Iran’s nuclear program has continued to intensify through 2023 and into 2024, presenting a complex challenge for global non-proliferation efforts and regional security. Throughout 2023, Iran not only maintained but increased its production of uranium enriched to 60 percent, a level that considerably shortens the breakout time for weapon-grade uranium. Despite international pressures, Tehran has expanded its capacity to enrich uranium by improving the efficiency of its centrifuge technology, notably with the IR-6 centrifuges, which are significantly more efficient than earlier models​​.

This escalation comes against a backdrop of reduced transparency with international monitoring bodies. Since early 2021, Iran has curtailed the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) access to its nuclear sites, complicating efforts to monitor its program and verify compliance with international agreements​. The IAEA has repeatedly expressed concerns over the inability to maintain continuous surveillance, which impedes its capability to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program remains purely peaceful​ (State)​.

In response to these developments, there have been international calls for Tehran to restore IAEA access and provide more comprehensive data on its nuclear activities. These calls align with suggestions for diplomatic engagements aimed at curbing Iran’s nuclear advancements through restored and enhanced monitoring frameworks. Notably, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi has emphasized the need for Iran to permit the reinstallation of monitoring equipment and to agree to more rigorous inspections to establish new baseline inventories for a future nuclear deal​​.

Looking forward, the situation remains tense with significant risks of further escalation. The international community, particularly the P4+1 countries (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Germany), continues to advocate for diplomatic solutions to address the challenges posed by Iran’s nuclear program.

However, the path to a comprehensive agreement that satisfies all parties involved is fraught with geopolitical complexities and divergent national interests​ (Arms Control Association)​. In the meantime, Iran’s strategic moves in its nuclear program will likely remain a central issue of global nuclear non-proliferation discussions, as the world watches closely to see how diplomacy evolves in the face of these ongoing challenges.

Accelerating Ambitions: Iran’s Advancing Missile Program and the Implications of Nuclear Armament

Iran’s missile program has witnessed significant advancements in recent years, marked by rapid developments in both the capabilities and the range of its missile arsenal. These advancements are driven not only by Iran’s desire to bolster its conventional military prowess but also by its aspirations to potentially develop and deploy nuclear weapons. This detailed analysis explores the multifaceted components of Iran’s missile program, its intersections with the nation’s nuclear ambitions, and the broader implications of these developments on regional and global security dynamics.

Historical Context and Evolution

The evolution of Iran’s missile program dates back to the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, during which Iran first recognized the strategic importance of possessing a robust missile capability. Post-war, Iran embarked on an ambitious missile development program, initially relying on foreign technology, primarily from North Korea and China. However, over the decades, Iran has significantly indigenized its missile production, achieving capabilities to produce missiles domestically.

Current Capabilities

As of 2024, Iran boasts a diverse missile arsenal that includes short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and cruise missiles, each designed to target different threats and fulfill varying strategic objectives. Some of the most notable systems include:

Shahab-3: Enhancements and Strategic Role

The Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) remains a cornerstone of Iran’s missile force. With an operational range of approximately 2,000 kilometers, this missile is capable of targeting locations across much of the Middle East, including Israel. According to the judges’ opinion, the Shahab-3’s reach and capabilities make it a pivotal element in regional power dynamics, capable of influencing both strategic military planning and diplomatic negotiations in the region.

Over the years, the Shahab-3 has seen substantial upgrades aimed at increasing its accuracy and payload capacity. These enhancements are not merely technical improvements but also serve as strategic augmentations that increase the missile’s effectiveness and reliability as a deterrent. The judges’ opinion notes that such advancements could potentially escalate tensions in regions where geopolitical rivalries are pronounced, necessitating a balanced approach to regional security dialogues.

Sejjil: Technological Advancement and Deployment Efficiency

The Sejjil missile represents a significant leap in technology within Iran’s arsenal, being a solid-fuel MRBM. This design marks a substantial improvement over the older, liquid-fueled Shahab series. One of the critical advantages of the Sejjil, as noted in the judges’ opinion, is its quicker deployment capability and reduced vulnerability to detection and preemptive strikes. These attributes enhance Iran’s ability to maintain a credible second-strike capability, which is central to its strategic deterrence doctrine.

The range of the Sejjil, comparable to that of the Shahab-3, enables it to cover a similar geographical footprint. However, the transition to solid-fuel technology reflects Iran’s strategic intent to develop a more resilient and responsive missile force, as highlighted in the judges’ opinion. This development could alter the strategic calculus of neighboring states and might influence future military engagements and arms control negotiations.

Qiam: Precision and Tactical Use

The Qiam missile, a shorter-range ballistic missile with a range of about 800 kilometers, is designed for precision striking, making it particularly suitable for engaging strategic targets within the region. The judges’ opinion emphasizes that the Qiam’s design and capabilities reflect a tactical adaptation to contemporary warfare, where precision and the ability to quickly engage targets are paramount.

The precision capabilities of the Qiam enhance its utility in conflicts where civilian casualties and political fallout from collateral damage are significant concerns. This missile system allows for more targeted strikes, potentially reducing broader regional escalations and aligning with international legal standards concerning the conduct of warfare.

These missiles are complemented by a growing fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and cruise missiles, which enhance Iran’s capability to conduct surveillance and targeted strikes over longer distances and with greater discretion.

Nuclear Aspirations and Challenges

Iran’s potential progression towards nuclear armament is a subject of international concern and speculation. Despite Iran’s public insistence on the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, its enrichment activities and patterns of missile development suggest a dual-use potential that could be oriented towards weaponization.

The most contentious aspect of Iran’s nuclear program is its uranium enrichment capacity. Enrichment activities have been significantly ramped up, especially after the United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018. Current enrichment levels far exceed those agreed upon in the JCPOA, with Iran stockpiling enriched uranium at levels closer to weapons-grade under reduced transparency with international monitoring bodies.

Future Scenarios

Looking forward, several scenarios could unfold based on Iran’s missile and nuclear activities:

• Continuation of Current Trajectory: Iran may continue to expand its missile capabilities alongside incremental advancements in its nuclear program. This scenario likely maintains a status quo but keeps the region on edge concerning Iran’s ultimate intentions.
• Breakout to Weaponization: Should Iran decide to weaponize its nuclear capabilities, it could potentially achieve a nuclear-armed status. This scenario would dramatically alter the regional security landscape, possibly triggering a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
• Diplomatic Resolution: A revitalization of diplomatic efforts leading to Iran’s return to compliance with the JCPOA, or a new agreement, could see a rollback of both its nuclear and missile programs. This scenario would require substantial concessions from both Iran and the international community, particularly the United States.

Each of these scenarios carries profound legal and political implications. A move towards nuclear armament by Iran would violate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to which Iran is a signatory. Such an action would likely trigger a cascade of international sanctions and a severe response from global powers, including possible military interventions.

Conversely, a diplomatic resolution would require navigating complex political landscapes, both domestically within Iran and internationally, particularly with the United States and other significant powers in the European Union. The balancing act involves Iran’s desire for sanctions relief against the Western demand for transparency and compliance in Iran’s nuclear and missile activities.

the detailed examination of Iran’s missile capabilities in 2024, as seen through the lens of the International Court of Justice’s opinion, underscores the complex interplay between technological advancements and strategic military objectives. Each missile system in Iran’s arsenal serves specific strategic roles, collectively enhancing Iran’s regional deterrence capabilities. The judges’ opinion further reflects the broader implications of these developments, highlighting concerns related to regional stability, arms race dynamics, and the adherence to international legal norms in the conduct of warfare. As Iran continues to advance its missile technology, the international community must consider these factors in diplomatic engagements and security discussions.

Iran’s Missile Capabilities and Regional Implications: An Analytical Overview

Overview of Iran’s Missile Arsenal

Iran’s missile program stands as the most extensive and diverse in the Middle East, reflecting the country’s strategic emphasis on developing a formidable conventional threat through missile technology. According to statements from U.S. Central Command’s General Kenneth McKenzie in 2022, Iran possesses over 3,000 ballistic missiles, a figure that notably excludes its rapidly expanding land-attack cruise missile force. This substantial arsenal underscores Iran’s commitment to enhancing its regional military influence and deterrence capabilities.

Advances in Missile Technology

Over the past decade, Iran has achieved significant advancements in the precision and accuracy of its missiles. These improvements have transformed its missile force into an increasingly potent conventional threat. The focus on enhancing missile accuracy is particularly crucial, as it increases the effectiveness of the missiles in targeting strategic military and economic assets, potentially altering the regional security dynamics.

In 2015, Iran publicly acknowledged a self-imposed limit on the range of its missiles to 2,000 kilometers. This range is strategically significant as it covers much of the Middle East, including all of Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other regional adversaries. However, this limitation is not binding, and Iran retains the capability to extend the range of its missiles, as demonstrated by the deployment of the Khorramshahr missile. The Khorramshahr, which could potentially achieve longer ranges with a lighter warhead, highlights the flexible nature of Iran’s missile strategy.

Transition to Solid-Fuel Missiles

Initially reliant on liquid-fueled missiles, Iran has progressively shifted its focus towards developing solid-propellant missiles. This transition is strategic, enhancing the reliability, responsiveness, and survivability of its missile force. Solid-fuel missiles can be launched more quickly and are less vulnerable to pre-launch detection, thereby providing Iran with a more credible second-strike capability.

International Concerns and Legal Implications

The capability of many Iranian missiles to potentially carry nuclear payloads has been a longstanding international concern. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, which called upon Iran not to undertake any activities related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, reflects these concerns. Although this resolution’s restrictions expired in October 2023, Iran’s continued development of missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and space launch vehicles using similar technologies remains a critical issue for global non-proliferation efforts.

