On a day marked by military rigour and strategic demonstration, North Korea engaged in a significant military exercise that captured global attention. This exercise, carried out on Monday, involved the firing of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and was publicized by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). Notably, this operation featured the deployment of “super-large multiple rocket units” and marked the inaugural use of North Korea’s newly developed Haekbangashoe nuclear weapon combined management system.
This exercise transcends the routine boundaries of military drills, representing a calculated showcase of North Korea’s enhanced military capabilities, especially its nuclear arsenal. It stands as a powerful reminder of the heightened tensions within the region, tensions that are increasingly becoming a focal point of international concern.
The presence of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the drills underscores the importance of this event. Under his guidance, the exercise utilized 600 mm “super-large” multiple rocket launchers in a simulated nuclear counterattack. This development is particularly significant as it signals a robust enhancement in North Korea’s military and strategic capabilities amidst ongoing regional tensions.
The KCNA report from Tuesday sheds light on the objectives of these exercises. The drills were specifically designed to demonstrate the reliability, superiority, and expanded capabilities of North Korea’s nuclear forces. The aim, as stated by KCNA, was to bolster these forces “both in quality and quantity,” which serves as a stark warning to North Korea’s perceived adversaries amidst what it views as aggressive military posturing by other nations.
At the core of these exercises were the “super-large” multiple rocket launchers, highlighted as key elements in boosting the prompt counterattack capacity of the nation’s nuclear forces. These launchers, integral to the “Haekbangashoe” strategy, are crucial for the management of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, representing a critical step in the nation’s ongoing military evolution.
This strategic demonstration by North Korea is not just a show of military strength but a clear message to the international community about its growing capabilities and its readiness to defend its sovereignty against perceived threats. As tensions continue to escalate in the region, the global community remains watchful of North Korea’s next moves in this complex geopolitical chess game.

Image : North Korean short-range ballistic missile launch on April 22, 2024. KCNA Photo
Date | Event Description | Involved Parties | Event Type | Range/Location of Event | International Responses |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
April 12, 2024 | Start of Korea Flying Training 2024 (KFT 24) at Kunsan Air Base. | U.S. Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, ROK Air Force | Joint Military Training Exercise | Kunsan Air Base | None explicitly mentioned, but part of routine training schedule. |
April 24, 2024 | North Korea conducts a firing drill using short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) from “super-large multiple rocket units.” Drill marks the first use of Haekbangashoe nuclear weapon combined management system. | North Korea | Military Drill with SRBMs | 352 km range, hitting an island target | South Korea, U.S., and Japan monitor and condemn the launch. |
April 24, 2024 | U.S. and South Korea Special Operations Forces stage a joint airborne infiltration drill. | U.S. and South Korea SOFs | Airborne Infiltration Drill | Not specified | Aimed at enhancing rapid infiltration capabilities in response to potential regional threats. |
April 26, 2024 | End of the joint formation drill at Kunsan Air Base. | U.S. and South Korea | Joint Military Training Exercise | Kunsan Air Base | Aimed at North Korea, described by North Korea as inciting war fever. |
April 24, 2024 | North Korea’s Missile Administration conducts a power test of a super-large warhead for Hwasal-1 Ra-3 strategic cruise missile and a test launch of Pyoljji-1-2 new-type antiaircraft missile. | North Korea | Weapon Testing | West Sea of Korea | Part of regular activities for the rapid development of military technologies, not directly linked to surrounding geopolitical situation. |
April 24, 2024 | South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff track several projectiles, believed to be SRBMs, fired from Pyongyang towards the East Sea. | South Korea, U.S., Japan (monitoring) | Missile Launch Monitoring | Fired from Pyongyang, traveled 300 km | South Korea and U.S. condemn the launch; Japan condemns and notes violation of Security Council resolutions. |
April 24, 2024 | U.S. Indo-Pacific Command reacts to the ballistic missile launch. | U.S. | Official Statement | Not applicable | Reaffirms U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea and Japan, consulting closely with allies. |
April 24, 2024 | Japan’s Ministry of Defense notes North Korea launched at least one ballistic missile northeast from its interior, estimating the missile’s maximum altitude and distance. | Japan | Missile Launch Monitoring | Flew more than 250 km, fell near east coast | Japan strongly protests and condemns the launch, highlighting threats to regional and international peace and security. |
This table provides a structured overview of the series of military activities and responses surrounding the tensions on the Korean Peninsula, capturing the essential details and the geopolitical context of each event.
