On July 15, 2025, Taiwan’s armed forces executed a groundbreaking maneuver during the 41st iteration of the Han Kuang Exercise, utilizing the Taipei Metro system to transport troops and munitions, marking a significant shift in the island’s defense strategy. This unprecedented integration of civilian infrastructure into military operations reflects Taiwan’s strategic adaptation to the escalating threat of a potential Chinese invasion, particularly in the context of urban warfare scenarios in Taipei. The exercise, the largest in its history with over 22,000 reservists mobilized, underscores a broader pivot toward whole-of-society resilience, a concept increasingly central to Taiwan’s defense posture as articulated by the Ministry of National Defense (MND) in its July 2025 press releases. By incorporating the Taipei Metro, a 150-kilometer network of 135 stations, into military logistics, Taiwan aims to exploit the inherent protective qualities of underground infrastructure against anticipated People’s Liberation Army (PLA) missile barrages and ground operations. This strategic evolution, however, raises critical questions about civilian safety, infrastructure resilience, and the operational feasibility of such tactics in a high-intensity conflict environment, necessitating a comprehensive analysis of the geopolitical, operational, and societal implications.

The Taipei Metro’s role in the 2025 Han Kuang Exercise, as reported by Taiwan’s Military News Agency on July 15, 2025, involved military police equipped with Stinger shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and other weaponry moving through the subway system between Shandao Temple and Longshan Temple stations. This operation, conducted in coordination with the Taipei City Government, simulated rapid troop redeployment and munitions transport under conditions mimicking a Chinese missile attack. The exercise’s design reflects lessons drawn from global conflicts, notably Ukraine’s defense against Russia, where urban infrastructure played a pivotal role in sustaining military operations under bombardment. According to a July 2025 Financial Times report, the use of the metro system was intended to test “battlefield survivability” in scenarios where surface infrastructure would be heavily targeted. The Taipei Metro, with its extensive underground sections, offers a hardened transportation network, enabling concealed movement of forces and supplies, a critical advantage in urban warfare where camouflage, concealment, and deception are paramount.

Taiwan’s strategic reorientation toward urban resilience is driven by the PLA’s growing military capabilities and China’s increasingly assertive posture. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) reported in December 2024 that China’s military modernization, including the expansion of its roll-on/roll-off (RO-RO) ferry fleet to over 200 vessels by 2026, enhances its capacity for amphibious assaults across the Taiwan Strait. These ferries, used in PLA exercises since 2019, can transport up to 300 vehicles and 1,500 personnel each, posing a significant threat to Taiwan’s coastal defenses. The PLA’s frequent incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ), with 3,075 sorties recorded in 2024 alone according to the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense, further underscore the immediacy of the threat. The 2025 Han Kuang Exercise, extended to 14 days and incorporating unscripted scenarios, responds to these developments by simulating a transition from PLA gray-zone tactics—provocative actions short of open conflict—to a full-scale invasion, as outlined by Major General Tung Chi-hsing in a Focus Taiwan briefing on April 5, 2025.

The decision to utilize the Taipei Metro aligns with Taiwan’s adoption of a “porcupine” strategy, emphasizing asymmetric warfare and societal resilience to deter or delay a PLA advance. This approach, detailed in a 2024 Atlantic Council report, prioritizes mobile, cost-effective weapons systems like Stinger missiles and drones, which were prominently featured in the 2025 exercise. The metro system’s integration into military planning enhances this strategy by providing a concealed logistics backbone, allowing forces to maneuver undetected and emerge unpredictably to engage PLA units. Official imagery from the MND shows troops disembarking from standard passenger cars and using maintenance railcars for munitions transport, highlighting the system’s versatility. However, as Claire Chu, a senior China analyst at Janes and nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council, noted in a July 2025 interview with The War Zone, the viability of this tactic hinges on variables such as electricity access and communication lines, which could be disrupted in a conflict scenario.

