tier powers can exploit asymmetry in undersea warfare to challenge technologically superior forces. The precedent also illustrates the utility of ballistic missile-capable conventional submarines — a capability that Poland may one day consider if vertical launch systems are integrated into the Orka program.
The cumulative effect of these adversarial programs is a shift in the global undersea warfare paradigm toward multi-domain, multi-platform strategic deterrence that fuses ISR, kinetic strike, and infrastructure disruption. Russia, China, and North Korea all prioritize survivability through deep-sea endurance, launch-on-warning doctrines, and hybrid force-mix integration that includes unmanned or AI-enhanced systems. Their platforms blur the boundary between tactical and strategic payloads, conventional and nuclear missions, and manned and unmanned capabilities. Poland’s Orka program — by comparison — must position itself not only as a platform acquisition but as a gateway into a broader NATO undersea defense ecosystem that incorporates these evolving threats. This requires platform survivability, network-centric C4ISR integration, real-time acoustic intelligence exchange, and deep interoperability with U.S., German, and French submarine operations. It also requires forward-looking investments in undersea sensor networks, maritime domain awareness satellites, and AI-based anomaly detection algorithms for seabed activity — technologies that adversaries have already begun to deploy.
In conclusion, Poland’s pursuit of a modern submarine capability through the Orka program is not merely a response to obsolescence but a forward-leaning recalibration of national and alliance maritime posture in an era defined by contested seas and asymmetric undersea threats. While Russia poses the most immediate threat in the Baltic through its precision-strike capable Kilo-class fleet and strategic signaling via the Northern Fleet, China’s doctrinal and industrial advancements point to future global power projection through undersea dominance. North Korea, although regionally confined, offers a template for how doctrinal agility and platform innovation can generate disproportionate strategic effect. For Poland, the lessons are clear: survivability, deterrence credibility, and undersea integration must be pursued with urgency, realism, and technological ambition. The Orka program, if executed with strategic foresight and industrial discipline, can provide Warsaw with a transformative capability that not only defends its national interests but strengthens NATO’s maritime flank against a world of increasingly silent and increasingly lethal threats beneath the surface.
