Russia’s 2026 CSTO Doctrine: Military Modernization and the New Eurasian Security Architecture

ABSTRACT

The regular session of the Collective Security Council (CSC) of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), convened in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in late November 2025, unfolded against a backdrop of deep strategic contradiction. On one hand, the summit signaled institutional cohesion and administrative stability, concluding the chairship of Kyrgyzstan and successfully adopting a declaration that reviewed implementation of priorities and outlined key objectives for the period ahead, as reported by the Kazakh president’s press service and further detailed by(https://caliber.az/en/post/csto-meeting-in-bishkek-concludes-with-key-decisions). Leaders, including Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Kazakhstan’s Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Belarus’s Aleksandr Lukashenko, Kyrgyzstan’s Sadyr Japarov, and Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon, demonstrated unity by approving the comprehensive declaration [1, 2] and formalizing the appointment of Taalatbek Masadykov of Kyrgyzstan as the new Secretary General for the 2026-2029 term [2]. Yet, this veneer of organizational continuity was decisively breached by the political rupture signified by the absence of a full member state.

The calculated boycott of the high-level meeting by Armenia’s leadership, whose participation in the bloc had been widely characterized as “frozen” since 2024 [3], served as a stark, unavoidable indictment of the CSTO’s core functional promise: the collective defense mechanism stipulated in Article 4 of the founding treaty [4, 5]. That article mandates that an act of aggression against one member state is considered aggression against all, requiring military and other necessary assistance in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter [5]. The failure to effectively uphold this provision in the face of ongoing security challenges faced by Yerevan has fundamentally eroded confidence in the alliance’s operational utility among smaller members. The complexity of this internal crisis was managed—or perhaps bypassed—through the final declaration, which acknowledged the “active interstate dialogue between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan” and voiced support for a comprehensive settlement, urging the prompt signing of an unconditional peace agreement [6]. This diplomatic positioning effectively validated the status quo, prioritizing regional stabilization and the containment of conflict over providing the mandated territorial guarantees to a member state.

This political calculation, where stability for the broader Eurasian sphere outweighs the specific security requirements of a single member, highlights the divergence between the CSTO’s founding rhetoric and its strategic reality in 2025. The organization is increasingly functioning as a critical mechanism for buttressing Russia’s overarching strategic goals—namely, maintaining regional stability in Central Asia and establishing a counter-hegemonic ideological framework—rather than operating as a strictly symmetric mutual defense pact. Despite the friction caused by Armenia’s calculated withdrawal, a move described by a Deputy Foreign Minister as consistent with Armenia’s policy of diversification and balancing [7], the operational core of the alliance remained intact, enabling Moscow to seize the moment to launch its ambitious agenda for the 2026 chairmanship.

The Foundation of Multipolarity: Russia’s 2026 Strategic Mandate

Russia’s upcoming chairmanship in 2026 was formally unveiled in Bishkek under the deliberate and expansive motto: “Collective Security in a Multipolar World. One Goal — Shared Responsibility” [8]. This motto transcends the traditional boundaries of regional military cooperation, reframing the CSTO as the hard security vanguard for a nascent global movement toward a polycentric world order [9]. The political messaging contained within the slogan positions the CSTO as a successful model for organizing collective defense outside of the perceived hegemony of Western alliances, particularly NATO [10]. Russia’s chairmanship, scheduled to culminate with the next CSC session in Moscow on November 11, 2026 [8], is structured around three interlocking strategic pillars: operational military modernization, the development of a sophisticated digital counter-terrorism doctrine, and the articulation of a new, inclusive Eurasian security architecture.

The first pillar addresses the persistent military-technical deficiencies within the bloc, focusing on the non-negotiable requirement for strengthening the CSTO’s defense potential. A specific directive issued during the summit by Russia’s leadership called for “special attention” to the necessary development of the CSTO’s air forces [Query text]. This imperative is derived directly from the kinetic lessons observed in high-intensity conflicts across the globe, especially the pervasive role of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). The military exercise “Rubezh-2025,” conducted in Kyrgyzstan earlier in the year, already demonstrated this doctrinal shift, concentrating extensively on teamwork, anti-terrorism activities, mutual defense, and, critically, strategies deployed against UAS [11]. The emphasis on counter-drone capabilities necessitates substantial investment in integrated air defense, electronic warfare, and specialized training across member state forces.

The challenge of meeting this modernization imperative highlights the profound economic and military asymmetry within the CSTO. The operational capacity of the alliance is anchored by the immense industrial output of Russia, which committed to a staggering planned military expenditure in 2025 estimated at 15.5 trillion roubles [12]. This colossal figure is equivalent to 7.2% of Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) [12], demonstrating a sustained, wartime level of resource devotion to its defense-industrial base. This vast fiscal capacity contrasts sharply with the budgets of CSTO’s Central Asian partners, making meaningful, independent air force modernization practically unfeasible for them. While CSTO protocols allow members to purchase Russian arms at preferential prices, the cost of maintenance, long-term training, and integrating sophisticated air defense systems ensures that these forces will become increasingly dependent appendages of Russian technical and logistical infrastructure.

This dependency serves a dual purpose: it guarantees a captive market for Russia’s expanding defense industry—which, despite sanctions, has sustained a massive military production surge [13]—and it deepens Moscow’s military-technical leverage over its allies. Although Russia’s share of global arms exports declined by 64% between the 2015–19 and 2020–24 periods, positioning it as the third largest exporter globally behind the United States and France [14], the domestic industrial apparatus, supported by high defense spending, retains the capacity to prioritize and sustain the required modernizations for the CSTO bloc. Thus, the air force development mandate, while presented as a collective security necessity, functions to strategically secure military-industrial alignment within Eurasia, cementing the asymmetrical nature of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Confronting the Digital Threat: The New Anti-Terrorism Doctrine

The second strategic pillar for the 2026 chairmanship is the proposal to initiate the preparation of a new anti-terrorism strategy for the CSTO [Query text]. This move signals a critical doctrinal shift, acknowledging that the threat environment has evolved past the focus of previous operations, such as the successful implementation of the 2021-2025 Anti-Drug Strategy [4]. The new strategy is specifically engineered to address the expansion of extremism into the digital and cognitive domains. Discussions among foreign ministers, defense ministers, and security council secretaries in Bishkek emphasized deepening cooperation in counteracting modern challenges, including terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, and, notably, growing threats to information security [15, 16].

A core component of the proposed strategy targets the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for terrorist purposes [8]. This strategic recognition formalizes the cognitive domain as a central sphere of operational concern for the CSTO. Furthermore, Russia’s leadership explicitly mandated focusing on countering the spread of radical ideas among youth [8]. This dual focus—on the infrastructure of communication and the ideological targets—elevates the alliance’s mission from border protection to proactive domestic information control and security service integration.

The implications of this doctrinal expansion are significant for regional governance. By prioritizing counter-extremism and the management of youth radicalization, the CSTO is institutionalizing its role as a mechanism for reinforcing internal regime stability against non-state, hybrid threats. This aligns with the precedent set by the deployment of the CSTO’s peacekeeping force in January 2022 to Kazakhstan to quell local unrest [17]. The new strategy will inevitably require the standardization of protocols for joint surveillance, information sharing, and rapid deployment of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) against threats involving digital infrastructure disruption or ideologically driven domestic instability. Furthermore, the acknowledgement of widespread vulnerabilities regarding information security [16] suggests that the strategy will push for the adoption of standardized cyber policies and potentially shared infrastructure supported by Russia, increasing Moscow’s visibility and influence over the national information security apparatus of its allies.

The focus also remains on traditional transnational threats, with member states affirming their readiness to step up efforts to neutralize the resource base of international terrorism, including combating the financing, training, and equipping of foreign terrorist fighters and managing their return from conflict zones [18]. This agenda is being pursued in coordination with wider regional security platforms, evidenced by the September 2025 discussions with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Anti-Terrorism Center in Dushanbe [19].

The Architecture of Equal Security: A Grand Geopolitical Design

The third and perhaps most ambitious pillar of Russia’s 2026 agenda is the proposal to hold an international expert forum dedicated to creating an “architecture of equal security” across Eurasia [Query text]. This initiative, which Moscow has been advancing since 2024 [10], is designed to be the ideological centerpiece of the multipolar vision. As articulated by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), this framework is grounded in the concepts of equality and indivisible security [10, 20].

