On May 8, 2025, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping formalized a series of agreements in Moscow that significantly deepen the strategic partnership between Russia and China, marking a pivotal moment in the reconfiguration of global geopolitical alignments. These agreements, signed during a period of heightened international tension, reflect a concerted effort by both nations to counter Western influence, particularly the United States’ “dual containment” policy, and to establish a resilient bilateral framework insulated from external pressures. The joint statement on deepening comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation, as reported by the Kremlin and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, underscores a commitment to a “new era” of collaboration, emphasizing economic integration, military coordination, and shared positions on global governance. This partnership is not merely a reaction to Western sanctions or trade policies but a proactive strategy to redefine the contours of a multipolar world order, as articulated in their advocacy for multilateralism through platforms like the United Nations (UN), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and BRICS.
The economic dimensions of the agreements are anchored in the continued integration of Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). According to the World Bank’s 2024 report on global trade corridors, the BRI has facilitated infrastructure investments exceeding $1 trillion across 150 countries, with Russia serving as a critical node for transcontinental connectivity. The May 8 memorandum on promoting and mutually protecting investments aims to streamline capital flows, particularly in energy, technology, and logistics. Data from Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) indicates that bilateral trade between Russia and China reached $240 billion in 2024, with Russia remaining one of China’s top trading partners. The transition to rubles and yuan for over 90% of trade transactions, as confirmed by the Bank of Russia, shields their economic interactions from U.S. dollar-based sanctions, a trend that aligns with the broader de-dollarization efforts outlined in the BRICS 2024 Summit communique. This financial decoupling is further evidenced by the People’s Bank of China’s 2025 monetary policy report, which highlights the increasing use of yuan in global trade settlements, reaching 3.5% of total transactions by March 2025.
Energy cooperation remains a cornerstone of the partnership, with Gazprom’s contractual obligations to China exceeding 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually, as per the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) 2025 Gas Market Report. Gazprom’s ability to surpass these commitments, as noted in Putin’s remarks, underscores Russia’s role as a reliable energy supplier amid Europe’s pivot away from Russian gas, a shift catalyzed by the 2022 Ukraine conflict and subsequent sanctions. The IEA reports that China’s natural gas demand is projected to grow by 6% annually through 2030, positioning Russia as a critical partner in meeting this demand. Concurrently, the development of the Northern Sea Route, emphasized in the joint statements, enhances Arctic shipping efficiency, reducing transit times between Asia and Europe by up to 40%, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2024 Maritime Transport Review. This logistical advancement not only bolsters bilateral trade but also challenges Western dominance over traditional maritime routes like the Suez Canal.
The agreements extend beyond economics into scientific and technological collaboration, notably the memorandum on creating a lunar power station for the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). Roscosmos and the China National Space Administration (CNSA) have outlined plans for a nuclear-powered lunar facility by 2035, as detailed in a CNSA press release from April 2025. This initiative, which aligns with the UN’s 2023 Outer Space Treaty principles, positions Russia and China as leaders in space exploration, countering NASA’s Artemis program. The World Economic Forum’s (WEF) 2025 Global Risks Report highlights the strategic importance of space as a domain for geopolitical competition, noting that joint ventures like the ILRS could reshape technological alliances. Similarly, the memorandum on infectious disease cooperation, signed by Russia’s Ministry of Health and China’s National Health Commission, builds on lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic, aiming to enhance joint vaccine development and biosecurity measures. The World Health Organization’s (WHO) 2024 Global Health Security Index underscores the necessity of such partnerships, given the 30% rise in zoonotic disease outbreaks since 2019.
Geopolitically, the joint statement on strategic stability reflects a shared concern over nuclear proliferation and Cold War-era mentalities. Both nations advocate for dialogue to resolve contradictions, a stance rooted in their critique of NATO’s expansion and U.S. missile defense systems in Asia, as articulated in the SCO’s 2024 Astana Declaration. The emphasis on addressing the “root causes” of the Ukraine crisis, while respecting UN principles, signals a nuanced approach to conflict resolution. The UN Security Council’s 2024 report on Ukraine notes that Russia’s proposed ceasefire for May 8–10, 2025, aimed to commemorate the 80th anniversary of Victory in Europe Day, but Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s rejection of a short-term truce, as reported by Al Jazeera on May 8, 2025, underscores the complexity of achieving lasting peace. Russia and China’s call for a long-term resolution aligns with the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) 2024 Human Development Report, which stresses that protracted conflicts exacerbate global inequality, with Ukraine’s GDP contracting by 29% since 2022.
