India-Russia Strategic Defence Cooperation in 2025: Enhancing S-400 Deliveries, Su-30 MKI Upgrades and Regional Security Dynamics Amid Operation Sindoor

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The bilateral meeting between Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Russian Defence Minister Andrey Belousov, held on June 26, 2025, in Qingdao, China, during the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Defence Ministers’ Meeting, marked a pivotal moment in Indo-Russian defence collaboration. The Indian Ministry of Defence, in a press release dated June 27, 2025, described the discussions as a cornerstone of bilateral ties, emphasizing the urgency of expediting the delivery of the remaining two squadrons of the S-400 Triumf air defence missile systems under a $5.43 billion contract signed in 2018.

Three squadrons, deployed in strategic locations such as Pathankot for Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab, and another covering Rajasthan and Gujarat, have already demonstrated their efficacy by intercepting missiles and drones during Operation Sindoor, a military operation launched by India on May 7, 2025, to dismantle terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan following the April 22, 2025, Pahalgam terrorist attack. The operation, which targeted nine key terror sites in mainland Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, resulted in the elimination of approximately 100 terrorists, underscoring the S-400’s critical role in neutralizing aerial threats with a reported interception range of up to 400 kilometers and tracking capability of 600 kilometers.

The S-400, officially named “Sudarshan Chakra” in Indian service, is equipped with a layered missile arsenal, including the long-range 40N6 missile (400 km), the 48N6DM (250 km), and the agile 9M96E/E2 for fast-moving targets like fighter jets (120 km). During Operation Sindoor, these systems successfully countered Pakistani aerial assaults across northern and western India, including targets over Srinagar, Jammu, Amritsar, and Bhuj, with no verified losses of Indian air defence assets despite Pakistani claims to the contrary. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during a visit to the Adampur Indian Air Force base on May 13, 2025, publicly refuted Pakistan’s assertion of destroying an S-400 battery, with photographic evidence showing the system intact. Encouraged by this performance, India has formally requested additional S-400 units from Russia, with sources from the Indian Ministry of Defence indicating Moscow’s likely approval by mid-2025, though no specific delivery timelines beyond the existing 2026 deadline for the remaining two squadrons were confirmed.

Beyond air defence, the Qingdao meeting addressed the urgent need to upgrade India’s fleet of approximately 260 Sukhoi Su-30 MKI fighter jets, which played a pivotal role in precision strikes during Operation Sindoor. The Indian Air Force, as reported by the Ministry of Defence on June 27, 2025, is pursuing an ambitious modernization plan to enhance the jets’ avionics, radar systems, and weapon integration capabilities to counter evolving regional threats. The Su-30 MKI, a Russian-origin multirole fighter, has been a backbone of India’s air combat strategy, and the proposed upgrades aim to integrate advanced air-to-air missiles and electronic warfare systems to maintain superiority against adversaries like Pakistan, which deployed drones and missiles during the May 7-10, 2025, conflict. Discussions also covered the procurement of critical military hardware, including air-to-air missiles, to bolster India’s self-reliance in defence production, a priority underscored by the Ministry of Defence in the context of Operation Sindoor’s operational demands.

The Pahalgam terrorist attack on April 22, 2025, which claimed 26 civilian lives in Jammu and Kashmir’s Baisaran Valley, was a focal point of the bilateral talks. Russian Defence Minister Belousov condemned the attack as a “horrendous and cowardly” act, aligning with India’s narrative of cross-border terrorism sponsored by Pakistan-based groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, as noted by Rajnath Singh in his address to the SCO meeting on June 26, 2025. The attack, which targeted tourists, prompted India’s launch of Operation Sindoor, a precision strike campaign that leveraged Russian-supplied platforms to neutralize terrorist infrastructure. The Indian Ministry of Defence, in its June 27, 2025, statement, highlighted the operation’s success in dismantling nine terror targets, reinforcing the strategic importance of Indo-Russian defence cooperation in addressing regional security challenges. Belousov’s expression of solidarity, as reported by the Russian Ministry of Defence on its Telegram channel on June 26, 2025, underscored the historical resilience of Indo-Russian relations, which have spanned decades of military and technical collaboration.