The principle of “equal and indivisible security” is paramount: it grants every state the right to independently choose how to ensure its security, but simultaneously demands that the security of one cannot be achieved at the expense of the security of others [20]. This concept is a direct, structural challenge to Western security governance, serving as a normative tool intended to structurally delegitimize NATO expansion and limit the sovereign alliance choices of Eurasian neighbors [10]. By incorporating this historical Russian diplomatic grievance into a proposed continental architecture, Moscow seeks to transform it from a bilateral issue into a globally recognized Eurasian standard for inter-state conduct.

The CSTO is explicitly positioned as the foundational structure upon which this new order will be built [9, 20]. The organization’s philosophy and developed network of military ties are intended to become central to the continental initiative, integrating with other regional structures to form a comprehensive system designed to address the full spectrum of security challenges across Eurasia [9]. The 2026 expert forum serves as the crucial soft-power venue, aiming to recruit global support and cement political alignment around this alternative systemic framework. The ultimate goal is to transform Eurasia into a common space of peace, stability, and mutual trust, consistent with Russia’s stated foreign policy concept [9].

The political viability of this proposed architecture relies heavily on formalized institutional integration across the post-Soviet space. The CSTO’s military agenda is inextricably linked to the broader strategic alignment established during the trilateral consultations held in Beijing in September 2025 between the executive bodies of the CSTO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) [21]. These consultations resulted in the approval of a Roadmap for the development of cooperation among the three organizations [21], codifying a functional division of labor in Eurasian governance. The CSTO provides the collective military muscle, while the rapidly expanding SCO—which includes China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and most recently Belarus [22]—provides the political and economic scaffolding, addressing counter-extremism, anti-drug trafficking, and establishing new institutions like a Universal Center for Countering Security Threats [19].

This synchronized approach allows Russia to project an image of stability and consolidated security management, leveraging SCO economic ties to manage regional challenges without bearing the unilateral financial burden, thereby increasing the credibility of the overall multipolar concept [23]. This intricate web of agreements positions the CSTO not merely as a regional military pact, but as the indispensable, operational core of an evolving, cohesive, non-Western Eurasian security bloc, ready to execute operations and enforce the normative demands of the proposed “architecture of equal security.” The success of Russia’s 2026 chairmanship hinges entirely on its ability to transcend the alliance’s internal political fissures—epitomized by the Armenian crisis—and present this highly ambitious, integrated military and ideological project as a viable global security alternative.

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Chapter Index (Table of Contents)

• The Bishkek Pivot: Political Fragility and Russia’s Chairmanship Mandate
• The Multipolar Doctrine: Conceptualizing Equal and Indivisible Security in Eurasia
• Revising the Hard Edge: Air Force Modernization and Collective Defense Capacity
• The Digital Battlefield: Advancing the CSTO’s Counter-Terrorism and ICT Strategy
• Institutional Integration and Strategic Competition: The SCO, CIS, and the Future of the Eurasian Bloc

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Core Concepts in Review: What We Know and Why It Matters

The November 2025 summit of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, highlighted a fundamental strategic contradiction at the heart of the Eurasian security apparatus: an alliance that maintains administrative stability while suffering profound political fracture. On the one hand, the summit successfully fulfilled its institutional duties, resulting in the adoption of a comprehensive declaration and the formal appointment of Taalatbek Masadykov of Kyrgyzstan as the new CSTO Secretary General for the three-year term beginning January 1, 2026.¹ Yet, this organizational continuity was decisively undermined by the calculated and conspicuous boycott of the high-level meeting by Armenia, which had effectively suspended its participation in the Russian-led bloc since 2024.³ This action serves as a potent reminder of the CSTO’s core functional vulnerability: its failure to activate the collective defense mechanism mandated by Article 4 of the founding treaty—which stipulates that aggression against one member is considered aggression against all—has severely eroded trust among key members, reducing the alliance to a functional five-nation bloc in the South Caucasus theatre. This profound crisis of cohesion provided the essential backdrop for Russia to launch its ambitious 2026 agenda, designed to project an image of strategic strength and unified purpose despite the internal fissures.

The centerpiece of Russia’s upcoming chairmanship, unveiled under the assertive motto “Collective Security in a Multipolar World. One Goal — Shared Responsibility” ⁶, is a geopolitical doctrine explicitly engineered to challenge the established Western-centric global order. This multipolar vision seeks to reposition the CSTO as the hard security vanguard for a nascent polycentric world system, driven by the consolidation of alternative power blocs such as the expanded BRICS group. The ideological core of this doctrine is the proposed establishment of an “architecture of equal security” across the entire Eurasian continent.⁷ This framework, which Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) officials have actively championed since 2024 ⁷, is fundamentally based on the concept of indivisible security.⁸ While granting every sovereign state the right to choose its own security path, this concept simultaneously imposes the non-negotiable condition that the security of one nation cannot be achieved at the expense of the security of others.⁸ This stipulation acts as a direct, structural challenge to NATO’s open-door policy, seeking to establish a normative Eurasian standard that limits the strategic alliance choices of neighboring states. The ambition is to transform the massive landmass into a common space of peace, stability, and mutual trust ⁹, thereby demonstrating the viability of a non-Western security model.

The military enforcement mechanism necessary to underpin this grand geopolitical architecture is the mandate to significantly strengthen the CSTO’s collective defense potential, with a specific focus on the necessary development of the CSTO’s air forces [Query text]. This shift is a direct response to the pervasive kinetic lessons of contemporary conflict, particularly the decisive role of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), which were a key focus of the “Rubezh-2025” military exercise in Kyrgyzstan.¹⁰ This modernization initiative highlights the profound asymmetry within the alliance, as its financial engine remains Russia, which allocated an estimated total planned military expenditure of 15.5 trillion roubles in 2025.¹¹ This immense sum is equivalent to 7.2% of Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ¹¹, a sustained, wartime level of resource commitment that ensures the Russian defense-industrial base—which employs approximately 4.5 million people nationwide and accounts for 20% of all manufacturing jobs ¹²—can supply and integrate the required high-end systems. This guarantees the increasing military-technical dependency of key Central Asian partners, such as Kazakhstan, whose military spending was 1.24 billion US dollars in 2023, a fractional figure compared to the cost of independent air defense modernization. The political consequence of the alliance’s internal crisis is starkly visible in the security choices of members, as demonstrated by Armenia’s pivot toward non-CSTO partners like India for new defense procurements, including the Akash Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System and the Trajan 155 mm Gun System.

Furthermore, the 2026 mandate recognizes that security challenges have fundamentally migrated into the ideological and digital sphere, necessitating the preparation of a new anti-terrorism strategy for the CSTO [Query text]. Discussions at the Bishkek summit emphasized deepening cooperation against growing threats to information security and countering the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for terrorist purposes.⁶ This strategy formalizes the cognitive domain as a central area of operational concern, requiring specific attention to countering the spread of radical ideas among youth.⁶ Security analyses confirm that the recruitment and indoctrination of young people are rapidly evolving, frequently relying on social bonding over ideological conviction, with extremist groups exploiting platforms like online forums and encrypted messaging apps to create reinforcing digital echo chambers. This internal security focus ensures the CSTO can be leveraged to reinforce regime stability against non-state, hybrid threats—a role it successfully demonstrated during the deployment of its peacekeeping force to Kazakhstan in January 2022.¹⁴

The alliance also continues to focus on traditional transnational threats, particularly the flow of illicit narcotics from Afghanistan into the Eurasian space.¹⁵ While the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported a significant decrease in opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan by 20 per cent in 2025 compared to 2024 figures, contracting to 10,200 hectares, the economic consequences are severe. Farmers’ income from opium sales plummeted by 48 per cent from $260 million in 2024 to $134 million in 2025. This economic desperation, coupled with the return of approximately four million Afghans and a reduction in humanitarian aid, creates a cyclical security risk for Central Asia, potentially making opium cultivation attractive once again.

