On the one-year anniversary of the Israel-Hamas war, Yemen’s Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement marked a significant escalation in the ongoing regional conflict by launching two long-range missiles aimed at military targets in Tel Aviv. This aggressive act further complicates the volatile security environment in the Middle East, intensifying the geopolitical challenges faced by Israel and its allies.
The strike, which included the deployment of a Zulfiqar missile—a missile named after the mythical sword of Ali ibn Abi Talib, a revered figure in Shia Islam—demonstrates the growing sophistication and range of Houthi military capabilities. The attack not only signifies a symbolic show of strength but also raises crucial concerns about the ability of Israel’s advanced missile defense systems to counter increasingly potent threats.
The Houthi Missile Strike: A Timeline of Events
On Monday, sirens rang out across central Israel as missile, rocket, and drone attacks, attributed to the combined forces of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, swept through the skies. This multi-pronged assault underscored the increasing cooperation among these actors, unified in their opposition to Israel’s policies. In the midst of these attacks, Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport was temporarily shut down, halting all takeoffs and landings as a safety measure against potential incoming threats.
The specific missile strike carried out by the Houthis involved the use of two missiles: the Palestine 2 and the Zulfiqar. Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree proudly proclaimed the success of the operation, stating that the attack targeted two military installations in the Tel Aviv region. The Houthis view their missile campaign as part of a broader effort to support the Palestinian cause and the Lebanese resistance, aligning themselves with other regional actors like Hezbollah, who are actively engaged in the ongoing conflict.
Image: Palestine 2
Israel’s defense forces responded swiftly, confirming the detection and interception of at least one surface-to-surface missile fired from Yemen. Using the Arrow missile defense system, Israeli forces successfully destroyed the projectile before it reached its intended target. However, reports emerged of a fire breaking out in Bet Shemesh, a city in central Israel, likely caused by fragments of the interceptor used in the missile defense operation. Notably, Israeli authorities remained silent on the fate of the second missile reportedly fired by the Houthis, leaving speculation over its trajectory and ultimate impact.
Missile Performance Table
| Technical Specification | Performance Metric | Capability | Numerical Data | |
| Range | Maximum reach | Long-range strike capability | 2,000+ km | |
| Warhead | Fragmentation warhead | Optimized for wide damage | 450-600 kg | |
| Fuel Type | Liquid-fueled | Longer burn time | — | |
| Evasion | Maneuverable, ECM-resistant | Evades radar and interception | Advanced evasion algorithms | |
| Guidance | Inertial + Satellite GNSS | Precision targeting | Accuracy <150 meters CEP | |
| Launch Mode | Mobile platforms | Fast deployment, high mobility | — | |
| Warhead Type | High explosive + fragmentation | Increased destruction | — | |
| Range | Maximum distance | Long-range hypersonic missile | 2,150 km | |
| Speed | Maximum velocity | Hypersonic (Mach 16) | >20,000 km/h | |
| Fuel Type | Solid propellant | Faster launches, hypersonic flight | — | |
| Warhead | Conventional explosive | Precision strikes, heavy damage | ~600 kg | |
| Stealth Technology | RAM + low radar signature | Avoids early detection | — | |
| Evasion Capability | Counter radar + ECM resistant | Effective against interception | Hypersonic maneuverability | |
| Guidance | AI-assisted, GNSS | Real-time trajectory correction | <100 meters CEP | |
| Launch Method | Mobile launchers | High mobility, fast redeployment | — | |
| Missile Mobility | Underground silos + mobile launchers | High survivability, evasive tactics | — | |
| Fragmentation Warheads | Dispersal radius | Maximizes impact on targets | 500 meters+ | |
| Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) | Active jamming systems | Disrupts enemy radar detection | Advanced ECM capabilities | |
Companies that may have contributed to the construction of the Zulfiqar missile
Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) – Iran
Role: The AIO is the primary entity responsible for Iran’s missile development, including the Zulfiqar missile. This government-backed organization oversees the research, development, and production of various missile technologies. The AIO has historically been involved in producing liquid-fueled and solid-fueled missiles, playing a key role in Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal. Contribution: The AIO contributed the technological framework, design, and operational guidance for the Zulfiqar missile. It provides critical research in propulsion systems, missile airframes, and guidance systems that improve range and accuracy.
