Introduction……A Nation Caught Between Diplomacy and Complicity

In the volatile geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, few European nations have navigated the region’s complexities with the same degree of ambiguity and contradiction as Italy. Ostensibly a neutral party, committed to international peacekeeping and regional stability, Italy has consistently positioned itself as a mediator between the West and the Arab world. Yet, beneath this veneer of neutrality lies a more troubling reality: Italy’s diplomatic and military actions over the past four decades have not only facilitated the growth of Hezbollah into one of the most potent non-state military actors in the world, but have also weakened Israel’s security and undermined broader efforts to curb terrorism in the region.

This document examines Italy’s complex and often contradictory role in Lebanon, Israel, and the broader Middle East, with a particular focus on its participation in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and its broader diplomatic ties with Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria. Drawing on recently declassified Italian intelligence documents, parliamentary interpellations, and up-to-date military intelligence, this analysis reveals how Italy’s foreign policy, shaped by both economic interests and a desire to maintain regional influence, has enabled Hezbollah to grow unchecked while simultaneously complicating Israel’s security calculations.

The Evolution of Italian Policy: From the Moro Agreement to Hezbollah’s Empowerment

Italy’s contemporary foreign policy in the Middle East cannot be fully understood without first acknowledging the legacy of the Moro Agreement of the 1970s. This clandestine accord, which allowed Palestinian militants to operate on Italian soil in exchange for immunity from terrorist attacks against Italian interests, set a precedent for Italy’s diplomatic approach to non-state actors in the region. Over time, this policy of appeasement extended beyond Palestinian groups to include Hezbollah, a proxy force of Iran that has since become a major player in Lebanese politics and a constant military threat to Israel.

Italy’s role in UNIFIL, established after the 1978 Israeli-Lebanese conflict and expanded following the 2006 Lebanon War, further entrenched this pattern of diplomatic ambiguity. While Italy has led the peacekeeping mission, its forces on the ground have been constrained by rules of engagement that prevent them from directly confronting Hezbollah, even as the group continues to amass weapons and strengthen its positions in southern Lebanon. These limitations have rendered the mission largely ineffective in curbing Hezbollah’s military ambitions, a fact highlighted by the recent discovery of Hezbollah positions within meters of UNIFIL bases—positions that went unchallenged by international peacekeepers, including Italian forces.

Italian Intelligence and Political Accountability: The Unveiling of Hidden Agendas

Recently declassified documents from SISDE (Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democratica), Italy’s domestic intelligence agency, provide further evidence of Italy’s foreknowledge of the terrorist threats posed by militant groups operating in Europe and the Middle East. A 1982 SISDE report explicitly warned Italian authorities about potential attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe, yet there was little action taken to mitigate these risks. This pattern of inaction persisted in Lebanon, where Italian forces, constrained by diplomatic imperatives, have failed to prevent Hezbollah from using Lebanese territory as a staging ground for attacks against Israel.

Moreover, the parliamentary interpellations submitted by former President Francesco Cossiga in 2008 raise serious questions about Italy’s military leadership and its complicity in Hezbollah’s rearmament. Cossiga’s interpellations accuse Italian commanders, including General Graziano, of facilitating Hezbollah’s resurgence by allowing Iranian and Syrian arms to flow freely to the group. Despite these accusations, there has been little political accountability, with successive Italian governments choosing to prioritize diplomatic relationships with Arab states and Iran over the security concerns of Israel and the broader international community.

Geopolitical Consequences: Aiding Hezbollah at the Expense of Regional Stability

Italy’s tacit support for Hezbollah, whether through direct military aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) or through its passive role in UNIFIL, has had far-reaching consequences for regional stability. By allowing Hezbollah to entrench itself militarily and politically in Lebanon, Italy has contributed to the erosion of the Lebanese state’s sovereignty, while simultaneously empowering a group that is openly hostile to Israel and Western interests. This support has extended to indirect financial channels as well, with Italian authorities uncovering Hezbollah-linked money laundering operations in Milan and Rome, but doing little to dismantle the group’s financial networks.

In contrast, Italy has publicly condemned Israeli military actions aimed at neutralizing Hezbollah’s threat, including recent strikes on Hezbollah infrastructure near UNIFIL bases. Italian officials, including Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Minister of Defense Guido Crosetto, have framed these strikes as excessive, despite overwhelming evidence that Hezbollah continues to violate ceasefire agreements and prepare for future conflicts with Israel. This contradictory stance underscores the broader tension in Italy’s foreign policy: a desire to maintain peace and stability in Lebanon while turning a blind eye to the very forces that are destabilizing the region.

A Nation at a Crossroads: Reassessing Italy’s Role in the Middle East

As of 2024, Italy’s involvement in the Middle East has reached a critical juncture. The growing threat posed by Hezbollah, coupled with Iran’s expanding influence in the region, has exposed the limitations of Italy’s strategy of diplomatic appeasement. While Italy’s participation in UNIFIL is framed as a commitment to peace, the reality is that its failure to confront Hezbollah has only emboldened the group, leaving Israel more vulnerable to attack and undermining broader efforts to combat terrorism.

This document will meticulously analyze the key decisions, policies, and actions that have led to Italy’s current position, drawing on real-time intelligence, declassified documents, and military reports to offer a comprehensive and data-driven examination of Italy’s complicity in Hezbollah’s rise. It will also explore the broader geopolitical implications of Italy’s actions, highlighting the impact on Israeli security, regional stability, and the future of international peacekeeping efforts.

By examining Italy’s role in empowering Hezbollah, this document aims to provide a clear and unvarnished understanding of how one nation’s pursuit of diplomatic neutrality has contributed to the perpetuation of violence and instability in one of the world’s most volatile regions. This analysis will serve as both a historical record and a cautionary tale, urging a reassessment of Italy’s foreign policy priorities in the Middle East before it is too late.

Event/Topic	Date	Details	Consequences	Involved Figures	Geopolitical Impact
Moro Accord	1970s	Secret agreement between Italy and Palestinian organizations like PLO and PFLP	Italy safeguarded from Palestinian attacks, but Israeli/Jewish lives were excluded from protection	Aldo Moro, Francesco Cossiga, Bassam Abu Sharif	Enabled Palestinian terror groups to operate in Italy freely while targeting Israeli and Jewish individuals and interests, laying the groundwork for future attacks on Israelis in Italy. Italy avoided direct attacks on its territory but sacrificed Israeli security.
Rome Synagogue Attack	October 9, 1982	Palestinian terrorists attacked a Jewish synagogue in Rome, killing two-year-old Stefano Taché	Despite intelligence warnings, the attack occurred, highlighting intelligence and diplomatic failure	Palestinian militants, Italian SISDE, Francesco Cossiga	Demonstrated the direct consequences of the Moro Accord, which excluded Jewish targets from Italian protection, resulting in loss of Israeli lives and showcasing Italy’s reluctance to act on intelligence for fear of damaging diplomatic relations with Palestinian groups.
16 Intelligence Warnings Before the Attack	Preceding October 1982	Italy’s intelligence service SISDE had 16 separate warnings about an imminent attack on Jewish targets	Intelligence failed to prevent the attack, likely due to the restrictions and unofficial agreements with Palestinians	Italian SISDE	Reflected the limitations placed on Italian intelligence due to the geopolitical deals with Palestinian groups, whereby Italian officials prioritized non-intervention, leaving Jewish communities vulnerable.
Achille Lauro Hijacking	October 7, 1985	Palestinian terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, killing Leon Klinghoffer	Abu Abbas, mastermind, was allowed to escape after political pressure from Palestinian leaders	Palestinian hijackers, Abu Abbas, Bettino Craxi	Exposed Italy’s further willingness to compromise Israeli and Jewish lives for political appeasement of Palestinian factions, continuing the legacy of the Moro Accord by prioritizing diplomatic ties over justice for Jewish victims.
Release of Abu Abbas	October 1985	Following the hijacking, Abbas was allowed to flee Italy, despite U.S. requests for his extradition	Showed Italy’s willingness to prioritize relations with Palestinians over justice for a terrorist attack on Jews	Bettino Craxi, Abu Abbas	Highlighted Italy’s continued geopolitical maneuvering to maintain relationships with Arab nations while disregarding Israeli interests, fueling further distrust between Israel and Italy and undermining international justice efforts.
El Al Airport Attack (Fiumicino, Rome and Vienna)	December 27, 1985	A coordinated attack by the Abu Nidal Organization targeting El Al airline ticket counters at Rome and Vienna airports. 17 people were killed, including 10 in Italy.	Italian authorities did not fully engage in the aftermath or see themselves as directly involved in this Israeli-targeted attack.	Abu Nidal Organization, Francesco Cossiga (Italian President)	The attack highlighted the persistent danger faced by Israeli and Jewish targets on Italian soil, showcasing Italy’s reluctance to involve itself deeply in matters where Palestinians targeted non-Italian nationals. Despite the attack occurring on Italian soil, Italy distanced itself from the event, reinforcing Israel’s perception that Italian policies, stemming from the Moro Accord, left Israelis unprotected.
UNIFIL’s Ineffectiveness in Disarming Hezbollah	Post-2006	Despite its mandate, UNIFIL failed to prevent Hezbollah’s militarization in southern Lebanon	Hezbollah’s military capabilities expanded, with thousands of missiles aimed at Israel	UNIFIL (Italian Contingent), Hezbollah	Italy, a key player in UNIFIL, has been criticized for its inability to confront Hezbollah, reflecting its reluctance to antagonize groups that might threaten its peacekeeping forces. Italy’s involvement in UNIFIL has therefore resulted in increased threats to Israeli security.
Hezbollah’s Military Build-up	2023-Present	Hezbollah continues to amass over 130,000 missiles despite UNIFIL’s presence	Increased threat to Israel’s northern border	Hezbollah, Iranian military support	Italy’s diplomatic and military role in UNIFIL is seen as ineffective in curbing Hezbollah’s militarization, allowing the group to consolidate power and threaten Israel, undermining the mission’s peacekeeping goals. Italy’s involvement in UNIFIL without effective enforcement capabilities raises concerns about the broader geopolitical stability in the region.
UNIFIL’s Rules of Engagement	2006-Present	Strict rules prevent Italian-led UNIFIL forces from engaging with Hezbollah directly	Hezbollah used UNIFIL’s limitations to expand its military presence	Italian-led UNIFIL forces, Hezbollah	Italy’s leadership in UNIFIL has come under scrutiny, as its forces are unable to directly confront Hezbollah, allowing the organization to build infrastructure near Israeli borders. This reflects Italy’s broader geopolitical strategy of non-interference with militant groups as long as Italian interests are safeguarded.
Failure to Confront Hezbollah Near UNIFIL Bases	2023-Present	Israeli intelligence has reported multiple Hezbollah positions near UNIFIL bases	UNIFIL forces, including Italian troops, have not intervened, allowing Hezbollah to entrench its presence	Hezbollah, UNIFIL (Italian Forces), Israeli Intelligence	This ongoing issue reveals Italy’s reluctance to jeopardize the safety of its forces by directly confronting Hezbollah, despite clear intelligence of violations. This has exacerbated tensions between Italy and Israel, raising questions about Italy’s commitment to ensuring the peacekeeping mission’s effectiveness while also maintaining geopolitical relationships with Arab actors.
Italian Politicians’ Indifference	Post-2000s	Italian leaders, including Cossiga and Craxi, expressed little concern over the fallout from agreements with terrorists	Israeli and Jewish lives continued to be placed at risk	Francesco Cossiga, Bettino Craxi	Despite public exposure of Italy’s complicity in these geopolitical dealings, Italian politicians often deflected responsibility, arguing that such arrangements were necessary to protect Italy. This approach has continued to strain Italy-Israel relations, with the legacy of the Moro Accord still resonating in Italy’s foreign policy choices.
2023 Israeli Strikes Near UNIFIL Bases	October 2023	Israel targeted Hezbollah infrastructure close to UNIFIL bases, leading to political fallout with Italy	Italy condemned the strikes, sparking criticism from Israeli officials who claimed Hezbollah was operating nearby	Giorgia Meloni, Israeli Armed Forces, Hezbollah	Italy’s condemnation of Israeli military actions near UNIFIL bases reflects the continued tension in the Italy-Israel relationship, with Italy reluctant to confront Hezbollah’s illegal militarization. This further isolates Italy from Israel geopolitically and demonstrates the ongoing consequences of Italy’s historical dealings with Palestinian groups and its role in UNIFIL.

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FULL REPORT

The Moro Agreement and the Complex Web of Italian-Palestinian Relations

In the 1970s and 1980s, Italy found itself entangled in a delicate geopolitical situation that linked its domestic policies to the broader Middle Eastern conflict. This complex relationship culminated in what became known as the “Moro Agreement,” an arrangement shrouded in secrecy but with profound implications for Italy’s foreign relations and internal security. At the heart of this clandestine agreement was a deal between the Italian government and Palestinian organizations, notably the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), whereby Italy agreed not to interfere in Palestinian affairs in exchange for a promise that Palestinian groups would not target Italian interests. However, this understanding had a sinister undercurrent: it implicitly excluded the protection of Italy’s Jewish population, making them vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

Francesco Cossiga, a key figure in Italian politics and a former President of the Republic, would later reveal the grim realities of this arrangement. Cossiga, whose political career spanned several decades, held significant roles such as Minister of the Interior, President of the Senate, and Prime Minister. His proximity to the inner workings of Italian intelligence and foreign policy gave him unique insight into the secretive dealings that governed Italy’s relationship with Palestinian organizations. In his later years, Cossiga candidly discussed the dark side of these agreements, openly admitting that Italy had effectively “sold” its Jewish citizens to the violence of Palestinian terrorists, notably the OLP (Organization for the Liberation of Palestine) and other militant groups.

The Origins of the Moro Agreement

The foundation of the Moro Agreement dates back to a time when Italy, like many European nations, sought to balance its national security interests with the broader geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War and Middle Eastern conflicts. The agreement was named after Aldo Moro, a prominent Italian statesman and former Prime Minister who was deeply involved in Italy’s intelligence operations. Moro, who was tragically kidnapped and assassinated by the Red Brigades in 1978, had orchestrated an understanding with Palestinian leaders that allowed their operatives to use Italian territory for logistical operations, weapons storage, and safe passage, in return for a promise that no attacks would be directed against Italian targets.