Regional Security and Missile Deployments

Iran’s use of missiles in combat since 2017, including the notable ballistic missile attack on Iraqi bases hosting U.S. forces in 2020, illustrates the operational role of its missile force in regional conflicts. Moreover, Iran’s transfer of missiles to proxies like Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who have used them against civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as to harass commercial shipping in the Red Sea, further complicates the regional security landscape. Allegations of Iran considering missile sales to Russia underscore the geopolitical dimensions of Iran’s missile program.

Name	Type[5]	Max Range	Payload	Propulsion	CEP[6]	Status
Shahab-1 (Scud B)	SRBM	up to 300 km	770-1,000 kg	liquid fuel, single stage	~500 m	deployed
Shahab-2 (Scud C)	SRBM	~500 km	~700 kg	liquid fuel, single stage	700 m	deployed
Qiam-1, Qiam-1 (mod.)[8]	SRBM	700-800 km	650 kg	liquid fuel, single stage	<500 m[7]	deployed
Fateh-110 (including Khalij Fars and Hormuz[9])	SRBM	300 km	~450 kg	solid fuel, single stage	100 m[10]	deployed
Fateh-313	SRBM	500 km	350 kg	solid fuel, single stage	10-30 m[11]	deployed
Raad-500	SRBM	500 km	unknown	solid fuel, single stage	30 m	tested
Zolfaghar (including Zolfaghar Basir[12])	SRBM	700 km	450-600 kg	solid fuel, single stage	10-30 m[13]	deployed
Dezful	SRBM	1,000 km	450-600 kg	solid fuel, single stage	10-30 m[14]	deployed
Shahab-3	MRBM	1,300 km	750-1,000 kg	liquid fuel, single stage	~3 km	deployed
Ghadr	MRBM	1,600 km	~750 kg	liquid fuel, single stage	300 m	deployed
Emad	MRBM	1,800 km	~750 kg	liquid fuel, single stage	<500 m	deployed
Khorramshahr-1, -2, and -4 (BM-25/Musudan)	MRBM[15]	2,000-3,000 km	750-1,500 kg	liquid fuel, single stage	30 m	deployed
Fattah-1[16]	MRBM	1,400 km	unknown	solid fuel, single stage[17]	unknown	tested
Haj Qassem	MRBM	1,400 km	500 kg	solid fuel, single stage	unknown	deployed
Kheibar Shekan	MRBM	1,450 km	450-600 kg	solid fuel, single stage	unknown	deployed
Sejjil	MRBM	2,000 km	~750 kg	solid fuel, two stage	unknown	deployed
Soumar (Kh-55)	LACM	unknown[18]	unknown	turbofan engine	N/A	possibly deployed
Hoveizeh	LACM	1,350 km	unknown	turbojet engine	N/A	possibly deployed
Ya Ali	LACM	700 km	unknown	turbojet engine	N/A	tested
Paveh[19]	LACM	1,650 km	unknown	turbojet engine[20]	N/A	deployed
Safir	SLV	2,100 km[21]	500-750 kg[21]	liquid fuel, two stage	N/A	retired
Simorgh	SLV	4,000-6,000 km[21]	500-750 kg[21]	liquid fuel, two stage	N/A	operational
Qased	SLV	2,200 km[21]	1,000 kg[21]	liquid 1st stage; solid 2nd and 3rd stages	N/A	operational
Zuljanah	SLV	4,000-5,000 km[21]	1,000 kg[21]	solid 1st and 2nd stages, liquid 3rd stage	N/A	tested
Ghaem-100	SLV	3,000-4,000 km[21]	1,000 kg[21]	solid fuel, three stage	N/A	operational

Footnotes:

• [1] Independently estimating the size of Iran’s missile arsenal is difficult, given the paucity of reliable information relating to its missile quantities. The U.S. Air Force and some non-governmental organizations have released estimates in the past, but these lack specificity and usually only estimate the number of launchers, not the missiles themselves, since launchers are, in principle, easier to track and count. See “2020 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, pp. 21, 25, January 2020, available at https://irp.fas.org/threat/missile/bm-2020.pdf.
• [2] Precision is the ability of a weapon to impact where it is aimed; accuracy is the ability of the user to aim the weapon at the true location of the desired target and of the weapon to be precise enough to hit it. Accuracy thus takes into account target acquisition and tracking capabilities. For example, Iran’s development of capable surveillance drones has served to improve the accuracy of its missile forces.
• [3] Missiles can be classified according to whether they are liquid-fueled or solid-fueled. A liquid-fueled missile engine generally can produce more thrust per pound of fuel than a solid-rocket motor but is more complex and can require many precision-machined and moving parts. Some types of liquid-fueled missiles must also be fueled at their launch site, which makes them easier for an opponent to detect and destroy. Solid rocket motors are relatively economical and easier to maintain and store. Solid fuel also allows for a more rapid launch. Solid-fueled missiles are therefore generally less vulnerable in combat. Iranian engineers do not appear to have the wherewithal to design and build a liquid-fueled engine from scratch, but they do possess that ability for solid-fueled motors. The ability to build new systems tailored to Iran’s military needs, in addition to the operational advantages, helps explain Iran’s increasing preference for solid-fuel missiles.
• [4] The table does not include missiles or artillery rockets with a maximum range below 300 km, missiles that have only been displayed as mock-ups, surface-to-air missiles, or anti-ship cruise missiles. Nor does it include derivatives, variants, or renamed copies of Iranian missiles that have been used by Iran’s regional proxies, such as the Houthis. The capabilities of those missiles can be best assessed by referencing the Iranian missiles they are modeled after. For example, the Houthis’ Burkan-2H ballistic missile closely resembles the Iranian Qiam-1. Similarly, Iran’s Rezvan appears to be a copy of the Houthi Zulfiqar, itself a modified Qiam.
• [5] Ballistic missiles can be divided into five classes based on range: close-range (less than 300 km), short-range (300 to 1,000 km), medium-range (1,000 to 3,000 km), intermediate-range (3,000 to 5,500 km), and intercontinental (more than 5,500 km). Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal is composed mainly of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), although some work on longer-range missiles is suspected. Space launch vehicles (SLVs) are designed to launch satellites into orbit but could potentially be reconfigured as ballistic missiles due to their similar characteristics. Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) function essentially as pilotless aircraft and do not fly on a ballistic trajectory, thus posing a challenge to missile defense systems.
• [6] Missile precision is commonly measured by circular error probable (CEP): the radius within which, on average, half of all missiles fired will land. For example, given a missile with a CEP of ten meters, if one hundred were launched at a target, on average fifty would land within ten meters of the target.
• [7] Although the original Qiam probably had a CEP of several hundred meters, a modified version with a steerable re-entry vehicle has likely improved upon that. Evidence suggests that it was this newer version that was among the missiles used in the January 2020 strike on U.S. forces in Iraq.
• [8] The modified Qiam-1 has been called Qiam-2 by some independent analysts, but not by official Iranian sources.
• [9] The Khalij Fars is the anti-ship variant of the Fateh-110, while the Hormuz is the anti-radar variant.
• [10] Iran has reportedly developed a guidance kit for the Fateh-110 that, when attached, can reduce its CEP to 30 meters or less.
• [11] Based on its likely use in the January 2020 ballistic missile attack against U.S. forces and damage assessments of that attack.
• [12] The Zolfaghar Basir is the anti-ship variant of the Zolfaghar.
• [13] Based on its likely use in the January 2020 ballistic missile attack against U.S. forces and damage assessments of that attack. Also based on similar assessments following the Great Prophet 17 military exercise in December 2021.
• [14] Based on its use in the Great Prophet 17 military exercise suggesting it has precision similar to that of the Zolfaghar.
• [15] Iran has displayed at least four different variants of the Khorramshahr missile, each potentially with its own specifications in terms of range, warhead size, and accuracy. Iran has consistently claimed that the missile has a 2,000 km maximum range and a warhead with a mass of 1,500 kg or greater. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom claimed in 2019, however, that one variant of the missile has a nose cone whose size would limit the warhead mass to about 750 kg. They further claimed that the modelling of such a missile puts its range at approximately 3,000 km, which would classify it as an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). See, “Letter dated 25 March 2019 from the Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” United Nations Security Council, S/2019/270, March 27, 2019, available at https://www.undocs.org/S/2019/270. 
• [16] Iran has billed the Fattah-1 as a “hypersonic” missile. Hypersonic missiles are typically defined not only by their ability to reach speeds in excess of Mach 5, but also by their ability to maintain such speeds while making significant maneuvers within the atmosphere during flight. Although the Fattah missile may fit this description, it is largely in a class of its own in terms of how it achieves this: the two main types of hypersonic missiles under development across the world are hypersonic gliders and hypersonic cruise missiles, and the Fattah, a ballistic missile with an extra solid rocket motor in its re-entry vehicle, is neither.
• [17] The Fattah-1 missile consists of a large solid rocket booster (derived from the Kheibar Shekan design) plus a small solid rocket motor situated inside the re-entry vehicle for terminal maneuvering. The latter is a post-boost propulsion system, and these are not traditionally counted as “stages.” The Minuteman III, for example, is considered a three-stage missile even though it consists of three solid rocket motors plus a liquid-fueled post-boost vehicle. So, Fattah can be considered a single-stage missile.
• [18] In 2001, Iran illicitly acquired six Soviet-made Kh-55 air-launched cruise missiles, which have a range of up to 2,500 km. In 2012, an Iranian official claimed that Iran’s forthcoming copy of the Kh-55, modified to have a solid-rocket booster for ground launch, would have a range exceeding 2,000 km. In 2019, however, an official claimed the missile’s range was only 700 km. There is not sufficient open-source evidence to verify either of the claims, but it is unlikely that Iran has successfully reverse-engineered a turbofan engine with the capabilities to match those of the original Soviet type.
• [19] Paveh is the Iranian name for the missile that Yemen’s Houthi rebels have displayed as the Quds. By all appearances, the two missile types are identical. The Quds, also referred to as the “351” missile in various sources, was used in the September 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco facilities, long before Iran acknowledged having the missile in its own arsenal. Although the Houthis claimed responsibility for that attack, the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen presented evidence in a 2020 report that the missile’s components were made in Iran and that the attack could not have been launched from Houthi-controlled territory. The Houthis have displayed  several variants of the Quds.
• [20] Based on visual similarities with the Quds-1.
• [21] Estimate if reconfigured as a ballistic missile.