Background and Context of the Drill
The drill was personally overseen by the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, highlighting its importance to Pyongyang’s strategic military objectives. According to KCNA, the primary aim of the exercise was to “demonstrate the reliability, superiority, might and diverse means of the DPRK’s nuclear force and to strengthen the nuclear force both in quality and quantity as a clear warning signal to the enemies.” This language underscores North Korea’s continued commitment to expanding its nuclear capabilities as a cornerstone of its national defense strategy.
Moreover, the timing of North Korea’s military actions appears to be a direct response to the ongoing military activities by the United States and South Korea. Since April 12, the U.S. and South Korea have been conducting the Korea Flying Training 2024 (KFT 24) at Kunsan Air Base. This training includes an average of 100 sorties a day, which KCNA claims are provocations aimed directly at North Korea. Such assertions by North Korea feed into its narrative of being threatened by external forces, thereby justifying its own military escalations.
Details of the North Korean Military Drill
During the drill, North Korea assessed the effectiveness of its command, management, control, and operation systems under the new Haekbangashoe framework. This included a salvo firing of rockets that successfully struck an island target located 352 km away. The operation was intended to verify the quick responsiveness and accuracy of the nuclear force in a simulated counterattack scenario. Images released by KCNA showed four launch vehicles conducting the salvo firing, visually reinforcing the message of military readiness and technological advancement.
Kim Jong Un emphasized that the exercise was crucial for preparing North Korea’s nuclear forces to rapidly and effectively execute their deterrence and war-initiating missions in any sudden scenario. This rhetoric reflects a strategic posture aimed at maintaining a high level of readiness and projecting strength, both domestically and internationally.

Image : Kim Jong Un observers North Korean short-range ballistic missile launch on April 22, 2024. KCNA Photo
Regional Reactions and Implications
The regional response was swift. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff reported monitoring the missile launches, which they tracked from Pyongyang toward the East Sea, traveling approximately 300 km. They condemned the launches, stating that such actions “gravely threaten the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.” This was accompanied by assurances of continued vigilance and readiness to respond to any provocations, emphasizing the robust nature of the U.S.-ROK defense alliance.
The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command also acknowledged the missile launches, reinforcing the United States’ unwavering commitment to the defense of South Korea and Japan. This statement is part of a consistent U.S. policy stance aimed at deterring North Korean aggression and reassuring regional allies of American military support.
Furthermore, Japan’s Ministry of Defense noted that the missile launches included at least one ballistic missile that flew over 250 km. Japan expressed strong condemnation, viewing these actions as threats to regional peace, security, and a violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. Japan’s strong response underscores the broader implications of North Korea’s military activities, highlighting the potential for escalating tensions not just on the Korean Peninsula, but across the wider Northeast Asian region.
North Korea Escalates Missile Testing: A Deep Dive into the Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile Pulhwasal-3-31
A New Phase in North Korea’s Military Strategy
In the dawn hours of Sunday, January 28, 2024, amid the watchful gaze of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and a group of senior officials, North Korea conducted a test launch of its cutting-edge military technology— the submarine-launched cruise missile Pulhwasal-3-31. This event, reported by the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on the following Monday, marks a significant step in North Korea’s ongoing military modernization aimed at bolstering its naval capabilities. The launch took place over the Sea of Japan, also known as the East Sea, and targeted a remote island, showcasing the missile’s precision and range capabilities.

Image: The North Korean submarine-launched cruise missile Pulhwasal-3-31. KCNA Photo
The Opaque Details of the Launch
The exact details surrounding the launch remain shrouded in mystery. KCNA’s report did not specify the launch platform nor the location, aside from a brief mention of launch smoke obscuring the firing point. This has led to speculation among international observers and analysts about the operational status of the launch vehicle, believed to be the No. 841 Hero Kim Kun Ok — North Korea’s first operational tactical nuclear-attack submarine. Introduced in September of the previous year, this submarine, a modified Romeo-class vessel, is thought to be capable of launching both ballistic and cruise missiles. However, expert analysis remains divided regarding its full operational readiness and capabilities.
Historical Context and International Implications
This isn’t the first time North Korea has tested the Pulhwasal-3-31 missile. Earlier in the same week, initial tests were conducted from a surface platform into the sea. These actions highlight a nuanced approach to North Korea’s defiance of various United Nations resolutions, which ban ballistic missiles but not cruise missiles — the latter of which can also be equipped with nuclear warheads.