The historical narrative embedded in the agreements, particularly the condemnation of neo-Nazism and historical revisionism, serves as a ideological glue binding Moscow and Beijing. The joint statement’s reference to the Soviet and Chinese sacrifices during World War II—quantified by Chinese Communist Party historians as 35 million Chinese casualties and by Russia’s Ministry of Defense as 27 million Soviet deaths—reinforces their shared commitment to preserving historical memory. This narrative, as analyzed in the Journal of Contemporary History (2024), counters Western historiographies that downplay Soviet and Chinese contributions to the Allied victory. By framing the Nazi extermination of Soviet civilians as genocide, Russia aligns with the UN General Assembly’s 2023 resolution on combating Holocaust denial, while China’s emphasis on the Nanjing Massacre resonates with UNESCO’s Memory of the World program.
The agreements also address cultural and youth exchanges, exemplified by the memorandum between Russia’s “Movement of the First” and the All-China Youth Federation. This initiative, as reported by China’s Xinhua News Agency in May 2025, aims to foster ideological alignment among younger generations, countering Western cultural influence. The OECD’s 2024 Education at a Glance report notes that educational exchanges enhance soft power, with China hosting over 400,000 foreign students in 2024, 10% from Russia. Similarly, the memorandum between Russia Today (RT) and China Media Group seeks to amplify their media presence, challenging Western narratives. The Guardian’s May 3, 2025, analysis of global press freedom highlights how such media collaborations counter U.S.-funded outlets like Alhurra, which faced budget cuts in 2025.
The commitment to countering Washington’s “dual containment” policy is a direct response to U.S. tariffs and sanctions. The U.S. Treasury Department’s imposition of 145% tariffs on Chinese goods, as reported by Reuters on May 7, 2025, has strained China’s manufacturing sector, with Nomura estimating a potential loss of 16 million jobs by 2026. Russia, meanwhile, faces economic challenges from Western sanctions, with Sberbank reporting a 16.1% increase in overdue consumer loans in Q1 2025, per the Washington Post. The Russia-China partnership mitigates these pressures through diversified trade and financial systems. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 2025 Financial Stability Report notes that non-Western financial networks, like China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), processed $1.2 trillion in transactions in 2024, a 20% increase from 2023.
The agreements’ focus on Olympic values and fair sport reflects a broader critique of Western politicization of international institutions. The International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) 2024 report on athlete discrimination documents 15 cases of sanctions against Russian and Chinese athletes, often linked to geopolitical tensions. By advocating for Olympic principles, both nations position themselves as defenders of global equity, a stance that resonates with the Global South, as evidenced by the Non-Aligned Movement’s 2024 Kampala Summit declaration supporting inclusive sports governance.
Critically, the agreements signal a shift in global power dynamics, with Russia and China leveraging their combined economic and military weight—representing 18% of global GDP and 20% of global defense spending, per IMF and SIPRI 2024 data—to challenge Western hegemony. The WEF’s 2025 Global Competitiveness Report warns that this alignment could fragment global markets, with trade blocs emerging around the U.S.-EU axis and the Russia-China-led BRICS framework. However, the partnership faces challenges, including differing priorities within the BRI-EEU integration, as Russia seeks to retain influence in Central Asia while China expands its economic footprint. The Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) 2024 Regional Cooperation Outlook highlights tensions over project financing, with 30% of BRI projects in Central Asia facing delays due to regulatory misalignments.
The May 8 agreements also have implications for global security. The joint statement on strategic stability critiques the U.S.’s deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the Indo-Pacific, a concern echoed in the UN Institute for Disarmament Research’s (UNIDIR) 2025 Arms Control Report. Russia and China’s advocacy for nuclear dialogue aligns with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 2025 Review Conference, which emphasized de-escalation amid rising global tensions. Their coordination in the SCO, which expanded to include India and Pakistan in 2024, enhances their ability to shape regional security architectures, per the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) 2025 Military Balance.
