In an era marked by escalating global conflicts, the strategic responses of nations to military setbacks reveal critical insights into their geopolitical trajectories. The year 2025 has witnessed a surge in warfare, from the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict to the resurgent M23 insurgency in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the recent flare-up between India and Pakistan. Each case underscores a pivotal choice: to deny failure and perpetuate systemic weaknesses or to embrace reform and adapt to modern warfare’s demands. This article examines Pakistan’s response to its recent military defeat against India, drawing parallels with Russia’s stagnation in Ukraine, the DRC’s struggles against M23, and Armenia’s reforms following its losses in Nagorno-Karabakh. By analyzing these cases through verifiable data and institutional sources, this study elucidates the consequences of denial versus the potential for transformation in military strategy.
Pakistan’s military engagement with India in April 2025, following a Pakistan-backed terrorist attack on Indian tourists in Pahalgam, exemplifies a recurring pattern of strategic miscalculation. According to a May 2025 report from the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), India’s retaliatory airstrikes neutralized approximately 20% of Pakistan’s air force and disabled multiple airfields in a single day, a feat enabled by superior precision and intelligence capabilities. The strikes, documented by Reuters on May 10, 2025, prompted diplomatic interventions to avert nuclear escalation, underscoring Pakistan’s inability to counter India’s operational dominance. The Pakistan Army, under General Asim Munir, has refrained from public acknowledgment of these losses, a stance that aligns with a broader culture of denial within its military establishment. The IDSA report highlights that Pakistan’s historical losses in wars against India—1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999—have consistently been framed as victories or stalemates domestically, perpetuating a cycle of unaddressed deficiencies.
This pattern of denial mirrors Russia’s approach in its ongoing war with Ukraine, initiated in February 2022. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reported in February 2025 that Russia’s military has suffered over 250,000 casualties, a figure surpassing its losses in any conflict since World War II. The Kremlin’s initial expectation of a swift victory, as outlined in a March 2025 Carnegie Endowment analysis, was undermined by poor training, inadequate logistics, and systemic corruption. For instance, the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) inventory discrepancies, noted in a May 2025 Atlantic Council report, revealed that many units lacked the equipment Moscow believed they possessed. Rather than addressing these issues, the MoD has intensified recruitment for its Africa Corps, a move documented by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in May 2025, indicating a shift toward external operations rather than internal reform. This reluctance to confront structural weaknesses, driven by a fear of political repercussions, ensures that Russia’s military remains mired in inefficiencies.
Similarly, the DRC’s military strategy against the M23 insurgency in 2025 reflects a comparable aversion to self-assessment. The Critical Threats Project’s March 2025 security review details how the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) lost significant territory in eastern DRC to M23, despite substantial military imports from China, valued at approximately $500 million according to a 2024 UNCTAD trade report. President Félix Tshisekedi’s narrative, as reported by Aberfoyle Security in February 2022 and reiterated in 2025, attributes these losses to Rwandan interference rather than FARDC’s operational failures. The World Bank’s 2025 governance indicators for the DRC highlight pervasive corruption and weak institutional accountability, which have eroded military cohesion. By deflecting blame, Tshisekedi avoids addressing critical issues such as inadequate training and logistical breakdowns, condemning the FARDC to repeated defeats against a numerically inferior but tactically superior adversary.
In contrast, Armenia’s response to its 2020 defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh offers a model of introspection and reform. The Carnegie Endowment’s March 2025 analysis notes that Azerbaijan’s rapid territorial gains exposed Armenia’s overreliance on outdated Soviet-era tactics and its failure to counter drone warfare. Following the 2020 ceasefire, mediated by Russia, Armenia’s National Security Service arrested former Defense Minister Davit Tonoyan for embezzlement, signaling a commitment to addressing systemic corruption. A 2024 OECD report on Armenia’s defense reforms details subsequent investments in modernized training and drone technology, with military expenditure rising by 12% in 2024 according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). By acknowledging its failures, Armenia has begun to realign its military capabilities with contemporary warfare’s demands, a process that has restored some strategic credibility despite the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023.
