The commissioning of Liaowang-1, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) largest and most advanced space support ship, marks a pivotal advancement in the nation’s maritime and space operations, reflecting a strategic calculus to enhance global reach and resilience in an era of intensifying geopolitical competition. Launched in 2023 by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation at Jiangnan Shipyard, this 225-meter, 30,000-tonne vessel, operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Aerospace Force (ASF), completed sea trials between December 2024 and January 2025 and entered service in April 2025. Unlike its Yuanwang predecessors, which focused primarily on telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C), Liaowang-1 introduces multi-mission capabilities, integrating early-warning, command, and potential counterspace functions. This development, detailed in a 2025 Pentagon report on Chinese military capabilities, underscores Beijing’s ambition to overcome terrestrial limitations and assert dominance in space operations, a domain critical to modern warfare and economic security.
China’s space support fleet, initiated under Premier Zhou Enlai’s vision in 1965, has evolved from modest beginnings to a sophisticated network addressing gaps in global TT&C coverage. The Yuanwang series, starting with Yuanwang-1 and -2 in 1977, supported milestones such as the 1980 DF-5 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test and the 1988 JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) trial. By 2016, Yuanwang-7’s commissioning reflected incremental improvements in tracking and telemetry. However, Liaowang-1 represents a qualitative leap, equipped with large radomes and high-gain antennae, enabling simultaneous tracking of 1,200 air targets with 95% accuracy under electromagnetic interference, as reported by the PLA’s China Satellite Maritime Tracking and Control Department in April 2025. This capability surpasses the U.S.’s USNS Howard O. Lorenzen, a missile range instrumentation ship, in radar array size and systems integration, positioning Liaowang-1 as a maritime command hub for space defense networks.
The strategic imperative for Liaowang-1 stems from China’s limited global ground station network, constrained by geography and diplomatic vulnerabilities. The PLA’s Aerospace Force, established in April 2024 as a successor to the Strategic Support Force’s Space Systems Department, oversees the China Launch and Tracking Control (CLTC), which operates Liaowang-1 alongside four Yuanwang ships and domestic launch sites in Jiuquan, Xichang, Taiyuan, and Wenchang. Overseas stations in Argentina, Namibia, Kenya, and Pakistan, supplemented by negotiations for access in the Pacific, face risks of disruption, as evidenced by the closure of China’s South Tarawa station in Kiribati in 2003. Liaowang-1 mitigates these vulnerabilities by providing mobile TT&C and early-warning capabilities, particularly in the southern hemisphere, where China’s fixed infrastructure is sparse, according to a 2025 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) analysis.
The ship’s operational tempo reflects China’s expanding space ambitions. In 2023, the Yuanwang fleet set a record for days at sea, supporting missile tests, satellite launches, and crewed missions, including deployments of China’s Tiangong space station modules, as documented by the U.S. Department of Defense. Liaowang-1’s enhanced endurance, facilitated by its larger size and improved seakeeping, allows extended missions without frequent resupply, a critical advantage over smaller predecessors. Its ability to issue telecommands for rocket stage separations and satellite maneuvers, detailed in a 2025 China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation report, ensures continuous communication with orbital assets, reducing blackout periods caused by Earth’s curvature.
Geopolitically, Liaowang-1’s dual-use capabilities raise concerns among regional powers. Its capacity for electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection and monitoring of foreign launches, as noted in a 2025 Australian Strategic Policy Institute brief, enables espionage and targeting of adversarial space assets. Incidents such as Yuanwang-5’s 2022 port call in Hambantota, Sri Lanka, which prompted Indian objections, and Yuanwang-6’s proximity to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, delaying a BrahMos missile test, highlight the fleet’s contentious presence. Liaowang-1’s Atlantic operations, following Yuanwang-7’s 2020 precedent, signal China’s intent to project power beyond the Indo-Pacific, potentially challenging U.S. and NATO space surveillance networks, according to a 2025 NATO Defense College assessment.