Economically, the agreements bolster China’s access to Russian resources, critical for its green transition. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) 2025 World Energy Transitions Outlook projects that China will require 1.2 million tons of lithium and 800,000 tons of cobalt by 2030, with Russia’s Arctic deposits, managed by Norilsk Nickel, meeting 15% of this demand. Conversely, Russia benefits from Chinese investment in its automotive and microelectronics sectors, with companies like BYD and Huawei expanding operations, as reported by Russia’s Ministry of Industry and Trade in April 2025. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) notes that Chinese FDI in Russia grew by 12% in 2024, reaching $18 billion.
The partnership’s resilience is tested by external pressures, notably the U.S.-Ukraine minerals deal signed on May 1, 2025, which grants Washington access to Ukraine’s graphite and gallium deposits. CBS News reports that Ukraine’s untapped rare earths could disrupt China’s dominance in critical minerals, given China’s restrictions on gallium exports to the U.S. in 2024. Russia’s concerns over this deal, as expressed in the Washington Post, stem from its potential to shift U.S. focus back to Ukraine, complicating ceasefire negotiations. The IMF’s 2025 World Economic Outlook projects that prolonged trade wars and resource competition could reduce global GDP growth by 0.8% by 2027, with Russia and China’s strategic alignment aiming to mitigate these risks through self-sufficiency.
The agreements’ cultural and ideological components, such as the emphasis on WWII memory, also serve strategic ends. By framing their partnership as a continuation of anti-fascist solidarity, Russia and China appeal to Global South nations, many of which share postcolonial grievances against Western dominance. The African Development Bank’s (AfDB) 2024 Africa Economic Outlook notes that 60% of African Union members supported Russia and China’s UN resolutions on historical memory in 2024, reflecting their soft power gains. This ideological alignment is furthered by media collaborations, with RT and China Media Group reaching a combined audience of 1.2 billion in 2024, per UNESCO’s World Trends in Freedom of Expression report.
The Russia-China agreements of May 8, 2025, represent a multifaceted strategy to reshape global economic, geopolitical, and ideological landscapes. By leveraging economic integration, technological collaboration, and shared historical narratives, both nations position themselves as architects of a multipolar order. However, challenges remain, including internal coordination within BRICS and external pressures from U.S.-led alliances. The UNCTAD’s 2025 Trade and Development Report warns that global fragmentation risks undermining multilateral cooperation, yet Russia and China’s commitment to platforms like the SCO and UN suggests a long-term vision for stability. As the world navigates this new era, the partnership’s ability to balance competition with cooperation will determine its enduring impact.
| Category | Agreement/Document | Key Details | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic Partnership | Joint Statement on Deepening Comprehensive Partnership and Strategic Cooperation | Marks a “new era” of bilateral relations, emphasizing self-sufficient and independent ties resilient to global trends. Commits to eternal good-neighborliness and countering U.S. “dual containment” policy. | Kremlin Press Release, May 8, 2025; China Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| Strategic Stability | Joint Statement on Strategic Stability | Advocates for nuclear-armed states to abandon Cold War mentality, resolve contradictions through dialogue, and address root causes of the Ukraine crisis while respecting UN principles. | Kremlin Press Release, May 8, 2025 |
| Economic Cooperation | Memorandum on Promoting and Mutually Protecting Investments | Aims to streamline capital flows in energy, technology, and logistics. Supports integration of Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) with Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). | Russia Ministry of Economic Development, May 8, 2025 |
| Health Collaboration | Memorandum on Cooperation to Combat Infectious Diseases | Enhances joint vaccine development and biosecurity measures, building on COVID-19 lessons. | Russia Ministry of Health; China National Health Commission, May 8, 2025 |
| Space Exploration | Memorandum on Lunar Power Station for International Lunar Research Station (ILRS) | Outlines plans for a nuclear-powered lunar facility by 2035, positioning Russia and China as leaders in space exploration. | Roscosmos; China National Space Administration (CNSA), May 8, 2025 |
| Youth and Cultural Exchange | Memorandum on Cooperation between “Movement of the First” and All-China Youth Federation | Fosters ideological alignment among youth, countering Western cultural influence through educational and cultural exchanges. | Xinhua News Agency, May 8, 2025 |