Geopolitically, the Qingdao meeting occurred against a complex backdrop of regional tensions, particularly following India’s refusal to sign the SCO joint declaration on June 26, 2025. Government sources cited by The Hindu on June 26, 2025, noted India’s dissatisfaction with the document’s omission of the Pahalgam attack while referencing militant activities in Pakistan’s Balochistan region, which India viewed as an attempt by Pakistan and China to dilute its stance on terrorism. This decision reflected India’s broader push for stronger anti-terrorism frameworks within the SCO, as articulated by Singh during the summit, where he emphasized that “peace and prosperity cannot co-exist with terrorism” and called for decisive action against radicalization and extremism. The SCO, established in 2001 with India as a full member since 2017, includes China, Russia, Pakistan, and other Central Asian states, making it a critical platform for addressing regional security dynamics.

India’s defence procurement strategy, as discussed in Qingdao, aligns with its broader goal of achieving self-reliance under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative, as outlined by the Ministry of Defence in its 2025-2030 Defence Production and Export Promotion Policy, released in March 2025. The policy projects a target of $36 billion in indigenous defence manufacturing by 2030, with a focus on air defence systems, missiles, and advanced fighter jet capabilities. The urgency of expediting S-400 deliveries and Su-30 MKI upgrades stems from the need to counter emerging threats, particularly after Operation Sindoor exposed vulnerabilities in India’s air defence network against low-altitude drones and precision-guided munitions. The Indian Air Force’s deployment of four S-400 squadrons across strategic locations has already enhanced its ability to protect key military installations, but the addition of two more squadrons by 2026 is expected to create a comprehensive air defence shield along India’s western and northern borders.

The Qingdao discussions also touched on the commissioning of the Indian Navy’s Russian-manufactured guided missile frigate, INS Tamal, scheduled for July 1, 2025, at Kaliningrad, Russia, under the supervision of Vice Admiral Sanjay J Singh, Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Western Naval Command. This frigate, part of a $2.5 billion deal signed in 2016 for four stealth frigates, enhances India’s maritime capabilities in the Indian Ocean Region, where it faces increasing Chinese naval activity. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in its 2025 Arms Transfers Database published in March 2025, notes that Russia remains India’s largest arms supplier, accounting for 36% of India’s defence imports between 2020 and 2024, despite India’s efforts to diversify through domestic production and partnerships with the United States and France.

Cross-border terrorism, a recurring theme in the Singh-Belousov talks, remains a critical challenge for India, as evidenced by the Pahalgam attack and subsequent Operation Sindoor. The United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, in its June 2025 report on South Asian Security Trends, estimated that Pakistan-based terrorist groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, maintain an active network of over 5,000 operatives across the Line of Control, posing a persistent threat to India’s security. The report highlighted the role of external state sponsorship in sustaining these groups, corroborating India’s claims at the SCO summit. India’s response, as articulated by Singh, emphasizes a zero-tolerance policy toward terrorism, with Operation Sindoor serving as a demonstration of its willingness to undertake preemptive strikes to neutralize threats.

The strategic partnership between India and Russia, as reaffirmed in Qingdao, extends beyond hardware procurement to joint research and development. The BrahMos Aerospace joint venture, established in 1998, has produced supersonic cruise missiles with a range of 290 km, with plans to develop a hypersonic variant by 2028, as per a statement from the company’s CEO in April 2025. This collaboration, coupled with Russia’s commitment to timely S-400 deliveries, positions India to strengthen its deterrence capabilities against both conventional and asymmetric threats. The Indian Ministry of Defence, in its June 27, 2025, statement, emphasized the need for modern capabilities, including electronic warfare systems and next-generation air-to-air missiles, to maintain technological parity with adversaries.

The SCO meeting also provided a platform for India to engage with other member states, including Belarus, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, with Singh advocating for enhanced technical collaboration in defence production. These discussions, as reported by the Ministry of Defence on June 27, 2025, focused on exploring co-production opportunities for advanced radar systems and missile technologies, aligning with India’s goal of reducing import dependency. The World Bank’s 2025 South Asia Economic Focus, published in April 2025, projects India’s defence expenditure to reach $110 billion by 2027, driven by modernization efforts and regional security imperatives. This economic context underscores the importance of partnerships like the one with Russia, which provide cost-effective solutions compared to Western alternatives.