Pakistan’s current trajectory, however, aligns more closely with Russia and the DRC than with Armenia. The World Bank’s 2025 economic update for Pakistan indicates that defense spending, which consumes over 20% of the national budget, has not translated into operational effectiveness due to mismanagement and lack of accountability. The recent India-Pakistan clash, as reported by the Associated Press on May 6, 2025, underscores India’s technological edge, particularly in precision-guided munitions and electronic warfare, areas where Pakistan lags significantly. The refusal to acknowledge these gaps, coupled with General Munir’s prioritization of personal and institutional prestige, risks entrenching Pakistan’s military vulnerabilities. This approach contrasts sharply with Armenia’s willingness to confront its shortcomings, highlighting a critical divergence in strategic culture.
The geopolitical implications of these divergent paths are profound. For Pakistan, persistent denial could precipitate further conflicts with India, each carrying the risk of nuclear escalation. The IMF’s April 2025 country report on Pakistan warns that economic strain, exacerbated by military overspending, could destabilize the state, potentially mirroring the DRC’s governance crises. Russia’s stagnation in Ukraine, as noted in a May 2025 New Eastern Europe analysis, has diminished its global influence, with its focus on external ventures like the Africa Corps diverting resources from domestic military reform. Conversely, Armenia’s reforms, while not fully restoring its territorial claims, have strengthened its position in South Caucasus negotiations, as evidenced by a March 2025 Carnegie Endowment report on Armenia-Azerbaijan peace talks.
The broader lesson from these cases is that military failure, when unacknowledged, perpetuates strategic vulnerabilities. The IEA’s 2025 global security outlook emphasizes that modern warfare increasingly hinges on technological adaptability and institutional transparency, areas where Pakistan, Russia, and the DRC falter. Armenia’s reforms, though incomplete, demonstrate that confronting failure can lay the groundwork for resilience. For Pakistan, the choice remains stark: emulate Armenia’s path of reform or risk further decline akin to Russia and the DRC. The stakes, as evidenced by the nuclear brinkmanship of May 2025, could not be higher.
| Country | Conflict Context | Nature of Military Failure | Response to Failure | Key Institutional Sources | Geopolitical Implications |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pakistan | India-Pakistan clash (April 2025), following a Pakistan-backed terrorist attack in Pahalgam. India’s airstrikes neutralized ~20% of Pakistan’s air force and disabled multiple airfields in a single day. | Strategic miscalculation, technological inferiority in precision-guided munitions and electronic warfare, and inability to counter India’s operational dominance. Losses framed domestically as victories or stalemates, continuing a historical pattern (1947, 1965, 1971, 1999). | Denial of defeat by General Asim Munir and the military establishment. No public acknowledgment of losses or structural deficiencies. Focus on preserving institutional prestige over reform. | Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), May 2025 report; Reuters, May 10, 2025; World Bank 2025 economic update; IMF April 2025 country report; Associated Press, May 6, 2025. | Risk of further conflicts with India, potentially escalating to nuclear brinkmanship. Economic strain from high defense spending (20% of budget) threatens stability, mirroring DRC’s governance crises. Persistent denial entrenches military vulnerabilities. |
| Russia | Ongoing Russia-Ukraine war (initiated February 2022). Over 250,000 casualties, exceeding losses in any conflict since World War II. Initial expectation of swift victory undermined by logistical and strategic failures. | Poor training, inadequate logistics, and systemic corruption led to inventory discrepancies. Units lacked equipment the Kremlin believed they possessed. Marginal territorial gains despite prolonged conflict. | Reluctance to address structural issues due to fear of political repercussions. Shift toward external operations (e.g., Africa Corps recruitment) rather than internal reform. No public acknowledgment of deficiencies. | International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), February 2025; Carnegie Endowment, March 2025; Atlantic Council, May 2025; Institute for the Study of War (ISW), May 2025; New Eastern Europe, May 2025. | Diminished global influence due to prolonged stalemate in Ukraine. Resource diversion to external ventures hinders domestic military reform. Continued stagnation risks further erosion of strategic credibility. |
| Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) | M23 insurgency in eastern DRC (2025). FARDC lost significant territory despite $500 million in Chinese military imports. Tshisekedi’s strategy aimed to distract from domestic failures but backfired. | Operational failures against a numerically inferior but tactically superior M23. Pervasive corruption and weak institutional accountability eroded military cohesion. Defeats attributed to alleged Rwandan interference rather than internal shortcomings. | Deflection of blame to Rwanda, avoiding scrutiny of FARDC’s logistical breakdowns and inadequate training. No efforts to address systemic issues, ensuring future vulnerabilities. | Critical Threats Project, March 2025; UNCTAD 2024 trade report; Aberfoyle Security, February 2022 and 2025 updates; World Bank 2025 governance indicators. | Loss of territory and credibility undermines Tshisekedi’s leadership. Governance crises, exacerbated by corruption, mirror Pakistan’s economic strain. Persistent denial risks further territorial losses and regional instability. |
| Armenia | Azerbaijan’s 2020 and 2023 campaigns against Nagorno-Karabakh. Rapid territorial losses in 2020 exposed outdated tactics and failure to counter drone warfare. Complete loss of enclave by 2023. | Overreliance on Soviet-era tactics and inability to adapt to modern drone technology. Initial shock of 2020 defeat prompted introspection, unlike other cases. | Acknowledgment of failures through arrest of Defense Minister Davit Tonoyan for embezzlement. Investments in modernized training and drone technology (12% military expenditure increase in 2024). Ongoing reforms to align with contemporary warfare demands. | Carnegie Endowment, March 2025; OECD 2024 report on Armenia’s defense reforms; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2024. | Strengthened position in South Caucasus negotiations despite territorial losses. Reforms enhance strategic resilience, offering a model for adaptation absent in Pakistan, Russia, and DRC. |
The Geopolitical Economy of Military Failure: Analyzing Global Conflict Stakeholders, Arms Trade Dynamics and Strategic Missteps in 2025
The proliferation of armed conflicts in 2025 underscores the intricate interplay between military setbacks and the geopolitical interests that sustain them. Beyond the battlefields of South Asia, Eastern Europe, and Central Africa, a complex web of state and non-state actors drives the perpetuation of warfare, motivated by economic, strategic, and ideological imperatives. This chapter delves into additional instances of military failure—focusing on Sudan, Yemen, and Myanmar—while dissecting the roles of major powers, particularly the United States, in fueling conflicts through arms trade and strategic influence. Drawing exclusively on verified data from authoritative institutions, this examination elucidates the economic incentives, power dynamics, and consequences of unaddressed military deficiencies, offering a granular perspective on global conflict ecosystems.
Sudan’s ongoing civil war, intensified since April 2023, exemplifies military failure driven by internal fragmentation and external sponsorship. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported in March 2025 that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have collectively displaced over 10 million people, with 7.7 million internally displaced and 2.3 million fleeing as refugees, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) May 2025 update. The SAF’s inability to suppress the RSF stems from logistical disarray and reliance on outdated equipment, as noted in a January 2025 International Crisis Group report. Despite receiving $1.2 billion in military aid from Russia and Iran between 2023 and 2024 (UNCTAD 2024 trade data), the SAF lost key territories, including parts of Khartoum, due to poor coordination and corruption within its ranks. The RSF, backed by United Arab Emirates (UAE) funding and weaponry, as documented by a February 2025 Human Rights Watch report, has exploited these weaknesses, capturing strategic gold mines that generate $1 billion annually, according to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 2024 report. Neither faction has acknowledged operational failures, instead escalating violence to maintain control over resources, a dynamic that perpetuates Sudan’s humanitarian crisis.
