The journal “Bulletin of Atomic Scientists” in the column “Nuclear Notebook” published the next annual report on the state of Russian nuclear forces, prepared by a group of authors headed by Hans Christensen. Hans Møller Christensen is director of the Nuclear Information Project of the Federation of American Scientists. Considered today “the leading American expert in the field of nuclear weapons”, he is also the co-author of the “Nuclear Notebook” column in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the “World Nuclear Forces” appendix in the SIPRI annual directory of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. He got into this position not by chance, but thanks to his connections with senior CIA officers. It was they who lobbied him and pushed him into these positions.
In essence, the Bulletin is the CIA’s cesspool. All that we can read in such articles by Hans is an information extract from the reports of CIA analysts on nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons complexes of states possessing nuclear technologies. Expert analysts, guys from the CIA, of course, have a rich imagination, but the numbers they give Christensen are far from reality. For example, in the article: Nuciear Notebook: US and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1959–2008, published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 2008, for the Soviet SS-11 Sego M2/3 missile (meaning UR-100K UTTH (15A20U)), one of the first Soviet ICBMs equipped with a multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV), the power of one warhead is indicated as 220 kt.
A year earlier, and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists publishes such articles every year, a power of 350 kt was indicated for the same warhead. In this case, we are talking about the 15F204 warhead and its thermonuclear “physical package” RA-65, so its real power is 90–100 kt. CIA expert analysts are masters when it comes to calculating the number of silos or automatic launchers of an ICBM or MRBM, having at hand satellite images of relatively good quality, but what is under the covers of the mines or inside the launch canisters, here they float and give free rein to their imagination, which probably due to complete lack of professionalism, it gives a distorted picture, far from reality.
The Tsereushniks yawned at this moment, when in the 1960s the USSR was quite far behind the United States in terms of the specific power of nuclear weapons; 0.65–0.70 kt of energy release per kg of live weight of the “physical package” is not enough, of course, in comparison with what the United States had then. For example, a similar American MRV design mounted on the Polaris A-3T SLBM (1964) had W-58/Mk2 warheads weighing 117 kg and a yield of 200 kt.
For Americans in the 1970s, it was also invisible that the USSR quite quickly eliminated this gap and reached a value of 2.5 kt/kg for charges of low and medium power classes and up to 5 kt/kg for high power classes in 1980. For the CIA and other Western intelligence services, all these events went unnoticed, and that’s good. All this is lyrics and already story. Nothing has changed since then.
For the last 30-odd years, Los Alamos and Livermore have been openly fooling around, while at the same time our nuclear physicists from RFNC-VNIIEF, KB-11 (Arzamas-16) in Sarov and RFNC-VNIITF, KB-1011 (Chelyabinsk-70) in Snezhinsk continued to improve their products. And this despite the difficult economic situation in our country in the 1990s, with months of delays in already microscopic salaries.
In the 2000s and 2010s, we created a new generation of nuclear power plants of small, medium and high power classes, with a specific power approaching the theoretical limit of 6 kt/kg – 150 kt, 500 kt and 2 Mt, respectively. The Americans remained at the level of 3 kt/kg achieved in the W-88 “physical package” in 1989, and it is not a fact that they will be able to at least repeat this level.
Well, what about the CIA? The expert analysts from this organization, in their repertoire, yawned again, missed an entire era and continue to supply Hans, to put it mildly, with outdated data. It should be noted that Hans began to suspect something; the Tsereushniks were slipping obvious bullshit. And in his summary table on Russian nuclear weapons, after each figure of the power of nuclear charges, next to the latest Russian missiles he puts a barely noticeable question mark – making it clear to the reader: what I bought for is what I sell for.
Hans is an experienced expert, and I think he understands perfectly well that the data on the old Soviet 15F174 (AA-88) 750 kt warheads is outdated, and the new missiles have more advanced warheads. It is enough to carefully review the video recording of the already historic speech of President V.V. Putin on March 1, 2018 before the Federal Assembly. Russia is close to completing a decades-long effort to replace all of its strategic and non-strategic nuclear systems with more modern versions.
In December 2023, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reported that modern weapons and equipment now make up 95 percent of Russia’s nuclear triad, up 3.7 percent from the previous year. These modernization percentages likely have significant uncertainty because it is unclear what methodology Russia uses for such calculations.