Crucially, Moscow is ensuring that the CSTO’s military agenda is fully integrated into the wider Eurasian political and economic governance structure. This institutional alignment was codified on September 3, 2025, in Beijing, during trilateral consultations that saw the approval of a Roadmap for the development of cooperation among the executive bodies of the CSTO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This agreement institutionalizes a division of labor where the CSTO provides the kinetic enforcement, and the rapidly expanding SCO—which now includes Iran and Belarus ¹⁶—provides the broader political and economic scaffolding.¹⁷ The SCO’s growing security mandates, including the launch of processes to establish a Universal Center for Countering Security Threats and Challenges in Tashkent ¹⁷, directly support the CSTO’s efforts against extremism and illicit trafficking. This synchronized approach allows Russia to project an image of cohesive, comprehensive security management, contrasting sharply with the internal political turmoil it must manage. The ultimate success of the 2026 chairmanship hinges entirely on its capacity to translate this integrated military, digital, and geopolitical vision into a credible, non-Western-aligned reality across the Eurasian sphere.

The Bishkek Pivot: Political Fragility and Russia’s Chairmanship Mandate

The regular session of the Collective Security Council (CSC) of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), convened in Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, in November 2025, represented a critical inflection point where administrative stability clashed with profound strategic fracture. The summit successfully fulfilled its organizational and procedural mandates: the leaders of Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan reviewed the implementation of the CSTO’s work areas for 2025, outlined key priorities for the forthcoming period, and formally adopted a comprehensive declaration.¹ Central to the summit’s administrative success was the formal appointment of Taalatbek Masadykov of the Kyrgyz Republic as the new Secretary General to head the organization for the three-year term spanning 2026 through 2029.² However, this institutional continuity was overshadowed by the conspicuous and deliberate absence of a full member state. Armenia, one of the CSTO’s six member nations, calculatedly boycotted the high-level meeting, confirming the fragility of the military bloc’s cohesion. Armenian leadership had already characterized its participation in the Russian-controlled alliance as “frozen” since 2024 ⁴, a state of affairs its own Deputy Foreign Minister described as consistent with Yerevan’s ongoing policy of strategic diversification and balancing its foreign policy interests.⁵ This calculated non-attendance highlighted an existential crisis for the CSTO’s core functional mechanism, which is designed to ensure collective defense.

The foundational tenet of the CSTO, which was established in Tashkent on May 15, 1992, rests on Article 4 of the treaty.⁶ This article unequivocally stipulates that if one of the state parties is subjected to aggression by any state or group of states, such an act shall be considered aggression against all member states, thereby obligating the remaining parties to provide the necessary assistance, including military support, in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter.⁶ The refusal or inability of the bloc to activate this reciprocal mechanism during the repeated security challenges faced by Armenia—which had been one of the original signatories of the 1992 treaty—has led to an undeniable erosion of trust, ultimately fracturing the political unity of the alliance.⁷ The Bishkek Declaration attempted to manage this geopolitical fissure by acknowledging the “active interstate dialogue between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan” and voicing support for a comprehensive resolution, specifically urging the prompt signing of an unconditional peace agreement.⁸ This diplomatic maneuver prioritized regional stabilization, particularly along the potentially volatile southern perimeter of Eurasia, over the explicit enforcement of the mutual defense clause for a distressed member state. This collective decision underscored a strategic reality: the CSTO currently operates less as a symmetric mutual defense pact and more as a specialized regional security instrument designed to serve the broader geopolitical stability objectives of its dominant member, Russia.

Russia’s operational command within the alliance was reaffirmed earlier in 2025 through large-scale joint exercises, which served as a crucial demonstration of military readiness and coordination. For instance, the “Rubezh-2025” military exercise, conducted in Kyrgyzstan, focused heavily on enhancing teamwork, anti-terrorism protocols, and mutual defense capabilities.⁹ Significantly, the exercise incorporated specific operational strategies dedicated to countering unmanned aerial systems (UAS), directly reflecting kinetic lessons derived from high-intensity conflicts in the broader region.⁹ This practical training, coupled with other major exercises like “Echelon-2025” in Belarus and “Indestructible Brotherhood-2025” in Tajikistan—all of which were successfully completed in 2025 ¹⁰—provided tangible evidence of the bloc’s capacity for coordinated action, particularly in managing internal unrest, such as the deployment of 2,000 CSTO peacekeepers to Kazakhstan in January 2022 to quell local disturbances.¹¹ This operational foundation of readiness allowed Moscow to leverage the Bishkek summit as a launchpad for a highly ambitious ideological and strategic agenda, framed to solidify the alliance’s role in the global geopolitical realignment.

The strategic mandate for Russia’s upcoming chairmanship in 2026 was formally announced by President Vladimir Putin under the deliberate and expansive motto: “Collective Security in a Multipolar World. One Goal — Shared Responsibility“.¹⁰ This slogan extends the traditional geographical focus of the alliance—which spans from Belarus in the west to Tajikistan in the south—and reframes it as the institutional security architecture for a new polycentric global system.¹² The strategic objective is to position the CSTO as a successful model for collective defense that explicitly operates outside of the existing Western-dominated security architecture, particularly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The chairmanship, which will conclude with the next CSC session in Moscow on November 11, 2026 ¹⁰, is built upon three non-negotiable pillars: military-technical modernization, the establishment of a sophisticated anti-terrorism and digital counter-extremism doctrine, and the creation of an inclusive, pan-Eurasian security framework.¹⁰ The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has explicitly asserted that this initiative is part of a broader effort to adjust international relations to the reality of the evolving multipolar world.¹³

The ideological centerpiece of this 2026 agenda is the proposal to host an international expert forum dedicated to constructing an “architecture of equal security” across Eurasia.¹³ This concept, which Moscow has actively promoted since 2024 ¹⁴, is fundamentally grounded in the dual principles of equality and indivisible security.¹³ This doctrine affirms the sovereign right of every state to choose independently how to ensure its own security, yet simultaneously imposes the condition that the security of one nation cannot be achieved at the expense of the security of others.¹³ This latter stipulation acts as a normative barrier, structurally designed to delegitimize the sovereign alliance choices of neighboring states and, in effect, challenge the expansion and operational mandate of the NATO alliance within the post-Soviet space. The Russian MFA views the CSTO’s established philosophy and developed network of military ties as the indispensable foundation upon which this new order will be built.¹³ The goal is to transform Eurasia into a single, contiguous common space characterized by peace, stability, and mutual trust.¹² This geopolitical project is intended to address the full spectrum of security challenges, both along the periphery of the continent and within its core territories.¹²

The military component necessary to support this grand geopolitical vision involves a renewed, high-stakes commitment to strengthening the CSTO’s collective defense potential, with a specific, articulated requirement to place “special attention” on the necessary development of the CSTO’s air forces [Query text]. This emphasis on air power integration stems directly from the evolving nature of warfare, particularly the proliferation and operational utility of UAS.⁹ Executing this modernization mandate reveals the profound military and economic asymmetry underpinning the alliance. The financial engine of the CSTO is definitively Russia, which committed a staggering planned military expenditure of 15.5 trillion roubles in 2025.¹⁵ This allocation represents a real-terms increase of 3.4% over 2024 figures and is equivalent to an immense 7.2% of Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).¹⁵ This sustained, wartime level of resource devotion to its defense-industrial base creates an enormous disparity with the comparatively modest budgets of its Central Asian partners.

This massive fiscal capacity ensures that while CSTO member states can purchase Russian arms at preferential prices ¹⁰, the technical complexity, maintenance requirements, and advanced training necessary to integrate modern air force and sophisticated counter-UAS systems will inevitably tie the forces of allies like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan closer to Russian technical and logistical infrastructure.⁹ This deep dependency serves Moscow’s strategic interests by guaranteeing a captive and aligned market for the Russian defense industry.¹⁶ Despite a substantial decline of 64% in Russia’s arms exports between the 2015–19 and 2020–24 periods, which placed it as the third largest global exporter behind the United States and France ¹⁷, the domestic defense sector remains robust. The industry employs approximately 4.5 million people nationwide as of April 2025 and accounts for 20% of all manufacturing jobs in Russia.¹⁶ The domestic industrial surge, driven by state demand, has proven resilient against international sanctions, successfully escalating military production, with missile output now reportedly exceeding pre-war levels.¹⁶ This sustained domestic industrial output provides Moscow with the necessary capacity to prioritize the strategic rearmament and technical alignment of the CSTO bloc, thereby solidifying the asymmetrical power dynamic required for its new security architecture.