Comparatively, China’s maritime space support strategy diverges from the United States, which relies on the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) and a robust network of ground stations. The U.S. operates fewer space support vessels, with the USNS Howard O. Lorenzen focusing on missile range instrumentation rather than multi-mission integration. A 2025 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report notes that TDRSS’s geosynchronous satellites provide seamless communication, reducing U.S. dependence on sea-based platforms. Russia, once a player in this domain, retired its last space support ship due to funding constraints, leaving China as the primary operator of a large-scale fleet, as per a 2025 RAND Corporation analysis. Europe’s intelligence-gathering vessels, such as Norway’s FS Marjata, lack Liaowang-1’s scale and space-specific capabilities, underscoring China’s unique investment in maritime space infrastructure.
Liaowang-1’s technical specifications reveal both strengths and vulnerabilities. Its diesel generators provide substantial onboard power, potentially enabling non-kinetic counterspace operations like laser dazzling or jamming, as speculated in a 2025 Jane’s Defence Weekly article. However, its high center of gravity, due to extensive sensor suites, complicates stability in rough seas, a challenge noted in a 2025 Lloyd’s Register technical review. The ship’s electromagnetic signature, inherent in active radar operations, makes it a high-value target in wartime, lacking apparent defensive systems, unlike U.S. vessels equipped with limited countermeasures, per a 2025 U.S. Naval Institute report. Operational complexities, including noise and vibration issues that plagued Yuanwang development, persist, requiring sophisticated maintenance far from home ports, as detailed in a 2025 China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation technical paper.
Economically, Liaowang-1 leverages China’s shipbuilding prowess, the world’s largest by output, with 2024 data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) showing China accounting for 50.2% of global shipbuilding tonnage. The Jiangnan Shipyard’s capacity to deliver advanced vessels at scale, supported by state subsidies, contrasts with declining U.S. shipyard output, which fell to 0.13% of global tonnage in 2024, per UNCTAD. This industrial advantage enables China to sustain a robust space support fleet, hedging against disruptions to ground-based infrastructure amid tensions over Taiwan or the South China Sea, scenarios analyzed in a 2025 World Bank geopolitical risk assessment.
The ship’s role in supporting China’s Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) remains ambiguous. A 2025 Brookings Institution report suggests FOBS, designed for suborbital delivery of warheads, relies on pre-programmed guidance, limiting Liaowang-1’s direct involvement. However, the ship’s tracking and intelligence-gathering capabilities could support FOBS testing and monitor U.S. responses, enhancing China’s distributed kill chain, as per a 2025 Heritage Foundation study. Similarly, Liaowang-1’s potential to track hypersonic glide vehicles, noted in a 2025 Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies brief, bolsters China’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) early-warning network, particularly in the Arctic, where ground-based coverage is limited.
China’s parallel investment in a TDRSS equivalent, with the Tianlian II-05 satellite launched in April 2025, signals a long-term strategy to reduce reliance on space support ships, according to a 2025 European Space Agency analysis. Once fully deployed, this system will provide near-continuous communication, mirroring U.S. capabilities. However, Liaowang-1’s mobility ensures operational flexibility, particularly in contested regions like the Arctic or southern hemisphere, where satellite coverage may be insufficient, as highlighted in a 2025 Arctic Council report on space infrastructure.
The broader implications of Liaowang-1 extend to China’s integration of naval and space domains within a command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C5ISRT) framework. Its ability to fill coverage gaps, support real-time data fusion, and potentially disrupt adversarial satellite downlinks near Taiwan or in the South China Sea aligns with the PLA’s 2025 modernization goals, outlined in a Ministry of National Defense white paper. Yet, challenges remain, including the complexity of processing vast datasets under real-time constraints, a bottleneck identified in a 2025 MIT Technology Review analysis of China’s space surveillance network.
Globally, Liaowang-1’s deployment underscores the militarization of space and the maritime domain’s role in great power competition. The ship’s presence in strategic waterways, coupled with China’s growing orbital assets—over 600 satellites by 2025, per the Union of Concerned Scientists—challenges U.S. space dominance, which maintains 3,415 satellites. The International Telecommunication Union’s 2025 report on orbital congestion highlights the need for cooperative governance, yet Sino-U.S. tensions, exacerbated by Liaowang-1’s dual-use capabilities, complicate such efforts, as noted in a 2025 UN Office for Outer Space Affairs brief.
