The Eastern-based Government of National Stability in Libya is in the midst of evaluating a potentially momentous decision: the possibility of joining BRICS, an increasingly influential economic bloc. This development was disclosed by Abdul Hadi Al-Hweij, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the interim Libyan government. In an interview Al-Hweij highlighted the importance of BRICS in the global economic landscape and emphasized his strong support for Libya’s potential membership. “BRICS is an important economic bloc,” Al-Hweij stated, adding that the government has undertaken numerous studies and is working toward this strategic alignment.
BRICS, established in 2009, originally comprised Brazil, Russia, India, and China. By 2010, the group had expanded to include South Africa. As of January 1, 2024, the bloc further grew to encompass Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), signifying its expanding influence among developing nations. Saudi Arabia, while not yet a formal member, has shown significant interest and has participated in BRICS meetings, further underscoring the growing appeal of the bloc among developing nations.
This article delves into Libya’s rationale behind considering BRICS membership, the potential economic and geopolitical implications of such a move, and the broader context of BRICS’ growing prominence in the international system. The decision to join BRICS is not merely a question of economic partnership; it carries broader implications for Libya’s foreign policy, economic recovery, and long-term development strategy.
The Strategic Appeal of BRICS for Libya
Libya’s contemplation of BRICS membership must be understood within the broader context of its post-conflict recovery, ongoing political instability, and the government’s search for viable economic partnerships that can contribute to sustainable development. Since the toppling of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, Libya has been in a state of near-constant turmoil. Various factions have vied for control, and the country remains divided, with different governments claiming legitimacy. In this chaotic political landscape, finding reliable international partners for economic recovery has been an ongoing challenge.
BRICS presents a unique opportunity for Libya to align itself with some of the world’s largest emerging economies. By forging closer ties with countries like China, Russia, and India, Libya could benefit from both financial investments and technological partnerships. The BRICS nations collectively represent a significant portion of the global population and GDP, and they have demonstrated a capacity for fostering South-South cooperation, a model that Libya could leverage to enhance its economic and infrastructural development.
Minister Al-Hweij’s remarks reflect a broader recognition within the Libyan government that traditional Western alliances, while still important, may not be sufficient to address Libya’s unique post-conflict challenges. By engaging with BRICS, Libya could diversify its international partnerships and gain access to alternative sources of capital, technology, and diplomatic support.
Economic Recovery and Sustainable Development
At the heart of Libya’s interest in BRICS is the potential for economic recovery and long-term sustainable development. The country’s economy, heavily dependent on oil revenues, has been severely damaged by years of conflict and instability. Infrastructure has been devastated, key industries remain underdeveloped, and unemployment is rampant. According to the World Bank, Libya’s GDP contracted by nearly 60% between 2010 and 2020, a staggering figure that underscores the extent of the damage inflicted by years of civil war.
Joining BRICS could provide Libya with access to new markets for its oil exports, as well as much-needed investment in sectors such as infrastructure, energy, and technology. China, in particular, has shown a keen interest in investing in the infrastructure of developing countries through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By aligning with BRICS, Libya could potentially position itself as a critical partner in China’s ambitions to expand its influence in North Africa and the Mediterranean.
Moreover, the experience of countries like South Africa, which has been a member of BRICS since 2010, could serve as a valuable blueprint for Libya. South Africa has benefited from increased trade with fellow BRICS members, as well as access to development financing through institutions like the New Development Bank (NDB), a financial institution created by BRICS to support infrastructure and sustainable development projects in member states. For Libya, joining BRICS could provide a similar pathway to development financing, which would be instrumental in rebuilding its war-torn infrastructure.