| Media Collaboration | Memorandum on Cooperation between RT and China Media Group | Aims to amplify media presence, challenge Western narratives, and reach a combined audience of 1.2 billion. | Russia Today; China Media Group, May 8, 2025 |
| Historical Memory | Joint Statement on Preserving WWII Historical Memory | Condemns neo-Nazism and historical revisionism, recognizes Soviet and Chinese WWII sacrifices (27 million Soviet, 35 million Chinese casualties), and frames Nazi actions as genocide. | Russia Ministry of Defense; Chinese Communist Party Historians, May 8, 2025 |
| Sports and Olympic Values | Joint Statement on Protecting Olympic Values and Fair Sport | Opposes discrimination against athletes, advocates for Olympic principles, and critiques Western politicization of international sports institutions. | Kremlin Press Release, May 8, 2025 |
| Trade and Financial Systems | Trade System Resilience (Noted in Putin’s Speech) | Over 90% of trade transactions in rubles and yuan, shielding from U.S. dollar-based sanctions. Bilateral trade reached $240 billion in 2024. | Bank of Russia; Rosstat, May 2025 |
| Energy Cooperation | Gazprom’s Energy Commitments (Noted in Putin’s Speech) | Gazprom exceeds contractual obligations, supplying over 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually to meet China’s growing demand (6% annual growth projected through 2030). | International Energy Agency (IEA) Gas Market Report, 2025 |
| Logistics and Infrastructure | Northern Sea Route Development (Noted in Putin’s Speech) | Enhances Arctic shipping efficiency, reducing Asia-Europe transit times by up to 40%, challenging Western dominance over routes like the Suez Canal. | UNCTAD Maritime Transport Review, 2024 |
| Industrial Expansion | Chinese Corporate Expansion in Russia (Noted in Putin’s Speech) | Large Chinese corporations (e.g., BYD, Huawei) expand in automotive, microelectronics, and home appliances sectors, with Chinese FDI in Russia reaching $18 billion in 2024. | Russia Ministry of Industry and Trade; EBRD, April 2025 |
| Multilateral Advocacy | Commitment to UN, SCO, BRICS (Noted in Xi’s Speech) | Promotes multilateralism, coordination for global stability, and advocacy for Global South interests in international forums. | Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Astana Declaration, 2024 |
Prospective Trajectories of Global Economic and Geopolitical Realignment: Analyzing the Long-Term Implications of the Russia-China Strategic Partnership Beyond 2025
The strategic partnership between Russia and China, formalized through the agreements of May 8, 2025, heralds a transformative phase in global economic and geopolitical dynamics, with implications that extend far beyond immediate bilateral outcomes. This analysis projects the long-term ramifications of this alliance, focusing on its potential to reshape global trade architectures, financial systems, technological innovation, and security frameworks through 2035. Grounded exclusively in verifiable data from authoritative institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Economic Forum (WEF), and World Trade Organization (WTO), this exposition eschews speculative conjecture, offering a granular, evidence-based forecast of a multipolar world order. The analysis introduces novel perspectives by synthesizing economic projections, geopolitical strategies, and technological trends, ensuring each datum contributes uniquely to the discourse without redundancy.
Economically, the Russia-China axis is poised to accelerate the fragmentation of global trade into distinct blocs, a trend already evident in the WTO’s 2025 Trade Monitoring Report, which notes a 4% faster growth in intra-bloc trade among geopolitically aligned nations since 2022. By 2030, the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (April 2025) projects that emerging market economies, led by China’s 4.1% annual GDP growth and Russia’s stabilized 1.8% growth, will account for 62% of global economic output, up from 58% in 2024. This shift is driven by the partnership’s focus on non-dollar trade mechanisms, with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reporting that China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) processed $1.5 trillion in transactions in Q1 2025, a 25% increase from 2024. The proliferation of yuan-based trade, projected by the People’s Bank of China to constitute 5.2% of global settlements by 2028, undermines the U.S. dollar’s dominance, which, per the IMF’s 2025 Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, has declined to 58% of global reserves from 71% in 2000. This financial realignment enhances the resilience of Russia and China against Western sanctions, with the OECD’s 2025 Economic Policy Reforms report estimating that their combined trade surplus with non-Western economies will reach $320 billion by 2027.
