ABSTRACT
The recent statements by the Italian Defense Minister, Guido Crosetto, concerning the reinforcement of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), have garnered considerable attention for their implications on Lebanon’s internal stability and the broader Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape. Italy’s intent to bolster Lebanon’s state military capabilities aims to reposition the LAF as a principal stabilizing force, challenging non-state actors like Hezbollah. This ambition represents a strategic push towards enhancing Lebanon’s national sovereignty but is fraught with significant political, social, and diplomatic complexities that risk exacerbating existing tensions both domestically and regionally.
The declared goal to render the LAF superior to Hezbollah, while ostensibly contributing to Lebanese state authority, must be analyzed within the broader and intricate dynamics of Lebanon’s socio-political structure. Hezbollah, unlike a typical militia, operates as a deeply embedded political and military entity with substantial grassroots support, especially within the Shiite community. Its dual role as a provider of social services and as a political representative complicates any efforts to sideline it through direct state military empowerment. The prospect of an empowered LAF counteracting Hezbollah introduces a risk of polarization, threatening Lebanon’s fragile internal power balance and possibly reigniting sectarian tensions.
Hezbollah’s status as a key component of Lebanon’s defense infrastructure, particularly against perceived external threats like Israel, further complicates any attempt to limit its influence without addressing the broader socio-political context. This group’s reputation as a resistance force against Israel has fortified its support base, making any effort to diminish its power fraught with the potential for backlash. If not accompanied by strategic engagement with the community Hezbollah represents, attempts to empower the LAF over Hezbollah risk generating internal instability and could lead to a counterproductive escalation of hostilities.
The complexity of Lebanon’s situation is underscored by the potential presidential candidacy of Joseph Aoun, Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces. International actors such as the United States and France have expressed support for Aoun’s candidacy, viewing him as a leader capable of aligning Lebanon more closely with Western interests. However, Hezbollah’s cautious stance toward Aoun demonstrates its strategic pragmatism—indicating a willingness to adapt in order to maintain influence. Aoun’s potential rise to power, therefore, highlights the delicate interplay between foreign-backed initiatives and the deeply rooted factions within Lebanon. His leadership represents a crucial intersection between Western aspirations and the entrenched influence of non-state actors, adding another layer of intricacy to Lebanon’s political future.
Moreover, reinforcing the LAF could inadvertently trigger an internal arms race. Hezbollah’s capability to replenish its arsenal, often with external assistance, is well-established, and a significant boost to the LAF’s military capacity could prompt a parallel escalation by Hezbollah. This scenario could transform Lebanon into a highly militarized arena, heightening the risk of internal conflict and posing broader security concerns for neighboring countries, particularly Israel. Given Hezbollah’s historical stance as a deterrent against Israeli threats, any move perceived as undermining its defensive capabilities could increase the likelihood of preemptive actions and escalate regional tensions.
Defence Minister Crosetto visits Lebanon. Lebanese army 'needs strengthening' says minister #ANSA https://t.co/WDRuTZfImT
— Ansa English News (@ansa_english) December 6, 2024
The implications of Crosetto’s remarks also extend to international diplomatic engagements, particularly concerning the role of foreign actors like Italy, France, and the United States. These nations have vested interests in limiting Hezbollah’s influence, yet their involvement risks deepening Lebanon’s internal divisions. The LAF, which has traditionally been viewed as a unifying force across Lebanon’s diverse sectarian landscape, might suffer a crisis of legitimacy if it is perceived as a proxy for Western intervention. Such perceptions could weaken the LAF’s standing among significant portions of the population, particularly those aligned with or supportive of Hezbollah, thereby undermining efforts to establish it as a true national security force capable of serving all Lebanese citizens impartially.
In addition, the suggestion to modify the rules of engagement for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and ensure fuller implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701 reveals another dimension of the broader strategy to address Hezbollah’s military presence in Lebanon. Resolution 1701, adopted after the 2006 Lebanon War, aims to disarm non-state actors and restore the Lebanese state’s authority across its territory. However, expanding UNIFIL’s mandate to curb Hezbollah’s influence may lead to friction between peacekeepers and local communities, especially considering Hezbollah’s significant grassroots support. Any miscalculated expansion of UNIFIL’s authority could lead to increased resistance and even violent confrontations, undermining the intended goals of peace and stability.
The socioeconomic element of Hezbollah’s power cannot be understated. The group’s extensive social welfare network provides crucial services—including healthcare, education, and community support—to marginalized sectors of Lebanese society, especially within the Shiite community. Any effort to strengthen the LAF and diminish Hezbollah’s influence without concurrently addressing these socioeconomic gaps risks creating a vacuum. Such an approach could lead to disenfranchisement, potentially driving more support towards Hezbollah or other radical groups that might seek to fill the void. Thus, a purely militaristic approach, without parallel socio-economic initiatives, overlooks the fundamental reasons behind Hezbollah’s entrenched influence.
A crucial point of consideration is the broader geopolitical environment in which these dynamics unfold. Lebanon’s political fragility is compounded by external influences, particularly from Iran, which views Hezbollah as a key ally within its broader regional strategy of countering Western and Israeli influence. Attempts to weaken Hezbollah are likely to prompt increased support from Iran, which could further entrench the group’s military capabilities and escalate regional tensions. Lebanon’s position as a nexus for international rivalries makes any attempt at internal power rebalancing highly susceptible to external manipulation, with potentially destabilizing consequences that extend beyond Lebanon’s borders.
The role of the LAF as a unifying national institution is pivotal, yet its empowerment as a counterweight to Hezbollah carries significant risks if not carefully managed. The LAF’s ability to assert itself as Lebanon’s primary military force depends not only on material support from international actors but also on maintaining its image as an institution free from sectarian bias. Should the LAF be perceived as an instrument of foreign agendas, particularly those aligned against Hezbollah, it risks losing its position as a symbol of national unity. This perception would critically undermine its operational capacity, as Lebanon’s historical sectarian tensions remain a key challenge to the effective exercise of centralized state authority.