Libya’s Oil, Gas, and Mineral Resources (September 30, 2024)
| Resource Type | Name of Field/Deposit | Type of Site | Production/Reserves | Location | Operators |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Oil | Bouri Field | Offshore Oil Field | 60,000 barrels/day (largest offshore field) | Mediterranean Sea | National Oil Corporation (NOC), Eni |
| Oil | El Sharara | Onshore Oil Field | 300,000 barrels/day | Murzuq Basin, Southwest | Repsol, NOC |
| Oil | Sarir | Onshore Oil Field | 220,000 barrels/day | Sirte Basin | NOC, BP |
| Oil | El Feel (Elephant) | Onshore Oil Field | 80,000 barrels/day (currently improving) | Murzuq Basin, Southwest | Eni, NOC |
| Oil | Waha | Onshore Oil Field | 100,000 barrels/day | Sirte Basin | ConocoPhillips, Total, NOC |
| Oil | Zelten | Onshore Oil Field | 110,000 barrels/day | Sirte Basin | NOC |
| Oil | Raguba | Onshore Oil Field | 30,000 barrels/day | Sirte Basin | NOC |
| Oil Refinery | Ras Lanuf Refinery | Refinery | 220,000 barrels/day | Coastal (Gulf of Sirte) | NOC |
| Oil Refinery | Zawiya Refinery | Refinery | 120,000 barrels/day | Western Libya | NOC |
| Natural Gas | Brega | Gas Processing Plant | Major gas export terminal | Sirte Basin | NOC, BP, Total |
| Natural Gas | Mellitah Complex | Gas Processing/LNG | 400,000 cubic meters/day (processing) | Mediterranean Coast | NOC, Eni |
| Natural Gas | Erawan | Offshore Gas Field | 92,000 barrels/day oil equivalent (includes gas) | Offshore | NOC |
| Natural Gas | Sabratha (Platform) | Offshore Gas Platform | Major offshore processing platform | Mediterranean Sea | NOC, Eni |
| Mineral | Wadi ash-Shati’ | Iron Ore Mine (Planned) | 795 million tons (52% Fe) | Fezzan, Southern Libya | NOC (not yet developed) |
| Mineral | Jabal al Hasawinah | Gypsum Deposit | 150,000 tons/year (gypsum) | Western Libya | Local operations |
| Mineral | Salt Flats (Various) | Salt Production | 11,000 tons/year | Coastal Northern Libya | Local companies |
| Mineral | Sirte Desert Potash | Potash Deposit | Reserves untapped | Sirte Basin | N/A |
| Mineral | Southern Gold Belt | Gold Prospecting Area | Active exploration, no production yet | Southern Libya (near Niger) | NOC (Exploratory) |
| Mineral | Phosphate Rock | Phosphate Deposit | Minor reserves, undeveloped | Sirte Basin | N/A |
Key Updates and Insights (2024):
- Oil Production: Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) is targeting 2 million barrels per day (bpd) by 2025, although current production is around 1.8 million bpd. Despite years of instability, the country’s major fields—such as El Sharara and Sarir—remain productive, with multinational companies like Repsol, Eni, and Total working to develop and expand operations.
- Gas Production: Significant investments have been made in Libya’s offshore gas fields, particularly in collaboration with Italy’s Eni. The Mellitah Complex and Brega terminal remain key gas infrastructure components. New developments, such as the Eni-led $8 billion gas project, highlight the country’s long-term potential in gas exports.
- Mineral Sector: Libya’s mining sector remains underdeveloped. Gypsum is one of the few minerals currently being mined. Potentially significant deposits of iron ore at Wadi ash-Shati’ and potash in the Sirte Desert are yet to be fully explored due to logistical and political challenges.
- Refineries: Libya’s refining capacity remains constrained, with Ras Lanuf and Zawiya being the major refineries. These facilities are critical to Libya’s domestic fuel supply and export capacity, although they have suffered interruptions in the past due to conflicts.
- Exploration and New Ventures: Libya plans to hold a new oil and gas licensing round in 2024, the first in almost two decades. This aims to attract foreign investment and boost exploration activities, particularly in underdeveloped basins such as the southern Ghadames Basin and offshore prospects.
Geopolitical Considerations and Libya’s Foreign Policy
The decision to consider BRICS membership is not solely based on economic factors. Libya’s foreign policy has historically been marked by a delicate balancing act between competing regional and global powers. Under the Gaddafi regime, Libya sought to position itself as a leader in the Arab world and Africa, often adopting an anti-Western stance. However, in the post-Gaddafi era, Libya has faced a more complex international environment, with various external actors, including the United States, the European Union, Russia, Turkey, and Egypt, playing influential roles in the country’s internal politics.
By considering BRICS membership, Libya may be signaling a shift towards a more multipolar foreign policy, one that seeks to balance traditional Western alliances with closer ties to emerging powers in the Global South. This realignment could provide Libya with greater diplomatic leverage, allowing it to navigate the competing interests of external powers more effectively.
Russia’s involvement in Libya’s ongoing civil conflict, for instance, has been significant. The Russian government has provided military support to General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), which controls much of the eastern part of the country, where the Government of National Stability is based. By joining BRICS, Libya could potentially strengthen its ties with Russia, further solidifying Moscow’s influence in the region. At the same time, closer ties with China and India could help Libya diversify its international partnerships, reducing its dependence on any one external power.
The Broader Context of BRICS Expansion
Libya’s potential BRICS membership must also be viewed within the context of the bloc’s ongoing expansion. The addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE in 2024 marks a significant milestone in BRICS’ evolution from a relatively small group of emerging economies to a broader coalition of developing nations. This expansion reflects the growing appeal of BRICS as an alternative to Western-led international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which have been criticized for imposing harsh conditions on developing countries seeking financial assistance.
For countries like Libya, which have struggled with debt and economic instability, BRICS offers a more flexible and potentially less politically fraught alternative. The NDB, for example, has been touted as a more responsive and less conditional lender than the IMF, making it an attractive option for countries in need of development financing.