The Taipei Metro’s strategic value lies in its hardened infrastructure, a feature rooted in its design and historical context. Construction began in the late 1970s, a period when Taiwan faced heightened tensions with China following the United States’ diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic in 1979. The metro’s underground sections, particularly in central Taipei, were designed with dual-use potential, serving as air-raid shelters—a function formalized by the Taiwanese government’s designation of 84,000 shelters nationwide, as reported by the Brookings Institution in December 2024. This dual-use capability draws on historical precedents, such as London’s use of subway stations during the Blitz in 1940, documented by the Imperial War Museums. In a Taiwanese context, metro stations could serve as command posts, field hospitals, or evacuation centers, enhancing resilience against PLA strikes aimed at crippling command-and-control networks, as highlighted in a July 2025 Reuters report on the exercise’s focus on decentralized operations.

However, the militarization of civilian infrastructure introduces significant risks, particularly to civilian safety. The PLA’s doctrine, as analyzed by the Foreign Policy Research Institute in March 2025, emphasizes electronic warfare and cyberattacks to disrupt communication and transportation networks. Should the PLA identify the Taipei Metro as a military asset, it could target stations or tunnels, potentially sealing entrances to trap forces or civilians inside. Such actions could lead to significant collateral damage, a concern echoed by Chu’s observation that metro stations’ dual role as air-raid shelters complicates their military use without endangering civilians. The MND’s coordination with civilian authorities during the 2025 exercise, as reported by Focus Taiwan, aimed to mitigate these risks by simulating joint military-civilian responses, but the potential for urban combat within the metro system remains a critical challenge.

The integration of the Taipei Metro into defense planning also reflects Taiwan’s broader whole-of-society resilience strategy, formalized under President Lai Ching-te’s Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee, established in June 2024. This committee, as detailed in a December 2024 CSIS report, coordinates across government, civil society, and private sectors to ensure continuity of operations in energy, communications, transportation, and medical services during a crisis. The 2025 Han Kuang Exercise’s inclusion of civilian evacuation drills and urban resilience exercises, conducted alongside military operations, underscores this approach. For instance, a July 2025 CNA report noted joint evacuation drills at hypermarkets, testing public-private coordination to enhance societal resilience. These efforts draw on lessons from conflicts like Ukraine, where civilian infrastructure sustained operations under prolonged bombardment, as noted by a Taiwanese defense official in the Reuters report.

Geopolitically, the exercise signals Taiwan’s determination to deter Chinese aggression while navigating complex relations with the United States and regional allies. The presence of U.S. military observers during the 2025 Han Kuang Exercise, reported by the South China Morning Post on April 7, 2025, highlights Washington’s interest in Taiwan’s defense innovations. The U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, cited in an Atlantic Council report, authorizes enhanced cybersecurity cooperation and access to low-earth-orbit satellite networks like Starlink to bolster Taiwan’s communications resilience. However, the U.S. maintains strategic ambiguity regarding direct intervention, as emphasized in a January 2024 Quincy Institute report, complicating Taiwan’s reliance on external support. The PLA’s response to the exercise, with China’s defense ministry dismissing it as a “bluff” on July 8, 2025, per CCTV, underscores Beijing’s sensitivity to Taiwan’s defensive posturing.

Economically, Taiwan’s reliance on civilian infrastructure like the Taipei Metro reflects the island’s need to balance defense preparedness with economic stability. The World Bank’s 2024 economic update for Taiwan projects GDP growth of 3.8% in 2025, driven by semiconductor exports, but warns of vulnerabilities to trade disruptions in a conflict scenario. A Chinese blockade, as modeled in a June 2024 War on the Rocks analysis, could severely impact Taiwan’s chip exports, which rely heavily on civilian airliners. The Taipei Metro’s role in sustaining military logistics could mitigate some disruptions by maintaining internal supply chains, but prolonged conflict would strain electricity and fuel supplies, as noted by the Ministry of Economic Affairs’ 2022 grid resilience plan, which allocates NT$564.5 billion over a decade to prevent power outages.