The second core pillar of the 2026 mandate involves initiating the preparation of a new anti-terrorism strategy for the CSTO [Query text]. This doctrinal revision acknowledges the critical evolution of the threat environment, moving beyond traditional security concerns to address the growing operational presence of extremism in the digital and cognitive domains.¹⁸ Discussions among the Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, and Security Council Secretaries in Bishkek emphasized deepening cooperation not only against traditional transnational threats—such as terrorism, extremism, and illicit drug trafficking—but also against growing threats to information security.¹⁸ The previous security framework, which saw the successful implementation of the 2021-2025 Anti-Drug Strategy ⁶, is now being superseded by a strategy that targets the pervasive use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) for terrorist purposes.¹⁰ This formal recognition elevates the cognitive domain as a central area of operational concern, demanding sophisticated mechanisms for joint surveillance and information control.

Russia’s leadership specifically mandated focusing on countering the widespread dissemination of radical ideas among youth ¹⁰, signifying a proactive approach to managing ideological threats that leverages the alliance’s infrastructure for enhanced domestic information security and intelligence integration across member states.¹⁰ This doctrinal expansion institutionalizes the CSTO’s role in reinforcing internal regime stability against non-state actors and hybrid threats, a utility demonstrated during the Kazakhstan deployment.¹¹ Furthermore, the member states affirmed their commitment to step up efforts to neutralize the resource base of international terrorism, including combating the financing, training, and equipping of foreign terrorist fighters, and managing their return from conflict zones.²⁰ This multi-faceted threat management is actively coordinated with adjacent structures, including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Anti-Terrorism Center, which held a major conference in Dushanbe in October 2025 focusing on the challenges posed by modern technologies, such as artificial intelligence, when utilized for terrorist purposes.²¹

This intricate web of security cooperation formalizes the institutional linkage necessary to underpin the “architecture of equal security” envisioned by Moscow. On September 3, 2025, senior officials from the executive bodies of the CSTO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) held crucial trilateral consultations in Beijing, strategically coinciding with the meeting of the SCO Heads of State Council. The meeting, attended by the CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov, the CIS Secretary General Sergei Lebedev, and the SCO Secretary-General Nurlan Yermekbayev, facilitated an exchange of views on regional security and the future development of the three organizations. Critically, the parties signed a definitive Roadmap for the development of cooperation among the CSTO, the CIS, and the SCO, alongside a joint statement commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and the establishment of the United Nations. The unanimous opinion shared by the three organizations was the essential, growing role they must play in maintaining global peace and regional security, and preventing instability across the Eurasian landmass.

This September 2025 Beijing agreement codifies a strategic division of labor: the CSTO provides the collective military enforcement mechanism, while the SCO, which expanded to include Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024 ²², supplies the political, economic, and expansive security scaffolding.²¹ The SCO’s growing mandates now include the launch of processes to establish the SCO Anti-Drug Center in Dushanbe and the Universal Center for Countering Security Threats and Challenges in Tashkent.²¹ By committing to this trilateral Roadmap, the CSTO membership confirmed its intention to ensure the comprehensive linkage of various integration projects and the essential harmonization of relations between regional development centers across Eurasia. The CSTO is thus positioned not merely as a regional security bloc for Russia’s immediate neighbors, but as the operational core of a much broader, integrated, non-Western security structure, ready to enforce the military, counter-terrorism, and normative dictates of the emerging Eurasian security architecture promoted by the upcoming 2026 Russian chairmanship.

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The Multipolar Doctrine: Conceptualizing Equal and Indivisible Security in Eurasia

The strategic intent behind Russia’s 2026 chairmanship of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), encapsulated in the motto “Collective Security in a Multipolar World. One Goal — Shared Responsibility” ¹, represents a formalization of Moscow’s grand strategy to structurally reshape the post-Cold War international order. This doctrinal pivot is driven by two fundamental geopolitical factors: the perceived and actual retreat of United States hegemonic influence from spheres it once dominated, and the progressive consolidation of an alternative bloc of power spearheaded by emerging powers, most notably the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation. This nascent polycentric system is actively seeking to change the foundational rules of the international legal order, a pursuit evident in the expanding institutional strength of mechanisms such as the BRICS group, which now includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. The CSTO is therefore being repurposed from a primarily regional mutual defense alliance into the hard security vanguard for this global movement, explicitly establishing a counter-hegemonic ideological framework to challenge Western alliances, most significantly the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).²

The ideological centerpiece of this 2026 mandate, which will culminate in the Collective Security Council (CSC) session in Moscow on November 11, 2026 ¹, is the proposal to host an international expert forum dedicated to establishing an “architecture of equal security” across the entire Eurasian continent.² This concept, which was initially advanced by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2024 ³, is anchored in the dual, non-negotiable principles of equality and indivisible security.² While the principle of equality affirms the sovereign right of every state to choose independently how to ensure its own security, the principle of indivisible security imposes the critical, conditioning clause that the security of one nation cannot be achieved at the expense of the security of others.² This second element is a direct, structural challenge to the foundational premise of NATO’s open-door policy, serving as a normative tool intended to limit the sovereign alliance choices of Eurasian neighbors and structurally delegitimize the perceived encroachment of Western military infrastructure into the post-Soviet space.² As articulated by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the objective is to transform Eurasia into a continental common space of peace, stability, mutual trust, development, and prosperity, consistent with the official(https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/reports/2018203/).⁴ This objective resonates with the historical diplomatic philosophy of Maxim M. Litvinov, the former People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, who asserted in 1935 that “there can be no security in one’s own peace and tranquillity if the peace of neighbors—both near and far—is not ensured”.⁴

The conceptual groundwork for this architecture is being meticulously laid through sustained institutional competition and identity formation across Eurasia.³ The Russian MFA has explicitly stated that the new architecture is open to all countries of the continent and is part of a broad effort to adjust international relations to the reality of the evolving multipolar world.² The CSTO itself is explicitly positioned as the indispensable foundation upon which this new order will be constructed, relying heavily on the organization’s existing developed network of military ties and its collective defense experience.² This positioning is designed to provide the proposed architecture with immediate military credibility and a unified operational philosophy that addresses the entire spectrum of security challenges, both along the volatile periphery of the continent and within its core territories.⁴ The intention is to integrate existing regional structures and agreements to form a comprehensive system ², a goal that requires formalized, synchronized cooperation with adjacent security and economic blocs.

This required institutional integration achieved a definitive strategic milestone in Beijing on September 3, 2025, during the thirteenth meeting of Senior Administrative Officials of the CSTO, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This meeting, held “on the margins” of the SCO Heads of State Council session, resulted in the signing of a crucial(https://en.odkb-csto.org/news/news_odkb/sostoyalas-13-ya-vstrecha-generalnykh-sekretarey-odkb-sng-i-shos/). The agreement confirmed the commitment of all three organizations to the formation of a new Eurasian security architecture, emphasizing the necessary linking of integration projects and the harmonization of relations between various development centers across Eurasia. The consensus shared by the three organizations, whose executive heads—Imangali Tasmagambetov (CSTO), Sergei Lebedev (CIS), and Nurlan Yermekbayev (SCO) ⁵—were present, was the recognition of their ever-increasing role in maintaining global peace, regional security, and preventing instability.

The trilateral agreement formalizes a strategic division of labor, leveraging the distinct mandates of each organization to manage the vast Eurasian landmass. While the CSTO is responsible for the hard military enforcement, the SCO provides the expanding political and economic scaffolding.⁶ The SCO’s sphere of influence has grown substantially, incorporating India and Pakistan in 2017, adding Iran in 2023, and formally welcoming Belarus in 2024.⁷ This expansion transforms the SCO into one of the leading platforms for global governance ⁶, extending the reach of the non-Western security paradigm deep into South Asia and aligning the economic gravity of China with the military influence of Russia. The SCO’s evolving mandate now encompasses significant security institutionalization, including the launch of processes to establish a dedicated SCO Anti-Drug Center in Dushanbe and a Universal Center for Countering Security Threats and Challenges of SCO Member States in Tashkent.⁶ This coordinated action ensures that the CSTO’s operational military agenda is seamlessly integrated with the broader political, counter-extremism, and economic security mandates of its strategic partners, strengthening the viability and credibility of the entire multipolar concept across Eurasia.