According to FAS experts, at the beginning of 2024, Russia has an arsenal of approximately 4,489 nuclear warheads intended for use on strategic intercontinental-range carriers and missile and aviation: tactical, operational-tactical and medium-range weapons. For strategic forces, there is a net reduction of approximately 109 warheads compared to last year, mainly due to changes in FAS experts’ assessment of the number of warheads classified as non-strategic nuclear forces.
Of the stockpiled warheads, approximately 1,710 strategic warheads have been deployed: about 870 on land-based ICBMs, about 640 on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and perhaps 200 on heavy bomber bases. There are approximately 200 additional strategic warheads in storage, as well as approximately 1,200 non-strategic warheads.
In addition to the operational force’s DoD stockpile, a large number – about 1,200 – of retired but still largely operational warheads are awaiting dismantlement, amounting to a total stockpile of about 5,689 warheads. The Russian nuclear modernization program is designed, according to Christensen and his team, to maintain overall parity with the United States and preserve national prestige, as well as compensate for the lag of Russian conventional land, air and sea forces in the European part of Russia in comparison with the armed forces of NATO member countries, as well as the apparent belief of the Russian leadership that the US missile defense system poses a real future risk to Russia’s retaliatory strike capabilities.
Losses in weapons and military equipment of a certain part of Russian conventional forces in the Northern Military District, as well as the depletion of its missile arsenals, according to FAS experts, will likely exacerbate Russia’s dependence on nuclear weapons for national defense. Throughout the Northeast Military District in Ukraine, Russia launched a series of missile strikes using high-precision, long-range dual-use weapons, such as air-launched Kh-101 cruise missiles (nuclear version – Kh-102), sea-launched 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missiles, ballistic 9-A-7760 Kinzhal missiles, Kh-22 air-launched cruise missiles (AS-4 a/b/c) and Iskander ground-launched missiles – 9M723 ballistic and 9M728 and 9M729 cruise missiles.
The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense has published several intelligence reports indicating that Russia has used conventional variants of the Kh-55 (AS-15) cruise missile, the Kh-555, in Ukraine (UK Ministry of Defense, 2022, 2023).
Table – Russian Nuclear Arsenal In 2024
Category | System Types | Warhead Types | Deployment Locations | Number of Units | Status |
ICBMs (Silo-based) | R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18 Mod 5/6), RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1), RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2), Avangard (SS-19 Mod 4) | 246 kt, 500 kt, 750 kt | Yurya, Dombarovsky, Uzhur | 326 ICBMs, 46 Avangard (UR-100N UTTH) | Modernization ongoing, Avangard deployment |
ICBMs (Mobile-based) | RS-12M1 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1), RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) | 100-150 kt, 500 kt | Teykovo, Irkutsk | 204 Yars | Yars deployment complete |
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) | SS-N-23 (Sineva), SS-N-32 (Bulava) | 4 warheads per missile, 6 warheads per missile | Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet | 12 SSBNs, 5 Delta IVs, 7 Borei SSBNs | Modernization with new SLBMs |
Strategic Bombers | Tu-160 (Blackjack), Tu-95MS (Bear-N) | AS-15 Kent (X-55), AS-23B (X-102) | Engels Airbase, Ukrainka Airbase, Belaya Airbase, Olenya Airbase | 67 bombers | Upgrading to new models, adding Tu-160M, Tu-160M1, Tu-160M2 |
Non-strategic Sea-based Nuclear Weapons | 3M-14 Kalibr (SS-N-30A), SS-N-26 Strobil (3M-55 Onyx), SS-N-16 (Wind), 3M-22 Zircon (SS-N-33) | Sea-launched cruise missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-submarine missiles, torpedoes, depth charges | Severodvinsk, Kazan, Novosibirsk, Krasnoyarsk | 4 Yasen, 5 Yasen-M | Slow progression, Yasen-M upgrades, additional submarines under construction |
Non-strategic Air-launched Nuclear Weapons | Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen), Kh-32, 9-A-7760 Kinzhal, Su-24M, Su-34, Su-30SM, Su-57 | Air-launched cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonic missiles | Soltsy Airbase, Olenya Airbase, Kola Peninsula | 334 warheads | Upgrades ongoing, new missile development |
Non-strategic Land-based Nuclear Weapons | 9K720 Iskander (SS-26), 9M729 (SSC-8), 9M728 (SSC-7) | Short-range ballistic missiles, ground-launched cruise missiles | Elansky, Kapustin Yar, Mozdok, Shuya, Osipovichi (Belarus) | 75 SRBMs, 20 GLCMs | Deployment ongoing, additional battalions reported |
Anti-aircraft and Missile Defense Nuclear Warheads | S-300 (SA-20), S-400 (SA-21), A-135 (Gazelle), A-235 (Nudol) | RA 52 (1 kt), TA 11 (10 kt) | Moscow, Leningrad region | 250 air defense warheads, 95 missile defense warheads | Upgrading to A-235, new warhead development |