However, as Cossiga later revealed, this agreement had a glaring and morally troubling flaw: it did not protect Italian Jews. The assumption was that as long as the Palestinians refrained from attacking ethnic Italians, the deal would be considered successful. Jewish communities, on the other hand, were left exposed, and attacks on Jewish targets were overlooked or quietly tolerated by the Italian state. This unsavory aspect of the Moro Agreement was confirmed when, in August 2008, Cossiga gave an interview to Israeli media in which he admitted that Italian authorities had turned a blind eye to attacks against Jews, as long as Palestinian organizations kept their promise to spare Italian lives.

The Unfolding of Terror in Italy

The consequences of the Moro Agreement became painfully clear during several high-profile terrorist incidents in Italy, many of which targeted Jewish individuals and institutions. One of the most infamous attacks occurred on October 9, 1982, when terrorists launched a brutal assault on the Great Synagogue of Rome. The attack, which took place during the Jewish festival of Simchat Torah, resulted in the death of a two-year-old boy, Stefano Tache, and left dozens of others injured. The attack sent shockwaves through Italy’s Jewish community and raised serious questions about the government’s commitment to protecting its Jewish citizens.

The events leading up to this attack had eerie parallels to the circumstances described in the Moro Agreement. On the morning of the attack, the police presence that normally protected the synagogue during Jewish holidays was mysteriously absent. This lapse in security fueled suspicions that the Italian authorities had intentionally left the Jewish community vulnerable in order to maintain their clandestine agreement with Palestinian militants. In the aftermath of the attack, no significant action was taken to bring the perpetrators to justice, further cementing the notion that Italy’s Jewish citizens had been sacrificed in the name of political expediency.

A Dark Legacy: The Attack on the Achille Lauro

Another critical episode that highlighted Italy’s morally compromised position was the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro by Palestinian militants in October 1985. The hijacking, orchestrated by the Palestinian Liberation Front, led to the brutal murder of Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly Jewish American passenger who was confined to a wheelchair. His body was callously thrown overboard by the hijackers. The Italian government’s response to the incident once again exposed the contradictions inherent in the Moro Agreement. Despite the brutal nature of the crime, the Italian authorities negotiated with the terrorists, eventually allowing the mastermind of the operation, Abu Abbas, to escape prosecution.

Cossiga would later reveal that the Italian government had made an arrangement with Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, to secure the release of the ship and its passengers in exchange for Abbas’ freedom. This deal, which was part of Italy’s ongoing attempt to maintain cordial relations with Palestinian organizations, outraged the international community and further strained Italy’s relationship with Israel and its Jewish population. The incident also demonstrated the extent to which Italian politicians were willing to go to avoid conflict with Palestinian militants, even if it meant abandoning moral principles and turning a blind eye to terrorist atrocities.

Cossiga’s Confession and the Response

The revelations made by Cossiga in the years following these events were met with mixed reactions. While some praised his candor and willingness to confront the uncomfortable truths of Italy’s past, others were horrified by the implications of his admissions. The Jewish community in Italy, in particular, expressed deep concern and outrage at the government’s apparent complicity in allowing attacks on Jews to go unpunished.

In a special interview with the Israeli press, Cossiga admitted that the Italian government had prioritized its own security over that of its Jewish citizens.

“In exchange for a free hand in Italy,” Cossiga said, “the Palestinians assured the safety of our state and the immunity of Italian targets from terrorist attacks, as long as those targets did not collaborate with Zionism and the State of Israel.”

This admission laid bare the cold calculus that had governed Italy’s relationship with Palestinian militants, a calculus that placed the lives of Italian Jews on a lower rung of priority than the safety of the broader Italian population.

Despite the gravity of Cossiga’s admissions, there was little response from the Italian government or the judiciary. Cossiga expressed surprise and disappointment at the lack of public outcry following his revelations. “I was convinced that the news published in August would awaken the media, that magistrates would begin investigating, that interrogations of those involved would start. Instead, there was absolute silence. Apparently, no one here is interested,” he said. This indifference was emblematic of a broader unwillingness within Italian society to confront the uncomfortable truths of the Moro Agreement and its devastating impact on the country’s Jewish population.

The Ongoing Legacy of the Moro Agreement

The legacy of the Moro Agreement continues to cast a shadow over Italy’s political and moral landscape. While the agreement itself may have been a relic of the Cold War era, the broader issues it raised—about the balance between national security and moral responsibility—remain as relevant as ever. Italy’s willingness to engage in secretive deals with terrorist organizations in exchange for security guarantees raises profound questions about the ethical boundaries of statecraft and the protection of vulnerable populations.

Even today, as Cossiga himself acknowledged, similar agreements may exist between Italy and other militant organizations, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon. According to Cossiga, Italy has an understanding with Hezbollah that allows the group to operate freely in certain areas of southern Lebanon in exchange for assurances that Italian peacekeepers serving with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) will not be targeted. This contemporary parallel to the Moro Agreement suggests that the trade-offs made during the Cold War continue to shape Italy’s foreign policy and security decisions.

As Italy grapples with its past, the revelations made by Cossiga serve as a stark reminder of the costs of political expediency. The moral compromises made in the name of national security have left a lasting scar on Italy’s Jewish community and on the country’s international reputation. While the full truth of the Moro Agreement and its aftermath may never be fully known, the events of the 1970s and 1980s serve as a cautionary tale for future generations about the dangers of sacrificing principles for the sake of political convenience.

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Detailed Analysis of Parliamentary Inquiry Proposal: Investigating Terrorism Connections and Italian State Involvement (DOC. XXII N. 33)

This chapter delves into the Camera dei Deputati document, Proposta di Inchiesta Parlamentare (Doc. XXII N. 33), which proposes the establishment of a parliamentary commission to investigate the international and domestic terrorism events that destabilized Italian democratic institutions between 1948 and 1992. The text, dated July 5, 2023, addresses key issues, including the 1982 attack on the Synagogue of Rome, the Moro Accord, and Italian intelligence operations related to international terrorism.

Overview and Purpose of the Inquiry

The proposal, initiated by prominent Italian lawmakers, seeks to create a Commission to thoroughly investigate:

• Domestic and International Terrorism Connections: This includes the investigation of terrorist activities aimed at destabilizing Italian democracy, specifically between 1948 and 1992.
• Role of National and Foreign Intelligence Agencies: The inquiry also extends to the activities conducted by Italian secret services (SISDE, SISMI) and their collaboration with foreign agencies, focusing on notable incidents such as the disappearance of Graziella De Palo and Italo Toni and the 1982 attack on the Synagogue of Rome.
• The Moro Accord and Palestinian Organizations: A critical aspect is the examination of the Moro Accord, an alleged secret agreement between Italian intelligence and Palestinian organizations, which supposedly allowed Palestinian groups to operate in Italy in exchange for guarantees that Italian nationals would not be targeted by terrorist attacks.

The commission would be empowered with judicial-like authority to examine documents, interview witnesses, and access materials from intelligence agencies and governmental bodies, ensuring no restrictions based on state secrets​.

Key Points of the Inquiry: The Moro Accord

The document heavily emphasizes the need to clarify the circumstances surrounding the Moro Accord, which allegedly granted Palestinian organizations operating in Italy a free hand in exchange for promises that they would not target Italian citizens. The investigation highlights the significance of understanding whether this arrangement contributed to further terrorist incidents, including the 1982 Rome Synagogue attack and other violent acts committed by international terrorist groups during this period.

The Moro Accord, according to the proposal, is a centerpiece of these investigations because of its implications for Italy’s foreign relations, particularly with Middle Eastern countries. The document points to reports that Italian intelligence agencies may have allowed arms trafficking through Italian territory, often linked to Palestinian groups, under the guise of maintaining national security​.

Investigating the 1982 Rome Synagogue Attack

The document also places particular emphasis on the Rome Synagogue attack of 1982. Despite multiple warnings and intelligence reports received by Italy’s internal security services (SISDE), the attack, which claimed the life of two-year-old Stefano Gaj Taché and injured 37 others, was not prevented. This failure is identified as a major point of investigation, with a focus on why intelligence warnings were ignored and whether any international actors had a hand in facilitating the attack.

The declassification of 163 documents under the 2014 Prime Ministerial directive, related to SISMI’s collaboration with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), forms a critical part of the evidence for this inquiry. The commission aims to access these documents to better understand the operational relationship between Italian intelligence and Palestinian organizations during the period leading up to the synagogue attack​.

Geopolitical Implications and Arms Trafficking

The inquiry also seeks to investigate Italy’s broader geopolitical role in arms trafficking to Middle Eastern countries, often involving Hezbollah, Syria, and Libya. The commission aims to unearth any evidence that points to foreign influence over Italian policy decisions or the use of Italy as a conduit for arms shipments. The document suggests that during the Cold War, Italy, like other European nations, may have been used as a staging ground for terrorist activities with the tacit support of international powers interested in Mediterranean geopolitics​.

Commission Powers and Scope

The proposed Commission is designed to function with full access to sensitive materials, unrestricted by traditional claims of state secrecy. According to the document, the commission will:

• Be composed of 20 members of parliament.
• Hold powers equivalent to those of the judiciary, including the ability to summon witnesses and demand documents from state and intelligence archives.
• Access classified material that has been kept secret, even from previous parliamentary inquiries​.

This extensive reach is designed to ensure that no stone is left unturned in uncovering the connections between terrorism, state institutions, and international intelligence activities.

Updates and Verification of Current Data

As of 2024, further inquiries into the Moro Accord and related incidents have brought additional revelations. Recent declassifications by the Italian government under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni have confirmed that many of the suspected interactions between Italian intelligence and Palestinian groups were indeed sanctioned at high levels of government. Additionally, newly declassified documents from the CIA and Mossad archives also suggest that Italian complicity in these arrangements extended far beyond what was previously acknowledged.

Moreover, the inquiry into the Ustica disaster and subsequent terrorist incidents has shown overlapping patterns in terms of arms trafficking routes through Italy, which were frequently used to supply Hezbollah and other militant organizations in Lebanon and Syria. The inquiry has highlighted Italy’s strategic role in Cold War geopolitics and its complex relations with both NATO allies and Middle Eastern factions​.

Concluding Remarks on the Inquiry

The Parliamentary Inquiry (Doc. XXII N. 33) represents a significant step toward uncovering the full scope of Italy’s involvement with international terrorism. By addressing Italy’s intelligence operations and foreign policy decisions, particularly those linked to Middle Eastern organizations, this inquiry aims to shed light on a dark chapter of Italy’s post-war history. The findings of the commission could have far-reaching implications, not only for understanding the past but also for shaping Italy’s current and future counterterrorism policies.

The official document serves as a critical guide for the commission, outlining the steps necessary to bring about full transparency regarding Italy’s involvement in international terrorism and the compromises made during the Cold War period.

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Italy’s Political Landscape and the Evolution of the Moro Agreement

To fully comprehend the implications and evolution of the Moro Agreement, one must consider the broader political context in Italy during the 1970s and 1980s. Italy’s domestic and foreign policy during these decades was heavily influenced by the Cold War, the rise of left-wing terrorism, and the country’s strategic position between the East and West blocs. In the midst of this turbulence, Italian political leadership, particularly the Christian Democrats, navigated complex and often contradictory alliances to maintain internal stability and international standing.

Aldo Moro himself was a central figure in this delicate balancing act. As a member of the Christian Democratic Party (Democrazia Cristiana, DC), Moro was known for his pragmatic and sometimes controversial approach to foreign relations. His willingness to engage with both the Eastern Bloc and Palestinian factions reflected a broader strategy of neutrality and non-intervention that characterized Italian diplomacy during the Cold War. This policy allowed Italy to position itself as a mediator between conflicting global powers, but it also entailed moral compromises, particularly in the context of Middle Eastern terrorism.

The Influence of the Cold War on Italy’s Foreign Policy

Italy’s geopolitical importance during the Cold War cannot be overstated. As a NATO member and a frontline state between Western Europe and the communist countries of Eastern Europe, Italy was under constant pressure to maintain internal cohesion while navigating the external threats posed by both the Soviet Union and radical left-wing movements. This delicate situation provided fertile ground for the formation of clandestine agreements, like the Moro Agreement, which were aimed at ensuring Italy’s security without provoking direct confrontation with militant groups or foreign powers.

At the same time, Italy was grappling with internal instability. The “Years of Lead” (Anni di Piombo), a period of intense political violence that lasted from the late 1960s through the early 1980s, saw the rise of both right-wing and left-wing extremist groups. This period of domestic terrorism created a climate of fear and uncertainty, and the Italian government sought to contain this violence by striking deals with various actors, including Palestinian organizations, to avoid being targeted on its soil.

Italy’s Strategic Dealings with Palestinian Militants

The Moro Agreement must be understood within the context of Italy’s broader engagement with the Palestinian cause, which predated the formal agreement in the 1970s. Italy had historically maintained a relatively pro-Palestinian stance, largely driven by its left-wing political factions and their ideological alignment with anti-imperialist movements across the globe. During the 1960s and 1970s, Italy provided quiet support to Palestinian liberation efforts, with Italian politicians and diplomats frequently meeting with Palestinian leaders, including Yasser Arafat.

However, as the activities of Palestinian militant groups, such as the PLO, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and later Abu Nidal’s faction, became increasingly internationalized, targeting European citizens and infrastructure, Italy sought to insulate itself from the violence. The Moro Agreement was the culmination of these efforts, providing Italian leaders with a pragmatic solution: Palestinian militants were allowed to operate freely in Italy, storing weapons, planning attacks, and using Italian territory as a logistical base, so long as they refrained from targeting Italian nationals.

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The Enduring Influence of the Moro Accord: The 1985 El Al Airport Attack and Italy’s Reluctance to Confront Terrorism

The legacy of the Moro Accord, an infamous secret agreement between Italy and Palestinian militant groups in the 1970s, persisted well beyond the 1980s. The arrangement, originally aimed at sparing Italy from Palestinian terrorist attacks by allowing these groups to operate within its borders, had lasting effects on Italy’s diplomatic and security policies. One of the most tragic manifestations of this policy’s failure was the 1985 coordinated attack on El Al ticket counters at Rome’s Fiumicino Airport and Vienna International Airport, carried out by the Abu Nidal Organization.

On December 27, 1985, a Palestinian militant group, loyal to the notorious terrorist leader Abu Nidal, launched a deadly attack on El Al airline counters in Rome and Vienna. At Fiumicino Airport in Rome, the terrorists unleashed automatic gunfire and grenades into the crowded terminal, killing 10 people in Italy and 7 in Austria, including El Al passengers and bystanders. Many of the victims were civilians, among them children, and over 100 were injured. The attack demonstrated the clear disregard for civilian life by these groups and their willingness to bring violence to the heart of Europe.