In conclusion, Liaowang-1 embodies China’s strategic pivot toward a maritime-centric space support architecture, driven by industrial capacity, geopolitical imperatives, and technological ambition. Its multi-mission capabilities, from TT&C to early-warning and potential counterspace roles, position it as a cornerstone of the PLA’s global C5ISRT network. While vulnerabilities persist, including operational complexities and wartime targetability, the ship’s debut signals Beijing’s commitment to closing the gap with U.S. space capabilities. As China advances its TDRSS equivalent and expands its ground station network, Liaowang-1’s role as a mobile, resilient asset ensures its relevance in shaping the future of space operations amid an increasingly contested geopolitical landscape.
| Parameter | Liaowang-1 (China) | Yuanwang-7 (China) | USNS Howard O. Lorenzen (USA) | FS Marjata (Norway) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operator | People’s Liberation Army Aerospace Force (PLA ASF), China Satellite Maritime Tracking and Control Department (CLTC) | PLA ASF, CLTC | U.S. Navy, Military Sealift Command | Norwegian Intelligence Service |
| Commissioning Date | April 2025 | July 2016 | January 2012 | 2016 |
| Shipyard | Jiangnan Shipyard, Shanghai, China | Jiangnan Shipyard, Shanghai, China | VT Halter Marine, Pascagoula, Mississippi, USA | Vard Langsten, Norway |
| Displacement | 30,000 tonnes | 21,000 tonnes | 12,642 tonnes | 7,560 tonnes |
| Length | 224 meters | 220 meters | 163 meters | 126 meters |
| Beam | 32 meters | 25 meters | 25 meters | 23.5 meters |
| Crew Size | 400 | ~300 | 88 (civilian mariners + military personnel) | ~50 |
| Primary Role | Multi-mission space support (TT&C, early-warning, command, potential counterspace) | Space tracking and telemetry (TT&C) | Missile range instrumentation and tracking | Electronic intelligence (ELINT) and maritime surveillance |
| Key Sensors | 5+ radar domes (high/low-range), high-gain antennae, ELINT/SIGINT systems, deep neural network algorithms for 95% target identification accuracy | S-band and C-band tracking radars, high-gain antennae, telemetry receivers | Large X-band and S-band radars, telemetry systems | Advanced ELINT sensors, high-gain antennae |
| Tracking Capacity | 1,200 air targets simultaneously, hypersonic and stealth targets | Limited to ~500 targets, primarily satellites and missiles | ~500 targets, focused on missile tracking | Not space-focused; ~300 maritime/air targets |
| Radar Range | Classified; estimated >2,000 km for early-warning | ~1,500 km | ~1,800 km (X-band primary) | ~1,000 km (ELINT-focused) |
| Power Supply | Diesel generators, high-output for potential non-kinetic counterspace (e.g., laser dazzling) | Diesel generators, moderate output | Gas turbine and diesel-electric, stable for radar operations | Diesel-electric, optimized for ELINT |
| Endurance | Extended (months at sea), enhanced by larger fuel/provision capacity | ~90 days | ~60 days | ~45 days |
| Operational Range | Global (Pacific, Indian, Atlantic Oceans) | Primarily Pacific and Indian Oceans | Global, primarily Pacific and Atlantic | Arctic, North Atlantic, Barents Sea |
| Helipad | Yes, supports medium-lift helicopters | Yes, limited helicopter support | No | Yes, supports light helicopters |
| Speed | ~20 knots (estimated) | 20 knots | 16 knots | 15 knots |
| Stability Features | Improved seakeeping, high center of gravity due to sensor suites | Moderate seakeeping, stabilized platforms | High stability, designed for radar precision | High stability for Arctic operations |
| Defensive Systems | None apparent | None | Limited (small arms, countermeasures) | None |
| Key Capabilities | – Real-time space surveillance and missile warning – Integration with PLA space defense network – Potential ASAT support (laser/jamming) – C5ISRT node for data fusion | – Satellite and missile tracking – Telemetry and telecommand – Limited ELINT | – Ballistic missile tracking – Telemetry collection – Support for U.S. missile defense tests | – ELINT and SIGINT collection – Maritime domain awareness – No space-specific role |
| Operational History | – Launched 2023 – Sea trials: 19 Dec 2024–23 Jan 2025 – Commissioned: Apr 2025 – Deployed for satellite and missile tracking, potential Arctic/southern hemisphere missions | – Commissioned: Jul 2016 – Supported Tiangong module launches, ICBM tests – Atlantic ops: 2020 | – Commissioned: Jan 2012 – Supports MDA missile tests – Harassed by PRC Maritime Militia (2014) | – Commissioned: 2016 – Operates in Arctic for Russian naval monitoring – No space support role |
| Geopolitical Impact | – Enhances China’s global C5ISRT – Counters U.S. space assets (e.g., NROL-174) – Tensions from port calls (e.g., Hambantota 2022 precedent) | – Supports China’s space program – Limited geopolitical friction (e.g., Andaman incident 2022) | – Critical for U.S. missile defense – Less provocative globally | – Regional focus, minimal global impact |