The response from South Korea was measured, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff merely confirming the detection of several cruise missiles near Sinpo, a major hub for North Korea’s defense and submarine-building industries. The statement emphasized ongoing surveillance and coordination with U.S. forces, reflecting the regional tensions stirred by such military activities.
Kim Jong Un’s Strategic Military Vision
Further reports from KCNA revealed that Kim Jong Un expressed satisfaction with the missile tests, viewing them as essential for the protection of North Korea’s maritime sovereignty in light of current and future security challenges. The test was declared non-threatening to neighboring countries and unrelated to the broader regional tensions. Following the successful launch, Kim Jong Un was briefed about ongoing projects, including the development of a nuclear-powered submarine, underscoring his commitment to expanding North Korea’s naval warfare capabilities.
Parallel Naval Movements in the Region
The regional military landscape during this period was also marked by the movements of Russian naval forces. The Russian cruiser RFS Varyag and destroyer RFS Marshal Shaposhnikov were observed navigating the Philippine Sea, having transited the East China Sea. These movements were closely monitored by Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force, indicating heightened military alertness in the region. Russian naval activities also included commemorative ceremonies and joint air-defense drills, reflecting a show of strength and cooperation within the Asia Pacific waters.
Meanwhile, the United States Navy reported the redeployment of the cruiser USS Antietam from Yokosuka Naval Base to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. This move is part of a strategic realignment of U.S. naval forces in the Pacific, highlighting ongoing adjustments in response to regional security dynamics.
The latest developments in North Korea’s missile program and the strategic maneuvers of neighboring naval forces paint a complex picture of the current military and security landscape in East Asia. North Korea’s advancements in submarine-launched missile technology, particularly the Pulhwasal-3-31, not only enhance its strategic deterrence capabilities but also complicate the regional security calculus. With the international community watching closely, the implications of these tests extend far beyond the Korean Peninsula, influencing geopolitical stability across the wider region.
In conclusion, North Korea’s latest military drills serve as a reminder of the ongoing security challenges on the Korean Peninsula. Each missile launch and military exercise by North Korea not only enhances its own strategic capabilities but also influences the geopolitical dynamics of Northeast Asia. As regional powers and the international community continue to grapple with North Korea’s actions, the situation remains fraught with potential for further escalation, necessitating careful diplomatic and military responses to maintain stability and prevent conflict.
APPENDIX 1 – NORTH KOREA MISSILE FACILITIES
Facility | Date of First Test | Date of Most Recent Test | Number of Tests | Latitude | Longitude | Location |
Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground | 09-apr-84 | 05-apr-09 | 17 | 40,8499966 | 129,666664 | Hwadae County, North Hamgyong Province |
Chihari Missile Base | 01-lug-91 | 01-lug-91 | 1 | 38,62333 | 126,6847 | Chiha-ri , Kangwon Province, (North Korea) |
Chunghwa County | 30-dic-22 | 26-mar-23 | 5 | 38,875 | 125,926 | Chunghwa County, North Hwanghae |
Jangyon | 13-mar-23 | 13-mar-23 | 2 | 38,275 | 125,071 | Jangyon, Jangyon County, South Hwanghae Province |
Unknown | 26-lug-14 | 17-dic-23 | 15 | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown |
Kittaeryong Missile Base | 05-lug-06 | 25-ago-17 | 20 | 38,99083 | 127,6236 | Kittae Pass, Kangwon Province, (North Korea) |
Sohae Satellite Launching Station | 13-apr-12 | 22-nov-23 | 14 | 39,6596 | 124,7057 | Cholsan County, North Pyongan Province |
Wonsan Kalma International Airport | 03-mar-14 | 17-nov-22 | 14 | 39,1677 | 127,4817 | Kangwon Province, (North Korea) |