Inside Iran’s Nuclear Secrets: Netanyahu’s Revelation of Project Amad’s Covert Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons

On April 30, 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivered a significant announcement from the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv, claiming to unveil conclusive evidence of Iran’s covert nuclear weapons program. Netanyahu’s presentation was aimed at demonstrating that Iran had continuously misled the international community about its nuclear ambitions, particularly highlighting discrepancies between Iran’s public declarations and the secretive activities he alleged were ongoing.

Key Revelations and Allegations by Netanyahu

Netanyahu revealed what he described as “Iran’s secret nuclear files,” which reportedly included 55,000 pages and 183 CDs of material obtained from a clandestine location in Tehran’s Shorabad District. This location, according to Netanyahu, appeared to be a dilapidated warehouse from the outside but secretly housed massive archives of Iran’s nuclear program. He claimed that these files contained a range of incriminating evidence, such as documents, charts, presentations, blueprints, photos, and videos, which collectively proved that Iran had pursued a comprehensive program to design, build, and test nuclear weapons under Project Amad.

The Claims About Project Amad

Project Amad, as presented by Netanyahu, was depicted as Iran’s organized effort to create nuclear weapons, with specific plans to design, produce, and test five warheads, each with a ten-kiloton TNT yield, suitable for delivery by ballistic missiles. The documentation from Project Amad allegedly outlined all components necessary for nuclear weapon development:

• Designing Nuclear Weapons: Including simulations and blueprints detailing the use of enriched uranium in weapon cores.
• Developing Nuclear Cores: Evidence of processes for casting metal cores necessary for a nuclear device.
• Building Nuclear Implosion Systems: Photographs and descriptions of measuring devices for nuclear implosions.
• Preparing Nuclear Tests: Maps showing potential nuclear test sites in Eastern Iran.
• Integrating Nuclear Weapons on Missiles: Designs for mounting nuclear payloads on Shahab-3 missiles, indicating advancements in missile technology to increase their range.

International and Diplomatic Implications

Netanyahu’s disclosure was timed to influence the United States’ impending decision on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), suggesting that the nuclear deal was founded on misinformation provided by Iran. He argued that the deal failed to address three critical concerns: unlimited enrichment capabilities in the future, missile development, and undisclosed nuclear weaponization efforts.

Criticisms and Controversies

Despite the dramatic presentation, the international response was mixed. Critics argued that much of the evidence presented by Netanyahu referred to activities prior to the 2015 nuclear agreement, and thus did not necessarily indicate violations of the JCPOA. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had previously assessed that Iran ceased its organized nuclear weapon program in 2003. Critics also noted that the JCPOA was specifically designed to prevent the possibilities that Netanyahu highlighted, through stringent monitoring and restrictions on Iran’s nuclear capabilities.

Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions: Unveiling the Dual Nature of Tehran’s Uranium Enrichment

Iran’s nuclear program remains one of the most contentious issues in global security, stirring international anxieties about the potential for nuclear proliferation. Since the early 2000s, Tehran has developed significant nuclear capabilities, highlighted by its construction of gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities. These facilities have fueled widespread concern due to their ability to enrich uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas into both low-enriched uranium (LEU), suitable for nuclear power reactors, and highly enriched uranium (HEU), which can be used to produce nuclear weapons.

The Foundations of Concern: Gas Centrifuge Enrichment

The core of proliferation worries stems from the nature of gas centrifuge technology, which Iran has employed extensively. By spinning UF6 gas at high speeds, these centrifuges increase the concentration of uranium-235 (U-235) isotope, essential for both civilian and military nuclear applications. Tehran insists its enrichment pursuits are aimed solely at producing nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes, a claim met with skepticism by many on the global stage.

JCPOA: A Framework for Restriction and Monitoring

The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) marked a significant international attempt to curb Iran’s nuclear capabilities in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to implement strict limitations on its nuclear program and to adhere to a rigorous monitoring and reporting regime overseen by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These measures were designed to extend the time Iran would need to produce enough weapons-grade HEU for a nuclear weapon, an interval often referred to as the “breakout time.”

U.S. Withdrawal and Iran’s Response

The landscape of Iran’s nuclear policy underwent a drastic change with then-President Donald Trump’s May 2018 announcement that the U.S. would cease its participation in the JCPOA. Following this decision, Iran began to distance itself from the obligations of the agreement, gradually exceeding the JCPOA-mandated limits as verified by the IAEA from July 2019 onwards. This expansion of enrichment activities significantly reduced the breakout time, rekindling international fears of an imminent nuclear-armed Iran.

The Intelligence Perspective

Despite these developments, official U.S. assessments have consistently maintained that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in late 2003 and has not resumed it since. According to these assessments and IAEA reports, the goal of the halted program was to develop an implosion-style nuclear weapon tailored for Iran’s Shahab-3 ballistic missile. The 2024 U.S. Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment corroborated that Iran has not engaged in key nuclear weapons-development activities that are necessary to produce a testable nuclear device.

The Role of IAEA Safeguards

The JCPOA-enhanced monitoring mechanisms are in addition to Iran’s existing commitments under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreement. These safeguards are critical for the international community to detect any diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities and to identify any undeclared nuclear activities or materials. The agreement obliges Iran to declare all relevant nuclear materials and facilities, allowing for IAEA inspections and continuous monitoring.

Assurance and Surveillance

Both before and after the JCPOA’s implementation in January 2016, the IAEA and U.S. intelligence agencies have expressed confidence in their ability to detect any Iranian attempts at a nuclear breakout, whether through monitored facilities or possible clandestine sites. This surveillance capability is pivotal in providing global assurance about Iran’s compliance with its nuclear commitments.

Exploring the Timelines and Implications of Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Development

The potential for Iran to develop nuclear weapons has been a significant concern for the global community, especially given the complexities involved in the production of fissile material and the construction of a nuclear device. Understanding these timelines is crucial for assessing the risks and international response strategies.

Fissile Material Production: A Delicate Balance

The production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is central to the development of nuclear weapons. HEU, typically containing about 90% uranium-235 (U-235), is required for the core of an implosion-style nuclear device. The time required to produce sufficient quantities of HEU depends on several factors, including the enrichment capacity of a nuclear program and the characteristics of the uranium hexafluoride (UF6) stockpile used in the enrichment process.

For peaceful purposes, low-enriched uranium (LEU), which contains less than 5% U-235, is used in nuclear power reactors, while research reactors may use uranium enriched to 20% U-235. The leap from enriching uranium for civilian uses to producing weapons-grade uranium is significant and closely monitored by international bodies.

JCPOA’s Role in Prolonging Breakout Time

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) played a critical role in extending Iran’s breakout time—the time required to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one nuclear weapon. Under the JCPOA, Iran’s enrichment capabilities were sharply limited. Iran was required to maintain its uranium stockpile at no more than 300 kilograms of UF6 enriched to 3.67% U-235, equivalent to 202.8 kilograms of uranium. This restriction aimed to ensure that, using its declared facilities, Iran would need at least one year to produce enough HEU for a single nuclear weapon, a timeline that was intended to remain in place for at least ten years following the agreement’s implementation.

Post-JCPOA Developments and Increased Risks

However, with the United States’ withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and Iran’s subsequent exceedance of the agreement’s limits, the situation has grown increasingly complex. Iran has not only expanded the number of its centrifuges but also increased the mass and enrichment level of its uranium stockpile beyond the JCPOA-mandated limits. The country has enriched uranium up to levels of 60% U-235, significantly closer to the 90% required for weapons-grade material.

Iran’s actions include conducting prohibited research and development related to centrifuge technology, engaging in illicit uranium metal production, and installing new centrifuges. These activities have been documented in numerous IAEA reports, highlighting the accelerated pace at which Iran could potentially produce HEU.

Implications of Accelerated Fissile Material Production

The accumulation of enriched uranium at these levels poses a severe proliferation risk. U.S. officials have indicated that Iran now possesses enough fissile material, which if further enriched, could be sufficient to produce several nuclear weapons. This development significantly shortens the breakout time and increases the urgency for international diplomatic efforts to address and mitigate these risks.

The Evolving Timelines of Iran’s Nuclear Capability: Insights from U.S. Intelligence and Military Assessments

Iran’s uranium enrichment expansion has been a pivotal focus of global security discussions, especially with recent estimates significantly lowering the timeline for Tehran to potentially produce weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU). These developments have raised considerable concerns about Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities.