Moreover, BRICS’ emphasis on South-South cooperation resonates with Libya’s desire to build stronger ties with other developing nations. By joining BRICS, Libya could position itself as a key player in regional efforts to promote economic integration and cooperation among African and Middle Eastern countries. This would not only enhance Libya’s standing in the international community but also contribute to its long-term economic recovery and stability.
Challenges and Obstacles to Libya’s BRICS Membership
Despite the potential benefits, Libya’s path to BRICS membership is not without challenges. The country’s ongoing political instability and divided government pose significant obstacles to its ability to engage effectively with international organizations like BRICS. While the Government of National Stability may be eager to pursue BRICS membership, it is unclear whether other factions within Libya, particularly the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Tripoli, share the same enthusiasm.
Moreover, BRICS itself is not a monolithic organization, and its members have divergent interests and priorities. While countries like China and Russia may be supportive of Libya’s membership, others, such as India and Brazil, may be more cautious, given Libya’s ongoing instability and the potential risks associated with admitting a country that is still in the midst of a civil conflict.
There are also broader geopolitical considerations at play. The United States and the European Union, which have been deeply involved in efforts to stabilize Libya, may view Libya’s alignment with BRICS as a challenge to their influence in the region. As Libya seeks to balance its relationships with Western powers and emerging economies, it will need to navigate these competing interests carefully to avoid alienating key partners.
Libya’s Bid to Join BRICS: Implications for Western Alliances, NATO, and Geopolitical Realignment
Libya’s current political leadership, based in the East and spearheaded by the interim Government of National Stability, has expressed strong interest in exploring membership in the BRICS economic bloc. This strategic consideration, confirmed by Libya’s Foreign Minister Abdul Hadi Al-Hweij, represents a significant potential shift in the country’s international orientation, which, until now, has been shaped primarily by its ties to Europe, NATO, and Western actors such as the United States. The timing of Libya’s move comes amidst BRICS’ growing global influence, reinforced by the recent addition of new members including Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE as of January 2024.
This article analyzes the profound consequences of Libya’s possible accession to BRICS for its relations with Europe, NATO, and the U.S., including economic ramifications, security implications, and the broader geopolitical balance in the Mediterranean and North Africa.
The Geopolitical Repercussions for NATO and U.S. Interests
Libya’s interest in joining BRICS signals a potential geopolitical pivot towards a group of nations that includes Russia and China, both seen as strategic competitors by NATO and the U.S. This would represent a marked departure from Libya’s prior dependence on Western-backed interventions, primarily NATO’s military involvement in 2011, which was pivotal in the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi. The post-Gaddafi era has been fraught with chaos, but NATO’s interests in Libya, which revolve around preventing a power vacuum exploited by terrorist groups and containing migrant flows to Europe, remain paramount.
NATO’s Diminished Influence
If Libya aligns itself more closely with BRICS, it would likely lead to a diminishing of NATO’s influence in the region, particularly with regard to security cooperation and counterterrorism. Russia has already played a substantial role in the Libyan conflict, particularly through its support of General Khalifa Haftar, whose Libyan National Army (LNA) controls much of eastern Libya. Moscow’s involvement has been a source of friction between the West and Russia, and Libya’s possible accession to BRICS would further solidify Russia’s foothold in the region, raising concerns within NATO that Libya could drift into Moscow’s strategic orbit.
Furthermore, China’s growing investments across Africa, facilitated through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), provide an additional lever of influence. Should Libya join BRICS, it could become a key node in China’s broader strategy to expand its presence in North Africa, potentially granting Beijing access to vital Mediterranean trade routes and energy resources. This would not only undermine NATO’s strategic dominance in the Mediterranean but also challenge the U.S.-led global order that has long depended on military and economic supremacy in these waters.
U.S. Strategic Response
For the United States, Libya’s potential BRICS membership raises alarm bells due to the implications for both energy security and counterterrorism. Although Libya has not been a major oil supplier to the U.S. since the Gaddafi era, the country holds one of the largest oil reserves in Africa. A pivot towards BRICS could see increased Russian and Chinese investments in Libyan oil, potentially creating a scenario in which the West’s access to Libyan energy resources is restricted, particularly in times of geopolitical crises.
Additionally, Libya’s post-Gaddafi instability has made it a hotbed for ISIS and other terrorist groups. U.S. counterterrorism efforts, including airstrikes on extremist targets, have relied on the fragile cooperation of Libyan factions. A realignment towards BRICS, however, could introduce new dynamics where Libya seeks closer security cooperation with Russia, China, and potentially other BRICS members, thereby complicating the West’s ability to execute counterterrorism strategies unimpeded. Washington may need to recalibrate its strategy in North Africa, potentially doubling down on its partnerships with Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria to counterbalance any geopolitical vacuum that arises from Libya’s shift.