The imperative for an independent Eurasian security architecture, separate from Western influence, is amplified by Moscow’s persistent perception of strategic containment. The Russian MFA has repeatedly articulated that interactions with Western structures are often perceived as deliberately hostile. For instance, in multilateral dialogues, Russia has openly accused trans-Atlantic political elites of using platforms like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to spread anti-Russia sentiments and prepare civil populations for armed confrontation with the Russian Federation. The Russian delegation has characterized certain meetings as resembling a(https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/2053730/), arguing that such actions discredit and undermine the prestige of platforms traditionally intended for multilateral dialogue. This confrontational dynamic necessitates the creation of an alternative structure, where security is defined by Eurasian members for Eurasian interests, free from perceived external manipulation.⁴ In 2023, Belarus had already spearheaded a regional political initiative by promoting the creation of the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the XXI Century ⁴, serving as a clear political precursor to the formalized 2026 doctrinal proposal.

The ultimate goal of the 2026 chairmanship, therefore, is not merely to modernize the CSTO militarily, but to transform the bloc into the operational template for a new geopolitical arrangement that extends the doctrine of equal and indivisible security across the world’s largest landmass.² This ambitious undertaking, which faces considerable resistance from Western powers ³, seeks to cement the CSTO as the indispensable military core of a cohesive, integrated, non-Western security structure.² The 2026 expert forum in Moscow is designed to be the critical venue to align global political support, thereby institutionalizing the multipolar vision and ensuring that Eurasia itself becomes the primary laboratory for an alternative, Russian-defined global security standard. The success of this effort relies heavily on Moscow’s ability to leverage the operational and military capacity of the CSTO to enforce stability and project the normative demands of this new architecture, thereby transforming diplomatic concepts into geopolitical reality.

Germany’s Rearmament Imperative: Urban Defense Drills and NATO Contingencies in the Shadow of Russian Aggression, 2025

Revising the Hard Edge: Air Force Modernization and Collective Defense Capacity

The primary operational mandate emerging from the November 2025 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit in Bishkek was a strategic pivot toward enhancing the bloc’s kinetic defense capacity, with a specific, articulated requirement to devote “special attention” to the necessary development of the CSTO’s air forces [Query text]. This directive signifies an institutional recognition that the traditional concept of collective defense, which historically focused on border security and counter-insurgency, is fundamentally insufficient to address the pervasive, high-intensity threats of the contemporary security environment. The impetus for this focus on air power is directly attributable to the lessons derived from recent major kinetic conflicts, which have demonstrated the decisive and pervasive role of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) in both reconnaissance and strike roles. The military exercise “Rubezh-2025,” successfully completed in Kyrgyzstan earlier in the year, already integrated this doctrinal shift, concentrating extensively on combined rapid reaction forces, electronic warfare, and, critically, operational strategies deployed against UAS.¹ Senior CSTO officials, including the Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov, highlighted the strategic importance of this operational training, particularly in mitigating the danger posed by extremist groups potentially infiltrating the volatile Central Asian region from Afghanistan.¹

This air force modernization imperative, while framed as a collective security necessity, immediately exposes the profound economic and military asymmetry that underpins the CSTO alliance. The ability to field a modern, integrated air defense architecture, capable of detecting and neutralizing sophisticated UAS attacks, requires technological and fiscal resources far exceeding the independent capacity of most member states. The operational and financial core of this modernization effort must, by necessity, be Russia, which in 2025 allocated a staggering planned military expenditure of 15.5 trillion roubles.² This colossal commitment represents a real-terms increase of 3.4% over the previous 2024 military budget and is equivalent to an immense 7.2% of Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).² This sustained, wartime level of resource devotion has been maintained despite—or perhaps because of—tough international sanctions, allowing the Russian economy to grow at a rapid pace while devoting disproportionate resources to its defense-industrial base.² This vast, state-backed financial capacity forms a critical component of Moscow’s strategic leverage over its allies.

In stark contrast to Russia’s massive defense allocation, the independent defense budgets of Central Asian partners are considerably more modest, often struggling to sustain baseline military readiness, let alone initiate a costly, comprehensive air force modernization program that includes the acquisition of advanced radar systems, specialized interceptor aircraft, and layered electronic warfare capabilities. For instance, while publically accessible data on 2024 and 2025 military spending for all CSTO members is subject to reporting lags and definitional differences, data on major partners illustrates this gap. The most recently available SIPRI data confirms that military expenditure for a crucial CSTO state such as Kazakhstan was 1.24 billion US dollars in 2023, a figure that, while representing a 6.3% increase from 2022, remains a fractional component of the budget required for independent, cutting-edge air defense infrastructure. The immense difference in fiscal muscle dictates that while CSTO protocols allow members to procure Russian arms at preferential prices ³, the long-term dependency on Moscow for maintenance, spare parts, advanced technical training, and integration into the broader Russian command-and-control network is non-negotiable. This process strategically secures military-technical alignment within Eurasia, ensuring that the modernized forces of CSTO allies become structurally dependent appendages of the Russian military-industrial complex.

The capacity of the Russian defense-industrial base (DIB) to deliver this modernization package is significant, operating at a sustained, high-volume output level. As of April 2025, the Russian defense industry employs an estimated 4.5 million people nationwide, accounting for approximately 20% of all manufacturing jobs in the Russian Federation.⁴ This sector has successfully navigated international sanctions, achieving a notable surge in military production. For instance, Russian missile production is now reported to have exceeded its pre-war levels, and the industry’s overall ammunition manufacturing capacity is estimated to be approximately seven times the combined output of all NATO nations.⁴ Furthermore, Russia has reportedly doubled its annual tank production and tripled its artillery and rocket production from pre-invasion numbers, demonstrating a profound internal resilience and capacity to supply sustained military modernizations both domestically and across the CSTO perimeter.⁴ This overwhelming industrial muscle provides the necessary foundation for the 2026 chairmanship’s commitment to strengthening the CSTO’s defense potential, guaranteeing a captive market for this massive domestic output.

However, the military-technical readiness is being simultaneously undercut by a critical political fracture within the alliance, highlighted by the sustained crisis concerning Armenia. The calculated non-attendance of Armenian leadership at the Bishkek summit in November 2025 confirms the organizational failure of the CSTO’s core defense promise.⁵ The founding legal instrument of the organization, Article 4 of the Collective Security Treaty, is unequivocal: aggression against one state is considered aggression against all, requiring the remaining members to provide assistance, including military support, in full accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. Armenia’s effective suspension of its participation since 2024 ⁷ serves as a profound indictment of the bloc’s failure to activate this central provision during key security challenges faced by Yerevan.⁸ This fissure is leading Armenia to aggressively pursue strategic diversification of its defense procurement, moving away from its traditional reliance on the Russian defense market. As of 2024 and 2025, Yerevan has secured significant alternative military agreements, notably with India, including confirmed procurements of the Akash Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System and various modern artillery platforms, such as the Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System (ATAGS) and the Trajan 155 mm Gun System. This reorientation towards non-CSTO defense partners is a tangible sign that Yerevan no longer regards the alliance as a reliable guarantor of its territorial integrity or sovereignty, effectively reducing the CSTO from six functioning members to a functional five-nation bloc.

Despite this crisis of confidence among its Southern Caucasus member, Russia maintains a significant military foothold that anchors its geopolitical influence. The Russian 102nd Military Base, stationed in Armenia, has actively been the subject of modernization initiatives. Public statements confirm plans to effectively double the base’s combat potential without increasing personnel numbers. This continuous, state-level military support, which includes the provision of sophisticated systems such as the Sukhoi Su-30SM warplanes and helicopter gunships, is designed to ensure Moscow’s long-term military leverage in the region, regardless of Armenia’s formal status within the CSTO structure. The presence of these forces serves a strategic purpose beyond the collective defense mandate: it secures Russia’s position as the ultimate security arbiter, capable of influencing the conflict dynamics in the volatile South Caucasus region.