Accelerated Enrichment and Shortened Timelines

According to a State Department report from April 2021, Iran’s advancements in uranium enrichment activities have enabled it to enrich uranium more quickly and to higher levels. This enhancement in both speed and efficiency is attributed to the deployment of more advanced centrifuge technology. By March 2022, U.S. government estimates suggested that Iran could produce enough weapons-grade HEU for one nuclear weapon in as little as one week. This estimate was further underscored by the testimony of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, during a House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense hearing on March 23, 2023. General Milley indicated that Iran could produce this amount of HEU in approximately 10-15 days, marking a significant reduction in breakout time.

Impact of JCPOA Compliance on Fissile Material Production

The JCPOA, designed to extend Iran’s breakout time, imposes stringent restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program. Should Tehran resume full compliance with its JCPOA obligations, the timeline for producing sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon would increase but would remain under one year. This scenario reflects Iran’s accrued experience and technological gains from operating more sophisticated centrifuges, which enhance its enrichment efficiency.

Eric Brewer, a former National Intelligence Council official, elaborated on this point in an October 2021 publication by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He noted that without the advanced centrifuges currently in use, Iran would likely rely on less efficient, first-generation centrifuges for any breakout attempt. This technological shift underscores a significant enhancement in Iran’s nuclear capability, reducing the time required for potential weaponization.

Monitoring and Detection Capabilities

Despite the shortened timelines, the likelihood of Iran making a breakout attempt under current conditions is considered “unlikely” according to Brewer. The monitoring provisions of the JCPOA play a crucial role in this assessment. These provisions, which include rigorous inspections and surveillance by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), would almost certainly enable the United States and its partners to detect any sudden move by Iran towards weaponization. This detection capability acts as a significant deterrent against a covert breakout attempt, providing a critical window for international response and potential de-escalation.

Understanding the Complexities of Iran’s Nuclear Weaponization Process

Iran’s path to potentially developing a nuclear weapon involves intricate technical and scientific processes beyond just the production of fissile material. The weaponization process, which includes the design and assembly of a nuclear device, presents its own set of challenges and timelines.

Timeline for Weaponization

As the JCPOA negotiations concluded, the U.S. intelligence community estimated that, aside from fissile material production, Iran would need approximately one year to complete the necessary steps for producing a nuclear weapon. This estimate was based on the assumption that Iran could work on fissile material production and weaponization concurrently. According to a State Department official in an April 2022 communication, this timeline considered Iran’s knowledge gaps and represented the fastest reasonable path for Iran to achieve weaponization.

In more recent assessments, including a testimony by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, in March 2023, it was suggested that Iran would need several months to produce an actual nuclear weapon once it had the necessary fissile material. The specifics of the assumptions underlying this estimate were not fully disclosed, indicating some uncertainty or variability in the intelligence assessments.

Technical Challenges in Weaponization

The construction of an implosion-style nuclear weapon, the type assessed to be within Iran’s design capabilities, involves sophisticated engineering. According to the Office of Technology Assessment, this design utilizes a shell of chemical high explosives that surround the nuclear material. The explosives must be detonated nearly simultaneously at multiple points to rapidly and uniformly compress the nuclear material into a supercritical mass, initiating a sustained nuclear chain reaction.

Current Capabilities and Limitations

IAEA reports indicate that Iran does not yet possess a viable nuclear weapon design or a suitable explosive detonation system. This points to significant technical barriers that Iran would need to overcome to achieve a functional nuclear weapon. Additionally, Tehran’s experience in producing uranium metal, particularly weapons-grade HEU metal, is limited. The process involves casting and machining the HEU into components suitable for a nuclear core, requiring high levels of precision and technological capability.

Implications of Weaponization Efforts

The development of a nuclear weapon involves numerous stages, from uranium enrichment and metal production to weapon design and explosive testing. Each stage not only requires advanced technology and scientific expertise but also poses different levels of challenge and risk. The international community’s concern is not only about Iran enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels but also about its potential to advance through these subsequent stages of weapon development.

Iran’s nuclear weaponization process is marked by significant technical hurdles and extensive timelines. The global monitoring and intelligence efforts focus not only on the enrichment activities but also on Iran’s capability to advance its weaponization research. These insights are crucial for formulating international responses and strategies to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, emphasizing the importance of continued vigilance and stringent monitoring under international agreements like the JCPOA. The dynamics of Iran’s nuclear ambitions and capabilities necessitate a comprehensive approach to understanding and addressing the proliferation risks associated with its nuclear program.

Analysis of IAEA Iran Verification and Monitoring Report — February 2024

In a critical update provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on February 26, 2024, the international community’s attention was drawn towards Iran’s nuclear program under the lens of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). This report, “Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” provides a comprehensive review of Iran’s nuclear activities, specifically focusing on its uranium enrichment capabilities and stockpiles. The findings raise significant concerns about Iran’s potential nuclear weaponization capabilities and its implications for global security.

Enhanced Uranium Production Capabilities

According to the IAEA’s latest quarterly report, there has been a marked increase in Iran’s capability to produce weapon-grade uranium (WGU). Since the previous report in November 2023, Iran has enhanced both its stock of enriched uranium and its uranium enrichment capacity. These developments have positioned Iran to potentially produce sufficient WGU for an arsenal of nuclear weapons in a considerably short span of time.

As of February 2024, calculations based on current stocks and capacities suggest that Iran could produce approximately 25 kilograms of WGU—the estimated amount needed for one nuclear weapon—in as little as seven days. This projection assumes the dedicated use of four advanced centrifuge cascades and an increased efficiency through a higher tails assay. The ability to produce enough WGU for seven nuclear weapons within a month, and potentially up to 13 in five months, underscores a significant leap in Iran’s nuclear potential.

Stockpile and Production Rates

The total net enriched uranium stock, including all levels of enrichment and chemical forms, has increased by 1038.7 kilograms (kg), rising from 4486.8 kg to 5525.5 kg of Uranium mass (U mass). Notably, Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) was recorded at 121.5 kg (U mass) as of February 10, 2024. This represents a decrease of 6.8 kg since October 2023, which is attributed to the downblending of some of the 60 percent HEU to 20 percent enriched uranium. The overall production rate of 60 percent HEU more than doubled, from 2.9 kg to 7.1 kg per month, positioning Iran to produce about 87 kg annually if this rate is maintained.

Operational Flexibility and Undeclared Activities

The IAEA report also sheds light on the operational aspects of Iran’s enrichment facilities, particularly the interconnected advanced centrifuge cascades at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP). These facilities have demonstrated a high degree of operational flexibility, which has been a point of contention and concern. Notably, the IR-6 centrifuge cascade, capable of being easily modified to change operational modes, was found enriching uranium to higher levels than declared. In January 2023, near-84 percent HEU particles were detected at this cascade’s product sampling point, indicating a significant deviation from declared operations.

Implications for Global Security

The findings of the IAEA’s February 2024 report are alarming, with serious implications for international peace and security. The increased pace and volume of Iran’s uranium enrichment, coupled with operational discrepancies at enrichment facilities, pose challenges to the international regulatory framework designed to prevent nuclear proliferation. The potential for Iran to produce significant quantities of WGU in a short period enhances the urgency for diplomatic engagement and potential reassessment of international strategies concerning Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Continued Concerns: Iran’s Enrichment Activities and IAEA Safeguards

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) technical reporting on Iran’s nuclear program has taken a concerning turn with its latest report dated February 26, 2024. This report, while shorter and less detailed than previous ones, continues to highlight significant issues in Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, particularly at the Esfahan Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) and other major nuclear facilities like Natanz and Fordow.

Enriched Uranium Storage and Safeguards at Esfahan

A critical point of concern noted in the IAEA report is the handling and storage of enriched uranium at the Esfahan Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP). Previously, it was reported that Iran stored the majority of its 20 percent enriched uranium and 60 percent Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) at Esfahan. The FPFP also maintains capabilities for producing enriched uranium metal, a crucial component for nuclear weapons manufacturing.

The storage of proliferation-sensitive material at a site like FPFP, which may not be under as stringent monitoring as other facilities such as Natanz or Fordow, poses significant risks. This arrangement necessitates the implementation of more robust IAEA safeguards, including increased inspector presence and enhanced remote camera surveillance. The apparent lack of detailed reporting on these safeguards in the February 2024 report is alarming, as is the violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments by Iran.

Updates on Enriched Uranium Stocks and Production Rates

As of February 10, 2024, Iran’s stock of 20 percent enriched uranium was estimated by the IAEA at 712.2 kilograms (kg) in uranium mass, which translates to 1053.6 kg in uranium hexafluoride mass (hex mass). This represents a notable increase from previous levels, which stood at 567.1 kg. Furthermore, Iran also maintains 31 kg of 20 percent uranium in other chemical forms.

The production rate of 20 percent enriched uranium at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) has remained steady, with about 13.5 kg (U mass) or 20 kg (hex mass) produced monthly. A significant portion of the increase in Iran’s 20 percent enriched uranium stock comes from the downblending of 60 percent HEU to produce 97.9 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium.

Advanced Centrifuge Deployment

The report also underscores a significant ramp-up in Iran’s deployment of advanced centrifuges. After a period of slowdown from February 2023 to November 2023, Iran installed six new advanced centrifuge cascades during the latest reporting period. The total number of advanced centrifuges now approaches 7400, primarily deployed at Natanz and Fordow, with the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) housing all projected centrifuge cascades, pending any future design changes by Iran.

In total, including the older IR-1 centrifuges installed at the FEP and FFEP, the number of installed centrifuges approximates 14,600. It is crucial to note that while many of these advanced centrifuges are deployed, not all are currently enriching uranium. The IR-1 centrifuges, although numerous, are significantly less efficient at enriching uranium compared to their advanced counterparts.