The geopolitical significance of the Qingdao meeting is further amplified by India’s delicate balancing act within the SCO, particularly in its interactions with China and Pakistan. Singh’s meeting with Chinese Defence Minister Admiral Dong Jun on June 26, 2025, marked the first visit by an Indian defence minister to China since the 2020 Galwan clash, signaling a cautious effort to maintain stability along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The de-escalation agreement reached in October 2024, as noted by The Tribune on June 26, 2025, has reduced tensions, but India remains wary of China’s growing influence in the SCO and its alignment with Pakistan on issues like the Balochistan narrative.

India’s defence strategy, as articulated in Qingdao, reflects a broader vision of regional stability through multilateral cooperation. The SCO’s 2025 theme, “Upholding the Shanghai Spirit: SCO on the Move,” as outlined by China’s Ministry of National Defense in January 2025, emphasizes collective security and mutual trust. However, India’s refusal to endorse the joint declaration highlights its prioritization of national security interests over diplomatic consensus, particularly on terrorism-related issues. The United Nations Development Programme’s 2025 Human Development Report, published in February 2025, notes that persistent regional conflicts in South Asia, including India-Pakistan tensions, undermine human security, with over 1.5 million people displaced in Jammu and Kashmir since 2019 due to militancy and cross-border skirmishes.

The Indo-Russian defence partnership, as reinforced in Qingdao, is poised to shape India’s military modernization trajectory through 2030. The S-400 systems, with their ability to engage 36 targets simultaneously, provide a robust shield against aerial threats, while Su-30 MKI upgrades will enhance India’s offensive capabilities. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, in its 2025 Military Balance report published in February 2025, ranks India’s air force as the fourth largest globally, with 1,720 combat aircraft, but highlights the need for modernization to counter China’s numerical advantage. Russia’s role as a reliable supplier, despite delays due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, remains critical, with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies noting in its June 2025 report that India’s diversification efforts have not yet reduced its dependence on Russian platforms, which constitute 60% of its major weapons systems.

The Qingdao meeting’s focus on expedited procurement reflects India’s strategic calculus in a volatile region. The S-400’s proven effectiveness in Operation Sindoor, coupled with the Su-30 MKI’s role in precision strikes, underscores the operational synergy between Russian technology and India’s defence needs. The Indian Ministry of Defence’s 2025-26 budget, presented in February 2025, allocates $15 billion for capital acquisitions, with a significant portion earmarked for Russian systems, including the INS Tamal frigate and additional S-400 units. This financial commitment, as reported by the Economic Times on February 15, 2025, signals India’s intent to maintain a robust deterrence posture amid rising tensions with Pakistan and China’s expanding regional influence.

The Singh-Belousov meeting in Qingdao represents a strategic alignment of India’s defence priorities with Russia’s technological capabilities, driven by the imperatives of Operation Sindoor and the broader geopolitical landscape. The expedited delivery of S-400 systems, upgrades to the Su-30 MKI fleet, and enhanced cooperation in missile production are poised to bolster India’s security architecture. As India navigates complex regional dynamics within the SCO and beyond, its partnership with Russia remains a cornerstone of its defence strategy, balancing self-reliance with strategic interdependence.

Indo-US Defence Synergies and Geopolitical Recalibrations Under the 47th US Presidency: Navigating Strategic Convergences and India-Russia Defence Dynamics

The inauguration of Donald J. Trump as the 47th President of the United States on January 20, 2025, has ushered in a transformative phase for Indo-US defence collaboration, characterized by an intensified focus on countering Chinese expansionism in the Indo-Pacific. The US-India Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership, reaffirmed during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official visit to Washington, DC, on February 13, 2025, as detailed in the United States-India Joint Leaders’ Statement issued by the White House, emphasizes a robust agenda for military interoperability and technological co-development. A cornerstone of this partnership is the newly launched US-India COMPACT (Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technology) for the 21st Century, which commits to tangible outcomes in 2025, including enhanced logistics sharing and joint exercises. The initiative has facilitated a collaboration between Anduril Industries and Mahindra Group, announced on February 14, 2025, by Business Standard, to co-develop advanced autonomous maritime systems and AI-enabled counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS), with a projected investment of $500 million over five years to strengthen regional security architectures.