Ultimately, the pursuit of stability in Lebanon requires a multidimensional strategy. Strengthening state institutions like the LAF is a necessary but insufficient measure unless it is coupled with efforts to address Lebanon’s profound economic challenges, political fragmentation, and the social inequities that underpin Hezbollah’s influence. A comprehensive approach must consider the importance of political dialogue, economic recovery, and inclusive governance that engages all segments of Lebanese society. Only by addressing the root causes of Hezbollah’s power—its political legitimacy, military capabilities, and provision of essential social services—can any sustainable reduction in its influence be achieved.
The path forward for Lebanon involves fostering a balanced approach where military empowerment is complemented by political inclusion and socioeconomic development. The international community’s role must go beyond military support for the LAF, encompassing efforts to facilitate dialogue among Lebanon’s factions and providing the economic assistance necessary to stabilize the country. By creating conditions that reduce reliance on non-state actors for essential services and defense, Lebanon can gradually work towards diminishing Hezbollah’s role without triggering renewed violence or deepening societal divisions.
In conclusion, while the goal of strengthening the LAF reflects a strategic vision to bolster Lebanese state sovereignty, this objective must be pursued with a nuanced understanding of Lebanon’s internal complexities and the broader regional context. Empowering the LAF to challenge Hezbollah directly risks exacerbating divisions and sparking an arms race that could destabilize not only Lebanon but the entire region. A sustainable path to stability requires addressing the underlying socioeconomic disparities, fostering political inclusivity, and reducing Lebanon’s vulnerability to external influence—thereby creating an environment where state institutions can effectively serve all Lebanese citizens and gradually diminish the need for armed non-state actors.
| Category | Concept | Details and Analysis |
|---|---|---|
| Primary Strategy | Strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) | Italy aims to enhance the LAF to reduce Hezbollah’s influence and bolster state authority. This strategy seeks to establish a national military capable of stabilizing Lebanon independently, yet it faces challenges due to Hezbollah’s established military, political, and social roles. |
| Challenges of Strategy | Risk of Polarization | Strengthening the LAF against Hezbollah could polarize Lebanese society, risking internal conflict. Hezbollah is not just a militia; it is also a political representative of the Shiite community, making any direct confrontation a potential cause for increased sectarian violence. |
| Hezbollah’s Influence | Socioeconomic Contributions | Hezbollah provides extensive social services, including healthcare and education, to marginalized Shiite communities. This has strengthened its legitimacy. Any attempt to weaken Hezbollah without replacing its social role could lead to unrest and further radicalization. |
| Geopolitical Implications | Regional Tensions and Iran’s Influence | Hezbollah’s ties to Iran make any effort to weaken the group a risk for escalating regional tensions. Strengthening the LAF could provoke Iran into further bolstering Hezbollah’s military capacity, leading to an internal arms race in Lebanon and heightening risks for Israel and the region. |
| Presidential Candidacy | Joseph Aoun | The LAF Chief of Staff is a potential presidential candidate supported by Western nations. Aoun’s rise could signify a shift towards Western influence, but Hezbollah’s ambivalent stance suggests a careful calculation to maintain its influence, complicating the balance of power within Lebanon. |
| UNIFIL and UNSC Resolution | Revised Rules of Engagement | Emphasizing the enforcement of UNSC Resolution 1701 and suggesting stronger rules of engagement for UNIFIL aim to curb Hezbollah’s military activities. However, expanding UNIFIL’s authority may provoke resistance from Hezbollah supporters, risking violent clashes and undermining the peacekeeping mission. |
| International Involvement | Western Aid and Perception of Interference | Western backing of the LAF risks creating a perception that the LAF is a proxy for foreign interests, especially among Shiite communities. This perception could erode the LAF’s legitimacy and compromise its standing as a neutral national institution capable of unifying the Lebanese people. |
| Risk of Internal Arms Race | Hezbollah’s Military Response | Reinforcing the LAF to directly challenge Hezbollah could lead to an internal arms race, prompting Hezbollah to upgrade its arsenal, potentially with Iranian assistance. This would increase the risk of armed conflict within Lebanon and pose a broader security threat to neighboring Israel. |
| Hezbollah’s Political Legitimacy | Integration in State System | Hezbollah is not just a military entity; it holds political power within Lebanon, with representation in parliament and a considerable support base. Attempts to diminish its influence without addressing these political realities may lead to further destabilization rather than consolidating state authority. |
| Socioeconomic Impact | The Vacuum Risk | Any military effort to weaken Hezbollah must be complemented by social and economic initiatives to fill the gap left by Hezbollah’s social services. Failure to do so could push marginalized communities towards more extreme actors, perpetuating cycles of unrest and instability. |
| Regional Dynamics | Role of Iran and External Actors | Iran views Hezbollah as a key component of its regional strategy to counter Western and Israeli influence. Attempts by the LAF, supported by Western powers, to weaken Hezbollah could lead to increased Iranian support for the group, intensifying Lebanon’s entanglement in regional rivalries. |
| Balance of State Authority | LAF vs. Non-State Actors | Strengthening the LAF to counter Hezbollah must consider the delicate balance of Lebanon’s internal power dynamics. Hezbollah’s entrenched political influence complicates efforts to establish the LAF as the sole military authority, risking internal division and a potential civil conflict. |
| International Strategy | Western vs. Local Interests | Western interests in bolstering the LAF align with broader objectives to curb Iranian influence. However, aligning too closely with Western interests may alienate Lebanese communities who see Hezbollah as a defense against foreign domination, thereby undermining efforts to unify state authority. |
| UNSC Resolution 1701 | Enforcement and Risks | The resolution calls for disarmament of all armed groups, including Hezbollah. Enhancing UNIFIL’s mandate could be perceived as an intrusion by Hezbollah and its supporters, escalating tensions and potentially leading to confrontation between UNIFIL and local communities. |
| Stability Risks | Sectarian and Societal Fragmentation | The LAF’s empowerment, if not handled inclusively, could lead to further fragmentation within Lebanon’s sectarian structure. Hezbollah’s narrative as a protector of the Shiite community may strengthen if its constituents perceive state actions as targeted against them. |