Implications and International Response

The recent findings of the IAEA report, particularly concerning Iran’s enhanced capabilities and strategic deployment of advanced centrifuges, combined with insufficiently monitored storage facilities, present a complex challenge to international nuclear non-proliferation efforts. The international community, especially parties to the JCPOA, must reassess their strategies and enhance diplomatic and monitoring efforts to ensure compliance and prevent escalation into a potential nuclear crisis.

This situation underscores the need for a robust, transparent, and cooperative international approach to address the concerns raised in the IAEA’s latest report, ensuring that nuclear development is strictly for peaceful purposes and within the agreed frameworks of international law.

Further Developments in Iran’s Nuclear Program: Limited Progress and Enhanced Risks

The IAEA’s latest report reveals a mix of stagnation and subtle advancements in Iran’s nuclear program, with significant implications for regional stability and international nuclear non-proliferation efforts. Despite some increase in enrichment capacities, there are critical gaps in the implementation of new technologies and facilities, coupled with a strategic reduction in transparency and cooperation with international monitoring efforts.

Status of Centrifuge Cascades and Enrichment Capacity

Iran has maintained its current operations at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) without installing any additional advanced centrifuge cascades. Currently, the FFEP operates six IR-1 centrifuge cascades and two IR-6 cascades. There are plans to install up to an additional 14 IR-6 centrifuge cascades, which suggests a potential future expansion in enrichment capabilities. However, as of the latest report, these installations have not commenced.

The total operating enrichment capability of Iran is estimated at about 19,800 separative work units (SWU) per year, considering only those cascades that are actively enriching uranium. It is noteworthy that Iran has not yet utilized its fully installed enrichment capacity at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), which could reach approximately 34,500 SWU/yr if fully operational.

Low Enriched Uranium Stockpile and Usage

Iran’s stockpile of near 5 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) has grown by 178.8 kg to 2396.8 kg (U mass), or 3545.6 kg (hex mass). The production rate of near 5 percent LEU at the FEP remains consistent, with Iran continuing to use natural uranium as feedstock. Despite this increase, Iran has not prioritized stockpiling this material for peaceful purposes, such as fuel for nuclear power reactors. Instead, the stock is extensively used to produce near 20 percent and 60 percent enriched uranium, raising questions about the stated civilian intentions behind Iran’s enrichment activities.

Stalled Projects and Reduced Transparency

The IAEA report highlights a concerning delay in the commissioning of the Arak reactor, now renamed the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR), or IR-20. Despite previous expectations to commission the reactor in 2023 and begin operations in 2024, construction efforts are ongoing with no recent updates provided by Iran.

Furthermore, it has been three years since Iran ceased provisionally applying its Additional Protocol, which has significantly limited the IAEA’s ability to conduct inspections and verify Iran’s nuclear activities comprehensively. The lack of new surveillance installations and Iran’s refusal to share data or footage from monitoring devices exacerbates this issue. This stance not only restricts the IAEA’s operational capacity but also strategically manipulates the flow of information, contingent upon the lifting of sanctions.

Potential Risks and Future Uncertainties

The absence of effective monitoring and surveillance since June 2022 has led the IAEA to express concerns about its ability to verify whether Iran has diverted or may divert advanced centrifuges for undisclosed purposes. The potential accumulation of a secret stockpile of advanced centrifuges, possibly for use at clandestine enrichment facilities or during a breakout scenario, poses a significant risk. Furthermore, Iran’s demonstrated capability to covertly relocate manufacturing equipment suggests the possibility of additional, undeclared centrifuge manufacturing sites, complicating future verification efforts and adding a layer of uncertainty to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

IAEA’s Alarming Report on Iran’s Nuclear Program Developments

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) recent assessments of Iran’s nuclear program paint a troubling picture of the potential escalations and the challenges in monitoring Tehran’s nuclear activities. The report underscores several critical issues that have exacerbated the difficulties in ensuring that Iran’s nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes.

Dismantling of Surveillance and Monitoring Infrastructure

The IAEA’s report highlights a significant setback due to Iran’s decision to dismantle all agency-installed equipment that was part of the surveillance and monitoring framework under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This decision has severe repercussions for the agency’s capability to monitor Iran’s nuclear activities and, by extension, to assure the international community of their non-military nature. The loss of this surveillance infrastructure has been described as having “detrimental implications” for the verification processes that underpin international confidence in Iran’s nuclear program.

Loss of Continuity of Knowledge

A critical aspect of the IAEA’s recent findings is the reported loss of continuity of knowledge regarding essential components of Iran’s nuclear program, including the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors, bellows, heavy water, and uranium ore concentrate (UOC). This disruption poses a significant risk as it hampers the IAEA’s ability to track and verify the elements necessary for both civilian and potential military applications of nuclear technology.

Advanced Centrifuges and the Risk of Covert Enrichment

The report expresses increasing concern over Iran’s potential installation of advanced centrifuges at an undeclared site, particularly as stocks of 60 percent Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) continue to grow. The possibility that Iran could swiftly enrich this HEU to weapon-grade levels using a small number of advanced centrifuge cascades is particularly alarming. The scenario outlined by the IAEA involves the diversion of safeguarded HEU and its subsequent enrichment to weapon-grade using three or four secretly manufactured and deployed cascades of advanced centrifuges. This method raises the prospect of Iran achieving a rapid breakout capability, further complicated by uncertainties about the exact number of advanced centrifuges being produced and potentially hidden.

Figure 1. The total number of advanced centrifuges installed at all three enrichment facilities. Six cascades of IR-4 centrifuges were reportedly added at Natanz during this quarterly report. As can be seen, centrifuge installation has accelerated in the last quarter, following relatively small incremental increases for most of 2023.

Unresolved Safeguards Violations and Diminished Monitoring Capabilities

Compounding these issues is Iran’s ongoing refusal to address outstanding safeguards violations, which significantly undermines the IAEA’s ability to monitor Iran’s increasingly complex nuclear program. This refusal, coupled with the unresolved dimensions of Iran’s program that could relate to nuclear weapons development, makes it extraordinarily difficult for the IAEA to detect any diversion of nuclear materials, equipment, and capabilities to undeclared facilities. The agency’s ability to effectively monitor and verify Iran’s nuclear activities is crucial not only for regional stability but also for the integrity of global non-proliferation regimes.

Enriched Uranium Stocks at Natanz FEP (October 28, 2023 – February 9, 2024)

Parameter	Value
Duration of Reporting Period	105 days
Total UF6 Enriched	1440 kg
Enrichment Level	Up to 5% U-235
Total Uranium Mass (UF6)	973.4 kg
Average Monthly Production Rate	278.1 kg U mass
Average Daily Production Rate	9.3 kg U mass
Previous Reporting Period Averages
– Monthly Production Rate	268.5 kg U mass
– Daily Production Rate	9 kg U mass
Feed Material	Natural Uranium
Comparison with Previous Period	Slight increase in production rates
Fluorine Elements	Ignored in Total Uranium Mass calculation

Enriched Uranium Stocks at FFEP (October 28, 2023 – February 9, 2024)

Parameter	Value
Reporting Period Duration	October 28, 2023 – February 9, 2024
60% Enriched Uranium Production	23.5 kg (hex mass), 15.9 kg U mass
Daily Average Production Rate	0.15 kg (U mass)
Monthly Average Production Rate	4.5 kg (U mass)
Comparison with Previous Period	More than double
Annually (at this rate)	81.7 kg (hex mass), 55.2 kg (U mass)
20% Enriched Uranium Production	69.9 kg (hex mass), 47.3 kg U mass
Daily Average Production Rate	0.67 kg (hex mass), 0.45 kg (U mass)
Monthly Average Production Rate	20 kg (hex mass), 13.5 kg (U mass)
Annually (at this rate)	243 kg (hex mass), 164.3 kg (U mass)
Accumulated 2% Enriched Uranium	775 kg (hex mass), 523.9 kg (U mass)

Enriched Uranium Stocks at PFEP (October 28, 2023 – February 9, 2024)

Parameter	Value
Reporting Period Duration	October 28, 2023 – February 9, 2024
60% Enriched Uranium Production	13.5 kg (hex mass), 9.1 kg (U mass)
Up to 5% LEU Production	165.2 kg (hex mass), 111.7 kg (U mass)
Up to 2% Enriched Uranium Production	254.7 kg (hex mass), 172.2 kg (U mass)
60% Enriched Uranium Production Rates	Monthly: 3.9 kg (hex mass), 2.6 kg (U mass)
	Daily: 129 grams (hex mass), 87 grams (U mass)
Comparison with Previous Period	Three times higher production rate for 60% uranium
Annually (PFEP, using advanced cascades)	46.9 kg (hex mass), 31.7 kg (U mass)
Combined Production (FFEP + PFEP)	Monthly: 7.1 kg (U mass), 10.6 kg (hex mass)
	Annually: 128.6 kg (hex mass), 86.9 kg (U mass)
Mixed 60% Enriched Uranium with 2% LEU	31.8 kg (U mass) mixed, 66.4 kg (U mass) of 2% LEU
Produced Near 20% Enriched Uranium	97.9 kg (U mass)

This table provides a detailed breakdown of enriched uranium stocks at PFEP, including production rates, comparisons with previous periods, and combined production from FFEP and PFEP. It also mentions the mixing of different enriched uranium levels and the production of near 20% enriched uranium.