Sunchon Airbase | 26-mar-14 | 31-ott-19 | 6 | 39,412594 | 125,89031 | South Pyongan Province |
Hodo Peninsula | 18-mag-13 | 28-mar-20 | 26 | 39,40167 | 127,5369 | Kangwon Province, (North Korea) |
Hwangju | 09-lug-14 | 05-set-16 | 12 | 38,686834 | 125,702005 | Hwangju, North Hwanghae province |
Kaesong | 13-lug-14 | 13-lug-14 | 2 | 37,9382 | 126,5878 | North Hwanghae Province |
Nampo | 01-mar-15 | 01-mar-15 | 2 | 38,7523 | 125,3247 | South Pyongan Province |
Sinpo Shipyard | 08-mag-15 | 07-mag-22 | 10 | 40,0368 | 128,1839 | South Hamgyong province |
Panghyon Airbase | 14-ott-16 | 19-ott-16 | 2 | 39,927472 | 125,207889 | Kusong, North Pyongan |
Kusong Testing Ground | 11-feb-17 | 11-feb-17 | 1 | 40,01325 | 125,22302 | Kusong, North Pyongan |
Pukchang Airfield | 28-apr-17 | 28-apr-17 | 1 | 39,504417 | 125,964333 | South Pyongan Province |
Koksan | 03-nov-22 | 03-nov-22 | 3 | 38,78 | 126,67 | Koksan, North Hwanghae Province |
North Kusong Testing Ground | 14-mag-17 | 14-mag-17 | 1 | 40,0659 | 125,2099 | Kusong, North Pyongan |
Lake Yonpung | 21-mag-17 | 21-mag-17 | 1 | 39,618283 | 125,8035851 | South Pyongan Province |
Panghyon | 04-lug-17 | 04-lug-17 | 1 | 39,872153 | 125,269192 | Kusong, North Pyongan |
Mupyong-ni Arms Plant | 28-lug-17 | 03-ott-22 | 6 | 40,611208 | 126,425743 | Mup’yong-ni, Chagang province |
Masikryong | 29-giu-14 | 29-giu-14 | 2 | 39,065962 | 127,250257 | Kangwon Province, (North Korea) |
Munchon | 08-ott-22 | 08-ott-22 | 2 | 39,2815 | 127,377 | Munchon, Kangwong Province |
Lake Taesong | 09-mar-23 | 09-mar-23 | 6 | 38,907 | 125,44 | South Pyongan Province |
Pyongyang International Airport | 28-ago-17 | 30-ago-23 | 22 | 39,200159 | 125,673256 | Pyongyang, North Korea |
Pyongsong Field | 28-nov-17 | 28-nov-17 | 1 | 39,282 | 125,869 | Pyongsong, South Pyongan Province |
Baegun | 09-mag-19 | 09-mag-19 | 2 | 40,029678 | 125,227326 | North Pyongan, North Korea |
Kwail Airbase | 05-ago-19 | 05-ago-19 | 2 | 38,421522 | 125,024421 | Kwail, Kwail-gun, South Hwanghae |
Hungnam | 09-ago-19 | 16-apr-22 | 6 | 39,811611 | 127,66375 | Hamhung, South Hamgyong |
Tongchan | 15-ago-19 | 28-ott-22 | 4 | 38,953797 | 127,891882 | Kangwon Province, (North Korea) |
Sondok Airbase | 23-ago-19 | 24-mar-21 | 3 | 39,7437 | 127,4732 | Sondok, South Hamgyong Province |
Kaechon Air Base | 09-set-19 | 02-nov-22 | 5 | 39,752321 | 125,899905 | Kaechon, South Pyongan Province |
Yonghung Bay | 01-ott-19 | 01-ott-19 | 1 | 39,26 | 127,58 | Kangwon Province, (North Korea) |
Yonpo Airport | 28-nov-19 | 24-mar-21 | 3 | 39,78938 | 127,53993 | Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province |
Samsok | 05-ott-22 | 05-ott-22 | 2 | 39,1268 | 125,9579 | Samsok District, Pyongyang |
Samsok missile test site | 12-apr-23 | 01-apr-24 | 4 | 39,112 | 125,998 | Samsok District, Pyongyang |
Samsok missile test site #2 | 17-dic-23 | 17-dic-23 | 1 | 39,12655 | 125,96453 | Samsok District, Pyongyang |
Samsok missile test site #3 | 17-mar-24 | 17-mar-24 | 3 | 39,105 | 126,006 | Samsok District, Pyongyang |
Sangum-ri | 02-mar-20 | 02-mar-20 | 2 | 39,141 | 127,616 | Anbyon County, Kangwon Province (North Korea) |
Sondok | 08-mar-20 | 08-mar-20 | 3 | 39,743 | 127,499 | Sondok, South Hamgyong Province |
Sukchon | 09-nov-22 | 19-feb-23 | 3 | 39,42 | 125,63 | Sukchon, South Pyongan Province |
Sunan | 28-set-22 | 22-nov-23 | 13 | 39,20299 | 125,70926 | Sunan District, Pyongyang |
West Sunan | 30-set-22 | 30-set-22 | 2 | 39,3942 | 125,6773 | Sunan District, Pyongyang |
Sunchon | 20-mar-20 | 29-set-22 | 4 | 39,4163 | 125,8907 | North Pyongan Province |
Taechon Reservoir | 24-set-22 | 24-set-22 | 1 | 39,9857 | 125,5186 | Taechon, North Pyongan Province |
Uiju | 14-gen-22 | 01-nov-22 | 6 | 40,025847 | 124,577936 | Uiju County, North Pyongan Province |
Yangdok | 15-set-21 | 15-set-21 | 2 | 39,275721 | 126,804867 | Yangdok, South Pyongan Province |
Overall | 09-apr-84 | 01-apr-24 | 267 |
This database exclusively encompasses all North Korean missiles with a minimum payload capacity of 500 kilograms (1102.31 pounds) and a range exceeding 300 kilometers (186.4 miles), documenting advancements since April 1984 and designed for ongoing updates as new developments arise.