| Joseph Aoun’s Presidency | Leadership Ambiguity | Aoun’s potential leadership must navigate Hezbollah’s influence while demonstrating a commitment to reform. His presidency could either contribute to stabilizing Lebanon or perpetuate existing power structures, depending on his ability to balance competing domestic and international pressures. |
| Path Forward for Lebanon | Multidimensional Strategy | A sustainable solution requires not only strengthening the LAF but also comprehensive political dialogue, economic recovery, and inclusive governance. Addressing Hezbollah’s influence involves reducing external interference and providing alternatives for social services currently offered by Hezbollah. |
| Recommendations for Stability | Inclusive Engagement | The international community must go beyond military support, fostering political reconciliation and economic support for all Lebanese communities. A nuanced approach is essential to gradually integrate Hezbollah into state structures while reducing reliance on non-state actors for basic services. |
| Broader Implications | Regional Stability and Arms Race | The push to empower the LAF could inadvertently lead to an arms race, increasing regional instability. Lebanon must avoid becoming a proxy battlefield for competing interests, requiring a balanced international approach to support internal stabilization without provoking further conflict. |
| Need for Political Solutions | Addressing Root Causes | Military measures alone are insufficient to weaken Hezbollah’s influence. A comprehensive solution must address the underlying socioeconomic grievances, sectarian inequalities, and external influences that contribute to Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon. |
#LebanonNews: National Defense Minister Maurice #Sleem met with #Italian Defense Minister Guido #Crosetto and his accompanying delegation this morning at his office in Yarzeh. https://t.co/dw4mSU34h0
— LBCI Lebanon English (@LBCI_News_EN) December 6, 2024
The Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto’s recent statements have sparked significant attention in political and diplomatic circles, focusing on the reinforcement of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). Crosetto’s remarks, delivered during his visit to Beirut, underscore Italy’s intention to bolster Lebanon’s military capabilities, positioning it as a crucial step towards establishing stability not only in Lebanon but also in the entire Middle East region. This assertion, however, introduces a series of complex dynamics involving Hezbollah, Israel, and broader international interests.
Crosetto’s statements highlight an essential but controversial aim: to make the Lebanese Armed Forces stronger than Hezbollah. The minister emphasized that true regional stability could only be achieved when the LAF possesses the capacity to defend the nation independently, thus reducing Hezbollah’s influence as a dominant military actor. This point introduces a potential political danger, not only for Lebanon’s internal power balance but also for the delicate geopolitical stability of the region, particularly considering Hezbollah’s complex ties with both regional and global actors.
By delving into Crosetto’s statements, it becomes evident that there is an underlying ambition to reshape the power dynamics in Lebanon by supporting state institutions over non-state actors like Hezbollah. On the surface, this appears aligned with the international objective of supporting legitimate governance structures. However, the implications run much deeper, presenting significant potential risks.
The proposition to strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces at the expense of Hezbollah, which has been both a political and military power in Lebanon, risks reigniting tensions that have long simmered in the country. Hezbollah is not merely an armed group but a political force that represents a considerable portion of the Lebanese Shiite population. Thus, Crosetto’s intent could be perceived as an external interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs, effectively positioning the LAF in direct confrontation with Hezbollah, thereby polarizing Lebanese society even further.
Moreover, the comparison made between enhancing the LAF and undermining Hezbollah suggests a desire to create a scenario where the Lebanese state could potentially challenge Hezbollah’s military might directly. This is a highly contentious approach, as Hezbollah has historically positioned itself as a resistance force against Israel, a role that has garnered it significant support among its constituents. Any attempt to weaken Hezbollah’s position without addressing its grassroots support could lead to severe internal instability in Lebanon, further complicating the already volatile situation.
Turning to Joseph Aoun, the Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces, his candidacy for the presidency represents a focal point of this broader discussion. The international community, particularly the United States and France, has shown support for Aoun’s candidacy, viewing it as an opportunity to install a figure who might align more closely with Western interests. However, Hezbollah’s stance towards Aoun remains ambivalent, creating a complex political equation.
Hezbollah’s cautious acceptance of Joseph Aoun as a potential presidential candidate—despite his apparent endorsement by the West—reflects a strategic calculation. Hezbollah has historically shown resilience in adapting to the changing political landscape, even if that means endorsing candidates who do not perfectly align with their ideology. Aoun’s candidacy is not simply about leading Lebanon; it represents a broader struggle over the country’s future orientation—whether it will lean towards Western influence or continue to balance between different geopolitical interests, including Iran and Syria.
Crosetto’s suggestion to strengthen the Lebanese military also brings into focus the broader concern of Hezbollah’s rearmament. Historically, Hezbollah has consistently managed to replenish its arsenal, often with support from Iran, despite international efforts to curb its capabilities. The risk here lies in the potential escalation of an arms race within Lebanon itself. If the LAF is significantly bolstered to confront Hezbollah, it could push Hezbollah to further enhance its military capabilities, leading to an internal arms race that risks turning Lebanon into an even greater flashpoint for conflict.
Furthermore, this scenario poses a direct threat to Israel. Hezbollah’s rearmament and its strategic positioning in southern Lebanon have long been a security concern for Israel. Any move perceived as an attempt to weaken Hezbollah could trigger preemptive actions by the group to safeguard its position, potentially leading to clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border. This is particularly dangerous given the current fragile state of affairs in the region, with ongoing conflicts and the presence of numerous armed groups with varying allegiances.
The involvement of international actors, such as the United States, France, and Italy, in Lebanon’s internal military and political affairs further complicates the situation. The U.S. and France’s support for Joseph Aoun is seen as a strategic move to counter Hezbollah’s influence, while Italy, through Crosetto’s statements, appears to be advocating for a more robust Lebanese state apparatus capable of challenging non-state actors. However, this approach risks pushing Lebanon into a prolonged state of instability.