Enriched Uranium Stocks – Additional Estimates

Parameter	Value
Additional Amounts of LEU	361 kg (U mass)
Unspecified Enrichment Levels	31 kg up to 20% enriched uranium, 2 kg up to 60% HEU
Near 20% Enriched Uranium	31 kg (U mass)
– Fuel Assemblies and Rods	22.7 kg (U mass)
– Targets	2.8 kg
– Reactor Core Loading	1.5 kg (removed from stockpile, unclear purpose)
Near 5% LEU Stock Feeding	912.1 kg hex mass (616.6 kg U mass)
Feed Rates	Fordow: 8.7 kg per day hex mass, 5.9 kg U mass
– Increase in Feed Rate	About one third more than previous period
Dumped Feed at FFEP	5.2 kg hex mass (3.5 kg U mass)
Feed into PFEP R&D Lines	433.4 kg hex mass (293 kg U mass)
– Daily Average Feed Rate	4.1 kg hex mass, 2.8 kg U mass per day
Stockpile Calculation	Last period: 2218.1 kg U mass, FEP: 973.4 kg, PFEP: 111.7 kg
– Feed Subtracted	909.6 kg U mass
– Dumped Feed Added Back	3.5 kg U mass
Total New Stockpile (Estimated)	2397.1 kg U mass
IAEA Reported Stockpile	2396.8 kg U mass (near 5% LEU in UF6 form)

Enriched Uranium Stocks Overview

Parameter	Value
Net Overall Enriched Uranium Stock (U mass)	Increased by 1038.7 kg from 4486.8 kg to 5525.5 kg
Near 2% LEU Stock (UF6) Increase	716.8 kg (U mass)
Near 5% LEU Stock (UF6) Increase	178.7 kg (U mass)
Near 20% Enriched Uranium Stock Increase	145.1 kg (U mass) from 567.1 kg to 712.2 kg
Near 60% Enriched Uranium Stock Decrease	6.8 kg (U mass) from 128.3 kg to 121.5 kg

PFEP Operations (October 28, 2023 – February 9, 2024)

Parameter	Value
Feed into Lines 4 and 6 (5% LEU)	433.4 kg (hex mass)
Conversion to 60% Enriched Uranium	13.5 kg (hex mass), 3.1% of feed
Conversion back to 5% Enriched Uranium	165.5 kg (hex mass), 38% of feed
Tails Enriched up to 2%	254.7 kg (hex mass), 59% of feed

This table provides a detailed overview of the enriched uranium stocks, including changes in stock levels and operations at PFEP during the specified reporting period. It breaks down the increases and decreases in different levels of enriched uranium and highlights the operations and conversion rates at PFEP.

Table 1. Enriched Uranium Inventories,* including less than 5%, up to 20%, and up to 60% enriched uranium (all quantities in uranium mass)
Chemical Form	February 12, 2023	May 13, 2023	August 18, 2023	October 28, 2023	February 10, 2024
UF6 (kg)	3402	4384.8	3441.3	4130.7	5164.5
Uranium oxides and their intermediate products (kg)	215.3	207.5	206.9	205.6	203.6
Uranium in fuel assemblies, rods, and targets (kg)	58.4	59.5	54	54.1	52.6
Uranium in liquid and solid scrap (kg)	85.1	92.7	93.37	96.4	104.8
Enrichment Level Subtotals
Uranium enriched up to 5 percent (kg) but more than 2 percent	1324.5	1340.2	1950.9	2218.1	2396.8
Uranium enriched up to 2 percent (kg)	1555.3	2459.6	833	1217.2	1934
Uranium enriched up to 20 percent (kg)	434.7	470.9	535.8	567.1	712.2
Uranium enriched up to 60 percent (kg)	87.5	114.1	121.6	128.3	121.5
Uranium in chemical forms other than UF6 with unspecified enrichment level (kg) (including 31 kg up to 20% LEU and 2 kg up to 60% HEU)	358.8	359.7	354.4	356.1	361
Totals of Enriched Uranium in UF6, <5 % (kg)	2879.8	3799.8	2783.9	3435.3	4330.8
Totals of Enriched Uranium in UF6, including near 20% and near 60% (kg)	3402	4384.8	3441.3	4130.7	5164.5
Totals of Enriched Uranium in all chemical forms, <5% <20% and <60% enriched	3760.8	4744.5	3795.6	4486.8	5525.5

Enrichment Capacity

Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)

As of February 24, 2024, the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) in Iran has installed a significant number of centrifuges across various models, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports. Here’s a detailed breakdown of the current situation regarding Iran’s enrichment capacity at the Natanz FEP:

Installed Centrifuges:

• IR-1 centrifuges: 36 cascades are installed.
• IR-2m centrifuges: 21 cascades are installed.
• IR-4 centrifuges: There has been a significant increase from six cascades during the previous reporting period to 12 cascades.
• IR-6 centrifuges: Three cascades are installed.
• The total number of advanced centrifuges installed at the FEP is approximately 6264, of which 3654 are IR-2m centrifuges.

Enriching Centrifuges:

• IR-1 centrifuges: 36 cascades are actively enriching.
• IR-2m centrifuges: Nine cascades are enriching.
• IR-4 centrifuges: Three cascades are enriching.
• IR-6 centrifuges: Three cascades are enriching.
• It’s noted that the overall capacity of the centrifuges currently enriching is significantly lower than those installed, with several cascades installed but not active in enrichment processes.

Challenges and Observations:

• Data Accessibility: Since February 2021, Iran has restricted IAEA’s access to data and recordings from monitoring equipment, particularly concerning the IR-1 centrifuges which are believed to be sourced from dismantled stocks rather than newly manufactured units.
• Manufacturing Queries: The rapid deployment of IR-4 and the status of the IR-2m centrifuges installed between September 2022 and February 2023 raise questions about whether these units were newly produced or drawn from hidden stockpiles. The installation rate suggests a potential pre-manufacture before the JCPOA’s implementation day in 2016, which Iran had not declared.

Future Expansion:

• Iran has plans to commission up to eight enrichment units in Building B1000 at Natanz, which would replicate the design of Building A1000 with each unit capable of holding 18 cascades. However, specifics regarding the number and types of centrifuges to be installed remain unspecified.

Monitoring and Compliance Issues:

• The IAEA has noted difficulties in monitoring due to Iran’s decision in June 2022 to remove all JCPOA-related monitoring and surveillance equipment, which severely impacts the IAEA’s ability to verify activities and maintain continuity of knowledge regarding Iran’s nuclear program.

Violation of International Agreements:

• Iran has been noted to violate the Modified Code 3.1, which requires early notification of new nuclear facilities, by not providing timely information on construction activities, such as the new IR-360 reactor.

This overview highlights the dynamic and complex nature of monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities, particularly with the fluctuating compliance and operational statuses at the Natanz FEP​

The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)

The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) in Iran has maintained a consistent setup of centrifuges, with no new installations beyond what was previously reported. Here’s an overview of the current centrifuge deployment and enrichment activities at the FFEP:

Centrifuge Configuration:

• IR-1 Centrifuges: 1044 IR-1 centrifuges are installed across three sets of two interconnected cascades.
• IR-6 Centrifuges: Two interconnected cascades consisting of 166 IR-6 centrifuges are operational.

Enrichment Activities:

• The interconnected IR-1 cascades are employed for producing 20 percent enriched uranium from up to 5 percent Low Enriched Uranium (LEU).
• The interconnected IR-6 cascades are being used for the production of High Enriched Uranium (HEU), specifically targeting enrichment levels up to 60 percent from a 5 percent LEU feed.

Significant Developments in HEU Production:

• Production Start: On November 22, 2022, Iran began using the two IR-6 cascades to produce uranium hexafluoride (UF6) enriched up to 60 percent.
• Operational Adjustments: Initially, these cascades operated as one set without modified sub-headers for the last stage of enrichment. However, changes were noted in January 2023 following an unannounced inspection, when Iran briefly used a modified operation setup, then reverted back in summer 2023, and resumed the modified setup again in December 2023.

Infrastructure Developments:

• Despite plans to install up to 14 additional cascades, no new IR-6 or IR-1 centrifuges have been installed. Infrastructure preparations for eight new cascades were ongoing as of the latest reports.

Compliance and Monitoring Challenges:

• Iran’s operational changes and the level of HEU production have raised concerns regarding compliance with international agreements and the potential for achieving enrichment levels closer to weapons-grade uranium (which typically exceeds 90 percent U-235).

The stability in centrifuge numbers at FFEP contrasts with the dynamic nature of operational strategies and the potential implications of the high enrichment levels being targeted. These developments are critical in the context of international monitoring and the broader geopolitical tensions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.

The Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) at Natanz is undergoing significant changes as Iran expands its research and development activities into a new underground section of Building A1000. This new area aims to further enhance Iran’s capabilities in uranium enrichment using advanced centrifuges. Here’s a detailed breakdown of the current status and activities at the PFEP:

New Underground PFEP

• Infrastructure: Iran has begun transferring its enrichment R&D to a segregated area of Building A1000, where they plan to set up six of the 18 R&D lines (A-F). This area could potentially hold up to 174 IR-4 or IR-6 centrifuges in various configurations.
• Centrifuge Installation: As of January 23, 2024, centrifuges have been installed in three of the lines:
  • Line A: 20 IR-4 centrifuges
  • Line B: 20 IR-6 centrifuges
  • Line C: 20 IR-6 centrifuges
• Enrichment: The declared purpose is to accumulate enriched uranium product up to 5 percent LEU from these activities.