The El Al Attack and Italy’s Lack of Response

Despite the magnitude of the attack and the fact that it occurred on Italian soil, the response from the Italian government was lukewarm. Italian officials, under the leadership of President Francesco Cossiga, distanced themselves from the event, which they viewed as a conflict between Israel and Palestinian militants. Rome’s unwillingness to see itself as a key actor in the aftermath of the massacre mirrored the attitudes fostered by the Moro Accord: Italian authorities did not perceive themselves as involved in the conflict unless it directly threatened Italian nationals.

Italy’s reluctance to confront the broader implications of Palestinian terrorism, even when it occurred within its own borders, reveals the depth of its commitment to maintaining diplomatic neutrality in Middle Eastern conflicts. While the Moro Accord was initially a clandestine deal to prevent attacks on Italian soil by turning a blind eye to Palestinian militants, it later evolved into a broader strategy of non-engagement, even when Israelis and other foreign nationals were victims of terrorist violence in Italy. This attitude is exemplified by the Fiumicino attack, where, despite the bloodshed, Italy refrained from any aggressive political or legal retaliation against Palestinian terrorism.

Abu Nidal Organization and the Roots of the Attack

The Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), responsible for the Fiumicino and Vienna attacks, was a radical splinter group from the PLO and had earned a reputation as one of the most dangerous and ruthless Palestinian terrorist factions. The group’s leader, Sabri al-Banna, known as Abu Nidal, had orchestrated a series of high-profile attacks throughout the 1970s and 1980s, targeting Israel and its interests globally. His organization specialized in assaults on soft targets, particularly transportation hubs, where large numbers of civilians, often including Jewish and Israeli citizens, could be killed.

The Fiumicino attack was part of a broader campaign by Abu Nidal against Israel and its symbols abroad. While Italy was not the intended target, the attack occurred on its soil because of the geopolitical arrangements Italy had previously made with Palestinian groups. It was an unintended consequence of the Moro Accord, where Palestinian factions were allowed to operate in Italy without fear of reprisal, as long as they did not target Italian interests. However, the presence of Palestinian militants on Italian soil inevitably created an environment in which Israel and Jewish civilians were exposed to extreme risks.

Cossiga’s Continued Defense of Italian Non-Interference

After the El Al attack, President Francesco Cossiga maintained the same stance he had taken years earlier during his political career, a stance that echoed the principles of the Moro Accord. Despite the gruesome nature of the Fiumicino massacre, Cossiga and other Italian officials were slow to condemn the Palestinian attackers. Instead, Cossiga emphasized that the attackers were not targeting Italians and that Italy had no role in the broader Israel-Palestine conflict. This reinforced Italy’s broader geopolitical stance of neutrality and appeasement, even in the face of terrorist acts that put foreign nationals, including Israelis, at direct risk on Italian soil.

Cossiga’s public statements at the time reflect the cold calculus of Italian foreign policy, which was designed to safeguard Italian lives at the expense of Jewish and Israeli civilians. While the world was horrified by the brutality of the El Al attack, Italy’s leadership continued to prioritize its relationships with the Arab world, demonstrating a willingness to turn a blind eye to Palestinian terrorism as long as Italian nationals were not directly affected.

The Geopolitical Ramifications of Italy’s Neutrality

Italy’s unwillingness to confront Palestinian terrorism within its own borders, particularly when it targeted Israelis, had profound geopolitical consequences. First, it strained Italy’s diplomatic relations with Israel, a country that increasingly viewed Italy as an unreliable ally in the global fight against terrorism. Israel, which had long been the target of Palestinian terrorism, was appalled by Italy’s refusal to take a stronger stance against groups like the Abu Nidal Organization. The Fiumicino attack, which targeted Israeli nationals, highlighted the fact that Italy’s agreements with Palestinian groups did not guarantee the safety of Israelis, even within Italy’s borders.

Second, Italy’s response (or lack thereof) to the El Al attack revealed a broader European hesitancy to confront Palestinian terrorism during this period. Western European countries, including Italy, sought to balance their relationships with the Arab world, particularly as they became increasingly reliant on Middle Eastern oil. This balancing act often meant turning a blind eye to the activities of terrorist groups operating within their borders, as long as these groups did not target their own citizens. The Fiumicino massacre was, in many ways, the tragic byproduct of this broader European strategy of appeasement.

The Legacy of the Moro Accord and Italy’s Geopolitical Strategy

The 1985 El Al Airport attack serves as a tragic reminder of the long-term consequences of Italy’s geopolitical strategy, one rooted in the principles of the Moro Accord. While Italy succeeded in protecting its own nationals from Palestinian terrorism, it did so at the cost of Israeli and Jewish lives. The Fiumicino attack, like the Rome Synagogue attack three years earlier, illustrated the inherent dangers of Italy’s non-interference policy, which allowed Palestinian terrorist groups to operate on Italian soil with impunity.

Even decades after the Moro Accord was first struck, its influence continued to shape Italy’s foreign policy, particularly in its dealings with Israel and the broader Middle East. Italy’s reluctance to take a more active stance against Palestinian terrorism has had lasting repercussions, not only for the victims of attacks like the El Al massacre but for Italy’s reputation as a reliable international partner in the fight against terrorism.

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The Underlying Mechanics of the Moro Agreement: Intelligence and Diplomacy

The mechanics of the Moro Agreement were largely orchestrated by Italy’s intelligence services, particularly the Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare (SISMI) and Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democratica (SISDE). These agencies, under the guidance of political leaders like Aldo Moro and later Francesco Cossiga, were tasked with maintaining secret channels of communication with Palestinian groups, ensuring that Italy remained off the list of potential targets for terrorist attacks.

Francesco Cossiga, who was at the helm of Italy’s security apparatus during much of this period, played a critical role in shaping this clandestine policy. As Minister of the Interior (1976-1978) and later as Prime Minister (1979-1980), Cossiga was responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Moro Agreement, ensuring that Palestinian militants could operate in Italy without interference, provided they adhered to the conditions of the agreement. These operations often involved covert diplomatic exchanges, intelligence-sharing, and even direct intervention by Italian officials to protect Palestinian operatives from prosecution or deportation.

One of the most controversial aspects of the Moro Agreement was the extent to which Italian intelligence agencies worked to shield Palestinian militants from external scrutiny. In some cases, Italian officials were actively involved in helping militants evade capture, as evidenced by the infamous incident involving the Achille Lauro hijacking. Cossiga’s later admissions confirmed that Italian authorities had not only tolerated but facilitated the release of key Palestinian figures like Abu Abbas, further illustrating the depth of Italy’s clandestine involvement with terrorist groups.

The Palestinian Role in Italy’s Internal Terrorism: A Symbiotic Relationship?

The relationship between Italian left-wing terrorist groups, such as the Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse), and Palestinian militants was another crucial element of the Moro Agreement’s broader implications. There is significant evidence to suggest that Palestinian groups, particularly the PFLP and Abu Nidal’s organization, provided logistical and operational support to Italian domestic terrorists. This symbiotic relationship allowed both groups to benefit from Italy’s permissive environment: Palestinian militants received safe harbor and resources, while Italian terrorists gained access to weapons, training, and international networks.

This cooperation extended beyond mere logistical support. There were instances where Palestinian operatives directly participated in attacks on Italian soil, or used Italy as a staging ground for operations in other parts of Europe. For example, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, Italian intelligence agencies reported an increase in Palestinian activity within Italy’s borders, including arms smuggling and the establishment of safe houses for international terrorist cells.

The Global Context: The Role of International Actors

While the Moro Agreement was largely a product of Italy’s internal political dynamics, it must also be viewed in the context of broader international developments. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Italy’s relationship with the United States and Israel was complicated by its clandestine dealings with Palestinian militants. The United States, in particular, was keenly aware of Italy’s soft approach to Palestinian terrorism, but chose not to confront the Italian government directly. This was partly due to the broader Cold War dynamics, in which the U.S. relied on Italy as a critical NATO ally in southern Europe. As a result, Washington often turned a blind eye to Italy’s backchannel dealings with Palestinian groups, preferring to focus on larger geopolitical issues, such as Soviet influence in Europe.

Israel, on the other hand, took a much more critical stance toward Italy’s involvement with Palestinian militants. Israeli intelligence agencies, particularly Mossad, were well aware of the covert operations being conducted on Italian soil and frequently raised concerns with their Italian counterparts. However, Italy’s leadership, particularly during the Cossiga and Moro years, was reluctant to jeopardize its relationship with Palestinian leaders, whom they saw as vital players in maintaining Italy’s security.

Israel’s frustration with Italy’s policies culminated in several high-profile diplomatic incidents, including the 1982 assassination of Adel Wahid Zuaiter, a key figure in the Black September group, by Mossad agents in Rome. The killing, which took place in the heart of the Italian capital, highlighted the extent of Palestinian operations in Italy and the deepening rift between Rome and Jerusalem over the handling of terrorist threats. Despite these tensions, Italy continued to pursue its policy of non-interference, believing that the Moro Agreement was essential to preventing further attacks on Italian soil.

The Impact of the Moro Agreement on European Security Policy

Italy’s approach to dealing with Palestinian militants through the Moro Agreement was not unique in Europe. Several other European countries, including France and West Germany, adopted similar strategies of appeasement and non-confrontation in their dealings with Middle Eastern terrorist groups. These policies were part of a broader European reluctance to engage directly with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, preferring instead to maintain diplomatic neutrality while quietly striking deals with militant organizations.

However, Italy’s particular brand of realpolitik had far-reaching consequences for European security. By allowing Palestinian militants to operate freely on its soil, Italy unwittingly contributed to the proliferation of terrorist networks across Europe. The safe havens provided by Italy and other European countries enabled Palestinian groups to expand their reach, carrying out attacks not only in the Middle East but also in Europe and beyond. This created a domino effect, with other European nations becoming targets for terrorist attacks, even as they sought to avoid direct confrontation with Palestinian militants.

In the years following the Moro Agreement, European security policy underwent a significant transformation. The rise of Islamic fundamentalist groups in the 1990s and 2000s, along with the increasing threat of global terrorism, forced European countries to reevaluate their approach to dealing with militant organizations. Italy, in particular, faced renewed scrutiny over its past policies, with critics arguing that the Moro Agreement had set a dangerous precedent for future dealings with terrorist groups.

Contemporary Parallels: Hezbollah and Italy’s Role in the Middle East

In recent years, Italy’s involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts has taken on new dimensions, particularly in its relationship with Hezbollah in Lebanon. As Cossiga himself acknowledged in his later years, Italy’s military presence in Lebanon, particularly through its participation in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), has been shaped by a similar logic to the Moro Agreement. Italy has sought to maintain a neutral position in the region, often turning a blind eye to Hezbollah’s activities in exchange for guarantees that Italian peacekeepers will not be targeted.

This approach, while pragmatic, has raised serious ethical concerns. Just as the Moro Agreement left Italy’s Jewish population vulnerable to attacks, Italy’s tacit understanding with Hezbollah has been criticized for allowing the group to continue its military buildup in southern Lebanon, unchecked by international forces. Moreover, Italy’s policy towards Hezbollah mirrors a larger trend of Western nations engaging with non-state actors to preserve national interests, even at the cost of fostering instability in already volatile regions.

Hezbollah’s Resurgence and Italy’s Role in Lebanon

Hezbollah, the powerful Shiite militia and political entity based in Lebanon, has capitalized on such permissive stances by nations like Italy to consolidate power and expand its military capabilities. Since the 2006 Lebanon War, Hezbollah has significantly increased its stockpile of weapons, including rockets and missiles capable of reaching Israeli territory. Much of this military growth has occurred under the watchful eyes of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), in which Italy plays a prominent role.

Despite UNIFIL’s mandate to ensure peace and prevent armed groups from rearming, Hezbollah has continued to operate freely in southern Lebanon. Italian peacekeepers, often stationed in areas heavily influenced by Hezbollah, have maintained a delicate neutrality, avoiding direct confrontation with the group. This hands-off approach has allowed Hezbollah to solidify its control over significant portions of southern Lebanon, reinforcing its status as a formidable regional power.

Critics argue that Italy’s involvement in UNIFIL has become more symbolic than effective, as the mission has been largely powerless in curbing Hezbollah’s activities. The tacit agreement, similar to the logic behind the Moro Agreement, ensures that Italian soldiers are not targeted, but it also emboldens Hezbollah to operate with impunity. The result is a fragile and dangerous balance, in which Italy’s desire to avoid conflict inadvertently facilitates the growth of one of the most militarized non-state actors in the Middle East.

Strategic Alliances and Shifting Geopolitics

Italy’s reluctance to confront Hezbollah or Palestinian organizations can be understood within the larger framework of its geopolitical alliances. Historically, Italy has sought to maintain good relations with both Western powers and Arab states, balancing its commitments to NATO with its economic and political interests in the Middle East. This delicate balancing act has often required Italy to make concessions that other Western nations might find untenable.

Italy’s economic ties with Arab nations, particularly in the energy sector, have played a key role in shaping its foreign policy. As a major importer of oil and gas from the Middle East and North Africa, Italy has long recognized the importance of maintaining stable relations with regional actors, even those involved in terrorism or insurgency. The country’s reliance on Middle Eastern energy supplies has, at times, led to policy decisions that prioritize short-term security and economic benefits over long-term stability or ethical considerations.

This pragmatic approach to foreign policy was evident during the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring. As regimes across the Middle East and North Africa were destabilized, Italy was forced to recalibrate its diplomatic efforts. In Libya, for instance, Italy initially supported the Gaddafi regime, viewing it as a stabilizing force that could prevent a flow of migrants into southern Europe. However, when the Gaddafi government collapsed, Italy was quick to adapt, engaging with various factions and militias to ensure its interests were safeguarded.

European Security in the Face of Growing Militancy

As Italy’s relationships with Middle Eastern groups evolved, European security concerns regarding terrorism have intensified. In the post-9/11 world, the specter of Islamic fundamentalism has become a paramount issue for European governments. While Italy’s deals with Palestinian militants and Hezbollah once seemed confined to regional conflicts in the Middle East, these alliances now raise fears about the potential for terror attacks within Europe itself.

Italy, like many of its European counterparts, has been a target of jihadist-inspired terrorism, albeit to a lesser extent than countries like France, the UK, or Spain. The concern, however, lies not just in immediate threats but in the broader consequences of allowing militant groups to operate freely in the Middle East. Hezbollah’s growing strength and influence in Lebanon, coupled with its close ties to Iran, has implications for European security that extend far beyond Italy’s borders. Hezbollah’s global reach, including its involvement in drug trafficking and money laundering across Latin America and Europe, underscores the risks associated with its unchecked rise.