The support for Aoun, coupled with the push to strengthen the LAF, can be interpreted as an indirect strategy to isolate Hezbollah politically and militarily. However, Hezbollah’s entrenched position in Lebanon’s political system means that any attempt to marginalize the group without a viable political solution will likely lead to further polarization. The comparison with Bachir Gemayel’s election in 1982—when he was seen as an Israeli-backed candidate—highlights the dangers of appearing to impose a leader through external influence, which could undermine Aoun’s legitimacy and provoke resistance from Hezbollah and its supporters.
The reference to a “Czech policy” alludes to a foreign policy stance that aims to support a faction within a foreign state to achieve broader strategic objectives. In this context, Crosetto’s advocacy for strengthening the LAF could be seen as an attempt to create a Lebanese military that is independent of Hezbollah and capable of aligning more closely with Western and Israeli interests. However, this policy carries significant risks, particularly for Israel.
Israel, which has faced numerous conflicts with Hezbollah, might perceive the strengthening of the LAF as a double-edged sword. On one hand, a stronger LAF could mean a Lebanese state more capable of controlling Hezbollah and preventing cross-border attacks. On the other hand, if the situation spirals out of control, it could lead to a scenario where both the LAF and Hezbollah are heavily armed and in direct confrontation, creating a highly volatile situation on Israel’s northern border. The risk here is that instead of leading to Hezbollah’s disarmament, such a policy could inadvertently contribute to a scenario where Lebanon becomes even more militarized, with multiple factions capable of challenging each other and, by extension, Israel.
Crosetto’s statements also highlight the risk of deepening divisions within Lebanese society. The attempt to empower the LAF over Hezbollah could be perceived by many Lebanese, particularly within the Shiite community, as an effort to undermine their political representation and security. Hezbollah has positioned itself not only as a resistance force against Israel but also as a protector of the Shiite community in Lebanon. Any perceived threat to Hezbollah’s military wing could thus be interpreted as a threat to the security of its supporters, leading to increased tensions and the possibility of internal conflict.
Lebanon’s political landscape is already characterized by a delicate balance between various sectarian groups, each with its own militias and foreign backers. The push to strengthen the LAF, particularly in a manner that positions it against Hezbollah, risks upsetting this balance and could lead to a resurgence of sectarian violence. This is especially concerning given Lebanon’s history of civil war and the ongoing economic crisis, which has left many Lebanese disillusioned with their political leaders and more susceptible to mobilization by sectarian groups.
Hezbollah’s response to these developments will likely be influenced by its broader strategic calculations, particularly its alliances with Iran and Syria. The group has long been a key player in the “axis of resistance” against Israel, and any attempt to weaken it internally could be perceived as part of a broader strategy to undermine Iranian influence in the region. This could prompt Hezbollah and its allies to take preemptive measures to secure their position in Lebanon, potentially escalating tensions not only within Lebanon but also across the region.
Iran, as Hezbollah’s main backer, has a vested interest in maintaining the group’s strength as a counterbalance to Israeli and Western influence in the region. Any move by the LAF, perceived as being backed by the West, to challenge Hezbollah could therefore lead to increased support from Iran, including military aid and political backing. This, in turn, could exacerbate the arms race in Lebanon and increase the risk of conflict spilling over into neighboring countries.
Crosetto also emphasized the need to update the rules of engagement for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and to ensure full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701. This resolution, adopted in the wake of the 2006 Lebanon War, calls for the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, including Hezbollah, and the extension of Lebanese government authority over all Lebanese territory. However, the implementation of this resolution has faced numerous challenges, primarily due to Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm and its continued presence in southern Lebanon.
Updating UNIFIL’s rules of engagement to allow for more proactive measures in enforcing Resolution 1701 could be seen as an attempt to curb Hezbollah’s influence in the region. However, this approach is fraught with risks. UNIFIL’s mandate is already a sensitive issue, with Hezbollah and its supporters viewing the force as an extension of Western interests in Lebanon. Any attempt to expand UNIFIL’s authority or to involve it more directly in disarming Hezbollah could lead to increased tensions between the peacekeeping force and the local population, potentially resulting in violent confrontations.
Crosetto’s call for increased financial, training, and equipment support for the Lebanese Armed Forces is part of a broader strategy to strengthen state institutions in Lebanon. The LAF is one of the few institutions in Lebanon that is seen as a unifying force, with members drawn from all of the country’s sectarian groups. Strengthening the LAF could therefore be seen as a way to promote national unity and stability. However, the effectiveness of this approach depends on the extent to which the LAF can be insulated from Lebanon’s sectarian politics and whether it can truly operate independently of Hezbollah.
The LAF’s ability to challenge Hezbollah’s military capabilities is limited, not only by the group’s superior firepower but also by the political realities in Lebanon. Hezbollah is part of the Lebanese government and has significant influence over state institutions. Any attempt by the LAF to confront Hezbollah militarily would therefore be seen as a direct challenge to a major political actor, potentially leading to a breakdown of state authority and a return to civil conflict.
The most significant danger presented by Crosetto’s statements and the broader international strategy to weaken Hezbollah is the risk of pushing Lebanon into an endless cycle of conflict. Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon is not solely based on its military capabilities; it is also rooted in its political influence and its role as a provider of social services to the Shiite community. Any attempt to weaken Hezbollah without addressing the underlying political and social factors that contribute to its support base is unlikely to succeed and could instead lead to a protracted conflict.
This situation bears similarities to other conflicts in the region where attempts to weaken non-state actors through military means have led to prolonged instability. In the absence of a comprehensive political solution that addresses the concerns of all of Lebanon’s sectarian groups, including the Shiite community represented by Hezbollah, the country risks being drawn into an endless cycle of violence and rearmament. This would have significant implications not only for Lebanon but also for regional stability, particularly for Israel, which would face the threat of a highly militarized and unstable neighbor on its northern border.
Crosetto’s remarks about strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces represent a strategic vision that aligns with broader Western interests, aiming to empower Lebanon’s state institutions while attempting to curb Hezbollah’s dominance. The intention to strengthen the LAF is not just about enhancing Lebanon’s security apparatus; it is about reshaping the political landscape of Lebanon by diminishing Hezbollah’s influence. This approach is fraught with complexities, given Hezbollah’s deep-rooted political presence and military prowess.