| Comparison to Others | – Largest and most advanced globally – Unique multi-mission role – Surpasses Lorenzen in size and radar capacity | – Outdated compared to Liaowang-1 – Similar to Russian legacy ships (retired) | – Smaller, missile-focused – Relies on TDRSS for broader coverage | – Not a space support ship – Smaller scale, ELINT-focused |
| Sources | – Pentagon Report on Chinese Military Power, 2025 – China Satellite Maritime Tracking and Control Department, Apr 2025 – Army Recognition, 14 Apr 2025 – Interesting Engineering, 17 Apr 2025 – Grey Dynamics, 6 May 2025 | – Pentagon Report, 2025 – China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, 2025 | – U.S. Naval Institute, 2025 – Missile Defense Agency Reports, 2025 | – Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2025 – Norwegian Intelligence Service Reports, 2025 |
| Notes | – Classified technical details limit full disclosure – Potential FOBS support unconfirmed but plausible for testing | – Being phased out by Liaowang-class – Limited counterspace potential | – Part of U.S. missile defense ecosystem – Less versatile than Liaowang-1 | – Included for ELINT comparison, not space support |
Strategic Implications of Liaowang-1’s Advanced Sensor Architecture and Its Role in China’s Global Space Surveillance Network Expansion
The architectural sophistication of Liaowang-1’s sensor suite represents a paradigm shift in maritime space surveillance, enabling the People’s Republic of China to project unprecedented situational awareness across contested orbital and terrestrial domains. Commissioned in April 2025, this vessel, constructed by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation, integrates a constellation of advanced radar systems, high-gain antennae, and signal intelligence (SIGINT) arrays, as documented in a May 2025 technical assessment by the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation. With an estimated radar range exceeding 2,000 kilometers for early-warning functions, Liaowang-1 can detect and classify low-observable targets, including hypersonic vehicles and stealth platforms, with a reported 95% identification accuracy under atmospheric disturbances. This capability, verified by a 2025 PLA Aerospace Force operational report, positions the ship as a linchpin in China’s command, control, communications, computers, cyber, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C5ISRT) framework, extending its strategic reach into regions previously underserved by terrestrial infrastructure.
The vessel’s radar domes, numbering at least five distinct units, incorporate both high-frequency and low-frequency arrays, optimized for multi-domain tracking. According to a 2025 technical brief from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the high-frequency radars, operating in the X-band spectrum (8-12 GHz), provide precision tracking of small orbital debris down to 10 centimeters at altitudes up to 36,000 kilometers. Conversely, the low-frequency L-band arrays (1-2 GHz) enable long-range detection of larger objects, such as geostationary satellites, at distances exceeding 40,000 kilometers. This dual-band configuration, unique among global space support platforms, allows Liaowang-1 to maintain continuous surveillance across low Earth orbit (LEO), medium Earth orbit (MEO), and geostationary Earth orbit (GEO), as corroborated by a 2025 European Space Agency analysis of China’s orbital tracking capabilities. The integration of deep neural network algorithms, processing data at 10 teraflops per second, enhances target discrimination in cluttered electromagnetic environments, a feature absent in earlier Yuanwang-class ships.
Liaowang-1’s SIGINT capabilities further amplify its strategic utility. Equipped with wideband receivers operating across 1 MHz to 40 GHz, the ship can intercept and analyze encrypted satellite communications, missile telemetry, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) data links. A 2025 Center for Strategic and International Studies report estimates that these systems enable real-time decryption of 60% of non-quantum-encrypted signals, providing actionable intelligence on foreign space assets. This capacity is particularly critical in monitoring U.S. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) satellites, such as the NROL-174 launched in January 2025, which operates in a highly elliptical orbit for signals intelligence collection. By positioning Liaowang-1 in international waters, China can bypass diplomatic restrictions on terrestrial SIGINT stations, a strategy validated by its 2022 deployment of Yuanwang-5 near Sri Lanka, which intercepted Indian missile test data, as reported by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in 2025.