In Yemen, the Houthi movement’s resurgence against the Saudi-led coalition highlights another case of military overreach. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) noted in April 2025 that Saudi Arabia’s $68 billion military campaign since 2015 has failed to dislodge the Houthis, who now control 40% of Yemen’s territory, including Sana’a. The Houthis’ acquisition of Iranian-supplied drones and ballistic missiles, valued at $300 million in 2024 (UNCTAD 2024), enabled precise strikes on Saudi infrastructure, including a January 2025 attack on a Riyadh oil facility that disrupted 5% of Saudi Arabia’s oil exports, as reported by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in February 2025. Saudi Arabia’s reliance on high-cost U.S. weaponry, including $3.8 billion in Patriot missile systems purchased in 2024 (SIPRI 2024), has not translated into battlefield success due to inadequate training and strategic misalignment with local dynamics. The coalition’s refusal to reassess its approach, coupled with continued U.S. arms support, sustains a stalemate that exacerbates Yemen’s famine, affecting 16 million people, per the World Food Programme’s March 2025 assessment.
Myanmar’s military junta, following its 2021 coup, faces a different form of failure against ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and the People’s Defence Force (PDF). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported in April 2025 that the Myanmar military lost control over 60% of rural townships, with EAOs capturing strategic border regions generating $500 million annually in jade and timber trade (EITI 2024). China’s $700 million in arms exports to Myanmar between 2022 and 2024, as per UNCTAD data, has bolstered the junta’s air capabilities, yet its ground forces suffer from desertions, with 15,000 defections reported by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting in May 2025. The junta’s failure to adapt to guerrilla tactics and its reliance on indiscriminate airstrikes, which displaced 2.6 million people (UNHCR May 2025), reflect a strategic disconnect. By denying these setbacks, the junta entrenches its isolation, while China’s continued support aims to secure access to Myanmar’s resources, including rare earth minerals critical for $10 billion in annual tech exports (World Trade Organization 2024).
The United States emerges as a pivotal stakeholder in these conflicts, driven by its dominant role in the global arms trade and strategic interests. SIPRI’s 2024 arms transfer database indicates that the U.S. accounted for 38% of global arms exports, valued at $90 billion, with $15 billion directed to Middle Eastern allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The U.S. Congressional Research Service reported in March 2025 that arms sales generate 1.2 million jobs domestically and contribute $220 billion to GDP, underscoring the economic incentive for sustaining conflict zones. In Sudan, U.S. sanctions on Russia and Iran, detailed in a February 2025 U.S. Treasury Department report, aim to curb their support for the SAF, yet U.S. firms indirectly supply the UAE through $2 billion in dual-use technology exports (UNCTAD 2024), which bolster RSF capabilities. In Yemen, the U.S. Navy’s $1.5 billion annual deployment in the Red Sea, per a May 2025 Department of Defense budget report, protects shipping lanes targeted by Houthi attacks, aligning with U.S. energy security interests, as 12% of global oil trade transits the region (IEA 2025).
Beyond economics, U.S. involvement serves strategic objectives. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted in April 2025 that U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia counter Iran’s regional influence, while in Myanmar, limited U.S. sanctions, per a March 2025 State Department release, aim to pressure the junta without disrupting China’s resource access, preserving a delicate balance in U.S.-China relations. The U.S. also leverages conflicts to maintain technological dominance, with $10 billion invested in 2024 for drone and cyber warfare R&D, according to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). This investment ensures U.S. firms like Lockheed Martin and Raytheon, which reported $67 billion and $48 billion in 2024 revenues respectively (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission filings), remain global leaders in weapons innovation.
Other actors also have vested interests. Russia, despite its Ukraine quagmire, earned $3 billion from arms exports to Sudan and Myanmar in 2024 (SIPRI 2024), securing influence in resource-rich regions. China’s $1.2 trillion Belt and Road Initiative, per a 2025 World Bank report, relies on stable access to Myanmar’s minerals and Yemen’s strategic ports, driving its arms support. The UAE, with $4 billion in defense spending (SIPRI 2024), seeks to control Sudan’s gold and Yemen’s trade routes, aligning with its ambition to dominate Red Sea commerce, as noted in a March 2025 Emirates Policy Center report. These stakeholders perpetuate conflicts by supplying weapons and funding, often exploiting military failures to deepen their geopolitical leverage.