One of the key elements of Crosetto’s vision lies in leveraging international support to bolster Lebanon’s formal military apparatus. Historically, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have received considerable backing from Western nations, including financial aid, technical support, and military training. The United States, France, and other European allies have been instrumental in equipping and providing advanced capabilities to the LAF, with the broader objective of creating a capable and cohesive national military force that can serve as a counterweight to Hezbollah’s influence. However, the LAF’s ability to genuinely act as a robust, independent institution is constantly challenged by Lebanon’s intricate internal politics and the influence of non-state actors.
The critical challenge in executing Crosetto’s vision lies in balancing the empowerment of the LAF without inciting direct conflict with Hezbollah, which holds substantial sway in Lebanese society, both as a military force and as a political entity. Hezbollah’s relationship with the LAF has been complex and at times cooperative, given their mutual interest in safeguarding Lebanon against external threats, particularly from Israel. Nevertheless, their concurrent coexistence as two armed forces within a single state creates a delicate and unstable dynamic, one that is particularly susceptible to shifting regional geopolitics and domestic crises.
Crosetto’s approach of using the LAF to counterbalance Hezbollah’s dominance inherently assumes that strengthening state institutions would, by default, undermine Hezbollah’s influence. However, this presumption may overlook key aspects of Hezbollah’s base of power. Hezbollah is not just a militia; it is also a deeply ingrained political and social movement that enjoys widespread support among Lebanon’s Shiite population. The group provides critical social services, health care, and educational programs, which have bolstered its legitimacy and enabled it to position itself as a champion of Lebanon’s marginalized communities. Any effort to weaken Hezbollah must also address the vacuum that would be created in the provision of these services, as failure to do so would risk pushing more individuals toward the group in search of basic necessities.
Moreover, Hezbollah’s entrenchment in Lebanon’s political system, with elected representatives in parliament and ministers in government, makes any direct challenge to its power a potential trigger for political unrest. Attempts to isolate Hezbollah by bolstering the LAF could inadvertently deepen divisions within Lebanon, leading to a scenario where the Shiite community feels alienated by what it perceives as a state apparatus working against its interests. The strengthening of the LAF, if seen as a tool of Western influence, might also bolster Hezbollah’s narrative of resisting foreign interference, thereby increasing its support among its constituency and undermining the very goal of marginalizing the group.
In addition, the international dimension of Crosetto’s vision cannot be overlooked. Italy’s vested interest in Lebanon is also driven by its longstanding contribution to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which has operated along the Israel-Lebanon border since the 1978 conflict. UNIFIL’s mandate, particularly in enforcing UN Security Council Resolution 1701, aims to maintain peace in the area, prevent arms transfers to unauthorized groups, and support the LAF in extending state authority to southern Lebanon. However, UNIFIL’s limited mandate and its reliance on the cooperation of local actors, including Hezbollah, have often constrained its ability to effectively fulfill these objectives.
Crosetto’s call for revisiting UNIFIL’s rules of engagement to allow for more assertive operations suggests a desire for a shift in the balance of power in southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah continues to maintain an extensive military infrastructure. However, any attempt to empower UNIFIL beyond its current mandate would require broad international consensus, particularly among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Additionally, a more assertive UNIFIL could face backlash from Hezbollah, which has historically viewed the force with suspicion and has tolerated its presence only insofar as it does not interfere with its military activities.
The Italian defense minister’s proposal also highlights the broader geopolitical struggle over Lebanon, with various international actors vying for influence. The United States and France have both indicated support for strengthening the LAF as part of their broader strategy to counter Iranian influence in the region, given Hezbollah’s close ties to Tehran. For the U.S. and its allies, Lebanon represents a critical battleground in the ongoing struggle to curb Iranian power in the Middle East, and empowering the LAF is seen as a means of shifting the balance of power in favor of state institutions aligned with Western interests. However, this strategy comes with inherent risks, particularly in a country as politically fractured as Lebanon, where external interference is often met with suspicion and resistance.
Iran, for its part, has a vested interest in maintaining Hezbollah’s military and political strength. Hezbollah represents a key component of Iran’s “axis of resistance,” which also includes Syria and other allied groups in the region. For Tehran, Hezbollah serves as a deterrent against Israeli and Western aggression, as well as a tool for projecting influence across the Levant. Any significant moves by the LAF, perceived as being orchestrated by the West to challenge Hezbollah, could prompt Iran to intensify its support for the group, including providing more sophisticated weaponry and financial resources, thereby heightening the risk of a broader regional escalation.
In this complex web of alliances and rivalries, the Lebanese Armed Forces find themselves in a precarious position. On the one hand, the LAF is expected to act as the principal state security apparatus, responsible for maintaining stability and defending Lebanon’s borders. On the other hand, it must navigate a landscape in which another powerful military force—Hezbollah—operates with considerable autonomy and enjoys the backing of a significant portion of the Lebanese population as well as a major regional power, Iran.
The reality on the ground is that the LAF and Hezbollah have, to some extent, found a modus vivendi that allows them to coexist. The two forces have cooperated on issues of mutual interest, particularly concerning defense against external threats. For instance, during periods of heightened tension along the border with Israel, both the LAF and Hezbollah have sought to avoid escalation, recognizing the devastating consequences that a new conflict would have for Lebanon. However, this fragile coexistence is not a long-term solution, as it rests on a delicate balance of power that could be disrupted by shifts in either domestic or regional dynamics.
Furthermore, the ongoing economic crisis in Lebanon adds another layer of complexity to the situation. The economic collapse has severely affected all state institutions, including the LAF, which has struggled to maintain salaries and provide adequate resources to its personnel. International financial support has been crucial in keeping the LAF operational, but the broader economic downturn has eroded public confidence in state institutions and exacerbated sectarian tensions. In this context, Hezbollah’s extensive social services network has become even more critical, filling the gaps left by the state and reinforcing the group’s position within the Shiite community.