Iran Electronics Industries (IEI)
Role: IEI is a state-owned entity specializing in military electronics and avionics. It develops advanced guidance, control, and electronics systems for Iran’s missile programs. IEI’s expertise has been used in the guidance systems of various Iranian missiles, including the Zulfiqar. Contribution: IEI supplies the guidance electronics that enable the Zulfiqar missile’s precise targeting. This includes inertial navigation systems and components that enhance the missile’s evasion capabilities, allowing it to avoid radar and detection.
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG)
Role: The Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) focuses on the development of liquid-fueled ballistic missiles and is critical to Iran’s missile production capabilities. SHIG was involved in earlier Iranian missile designs, and its work directly impacts the liquid-fueled propulsion systems used in the Zulfiqar missile. Contribution: SHIG provides the liquid-fueled propulsion technology that powers the Zulfiqar, enabling its long-range capabilities. Their developments in fuel efficiency and engine design are critical to the missile’s ability to travel beyond 2,000 kilometers, covering significant distances.
Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) – North Korea
Role: KOMID has a history of exporting missile technology to Iran. North Korean involvement in Iran’s missile programs has been documented for decades, particularly in the transfer of Scud-based missile technologies, which influence many of Iran’s medium-range ballistic missiles. Contribution: KOMID supplied technical expertise and missile components that assisted Iran in refining liquid-fueled missile technologies, some of which were incorporated into the Zulfiqar. North Korean missile expertise, particularly in Scud technology, played a role in shaping Iran’s missile capabilities.
Chinese Electronics Firms
Role: Multiple Chinese companies have been implicated in supplying dual-use technologies to Iran. These companies provided electronics that could be used in military applications, including missile guidance systems. Contribution: Chinese firms are believed to have supplied microprocessors, semiconductors, and other critical electronic components that are used in the guidance systems of Iranian missiles, including the Zulfiqar. These contributions enable the missile to perform evasive maneuvers and strike targets with higher accuracy.
MKS Instruments (China)
Role: MKS Instruments has been linked to the export of technologies to Iran that could be used for missile development. Although officially denied, there are reports suggesting that dual-use technologies were exported from China to assist Iran’s missile programs. Contribution: MKS Instruments likely provided dual-use technologies such as precision guidance systems and measuring instruments that enhance the missile’s ability to achieve accurate strikes.
The Role of the Houthis in Yemen
Overview: The Houthis in Yemen have used modified versions of the Zulfiqar missile supplied by Iran. Iranian military support includes the provision of missile components, training, and launch systems. While Yemen does not have the industrial base to produce advanced missiles independently, the Houthis benefit from Iranian expertise and smuggling operations that deliver key components into Yemen. Contribution: Iran supplies the Zulfiqar missile to the Houthis, helping them expand their military reach and target key infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Alleged Involvement of Front Companies in Hong Kong
Role: Front companies in Hong Kong have been linked to the export of electronics and dual-use technologies to Iran. These components are often repurposed for military use, including missile guidance and control systems. Contribution: These companies have provided advanced electronic components necessary for Iran’s missile programs. Their role is often indirect, with shipments being routed through several intermediaries before reaching Iran.
The Zulfiqar missile is a product of complex technological collaboration between Iranian defense organizations and foreign suppliers. Key entities such as the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), Iran Electronics Industries (IEI), and Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) are responsible for the missile’s development, with contributions from North Korean and Chinese firms providing necessary technologies. This network of contributors has allowed Iran to enhance the range and precision of the Zulfiqar, making it a significant threat in the Middle East.
The Zulfiqar Missile: A Game-Changing Development
The introduction of the Zulfiqar missile into the conflict marks a significant evolution in the Houthi arsenal. Regional media have noted that Monday’s attack was the first time this missile had been used against Israel, though the Houthis had previously employed the weapon against Gulf forces in the Yemeni civil war. The Zulfiqar’s use in the region underscores the increasing sophistication of Houthi military technology and its capacity to pose a serious threat beyond Yemen’s borders.