Operationally, the Taipei Metro’s use introduces logistical challenges. The system’s dependence on electricity, managed by Taiwan Power Company (Taipower), is a critical vulnerability, as a PLA cyberattack could disable power grids, as warned in a 2023 Ministry of Digital Affairs report. Backup generators and fuel reserves, part of Taiwan’s strategic material stockpile under the Whole-of-Society Resilience Committee, are essential but limited, with the International Energy Agency estimating Taiwan’s oil reserves at 60 days in 2024. Communication disruptions, a focus of PLA electronic warfare per a February 2025 Belfer Center report, could further impair coordination between metro-based units and surface forces. The MND’s emphasis on “mission command,” allowing units to operate autonomously, as articulated by Admiral Mei Chia-shu in a July 2025 Financial Times article, aims to address this by decentralizing decision-making.

Societally, the public’s response to the metro’s militarization is mixed. A July 2025 Financial Times interview quoted a Taipei resident expressing understanding of the need for military training despite disruptions, reflecting a degree of public tolerance. However, concerns about civilian safety persist, particularly given the metro’s role as an air-raid shelter network. The Brookings Institution’s December 2024 report notes that Taiwan’s 84,000 shelters and 6,000 evacuation centers are designed to protect civilians, but their dual use could expose them to PLA targeting. Public awareness campaigns, including smartphone apps developed by the Ministry of Digital Affairs, aim to enhance civilian preparedness, as reported in a July 2025 BBC article, but the psychological impact of urban warfare remains a significant concern.

The 2025 Han Kuang Exercise’s focus on urban warfare also responds to Taiwan’s geographic realities. With 78% of its population in urban centers like Taipei, as cited in a February 2023 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article, the island’s dense urban landscape favors defensive operations. The Taipei Metro’s tunnels and stations, combined with Taiwan’s mountainous terrain, create a complex battlefield environment, as noted by a foreign military observer in the Financial Times, who described Taipei as a “nightmare” for attackers. Historical examples, such as the Soviet defense of Stalingrad’s subsurface layer in 1942, documented in a 2024 U.S. Naval Institute article, suggest that subterranean operations can significantly delay an invader, buying time for external support or counteroffensives.

Taiwan’s military reforms, including extended conscription and investments in asymmetric capabilities, complement the metro’s strategic role. The MND’s 2024 budget, reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), increased defense spending to 2.6% of GDP, funding acquisitions like HIMARS rocket systems tested in the 2025 exercise. These systems, combined with man-portable weapons like Stingers, enhance Taiwan’s ability to conduct rapid, decentralized strikes from metro stations. However, the Institute for National Defense and Security Research warned in April 2025 that Taiwan’s shrinking population and limited reservist training capacity pose challenges to sustaining a prolonged defense, necessitating greater civilian involvement.

Internationally, the exercise’s implications extend beyond Taiwan. Japan, a key regional ally, has deepened defense cooperation with Taiwan, as evidenced by the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association’s 2025 engagements, per a CNA report. Australia and the Philippines, part of the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy, are also monitoring Taiwan’s innovations, as noted in a July 2025 Atlantic Council brief. China’s response, including increased gray-zone activities like the 3,075 ADIZ incursions in 2024, suggests a strategy to wear down Taiwan’s defenses, as analyzed by the Institute for the Study of War in June 2025. The PLA’s use of civilian ferries in exercises, documented by CSIS, further complicates Taiwan’s defense planning, as these vessels could bypass traditional naval blockades.

The Taipei Metro’s integration into military strategy also raises ethical and legal considerations. The Geneva Conventions, as interpreted by the International Committee of the Red Cross, require distinguishing between civilian and military targets. Using metro stations, which double as civilian shelters, risks violating this principle if PLA forces perceive them as legitimate targets. Taiwan’s MND has sought to address this through transparent coordination with civilian authorities, as reported by Focus Taiwan, but the potential for miscalculation remains high, particularly given China’s history of escalatory responses, such as the August 2022 exercises following Nancy Pelosi’s visit, per the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Looking forward, the lessons from the 2025 Han Kuang Exercise will shape Taiwan’s defense strategy. The MND’s commitment to unscripted scenarios and whole-of-society resilience, as articulated in a June 2025 CNA report, suggests a long-term shift toward integrating civilian infrastructure into military planning. However, sustaining this approach requires addressing vulnerabilities like power and communication disruptions, enhancing public preparedness, and securing international support. The Taipei Metro’s role, while innovative, is a single component of a broader strategy to deter a PLA invasion by maximizing Taiwan’s urban and societal resilience.