The economic dimension also underscores the limits of Crosetto’s strategy. Strengthening the LAF without addressing Lebanon’s deep-seated economic woes risks exacerbating the very conditions that allow Hezbollah to thrive. Any effort to empower the LAF must therefore be accompanied by a comprehensive economic recovery plan that addresses the needs of all Lebanese citizens, particularly those who have historically been marginalized. Without such a plan, the LAF may find itself unable to gain the broad-based support necessary to effectively counter Hezbollah’s influence.
Another potential risk associated with Crosetto’s vision is the possibility of igniting an arms race within Lebanon. If international actors were to provide significant military aid to the LAF in an effort to build its capacity to challenge Hezbollah, it is likely that Hezbollah would respond by further upgrading its own arsenal, potentially with more advanced weapons from Iran. This scenario could lead to an escalation of tensions and increase the likelihood of armed conflict, either within Lebanon or along the border with Israel. The specter of an internal arms race is particularly concerning given Lebanon’s fragile state and the potential for such a development to spiral out of control.
In addition to the internal challenges, the regional context also plays a crucial role in shaping Lebanon’s future. The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the ongoing conflict in Syria, and the broader struggle for influence between Western powers and Russia all have direct implications for Lebanon. Saudi Arabia, which has historically backed Sunni factions in Lebanon, has shown support for efforts to strengthen the LAF, viewing it as a potential counterweight to Hezbollah and, by extension, to Iranian influence. However, Saudi Arabia’s influence in Lebanon has waned in recent years, particularly following the resignation of Prime Minister Saad Hariri under apparent pressure from Riyadh in 2017, which was widely viewed as a misstep that weakened Saudi Arabia’s position in the country.
Russia, meanwhile, has sought to expand its influence in the Middle East, including in Lebanon. Moscow’s relationship with Hezbollah is complex, as the two have cooperated in Syria in support of the Assad regime, but Russia has also cultivated relationships with other Lebanese factions and has expressed interest in playing a role in Lebanon’s energy sector. Russia’s involvement adds another layer of complexity to the already intricate web of foreign interests in Lebanon, and any effort to strengthen the LAF must take into account the broader geopolitical landscape in which Lebanon is situated.
Ultimately, Crosetto’s vision of strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces as a means of reshaping Lebanon’s political landscape and reducing Hezbollah’s influence is fraught with challenges and risks. While the goal of empowering state institutions is a laudable one, the reality on the ground in Lebanon is that any effort to marginalize Hezbollah must contend with the group’s deep-rooted political, social, and military presence. Strengthening the LAF without addressing the underlying political and socio-economic factors that contribute to Hezbollah’s power is unlikely to succeed and could instead lead to further instability.
For Lebanon to achieve lasting stability, a more comprehensive approach is needed—one that includes not only military support for the LAF but also political dialogue, economic recovery, and efforts to address the needs of all Lebanese communities. This means engaging with Hezbollah as a political actor and finding ways to integrate the group more fully into Lebanon’s state structures, while also working to strengthen state institutions and reduce the influence of foreign powers in the country.
The path forward for Lebanon is undoubtedly complex, and there are no easy solutions. However, by addressing the root causes of instability and working towards a more inclusive political system, it may be possible to create the conditions for a stable and prosperous Lebanon, where state institutions are strong enough to serve all citizens and where the influence of armed non-state actors is gradually diminished. This will require the cooperation of both domestic and international actors, as well as a recognition of the need for compromise and dialogue in order to build a more resilient and united Lebanon.
The Dangers and Shortcomings of Crosetto’s Vision for Lebanon
Summary Table: Analysis of Crosetto’s Statements on Strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)
| Category | Concept | Details and Analysis |
|---|---|---|
| Primary Strategy | Strengthening LAF over Hezbollah | Crosetto aims to enhance the military capabilities of the Lebanese Armed Forces as a means to weaken Hezbollah’s influence. This approach is motivated by the desire to establish state authority but disregards Hezbollah’s political and social roles. |
| Dangers of Strategy | Sectarian Violence Risk | By framing LAF as a counterforce to Hezbollah, Crosetto risks polarizing Lebanese society, potentially leading to sectarian violence. Hezbollah is both a military and political entity representing the Shiite community, and challenging it directly could destabilize Lebanon’s fragile balance. |
| Socioeconomic Impact | Lack of Alternative Social Services | Hezbollah provides essential social services, such as healthcare and education, to the Shiite population. Crosetto’s strategy overlooks the socioeconomic dimension, creating a vacuum that could be exploited by more radical actors, leading to widespread unrest. |
| Regional Dynamics | Provoking Iran and Escalation | Hezbollah’s ties to Iran and Syria mean that Crosetto’s strategy could provoke Iran to increase its support for Hezbollah, leading to an internal arms race. This escalation risks destabilizing Lebanon and increasing regional tensions, with potential implications for Israel and other neighboring countries. |
| Political Legitimacy of Hezbollah | Political Representation | Hezbollah’s legitimacy stems from its role as a political party representing the Shiite community. Crosetto’s approach oversimplifies this reality, risking the alienation of significant portions of the Lebanese population who view Hezbollah as a defender of their interests. |
| Perception of Foreign Interference | Undermining LAF’s Legitimacy | By aligning the LAF too closely with Western interests, Crosetto risks undermining the perception of the LAF as a neutral national force. This could erode the LAF’s legitimacy, especially among those who view Hezbollah as a defense against foreign influence, potentially weakening its role as a unifying force. |
| Role of Joseph Aoun | Ambiguous Stance Towards Hezbollah | Joseph Aoun, Chief of Staff of the LAF, is a potential candidate for the presidency. His stance towards Hezbollah is ambiguous, raising concerns that he may not effectively challenge the group’s influence. Aoun’s approach could lead to maintaining Hezbollah’s autonomy, undermining efforts to strengthen state institutions. |
| Risk of Stagnation | Balancing Reform and Hezbollah Relations | Aoun’s presidency may attempt to balance Western interests and Hezbollah’s influence. This paradoxical stance risks stagnating political progress, failing to satisfy either reformists or Hezbollah supporters, and perpetuating Lebanon’s existing power dynamics. |