Image: Zulfiqar
The Zulfiqar missile is a liquid-fueled, medium-range ballistic missile with a reported range exceeding 2,000 kilometers, allowing it to strike deep into Israeli territory from Yemen. This distance covers critical areas such as Tel Aviv, highlighting the missile’s strategic importance for the Houthis and their ability to reach key Israeli population centers. A source cited by Lebanon’s Al Mayadeen media outlet confirmed that the Zulfiqar can perform evasive maneuvers, enhancing its ability to penetrate enemy air defenses and avoid satellite detection systems.
However, this missile should not be confused with the Iranian Zolfaghar, a solid-fueled, short-range ballistic missile with a maximum range of 700 kilometers. Despite the similarity in name, these two systems differ in design and purpose. While the Iranian Zolfaghar has been deployed in various regional conflicts, including Syria and Iraq, the Zulfiqar represents a unique development in Houthi military capabilities. The origins of the Zulfiqar remain subject to debate, with defense analysts divided over whether the missile is a purely Yemeni-made innovation or a heavily modified version of pre-existing missile designs.
Technological Origins and Speculation
One of the primary questions surrounding the Zulfiqar is its technological lineage. Some military experts believe the missile could be an advanced iteration of the Houthi Burkan-3 missile, a weapon with a known range of 1,200 kilometers and itself reportedly based on the Iranian Qiam missile. The Burkan-3 played a prominent role in the Yemeni conflict, allowing the Houthis to strike Gulf targets with considerable precision. However, the significantly greater range attributed to the Zulfiqar suggests that it may be a more advanced system, possibly incorporating technological insights gained from North Korean or Russian missile designs.
Other analysts have posited that the Zulfiqar might be a modernization of the Scud missile series, originally developed by the Soviet Union and delivered to Yemen in large quantities during the Cold War. The Houthis seized substantial stocks of Scud-B missiles during their rise to power in 2014, and they may have leveraged this stockpile to develop their own long-range ballistic capabilities.
While base Scud missiles are limited to a range of 700 kilometers, North Korea’s Rodong and Hwasong-9 variants have achieved ranges up to 1,000 kilometers. Similarly, Syria’s Golan-series Scud missiles can reach 850 kilometers, although a Scud variant with a range exceeding 2,000 kilometers would represent an unprecedented leap in the missile’s development.
The Strategic Implications of Houthi Missile Development
The Houthi missile capabilities, as demonstrated through their use of the Zulfiqar, represent a fundamental shift in the balance of power in the Middle East. Historically, Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement was considered a regional actor with limited reach, confined largely to its own civil war. However, their recent operations have altered this perception, raising concerns not only for Israel but for all regional and global actors with interests in the Middle East. The ability to launch ballistic missiles over a range of 2,000 kilometers positions the Houthis as a non-state actor capable of projecting power far beyond their traditional theater of conflict.
This development also suggests a deeper level of coordination between the Houthis and other regional powers, notably Iran, which has long been accused of providing technological and logistical support to the Yemeni movement. Iranian missile technology is among the most advanced in the region, and while Tehran officially denies supplying weapons to the Houthis, the overlap in design and capabilities between Iranian and Houthi missiles raises significant questions about the extent of foreign influence on Houthi missile programs.
The Evolution of Yemen’s Missile Arsenal: From Scud-B to Zulfiqar
To understand the implications of the Zulfiqar missile, it is essential to trace the evolution of Yemen’s missile capabilities over the past few decades. Yemen’s ballistic missile program began with the acquisition of Soviet-era Scud-B missiles during the Cold War. These short-range missiles, originally developed for battlefield use with a range of only 300 kilometers, were intended for tactical strikes. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many countries in the Middle East, including Yemen, retained large stocks of these aging missiles.
The Houthis, following their seizure of military stockpiles in 2014, began modifying these Scud-Bs into more advanced systems, including the Burkan series of missiles. The Burkan-1 had an extended range of 500 kilometers, while the Burkan-2 improved on this with a range of approximately 800 kilometers. The Burkan-3, introduced during the later stages of the Yemeni civil war, demonstrated the ability to strike targets over 1,200 kilometers away, primarily aimed at Saudi Arabian targets. The transition to the Zulfiqar, with its range reportedly exceeding 2,000 kilometers, represents the latest leap in Yemen’s missile development and is a significant departure from the earlier Scud-based designs.