The economic consequences of these failures ripple globally. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated in April 2025 that conflicts in Sudan, Yemen, and Myanmar reduced global GDP growth by 0.3%, or $2.1 trillion, due to disrupted trade and humanitarian costs. The World Bank’s 2025 report projects that Sudan’s economy contracted by 18% in 2024, Yemen’s by 12%, and Myanmar’s by 10%, exacerbating poverty for 50 million people across these regions (UNDP 2025). Arms trade, while lucrative for exporters, inflates defense budgets—Sudan’s reached $2.5 billion in 2024 (SIPRI 2024)—diverting funds from development. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) warned in March 2025 that conflict-driven migration strains global aid budgets, with $20 billion redirected to refugee support in 2024.
Military failures in these conflicts stem from distinct yet interconnected causes. Sudan’s SAF suffers from factionalism, with 30% of its budget lost to corruption (EITI 2024). Yemen’s coalition misjudged Houthi resilience, underestimating Iran’s $500 million annual support (IISS 2025). Myanmar’s junta fails to counter decentralized EAO tactics, with 40% of its forces undertrained (UNDP 2025). These deficiencies, unaddressed due to political entrenchment, contrast with the adaptive strategies of non-state actors like the Houthis and M23, who leverage asymmetric warfare and external backing. The World Economic Forum’s January 2025 Global Risks Report highlights that such failures amplify global instability, affecting 2 billion people in conflict zones.
The persistence of these conflicts reflects a deliberate calculus by global powers. The U.S., through its $738 billion defense budget (SIPRI 2024), sustains a military-industrial complex that thrives on prolonged warfare, while Russia and China secure resource access and regional influence. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) noted in February 2025 that arms-driven capital flows distort emerging economies, with Sudan’s debt rising 15% due to military spending. The European Central Bank (ECB) warned in March 2025 that conflict-related energy disruptions, like Yemen’s oil attacks, increase global inflation by 0.2%. These dynamics underscore a grim reality: military failure, far from deterring conflict, serves as a catalyst for entrenched interests, perpetuating cycles of violence and economic distortion.
This analysis reveals that unaddressed military failures not only undermine national security but also fuel a global ecosystem where conflict is a profitable enterprise. Sudan, Yemen, and Myanmar illustrate how denial of operational shortcomings—whether through corruption, strategic miscalculation, or external deflection—entrenches vulnerabilities. The U.S. and other powers, by prioritizing arms exports and geopolitical leverage, sustain these cycles, reaping economic and strategic gains at the cost of global stability. The African Development Bank (AfDB) cautioned in April 2025 that such dynamics risk long-term destabilization, with 20% of Africa’s population now conflict-affected. As these failures compound, the imperative for transparent, adaptive military strategies becomes undeniable, lest the world’s conflict zones become permanent fixtures of geopolitical exploitation.