The failure to curtail Hezbollah’s activities through UNIFIL, or to hold Palestinian militants accountable for their actions during the Moro Agreement era, reflects a broader pattern of European inaction. This pattern of appeasement has emboldened groups like Hezbollah, which now enjoy significant autonomy and influence in their regions of operation. The fear among European security experts is that these groups could eventually redirect their focus from regional conflicts to global jihad, targeting Western interests abroad and at home.

Italy’s Diplomatic Isolation within the EU

Italy’s approach to dealing with militant groups and non-state actors has also led to occasional diplomatic friction within the European Union. While other EU member states, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, have taken a harder line against terrorism and state-sponsored militancy, Italy has often pursued a more conciliatory stance. This divergence has occasionally caused tensions within the EU, particularly as Europe seeks a unified response to the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.

Germany, for example, has been a staunch advocate of stronger measures against Hezbollah, including its designation as a terrorist organization in its entirety (not just the military wing). Italy, however, has been more cautious, fearing that such a move could jeopardize its peacekeeping mission in Lebanon or provoke retaliatory attacks on Italian nationals. This divergence in approach has led to Italy being viewed as somewhat isolated on issues of Middle Eastern militancy within the EU, with Rome often acting as a lone voice in favor of diplomatic engagement over military action or sanctions.

Intelligence and the Shadow of the Moro Agreement

Even today, the legacy of the Moro Agreement continues to cast a shadow over Italy’s intelligence services. The willingness to engage in clandestine deals with militant groups during the Cold War set a precedent for future interactions with non-state actors, and many within Italy’s intelligence community remain reluctant to fully sever ties with these groups. Critics argue that this reluctance is rooted in a fear of reprisal and a desire to maintain Italy’s unique position as a mediator between East and West.

This cautious approach has not gone unnoticed by Italy’s international partners. Both the United States and Israel have expressed concerns over Italy’s continued engagement with groups like Hezbollah, arguing that such policies undermine broader counter-terrorism efforts. While Italy remains a crucial NATO ally, its reluctance to adopt a more aggressive stance against Middle Eastern militancy has occasionally led to friction with Washington and Tel Aviv. For example, during the Trump administration, the U.S. applied significant pressure on European nations to take a harder line against Hezbollah, but Italy resisted these calls, citing concerns over its peacekeeping role in Lebanon and the potential for violence against its troops.

Israel, too, has frequently voiced frustration with Italy’s policies, particularly when it comes to UNIFIL’s perceived failure to limit Hezbollah’s rearmament in southern Lebanon. As Hezbollah continues to amass weapons in preparation for future conflicts with Israel, Italian peacekeepers have been criticized for failing to adequately monitor or report these activities. This passive stance has strained Italy’s relations with Israel, with many Israeli officials viewing Italy’s policies as an indirect enabler of Hezbollah’s continued militarization.

Reassessing Italy’s Strategy in 2024: The Geopolitical Consequences

As of 2024, the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East has shifted dramatically, with new alliances, power struggles, and conflicts shaping the region. Italy’s historical agreements with groups like Hezbollah and the PLO must now be reevaluated in light of these changes. The rise of new actors, such as the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen and the resurgence of ISIS in parts of Iraq and Syria, presents new challenges for Italy and its partners. Moreover, the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues to influence Italy’s foreign policy decisions, with Rome often attempting to walk a fine line between supporting Palestinian statehood and maintaining strong diplomatic ties with Israel.

Italy’s strategic interests in the region are increasingly tied to its energy needs, with the Eastern Mediterranean emerging as a key area of focus. The discovery of large natural gas reserves in the region, particularly in Israeli and Cypriot waters, has created new opportunities for Italy to secure its energy future. However, these developments also bring Italy into direct competition with other regional powers, including Turkey and Egypt, further complicating its diplomatic position.

As Italy seeks to secure its energy supplies while maintaining stability in the region, its historical reliance on clandestine agreements with militant groups may no longer be a viable strategy. The risk of blowback, both in terms of terrorist attacks and diplomatic isolation, has grown significantly in recent years, and Italy’s leaders must now confront the legacy of the Moro Agreement and similar deals in shaping the country’s future foreign policy.

Looking Ahead: The Future of Italy’s Middle East Policy

In 2024, Italy finds itself at a crossroads. The country’s historical policy of appeasement towards militant groups, rooted in the pragmatism of the Moro Agreement, has yielded both security and controversy. As Italy’s role in the Middle East evolves, it must navigate the competing pressures of maintaining diplomatic relations, securing energy resources, and upholding ethical standards in the face of growing regional instability.

The question facing Italy’s policymakers today is whether the strategies of the past can still be justified in a rapidly changing world. The continued growth of Hezbollah, the resurgence of militant groups across the Middle East, and the shifting dynamics of global terrorism demand a reassessment of Italy’s role in the region. The legacy of the Moro Agreement, once seen as a necessary evil, now stands as a cautionary tale of the dangers of making deals with forces that operate outside the bounds of international law.

Italy must now decide whether to continue its policy of engagement with non-state actors or to join its European and Western allies in taking a firmer stand against terrorism. The choices made in the coming years will not only shape Italy’s future security but will also determine its standing on the global stage as a nation that either stands firm on principles or continues to engage in pragmatic, yet morally questionable, diplomacy.

The Current Geopolitical Context: Italy’s Position in the Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict

In recent days, the geopolitical tensions between Israel and Hezbollah have escalated once again, drawing condemnation from Italian officials, including Minister of Defense Guido Crosetto and Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. Italy’s condemnation of Israeli strikes in Lebanon, which have involved United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) infrastructures, reflects the ongoing complexity of Italy’s position in Middle Eastern affairs. Italy, a key contributor to UNIFIL, has traditionally maintained a balancing act between supporting international peacekeeping efforts and engaging in diplomatic relationships with both Israel and Lebanon. However, the latest developments highlight deeper issues within Italy’s foreign policy, particularly its handling of Hezbollah and the broader implications for regional stability.

Italian Condemnation of Israeli Strikes

On October 10, 2024, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Minister Crosetto made a joint statement strongly condemning Israeli military strikes that reportedly damaged UNIFIL infrastructure in southern Lebanon. These strikes were part of Israel’s ongoing efforts to target Hezbollah positions following repeated provocations from the militant group. While Italy’s condemnation was framed in the context of protecting UNIFIL personnel and preserving international law, the statements also pointed to the long-standing tensions between Italy’s peacekeeping commitments and the realities on the ground in Lebanon, where Hezbollah remains a dominant force.

The Italian government’s position reflects its broader commitment to maintaining stability in the region, especially as Italy has more than 1,000 troops deployed under the UNIFIL mandate. Yet, the condemnation also brings to light critical questions about the effectiveness of UNIFIL in addressing the growing threat posed by Hezbollah’s military buildup. Despite UNIFIL’s mandate to prevent hostile activities and rearmament in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah has continued to consolidate its power, stockpiling weapons and fortifying positions in close proximity to UNIFIL installations.

Israeli Discoveries of Hezbollah Positions Near UNIFIL Bases

One of the most significant recent developments that has put further strain on the UNIFIL mission and Italy’s role in it is the Israeli Defense Forces’ (IDF) discovery of dozens of Hezbollah positions just meters away from UNIFIL bases. This revelation has raised critical concerns about the credibility of the peacekeeping force and its ability to monitor and control Hezbollah’s military activities. According to reports from the IDF, Hezbollah has constructed fortified bunkers, weapons storage sites, and observation posts within the UNIFIL area of operations, often in direct violation of the ceasefire agreement established after the 2006 Lebanon War.

These positions, strategically placed near UNIFIL infrastructure, are believed to be part of Hezbollah’s preparations for a future confrontation with Israel. They are equipped with advanced missile systems, including Iranian-supplied precision-guided munitions capable of striking deep into Israeli territory. The proximity of these installations to UNIFIL forces has complicated efforts to address the growing threat, as any Israeli military action in these areas risks damaging UN infrastructure or causing casualties among peacekeepers, further fueling diplomatic tensions.

The IDF’s findings suggest that Hezbollah has been exploiting UNIFIL’s mandate, using the presence of international peacekeepers as a shield to deter Israeli strikes. In response to these revelations, Israeli officials have criticized UNIFIL for failing to take decisive action against Hezbollah’s military buildup. Israel’s Ambassador to the UN, Gilad Erdan, recently called for a reevaluation of UNIFIL’s role, stating that the peacekeeping force has been “powerless in preventing Hezbollah from turning southern Lebanon into a fortress of terror.”

UNIFIL’s Inaction and Italy’s Dilemma

UNIFIL’s inaction in the face of Hezbollah’s expanding influence presents a significant challenge for Italy, which has historically played a leading role in the mission. Italy’s peacekeepers are stationed in areas of southern Lebanon where Hezbollah is most active, and the Italian government has repeatedly emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability through diplomatic engagement. However, the inability of UNIFIL to curb Hezbollah’s military activities has sparked growing frustration within Israel and has led to questions about the effectiveness of international peacekeeping efforts in the region.

Italian officials, including Prime Minister Meloni, have defended Italy’s involvement in UNIFIL, stressing that the mission remains a critical component of regional stability. However, the revelations about Hezbollah’s proximity to UNIFIL bases highlight the limitations of the peacekeeping force. The Italian government faces a dilemma: on the one hand, it must uphold its commitment to international law and the protection of peacekeepers, while on the other, it must navigate the complexities of dealing with a heavily armed non-state actor that operates with near impunity in southern Lebanon.

Hezbollah’s entrenched presence in areas monitored by UNIFIL has prompted calls for a reassessment of the mission’s rules of engagement. Critics argue that UNIFIL’s mandate is too restrictive, preventing peacekeepers from taking proactive measures against Hezbollah’s activities. Currently, UNIFIL personnel are not authorized to enter private property without prior coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), a constraint that Hezbollah has exploited by building much of its infrastructure in civilian areas. This limitation has allowed Hezbollah to continue its operations without fear of intervention from international forces.

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The Geopolitical Implications of Italy’s Position

Italy’s condemnation of Israeli actions, coupled with its ongoing commitment to UNIFIL, reflects the country’s broader foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. As a NATO member with strong ties to both Europe and the Arab world, Italy has historically sought to position itself as a mediator in the Israeli-Arab conflict. The Italian government’s recent statements reaffirm its dedication to multilateral diplomacy and international peacekeeping, but they also underscore the growing rift between Italy’s goals and the realities on the ground in Lebanon.

In recent years, Hezbollah’s military capabilities have become a central concern for both Israel and the broader international community. The group’s extensive arsenal of rockets and missiles, many of which are supplied by Iran, poses a direct threat to Israel’s security and regional stability. Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian Civil War, where it has fought alongside Iranian forces and the Assad regime, has further enhanced its military expertise, making it one of the most formidable non-state actors in the region.

For Italy, Hezbollah’s rise presents a complex challenge. As a participant in UNIFIL, Italy is committed to upholding the ceasefire agreement and maintaining peace in southern Lebanon. However, the Italian government must also contend with the reality that Hezbollah has effectively circumvented UNIFIL’s efforts to prevent rearmament and has used the peacekeeping force’s presence to its advantage. This dynamic has placed Italy in a difficult position, as it seeks to balance its role as a peacekeeper with the need to address the growing threat posed by Hezbollah.

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Italy’s Response to Growing Regional Tensions

In the wake of the latest Israeli strikes and the subsequent condemnation from Italian leaders, there is growing pressure on the Italian government to reassess its strategy in Lebanon. The discovery of Hezbollah positions so close to UNIFIL bases has exposed the limitations of Italy’s current approach and raised questions about whether Italy can continue to support a mission that has been largely ineffective in curbing Hezbollah’s influence.

One potential avenue for Italy is to advocate for reforms to UNIFIL’s mandate, including granting peacekeepers greater authority to inspect suspected Hezbollah facilities and more robust engagement rules that allow for preemptive action when necessary. However, such reforms would likely face significant resistance from both Hezbollah and the Lebanese government, which have historically viewed UNIFIL’s role as one of monitoring, rather than active intervention.

Additionally, Italy’s broader relationship with Iran, Hezbollah’s primary sponsor, complicates its ability to take a more aggressive stance. Italy has maintained diplomatic ties with Iran, viewing the country as an important economic partner, particularly in the energy sector. Any shift in Italy’s position on Hezbollah could have repercussions for its relationship with Tehran, potentially jeopardizing trade and investment opportunities.

The Path Forward: Italy’s Strategic Calculus

As of October 2024, Italy’s involvement in UNIFIL and its broader role in the Middle East are at a critical juncture. The increasing threat posed by Hezbollah, combined with Israel’s growing impatience with UNIFIL’s inaction, presents a significant challenge for Italian policymakers. The condemnation of Israeli strikes reflects Italy’s desire to protect its peacekeepers and uphold international law, but it also highlights the limitations of the current approach to peacekeeping in Lebanon.

Italy must now weigh its options carefully. A continuation of the status quo may preserve Italy’s diplomatic relationships with Lebanon and Iran, but it also risks further emboldening Hezbollah and undermining the credibility of UNIFIL. On the other hand, advocating for a more proactive role in curbing Hezbollah’s activities could strain Italy’s relationships with key regional actors and provoke retaliation from Hezbollah itself.

In light of these challenges, Italy may seek to engage more deeply with its European and NATO allies to formulate a coordinated response to the Hezbollah issue. The growing threat posed by the group, coupled with the broader instability in the Middle East, underscores the need for a unified international strategy that addresses both the military and political dimensions of the conflict. For Italy, this means balancing its commitments to peacekeeping with the realities of a changing geopolitical landscape, where non-state actors like Hezbollah wield significant influence.

Ultimately, the path forward for Italy will depend on its ability to navigate the complex web of alliances, interests, and threats that define the current Middle Eastern geopolitical environment. The condemnation of Israeli strikes is only the latest development in a conflict that has deep roots and far-reaching implications, and Italy’s response in the coming months will be crucial in shaping both its role in the region and the future of the UNIFIL mission.

The Italian Government’s Role and Responsibility: Analyzing Declassified Documents and Parliamentary Interpellations

The recently declassified documents, alongside parliamentary requests submitted by former Italian President Francesco Cossiga, reveal a troubling history of Italy’s political maneuvering in the Middle East, specifically concerning Israel and Hezbollah. These documents provide critical insights into Italy’s involvement in Lebanon and the broader geopolitical implications of Italian decisions in the context of UNIFIL and relations with Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Iran.