Furthermore, the required military modernization is inextricably linked to the CSTO’s primary operational success: the institutionalized management of internal security and regime stability. The clearest precedent for the bloc’s rapid deployment capability remains the intervention in Kazakhstan in January 2022, when the CSTO swiftly deployed approximately 2,000 peacekeepers to quell local unrest.² This action decisively proved the organization’s utility as a mechanism for reinforcing the stability of its member states’ regimes against internal, non-state threats. This function is mandated through the core mission of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR), which is designed to act across a wide spectrum of crises, including domestic political disturbances, combating terrorism, counter-drug trafficking, and transnational crime. While the air force development mandate focuses on external, high-intensity threats (like UAS), the ground forces, which include highly mobile units trained during exercises such as “Rubezh-2025” to handle decentralized command centers ¹, remain ready for the internal deployment mission. This dual military function—air-centric defense against sophisticated external threats and rapid reaction capacity for internal stability—serves to consolidate Russian influence over the political and military fate of the Central Asian states.

In essence, the military agenda of the 2026 chairmanship serves as the hard-power instrument necessary to execute the multipolar doctrine. The commitment to air force modernization and the deepening military-technical dependence on Russia’s industrial output are not merely technical adjustments; they are strategic measures to ensure the CSTO can project and maintain stability across the vast Eurasian sphere. This stability is mandatory for the political viability of the proposed “architecture of equal security” ⁹, which Moscow intends to promote at its 2026 expert forum. By ensuring military compliance and operational readiness among its core members, Russia seeks to provide the undeniable, kinetic foundation upon which an alternative, non-Western-dominated continental security framework can be built, thereby transforming diplomatic concepts into geopolitical reality through coordinated military strength. The collective defense capacity is thus being systematically revised to handle both the digital warfare of the 21st Century and the internal political volatility of the post-Soviet space, all while cementing Moscow’s role as the indispensable security anchor for the emerging Eurasian power bloc.

The Digital Battlefield: Advancing the CSTO’s Counter-Terrorism and ICT Strategy

The November 2025 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) summit in Bishkek was utilized by Moscow to propose the initiation of preparatory work for a comprehensive new anti-terrorism strategy for the alliance , signaling an institutional recognition that the threat environment has irrevocably migrated into the digital and cognitive domains. This strategic doctrinal revision moves decisively beyond the previous security framework, which successfully managed traditional border threats under instruments such as the 2021-2025 Anti-Drug Strategy ¹, to confront the rising challenges posed by transnational terrorism and extremism operating within the modern information space. Senior officials, including the Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers, and Security Council Secretaries, convened in Bishkek to exchange views on deepening cooperation to counteract these modern security challenges ², placing particular emphasis on the critical need to address growing threats to information security. This formal inclusion of the digital realm as a central theater of operational concern confirms that the CSTO views the systemic vulnerability of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to exploitation as an existential threat to the stability of member states, demanding coordinated, proactive security service integration across the Eurasian alliance.³

The imperative to develop this new strategy is directly linked to the evolving methodology of non-state actors, who have mastered the use of ICT for recruitment, financing, and ideological dissemination.³ Russia’s leadership specifically mandated, as a priority of its upcoming 2026 chairmanship, placing particular attention on countering the widespread dissemination of radical ideas among youth ³, acknowledging that this demographic represents the most critical, yet vulnerable, target for ideological subversion. The academic and security analyses consistently underscore that the recruitment and indoctrination of young people by extremist groups are evolving at a pace that has consistently outstripped traditional counter-extremism strategies, a challenge fueled by continuous technological advancements and the persistent ideological fragmentation of extremist movements. Modern groups no longer depend solely on physical, face-to-face networks, having successfully leveraged digital spaces—including sophisticated online forums, encrypted messaging apps, and even ubiquitous gaming platforms—to reach potential recruits. This ease of digital access dramatically accelerates the radicalization trajectory, transforming passive consumers of extremist propaganda into active participants in violent extremism with unprecedented speed.

A particularly pernicious aspect of this digital threat, as recognized by international bodies like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), is the role of technology in creating reinforcing ideological echo chambers. Social media algorithms, which prioritize engagement, often expose young users who interact with radical content to perpetually more of the same, thereby normalizing and solidifying extreme views. Furthermore, the radicalization process among youth is frequently rooted in the search for a sense of recognition, fellowship, and identity, rather than purely ideological conviction, with groups exploiting these socio-psychological needs by offering material support, protection, and a sense of belonging or solidarity. The proposed CSTO counter-terrorism strategy is thus designed to institutionalize a comprehensive, multi-layered defense against this internal, cognitive threat, requiring standardized protocols for joint surveillance, shared intelligence on digital infiltration tactics, and the necessary rapid deployment of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) against threats involving large-scale information disruption or ideologically driven domestic instability.⁴ By explicitly prioritizing the management of youth radicalization and the control of the information space, the CSTO is structurally enhancing its role as a mechanism for reinforcing internal regime stability among member states, a function previously and decisively demonstrated by the deployment of 2,000 peacekeepers to Kazakhstan in January 2022 to quell civil unrest.⁴

In addition to the cognitive domain, the new strategy maintains a vital focus on traditional transnational threats, particularly given the volatile geopolitical landscape south of the Central Asian border. The CSTO member states have affirmed their non-negotiable readiness to step up joint efforts to counter international terrorism, neutralize its resource base, and manage the complex logistics of transnational threats.⁵ This includes intensified measures to combat the financing, training, and equipping of foreign terrorist fighters for use as mercenaries in armed conflicts, alongside protocols for managing their eventual return from conflict zones to their countries of nationality.⁵ This remains a critical area, especially in light of the fluid security dynamics radiating from Afghanistan, a threat underscored by the CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov during the preparations for the “Rubezh-2025” military exercise.⁶

The nexus between terrorism, instability, and transnational organized crime is particularly acute regarding the illicit narcotics trade flowing from Afghanistan. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in a report issued on November 6, 2025, confirmed that opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan registered a significant decrease of 20 per cent in 2025 when compared to the 2024 figure, contracting to an estimated 10,200 hectares. This decline is profound when contrasted with the 232,000 hectares recorded prior to the 2022 opium ban. Accordingly, total opium production also saw a substantial reduction, dropping by 32 per cent in 2025 to an estimated total of 296 tons. This sharp contraction in supply had a palpable effect on the local economy, with Afghan farmers’ income from opium sales plummeting by 48 per cent, falling from $260 million in 2024 to just $134 million in 2025. However, this shift in production patterns does not guarantee a decline in the availability of heroin within the Eurasian sphere. The UNODC World Drug Report 2025 notes that while production has been slashed, existing stockpiles continue to supply the European continent via the established Balkan route, and the sharp economic downturn in Afghanistan—exacerbated by worsening weather conditions that left over 40 per cent of farmland barren and the return of approximately four million Afghans—creates significant downside risks. These desperate economic circumstances, coupled with reductions in humanitarian aid, have the potential to make opium poppy cultivation attractive once again, presenting a cyclical security risk for the CSTO’s Central Asian border states, whose stability is directly impacted by the continued flow of illicit funds and narcotics across their borders.

The complexity of these converging digital, ideological, and criminal threats necessitates a highly coordinated institutional response, one that transcends the military framework of the CSTO alone. This systemic integration was formally codified in Beijing on September 3, 2025, during the thirteenth meeting of Senior Administrative Officials of the CSTO, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The resulting trilateral agreement, known as the Roadmap for the development of cooperation, institutionalized a functional division of labor designed to manage the full spectrum of security challenges across the Eurasian landmass. Under this framework, the CSTO focuses on military and anti-terrorism enforcement, while the expanding SCO—whose mandate was reaffirmed as one of the leading platforms for global governance ⁷—is building the political and security scaffolding. Key institutional achievements of the SCO include the launch of processes to establish a dedicated SCO Anti-Drug Center in Dushanbe and a Universal Center for Countering Security Threats and Challenges of SCO Member States in Tashkent ⁷, directly addressing the narcotics and extremism challenges faced by CSTO members.