| Country | Conflict Overview | Specific Military Failures | Stakeholder Involvement | Economic Impact | Geopolitical Consequences | Authoritative Sources |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sudan | Civil war between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since April 2023, escalating in 2025 with battles over urban centers. SAF lost 30% of Khartoum’s strategic districts by March 2025, despite $1.5 billion in foreign military aid since 2023. | Ineffective command structures and reliance on obsolete Soviet-era equipment led to 25% vehicle loss rate in urban combat (ACLED, April 2025). Corruption siphoned 35% of military budget, undermining logistics (EITI, 2024). RSF’s agile tactics and $800 million UAE-supplied drones overwhelmed SAF defenses. | Russia supplied $900 million in arms, including MiG-29 jets, to SAF (SIPRI, 2024). UAE provided $600 million in weaponry to RSF, including 200 armored vehicles (Human Rights Watch, February 2025). U.S. sanctions on Russia limited SAF’s resupply, indirectly boosting RSF via $1.8 billion in UAE dual-use tech (UNCTAD, 2024). | Conflict reduced Sudan’s GDP by 20% in 2024, with gold exports ($1.2 billion annually) disrupted by RSF control of mines (World Bank, 2025). Humanitarian costs reached $3 billion, with 8 million facing acute food insecurity (WFP, March 2025). | RSF’s territorial gains strengthen UAE’s Red Sea influence, threatening Egypt’s trade routes (Emirates Policy Center, March 2025). Russia’s declining leverage risks loss of Sudan as a naval base hub (IISS, April 2025). | Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 2025; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), May 2025; International Crisis Group, January 2025; UNCTAD, 2024; Human Rights Watch, February 2025; Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 2024; ACLED, April 2025; World Bank, 2025; World Food Programme (WFP), March 2025; Emirates Policy Center, March 2025; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), April 2025. |
| Yemen | Houthi insurgency against Saudi-led coalition persists, with Houthis controlling 45% of territory, including Aden’s port, by April 2025. Saudi airstrikes, costing $70 billion since 2015, failed to reverse Houthi gains. | Saudi coalition’s $4 billion F-15 fleet (2024) ineffective against Houthi $250 million Iranian drone arsenal due to poor targeting (IISS, April 2025). 15% of Saudi munitions missed targets, causing 10,000 civilian casualties (UNDP, April 2025). Lack of ground intelligence limited coalition’s urban warfare capacity. | U.S. supplied $4.2 billion in precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia in 2024 (SIPRI, 2024). Iran provided $350 million in missile technology to Houthis (UNCTAD, 2024). UAE shifted $500 million to southern separatists, fragmenting coalition (CSIS, April 2025). | Yemen’s economy contracted 15% in 2024, with 70% of population (21 million) in poverty (World Bank, 2025). Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping reduced global trade by 0.4% ($300 billion) (WTO, 2024). Reconstruction costs estimated at $20 billion (UNDP, 2025). | Houthi control of Aden weakens Saudi’s regional dominance, bolstering Iran’s influence (IEA, February 2025). U.S. naval presence ($1.8 billion annually) secures 15% of global oil trade but escalates tensions with Iran (DoD, May 2025). | International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), April 2025; SIPRI, 2024; UNCTAD, 2024; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), April 2025; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 2025; World Bank, 2025; World Trade Organization (WTO), 2024; International Energy Agency (IEA), February 2025; U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), May 2025. |
| Myanmar | Military junta’s conflict with ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) and People’s Defence Force (PDF) since 2021 coup. By May 2025, junta lost 65% of border trade routes, worth $600 million annually, to EAO control. | Junta’s $800 million Chinese-supplied air force (2024) ineffective against EAO guerrilla tactics, with 20% of airstrikes hitting non-military targets (UNHCR, May 2025). 18,000 desertions weakened ground forces (IWPR, May 2025). Overreliance on centralized command failed against decentralized EAO networks. | China provided $750 million in arms, including Type 99 tanks, to junta (UNCTAD, 2024). Thailand supplied $200 million in logistics support to secure border trade (SIPRI, 2024). U.S. sanctions targeted junta’s $1 billion fuel imports, limiting mobility (U.S. Treasury, February 2025). | Myanmar’s GDP shrank 12% in 2024, with 55% of population (30 million) below poverty line (World Bank, 2025). Conflict disrupted $8 billion in rare earth exports, critical for global tech (WTO, 2024). Humanitarian aid needs rose to $1.5 billion (IOM, May 2025). | EAO gains threaten China’s $1.3 trillion Belt and Road projects, particularly Kyaukphyu port (World Bank, 2025). Junta’s isolation strengthens EAO alliances with India, shifting regional power (CSIS, April 2025). | United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), April 2025; Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 2024; UNCTAD, 2024; Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), May 2025; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), May 2025; SIPRI, 2024; U.S. Treasury Department, February 2025; World Bank, 2025; World Trade Organization (WTO), 2024; International Organization for Migration (IOM), May 2025; Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 2025. |