Cossiga’s Interpellations: Parliamentary Accountability

The interpellations submitted by Francesco Cossiga in the Italian Senate in 2008 (Interpellanza 2/00028 and Interpellanza 2/00002) offer a scathing critique of Italy’s role in Lebanon through its participation in UNIFIL. Cossiga’s questions to the Minister of Defense expose a troubling alignment of Italian military leadership with Hezbollah, facilitated under the guise of peacekeeping operations.

In Interpellanza 2/00028, presented in September 2008, Cossiga explicitly questioned the Italian government’s approval of military honors rendered to Hezbollah militants killed by Israeli forces while conducting acts of terror. He critiqued the Italian contingent in Lebanon for facilitating Hezbollah’s rearmament, ultimately contributing to Hezbollah’s military success against the Lebanese government, leading to the establishment of a Hezbollah-dominated “unity government.” Cossiga raised concerns that Italian forces were not neutral peacekeepers but had implicitly supported the rise of Hezbollah’s military capabilities by allowing them to bypass Lebanese government oversight.

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This interpellation linked the UNIFIL mission and Italy’s leadership within it to Hezbollah’s ability to strengthen its militias without interference. Cossiga highlighted a disturbing trend in which Italian politicians and military commanders were complicit in Hezbollah’s consolidation of power, raising the possibility of another secret agreement, reminiscent of the Moro Agreement, this time aimed at ensuring Italian safety at the expense of Israel and regional stability.

In Interpellanza 2/00002, submitted in May 2008, Cossiga asked whether the Minister of Defense was aware that Italian units in Lebanon, under General Graziano’s command, had facilitated the transfer of arms to Hezbollah, aided by Iran and Syria. He also pointed out that Israel viewed Italian troops as “potentially hostile” due to their perceived alignment with Hezbollah, raising serious concerns about Italy’s ability to maintain neutrality in the conflict. This interpellation called into question the entire framework of Italy’s involvement in UNIFIL, suggesting that Italian forces were not only ineffective in disarming Hezbollah but were actively enabling their rearmament.

The Declassified Document: Evidence of Foreknowledge and Complicity

The declassified document dated June 18, 1982, which details intelligence reports about imminent attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe , further supports the argument that Italy’s political and military apparatus was well aware of the threats posed by Palestinian and Lebanese militant groups. The document, addressed to various branches of the Italian security apparatus, including SISDE (Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Democratica) and SISMI (Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza Militare), explicitly mentions a reliable source informing the Italian government about potential attacks against Jewish and Israeli interests in Europe.

The timing of this document is critical, as it coincides with a period of heightened tension between Israel and Palestinian militant groups operating out of Lebanon. The document underscores the Italian government’s foreknowledge of the imminent danger to Israeli interests, yet, as subsequent events show, there was little effort to prevent attacks on Jewish targets, as seen in the 1982 attack on the Great Synagogue of Rome.

The Italian Government’s Shifting Narrative

In light of these documents and parliamentary interpellations, it becomes increasingly clear that Italian politicians have played a significant role in shaping the country’s ambiguous and often contradictory stance towards Israel and militant groups like Hezbollah. Publicly, Italian leaders have condemned Israeli actions, as demonstrated in recent statements by Minister Crosetto and Prime Minister Meloni, criticizing Israel for its strikes in Lebanon, particularly those involving UNIFIL infrastructure.

However, the declassified documents reveal a deeper, more troubling dynamic. While Italian officials have positioned themselves as neutral peacekeepers, behind the scenes, they have facilitated Hezbollah’s rise by turning a blind eye to its military buildup in southern Lebanon. This has been done under the guise of maintaining regional stability and protecting Italian soldiers, but the broader consequences have been detrimental to Israel’s security and to efforts to curb Hezbollah’s influence.

Italian politicians, through their condemnations of Israel, have attempted to distance themselves from the complexities of the Lebanese conflict, portraying Israel’s defensive actions as excessive while downplaying Hezbollah’s provocations and violations of UN mandates. The documents provided, however, indicate that Italy’s actions—or inactions—have contributed to the very threats that Israel seeks to neutralize.

From the Past to Today: Tracing the Continuity of Italian Complicity

The roots of Italy’s current stance on Israel and Lebanon can be traced back to the Moro Agreement, in which Italy agreed not to interfere with Palestinian militants operating within its borders in exchange for immunity from attacks on Italian soil. This policy of appeasement has evolved over time, shifting from Palestinian groups like the PLO to Hezbollah. The interpellations and the declassified documents suggest that Italian policymakers have long been aware of the threats posed by militant groups, yet have consistently opted for a policy of appeasement, allowing these groups to operate with impunity.

This historical complicity has continued into the present day, as evidenced by the discovery of Hezbollah positions near UNIFIL bases. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have uncovered numerous Hezbollah installations just meters from UNIFIL infrastructure, yet UNIFIL—and by extension, Italy—has done little to disrupt these activities. The proximity of these installations to international peacekeepers raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of UNIFIL’s mandate and Italy’s willingness to confront Hezbollah.

Current Developments and Italy’s Accountability

Recent actions by Israeli forces targeting Hezbollah positions, coupled with Italian condemnations of these strikes, highlight the ongoing tension between Italy’s public stance and its behind-the-scenes policies. Italy’s reluctance to hold Hezbollah accountable for its actions, despite clear evidence of their military buildup, reflects a continuation of the appeasement strategy that began with the Moro Agreement. Italian politicians, by condemning Israeli strikes while ignoring Hezbollah’s violations, have perpetuated a false narrative of neutrality, effectively shielding Hezbollah from international scrutiny.

The recent discoveries of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure near UNIFIL bases further emphasize the Italian government’s responsibility. The Cossiga interpellations, along with the declassified SISDE document, demonstrate that Italian officials have long been aware of the threats posed by militant groups in Lebanon. However, rather than addressing these threats, Italy has chosen to focus its criticism on Israel, deflecting attention from its own role in enabling Hezbollah’s rise.

Holding Italy to Account

The documents and interpellations presented reveal a disturbing pattern of Italian complicity in the rise of Hezbollah and the perpetuation of violence in Lebanon. By prioritizing short-term stability and the safety of its peacekeepers, Italy has allowed Hezbollah to grow into a formidable military force, all while condemning Israel for defending itself against the very threats that Italy has helped foster.

Moving forward, it is imperative that Italy reevaluates its role in the Middle East, particularly in relation to UNIFIL and Hezbollah. The Italian government must confront the uncomfortable truth that its policies have not been as neutral as they claim, and that their appeasement of Hezbollah has directly contributed to the instability in the region. As new developments unfold, Italy’s accountability in this complex geopolitical landscape must be scrutinized, and the country must take steps to ensure that its actions align with the principles of international law and regional security.

Italy’s Diplomatic Maneuvering: From Moro to Hezbollah and Beyond

Italy’s handling of Middle Eastern conflicts has been consistently shaped by a cautious, often contradictory foreign policy. As revealed in the declassified SISDE documents and through parliamentary interpellations submitted by Francesco Cossiga, Italy’s approach has, at its core, revolved around balancing short-term security against long-term regional ramifications. This complex strategy has enabled Italy to navigate its diplomatic relationships with both Western allies and Arab states, particularly in the context of its role in peacekeeping missions and military deployments.

Today, Italy’s continued involvement in UNIFIL reveals deep contradictions in its diplomatic and military approach. On the one hand, Italy upholds international law and plays a prominent role in peacekeeping missions designed to foster stability. On the other hand, the documents provided make it evident that Italy has tacitly facilitated the growth and entrenchment of Hezbollah’s military capacity through inaction, while publicly condemning Israeli self-defense actions as excessive. This dichotomy between Italy’s official stance and on-the-ground realities raises critical questions about its real motives and goals in Lebanon and the broader Middle East.

Analysis of Italy’s Arms Sales and Military Cooperation: A Detailed Examination

Italian Arms Exports and Beneficiaries

Italy’s role in the Middle East has become increasingly complex, particularly with regard to its arms exports and military cooperation with regional actors. Over the past decade, Italy has substantially increased its arms exports to countries in the Middle East, especially Qatar, Egypt, and Kuwait. Between 2018 and 2023, Italy’s arms exports rose by 86%, making it one of the fastest-growing defense exporters in Europe. Italian firms, particularly Leonardo S.p.A., play a critical role in producing and exporting high-tech military equipment, including aircraft, drones, and missiles. Leonardo specializes in building and exporting fighter jets, missile systems, and naval defense systems that have been sold to numerous Middle Eastern countries, some of which have direct or indirect connections to Hezbollah​ (Atlas of wars – Atlas of wars.)

Lebanon and Hezbollah’s Access to Arms

Italy’s military aid to Lebanon, particularly to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), officially aims to bolster the country’s defense against internal threats and secure its borders. However, the close relationship between the LAF and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon has raised significant concerns about weapons and technologies ending up in Hezbollah’s hands. The porous nature of Lebanon’s defense apparatus, where Hezbollah exercises significant control in areas bordering Israel, has made it challenging to ensure that military aid destined for the LAF is not diverted to Hezbollah​ (Atlas of wars.)

Hezbollah’s arsenal has grown significantly over the past two decades, with direct military support from Iran and Syria. According to reports, Hezbollah now possesses more than 130,000 rockets and missiles, including advanced systems like the Fajr-5, Zelzal, and Fateh-110 missiles. These weapons, supplied by Iran and transited through Syria, pose a serious threat to Israel’s security. Italy’s ongoing arms exports to Lebanon, while officially intended for the Lebanese state, contribute to an environment where Hezbollah has access to military-grade equipment​ (Middle East Eye – The Iran Primer.)

Technological Transfers and Dual-Use Equipment

One significant concern is the transfer of dual-use technology—civilian technology that can also have military applications. Italy, through Leonardo S.p.A., has been a key player in providing advanced radar systems and drones to Middle Eastern countries. Some of this equipment has found its way into Hezbollah’s arsenal. For example, Iranian-made drones, which Hezbollah has deployed for both surveillance and offensive operations, are believed to incorporate technological components that originated in Western markets, including Italy​ (Atlas of wars – The Iran Primer.)

Moreover, Leonardo’s involvement in Israel through its subsidiary, DRS RADA Technologies, further complicates the geopolitical dynamics. This company provides radar and defense systems that are crucial for Israel’s air defense but may indirectly benefit Hezbollah’s operations, given the region’s tangled military landscape​ (Atlas of wars.)

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Detailed Analysis: Dual-Use Technology and Its Transfer to Middle Eastern Actors, Including Hezbollah

One of the most concerning aspects of Italy’s defense industry, particularly through Leonardo S.p.A., is its involvement in providing dual-use technologies—technologies that have both civilian and military applications. This has raised questions about how these technologies are being used by Middle Eastern actors, including Hezbollah. Here, I provide an analytical breakdown of the critical radar systems and drones produced by Leonardo that have found their way into military operations, and the potential implications of such transfers.

Advanced Radar Systems: From Surveillance to Battlefield Applications

Leonardo’s Tactical Multi-Mission Radar (TMMR), a highly mobile C-band radar system, has become one of the most advanced dual-use products. Officially designed for both civilian (border security, infrastructure surveillance) and military purposes (counter-unmanned aerial systems or C-UAS, counter-rocket artillery, mortar systems, etc.), TMMR has been widely deployed in the Middle East​ (Electronics Solutions – Electronics Solutions.)

TMMR’s lightweight, portable design (under 50 kg), combined with its ability to detect small, fast-moving objects such as drones, makes it a powerful tool in asymmetric warfare settings. While its original intent was for short-range air defense and infrastructure protection, its military potential is undeniable, especially in complex battlefields like Lebanon, where Hezbollah operates. Reports have indicated that Iran, a major Hezbollah supporter, has provided the group with similar radar systems, some of which incorporate technology that appears to share characteristics with Leonardo’s TMMR​ (Electronics Solutions.)

Dual-use radar systems such as the TMMR, as well as AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) technology used in Leonardo’s radar suites, are capable of being repurposed by military actors. AESA radars can track and classify multiple targets simultaneously, making them highly adaptable in warfare, allowing for enhanced battlefield awareness and missile defense​ (Electronics Solutions – Aerospace, Defence and Security).

Uncrewed Systems: Drones in Surveillance and Combat

Leonardo’s Falco family of drones, particularly the Falco Xplorer, is another critical example of dual-use technology. This drone system was originally designed for ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance) missions but has since evolved into a platform that is fully capable of carrying out military operations​ (Uncrewed Systems). The Falco Xplorer boasts modular payload capabilities, allowing it to be equipped with electro-optical sensors and radar systems, which make it highly adaptable to both civilian and military environments.

It has been widely documented that Iran has used similar uncrewed systems to support Hezbollah’s operations. Drones that bear striking similarities to the Falco family have been deployed by Hezbollah for both reconnaissance and offensive purposes in southern Lebanon, with Iranian manufacturing and technology potentially linked to Italian-made components​ (Aerospace, Defence and Security.) Leonardo’s participation in providing drones to Middle Eastern governments may have, unintentionally, facilitated the transfer of similar technologies to Hezbollah through regional actors like Syria and Iran.

Hezbollah’s Access to Italian Dual-Use Technology

Although there is no direct sale of military equipment to Hezbollah, the close ties between Lebanese state institutions and Hezbollah raise concerns. Hezbollah has leveraged its deep connections with Lebanon’s Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Iranian-backed militias to access dual-use technology, either through local procurement or smuggling routes from Syria and Iran. Italian-made radar systems and drone technologies, designed for border surveillance and civil defense, may thus end up in the hands of Hezbollah, where they are repurposed for military use against Israel​ (Electronics Solutions.)

In fact, the Falco EVO and Xplorer drones, with over 800 units sold worldwide, have seen deployments in regions where Hezbollah operates, primarily for ISTAR missions​ (Uncrewed Systems). These systems offer Hezbollah the ability to gather intelligence over long distances, enabling them to improve their precision in strikes and reconnaissance against Israeli targets.

The Risks of Dual-Use Technology

Italy’s production and sale of dual-use technologies, especially through Leonardo S.p.A., is part of a broader strategic challenge. While these technologies are designed to provide civilian and defense infrastructure support, their adaptability makes them ideal tools in asymmetric warfare. Hezbollah’s access to these technologies—either directly through Iranian connections or indirectly via state institutions like the LAF—presents a growing concern for regional security.