The Impact on European Union and Mediterranean Stability
Economic Concerns: Energy and Migration
For the European Union, Libya’s potential move towards BRICS would present both economic and security challenges. Libya’s geographical proximity to Europe, particularly to countries like Italy, positions it as a critical partner in two main areas: energy supplies and migration control. Italy, which imports a significant proportion of its oil and gas from Libya, would be particularly vulnerable to any geopolitical realignment that sees Libya drift towards BRICS, particularly if it leads to a greater Russian or Chinese stake in Libya’s energy infrastructure.
European powers, especially Italy and France, have been heavily involved in the Libyan conflict, often backing opposing factions due to their competing energy interests. France’s Total and Italy’s Eni are two key players in Libya’s oil sector, and both countries have sought to protect their interests amidst the turmoil. If Libya were to fully embrace BRICS membership, Europe could find its energy interests compromised, especially given China’s growing appetite for African energy and Russia’s interest in controlling oil and gas supplies as geopolitical leverage.
Migration is another area where Europe’s interests are directly at odds with a potential Libyan BRICS membership. The EU has poured millions into supporting Libyan coastguards and security forces in order to stem the flow of African migrants attempting to reach European shores via Libya. A closer alignment with BRICS could shift Libya’s focus away from cooperation with European agencies on border control, especially if Russia and China offer alternative forms of development assistance that reduce Libya’s reliance on European financial aid.
Diminished European Diplomatic Leverage
Diplomatically, Europe’s leverage in Libya could be severely undermined by a BRICS membership. The European Union has supported UN-backed peace processes and attempted to mediate between the warring factions within Libya. However, these efforts have had limited success, largely due to competing interests within the EU and the broader international community. Should Libya join BRICS, its reliance on Western diplomatic frameworks could diminish, with the country potentially turning to Russia and China for greater diplomatic support and development assistance. This could further marginalize the EU’s role in Libya’s future governance, placing Europe on the backfoot in terms of influencing outcomes in the region.
Libya’s Domestic and Regional Strategy: Balancing Between BRICS and the West
A Bid for Sovereign Autonomy
From Libya’s perspective, the potential decision to join BRICS represents an attempt to regain a semblance of sovereign autonomy, particularly in the face of the fractured political situation within the country. Over the past decade, Libya has struggled to assert its independence, often becoming the battleground for external powers, including Turkey, Russia, Egypt, and the UAE, each vying for influence over its future. Joining BRICS would allow Libya to position itself as a partner to multiple developing economies, thereby diversifying its international alliances and reducing dependency on Western powers. This shift could help Libyan leaders negotiate with Europe, NATO, and the U.S. from a position of greater strength, as Libya would have an alternative bloc to fall back on.
Regional Realignment: North Africa and BRICS’ Expansion
A Libyan entry into BRICS would not occur in a vacuum but would signal a broader regional realignment that includes countries like Egypt and Ethiopia, which have already joined the bloc. North Africa, traditionally a sphere of influence for European powers and the U.S., could increasingly tilt towards BRICS, as countries in the region seek alternatives to the Western-led international financial and security frameworks. For Libya, this would mean closer cooperation with countries like Egypt, its neighbor to the east, and potentially greater alignment with the broader African Union, which has long advocated for more independence from Western influence.
Navigating a Complex Geopolitical Future
Libya’s interest in joining BRICS is not just an economic decision but a strategic pivot with far-reaching implications for its relations with NATO, the U.S., and Europe. The potential benefits of BRICS membership—access to development financing, new energy partnerships, and geopolitical diversification—must be weighed against the risks of alienating Western allies who have been instrumental in both the country’s political and security landscape.
As Libya explores this path, it will need to carefully balance its internal political dynamics, regional aspirations, and international partnerships to avoid further fragmentation and to ensure that its geopolitical pivot leads to long-term stability and prosperity. The reaction from Europe, NATO, and the U.S. will be critical in determining how this realignment unfolds, and whether Libya can navigate the complex geopolitical landscape without undermining its own sovereignty or its role as a key player in North African politics.
Libya’s consideration of BRICS membership represents a significant development in the country’s post-conflict recovery and its efforts to forge new international partnerships. While the road to membership is fraught with challenges, the potential economic and geopolitical benefits make this a strategic move worth pursuing. For Libya, BRICS offers not only the prospect of economic recovery but also the opportunity to reposition itself on the global stage as a key player in the emerging multipolar world order.
As the Government of National Stability continues its discussions with various political circles and engages in further studies on the feasibility of joining BRICS, the decision will ultimately hinge on Libya’s ability to stabilize its internal political situation and present a unified front to the international community. If successful, Libya’s membership in BRICS could mark a new chapter in the country’s history, one characterized by closer ties to emerging economies, greater economic diversification, and a more balanced foreign policy.