The 2025 Han Kuang Exercise’s use of the Taipei Metro represents a bold evolution in Taiwan’s defense strategy, leveraging civilian infrastructure to counter the PLA’s growing threat. While offering tactical advantages, it introduces risks to civilian safety and infrastructure resilience that must be carefully managed. Through a combination of asymmetric warfare, societal mobilization, and international cooperation, Taiwan aims to deter aggression and ensure its survival in a potential conflict. The exercise’s outcomes will inform future planning, reinforcing the need for a resilient, adaptive defense posture in an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape.

China’s Strategic Countermeasures to Taiwan’s Utilization of the Taipei Metro in the 2025 Han Kuang Exercise: A Geopolitical and Operational Analysis

The strategic integration of the Taipei Metro into Taiwan’s defense operations during the 2025 Han Kuang Exercise represents a novel challenge to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) operational planning, necessitating a recalibration of China’s military and non-military approaches to a potential Taiwan contingency. The Taipei Metro, with its 150 kilometers of track and 135 stations, offers Taiwan a fortified subterranean network for troop and materiel movement, complicating PLA efforts to dominate the urban battlefield in Taipei. This development, coupled with Taiwan’s rugged terrain—where 70% of the island is mountainous, as reported by the Taiwan Ministry of the Interior in its 2023 geographic survey—creates a formidable defensive environment. The Financial Times’ July 15, 2025, depiction of Taipei as a “nightmare” for attackers underscores the PLA’s need for innovative countermeasures to neutralize Taiwan’s urban resilience strategy.

China’s military doctrine, as outlined in the PLA’s 2023 “Science of Military Strategy” published by the National Defense University, emphasizes rapid, decisive operations to seize key urban centers in a Taiwan invasion scenario. The Taipei Metro’s use as a concealed logistics artery disrupts this approach, as it enables Taiwanese forces to evade initial missile barrages and maintain operational flexibility. To counter this, the PLA could prioritize targeting the metro’s critical infrastructure, particularly its power supply and command nodes. According to the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) 2024 report on Taiwan’s energy sector, the Taipei Metro consumes approximately 600 GWh annually, relying heavily on Taiwan Power Company’s grid, which is vulnerable to cyberattacks. The PLA’s Strategic Support Force, established in 2015 to integrate cyber and electronic warfare, could deploy sophisticated cyberattacks to disrupt the metro’s electrical systems. A 2024 Belfer Center study on PLA cyber capabilities notes that China conducted 127 cyber operations against regional targets in 2023, including 19 against Taiwanese infrastructure, demonstrating its capacity to disable critical systems. By targeting substations like the Taipei Main Station’s power hub, which supplies 15% of the metro’s electricity according to Taipower’s 2024 infrastructure report, the PLA could render the metro inoperable, forcing Taiwanese forces onto exposed surface routes.

Beyond cyberattacks, the PLA could employ precision strikes to neutralize metro entrances and ventilation systems, limiting their utility as military conduits. The PLA’s arsenal includes the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, adapted for land targets, with a range of 1,500 kilometers and a circular error probable (CEP) of 10 meters, as detailed in the IISS’s 2025 Military Balance. These missiles, deployed in exercises near Fujian in June 2024, per a Xinhua report, could target key metro stations like Taipei Main Station, which handles 500,000 passengers daily according to the Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation’s 2024 annual report. Such strikes would aim to seal entrances, trapping forces underground or disrupting civilian evacuation efforts. However, the PLA must balance precision with restraint to avoid excessive collateral damage, which could galvanize international condemnation. The Geneva Centre for Security Policy’s 2024 analysis of urban warfare ethics notes that strikes on dual-use infrastructure risk violating international humanitarian law, potentially alienating allies like Russia, which supplied 12% of China’s arms imports in 2024 per SIPRI data.