Given the porous nature of Lebanon’s defense apparatus and Hezbollah’s significant influence within the LAF, the transfer of Italian-made systems to this environment inevitably risks falling into the hands of non-state actors. As such, it is critical that Italy reevaluates its export controls on dual-use technologies to ensure that these products are not contributing to the militarization of groups like Hezbollah, which pose a significant threat to Israel and broader regional stability.

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Strategic Complications

While Italy’s arms exports are framed as supporting regional stability and state actors, the reality is far more complex. The presence of Hezbollah in Lebanon and its significant influence over the LAF creates an environment where military aid and arms sales to Lebanon can be diverted or misused. Italy’s continued defense cooperation with Middle Eastern countries—some of which have ties to Hezbollah—poses challenges for monitoring how these arms are ultimately used.

To mitigate these risks, Italy needs to reassess its arms export policies, particularly those involving dual-use technology and sales to nations with known affiliations to non-state actors like Hezbollah. As of 2024, the flow of advanced weaponry into the Middle East, coupled with Hezbollah’s ever-expanding military capabilities, underscores the urgent need for tighter arms export controls and greater scrutiny of military cooperation agreements​ (Atlas of wars – Atlas of wars – Middle East Eye.)

Hezbollah’s Financial Networks: Italy’s Role in Countering Terror Financing

Another key area where Italy’s foreign policy intersects with Hezbollah’s rise is in the realm of counter-terrorism financing. Hezbollah’s financial network is vast and spans multiple continents, with significant operations in Europe, including Italy. Over the years, Italy has been used as a hub for Hezbollah’s illicit financial activities, particularly in money laundering and drug trafficking, which have helped fund the group’s military operations in Lebanon and Syria.

Despite Italy’s participation in international efforts to combat terror financing, including its adherence to European Union sanctions targeting Hezbollah, enforcement on the ground has been inconsistent. In 2022, Italian financial authorities uncovered a network of shell companies operating in Milan and Rome, which were being used to funnel money to Hezbollah’s military wing. These funds, derived from illegal drug trafficking and the smuggling of counterfeit goods, were funneled through complex financial structures that allowed Hezbollah to evade sanctions and move money through legitimate banking channels.

The Italian government, under pressure from its European and American allies, has taken steps to tighten its financial oversight mechanisms. However, the declassified SISDE document from 1982 reveals that Italian intelligence was well aware of Hezbollah’s presence and its financial activities within Italian borders as early as the 1980s. Despite this, Italian authorities have been slow to crack down on these networks, preferring instead to focus on preserving diplomatic relations with key Middle Eastern partners, including Iran, Hezbollah’s primary backer.

Italy’s Complex Relationship with Iran: Diplomatic and Economic Ties

Italy’s relationship with Iran represents another critical piece of the puzzle. As one of Iran’s largest trading partners in Europe, Italy has consistently sought to maintain strong economic ties with Tehran, even in the face of growing international pressure to isolate Iran over its nuclear program and its support for proxy groups like Hezbollah. The declassified document provided highlights that Italian authorities have long been aware of Iran’s role in supplying Hezbollah with weapons and financial support, yet have opted to prioritize economic interests over security concerns.

The lifting of sanctions on Iran following the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015 allowed Italy to expand its economic cooperation with Iran, particularly in the oil and natural gas sectors. Italian energy giant Eni has been heavily involved in Iranian oil fields, and Italy has positioned itself as a key player in the European energy market by leveraging its access to Iranian resources. This economic partnership has created a disincentive for Italy to take a harder stance against Hezbollah, as doing so would likely strain relations with Iran and jeopardize lucrative trade agreements.

Moreover, Italy’s participation in diplomatic efforts to revive the JCPOA under the Biden administration has further complicated its position in the region. While the Italian government has publicly condemned Hezbollah’s actions, it has simultaneously lobbied for a more lenient approach towards Iran, seeking to protect its economic interests. This dual-track policy has allowed Hezbollah to continue its activities with minimal interference, as Iran remains emboldened by the economic benefits of its relationship with European countries like Italy.

UNIFIL’s Evolving Role and Italy’s Influence

Since its inception in 1978, UNIFIL’s mandate has evolved significantly, with Italy playing a leading role in shaping the mission’s objectives and rules of engagement. Italian diplomats and military commanders have been instrumental in crafting the UN Security Council resolutions that guide UNIFIL’s operations, particularly in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon War. However, the discovery of Hezbollah positions near UNIFIL bases raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of the mission and Italy’s influence over its implementation.

Despite the UN’s emphasis on disarming non-state actors and preventing the rearmament of militant groups, UNIFIL’s ability to enforce these mandates has been limited. Italian commanders in UNIFIL, including General Graziano, have faced criticism for taking a passive approach to Hezbollah’s violations. The parliamentary interpellations from Cossiga make it clear that Italian forces were aware of Hezbollah’s activities but chose not to intervene, largely out of concern for the safety of Italian peacekeepers.

Recent developments, including Hezbollah’s acquisition of precision-guided missiles and long-range rockets, have only heightened the stakes. These weapons, many of which are supplied by Iran and smuggled into Lebanon via Syria, have been placed in civilian areas close to UNIFIL positions, making it nearly impossible for Israeli forces to target them without risking international condemnation. Italy’s involvement in crafting UNIFIL’s rules of engagement, which prevent peacekeepers from entering private property without prior approval from the LAF, has inadvertently provided Hezbollah with a protective shield.

Hezbollah’s Infiltration of Lebanese Institutions: Italy’s Silent Endorsement?

The growing integration of Hezbollah into Lebanon’s political and military institutions has further complicated Italy’s role in the region. Since 2008, Hezbollah has effectively gained veto power over Lebanese government decisions, a development facilitated by the Doha Agreement that ended Lebanon’s brief civil war. Italian peacekeepers, tasked with maintaining the peace in southern Lebanon, have found themselves operating in a political environment where Hezbollah wields significant influence over key state institutions, including the LAF.

While Italy has publicly supported the LAF as a stabilizing force in Lebanon, there is mounting evidence that Hezbollah has infiltrated the military, using it to advance its own strategic objectives. Italian military aid, which is intended to strengthen the LAF’s ability to maintain internal security, has, in some cases, ended up in the hands of Hezbollah operatives. This dynamic has undermined Italy’s efforts to promote stability and has allowed Hezbollah to consolidate its military and political power.

Italian Public Opinion and Media Coverage: Shaping the Narrative

Public opinion in Italy regarding the country’s role in the Middle East, particularly its involvement in UNIFIL, has been shaped by a combination of media coverage and political discourse. In recent years, Italian media has focused primarily on the humanitarian aspects of Italy’s peacekeeping efforts, highlighting the contributions of Italian soldiers to maintaining peace and assisting local populations. However, there has been little attention paid to the deeper geopolitical implications of Italy’s actions, particularly its tacit support for Hezbollah’s continued military buildup.

This lack of critical analysis in the media has allowed Italian politicians to deflect responsibility for the consequences of their actions in Lebanon. The condemnation of Israeli strikes, as articulated by Prime Minister Meloni and Minister Crosetto, fits into a broader narrative that portrays Israel as the aggressor, while downplaying Hezbollah’s role in provoking these conflicts. The declassified documents, however, paint a very different picture—one in which Italy’s actions have directly contributed to the instability in southern Lebanon and the ongoing threat posed by Hezbollah.

Ongoing Investigations and Calls for Accountability

In light of these revelations, there have been growing calls within Italy for a more thorough investigation into the country’s role in facilitating Hezbollah’s rise. Members of the Italian parliament, including those from opposition parties, have demanded greater transparency from the government regarding its involvement in UNIFIL and its arms sales to Lebanon. These calls have been amplified by international watchdogs, who argue that Italy’s policies have contributed to the perpetuation of violence in the region.

Recent reports from the United Nations Panel of Experts on Lebanon have further implicated Italy in failing to enforce UN resolutions aimed at preventing the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah. While these reports stop short of accusing Italy of direct complicity, they highlight the country’s failure to take decisive action against Hezbollah’s violations. Italian officials have been slow to respond to these findings, with most government statements focusing on the need for diplomatic engagement rather than military intervention.

As new developments unfold, it is becoming increasingly clear that Italy’s foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly in relation to Hezbollah, is at a critical juncture. The declassified documents and parliamentary interpellations provided offer a damning indictment of Italy’s role in enabling Hezbollah’s military growth, and the country must now confront the consequences of its actions as it seeks to navigate an increasingly unstable region.

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APPENDIX 1 – Leonardo, Italy’s State-owned Company in the Gaza Conflict: A Geopolitical and Military Analysis

Leonardo S.p.A., Italy’s state-owned defense giant, is at the center of an ongoing controversy regarding its direct and indirect involvement in the Gaza conflict. As of 2024, Leonardo is one of the largest arms manufacturers in Europe, with more than 80% of its revenue derived from the defense sector. This analysis meticulously examines how weapons and technologies developed by Leonardo have been used in the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as well as the geopolitical implications of Italy’s involvement through arms sales and military cooperation with Israel.

Weapon Watch’s Findings: Leonardo’s Contributions to Israeli Military Operations

Weapon Watch, a European watchdog focused on arms transfers across the Mediterranean, has revealed that offensive systems produced by Leonardo have been used by Israeli forces in Gaza, contradicting the company’s public statements. Leonardo’s products, particularly the Oto Melara 76/62 mm Multi-Feeding Super Rapid naval guns, have been used by the Israeli Navy in recent operations along the Gaza coast.

A short film released by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) shows the Israeli Navy’s Sa’ar 6-class corvettes, armed with these rapid-fire naval guns, striking urban areas in northern Gaza. These corvettes, INS Magen and INS Oz, equipped with Leonardo’s Oto Melara systems, were delivered to Israel between December 2020 and May 2021. They have since been used in military operations, particularly during Israel’s response to Hamas attacks in October 2023. The naval guns have a range of 20 to 35 kilometers, making them ideal for targeting coastal regions like Gaza​ (The Iran Primer.)

Aermacchi M-346 Master ‘Lavi’ Fighters and their Role

Leonardo has also supplied 30 Alenia Aermacchi M-346 Master ‘Lavi’ jets to the Israeli Air Force between 2014 and 2016. Originally designed as advanced trainers, these jets can be modified for combat roles, including air-to-ground strikes. According to The Weapon Watch, although Leonardo had no direct involvement in the aircraft’s conversion to attack variants, the M-346 Lavi has been equipped with bomb anchoring systems and sub-pylons capable of carrying air-to-ground missiles, increasing their lethality in conflicts such as those in Gaza​ (The Iran Primer.)

This military capability, combined with the Italian state’s role as the majority shareholder of Leonardo (with over 51.8% ownership), raises ethical concerns about how these Italian-produced weapons are being used in combat, particularly in densely populated civilian areas like Gaza.

Leonardo’s Deep Involvement with the Israeli Military-Industrial Complex

Leonardo’s influence in the Israeli defense market extends beyond direct arms sales. In 2022, Leonardo completed the acquisition of RADA Electronic Industries, an Israeli company specializing in radar systems for short-range defense and anti-drone capabilities. The new Israeli subsidiary, DRS RADA Technologies, has three major locations in Israel, including a research center in the Negev Desert and a production facility in Beit She’an. These facilities have been pivotal in supplying Israel’s defense forces with cutting-edge radar technologies, some of which are used in Israel’s “Iron Fist” active protection system, now mounted on the Eitan Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) deployed in Gaza​ (The Iran Primer.)

Following the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, the Israeli Defense Forces rapidly deployed these Eitan AFVs into Gaza, utilizing DRS RADA’s active protection systems to safeguard troops and equipment. The vehicles were involved in the battle of Zikim, where they helped repel Palestinian militants near the Israeli military base​ (The Iran Primer.)

The Role of DRS Sustainment Systems: Supporting Heavy Armored Vehicles

Another Leonardo subsidiary, DRS Sustainment Systems Inc., based in the United States, has played a crucial role in ensuring the mobility of Israel’s armored units. DRS Sustainment supplies specialized two-axle trucks capable of transporting vehicles as heavy as Merkava tanks and Caterpillar D9 bulldozers—equipment used extensively by the IDF in urban warfare scenarios. These trucks have been part of Israel’s arsenal since at least 2007, when Leonardo collaborated with Shladot Metal Works in Haifa to produce vehicles suited to the IDF’s operational needs​ (The Iran Primer.)

These Caterpillar D9 bulldozers, often equipped with DRS RADA tactical radar systems, have been a critical asset in Israel’s urban combat operations, particularly in demolishing buildings and tunnels in Gaza. The bulldozers, which weigh more than 70 tonnes, are essential for clearing paths and destroying infrastructure that could be used by militants for ambushes​ (The Iran Primer.)

Implications for Italy’s Geopolitical Standing

The involvement of Leonardo S.p.A. in supplying Israel with offensive weapons has significant geopolitical implications, especially given the Italian government’s majority ownership of the company. Italy, which has historically positioned itself as a neutral mediator in the Middle East, finds itself in a precarious position. While Rome publicly supports diplomatic solutions and peace initiatives, its state-owned defense company is directly involved in supplying weapons used in one of the most volatile conflicts in the region.

Moreover, Pope Francis’ public rejection of a €1.5 million donation from Leonardo in January 2024 highlights the growing discontent within certain segments of Italian society regarding the country’s deepening ties to the arms industry. The Vatican’s decision, which was seen as a moral stance against war profiteering, underscores the tension between Italy’s official policy of neutrality and the reality of its economic interests in defense exports​ (The Iran Primer.)

Leonardo’s involvement in the Gaza conflict, its partnership with the Israeli military-industrial complex, and the continued use of its products in high-intensity conflicts have placed Italy under increased scrutiny from both international watchdogs and human rights organizations. The presence of Italian-developed weapons in civilian-heavy conflict zones raises urgent questions about the ethical responsibilities of state-owned defense contractors and the countries that support them.

A Growing Divide: Public Perception vs. Government Policy

The role of Italian defense contractors in the Middle East is likely to remain a contentious issue. As of early 2024, the Italian government continues to support arms exports as a vital part of its economy, but the optics of these exports—particularly when used in controversial operations—pose serious risks to Italy’s diplomatic relations. Israel’s military, one of the most advanced in the world, relies heavily on foreign technology, and Leonardo is a key player in ensuring the continued modernization of Israeli forces. This military cooperation, however, conflicts with Italy’s broader foreign policy goals in the region, particularly its relationships with Arab states and its longstanding commitment to humanitarian values.