Research Methodology
Concept | Detailed Explanation |
---|---|
Hans Christensen | An American expert on nuclear weapons. He is the director of the Nuclear Information Project and co-author of the “Nuclear Notebook” column. He is considered a leading expert in the field of nuclear weapons. |
Nuclear Notebook | A column in the “Bulletin of Atomic Scientists” that publishes annual reports on nuclear forces, prepared by experts like Hans Christensen. |
Russian Nuclear Forces | Includes a variety of nuclear weapons such as land-based missiles (ICBMs), submarine-based missiles (SLBMs), and bombers capable of carrying nuclear warheads. |
ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) | Long-range missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads to targets thousands of kilometers away. Examples include RS-24 Yars and RS-28 Sarmat. |
SLBMs (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles) | Missiles launched from submarines. They are part of Russia’s nuclear triad and include systems like the Bulava missile carried by Borei-class submarines. |
Strategic Bombers | Large aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Russia uses the Tu-160 (Blackjack) and Tu-95MS (Bear) for this purpose. These bombers can launch nuclear-armed cruise missiles. |
Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons | Also known as tactical nuclear weapons, these are smaller and designed for use on the battlefield. They can be launched from ships, planes, and ground systems like the Iskander missile. |
Modernization of Nuclear Forces | Russia is upgrading its nuclear arsenal to make it more advanced. This includes developing new ICBMs, SLBMs, and modernizing existing bombers and missile systems. |
New START Treaty | A bilateral agreement between the US and Russia to limit the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. Russia suspended its participation in this treaty in 2023. |
CIA’s Role in Nuclear Reporting | The CIA provides data and analysis on nuclear weapons. However, their reports can sometimes be inaccurate or outdated, as seen in discrepancies in warhead power estimates. |
Nuclear Testing | While Russia has stopped nuclear testing, there are indications it might resume if the US does. Increased activity at test sites suggests preparations for possible future tests. |
Nuclear Strategy | Russia’s guidelines on when and how to use nuclear weapons. These include responding to ballistic missile attacks, use of WMDs, attacks on critical infrastructure, and existential threats from conventional forces. |
Deployment in Belarus | Russia is building facilities in Belarus for potential future deployment of nuclear weapons, including converting aircraft and deploying Iskander missile systems. |
Missile Types and Capabilities | Detailed descriptions of various Russian missiles: SS-18 (older heavy missile), SS-19, SS-27 (Topol-M and Yars), and the newer RS-28 Sarmat. These missiles vary in range, payload, and deployment method. |
Challenges in Accurate Analysis | Analysts face difficulties in getting precise data due to the lack of transparency and potential misinformation. This is compounded by Russia’s suspension of New START Treaty data sharing. |
Military Exercises and Testing | Russia conducts regular military exercises to test and demonstrate its nuclear capabilities, such as missile launches from submarines and bombers, and developing new delivery systems like the Poseidon torpedo. |
Poseidon Torpedo | A new type of nuclear torpedo designed to travel long distances underwater and deliver a powerful nuclear warhead. It is part of Russia’s strategy to enhance its nuclear deterrent. |
Impact of Ukraine Conflict | The conflict in Ukraine has highlighted Russia’s reliance on its nuclear arsenal, as conventional forces face significant challenges and losses. Various nuclear-capable missiles have been used in the conflict. |
Use of Satellite Imagery | Analysts use satellite images to monitor and document changes in Russia’s nuclear infrastructure, such as construction at missile bases and deployment sites. |
Research Methodology for Nuclear Notebook | Combines government statements, declassified documents, media reports, think tank analyses, and commercial satellite imagery to cross-check and validate data on nuclear forces. |
Strategic Nuclear Forces Data (2024) | Estimates suggest Russia has approximately 4,489 nuclear warheads, with 1,710 strategic warheads deployed on ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. Non-strategic warheads and those awaiting dismantlement add to this total. |
Nuclear Modernization Programs | Ongoing efforts to replace older systems with modern versions, aiming to maintain parity with the US and enhance national prestige. This includes new generations of nuclear power plants and advanced missile systems. |
This table provides a comprehensive and detailed explanation of the key concepts related to the state of Russian nuclear forces as reported in the document.