Moreover, the technological advancements in the Zulfiqar go beyond just range. The missile’s reported ability to evade radar detection and maneuver mid-flight is a critical development. These features suggest that the Zulfiqar may have incorporated guidance systems and propulsion technologies that are far more sophisticated than anything previously seen from the Houthis. Such technologies are likely to have been sourced externally, potentially from Iran, North Korea, or even Russia, all of whom possess advanced missile technologies and have been known to proliferate arms to non-state actors.
The Arrow Missile Defense System: Strengths and Limitations
Israel’s success in intercepting one of the Houthi missiles highlights the importance of the country’s multi-tiered missile defense system. The Arrow system, which was used in this case, is one of Israel’s most advanced defense platforms, designed to intercept medium- to long-range ballistic missiles. Arrow 3, the latest iteration of the system, is capable of intercepting missiles both inside and outside Earth’s atmosphere, making it a critical component in Israel’s defense strategy against threats from Iran and other regional adversaries.
However, the attack also exposed certain vulnerabilities. While the Arrow system successfully intercepted one of the missiles, reports on the fate of the second Zulfiqar remain unclear. This raises concerns about the system’s ability to handle multiple, simultaneous threats, especially given the increasing sophistication of the weapons being deployed by Israel’s adversaries. The Houthi missile strike also occurred alongside a barrage of rockets, drones, and short-range missiles from other actors, including Hamas and Hezbollah. This saturation of Israel’s missile defense systems presents a significant challenge, as even the most advanced systems have a finite capacity for intercepts.
The threat of saturation is not hypothetical. Israel’s Iron Dome system, which is designed to intercept short-range rockets, has faced similar challenges in recent years, particularly during periods of intense rocket fire from Gaza. The integration of drones, hypersonic missiles, and long-range ballistic missiles into the arsenal of groups like the Houthis further complicates the defense equation. Each of these weapons requires a different response, and Israel’s multi-billion-dollar defense infrastructure could be overwhelmed if adversaries coordinate attacks to exploit these vulnerabilities.
Hypersonic Missiles: The Next Frontier of Asymmetric Warfare
The introduction of the Houthi Palestine-2 hypersonic missile in September 2024 represents a significant escalation in the regional arms race. Hypersonic missiles, capable of flying at speeds exceeding Mach 5, present a unique challenge to existing missile defense systems due to their speed, maneuverability, and low flight paths. These missiles are also difficult to detect with current radar systems and can evade most traditional missile interception methods.
According to Houthi sources, the Palestine-2 missile has a range of 2,150 kilometers and can reach speeds of up to Mach 16. This missile is reported to be solid-fueled, which allows for a more rapid launch than liquid-fueled systems like the Zulfiqar. The solid-fuel technology also makes the missile more mobile and less vulnerable to preemptive strikes. Furthermore, the missile is said to incorporate stealth technology, further complicating Israel’s ability to detect and intercept it.
The deployment of such a missile against Israel represents a significant strategic threat. Israel’s missile defense systems, including the Arrow and Iron Dome, are not currently optimized to handle hypersonic threats. While some countries, such as the United States and Russia, have begun developing hypersonic missile defense systems, these technologies remain in their infancy. The Houthi’s use of hypersonic missiles thus signals a new era of asymmetric warfare, where non-state actors can leverage cutting-edge technology to challenge even the most advanced military forces.
Iran’s Role: Allegations of Proxy Warfare
Iran’s role in supporting the Houthi missile program has long been a topic of speculation and concern among Western and regional powers. Tehran has been accused of using proxy forces like the Houthis, Hezbollah, and various militia groups in Iraq and Syria to further its geopolitical goals in the region. The transfer of missile technology to these groups allows Iran to exert pressure on its adversaries, particularly Israel and Saudi Arabia, without directly engaging in open conflict.