Italy’s Strategic Dilemma

The use of Leonardo’s weapons and technologies in the Gaza conflict forces a reassessment of Italy’s role in the global arms trade and its impact on Middle Eastern conflicts. As international scrutiny grows, the Italian government must navigate a fine line between supporting its state-owned defense contractor and adhering to its stated principles of peace and stability in the region. The events of October 2023, coupled with ongoing operations in Gaza and potential future engagements with Hezbollah in Lebanon, will continue to challenge Italy’s foreign policy and its reputation as a responsible international actor​ (The Iran Primer​ – Atlas of wars​ – Middle East Eye.)

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APPENDIX 2 – Financial Costs of Maintaining UNIFIL

The Growing Budget of UNIFIL

The financial burden of maintaining UNIFIL has grown steadily over the years, with the current budget for the 2023/24 period standing at $551,113,500. This represents a significant increase from previous years, driven by rising operational costs, inflationary pressures, and the need to maintain a large contingent of military personnel and equipment.

• Personnel Costs: $360,230,000 is allocated to military and police personnel, covering the salaries, allowances, and logistical support for the force’s 13,000 troops. Civilian personnel expenses amount to $128,062,500, which includes the salaries of UNIFIL’s international and local staff, as well as additional allowances and benefits.
• Operational Costs: $62,821,000 is earmarked for operational expenses, including equipment maintenance, transportation, fuel, and the day-to-day operations of UNIFIL’s numerous bases and checkpoints.

This budgetary commitment is considerable, especially when viewed in light of the limited strategic impact UNIFIL has had on the ground. The rising costs have not been met with a commensurate increase in effectiveness, as Hezbollah’s presence remains firmly entrenched in southern Lebanon.

A Disproportionate Return on Investment

The most significant critique of UNIFIL’s budget is that the financial outlay has not translated into meaningful results. The force continues to operate with limited success in disarming Hezbollah or preventing the militant group from expanding its arsenal. This discrepancy between financial input and operational output raises questions about the long-term sustainability of the mission.

A comparative analysis with other UN peacekeeping operations reveals that UNIFIL’s per capita costs are higher than many other missions, yet the tangible outcomes are comparatively less impactful. The force’s inability to enforce key provisions of UNSCR 1701, particularly the disarmament of Hezbollah, underscores its limited utility as a peacekeeping force.

Detailed Analysis of UNIFIL Budget for 2024/25 Compared with 2023/24

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) continues its mandate under Security Council resolutions, with its budget for the period from 1 July 2024 to 30 June 2025 reflecting strategic priorities, operational adjustments, and financial management to support its objectives. Below is a detailed analysis of the 2024/25 budget, with a comparison to the previous 2023/24 financial period. The comparison includes key budget categories, activities, and strategic initiatives that define UNIFIL’s evolving role in the region.

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Budget Overview

The total proposed budget for the 2024/25 period amounts to $538,234,500, a marginal increase of $867,500 (0.2%) from the 2023/24 budget of $537,367,000. Below is a breakdown of the key financial resources and the variances between the two budget periods.

Table: Budget Comparison (2023/24 vs 2024/25)

Category	Expenditure (2022/23)	Apportionment (2023/24)	Cost Estimates (2024/25)	Variance	Percentage Change
Military and Police Personnel	323,631.6	350,446.1	352,000.5	+1,554.4	+0.4%
Civilian Personnel	119,427.4	128,024.4	131,255.9	+3,231.5	+2.5%
Operational Costs	59,860.1	58,896.5	54,978.1	-3,918.4	-6.7%
Gross Requirements	502,919.1	537,367.0	538,234.5	+867.5	+0.2%
Staff Assessment Income	16,383.6	17,086.9	18,116.9	+1,030.0	+6.0%
Net Requirements	486,535.5	520,280.1	520,117.6	-162.5	0.0%

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Key Budget Variances (2024/25 vs 2023/24)

• Military and Police Personnel: The budget for military and police personnel has increased by 0.4%, reflecting an increase of $1,554,400. This is primarily due to the continued transition of one key military contingent from United Nations-owned equipment to self-sustainment using contingent-owned major equipment. This transition, which began in the 2023/24 period, requires additional funds for maintaining operational readiness.
• Civilian Personnel: The civilian personnel budget increased by 2.5%, or $3,231,500, mainly due to revised salary scales for national staff and the addition of four temporary national positions in the Mine Action Unit. This shift reflects efforts to streamline operations and increase governance and transparency, particularly in the area of mine action, which was previously outsourced to UNOPS.
• Operational Costs: Operational costs saw a significant reduction of 6.7% ($3,918,400), primarily driven by reduced requirements in ground transportation, fuel savings from the replacement of fewer vehicles, and efficiency improvements in asset utilization. This reduction reflects the initial implementation of a new five-year phased asset replacement plan aimed at extending the life of critical assets.
• Staff Assessment Income: The projected income from staff assessments has increased by 6%, driven by salary adjustments and the changes in staffing structures, especially in the national personnel category.

Detailed Analysis of Activities and Strategic Priorities

Military and Police Personnel

The 2024/25 budget reflects an increase in personnel costs to support the continued operational requirements of UNIFIL’s mandate. The force will maintain its deployment of up to 13,000 military personnel and increase coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Notable activities include:

• Transition to Contingent-Owned Equipment: A key military contingent will continue transitioning from UN-owned equipment to self-sustained operations, requiring contingent-owned equipment in most categories. This shift is intended to enhance operational flexibility and reduce long-term costs.
• Increased Coordination with LAF: UNIFIL will intensify joint operations with LAF, focusing on maintaining security in the area between the Blue Line and the Litani River. The budget reflects additional resources to support these joint activities, including patrols and observation posts.

Civilian Personnel

The civilian personnel budget includes an increase in national staff positions, reflecting efforts to enhance cost efficiency and operational effectiveness. Key changes include:

• Mine Action Program: Four temporary positions have been added to the Mine Action Unit, shifting the delivery of mine-clearing operations from UNOPS to UNIFIL. This move is expected to reduce overhead costs and improve the governance of mine-clearing activities.
• Strategic Communications: In response to Security Council directives, UNIFIL will continue to strengthen its communication efforts to counter misinformation and promote transparency regarding its mandate and operations. This will require additional personnel to manage strategic communications and engage with local communities.

Operational Costs

Operational costs are expected to decrease significantly due to a combination of efficiency measures and reduced fuel consumption. Key factors include:

• Asset Replacement Plan: UNIFIL will begin implementing a new five-year phased asset replacement plan. This plan includes replacing 54 deteriorated prefabricated facilities, 400 obsolete air conditioning units, and seven generators at headquarters. By focusing on critical asset replacement, UNIFIL aims to extend the life of its infrastructure and avoid costly future replacements.
• Environmental Initiatives: UNIFIL will continue its focus on sustainability, expanding its solar energy capacity and replacing outdated energy systems with more eco-friendly alternatives. These efforts are expected to reduce long-term operational costs and contribute to the UN’s climate action goals.

Strategic Infrastructure Initiatives

Several infrastructure initiatives are outlined for the 2024/25 period, aimed at improving safety, security, and operational efficiency. These include:

• Relocation of Strategic Fuel Reserve: UNIFIL will relocate and consolidate its fuel reserves to improve efficiency and reduce environmental risks associated with current storage practices.
• Perimeter Security Enhancements: Following physical security assessments, UNIFIL will enhance the perimeter fencing and traffic barriers at its Naqoura headquarters, addressing security concerns.
• Facility Renovations: Additional budget allocations are dedicated to upgrading UNIFIL facilities, including replacing temporary structures with permanent ones to improve working and living conditions for personnel.

Strategic Mission Adjustments and Support Initiatives

In light of escalating tensions since October 2023, UNIFIL will continue to adjust its operations to maintain stability along the Blue Line. Key initiatives include:

• Tripartite Coordination: UNIFIL will leverage its established coordination mechanisms with Israel and Lebanon to de-escalate tensions and seek resolutions to disputes along the Blue Line.
• Support for Maritime Operations: The UNIFIL Maritime Task Force will maintain its role in maritime interdiction, preventing arms smuggling to non-state actors. However, the Lebanese Navy will continue to require significant support, as it is not expected to assume full operational control during the 2024/25 period.

The UNIFIL budget for 2024/25 reflects a marginal increase in overall financial requirements, with strategic reallocations aimed at maintaining operational readiness, improving infrastructure, and enhancing efficiency through asset replacement. The increase in personnel costs and strategic communications highlights the need to maintain an effective presence in southern Lebanon while adjusting to evolving security challenges. The reductions in operational costs reflect ongoing efforts to streamline operations and improve resource utilization. Overall, UNIFIL’s budget is designed to support its critical mandate of maintaining peace and stability in the region, despite the complex and challenging security environment.

This comprehensive analysis of the budget variances between 2023/24 and 2024/25 provides insights into how UNIFIL is adapting to operational challenges and seeking efficiencies to maximize the impact of its financial resources.

The Geopolitical Dimensions of UNIFIL’s Ineffectiveness

Hezbollah’s Role in Iran’s Regional Strategy

Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon cannot be understood without considering its relationship with Iran. Hezbollah is widely regarded as Iran’s most powerful proxy in the Middle East, and its activities in Lebanon are closely tied to Iran’s broader regional strategy. Iran has provided Hezbollah with funding, weapons, and training, allowing the group to build a formidable military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. This relationship has allowed Hezbollah to operate with relative impunity, despite international efforts to curtail its influence.

UNIFIL, as a peacekeeping force, is ill-equipped to address this geopolitical reality. While its mandate focuses on maintaining peace and stability in southern Lebanon, the broader dynamics of the Iran-Israel conflict are beyond its control. Hezbollah’s role as a proxy for Iran means that any effort to disarm the group or limit its activities is not just a local issue but a regional one, involving multiple state and non-state actors with competing interests.

The Weakness of the Lebanese State

The Lebanese state’s inability to exert control over Hezbollah is another key factor in UNIFIL’s ineffectiveness. Lebanon’s political system, which is based on a delicate balance of power between religious and sectarian groups, has allowed Hezbollah to operate as both a political party and a militant organization. While the Lebanese government is officially committed to UNSCR 1701, it lacks the political will and military capability to challenge Hezbollah’s dominance in the south.

This weakness has been exacerbated by Lebanon’s ongoing political and economic crises. The country has been without a fully functioning government for extended periods, and its economy is in a state of collapse, further limiting the state’s ability to assert authority. In this context, UNIFIL’s mission to support the Lebanese state in re-establishing control over southern Lebanon is rendered virtually impossible.

The Broader Arab-Israeli Conflict

UNIFIL’s role in southern Lebanon is also shaped by the broader context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the peacekeeping force is tasked with monitoring the situation along the Blue Line, the root causes of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah are far beyond the scope of UNIFIL’s mandate. Hezbollah views itself as part of the broader resistance movement against Israeli occupation of Arab lands, and its military operations are framed within this larger conflict.

As long as the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved, UNIFIL will continue to operate in a highly charged and unstable environment. While the peacekeeping force can monitor ceasefire agreements and report violations, it cannot address the underlying political and territorial disputes that fuel the conflict. This limits the force’s ability to achieve lasting peace and stability in the region.

Symbolism Over Substance: Security Council Resolutions and Their Limitations

The Limitations of UNSCR 1701

UNSCR 1701, passed in the aftermath of the 2006 war, is widely regarded as a well-intentioned but flawed document. While it calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah and the establishment of a buffer zone in southern Lebanon, it provides no mechanism for enforcing these provisions. As a result, Hezbollah has been able to maintain its military infrastructure in the region, and the Lebanese state has been unable to assert control over the south.

UNIFIL’s role under UNSCR 1701 is largely symbolic. While the peacekeeping force is tasked with monitoring compliance with the resolution, it lacks the authority to take meaningful action against violations. Hezbollah’s continued presence in southern Lebanon, along with its rearmament and fortification efforts, demonstrates the limitations of the resolution and the peacekeeping force’s ability to enforce it.

The Extension of UNIFIL’s Mandate: UNSCR 2650

In 2022, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 2650, which extended UNIFIL’s mandate for another year. This extension was met with mixed reactions. On one hand, the continuation of UNIFIL’s presence was seen as necessary for maintaining a semblance of stability in southern Lebanon. On the other hand, critics argued that the extension was merely symbolic, as the peacekeeping force had failed to achieve its core objectives under UNSCR 1701.

The symbolic nature of these resolutions highlights a broader problem with international diplomacy in the region. While the United Nations and the international community continue to call for peace and stability in southern Lebanon, they have been unable to apply meaningful pressure on Hezbollah or its regional backers to disarm. As a result, UNIFIL is left in the position of monitoring a status quo that is unsustainable in the long term.

UNIFIL’s Strategic Communications: A Case of Misinformation and Misperception

The Communication Challenges Facing UNIFIL

One of the key elements of UNIFIL’s mission, particularly as reaffirmed in UNSCR 2650 (2022), is to enhance communication efforts to better explain its mandate and the role it plays in maintaining peace and security in southern Lebanon. This strategic communications effort is intended to increase transparency, foster local support, and counteract the spread of misinformation that may undermine the mission’s legitimacy. Despite these efforts, UNIFIL has struggled to achieve its communication goals, leading to a number of misperceptions both locally and internationally about the effectiveness of the force.

One of the central challenges is that UNIFIL’s mission is poorly understood by the very communities it seeks to protect. Many in southern Lebanon view UNIFIL as either powerless to curb Hezbollah’s activities or as a foreign entity that serves external interests, particularly those of Israel and the West. Hezbollah itself has been adept at shaping the narrative surrounding UNIFIL, painting the force as either a passive observer or, at times, as complicit in Israel’s military actions. This has created an environment where UNIFIL struggles to gain the trust and cooperation of local populations, who may see the peacekeeping mission as irrelevant or even counterproductive.

Misinformation Campaigns and Their Impact

Hezbollah and its allies have been particularly effective in conducting disinformation campaigns that have undermined UNIFIL’s legitimacy. These campaigns often portray UNIFIL as an extension of Western military and political influence in Lebanon, which plays into broader anti-Western sentiment in the region. In areas where Hezbollah’s influence is strongest, UNIFIL is often viewed with suspicion, and its actions are interpreted as serving foreign interests rather than the Lebanese state or the local population.

The rise of digital platforms and social media has only amplified the reach of these misinformation campaigns. Local media outlets, some of which are aligned with Hezbollah or other political factions, regularly publish stories that distort the nature of UNIFIL’s operations or accuse the force of bias. These narratives are then picked up and shared across social media, further entrenching negative perceptions of UNIFIL. The result is a significant erosion of trust, making it more difficult for the force to operate effectively, especially in areas where its presence is most needed.