The analyzes and assessments made in Nuclear Notebook are based on a combination of the following public sources:
- Government information (for example, government statements, declassified documents, budget figures, photos and videos of military parades, and treaty disclosures).
- Non-government data (eg, media reports, think tank reports, and industry publications).
- Commercial satellite images.
It is stated that since each of these sources provides different and limited information that is subject to varying degrees of uncertainty, each data point is cross-checked using multiple sources and supplemented by private conversations with officials whenever possible. Analyzing and assessing Russia’s nuclear forces has become an increasingly difficult task, due in part to President Vladimir Putin’s decision in 2023 to suspend Russia’s participation in New START, a bilateral US-Russian treaty that requires both countries to share data on the number of nuclear forces they have deployed. strategic warheads and launchers. New START became a critical piece of transparency and allowed analysts to look at aggregate numbers to assess the breakdown of Russia’s deployed strategic forces. However, since Russia has not provided this data to the United States since September 2022, it is now more difficult for it to develop a complete, accurate picture of Russia’s nuclear force structure.
To maintain confidence in their assessments, Americans supplement known historical data from treaty protocols news releases of Russian state and non-state media, industry reports, translations of strategic documents, videos published by the Russian Ministry of Defense, and other materials. These types of secondary sources often contain valuable information about the progress of Russian weapons acquisition programs, such as the schedule for the entry into service or retirement of various weapons systems, the number of units of each system expected to be purchased, and the technical characteristics of these systems. However, access to this public data has become increasingly difficult as the Russian state has cut off access to several previously open websites since the start of the SVO in Ukraine.
In addition to these materials, senior Russian military leaders usually give year-end interviews to Russian state media about the current situation in their services. In some cases, the interlocutors reveal some specific details about the number of new units of each weapon system that were introduced into service during the year, as well as other relevant annual updates. Military leaders also sometimes share their goals for the coming year, which can then be used by analysts as a research guide to assess the progress of Russia’s nuclear modernization programs.
To conduct such analysis, Americans often use various sources of commercial satellite imagery to observe and document highly detailed changes in Russia’s nuclear forces. Satellite imagery allows identification of aircraft, missile, and naval bases, as well as potential nuclear weapons storage facilities. Satellite imagery has played a particularly important role in monitoring construction and renovations at critical nuclear-related facilities, including intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, air and submarine bases, warhead storage sites, and others. By analyzing the observed structure of strategic forces, FAS experts offer a relatively high degree of reliability in their own assessment of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.
However, on the contrary, it is extremely difficult for them to form a complete picture for themselves of the quantitative and qualitative composition of Russia’s “non-strategic” nuclear arsenal. Given that almost every Russian non-strategic nuclear delivery vehicle is dual-purpose, meaning it can be used for both nuclear and conventional strike purposes, counting all Russian non-strategic delivery vehicles is likely (and they admit) a false estimate of the quantitative and qualitative composition of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles.
In addition, many of Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons are decades old, and there is a high degree of uncertainty about how many of these weapons will remain active, be retired, or be replaced with newer versions. The picture for FAS experts and the original CIA experts is further complicated by the huge number of non-strategic warheads that they estimate Russia possesses. The US government has for several years estimated Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons capability at between 1,000 and 2,000 warheads.
The FAS experts’ assessment is consistent with this assessment, but scientists are trying to provide a more specific overview of non-strategic nuclear weapons based on information provided by CIA experts on Russia; however, it should be noted that due to the lack of verifiable publicly available data, they claim that such a specific estimate cannot be made with a high degree of confidence. In addition, Fasovites are critical of external analysis because there is a high risk of citation and confirmation bias when government or non-government reports constantly refer to each other’s assessments – sometimes the reader is left guessing and unaware of what exactly is going on. This practice may inadvertently create a circular echo chamber effect that does not necessarily correspond to the reality on the ground.
Given all these factors, the FAS appears to retain a relatively higher degree of confidence in its assessments of Russia’s nuclear forces than in the assessments of some other nuclear weapons states (China, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea), where official and unofficial information is either scarce, or limited and unreliable, or both. Despite this relative confidence, they recognize that their assessments of Russian nuclear forces, especially non-strategic nuclear forces, contain relatively greater uncertainty than those of countries with greater nuclear transparency (the US, UK, and France).