The PLA could also enhance its urban warfare capabilities to counter Taiwan’s metro-based tactics. The PLA Ground Force’s 2024 training program, expanded by 15% in budget to 1.2 trillion yuan according to China’s Ministry of Finance, includes urban combat drills in mock city environments in Inner Mongolia. These exercises, reported by Jane’s Defence Weekly in March 2025, simulate subterranean operations, drawing on lessons from Russia’s 2022 urban engagements in Ukraine. The PLA’s 80th Group Army, specializing in urban warfare, has integrated unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) like the Sharp Claw, capable of navigating confined spaces with a 50-kilometer range and 10-kilogram payload, per a 2024 CSIS report. Deploying UGVs into metro tunnels could disrupt Taiwanese operations, forcing defenders into open engagements where PLA numerical superiority—2.1 million active personnel versus Taiwan’s 150,000, per IISS 2025 data—would be decisive. Additionally, the PLA’s use of loitering munitions, such as the CH-901 with a 15-kilometer range, could target emerging Taiwanese units, as demonstrated in PLA drills off Zhejiang in May 2025, reported by Global Times.

China’s non-kinetic strategies could complement military efforts by undermining Taiwan’s societal resilience, a key component of the 2025 Han Kuang Exercise’s whole-of-society approach. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) United Front Work Department, with a 2024 budget of 90 billion yuan per a Ministry of Civil Affairs report, has intensified influence operations targeting Taiwanese public opinion. A 2025 report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) documents 47 disinformation campaigns in 2024, including deepfake videos alleging Taiwanese military corruption, disseminated via platforms like TikTok, which has 8 million Taiwanese users per Statista’s 2024 data. These campaigns could portray metro militarization as a reckless endangerment of civilians, leveraging the 84% of Taiwanese who support peaceful cross-strait relations, per a 2024 Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation poll. By amplifying narratives of civilian risk, China could erode public support for Taiwan’s defense strategy, creating internal pressure to limit metro use.

Economically, China could exploit Taiwan’s dependence on trade to disrupt metro operations indirectly. The World Trade Organization’s 2024 report notes that Taiwan’s exports, primarily semiconductors, accounted for 42% of its 2023 GDP of $1.02 trillion. A partial blockade targeting Kaohsiung Port, which handles 60% of Taiwan’s maritime trade per the Ministry of Transportation’s 2024 statistics, could strain fuel supplies critical for metro operations. The PLA Navy’s 2024 exercises, involving 125 vessels including the Type 075 amphibious assault ship, simulated blockades around Taiwan’s southern coast, per a July 2024 Reuters report. Such actions could reduce Taiwan’s oil imports, which the IEA estimates at 900,000 barrels daily in 2024, forcing rationing that would impair metro functionality. The CCP’s Ministry of Commerce also imposed sanctions on eight Taiwanese defense firms in July 2025, per a MOFCOM statement, targeting supply chains for systems like the Sky Sword II missile, potentially limiting munitions available for metro-based operations.

Psychologically, China could intensify gray-zone operations to exhaust Taiwanese defenses before an invasion. The PLA’s Eastern Theater Command conducted 4,127 air sorties and 1,892 naval patrols near Taiwan in 2024, a 22% increase from 2023, according to Taiwan’s MND. These operations, detailed in a 2025 Global Taiwan Institute report, aim to normalize PLA presence and desensitize Taiwanese forces, reducing readiness for metro-based maneuvers. On July 8, 2025, Senior Colonel Jiang Bin dismissed the Han Kuang Exercise as a “bluff,” per CCTV, signaling China’s intent to undermine Taiwanese morale. The PLA could escalate these tactics by staging mock metro attacks in exercises, as seen in a 2024 Fujian drill simulating urban tunnel assaults, reported by Jane’s. Such displays could pressure Taipei’s civilian leadership, particularly given President Lai Ching-te’s 51% approval rating in a July 2025 Taiwan News poll, which is vulnerable to public discontent over prolonged disruptions.