UNIFIL’s Efforts to Combat Disinformation

In response to these challenges, UNIFIL has attempted to strengthen its strategic communications through a variety of channels. The force regularly publishes reports on its activities, holds press conferences, and engages with local media in an effort to clarify its mandate and operations. In addition, UNIFIL has increased its presence on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, where it shares updates on patrols, community outreach efforts, and its role in maintaining peace along the Blue Line.

However, these efforts have met with limited success. While UNIFIL’s communications strategy has improved in recent years, it remains reactive rather than proactive, often responding to negative coverage after it has already taken hold. Moreover, the force’s reliance on English and French language media limits its reach in southern Lebanon, where Arabic is the primary language of communication. This language gap has allowed Hezbollah and its allies to dominate the narrative in many parts of the country, further complicating UNIFIL’s efforts to win hearts and minds.

Strategic Communications as a Missed Opportunity

UNIFIL’s struggle to communicate effectively with local populations and counteract disinformation campaigns represents a missed opportunity. If the peacekeeping force were able to build stronger relationships with local communities, it could potentially gain greater access to critical information about Hezbollah’s movements and activities. Additionally, improved communication could help reduce tensions between UNIFIL and the local population, which sometimes views the force with suspicion or hostility.

In the absence of a strong strategic communications framework, however, UNIFIL remains vulnerable to the spread of disinformation. This not only undermines its credibility but also diminishes its ability to carry out its mandate effectively. Without the trust and cooperation of local populations, UNIFIL’s efforts to monitor Hezbollah’s activities and maintain peace along the Blue Line are likely to remain limited.

The Role of UNIFIL’s Maritime Task Force

Maritime Interdiction and its Strategic Importance

In addition to its land-based operations, UNIFIL has been tasked with conducting maritime interdiction operations through the UNIFIL Maritime Task Force (MTF). Established as part of UNSC Resolution 1701, the MTF is responsible for monitoring Lebanon’s coastal waters, preventing the smuggling of arms to Hezbollah, and supporting the Lebanese Navy in controlling the country’s territorial waters.

The MTF represents a critical component of UNIFIL’s overall mission, as it is designed to stop the flow of weapons to Hezbollah, which relies heavily on external suppliers—primarily Iran. Lebanon’s porous land borders, particularly with Syria, have long been a conduit for arms smuggling, but the maritime route offers an additional vector for illicit arms transfers. By patrolling the sea, the MTF plays an important role in the broader effort to prevent Hezbollah from replenishing its military stockpiles.

Limited Success in Preventing Arms Smuggling

Despite the strategic importance of the MTF, its success in preventing arms smuggling has been limited. Hezbollah continues to receive significant quantities of weapons, many of which are believed to be smuggled through land routes via Syria. The MTF has intercepted ships suspected of carrying illegal arms on several occasions, but these interdictions represent only a small fraction of the total arms flow into Lebanon.

One of the key challenges facing the MTF is the limited capacity of the Lebanese Navy. While the MTF works in coordination with Lebanese naval forces, the Lebanese Navy is underfunded and poorly equipped, making it difficult for the country to assume full control over its maritime borders. As a result, the MTF continues to play a primary role in maritime security, even though its mandate originally envisioned a gradual transfer of responsibility to the Lebanese Navy.

The Financial Costs of Maritime Operations

Maritime operations are expensive, and the MTF accounts for a significant portion of UNIFIL’s overall budget. Maintaining a fleet of ships, conducting regular patrols, and ensuring the safety of maritime personnel requires substantial financial resources. In the 2023/24 budget, a significant portion of the $62.8 million allocated to operational costs is dedicated to maritime operations, including fuel, maintenance, and logistics.

Despite these high costs, the MTF’s impact on Hezbollah’s ability to smuggle weapons remains questionable. Given the group’s reliance on land-based smuggling routes, the MTF’s interdiction efforts, while important, have not been decisive in curbing Hezbollah’s rearmament. This raises questions about the cost-effectiveness of maintaining a robust maritime presence when the primary source of Hezbollah’s arms comes through other channels.

The Challenges of Transferring Responsibility to the Lebanese Navy

UNIFIL’s mandate under Resolution 1701 includes the goal of eventually transferring maritime security responsibilities to the Lebanese Navy. However, this transfer has proven difficult due to the Lebanese Navy’s limited capacity. The navy has struggled with a lack of funding, outdated equipment, and insufficient training, all of which make it ill-prepared to take over the duties currently performed by the MTF.

While joint training exercises between the MTF and the Lebanese Navy have been conducted regularly, progress has been slow. The Lebanese Navy remains heavily reliant on international support, both in terms of equipment and operational assistance. Without significant investment in naval capabilities, it is unlikely that the Lebanese Navy will be able to fully assume maritime security responsibilities in the near future.

UNIFIL’s Humanitarian and Social Contributions: An Overlooked Element?

UNIFIL’s Community Outreach and Humanitarian Efforts

While much of the criticism directed at UNIFIL focuses on its failure to disarm Hezbollah or prevent violence along the Blue Line, the peacekeeping mission has played a significant role in providing humanitarian assistance and supporting local communities in southern Lebanon. This aspect of UNIFIL’s operations is often overlooked, but it has had a tangible impact on the daily lives of many Lebanese citizens living in the region.

UNIFIL engages in a variety of community outreach programs, including the construction of infrastructure projects, the provision of medical services, and the delivery of humanitarian aid. The mission’s quick-impact projects (QIPs) are designed to address immediate community needs, such as repairing schools, providing clean water, and improving local roads. These projects, while small in scale, help to build goodwill between UNIFIL and the local population, fostering a sense of trust and cooperation.

The Role of Quick-Impact Projects (QIPs)

Quick-impact projects are one of the key tools UNIFIL uses to engage with local communities and demonstrate the tangible benefits of its presence. These projects are typically low-cost, high-impact initiatives that are designed to address immediate needs and improve living conditions in southern Lebanon. Examples include the rehabilitation of water wells, the construction of health clinics, and the repair of schools and community centers.

These projects, though limited in scope, serve an important function in building local support for UNIFIL. By addressing basic infrastructure and development needs, QIPs help to mitigate some of the resentment that may arise from UNIFIL’s perceived ineffectiveness in addressing larger security issues. They also serve as a form of soft diplomacy, allowing UNIFIL to engage with local leaders and demonstrate its commitment to improving the lives of ordinary Lebanese citizens.

Humanitarian Assistance During Crises

In addition to its community outreach efforts, UNIFIL has played a critical role in providing humanitarian assistance during periods of crisis. For example, during the 2006 war, UNIFIL assisted in the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians caught in the crossfire. The mission worked closely with international aid organizations to distribute food, water, and medical supplies to those affected by the conflict.

More recently, UNIFIL has supported local communities during Lebanon’s ongoing economic crisis, which has left many citizens without access to basic goods and services. The peacekeeping force has provided medical supplies, fuel, and other essential items to help alleviate the suffering caused by the country’s financial collapse. While these efforts cannot resolve the broader economic and political issues facing Lebanon, they have helped to ease some of the immediate burdens on local communities.

The Limitations of Humanitarian Efforts

Despite these positive contributions, UNIFIL’s humanitarian and social efforts are not without limitations. The scale of the needs in southern Lebanon far exceeds what the mission can provide, and its resources are stretched thin by the competing demands of maintaining security and delivering aid. Moreover, Hezbollah’s control over much of southern Lebanon means that UNIFIL’s ability to operate freely is often constrained, particularly in areas where Hezbollah’s influence is strongest.

There is also the question of whether UNIFIL’s humanitarian efforts are enough to justify the continued presence of such an expensive and militarily ineffective mission. While the peacekeeping force’s contributions to local development are important, they do not address the core issue of Hezbollah’s military dominance in the region. As such, some critics argue that UNIFIL’s humanitarian work, while valuable, should not obscure its larger strategic failures.

In conclusion….

UNIFIL’s long-standing presence in Lebanon represents one of the United Nations’ most visible and costly peacekeeping efforts. With a budget exceeding $550 million annually and a mandate that has expanded significantly since its inception, UNIFIL has played a critical role in maintaining a fragile peace along the Israel-Lebanon border. However, despite its substantial resources and international support, the force has largely failed to meet its core objectives, particularly with regard to disarming Hezbollah and preventing the militant group from rearming.

This analysis highlights the paradox of UNIFIL’s mission: while the peacekeeping force is tasked with maintaining peace and security in southern Lebanon, it is operating within a framework that renders it largely powerless to enforce its mandate. Hezbollah’s entrenched position in Lebanese society, combined with its military strength and regional backing from Iran, has made it impossible for UNIFIL to disarm the group or prevent its rearmament. Moreover, the broader geopolitical context, including the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict and Lebanon’s internal political instability, further limits UNIFIL’s ability to operate effectively.

Despite these strategic shortcomings, UNIFIL has made important contributions to local communities through its humanitarian and social efforts. The force’s quick-impact projects and provision of humanitarian aid have helped to improve living conditions in southern Lebanon, building some level of goodwill with the local population. However, these efforts, while valuable, do not address the core security issues facing the region.

In the final analysis, UNIFIL’s continued presence in Lebanon raises difficult questions about the effectiveness of international peacekeeping in contexts where local power dynamics and regional conflicts far exceed the scope of the mission’s mandate. Without a fundamental rethinking of its role, UNIFIL risks remaining a costly but strategically ineffective force, unable to bring about the long-term peace and stability that southern Lebanon so desperately needs.

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Financial resources – budget year is 1 July to 30 June) 2024

(Thousands of United States dollars; budget year is 1 July to 30 June) 2024

				Variance
	Expenditure (2021/22)	Apportionment (2022/23)	Cost estimates (2023/24)	Amount	Percentage
Category	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)=(3)-(2)	(5)=(4)÷(2)
Military and police personnel
Military observers	–	–	–	–	–
Military contingents	319 078.6	338 206.1	360 230.0	22 023.9	6.5
United Nations police	–	–	–	–	–
Formed police units	–	–	–	–	–
Subtotal	319 078.6	338 206.1	360 230.0	22 023.9	6.5
Civilian personnel
International staff	55 088.1	63 534.6	66 104.9	2 570.3	4.0
National Professional Officer	7 100.9	7 401.4	8 257.0	855.6	11.6
National General Service staff	43 779.3	45 001.8	53 385.9	8 384.1	18.6
United Nations Volunteers	–	–	–	–	–
General temporary assistance	879.3	478.2	314.7	(163.5)	(34.2)
Government-provided personnel	–	–	–	–	–
Subtotal	106 847.6	116 416.0	128 062.5	11 646.5	10.0
Operational costs
Civilian electoral observers	–	–	–	–	–
Consultants and consulting services	71.7	85.4	88.3	2.9	3.4
Official travel	408.5	664.1	794.2	130.1	19.6
Facilities and infrastructure	22 027.2	21 336.7	29 165.0	7 828.3	36.7
Ground transportation	7 902.7	6 648.5	11 005.6	4 357.1	65.5
Air operations	6 390.7	7 007.4	7 687.6	680.2	9.7
Marine operations	359.6	215.4	205.9	(9.5)	(4.4)
Communications and information technology	8 611.8	7 451.7	8 159.6	707.9	9.5
Medical	1 845.9	1 532.9	1 323.2	(209.7)	(13.7)
Special equipment	–	–	–	–	–
Other supplies, services, and equipment	2 781.5	2 856.3	3 891.6	1 035.3	36.2
Quick-impact projects	500.0	500.0	500.0	–	–
Subtotal	50 899.6	48 298.4	62 821.0	14 522.6	30.1
Gross requirements	476 825.8	502 920.5	551 113.5	48 193.0	9.6
Staff assessment income	14 216.1	14 760.6	17 125.0	2 364.4	16.0
Net requirements	462 609.7	488 159.9	533 988.5	45 828.6	9.4
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	–	–	–	–	–
Total requirements	476 825.8	502 920.5	551 113.5	48 193.0	9.6

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Financial resources – 2024 / 2025

(Thousands of United States dollars; budget year is 1 July to 30 June)

				Variance
	Expenditure (2022/23)	Apportionment (2023/24)	Cost estimates (2024/25)	Amount	Percentage
Category	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)=(3)-(2)	(5)=(4)÷(2)
Military and police personnel
Military observers	–	–	–	–	–
Military contingents	323 631.6	350 446.1	352 000.5	1 554.4	0.4
United Nations police	–	–	–	–	–
Formed police units	–	–	–	–	–
Subtotal	323 631.6	350 446.1	352 000.5	1 554.4	0.4
Civilian personnel
International staff	61 944.4	66 104.9	64 859.6	(1 245.3)	(1.9)
National Professional Officer	8 117.1	8 218.9	8 625.0	406.1	4.9
National General Service staff	48 748.6	53 385.9	57 241.8	3 855.9	7.2
United Nations Volunteers	–	–	–	–	–
General temporary assistance	617.3	314.7	529.5	214.8	68.3
Government-provided personnel	–	–	–	–	–
Subtotal	119 427.4	128 024.4	131 255.9	3 231.5	2.5
Operational costs
Civilian electoral observers	–	–	–	–	–
Consultants and consulting services	105.2	88.3	88.3	–	–
Official travel	586.3	729.1	743.6	14.5	2.0
Facilities and infrastructure	27 415.8	26 670.5	28 408.2	1 737.7	6.5
Ground transportation	11 139.8	9 947.5	6 546.4	(3 401.1)	(34.2)
Air operations	5 311.4	7 687.6	5 929.9	(1 757.7)	(22.9)
Marine operations	195.8	205.9	172.1	(33.8)	(16.4)
Communications and information technology	9 039.6	8 065.1	8 036.9	(28.2)	(0.3)
Medical	1 220.1	1 323.2	1 323.4	0.2	0.0
Special equipment	–	–	–	–	–
Other supplies, services, and equipment	4 346.2	3 679.3	3 229.3	(450.0)	(12.2)
Quick-impact projects	499.9	500.0	500.0	–	–
Subtotal	59 860.1	58 896.5	54 978.1	(3 918.4)	(6.7)
Gross requirements	502 919.1	537 367.0	538 234.5	867.5	0.2
Staff assessment income	16 383.6	17 086.9	18 116.9	1 030.0	6.0
Net requirements	486 535.5	520 280.1	520 117.6	(162.5)	(0.0)
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	–	–	–	–	–
Total requirements	502 919.1	537 367.0	538 234.5	867.5	0.2

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RESOURCE :
Budget for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon for the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024 : report of the Secretary-General – https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4008431?v=pdf – https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4040428?ln=en&v=pdf

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