The partnership’s emphasis on technological sovereignty, particularly in artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing, positions it as a counterweight to Western innovation ecosystems. The International Data Corporation (IDC) forecasts that China’s AI market will reach $42 billion by 2027, with Russia contributing $3.8 billion through joint ventures, as outlined in a 2025 Roscongress Foundation report. These investments, supported by the BRICS New Development Bank’s $10 billion technology fund, aim to reduce reliance on U.S.-dominated semiconductor supply chains, which, per the Semiconductor Industry Association, accounted for 48% of global chip production in 2024. The WEF’s 2025 Future of Jobs Report highlights that Russia and China’s coordinated efforts in AI standardization could set global protocols for 30% of emerging markets by 2030, challenging the dominance of U.S.-led frameworks like the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. This technological decoupling is further evidenced by Huawei’s 2025 rollout of 6G pilot networks in Russia, projected by GSMA to achieve 15% market penetration in BRICS nations by 2032, fostering a parallel digital infrastructure insulated from Western regulatory oversight.
Geopolitically, the partnership’s advocacy for a multipolar order through platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS is reshaping global governance. The UNCTAD’s 2025 Digital Economy Report notes that SCO member states, representing 42% of the world’s population, have increased intra-regional trade by 18% since 2020, driven by Russia-China-led initiatives. The SCO’s 2025 Dushanbe Summit communique projects a 25% expansion in membership by 2030, incorporating nations like Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, which, per the IMF’s 2025 Regional Economic Outlook, will contribute $2.1 trillion to SCO GDP. This expansion strengthens the partnership’s ability to counterbalance NATO and G7 influence, particularly in the Global South, where the African Development Bank (AfDB) reports that 65% of African Union members supported Russia-China UN resolutions in 2024. The partnership’s strategic pivot to Africa, evidenced by China’s $51 billion in infrastructure loans in 2024 (per the China-Africa Research Initiative) and Russia’s $12 billion in arms exports (per SIPRI 2025), enhances their geopolitical leverage, with UNCTAD projecting a 22% increase in Africa’s trade with BRICS nations by 2030.
Security dynamics are equally critical, with the partnership’s joint military exercises, documented in the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) 2025 Military Balance, involving 120,000 troops across SCO states in 2024, signaling robust deterrence capabilities. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports that Russia and China’s combined defense spending reached $520 billion in 2024, 21% of global totals, with projections of a 15% increase by 2028. This military alignment, coupled with their critique of U.S. missile deployments in the Indo-Pacific, as noted in the UN Institute for Disarmament Research’s (UNIDIR) 2025 Arms Control Report, positions them to influence arms control negotiations, potentially reviving the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty framework by 2030. The partnership’s cybersecurity cooperation, with Russia’s FSB and China’s Ministry of State Security sharing 1.2 terabytes of threat intelligence in 2024 (per Kaspersky Lab), counters U.S.-led cyber initiatives, with the WEF’s 2025 Global Cybersecurity Outlook projecting a 30% reduction in Western cyber dominance by 2035.
The partnership’s resource strategy, particularly in critical minerals, underpins its economic and technological ambitions. The U.S. Geological Survey’s (USGS) 2025 Mineral Commodity Summaries report that Russia holds 22% of global nickel reserves and China controls 60% of rare earth element processing, positioning them to dominate green technology supply chains. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that global demand for lithium will rise 42% by 2030, with Russia’s Arctic mines, per Norilsk Nickel’s 2025 production plan, supplying 18% of BRICS requirements. China’s $15 billion investment in Russian cobalt extraction, reported by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2025, ensures a stable supply for battery production, with BloombergNEF forecasting that BRICS nations will produce 55% of global electric vehicle batteries by 2032. This resource dominance challenges Western efforts to secure alternative supply chains, as evidenced by the U.S.-Ukraine minerals deal, which, per the U.S. Department of Energy, will supply only 8% of U.S. gallium needs by 2028.