APPENDIX 2 – NORTH KOREA MISSILE – Count of Tests
Count of Tests | Column Labels | |||
Missile Types | Failure | Success | Unknown | Grand Total |
ER Scud | 1 | 7 | 8 | |
Musudan | 7 | 1 | 8 | |
Nodong | 4 | 12 | 16 | |
Scud-B | 3 | 7 | 10 | |
Scud-C | 26 | 1 | 27 | |
Taepodong-1 | 1 | 1 | ||
Unha | 2 | 2 | ||
Unha-3 | 1 | 2 | 3 | |
Unknown | 6 | 17 | 32 | 55 |
KN-02 | 20 | 20 | ||
Hwasong-12 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 7 |
Scud-C MaRV | 1 | 1 | ||
Hwasong-14 | 2 | 2 | ||
Scud-B MaRV | 1 | 2 | 3 | |
Hwasong-15 | 3 | 3 | ||
KN-23 | 1 | 1 | ||
KN-25 | 1 | 30 | 31 | |
Pukguksong-1 | 3 | 3 | 6 | |
Pukguksong-2 | 2 | 2 | ||
Pukguksong-3 | 1 | 1 | ||
Rail-mobile KN-23 | 4 | 4 | ||
Hwasong-17 | 1 | 2 | 3 | |
New IRBM (2022) | 1 | 1 | ||
Silo-based KN-23 | 1 | 1 | ||
Hwasong-11A (KN-23) | 16 | 16 | ||
Hwasong-11B (KN-24) | 10 | 10 | ||
Hwasong-11S (Navalized KN-23) | 2 | 2 | ||
Hwasong-11D | 8 | 8 | ||
Hwasong-18 | 3 | 3 | ||
Hwasong-11C | 4 | 4 | ||
Chollima-1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | |
Hwasong-12A | 1 | 1 | ||
Hwasong-12A MARV? | 2 | 2 | ||
Hwasong-16A? | 1 | 1 | ||
Hwasong-16B | 1 | 1 | ||
Grand Total | 36 | 197 | 34 | 267 |
This database exclusively encompasses all North Korean missiles with a minimum payload capacity of 500 kilograms (1102.31 pounds) and a range exceeding 300 kilometers (186.4 miles), documenting advancements since April 1984 and designed for ongoing updates as new developments arise.
APPENDIX 3 – NORTH KOREA MISSILE – Count of Tests – Years
Count of Tests | Test Result | |||
Years | Failure | Success | Unknown | Grand Total |
1984 | 3 | 3 | 6 | |
1986 | 1 | 1 | ||
1990 | 1 | 1 | 2 | |
1991 | 1 | 1 | ||
1992 | 1 | 1 | ||
1993 | 3 | 1 | 4 | |
1998 | 1 | 1 | ||
2006 | 1 | 6 | 7 | |
2009 | 1 | 7 | 8 | |
2012 | 1 | 1 | 2 | |
2013 | 6 | 6 | ||
2014 | 19 | 19 | ||
2015 | 2 | 13 | 15 | |
2016 | 10 | 14 | 24 | |
2017 | 6 | 14 | 1 | 21 |
2019 | 1 | 26 | 27 | |
2020 | 9 | 9 | ||
2021 | 6 | 6 | ||
2022 | 5 | 42 | 22 | 69 |
2023 | 3 | 21 | 9 | 33 |
2024 | 5 | 5 | ||
Jan | 1 | 1 | ||
Mar | 3 | 3 | ||
Apr | 1 | 1 | ||
Grand Total | 36 | 197 | 34 | 267 |
This database exclusively encompasses all North Korean missiles with a minimum payload capacity of 500 kilograms (1102.31 pounds) and a range exceeding 300 kilometers (186.4 miles), documenting advancements since April 1984 and designed for ongoing updates as new developments arise.