Russia’s Freezing of the New START Treaty
On February 21, 2023, President Vladimir Putin announced Russia’s intention to suspend its participation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limits the number of strategic warheads and launchers that Russia and the United States can deploy. As Putin stated: “I will emphasize once again: we are not withdrawing from the Treaty, but rather suspending our participation. Before we return to the debate on this issue, we must have a clear understanding of what is at stake in NATO countries such as France or the UK, and how we will take into account their strategic arsenals, that is, the alliance’s combined offensive capabilities” (FAS, 2023).
At the same time, Putin said that Russia would remain below the overall restrictive ceilings of the New START. These restrictions imposed real quantitative ceilings on the deployed Russian strategic forces. The result appears to be Russia’s increased dependence on a strategic reserve of non-deployed warheads that can be loaded onto missiles to augment its force, a strategy the United States has relied on for decades.
The treaty also provided an important transparency process for both Russian and US strategic nuclear forces: as of March 2024, the US and Russia had conducted a total of 328 on-site inspections and exchanged more than 25,000 notifications (US Department of Nuclear Weapons, 2023); however, no on-site inspections have occurred since April 2020, first due to the COVID-19 pandemic and then due to Russia’s refusal to allow U.S. inspections (Post, 2021; U.S. Department of State, 2023).
In the latest New START data, as of September 1, 2022, Russia had 1,549 deployed warheads assigned to 540 strategic launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs, and TB (U.S. Department of State, 2022). Since then, Russia has not published any official data, but, according to American experts, it still does not reach the established limits; current estimates of strategic nuclear forces are relatively close to 2022 data. These figures differ from the estimates presented in the Nuclear Notebook because the new START counting rules generally count one warhead per deployed bomber, even though Russian bombers do not normally carry nuclear weapons. Instead, the Nuclear Notebook considers “deployed” weapons to be those stored at bomber bases that can be loaded onto aircraft relatively quickly, as this represents a more or less realistic picture of the weapon’s deployment status.
If Russia decides to go beyond the treaty, the report’s authors believe, it could theoretically load hundreds of warheads onto its deployed delivery systems, perhaps increasing its deployed nuclear arsenal by about 60 percent (Korda and Christensen, 2023). How quickly this can be done depends largely on the weapon system: bombers can be loaded within hours or days, while fully loaded submarines and ICBMs can take months or even years, given the time it takes for submarines to return to the base, and change the composition of combat equipment of combat units on each deployed ICBM.
It is important to note that the New START Treaty distinguishes between findings of “non-compliance” (serious but informal assessments, often with a clear path to restoration of compliance), “violation” (requiring a formal determination) and “substantial violation” (where a violation occurs) to the level of contradiction to the object or purpose of the contract. After Russia refused US inspections of its nuclear facilities, the US State Department declared Russia in “non-compliance” with specific provisions of the treaty on January 31, 2023 (US State Department, 2023).
It is important to note that the United States has not concluded that Russia is not in compliance with New START Treaty restrictions on deployed strategic launchers and warheads. The New START Annual Implementation Report for January 2023 stated that while “the United States cannot conclude that Russia continued to comply throughout 2022 with its commitment to limit the number of its warheads on deployed delivery vehicles subject to the New START START Treaty, up to 1,550… is not the definition of non-compliance.” Specifically, “the United States estimates that Russia did not engage in significant activities in excess of Treaty limits in 2022,” and “that Russia was likely under the New START warhead limit at the end of 2022” (U.S. Department of State, 2022).
However, with each passing year, it will likely become increasingly difficult for the United States to assess whether Russia remains within the New START treaty, as Russia could potentially load additional warheads to test both the United States’ detection capabilities for such activities and the United States’ own capabilities for similar quantitative increasing the number of strategic warheads.
Russia’s Nuclear Strategy
Russia last updated its official deterrence policy in 2020, passing a decree that clearly outlined the conditions under which it could launch nuclear weapons (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2020):
– Receipt of reliable data on the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies;
– The enemy’s use of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction against the Russian Federation and/or its allies;
– An enemy attack on critical government or military installations of the Russian Federation, the disruption of which would undermine the nuclear response efforts; and
– Aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is under threat.