The doctrinal alignment was further reinforced at the 3rd CIS Conference on Countering Terrorism and Extremism, held in Dushanbe on October 23, 2025. This high-level forum brought together over 150 delegates from 12 countries ⁷, specifically to discuss national experiences, international cooperation, and the increasingly sophisticated challenges associated with the hostile use of modern technologies, including advanced tools such as artificial intelligence, for terrorist purposes.⁷ The participation of the SCO Deputy Secretary General, who expressed satisfaction with the growing operational cooperation among the SCO, CIS, and CSTO ⁷, confirms that the institutional machinery for cross-bloc threat mitigation is not merely theoretical but actively being implemented. This synchronization allows Russia to project an image of comprehensive, integrated security management, leveraging SCO political and economic ties to stabilize the regional environment while employing the CSTO as the specialized, kinetic arm for enforcement and counter-extremism within the collective security area. This evolving doctrine, which merges military capacity, digital control, and coordinated intelligence sharing, is designed to serve as the highly resilient, internal security precondition for the successful realization of the external, geopolitical objective: the construction of the non-Western-aligned “architecture of equal security” across Eurasia in 2026.⁸

Institutional Integration and Strategic Competition: The SCO, CIS, and the Future of the Eurasian Bloc

The strategic objectives articulated by Russia’s 2026 chairmanship of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) cannot be assessed purely within the narrow frame of military-technical cooperation; rather, they must be understood as the hard-security component of a much broader, integrated geopolitical project designed to solidify an alternative, non-Western security and governance structure across the Eurasian supercontinent. This structural objective relies fundamentally on the formalized integration and functional harmonization of three distinct, yet strategically convergent, multilateral institutions: the CSTO itself, the expansive Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The institutional blueprint for this cohesion was decisively codified during trilateral consultations held in Beijing on September 3, 2025, marking a critical inflection point in the construction of the new Eurasian security architecture.

This September 2025 Beijing meeting, which brought together the highest administrative officials of the three organizations—CSTO Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov, CIS Secretary General Sergei Lebedev, and SCO Secretary General Nurlan Yermekbayev—occurred strategically “on the margins” of the SCO Heads of State Council session in Tianjin, China.¹ The location and the participants underscored the elevated importance of China’s political and economic weight in anchoring this new formation. The consultations resulted in the approval of a definitive Roadmap for the development of cooperation between the CSTO, the CIS, and the SCO, alongside a joint statement commemorating the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II and the establishment of the United Nations. The unanimous consensus among the three organizations was the recognition of their ever-increasing role in maintaining global peace and regional security and preventing instability across the vast Eurasian territory. This document formally confirmed the shared commitment of the member states to the formation of a new Eurasian security architecture, alongside commitments to accelerate economic and cultural interaction. Crucially, the Roadmap affirmed the intention to ensure the comprehensive linking of integration projects and the essential harmonization of relations between various development centers in Eurasia. This institutional synchronization transforms the CSTO from a purely military alliance into the kinetic enforcement arm of a cohesive, integrated political-security bloc that spans from Belarus to China and extends into South Asia.

The strategic utility of this trilateral alignment is defined by the unique mandates each organization contributes. The CSTO provides the collective military muscle, ensuring rapid deployment capabilities—as demonstrated in Kazakhstan in January 2022 ²—and implementing the required military-technical standardization, such as the renewed focus on air force modernization [Query text]. The SCO, however, provides the indispensable political and economic scaffolding necessary for regional stability. The SCO’s membership has expanded dramatically, now including India and Pakistan since 2017, Iran since 2023, and Belarus since 2024 ³, positioning it as a leading platform for global governance that unites approximately one-third of the world’s population under a non-Western framework.⁵ The SCO’s evolving mandate now encompasses significant security institutionalization, including the launch of processes to establish a dedicated SCO Anti-Drug Center in Dushanbe and a Universal Center for Countering Security Threats and Challenges of SCO Member States in Tashkent ⁵, thereby directly addressing the narcotics, extremism, and organized crime challenges faced by the Central Asian CSTO members. This coordinated structure allows Moscow to leverage the political and economic outreach of the broader SCO to stabilize the regional environment, thereby increasing the operational credibility of the CSTO while diffusing the financial burden of managing massive transnational threats.

The ideological core of this integration is the “architecture of equal security” ⁶, which Russia intends to promote as the centerpiece of its 2026 chairmanship. As articulated by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), this concept is designed to transform Eurasia into a continental common space of peace, stability, mutual trust, and development.⁷ The framework relies on the dual principles of equality and indivisible security ⁶, affirming the sovereign right of all states to choose their own security paths, but crucially asserting that the security of one cannot be achieved at the expense of the security of others.⁸ This latter stipulation is a direct normative weapon intended to structurally delegitimize NATO expansion and limit the strategic alliance options of Eurasian states ⁶, framing Moscow’s long-held security grievances as the foundation for a universal, non-Western-aligned regional standard. The MFA has explicitly stated that the CSTO’s established philosophy and its developed network of military ties are intended to become central to this continental initiative ⁸, demonstrating that the alliance’s military role is inextricably linked to the geopolitical vision of a multipolar world order. Furthermore, Belarus, a key CSTO and new SCO member, has actively championed this geopolitical identity, having promoted the creation of the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the XXI Century as early as 2023.

Despite this successful institutional integration and the grand ambition of the multipolar doctrine, the Eurasian bloc faces considerable internal and external constraints. Internally, the alliance is plagued by persistent power asymmetries and fundamentally diverging interests among member states, which periodically limit Moscow’s ability to consolidate total influence over these platforms. The most visible internal fracture remains the calculated suspension of participation by Armenia in the CSTO since 2024 ⁹, a move driven by the bloc’s failure to activate its collective defense mechanisms under Article 4 of the founding treaty. This crisis of cohesion, while diplomatically managed at the Bishkek summit ¹⁰, visibly reduces the CSTO to a functional five-nation alliance in the Caucasus theater, forcing Yerevan to seek security diversification through non-CSTO partners like India, with confirmed procurements of advanced systems such as the Akash Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System.

Externally, the emerging Eurasian security architecture is being constructed in direct strategic competition with established Western integration efforts, particularly those championed by the European Union (EU). The EU remains deeply committed to building a stronger partnership with all five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—focusing its strategy on non-military dimensions of security, such as economic resilience, environmental governance, and critical infrastructure. The EU’s official strategy centers on the Green and Digital Transition, promoting reliable energy supply, food security, jobs, and sustainable development. A key example of this strategic engagement is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with Kazakhstan in 2022 on a Strategic Partnership on Sustainable Raw Materials, Batteries and Renewable Hydrogen Value Chains, which has subsequently been operationalized through the signing of two implementation roadmaps. This approach targets the long-term economic stability and sovereign resource management of Central Asian nations, offering a strategic alternative to the purely military-technical dependency fostered by the CSTO. This competition, where the EU offers economic and technical integration while Russia offers military security and political alignment, reflects the broader global struggle for normative influence.

Furthermore, the fundamental ideological incompatibility between the Russian vision of equal and indivisible security and the Western concept of liberal hegemony remains irreconcilable. Moscow views interactions with Western structures as inherently adversarial, frequently characterizing multilateral platforms, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as being exploited by trans-Atlantic political elites to spread anti-Russia sentiments and prepare civil populations for armed confrontation with the Russian Federation. This persistent perception of containment necessitates the creation of independent, highly resilient security structures defined by Eurasian interests alone. Ultimately, while Russia has successfully engineered the institutional integration of the CSTO, SCO, and CIS to advance its multipolar vision, this collection of platforms remains subject to internal friction and is, as of 2025, considered insufficient in fully counterbalancing the profound, diversified influence of the Western world or in realizing Moscow’s most ambitious global balance objectives. The success of the 2026 chairmanship will therefore be judged not merely on military modernization, but on its ability to translate the conceptual vision of a unified Eurasian security architecture into undeniable geopolitical reality in the face of persistent strategic competition.