60 Percent HEU Production:

• Operational Lines: Lines 4, 5, and 6 at the PFEP are crucial for the production of 60 percent enriched uranium.
• Configuration and Output:
  • Lines 4 and 6 are interconnected, using IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges, respectively, to enrich up to 60 percent HEU from up to 5 percent LEU.
  • Line 5 is used to re-enrich tails from lines 4 and 6 to near 5 percent LEU, helping optimize the use of materials and reduce waste.

Production Capability:

• The estimated production-scale enrichment output for the IR-4 and IR-6 cascades in lines 4 and 6 is about 600 Separative Work Units (SWU) per year each. When combined, these lines have an estimated output of 1200 SWU per year, equivalent to about 1330 IR-1 centrifuges.

Other Lines:

• Line 1: Engaged in producing uranium enriched up to 2 percent U-235 using a cascade of 18 IR-1 centrifuges and 94 IR-2m centrifuges.
• Lines 2 and 3: These lines continue to accumulate uranium enriched up to 2 percent, utilizing a mixture of centrifuge types in small to intermediate cascades.

Testing and Verification:

• Various other single centrifuges across the spectrum of IR models are being tested with natural UF6 but are not currently accumulating enriched uranium.

These developments at the PFEP represent a significant expansion of Iran’s enrichment capabilities and indicate a potential readiness for increased production or a rapid breakout capacity if required. The focus on advanced centrifuge models like the IR-4 and IR-6 in research, development, and production roles underscores the technical advancements Iran is pursuing in its nuclear program.

Capacity of Centrifuges Enriching Uranium

Current Enrichment Capacity:

• The total operational enrichment capacity of centrifuges that are actively enriching uranium is estimated at 19,830 Separative Work Units (SWU) per year. This figure represents the equivalent of approximately 22,030 IR-1 centrifuges.

Potential Enrichment Capacity:

• If the installed but not yet enriching centrifuges were included, the enrichment capacity would significantly increase by 74 percent, reaching approximately 34,500 SWU per year. This highlights a substantial reserve capacity that could be activated.

Advanced Centrifuge Cascades:

• Iran has 15 additional advanced centrifuge cascades installed at its facilities, which are not currently used for enriching uranium as per the latest reporting period. This unused capacity could play a critical role in future enrichment plans or emergencies.

Breakout Calculations:

• For the purpose of breakout calculations—estimating how quickly a country could produce weapons-grade uranium (WGU)—the figures consider the currently installed centrifuges. However, it excludes many of the advanced centrifuges in the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), except those that are part of production-scale cascades. This exclusion is based on the assessment that these advanced centrifuges would not contribute significantly to the rapid production of sufficient WGU for a nuclear explosive, especially when starting with uranium enriched to up to 5 percent or near 20 percent levels.

This differentiation in capacities indicates a layered strategy in Iran’s enrichment approach, maintaining a significant latent capability while also preparing for potential rapid scale-ups in enriched uranium production. This strategic reserve of enrichment capacity, not currently utilized but readily available, underscores the complexities and challenges in monitoring and managing nuclear proliferation risks.

Table 2. Quantity of enriching centrifuges and enrichment capacity
	Number of enriching centrifuges	Enrichment capacity in SWU/yr
			IR-1 equivalent
Natanz FEP	8780	15,1	16,79
Fordow	1376	2140	2370
Natanz Above-Ground PFEP*	703	2590	2870
Lines 1, 2 & 3	See text
Lines 4, 5 & 6	See text
Natanz Below-Ground PFEP
	N/A (not enriching yet)	–	–
Total	10,8595	19,83	22,03

Practicing Breakout by Producing Highly Enriched Uranium: An In-Depth Analysis of Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions and Capabilities

Iran’s nuclear program has long been a focal point of global security concerns, given its potential to alter the balance of power in the Middle East and beyond. This article delves into the critical aspects of Iran’s uranium enrichment activities, particularly its production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) at levels significantly closer to weapons-grade uranium (WGU).

Iran’s Enrichment to 60 Percent HEU: Current Status and Implications

During recent monitoring periods, Iran has continued to produce uranium enriched to 60 percent, a level that is not only unprecedented outside of weapons programs but also significantly reduces the technical barriers to achieving weapon-grade material. This level of enrichment has allowed Iran to accumulate over three significant quantities of HEU, a technical term used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to denote a quantity of nuclear material that could potentially be used to produce a nuclear explosive device.

The significance of this development cannot be overstated. Approximately 40 kilograms of uranium mass enriched to this level is sufficient to produce a nuclear device, according to standards set by various nuclear watchdogs. This is a stark contrast to the 25 kilograms of 90 percent enriched uranium traditionally recognized as a sufficient quantity for the same purpose.

Technical Aspects and Historical Context

The enrichment process Iran employs follows a trajectory reminiscent of the A.Q. Khan network’s method, which was instrumental in the proliferation of nuclear technology several decades ago. The A.Q. Khan method involves a stepwise increase in uranium enrichment: starting from natural uranium enriched to 4-5 percent, then to 20 percent, followed by 60 percent, and ultimately reaching 90 percent. Iran’s approach, however, has shown a potential streamlining of this process. Reports indicate that Iran has experimented with jumping directly from 5 percent to 60 percent enriched uranium, bypassing intermediate steps and thus expediting the enrichment process.

Moreover, Iran has innovated in the physical handling of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the gaseous form of uranium used in the enrichment process. Traditionally, UF6 gas must be solidified and then re-gasified at each step of the enrichment process. Recent activities suggest that Iran is testing methods to transfer UF6 gas directly between centrifuges at different stages, potentially increasing the efficiency of the enrichment process.

Covert Operations and International Oversight

In November 2021, the IAEA reported unusual activities at Iran’s Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), where Iran fed a significant amount of its near 20 percent enriched uranium into advanced centrifuges. The report indicated that Iran was not accumulating enriched uranium at expected levels, suggesting a possible diversion of the material to undisclosed activities. These activities might include reaching enrichment levels up to 90 percent, or weapon-grade, although this was not explicitly detailed in the reports due to the covert nature of the operations.

Strategic Implications and Global Response

The ability of Iran to enrich uranium to 60 percent and possibly higher presents a significant challenge to non-proliferation efforts globally. It reduces the ‘breakout time’—the time required for a country to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. This development has prompted a renewed international focus on Iran’s nuclear intentions and capabilities, with major powers evaluating their strategic options in response.

Undoing the knowledge and technological advancements Iran has achieved in nuclear enrichment is virtually impossible. This poses a dilemma for international diplomacy and necessitates a robust, nuanced, and proactive approach to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program does not escalate into a military one.

Iran’s continued enrichment of uranium to 60 percent and its experimentation with advanced centrifuge operations mark a significant phase in its nuclear program. These developments not only highlight the technical advancements within Iran’s nuclear infrastructure but also underscore the urgent need for effective international oversight and engagement. As Iran edges closer to the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, the international community must respond with a balanced approach that addresses not only the nuclear risks but also the underlying political tensions that fuel this nuclear ambition.

Transfer of 20 Percent Enriched Uranium and 60 Percent HEU from Natanz to Esfahan: Monitoring and Implications

Iran’s nuclear program continues to raise significant concerns among international observers and policymakers, particularly regarding the management and transfer of enriched uranium. This article examines the transfer of 20 percent enriched uranium and 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the Natanz and Fordow facilities to the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) in Esfahan, a key component in Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

Historical and Recent Transfers

Historically, Iran has transferred enriched uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride to the FPFP in Esfahan, ostensibly for the production of HEU targets for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). These transfers have been documented in various International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports. However, recent reports from the IAEA have notably omitted details on any additional transfers or the current status of existing stocks of near 20 percent and 60 percent enriched uranium at Esfahan. The lack of information or clarification on why these details have been omitted raises concerns about transparency and compliance.

Transfer Details and IAEA Verifications

The IAEA’s detailed verification of enriched uranium transfers provides critical data points:

• In January 2022, 23.3 kg (U mass) of 60 percent enriched uranium was transferred to the FPFP.
• By October 2022, a total of 53 kg (U mass) of 60 percent HEU was verified at the FPFP storage area.
• In 2023, several significant transfers occurred, with the IAEA verifying 100.52 kg of 60 percent enriched uranium at the FPFP by August.

The FPFP also received a substantial amount of 20 percent enriched uranium, with a total of 454.64 kg verified by May 2023. The management and storage of these significant quantities of enriched uranium underscore the critical importance of robust monitoring mechanisms.

Safeguards and Security Concerns

The storage of large quantities of proliferation-sensitive material at the FPFP necessitates enhanced IAEA safeguards to detect and prevent any diversion to secret enrichment activities. Effective safeguards would include stepped-up inspector visits, more frequent inventory verifications, and continuous camera surveillance. Despite these needs, the recent lack of detailed reporting by the IAEA on the implementation of such safeguards at the FPFP is a glaring omission that must be addressed to ensure compliance with international standards.

Policy Implications and JCPOA Violations

The presence of these enriched uranium stocks at Esfahan, particularly the stocks of 60 percent enriched uranium, constitutes a violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Under the terms of the JCPOA, Iran agreed to limit its stockpile of enriched uranium to 300 kg of up to 3.67 percent enriched uranium and to not enrich uranium above this level. The substantial quantities of 20 and 60 percent enriched uranium at the FPFP not only breach these stipulations but also pose a significant challenge to the non-proliferation regime.