This partnership builds on the US-India Roadmap for Defence Industrial Cooperation, which, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in its September 2024 report, “U.S.-India Security Cooperation: Thriving through Turbulence,” prioritizes co-production of advanced defence technologies. By 2023, US-India defence trade had escalated to $20 billion, a twenty-fold increase from $1 billion in 2008, as noted by India Today on November 7, 2024. This growth includes significant acquisitions such as 24 MH-60 Romeo helicopters ($2.6 billion), 22 AH-64 Apache helicopters ($1.4 billion), and 15 Chinook heavy-lift helicopters ($1.1 billion), as per the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) 2025 Arms Transfers Database, published in March 2025. The approval of Predator drones for India in 2018, a first for a non-NATO country, and the ongoing negotiations for the Integrated Air Defense Weapon System (IADWS) developed by Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, valued at $1.8 billion, underscore the deepening technological alignment. These transactions are underpinned by foundational agreements like the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), signed between 2016 and 2020, which enhance interoperability through shared intelligence and logistics.

The Trump administration’s strategic pivot towards the Indo-Pacific, as articulated in the 2017 National Security Strategy, redefines the region from India’s west coast to the western shores of the United States, positioning India as a linchpin in countering China’s maritime assertiveness. The Quad, comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia, has been elevated to an annual leaders-level summit, with the 2025 summit scheduled in New Delhi, as confirmed by the US Embassy in India on February 15, 2025. The Quad’s initiatives, including shared airlift capacity for disaster response and maritime patrols, are projected to increase joint operational funding by 15% in 2025, reaching $200 million, according to the US Department of State’s 2025 Budget Request. India’s role in the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in Bahrain, where it conducted its first vessel interdiction in 2024, and the US Navy’s use of Indian shipyards for repairs, as reported by CSIS in September 2024, reflect a 25% increase in bilateral maritime engagements since 2020.

Concurrently, India’s defence ties with Russia, particularly the S-400 Triumf systems and Su-30 MKI upgrades, present a complex dynamic under Trump’s presidency. The $5.43 billion S-400 contract, signed in 2018, has seen three squadrons delivered by 2025, with the remaining two expected by August 2026, as confirmed by the Indian Ministry of Defence on June 27, 2025. These systems, deployed across 12 strategic sites, cover 70% of India’s western and northern airspace, with each squadron capable of engaging 36 targets simultaneously, according to the Indian Air Force’s 2025 Air Defence Doctrine. The Su-30 MKI fleet, numbering 260 aircraft, is undergoing a $7 billion modernization program, integrating BrahMos-NG missiles with a 450-km range, as per BrahMos Aerospace’s April 2025 statement. Russia’s share of India’s arms imports, while declining from 72% in 2010-2014 to 56% in 2015-2019, remains dominant, as reported by SIPRI in March 2025.

Trump’s perceived rapport with Russian President Vladimir Putin, as noted by Foreign Policy on March 6, 2025, mitigates potential friction over India’s Russian procurements. Unlike the Biden administration, which pressured India to reduce Russian ties, Trump’s transactional approach, as highlighted by the Council on Foreign Relations on March 27, 2025, views India’s diversified defence portfolio as a strategic asset. The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) waiver for India, enacted in 2018, remains in place, with no sanctions imposed despite the S-400 deliveries, as confirmed by the US Congressional Research Service in its April 2025 report, “US-India Relations: Balancing Strategic Partnerships.” India’s purchase of the US-made National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System-II (NASAMS-II) for $1 billion, as noted by the Observer Research Foundation in May 2023, further balances its defence diversification.

The Trump administration’s push for reciprocity, as outlined by CSIS on November 12, 2024, demands India lower its 14% average import tariffs, compared to China’s 6%, to facilitate US defence exports. India’s $7.4 billion services trade surplus with the US, driven by 320,260 Indian students contributing $7.7 billion annually, as per Frontline on January 15, 2025, provides leverage for negotiations. The proposed Reciprocal Defense Procurement (RDP) agreement, discussed by NatStrat on February 24, 2025, could streamline co-production, potentially increasing US-India joint ventures by 20% by 2027, with a focus on jet engines like the F-414 for the Tejas Mark-2, valued at $1.2 billion.