| Western Interests | Dependency on Foreign Aid | Crosetto’s emphasis on empowering the LAF aligns with Western interests but risks deepening divisions within Lebanese society. The perception of dependency on Western aid may alienate key segments of the population, particularly the Shiite community, reducing the LAF’s effectiveness as a national institution. |
| Hezbollah’s Role in Social Fabric | Socioeconomic Contributions | Hezbollah has woven itself into the socioeconomic fabric of Lebanon, providing vital services to marginalized communities. Any attempt to weaken Hezbollah must address these contributions, or it risks exacerbating instability and further entrenching Hezbollah’s support base. |
| Regional Geopolitics | Proxy Battleground Risk | Strengthening the LAF without addressing broader regional dynamics could turn Lebanon into a battleground for competing regional powers. Hezbollah’s ties to Iran and Syria complicate efforts to enhance state security without provoking countermeasures from opposing actors. |
| Need for Comprehensive Strategy | Holistic Approach Required | Crosetto’s focus on military empowerment neglects the need for political reconciliation, economic stability, and social cohesion. A more nuanced strategy is required to address the root causes of Hezbollah’s influence, including socioeconomic grievances and external interference. |
| Joseph Aoun’s Potential Presidency | Risks and Opportunities | Aoun’s rise could either serve as a stabilizing force or entrench existing power structures. He must navigate Hezbollah’s influence while demonstrating a commitment to reform and state authority, a challenging balance that requires international support and diplomatic finesse. |
| Recommendations for Stability | Multidimensional Solutions | Strengthening the LAF should be accompanied by political reconciliation, economic development, and engaging all stakeholders in dialogue. Addressing Hezbollah’s influence requires a comprehensive approach, including socioeconomic initiatives and reducing external interference. |
| Broader Implications | Geopolitical Consequences | The approach to strengthen LAF risks exacerbating Lebanon’s divisions, making it a proxy battleground for regional powers. A unilateral focus on security could provoke responses from Iran and Hezbollah, increasing regional instability. |
| Path Forward | Inclusive Engagement | The international community must support Lebanon’s political, economic, and social recovery in a balanced manner. This involves engaging with Hezbollah to reduce tensions while investing in state-building and national cohesion initiatives. |
Minister Guido Crosetto’s recent statements advocating for the empowerment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) over Hezbollah expose significant strategic dangers and reflect a profound inability to appreciate the complexities of Lebanon’s political and societal architecture. While ostensibly motivated by a desire to promote national stability, Crosetto’s approach disregards essential dynamics and risks exacerbating Lebanon’s internal fragility and regional vulnerabilities.
A fundamental flaw in Crosetto’s position lies in the presumption that strengthening the LAF at Hezbollah’s expense will inherently lead to greater stability. This view is reductive, as it overlooks Hezbollah’s dual role as both a military and political entity representing a substantial segment of Lebanon’s Shiite population. Hezbollah is not merely an armed faction; it is a deeply embedded political actor within the Lebanese government. Framing the LAF as a counterforce to Hezbollah could precipitate direct conflict, destabilizing Lebanon’s already precarious political equilibrium. Such a polarization between state institutions and non-state actors risks igniting sectarian violence, with devastating ramifications for Lebanon’s social cohesion.
Moreover, Hezbollah’s influence is not confined to its military capacity; it extends deeply into the socioeconomic fabric of Lebanon. Hezbollah has managed to build an extensive network of social services that provides healthcare, education, and other essential services to the Shiite community. This means that any attempt to weaken Hezbollah without addressing the fundamental socioeconomic needs it fulfills would likely lead to widespread unrest and potentially radicalize segments of the population. Crosetto’s strategy appears to disregard this dimension, focusing solely on military empowerment without a concomitant plan to replace or replicate the social safety nets provided by Hezbollah. By failing to address these aspects, his approach risks creating a vacuum that more radical actors could easily exploit, thereby exacerbating the very instability he purports to counter.
Crosetto’s statements also reveal a limited grasp of the regional alliances that shape Lebanon’s political dynamics. Hezbollah’s affiliations with Iran and Syria are not purely ideological but are deeply rooted in broader geopolitical strategies involving multiple actors across the region. By advocating for a more potent LAF to counterbalance Hezbollah, Crosetto is, in effect, challenging Iran’s influence in Lebanon. This approach risks provoking Iran into intensifying its support for Hezbollah, thereby igniting an internal arms race that could escalate tensions not only within Lebanon but also across the broader Middle East. Such an arms race would pose a direct threat to regional stability, particularly for Israel, which has long perceived Hezbollah’s military capabilities as a critical security concern. Any perception that Lebanon is becoming a battleground for a proxy struggle between the West and Iran could also drag other regional actors into the fray, further complicating an already volatile situation.
Furthermore, Crosetto’s vision fails to consider the fragile balance of power within Lebanon itself. Hezbollah’s political legitimacy is not simply a product of its military strength but also its role as a political party representing the interests of the Shiite community in Lebanon’s confessional system. The notion that the LAF, by becoming stronger, could seamlessly replace Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon’s defense architecture oversimplifies the delicate interplay of sectarian politics. Such a move risks alienating not only Hezbollah’s base but also other segments of the Lebanese population that fear a return to civil conflict. Lebanon’s history is replete with examples of sectarian tensions escalating into full-scale conflict, and any move that could be interpreted as upsetting the fragile sectarian balance has the potential to be catastrophic.
Crosetto’s call for increased international support for the LAF also risks being perceived as foreign interference, which has historically left deep scars on Lebanon’s national consciousness. The legacy of repeated foreign interventions has contributed to a pervasive sense of mistrust among many Lebanese communities. By aligning too closely with Western powers, Crosetto risks undermining the LAF’s legitimacy, especially among those who view Hezbollah as a bulwark against external threats. This could erode the LAF’s standing as one of the few institutions capable of bridging Lebanon’s sectarian divides, instead rendering it a perceived instrument of foreign influence, thereby alienating significant segments of the population. The perception of foreign interference could also embolden Hezbollah’s narrative of resistance, thus solidifying its support base and making it even more challenging to weaken its influence.