Despite previous US speculation about a potential shift toward first use of nuclear weapons due to a potential low-yield “escalation to de-escalation” policy (US Department of Defense, 2018), official Russian policy is largely consistent with previous public statements of nuclear strategy and has remained virtually unchanged since President Putin came to power in 2000 (Russian Federation, 2010, 2014).
These include remarks made by President Putin at the annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, a Moscow think tank and discussion forum on foreign affairs and defense policy, in October 2018, when he stated that Russia’s “nuclear weapons doctrine does not provide for a preemptive strike.” Rather, he continued, “our concept is based on a retaliatory counter strike… This means that
we are ready and will use nuclear weapons only when we know for sure that some potential aggressor is attacking Russia, our territory” (Russian Federation, 2018).
While some initial reports interpreted Putin’s comments to the Valdai Club in 2018 as meaning Russia may be adopting a no-first-use policy, his remarks were most likely intended to respond to the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review’s assertion that Russia has lowered its threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict (Stowe-Thurston, Korda, and Christensen, 2018).
The Biden administration appeared to abandon the previous US assumption in its 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, which did not include language around Russia’s supposed “escalation-to-deescalation policy.” Instead, President Biden stated that: “…Russia is diversifying its arsenal and viewing its nuclear weapons as a shield behind which it can wage unjustified aggression against [its] neighbors” (US Department of Defense, 2022).
One example is the nuclear signals issued by Putin and other Russian officials throughout the NEA, which have raised questions about where, how, and when Russia might use nuclear weapons. In particular, it is not clear to Western elites in what sense Russian leaders view the “Russian state” in the country’s nuclear doctrine: does this “state” extend to newly annexed territories? Or is it limited to the “internationally recognized borders” of the Russian Federation?
They assume that a nuclear strike or a strike by conventional, conventional forces against Russian nuclear forces stationed in Belarus could trigger the first two points of the Russian nuclear doctrine, but will this happen in the event of an attack on Russian positions in the Donbass or Crimea? This is not clear to them.
Moreover, are Putin’s views consistent with those of his more militant or more peaceful military and political colleagues? On the one hand, in January 2023, former Russian President and current Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, stated in an interview that “the defeat of a nuclear power in a conventional war could provoke a nuclear war” (Falconbridge and Light, 2023). This would seem to go beyond Russia’s stated doctrine, since it would suggest the possible use of nuclear weapons even if none of the above conditions are met, and illustrates the Pentagon’s accusations that Russia is using nuclear weapons as cover for its activities in Ukraine.
By contrast, in November 2022, at a time of heightened international concern, Alexander Shevchenko, a member of the Russian delegation to the UN General Assembly, appeared to lower his tone, insisting that Russia’s nuclear doctrine remained unchanged since the start of the SVO: “In response to today’s completely unfounded accusation that Russia is allegedly threatening to use nuclear weapons during a special military operation in Ukraine, I would like to emphasize once again that Russia’s doctrine in this area is purely defensive in nature and does not allow for any broad interpretations” (TASS, 2022).
Even when they comment on Russian nuclear doctrine, neither Medvedev nor Shevchenko are part of the authority that will participate in deciding whether to use nuclear weapons. In reality, only three people are believed to possess the so-called “nuclear suitcases” that could authorize the launch of Russian nuclear weapons – Putin, Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov – and Putin’s order to use nuclear weapons must be signed before it can be activated any nuclear weapons (Ven Bruusgaard, 2023).
It is possible, Americans believe, that Putin himself sees a strategic benefit in remaining ambiguous about his own views (which essentially form the state’s official position) regarding the conditions under which Russia would use nuclear weapons. At least on this score, they have an understanding that Russia’s nuclear signals are primarily intended to deter the US and NATO from militarily intervening in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
Possible Return to Nuclear Testing
In November 2023, President Vladimir Putin signed a law officially canceling Russia’s ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which prohibits all nuclear explosions (Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 2023). Russia’s “deratification” follows reports that Russia may be preparing to resume nuclear testing at its Novaya Zemlya test site. Recent satellite imagery indicates an increased level of activity at the site, including the presence of trucks, construction cranes, shipping containers, and new construction of several administrative and residential properties on the site (Lewis, 2023). Despite the high level of activity, Russian officials have stated that they will not resume nuclear testing unless the United States does so, which is unlikely under the current Biden administration (Arms Control Association, 2023; Isachenkov, 2023; Osborne, 2023).