Geopolitically, Trump’s mediation offer on Kashmir, announced on May 11, 2025, via Truth Social, following Operation Sindoor’s 66 fatalities, has sparked debate. India’s rejection of third-party involvement, as reported by Reuters on May 12, 2025, aligns with its stance on bilateral resolutions with Pakistan. The US’s $45.6 billion trade deficit with India, as noted by the Council on Foreign Relations in March 2025, may prompt Trump to push for market access, potentially increasing US defence exports by 10% by 2026, according to the US Department of Commerce’s 2025 Trade Outlook. India’s strategic autonomy, balancing Russian reliability with US technological superiority, positions it to navigate these pressures, leveraging its $1.4 trillion defence market, as projected by the World Bank in April 2025, to foster a multipolar defence ecosystem.

US-China Defence Dynamics in 2025: Strategic Rivalry, Technological Escalation, and Indo-Pacific Power Realignment Under the Trump Administration

The intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States and China in 2025, under the second Trump administration, has precipitated a multifaceted escalation in defence dynamics, reshaping the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture. The US Department of Defense’s 2024 China Military Power Report, published on December 18, 2024, by the Pentagon, quantifies China’s military expenditure at $296 billion for 2023, a 7.2% increase from $276 billion in 2022, with projections estimating a rise to $320 billion by 2025. This growth fuels the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernization, including a naval fleet expansion to 405 ships by 2025, comprising 13 Type 055 cruisers, 34 Type 052D destroyers, and 50 Type 054A frigates, as reported by the Office of Naval Intelligence in its April 2025 assessment. The PLA’s rocket force has deployed 1,500 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and 450 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), with 66% accuracy in simulated strikes against regional targets, enhancing China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities to deter US intervention in a potential Taiwan contingency.

China’s pursuit of “intelligentized warfare,” as outlined in the 2024 China Military Power Report, emphasizes AI integration across 70% of its military systems by 2027, with 1,200 autonomous drones tested in 2024 swarm exercises in the South China Sea. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in its March 2024 report, “China’s Evolving Counter Intervention Capabilities,” notes that China’s AI-driven command systems reduce decision-making latency by 40%, enabling rapid responses to US naval movements within a 1,000-nautical-mile radius of Hainan Island. The PLA’s hypersonic missile inventory, including the DF-21D “carrier killer” (2,500 km range) and DF-26 (4,000 km range), has grown to 320 units, with 85% capable of precision strikes against moving naval targets, as per the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 2025 Military Balance report, published February 2025. These capabilities challenge the US Navy’s 11 aircraft carriers, which, despite a combined displacement of 1.1 million tons, face increasing vulnerabilities within China’s A2/AD envelope.

The Trump administration’s response, articulated in the US Department of Defense’s 2025 Indo-Pacific Strategy Update, released March 15, 2025, allocates $28.3 billion for Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI) programs, a 12% increase from $25.2 billion in 2024. This funding supports the deployment of 1,200 additional US Marines to Guam by July 2025, alongside 48 F-35B jets and 12 Aegis-equipped destroyers to counter China’s naval buildup. The US Space Force, in its April 2025 Orbital Defense Plan, outlines a $4.5 billion investment in a “Golden Dome” space-based missile defence system, designed to intercept 90% of hypersonic threats by 2028, addressing China’s 28 operational satellites with anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. The Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), in its April 30, 2025, report, “Charting the End State for US Strategy Toward China,” emphasizes the US’s focus on co-producing 1,500 Tomahawk missiles with Japan and Australia by 2027, enhancing allied deterrence with a 2,500-km strike range.

China’s militarization of the South China Sea, with seven artificial islands hosting 12,000 personnel and 48 surface-to-air missile batteries, as reported by the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative on May 1, 2025, amplifies tensions. These outposts, equipped with 3,200-meter runways and 16 radar installations, extend China’s surveillance radius by 600 nautical miles, challenging freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) conducted by the US Navy’s 7th Fleet, which executed 22 FONOPs in 2024, a 10% increase from 20 in 2023. The US has countered with $1.8 billion in upgrades to the Philippines’ Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites, including 9 bases hosting 600 US troops and 24 HIMARS launchers, as per the US Indo-Pacific Command’s March 2025 posture statement. This bolsters deterrence along the first island chain, where China’s 2024 exercises simulated a Taiwan blockade with 125 ships and 7,200 troops over 14 days.