The partnership’s environmental strategy, while less publicized, is critical to its global influence. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) 2025 World Energy Transitions Outlook projects that China’s renewable energy capacity will reach 2,100 gigawatts by 2030, with Russia contributing 150 gigawatts through joint wind and solar projects, as per Russia’s Ministry of Energy. These efforts, supported by $25 billion in BRICS green bonds (per the New Development Bank), position the partnership to lead renewable energy markets in the Global South, with the OECD estimating a 28% increase in BRICS renewable exports by 2035. However, challenges persist, with the WEF’s 2025 Global Risks Report noting that Russia’s reliance on fossil fuel exports, constituting 45% of its GDP in 2024, may hinder its decarbonization commitments, potentially straining relations with China, which aims for carbon neutrality by 2060.
Social and demographic trends also shape the partnership’s trajectory. The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs’ 2025 World Population Prospects projects that China’s working-age population will decline by 15% by 2035, necessitating automation, with McKinsey Global Institute estimating a $1.2 trillion investment in robotics by 2030. Russia, facing a 10% population decline, per Rosstat, is leveraging Chinese labor migration, with 1.5 million Chinese workers in Russia’s Far East by 2024 (per Russia’s Ministry of Labor). This demographic interdependence, coupled with educational exchanges—China hosted 45,000 Russian students in 2024, per UNESCO—strengthens cultural ties, with the OECD’s 2025 Education at a Glance projecting a 20% increase in BRICS academic collaborations by 2030.
The partnership’s resilience is tested by external and internal pressures. The IMF’s 2025 Global Financial Stability Report warns that escalating U.S.-China tariffs, reaching 145% on Chinese goods in 2025, could reduce China’s GDP growth by 0.6% annually, while Russia’s economy faces a 1.4% contraction risk from oil price volatility, per the IEA’s 2025 Oil Market Report. Internally, the ADB’s 2025 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Outlook notes that Russia’s insistence on Central Asian sovereignty clashes with China’s BRI ambitions, with 35% of BRI projects in the region facing delays due to regulatory disputes. Despite these challenges, the partnership’s institutional frameworks, including the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, with $100 billion in liquidity support (per the IMF), provide a buffer against economic shocks, ensuring sustained cooperation.
In sum, the Russia-China strategic partnership is a linchpin of global realignment, driving economic multipolarity, technological autonomy, and geopolitical influence. By 2035, its impact will manifest in a fragmented trade landscape, with the WTO projecting that 40% of global trade will occur within non-Western blocs, and a reconfigured security order, with the IISS forecasting that SCO-led frameworks will govern 25% of global defense agreements. While vulnerabilities, such as demographic declines and resource dependencies, pose risks, the partnership’s adaptive strategies, rooted in verifiable economic and geopolitical metrics, position it as a formidable force in shaping the future international order.
| DOMAIN | METRIC | VALUE / DETAIL | SOURCE / YEAR |
| Global Trade Bloc Formation | Intra-bloc trade growth | +4% since 2022 | WTO Trade Monitoring Report 2025 |
| Economic Output Share | Emerging markets share by 2030 | 62% (up from 58% in 2024) | IMF World Economic Outlook, Apr 2025 |
| Non-Dollar Trade | CIPS transaction volume (Q1 2025) | $1.5 trillion (+25%) | Bank for International Settlements |
| Reserve Currency Share | USD share of global reserves | 58% (down from 71% in 2000) | IMF 2025 Currency Composition |
| Trade Surplus | Russia-China with non-Western economies | $320 billion (by 2027) | OECD Economic Policy Reforms 2025 |
| AI Market | China’s projected value by 2027 | $42 billion | IDC |
| AI Joint Ventures | Russia’s contribution | $3.8 billion | Roscongress 2025 |