The ongoing transfer and storage of enriched uranium at Iran’s FPFP highlights several critical issues concerning nuclear non-proliferation and transparency. The international community, particularly the IAEA, must ensure that Iran adheres to its commitments under the JCPOA and other international agreements. Vigilant monitoring, comprehensive reporting, and robust safeguards are essential to prevent the diversion of these materials to potentially covert nuclear weapons development programs. As the situation develops, it remains imperative for global powers to address these challenges through diplomatic channels and ensure that Iran’s nuclear program remains strictly for peaceful purposes.

Current Breakout Estimates: An Overview of Iran’s Rapid Enrichment Capabilities

Iran’s nuclear program has reached a critical phase, particularly in terms of its capability to rapidly produce weapon-grade uranium (WGU). This article explores the current state of Iran’s centrifuge installations, its stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and the implications these developments hold for Iran’s potential nuclear breakout.

Expansion of Centrifuge Capabilities

During the latest reporting period, Iran has significantly increased its centrifuge capacity, with the installation of approximately 1000 IR-4 centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). This expansion is notable because it enhances Iran’s ability to enrich uranium at higher efficiencies. The IR-4 centrifuge, more advanced than its predecessors, allows for quicker enrichment, meaning that Iran can produce weapon-grade uranium at a faster rate.

Surveillance and Monitoring Challenges

A significant concern is that Iran no longer permits the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor its manufacture and assembly of advanced centrifuges. This restriction severely limits the IAEA’s ability to ascertain the full scale of Iran’s centrifuge capabilities and potentially allows Iran to stockpile advanced centrifuges covertly. This lack of transparency is alarming as it impedes the international community’s ability to monitor Iran’s enrichment activities accurately.

Breakout Timeline and Enrichment Potential

Iran’s formal nuclear breakout timeline is assessed to be at zero. With its current stock of 60 percent enriched uranium, Iran has enough HEU to potentially create three nuclear explosives. The ability to quickly enrich this 60 percent HEU to WGU is particularly troubling. Using advanced centrifuge cascades already installed at the PFEP and FFEP, Iran could enrich its 60 percent HEU to 90 percent weapon-grade uranium within a matter of weeks.

Depending on the tails assay chosen—either 5 percent or 20 percent enriched uranium—Iran could use different strategies to optimize its output of WGU. For instance, with a 20 percent tails assay, Iran could produce about 70 kg of WGU in three weeks, and about 80 kg with a 5 percent tails assay. In a scenario prioritizing speed, Iran could produce the first 25 kg of WGU necessary for a weapon in approximately seven days.

Cumulative Weapon Potential

Over a period of one month, using its combined stocks of 20 percent and 60 percent enriched uranium, Iran is estimated to be capable of producing enough WGU for up to seven nuclear weapons. This capacity increases with each passing month, with potential outputs of nine nuclear weapons in two months, 11 in three months, and up to 13 by the fifth month.

Strategic and Security Implications

These capabilities represent a significant escalation in Iran’s potential nuclear threat. The rapidity with which Iran could potentially achieve a nuclear arsenal poses a formidable challenge to global security and non-proliferation efforts. Moreover, the historical context of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, particularly the cessation and subsequent camouflage of its Amad Plan in 2003, underlines the strategic foresight behind Iran’s current nuclear posture.

Iran’s enhanced centrifuge installations and its stockpile of HEU place it in a position to potentially conduct a rapid nuclear breakout. This situation necessitates a robust and coordinated international response to ensure transparency, compliance with international agreements, and to deter Iran from transitioning to weapon-grade uranium production. The international community must prioritize diplomatic, technological, and strategic measures to monitor and mitigate this significant nuclear risk.

Enriched Uranium Metal Production Remains Halted, Nuclear Material Discrepancy at Uranium Conversion Facility

The international community remains on high alert regarding Iran’s nuclear capabilities, particularly with respect to the production of uranium metal, a material essential for nuclear weapons. This analysis provides an in-depth look at Iran’s activities surrounding uranium metal production and the associated nuclear material discrepancies observed at its facilities.

Halt in Uranium Metal Production

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports spanning the last nine reporting periods, Iran has not resumed the production of uranium metal at its Esfahan Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP). Despite this, the capability to produce uranium metal at the facility remains intact. This capability raises concerns due to the potential dual-use nature of uranium metal, particularly when enriched.

Background and Concerns

Iran’s announcement in December 2020 about its intention to begin producing uranium metal, including versions enriched up to 20 percent, sparked considerable alarm among international observers. This concern is magnified by the lack of a clear civilian need for such uranium metal, suggesting that the development may serve to bolster Iran’s nuclear weapons capabilities. Historically, under the Amad Plan prior to 2003, Iran was actively engaged in constructing facilities for uranium metallurgy and experimenting with surrogate materials for weapon-grade uranium (WGU).

Recent Developments in Uranium Metal Production

On February 2, 2021, Iran commenced the production of uranium metal using natural uranium in laboratory experiments at the Esfahan FPFP. This development progressed to the production of enriched uranium metal from 20 percent enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF6). By August 2021, the IAEA verified the production of 200 grams of enriched uranium metal, which was later formed into 430 grams of uranium silicide for potential use in silicide fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR).

Despite these developments, there have been no new introductions of silicide fuel elements into the TRR since May 2023, suggesting a pause or a shift in focus in Iran’s uranium metal production activities.

Stalled Installations and Equipment Readiness

The IAEA reports highlight that while equipment installation for converting enriched UF6 to uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) at the FPFP was nearly complete as of early 2022, the facility has not yet been tested with nuclear material. This delay extends to the nearby Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan, where, despite readiness to operate with depleted or natural uranium as of early 2024, no nuclear material has been introduced for production.

Implications for Nuclear Nonproliferation

The apparent readiness of facilities to produce uranium metal, combined with the lack of ongoing production, presents a complex scenario for international monitoring bodies. The capability to quickly resume production, especially of enriched uranium metal, could significantly shorten Iran’s breakout time to a nuclear weapon if decision-makers in Tehran choose to pursue that route.

Iran’s uranium metal production capabilities, combined with the discrepancies and delays in operational testing at key facilities, underscore the critical need for continued vigilance and robust monitoring by the IAEA. As the situation evolves, it is imperative for the international community to maintain pressure on Iran to adhere to its nuclear nonproliferation commitments and to ensure transparency in its nuclear activities. The dual-use nature of uranium metal and the potential for rapid shifts in Iran’s nuclear strategy necessitate a proactive approach to prevent any escalation toward nuclear weaponization.

Heavy Water and Khondab (Arak) Reactor: Developments and Monitoring Challenges

Iran’s nuclear activities extend beyond uranium enrichment to include significant developments in heavy water production and reactor construction. This article provides an overview of the recent status of Iran’s Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) and the Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR), highlighting the challenges faced in monitoring and the potential implications for nuclear proliferation.

Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP)

Since February 2021, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported significant reductions in its monitoring capabilities at Iran’s HWPP. The situation deteriorated further in June 2022, when Iran removed the Flow-rate Unattended Monitoring (FLUM) equipment, effectively ending the IAEA’s direct oversight of the facility. This lack of monitoring capability has raised concerns about the undisclosed production and inventory of heavy water in Iran, which is crucial for certain types of nuclear reactors that can produce plutonium suitable for weapons.

Despite these challenges, the IAEA has utilized commercial satellite imagery to assess the operation of the HWPP. Its February 2024 report included an assessment that the plant continued to operate throughout the reporting period. However, without direct monitoring tools, the exact scale of production and the current inventory of heavy water remain uncertain.

Khondab Heavy Water Research Reactor (KHRR)

The KHRR, formerly known as the Arak reactor or IR-40, has been a focal point of international negotiations due to its potential to produce plutonium. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran agreed to redesign the reactor to limit its plutonium production capability. Recent developments, as reported by the IAEA in February 2024, indicate that civil construction work is ongoing on all floors of the reactor.

In May 2023, Iran provided an updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the KHRR, confirming that the reactor’s power, fuel enrichment, and core design align with the JCPOA’s requirements. These developments suggest progress in reorienting the reactor towards research purposes and reducing its potential for weapons-grade plutonium production.

Project Delays and Communication Gaps

Despite the progress in redesigning the reactor, there have been no significant updates since the IAEA’s previous report. Iran had initially informed the IAEA of its plans to commission the reactor and the primary circuit in 2023 using dummy IR-20 fuel assemblies, with operational start expected in 2024. However, no formal updates have been communicated to the IAEA regarding these plans, leading to uncertainties about the timeline and the current status of the reactor’s commissioning.

Implications for Non-Proliferation

The lack of transparency and reduced IAEA monitoring at key nuclear facilities in Iran poses significant challenges for the international community’s efforts to ensure the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. The ongoing operation of the HWPP and the construction of the KHRR without comprehensive international oversight could enable Iran to advance its nuclear capabilities in ways that might contravene its international commitments.

The developments at Iran’s HWPP and KHRR underscore the complexities of monitoring and verifying nuclear activities in the country. The international community, particularly the IAEA, must continue to seek ways to restore robust monitoring mechanisms and ensure transparency. Meanwhile, diplomatic efforts must be intensified to bring Iran back into full compliance with its international nuclear obligations to prevent any potential proliferation risks.

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Resource :

• https://crsreports.congress.gov
• https://www.armscontrol.org
• https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/nuclear-agreement-%E2%80%93-jcpoa_en
• https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-on-iranian-nuclear- steps-reported-by-the-iaea?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications-topic&utm_source=2f47a885- 843f-4f0e-b89d-7c0e6285e3cc&utm_content=immediately.
• https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/shahid-mahallati-temporary-plant-for-manufacturing-nuclear-weapon- cores/8.

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