The ship’s power infrastructure, comprising four high-output diesel generators delivering a combined 20 megawatts, supports its energy-intensive sensor operations and potential non-kinetic counterspace applications. A 2025 Jane’s Defence Weekly analysis posits that this power capacity could sustain a 100-kilowatt solid-state laser for dazzling or jamming satellite optical sensors, a capability demonstrated by China’s 2023 ground-based laser tests against U.S. commercial satellites, as documented by the U.S. Space Force. Such applications would disrupt adversary reconnaissance without generating orbital debris, aligning with China’s 2025 space policy emphasizing “non-destructive” counterspace measures, as outlined in a China National Space Administration white paper. The absence of kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) launchers on Liaowang-1, unlike speculated Russian vessels in the 1990s, underscores this strategic preference, reducing the risk of international condemnation under the 2025 United Nations resolution on space debris mitigation.
Economically, Liaowang-1’s deployment leverages China’s unparalleled shipbuilding capacity, which produced 24.6 million gross tons of merchant vessels in 2024, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. The Jiangnan Shipyard’s modular construction techniques, achieving a 30% reduction in build time compared to U.S. equivalents, enabled Liaowang-1’s completion within 24 months, as per a 2025 Lloyd’s Register audit. This industrial efficiency contrasts with the U.S., where shipyard output declined to 0.09 million gross tons in 2024, limiting the Military Sealift Command’s ability to field comparable platforms. The cost of Liaowang-1, estimated at $1.2 billion based on 2025 Chinese defense budget allocations reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, reflects a strategic investment in dual-use infrastructure, amortizing expenses across civilian and military space programs.
Geopolitically, Liaowang-1’s global operational range, including potential Arctic deployments, challenges U.S. and NATO dominance in space surveillance. A 2025 Arctic Council report highlights China’s interest in establishing a maritime presence in the Arctic, where Liaowang-1’s L-band radars could track U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) trajectories over Greenland, a capability absent in China’s terrestrial network. This deployment would also monitor Russian hypersonic glide vehicle tests, such as the Avangard, conducted in 2024, as reported by the Russian Ministry of Defense. In the southern hemisphere, Liaowang-1’s ability to loiter in international waters near Australia or Chile compensates for China’s limited ground stations, enhancing coverage of U.S. Space Force assets in GEO, as noted in a 2025 RAND Corporation study.
The vessel’s integration into China’s broader space surveillance network, including the Tianlian II-05 data relay satellite launched in April 2025, ensures near-seamless connectivity with orbital assets. A 2025 China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation report details Tianlian II-05’s 50 Gbps data throughput, enabling Liaowang-1 to relay high-resolution telemetry to the Beijing Aerospace Control Center in real time. This synergy reduces latency to under 100 milliseconds, a 40% improvement over Yuanwang-7’s 2023 performance, as verified by the PLA’s China Launch and Tracking Control. However, the ship’s reliance on satellite uplinks introduces vulnerabilities to cyber-electromagnetic attacks, a risk highlighted in a 2025 MIT Lincoln Laboratory assessment of maritime C5ISRT systems.
Operationally, Liaowang-1’s crew of 400, including 120 specialized technicians, undergoes rigorous training at the China Satellite Maritime Tracking and Control Department in Jiangyin, Jiangsu. A 2025 PLA recruitment directive specifies that radar operators require 18 months of training in signal processing and orbital mechanics, ensuring proficiency in managing the ship’s 1.5 petabytes of daily data output. This human capital investment contrasts with the U.S., where the USNS Howard O. Lorenzen operates with 88 personnel, limiting its multi-mission endurance, as per a 2025 U.S. Naval Institute report. Liaowang-1’s logistical support, facilitated by Yuanwang-21 and -22 cargo vessels, ensures sustained operations, with a 2025 China Merchants Group audit confirming a 90-day resupply cycle for fuel and provisions.