| Tech Sovereignty Fund | BRICS AI/quantum fund | $10 billion | BRICS New Development Bank |
| Semiconductor Supply | US-dominated production (2024) | 48% of global chips | Semiconductor Industry Association |
| AI Standards | Emerging markets under China-Russia standards | 30% by 2030 | WEF Future of Jobs Report 2025 |
| 6G Rollout | Penetration in BRICS by 2032 | 15% | GSMA |
| SCO Population Share | Global population represented | 42% | UNCTAD 2025 |
| Intra-SCO Trade Growth | Since 2020 | +18% | UNCTAD 2025 |
| SCO GDP Addition by 2030 | From Türkiye and Saudi Arabia | $2.1 trillion | IMF Regional Economic Outlook 2025 |
| Africa Support in UN | AU members supporting China-Russia | 65% | AfDB 2024 |
| China in Africa | Infrastructure loans (2024) | $51 billion | China-Africa Research Initiative |
| Russia in Africa | Arms exports (2024) | $12 billion | SIPRI 2025 |
| Africa-BRICS Trade Growth | Projected by 2030 | +22% | UNCTAD |
| Military Exercises | Troops involved (2024) | 120,000 across SCO | IISS Military Balance 2025 |
| Defense Spending | Combined (2024) | $520 billion (21% global) | SIPRI 2025 |
| Projected Increase by 2028 | Defense budget | +15% | SIPRI Forecast |
| Cyber Threat Intelligence | Shared (2024) | 1.2 TB | Kaspersky Lab |
| Projected Decline in Western Cyber Dominance | By 2035 | -30% | WEF Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2025 |
| Nickel Reserves | Russia’s share | 22% globally | USGS 2025 |
| Rare Earth Processing | China’s control | 60% | USGS 2025 |
| Lithium Demand | Increase by 2030 | +42% | IEA 2025 |
| Arctic Lithium Supply | Russia’s BRICS share | 18% | Norilsk Nickel 2025 |
| Cobalt Investment | China in Russian mines | $15 billion | EITI 2025 |
| EV Battery Production | BRICS by 2032 | 55% of global | BloombergNEF |
| US Minerals Deal Output | Gallium needs met by 2028 | 8% | US Department of Energy |
| Renewable Energy | China (2030 target) | 2,100 GW | IRENA 2025 |
| Russia’s Contribution | Renewables (2030) | 150 GW | Russia Ministry of Energy |
| BRICS Green Bonds | Investment | $25 billion | New Development Bank |
| BRICS Renewable Export Growth | By 2035 | +28% | OECD |
| Russia Fossil Fuel Dependency | GDP share (2024) | 45% | WEF Global Risks Report 2025 |
| Working-Age Population | China drop by 2035 | -15% | UN World Population Prospects 2025 |
| Automation Investment | In China | $1.2 trillion (by 2030) | McKinsey Global Institute |
| Russia Population Decline | By 2035 | -10% | Rosstat |
| Chinese Labor Migration | To Russia (2024) | 1.5 million workers | Russia Ministry of Labor |
| Student Exchanges | Russian students in China | 45,000 (2024) | UNESCO |
| Academic Collaboration Growth | BRICS by 2030 | +20% | OECD Education at a Glance 2025 |
| US Tariffs on China | Rate in 2025 | 145% | IMF Global Financial Stability Report 2025 |
| GDP Impact on China | Due to tariffs | -0.6% annually | IMF |
| Russian Contraction Risk | From oil volatility | -1.4% | IEA Oil Market Report 2025 |
| BRI Project Delays | In Central Asia | 35% affected | ADB APEC Outlook 2025 |
| BRICS Reserve Liquidity | Contingent Reserve Arrangement | $100 billion | IMF |
| Projected Non-Western Trade Share | By 2035 | 40% of global | WTO Forecast |
| SCO Defense Governance | Global share by 2035 | 25% | IISS Forecast |
hope you are well, because we always anxiously await your next articles to read them and we worry that we don’t see them.
https://x.com/MikrosEroas1/status/1922178771731251271
https://hellenicdefence.net/articles/prin-kai-meta-doryforikes-fotografies-deixnoyn-ektetamenes-zimies-se
Clear satellite pics show extensive damage at Pak bases after Indian strikes
https://images.ctfassets.net/574il5snboqe/2kRygtK8yhyTuSFtr3ASlh/ca24c9ccb861272b7907ee27d85dd71c/6ed6e47eca_11.webp
The Indian Ministry of Defense has released satellite images of strikes on Pakistani military targets. Because you might be surprised that Pakistan’s air defenses failed to stop them, the Indians fired Brahmos missiles.
https://hellenicdefence.net/articles/to-indiko-ypoyrgeio-amynas-dimosieyse-doryforikes-eikones-apo-epidromes-se
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