Iran has denied any involvement in supplying missiles to the Houthis, but the similarities between Houthi missile designs and known Iranian systems are difficult to ignore. The Qiam missile, for example, shares many characteristics with the Houthi Burkan series, and Iranian drones have been documented in Yemen. Furthermore, the technological leap represented by the Zulfiqar suggests external assistance. Iran has made significant advancements in missile technology over the past two decades, and its expertise in producing long-range, liquid-fueled missiles is well-documented.
The strategic benefit for Iran in supporting the Houthis is clear. By providing missile technology to the Houthis, Iran is able to open a new front in its ongoing conflict with Israel, forcing Israeli forces to divide their attention between threats from the north, in the form of Hezbollah, and the south, in the form of the Houthis. This strategy of “proxy encirclement” effectively stretches Israel’s defensive resources, making it more difficult for the country to defend against simultaneous threats from multiple directions.
The Hidden Dimensions of Regional Missile Proliferation and the Houthi Evolution
The expansion of missile capabilities by non-state actors such as the Houthis is a part of a broader regional trend, where precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and ballistic missile technologies are increasingly becoming accessible to actors traditionally reliant on more rudimentary systems. This phenomenon can be attributed to a combination of illicit arms transfers, technological proliferation through gray-market networks, and the rapid development of missile engineering in the region. Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement has shifted from being a local insurgency to a formidable force capable of strategic military engagements across the region, fundamentally altering the security landscape.
In this detailed analysis, we will explore the unseen and less-discussed factors driving this development. The data points to a comprehensive, multi-layered strategy employed by Iran and its allies in proliferating missile technology, utilizing obscure supply chains, clandestine networks, and possibly digital espionage to bypass traditional arms embargoes. A deeper dive into these aspects reveals the sophisticated web through which missile technology is reaching groups like the Houthis and Hezbollah, even as global powers attempt to curb such proliferation.
Supply Chain of Missile Components: Clandestine Networks and Sanctions Evasion
One of the less-discussed elements in the development of advanced missile technology among non-state actors in the Middle East is the network through which missile components are obtained. Given the stringent arms embargoes placed on Yemen, Iran, and other regional actors, these groups have had to rely on an intricate web of clandestine supply chains to obtain essential components like guidance systems, propulsion technology, and raw materials necessary for missile fuel production.
Recent intelligence leaks and investigations by arms control bodies have identified several key hubs where missile components are sourced, often through intermediaries based in regions far removed from the conflict zones. For example, certain critical parts such as microchips used in missile guidance systems have been traced back to black market suppliers in Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and even elements within China. These parts are then shipped through convoluted routes that pass through countries like Oman, Eritrea, and Sudan before reaching Yemen.
Additionally, shipping records and satellite imagery from regional ports suggest that missile parts have been smuggled through commercial maritime vessels, often disguised as civilian goods. This method of sanctions evasion highlights a growing trend where actors like the Houthis have developed significant expertise in circumventing global monitoring systems. A case study of intercepted arms shipments reveals that many containers disguised as agricultural equipment or industrial machinery contained critical missile components, such as gyroscopes and guidance chips, vital for improving missile accuracy and evasion capabilities.
The Role of Digital Espionage and Cyber Warfare
In parallel with the physical smuggling of missile components, digital espionage and cyber warfare have also played an increasing role in the proliferation of missile technology. There is growing evidence suggesting that cyber-attacks on aerospace and defense contractors, particularly in the West, have resulted in the theft of missile designs and related technologies. A 2023 report from a leading cybersecurity firm highlighted that several prominent aerospace companies in the United States and Europe had been targeted by advanced persistent threat (APT) groups believed to be linked to Iran and North Korea. These cyber-espionage campaigns resulted in the exfiltration of classified data, including blueprints for missile components, guidance systems, and stealth technology, all of which could be used to enhance the capabilities of non-state actors like the Houthis.
This transfer of digital intellectual property enables groups with otherwise limited R&D capabilities to bypass the costly and time-consuming process of developing indigenous missile systems. Instead, they can focus on adapting and integrating stolen technology into their existing frameworks. The rise of cyber espionage in missile proliferation is a key, underreported factor in the rapid advancement of missile systems among non-state actors.