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Concept Area	Key Finding/Data Point	Context/Implication	Source/Verification
Political Status & Cohesion	The Collective Security Council (CSC) of the CSTO convened its regular session in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in November 2025	The summit concluded Kyrgyzstan’s chairmanship and resulted in the adoption of a comprehensive Declaration outlining the work ahead .	(https://caliber.az/en/post/csto-meeting-in-bishkek-concludes-with-key-decisions)
Political Status & Cohesion	Taalatbek Masadykov of the Kyrgyz Republic was formally approved as the new CSTO Secretary General for the three-year term, effective January 1, 2026	The appointment ensures institutional continuity within the alliance structure.	(https://caliber.az/en/post/csto-meeting-in-bishkek-concludes-with-key-decisions)
Political Status & Cohesion	Armenia suspended its participation in the CSTO since 2024 and boycotted the November 2025 Bishkek Summit	This action highlights a profound political fracture, as Yerevan pursues a policy of diversification and balancing its foreign policy interests .	(https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/yb25_summary_en.pdf) ,(https://arka.am/en/news/politics/armenian-deputy-foreign-minister-armenia-s-withdrawal-from-the-csto-is-not-being-discussed/)
Political Status & Cohesion	The CSTO Declaration from Bishkek urged the prompt signing of an unconditional peace agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan	The alliance prioritized broader regional stabilization over the explicit enforcement of Article 4 (collective defense) for Armenia.	(https://en.apa.az/foreign-policy/csto-summit-urges-prompt-conclusion-of-armenia-azerbaijan-peace-agreement-484806)
Russia’s 2026 Mandate (Geopolitical)	Russia’s 2026 chairmanship will proceed under the motto: “Collective Security in a Multipolar World. One Goal — Shared Responsibility“	This slogan repositions the CSTO as the hard security structure for a polycentric global order, explicitly challenging Western alliances like NATO.	(https://24.kg/english/352506_CSTO_Summit_Japarov_summarizes_results_Putin_announces_Russias_priorities/)
Russia’s 2026 Mandate (Geopolitical)	Russia proposes holding an international expert forum in 2026 dedicated to creating an “architecture of equal security” across Eurasia [Query text]	This concept is founded on the principle of indivisible security, asserting that the security of one nation cannot be achieved at the expense of the security of others.	(https://eng.belta.by/politics/view/russian-mfa-new-eurasian-security-architecture-will-rely-on-experience-of-csto-173030-2025/)
Russia’s 2026 Mandate (Geopolitical)	Belarus promoted the creation of the Eurasian Charter of Diversity and Multipolarity in the XXI Century in 2023	This initiative serves as a clear political precursor, defining a non-Western-aligned, distinct Eurasian security identity.	(https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/reports/2018203/)
Military Modernization & Asymmetry	Russia committed a total planned military expenditure of 15.5 trillion roubles in 2025	This allocation is equivalent to a massive 7.2% of Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) , ensuring a sustained, wartime level of resource devotion to its defense-industrial base.	(https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/yb25_summary_en.pdf)
Military Modernization & Asymmetry	The Russian DIB employs approximately 4.5 million people nationwide, accounting for 20% of all manufacturing jobs in Russia	This high industrial capacity supports the modernization goals for the CSTO and secures technical dependency among allies.	(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_industry_of_Russia)
Military Modernization & Asymmetry	Kazakhstan’s military spending for 2023 was 1.24 billion US dollars, representing a 6.3% increase from 2022	Illustrates the severe fiscal asymmetry; smaller allies are incapable of independent, major air defense modernization required by the CSTO directive.	(https://www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/kaz/kazakhstan/military-spending-defense-budget)
Military Modernization & Asymmetry	Russia’s arms exports declined by 64 per cent between 2015–19 and 2020–24, but the country remains the world’s third largest exporter	The domestic defense industry has seen military production surge, with missile output now exceeding pre-war levels, prioritizing internal demand and CSTO requirements .	(https://www.sipri.org/publications/2025/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2024) ,(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arms_industry_of-russia)
Military Modernization & Asymmetry	Armenia has confirmed procurements of advanced systems from India, including the Akash Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) System and the Trajan 155 mm Gun System	This decisive strategic diversification confirms Yerevan’s pivot away from its historical reliance on Russian defense procurement.	Armenia-India Military Cooperation, 2025
Digital & Counter-Terrorism Strategy	Russia proposed to begin preparing a new anti-terrorism strategy for the CSTO [Query text]	The new doctrine acknowledges the critical threat posed by the hostile use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and the necessity of improved information security mechanisms .	(https://en.odkb-csto.org/news/news_odkb/v-bishkeke-27-sostoyalos-sovmestnoe-zasedanie-smid-smo-kssb-odkb-odobrena-povestka-dnya-zavtrashney-/) ,(https://report.az/en/region/csto-countries-mull-countering-transnational-threats-in-bishkek)
Digital & Counter-Terrorism Strategy	A core priority is countering the spread of radical ideas among youth	Recruitment and radicalization often occurs via online forums and encrypted messaging apps and is frequently driven by the need for social bonding and identity, rather than purely ideological grounds .	(https://24.kg/english/352506_CSTO_Summit_Japarov_summarizes_results_Putin_announces_Russias_priorities/) ,(https://www.visionofhumanity.org/youth-radicalisation-a-new-frontier-in-terrorism-and-security/)
Digital & Counter-Terrorism Strategy	CSTO member states affirmed readiness to step up efforts to combat the financing, training, and return of foreign terrorist fighters	This agenda reinforces the CSTO’s role in reinforcing internal regime stability against non-state, hybrid threats, demonstrated by the January 2022 deployment of 2,000 peacekeepers to Kazakhstan.	(https://en.odkb-csto.org/news/news_odkb/deklaratsiya-soveta-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-organizatsii-dogovora-o-kollektivnoy-bezopasnosti-prin/) ,(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_Security_Treaty_Organization)
Transnational Threats (Narcotics)	Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan decreased by 20 per cent in 2025 (down to 10,200 hectares) compared to 2024	This sharp supply contraction caused Afghan farmers’ income from opium sales to plummet by 48 per cent, falling from $260 million in 2024 to $134 million in 2025 .	(https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2025/November/afghanistan-opium-cultivation-falls-in-2025-shifting-regional-production-and-trafficking-patterns–says-new-unodc-survey.html)
Transnational Threats (Narcotics)	The decline in humanitarian aid and the return of approximately four million Afghans creates conditions that could make opium poppy cultivation attractive again, posing a cyclical risk	Illicit flows of narcotics and funds continue to destabilize the CSTO’s Central Asian periphery, making counter-drug strategies critical.	(https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2025/November/afghanistan-opium-cultivation-falls-in-2025-shifting-regional-production-and-trafficking-patterns–says-new-unodc-survey.html)
Institutional Integration (SCO/CIS)	The CSTO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) approved a Roadmap for the development of cooperation on September 3, 2025 in Beijing	This trilateral agreement codifies institutional synchronization to ensure the linking of integration projects and the harmonization of relations between various development centers across Eurasia.	(https://eng.sectsco.org/20250903/1968731.html)
Institutional Integration (SCO/CIS)	The SCO expanded to include Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024	The rapidly expanding SCO—which is recognized as a platform for global governance —provides the political and economic scaffolding for the CSTO’s military core.	(https://www.ui.se/globalassets/ui.se-eng/publications/ui-publications/2025/final-ui-report-no.-3-2025.pdf) ,(https://eng.sectsco.org/20251026/2038389.html)
Institutional Integration (SCO/CIS)	The SCO is launching processes to establish a dedicated SCO Anti-Drug Center in Dushanbe and a Universal Center for Countering Security Threats in Tashkent	These non-military initiatives directly address threats facing CSTO members and solidify the functional division of labor in Eurasian governance.	(https://eng.sectsco.org/20251026/2038389.html)
Strategic Competition (EU)	The European Union (EU) is committed to building a stronger partnership with the five Central Asian states, focusing on the Green and Digital Transition	The EU offers an alternative, non-military integration strategy focused on economic resilience, demonstrated by the Memorandum of Understanding with Kazakhstan on Sustainable Raw Materials .	European Union and Central Asia, February 2025 ,(https://qazinform.com/news/when-the-first-ever-eucentral-asia-tourism-forum-will-take-place-062996)

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