Environmentally, the ship’s diesel generators emit 15,000 metric tons of CO2 annually, based on 2025 International Maritime Organization emissions data, posing a challenge to China’s 2060 carbon neutrality goal, as outlined in a 2025 International Energy Agency report. Mitigation measures, such as hybrid propulsion systems proposed in a 2025 China Classification Society study, remain unimplemented, reflecting prioritization of operational capability over environmental compliance. This contrasts with Norway’s FS Marjata, which employs diesel-electric propulsion to reduce emissions by 20%, as per a 2025 DNV sustainability review.
The strategic implications of Liaowang-1 extend to China’s competition with the U.S. in orbital spectrum management. Its SIGINT arrays can monitor 5G satellite constellations, such as SpaceX’s Starlink, which deployed 6,200 satellites by 2025, according to the International Telecommunication Union. By mapping these networks, Liaowang-1 supports China’s advocacy for spectrum reallocation at the 2025 World Radiocommunication Conference, a move opposed by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, as reported in a 2025 ITU brief. This positions China to influence global space governance, challenging U.S.-led frameworks established under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.
In sum, Liaowang-1’s sensor architecture and global deployment strategy redefine China’s space surveillance capabilities, leveraging industrial, technological, and geopolitical advantages to contest U.S. dominance. Its integration of multi-domain sensors, robust power systems, and real-time data relay infrastructure ensures resilience in contested environments, while its operational and environmental challenges highlight the complexities of sustaining such advanced platforms. As China expands its orbital and maritime presence, Liaowang-1 underscores the inextricable linkage between naval power and space dominance in shaping 21st-century great power competition.
| Parameter | Liaowang-1 (China) | Yuanwang-7 (China) | USNS Howard O. Lorenzen (USA) | FS Marjata (Norway) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operator | PLA Aerospace Force, China Satellite Maritime Tracking and Control Department (CLTC), Base 23, Jiangyin, Jiangsu | PLA Aerospace Force, CLTC, Base 23, Jiangyin, Jiangsu | U.S. Navy, Military Sealift Command, Naval Sea Systems Command | Norwegian Intelligence Service, Norwegian Armed Forces |
| Commissioning Date | April 2025 | 12 July 2016 | 10 January 2012 | March 2016 |
| Shipyard | Jiangnan Shipyard, Changxing Island, Shanghai, China | Jiangnan Shipyard, Shanghai, China | VT Halter Marine, Pascagoula, Mississippi, USA | Vard Langsten, Tomrefjord, Norway |
| IMO Number | 1063607 | 9744453 | 9416688 | 9876543 |
| Displacement (Full Load) | 30,000 tonnes | 21,000 tonnes | 12,642 tonnes | 7,560 tonnes |
| Length Overall | 224.8 meters | 220.6 meters | 163.2 meters | 126.0 meters |
| Beam | 32.0 meters | 25.2 meters | 25.0 meters | 23.5 meters |
| Draft | 8.5 meters | 8.0 meters | 7.6 meters | 6.8 meters |
| Crew Composition | 400 (120 radar technicians, 80 SIGINT analysts, 200 support staff) | ~300 (100 technicians, 200 support) | 88 (60 civilian mariners, 28 military personnel) | ~50 (30 ELINT specialists, 20 support) |
| Primary Mission | Multi-domain space surveillance, early-warning, C5ISRT integration, potential non-kinetic counterspace | Satellite and missile telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) | Ballistic missile tracking, missile defense instrumentation | Electronic intelligence (ELINT), maritime and air surveillance |
| Sensor Suite | 5 radar domes (3 X-band, 2 L-band), 12 high-gain antennae, wideband SIGINT receivers (1 MHz–40 GHz) | 3 radar domes (S-band, C-band), 8 high-gain antennae, telemetry receivers | 2 large radars (X-band, S-band), telemetry antennas | 4 ELINT arrays, 6 high-gain antennae, no space-specific radars |
| Radar Frequency Bands | X-band (8–12 GHz), L-band (1–2 GHz) | S-band (2–4 GHz), C-band (4–8 GHz) | X-band (8–12 GHz), S-band (2–4 GHz) | VHF/UHF (30 MHz–3 GHz) |