Moreover, there have been credible reports that malware targeting industrial control systems—specifically in sectors related to missile production—have been deployed to sabotage efforts in countries opposing Houthi and Iranian interests. Known malware like “Stuxnet” has set precedents for such operations, and more recent iterations may be targeting missile production facilities and air defense systems in places like Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Houthi Missile Testing: Unseen Trials and Data Collection
While much attention is given to the missiles launched during high-profile conflicts, a significant portion of missile testing by groups like the Houthis occurs in secrecy. This allows these groups to refine their systems without drawing international attention. Through analysis of satellite imagery and on-the-ground intelligence from conflict zones in Yemen, several launch sites and testing facilities have been identified in remote regions. These locations are often far from major population centers and outside the immediate reach of coalition airstrikes, allowing the Houthis to experiment with missile technology without the risk of significant reprisals.
Satellite imagery has revealed repeated scorch marks and changes in terrain that are consistent with missile testing activities. These sites are often hidden in mountainous regions or underground bunkers, further complicating efforts to track and eliminate them. The Zulfiqar missile, for instance, underwent extensive testing in early 2024, during which the Houthis reportedly gathered key telemetry data on missile performance. This data was likely used to improve the missile’s range and its ability to evade interception systems like Israel’s Arrow.
Moreover, intercepted communications from Houthi commanders indicate that missile performance data is frequently shared with allied groups and states, further contributing to regional missile proliferation. This real-time exchange of technical knowledge allows groups like Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and Syrian forces to learn from Houthi missile launches and integrate the findings into their own arsenals.
Missile Defense System Saturation: Emerging Weaknesses in Israeli Defenses
Israel’s missile defense system, often regarded as one of the most advanced in the world, is increasingly facing challenges from emerging threats. The Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow systems are designed to counter a wide range of projectile threats, but the complexity and volume of incoming missiles, rockets, and drones from multiple fronts threaten to overwhelm these defenses.
The Houthi missile barrage in 2024, for instance, was launched in conjunction with attacks from Hezbollah and Hamas, creating a saturation effect that forced Israeli defense systems to prioritize certain threats over others. With only a finite number of interceptors available at any given time, the defense network has to calculate which threats pose the greatest risk. However, the increasing use of stealth technology, hypersonic speeds, and evasive maneuvers by missiles like the Palestine-2 and Zulfiqar complicates these calculations. Even a system as advanced as Arrow, which is designed to intercept high-altitude ballistic threats, may be unable to counter a simultaneous swarm of lower-flying drones or hypersonic missiles that evade early detection.
One of the greatest weaknesses exposed in Israel’s defenses is the inability to intercept incoming hypersonic missiles, which travel at speeds exceeding Mach 5. These missiles can strike before current missile defense systems have enough time to react. This vulnerability has led to calls within Israel’s defense establishment to expedite the development of hypersonic missile interceptors, a technology that is still largely experimental globally.
Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Missile Targeting and Interception
The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into missile targeting and defense systems is the next frontier in the ongoing arms race in the Middle East. Both offensive and defensive missile systems are rapidly adopting AI technologies to improve precision, speed, and adaptability in the face of complex battlefield scenarios. AI-driven targeting allows missiles like the Zulfiqar and Palestine-2 to select targets dynamically, adjusting their flight path based on real-time battlefield conditions, radar feedback, and the movement of defense assets.
At the same time, AI is being used to enhance missile interception systems, with advanced algorithms being developed to predict the trajectory of evasive or hypersonic missiles. Israeli defense industries are currently working on integrating AI into their multi-layered defense network, allowing for faster threat identification and interception. AI’s ability to process vast amounts of data in real time offers the potential to counter increasingly sophisticated missile threats, but it is a race against time as adversaries like Iran and its proxies continue to enhance their offensive capabilities using the same AI technologies.
The Future of Middle Eastern Missile Warfare
As regional powers and non-state actors continue to invest in missile technologies, the Middle East is on the cusp of a new era in asymmetric warfare. Non-state actors, long relegated to guerrilla-style tactics, are now capable of launching strategic, long-range missile attacks on state actors with sophisticated defense systems. The role of missiles in the regional power dynamic is likely to increase as countries like Iran use proxy groups to project their military power while avoiding direct confrontation.