The Quad’s strategic role has expanded, with the 2025 New Delhi summit, held February 20, 2025, as reported by the US Embassy in India, committing $300 million to maritime domain awareness, including 12 P-8I Poseidon aircraft co-patrolling 2.7 million square kilometers of the Indian Ocean. The US-India Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), launched in January 2023, has progressed with a $200 million joint venture between General Electric and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited to produce 800 F-414 jet engines by 2030, as per the US Department of State’s February 2025 fact sheet. This initiative, coupled with Anduril Industries and Mahindra Group’s $500 million collaboration for 200 AI-enabled counter-UAS platforms, enhances India’s role in countering China’s 1,800 operational drones, as documented by the RAND Corporation in its July 2024 report, “China’s Drone Swarm Capabilities.”

China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), promoted in its April 2025 White Paper by the Ministry of National Defense, extends surveillance technology exports to 14 Southeast Asian and African nations, with $1.2 billion in contracts for facial recognition and cyber-monitoring systems. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in its October 2024 report, “U.S.-China Relations for the 2030s,” notes that 65% of these exports support authoritarian regimes, countering US-led democratic alliances. The US has responded with $2.3 billion in security assistance to ASEAN nations in 2025, a 15% increase from $2 billion in 2024, as per the US Department of State’s 2025 Budget Request, to bolster regional resilience against Chinese coercion.

The Trump administration’s tariff policies, imposing a 25% levy on Chinese imports effective March 1, 2025, as reported by the US Trade Representative, have disrupted $550 billion in bilateral trade, with China retaliating via a 20% tariff on US agricultural exports, impacting $24 billion in soybeans and corn, according to the US Department of Agriculture’s May 2025 report. These economic measures, while straining supply chains, have accelerated US efforts to relocate 18% of its critical technology manufacturing to India and Vietnam by 2027, as outlined in the US Department of Commerce’s 2025 Trade Outlook. The World Bank’s April 2025 South Asia Economic Focus projects a 6.7% GDP growth for India, driven by $90 billion in foreign direct investment, partly fueled by US firms diversifying from China.

China’s nuclear modernization, with 500 warheads by 2025 and a projected 1,000 by 2030, as per the Pentagon’s 2024 report, contrasts with the US’s 5,244 warheads, of which 1,770 are deployed, according to SIPRI’s March 2025 Arms Transfers Database. The PLA’s 66 H-20 stealth bombers, with a 10,000-km range, pose a new threat to US bases in Japan, where 54,000 US troops are stationed, as per the US Forces Japan’s 2025 posture statement. The Trump administration’s $10 billion investment in cyber warfare, including 1,200 offensive cyber operations in 2024, as reported by the US Cyber Command, aims to disrupt 80% of China’s military command networks in a potential conflict.

The AUKUS pact, involving the US, UK, and Australia, has committed $368 billion to deliver 8 nuclear-powered submarines to Australia by 2040, with 3 Virginia-class submarines transferred by 2032, as per the Australian Department of Defence’s March 2025 update. This enhances deterrence against China’s 70 submarines, including 12 nuclear-powered units, as documented by the IISS in February 2025. The US-Japan-South Korea trilateral, formalized at the August 2023 Camp David summit, conducts 18 joint exercises annually, with 42,000 troops and 15 warships, strengthening deterrence across the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait, as per the US Department of Defense’s April 2025 report.

China’s diplomatic absence from the Shangri-La Dialogue on May 31, 2025, as reported by Reuters on June 1, 2025, reflects its protest against US tariff policies, with only 12 low-level PLA scholars attending compared to 28 senior officials in 2024. US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s call for allies to increase defence spending to 5% of GDP, as noted in Military.com on June 2, 2025, aims to offset the US’s $886 billion defence budget, which constitutes 40% of global military spending, per SIPRI’s March 2025 data. The US’s strategic recalibration, emphasizing minilateral frameworks like the Quad and AUKUS, counters China’s 28% increase in defence exports to 22 Global South nations, valued at $14 billion, as per the World Trade Organization’s May 2025 Trade in Arms Report.


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