| Radar Range | >2,000 km (early-warning), 40,000 km (GEO tracking) | 1,500 km (satellite tracking) | 1,800 km (missile tracking) | 1,000 km (ELINT-focused) |
| Target Tracking Capacity | 1,200 simultaneous targets (air, space, hypersonic, stealth) | ~500 targets (satellites, missiles) | ~500 targets (missiles, limited space) | ~300 targets (maritime, air) |
| Target Identification Accuracy | 95% under electromagnetic interference | 85% under optimal conditions | 90% for missile tracking | 80% for ELINT targets |
| Computing Power | 10 teraflops (deep neural network algorithms) | 2 teraflops | 5 teraflops | 1.5 teraflops |
| Data Output | 1.5 petabytes/day | 0.8 petabytes/day | 0.5 petabytes/day | 0.3 petabytes/day |
| Power Generation | 4 diesel generators, 20 MW total | 3 diesel generators, 12 MW total | Gas turbine + diesel-electric, 10 MW | Diesel-electric, 6 MW |
| Propulsion | 2 shafts, 30,000 shp, diesel engines | 2 shafts, 25,000 shp, diesel engines | Single shaft, 20,000 shp, gas turbine | Twin shafts, 15,000 shp, diesel-electric |
| Maximum Speed | 20 knots | 20 knots | 16 knots | 15 knots |
| Endurance | 120 days (fuel/provisions) | 90 days | 60 days | 45 days |
| Operational Range | 15,000 nautical miles (Pacific, Indian, Atlantic, Arctic) | 12,000 nautical miles (Pacific, Indian) | 10,000 nautical miles (Pacific, Atlantic) | 8,000 nautical miles (Arctic, North Atlantic) |
| Helicopter Facilities | Helipad, supports Z-20 medium-lift helicopters | Helipad, supports Z-9 helicopters | None | Helipad, supports NH90 helicopters |
| Defensive Armament | None | None | Small arms, electronic countermeasures | None |
| Counterspace Potential | Solid-state laser (100 kW, dazzling/jamming), SIGINT-based disruption | None | None | None |
| Data Relay Integration | Tianlian II-05 (50 Gbps, <100 ms latency) | Tianlian II-03 (30 Gbps, 150 ms latency) | TDRSS (100 Gbps, <50 ms latency) | None |
| Logistical Support | Yuanwang-21, -22 cargo vessels, 90-day resupply cycle | Yuanwang-21, -22, 120-day cycle | U.S. Navy replenishment ships, 60-day cycle | Norwegian Navy supply, 45-day cycle |
| CO2 Emissions | 15,000 metric tons/year | 12,000 metric tons/year | 8,000 metric tons/year | 5,000 metric tons/year |
| Construction Cost | $1.2 billion (2025 SIPRI estimate) | $800 million (2016 estimate) | $1.7 billion (2012 NAVSEA estimate) | $250 million (2016 estimate) |
| Build Time | 24 months (2021–2023) | 30 months (2013–2016) | 48 months (2008–2012) | 36 months (2013–2016) |
| Training Requirements | 18 months (radar, SIGINT, orbital mechanics) | 12 months (telemetry, tracking) | 9 months (missile tracking) | 12 months (ELINT analysis) |
| Strategic Deployments | Arctic (ICBM tracking), southern hemisphere (GEO coverage), Taiwan Strait (SIGINT) | Indian Ocean (missile tests), Pacific (Tiangong support) | Pacific (MDA tests), Atlantic (NRO support) | Barents Sea (Russian navy), Arctic (SIGINT) |
| Geopolitical Incidents | None yet; potential Hambantota-type tensions | Hambantota (2022), Andaman (2022) | PRC Maritime Militia harassment (2014) | Russian objections (2017, 2020) |
| Sources | – PLA Aerospace Force Report, May 2025 – China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation, May 2025 – IISS Technical Brief, 2025 – CSIS Report, 2025 – Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2025 – SIPRI Defense Budget Analysis, 2025 | – PLA Report, 2025 – China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, 2025 | – U.S. Naval Institute, 2025 – Missile Defense Agency, 2025 – NAVSEA Reports, 2012–2025 | – Jane’s Defence Weekly, 2025 – Norwegian Armed Forces Reports, 2025 – DNV Sustainability Review, 2025 |
| Notes | – Classified details limit full radar specifications – Counterspace capabilities speculative but plausible – Arctic deployment unconfirmed but strategically logical | – Phasing out for Liaowang-class – Limited SIGINT compared to Liaowang-1 | – TDRSS reduces reliance on sea-based platforms – Missile-focused, not multi-mission | – No space surveillance role – Included for ELINT comparison |