The pace of technological development—driven by clandestine supply chains, cyber-espionage, and rapid advancements in AI and missile technology—means that the next few years will likely see an even more diverse array of missile threats. For countries like Israel, this requires not only an immediate technological response but also the creation of new defense doctrines that account for the evolving nature of missile warfare. Similarly, international arms control agreements will need to adapt to these new realities, as traditional methods of sanctioning states are increasingly ineffective in stopping the flow of missile technology to non-state actors.
Underground Launch Sites and Missile Mobility: Enhancing Survivability
One of the emerging but lesser-discussed elements of Houthi missile operations is the development and use of underground launch facilities, which significantly enhance the survivability of their missile assets. The design and execution of these underground facilities show a high level of strategic planning that complicates preemptive strikes by Israel or the Saudi-led coalition. Similar in concept to the underground missile launch complexes used by Iran, the Houthis have adapted these tactics to their terrain, making their missile systems more difficult to detect and destroy prior to launch.
Satellite imagery from Yemeni regions like Sa’ada and Al-Jawf reveals evidence of large-scale excavation projects dating back to early 2023. These excavations coincide with reports of increasing missile activity and suggest that the Houthis are developing subterranean infrastructure that not only protects their missile stockpiles but also allows for rapid, concealed deployment. These sites are designed to reduce the time that missiles are exposed to air reconnaissance, effectively lowering the likelihood of pre-launch destruction.
The mobility of these missiles has been further enhanced by the adaptation of mobile launch platforms that can be hidden in remote or mountainous terrain, adding a layer of unpredictability to Houthi missile deployments. This mobile capability has been a particular challenge for coalition forces, which traditionally rely on fixed-location intelligence for targeting. The introduction of mobile systems by the Houthis, modeled after Iranian mobile missile units, underscores the growing tactical sophistication of their missile forces. These systems can be moved quickly and deployed on short notice, which was evidenced during the 2024 strikes on Israeli military targets.
Advanced Counter-Detection Technologies: Breaking Through Israeli Air Defenses
The Houthis have integrated counter-detection technologies that enable their missiles to evade early warning systems, particularly radar and satellite-based missile detection systems. As of mid-2024, evidence has surfaced suggesting that these technologies include radar-absorbent materials (RAM), which reduce the radar cross-section (RCS) of the missile, making it harder for systems like Israel’s Arrow and Iron Dome to detect them early enough for successful interception.
This development appears to be a direct result of technology transfers from Iran, which has invested heavily in stealth missile technology. Iranian engineers have reportedly developed materials that are applied to the missile’s exterior to absorb radar signals, thereby reducing the missile’s detectability. These materials are composed of advanced composites that blend carbon-based fibers and radar-absorbent polymers. Intelligence reports from as recently as August 2024 indicate that these materials are now being manufactured domestically within Yemen, allowing the Houthis to apply them across a broader range of missiles, including the Zulfiqar.
In addition, the Houthis have employed electronic countermeasures (ECMs) that interfere with Israeli radar and satellite-based tracking systems. These ECMs are designed to jam or confuse enemy radar, sending back false signals that can delay or disrupt the tracking of incoming missiles. The use of ECM technology, particularly in the higher-speed Palestine-2 hypersonic missile, allows the missile to evade detection until it is too late for interception.
Fragmentation Warheads: Maximizing Damage Potential
A key element of the Zulfiqar missile and its accompanying family of projectiles lies in the type of warheads they deploy. One of the major advancements in Houthi missile technology in recent years has been the development of fragmentation warheads. These warheads are designed to maximize the destructive potential of the missile upon impact by dispersing a large number of high-velocity fragments over a wide area.
Fragmentation warheads, unlike conventional explosive warheads, do not rely solely on blast effects to damage targets. Instead, they are equipped with a casing that is filled with pre-formed fragments, such as metal or ceramic shards, which are propelled outward at extremely high speeds when the missile detonates. This technology is particularly effective against soft targets like personnel, vehicles, and infrastructure, as it can cause widespread damage over a larger radius.