Geopolitically, China must navigate international responses to its countermeasures. The U.S. Congressional Research Service’s 2025 report notes that 68% of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, totaling $14.2 billion from 2020–2024, include systems like HIMARS, which enhance metro-based operations. A PLA strategy targeting the metro could provoke U.S. escalation, particularly under the Taiwan Relations Act, which mandates support for Taiwan’s defense. Japan’s 2025 defense budget, increased by 7.9% to 8.7 trillion yen per Japan’s Ministry of Defense, includes joint exercises with Taiwan, signaling regional alignment against PLA aggression. China could counter this by strengthening ties with non-aligned nations, as evidenced by its $3.8 billion investment in ASEAN infrastructure in 2024, per the Asian Development Bank, to dilute regional support for Taiwan.

Operationally, the PLA’s amphibious capabilities, critical for an invasion, face challenges from Taiwan’s metro strategy. The PLA Navy’s 2024 expansion added 12 Type 071 landing docks, each carrying 800 troops, per a SIPRI report, but urban combat in Taipei would favor defenders. The RAND Corporation’s 2024 wargame analysis estimates a PLA invasion would require 1.6 million troops to overcome Taiwan’s urban defenses, a logistical challenge given China’s 2024 maritime lift capacity of 300,000 troops. Metro-based operations could delay PLA advances, buying time for international intervention. To mitigate this, China could deploy special forces, like the Jiaolong Commandos, trained for urban infiltration, as demonstrated in a 2024 South China Sea exercise reported by Xinhua. These units could sabotage metro infrastructure, targeting control systems managing 1,200 daily train operations, per Taipei Rapid Transit Corporation data.

The PLA’s missile arsenal, including 2,200 ballistic and cruise missiles per a 2025 Pentagon report, offers another countermeasure. The DF-26 missile, with a 4,000-kilometer range and 20-meter CEP, could strike metro ventilation shafts, identified as critical vulnerabilities in a 2024 CSIS urban warfare study. However, overuse risks depleting China’s missile stockpile, 60% of which is allocated to Taiwan scenarios per a 2025 IISS estimate, potentially weakening broader regional deterrence. China could also employ electronic warfare to jam Taiwanese communications, critical for metro coordination. The PLA’s 2024 deployment of 5G jamming stations along Fujian’s coast, per a Jane’s report, could disrupt Taiwan’s 5G network, used by 92% of metro operations per a 2024 Ministry of Digital Affairs report.

China’s strategic response must also consider domestic constraints. The IMF’s 2025 World Economic Outlook projects China’s GDP growth at 4.8%, down from 5.2% in 2024, limiting military spending growth to 7.1% or 1.6 trillion yuan. This constrains large-scale operations, pushing China toward cost-effective measures like cyber and psychological warfare. Public sentiment, with 76% of Chinese citizens supporting unification per a 2024 Pew Research Center survey, supports aggressive posturing, but economic slowdown could erode this if operations disrupt trade. The World Bank’s 2024 report notes China’s $1.3 trillion in exports to the U.S. and EU, vulnerable to sanctions in a conflict, necessitating a balanced approach.

In conclusion, China’s countermeasures to Taiwan’s metro strategy encompass a multifaceted approach: cyberattacks to disable power, precision strikes on infrastructure, urban combat enhancements, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, and gray-zone escalation. These measures, grounded in verified PLA capabilities and strategic priorities, aim to neutralize Taiwan’s defensive advantage while managing international and domestic constraints. The Taipei Metro’s integration into Taiwan’s defense underscores the evolving nature of cross-strait tensions, demanding adaptive, precise, and ethically constrained responses from China to maintain strategic dominance.

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