Another critical dimension of the current situation is the role of Joseph Aoun, the Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces, who has emerged as a potential candidate for the presidency. Aoun’s candidacy presents its own set of dangers, particularly due to his ambiguous stance towards Hezbollah. While international actors, particularly Western nations, view Aoun as a figure who could lead Lebanon towards greater alignment with their interests, Hezbollah’s cautious acceptance of Aoun indicates that he may not pose a significant challenge to the group’s influence. This ambiguity raises the possibility that Aoun, once in power, could play both sides—maintaining the facade of reform while preserving Hezbollah’s autonomy to avoid direct confrontation.
This dual role presents a significant risk to Lebanon’s stability. If Aoun were to adopt a conciliatory approach towards Hezbollah to maintain internal stability, it could undermine efforts to strengthen state institutions and reduce the influence of non-state actors. Such an outcome would perpetuate the status quo, allowing Hezbollah to continue operating as a parallel military force with substantial autonomy. Moreover, Aoun’s perceived closeness to Western interests, combined with his potential unwillingness to confront Hezbollah directly, could lead to a situation where neither side is fully satisfied—alienating Hezbollah’s base while also disappointing those who seek genuine reform and the reassertion of state authority. This paradoxical stance could lead to a stagnation of political progress, wherein Lebanon remains mired in its existing power dynamics without a clear path toward strengthening state sovereignty.
The international dimension of Crosetto’s strategy also requires closer examination. The support for strengthening the LAF aligns with broader Western interests, particularly those of the United States and France, which have historically sought to curtail Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon. However, this external backing, if not carefully managed, risks entrenching divisions within Lebanese society. The Lebanese Armed Forces, while respected as a national institution, could find itself in a precarious position if it is seen as overly dependent on Western aid and directives. Such a perception could undermine its neutrality, which has been a cornerstone of its legitimacy in a country where sectarian affiliations dictate much of political life. If the LAF is perceived as an extension of Western power, it risks losing the trust of key segments of the Lebanese population, particularly within the Shiite community, thereby weakening its capacity to act as a unifying force.
Crosetto’s inability to recognize the complex interplay of Lebanon’s internal and external dynamics underscores a fundamental deficiency in his strategic vision. His focus on military empowerment, absent an emphasis on political reconciliation, economic stability, and addressing sectarian grievances, reveals a reductionist approach that risks doing more harm than good. The inherent dangers of his statements extend beyond the potential for escalating conflict; they lie in the absence of a viable, holistic path forward for Lebanon—one that genuinely addresses the needs and concerns of all its communities. By pursuing an oversimplified solution to a deeply nuanced problem, Crosetto risks exacerbating the very tensions he purports to resolve, potentially plunging Lebanon into renewed cycles of instability and conflict.
In sum, the interplay between Crosetto’s vision for the LAF and Joseph Aoun’s potential rise to power adds layers of complexity to Lebanon’s already delicate balance. Crosetto’s focus on empowerment through military means, without integrating economic and political reconciliation strategies, overlooks the socioeconomic fabric that Hezbollah has effectively woven within its constituency. Likewise, Joseph Aoun’s ambiguous positioning presents a paradox: his rise could either stabilize the nation through moderation or inadvertently maintain the very parallel power structures that contribute to Lebanon’s instability. Without a comprehensive and multidimensional approach that addresses military, political, and socioeconomic issues in tandem, Crosetto’s strategy risks deepening Lebanon’s fractures rather than healing them.
The implications of Crosetto’s strategy for Lebanon’s broader geopolitical context cannot be overstated. Strengthening the LAF in isolation from the wider political and economic landscape could inadvertently entrench Lebanon’s divisions and make the country more susceptible to becoming a proxy battleground for competing regional powers. The intricate web of alliances involving Hezbollah, Iran, Syria, and Western powers means that any unilateral approach to enhancing state security is likely to provoke countermeasures from opposing actors. Such actions could exacerbate regional instability, with Lebanon once again finding itself at the epicenter of a broader geopolitical struggle.
To mitigate these risks, a more nuanced strategy is required—one that goes beyond mere military empowerment. The international community, while supporting the LAF, must also invest in Lebanon’s political reconciliation processes, economic development, and social cohesion initiatives. This requires engaging all Lebanese stakeholders, including Hezbollah, in dialogue aimed at reducing tensions and fostering a shared vision for Lebanon’s future. Only by addressing the root causes of Hezbollah’s influence—its provision of social services, its role as a representative of a marginalized community, and its position within the geopolitical struggle—can there be any hope of reducing its military presence without triggering broader instability.
Moreover, Joseph Aoun’s potential presidency must be approached with caution. His rise to power could either serve as a catalyst for reform or entrench the existing power dynamics that have hindered Lebanon’s progress for decades. Aoun must demonstrate a genuine commitment to strengthening state institutions while also engaging with Hezbollah in a manner that seeks to integrate, rather than alienate, the group’s supporters. This will require deft political maneuvering, as well as the support of the international community in ensuring that Lebanon’s sovereignty is respected and that external actors do not use the country as a pawn in their regional ambitions.
Ultimately, the path forward for Lebanon requires a holistic and multidimensional approach that considers the complex interplay of military, political, and socioeconomic factors. Crosetto’s current strategy, with its narrow focus on empowering the LAF at the expense of Hezbollah, fails to account for the broader context in which Lebanon’s challenges are situated. Without a comprehensive plan that addresses the underlying causes of instability—poverty, sectarianism, and external interference—Lebanon risks remaining trapped in a cycle of conflict and fragmentation. The stakes are too high for such a reductionist approach, and the international community must work towards a more balanced and inclusive strategy that fosters genuine stability and progress for all of Lebanon’s people.