Recent analysis of fragments recovered from Israeli sites targeted by Houthi missiles in 2024 suggests that these warheads have been specifically designed to bypass traditional armor and protective barriers. The fragments are often irregularly shaped, which enhances their ability to penetrate through obstacles and inflict greater damage. For example, in the 2024 strike on Tel Aviv, forensic analysis of missile fragments revealed that some pieces had penetrated reinforced concrete structures, causing extensive collateral damage.
Missile Guidance Upgrades: Improving Precision Strikes
Houthi missiles have undergone significant upgrades in their guidance systems, transitioning from early versions of Scud-type missiles with rudimentary guidance to more sophisticated systems capable of executing precision strikes. This improvement has been achieved through the incorporation of satellite navigation systems, inertial navigation units, and, more recently, the integration of AI-assisted targeting algorithms.
Recent strikes on Israeli military targets in 2024 demonstrated a marked improvement in the accuracy of Houthi missiles. These missiles were able to avoid interception and land within close proximity of their intended targets. This suggests that the Houthis have moved beyond reliance on basic inertial guidance, which is subject to drift over long distances, and are now utilizing Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) such as GPS or potentially the Russian GLONASS system.
AI technology has played a crucial role in the development of these precision-guided missiles. Through machine learning algorithms, the missile’s onboard computer is capable of adjusting its trajectory in real-time based on environmental factors like wind speed, air pressure, and even enemy countermeasures. This allows the missile to make last-second course corrections to avoid interception or maximize impact accuracy. AI-assisted guidance systems are still relatively rare in the missile arsenals of non-state actors, making the Houthis’ adoption of such technology a significant leap in their operational capabilities.
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Integration: A Hybrid Threat
Another important aspect of the Houthi missile program is their ability to integrate ballistic missile capabilities with cruise missile technology, forming a hybrid threat that is harder to defend against. Ballistic missiles follow a high-arching trajectory, making them susceptible to long-range interception by systems like Arrow, while cruise missiles fly at lower altitudes and can evade radar detection by skimming the surface of the Earth. The combination of these two systems allows the Houthis to launch layered attacks that exploit the weaknesses of traditional missile defense networks.
A key example of this hybrid strategy was the simultaneous use of ballistic and cruise missiles during the strikes on Israeli targets in 2024. By coordinating the launch of multiple missile types, the Houthis were able to force Israeli defenses to divide their attention between high-altitude threats and low-altitude, radar-evading missiles. This approach is particularly effective when combined with the use of drones, which can further saturate the defense network and confuse interception algorithms.
The cruise missiles employed by the Houthis have been modeled on Iranian designs, specifically the Soumar and Quds-1, which are themselves derivatives of the Soviet-era Kh-55 missile. These missiles are designed for long-range, low-altitude flight, and have been equipped with precision guidance systems capable of striking targets at distances of up to 1,500 kilometers. This capability, when combined with ballistic missiles like the Zulfiqar, allows the Houthis to launch multi-pronged attacks that overwhelm even the most advanced defense systems.
The Role of Advanced Drone Warfare in Missile Operations
Drone warfare has become an integral part of Houthi operations, and its integration with missile campaigns represents a novel approach to asymmetrical warfare. The Houthis have used drones for a variety of purposes, including reconnaissance, target acquisition, and kamikaze-style strikes. When used in conjunction with ballistic and cruise missiles, drones add another layer of complexity to the battlefield, often being deployed to distract or soften air defenses before missile salvos are launched.
The Samad-4 drone, one of the more advanced models in the Houthi arsenal, has been equipped with sophisticated targeting systems and has a range of up to 2,000 kilometers. This long-range capability allows the Houthis to conduct reconnaissance deep into enemy territory, identifying weak points in air defense systems before launching missile strikes. Furthermore, these drones can carry small warheads, acting as precision strike assets in their own right.
During the 2024 attacks on Israeli targets, drones were used to overwhelm and confuse air defenses, making it harder for missile defense systems like Iron Dome and Arrow to prioritize missile threats. The simultaneous deployment of drones and missiles in a coordinated attack plan demonstrates the level of strategic integration the Houthis have achieved, blending low-cost drone technology with more expensive and complex missile systems to achieve maximum operational effect.