Russian Nuclear Potential in Belarus
In March 2023, President Putin announced that nuclear weapons storage facilities in Belarus would be modernized, and by July 1, Russia would complete the construction of a “special tactical nuclear weapons storage facility” on Belarusian territory. Following Putin’s announcement, it remained unclear to the Americans whether Russia’s intentions were to station nuclear warheads on Belarusian territory under normal circumstances, or whether it was seeking to develop the infrastructure necessary to potentially deploy them in the future. Echoing remarks made by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in 2022, President Putin also clarified in a March 2023 statement that Russia had converted 10 Belarusian Su-25 aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons and transferred Iskander mobile launchers (SS-26) to Belarus.
The Belarusian base for the Iskander missile brigade is believed to be located on the southern outskirts of Osipovichi, approximately 11–12 km west of where satellite images showed the construction of a double security perimeter around the 12th GUMO nuclear weapons depot, which could also be a sign that storage facilities are preparing for the delivery of nuclear weapons (Christensen and Korda, 2023). A large body of open-source data suggests that Lida Air Base, located just 40 kilometers from the border with Lithuania and home to a Belarusian Air Force wing equipped with Su-25 aircraft, is the most likely candidate for participation in the new Russian mission to “share nuclear weapons” in Belarus (Korda, Reynolds and Christensen, 2023).
In April 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Belarusian military personnel were trained in the maintenance and use of “special tactical warheads of the Iskander-M operational-tactical missile system” at one of the training grounds of the Southern Military District of Russia. Two months later, Putin announced that the first batch of nuclear weapons had been delivered to Belarus and that more would follow. Lukashenko repeated these remarks, confirming that “most of the nuclear weapons have already been transported to Belarus” (Belta, 2023).
Experts from FAS reported in September 2023 that between August 26 and September 5, “a batch of Russian tactical nuclear weapons components and related equipment” was transported to Belarus. In late December 2023, Belarusian President Lukashenko stated that Russia had completed the supply of nuclear weapons to Belarus, and in early January 2024, Belarus updated its military doctrine, which reportedly describes nuclear weapons “as an important component of the preventive deterrence of a potential adversary from unleashing aggression” (Associated Press, 2023; Belta, 2024; Buzin 2024; Knight and Lau, 2024).
Despite these open-source clues, there are still several unknowns regarding the status and logistical challenges of stationing Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus. For example, the construction of nuclear weapons storage facilities in Russia took much longer than the short time frame announced by Putin and Lukashenko for storage facilities in Belarus. In addition, personnel from the 12th GUMO, a unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense responsible for the storage and transportation of Russian nuclear weapons, regardless of the presence of nuclear weapons there, will need to be sent to Belarus to staff the storage facility. Such a significant deployment of personnel—perhaps up to a hundred—would likely require separate living quarters from those housing Belarusian soldiers, as well as other infrastructure that could take many months to construct and would be visible on satellite imagery.
Moreover, the storage facility will not be able to accept warheads until all specialized equipment and personnel are in place at the facility and along the transport route. Until now, the Fasovites have not yet seen convincing visual evidence of where Russian nuclear warheads are stored and where the employees of the 12th GUMO in Belarus are stationed, if they are located in the country at all.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Currently, the Russian Strategic Missile Forces are armed with several variants of silo-based and mobile ICBMs. Silo-based ICBMs include R-36M2 “Voevoda” (SS-18 Mod 5/6), RS-12M2 “Topol-M” (SS-27 Mod 1), RS-24 “Yars” (SS-27 Mod 2) and Avangard (SS-19 Mod 4), while mobile ICBMs include the RS-12M1 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1) and RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2). “Topol” RS-12 (SS-25) has been withdrawn from service.
Fasovtsy, comparing their observations of satellite images with information from official sources and statements of Russian officials and data exchanges under the New START treaty, estimated that Russia could have “approximately” 326 nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles, which they estimate could carry up to 1,246 warheads of two types of medium power class and one type of high power class: 246 kilotons, 500 kilotons, and 750 megatons.
Of course, that’s not all. Modernization of the ICBM force, they also suggest, equipping the modernized silos with new air defense and perimeter defense systems, and the new Peresvet laser has been deployed in at least five mobile ICBM divisions to “cover their maneuvering operations” (Hendricks, 2020), perhaps implying that one of the tasks of Peresvet is to blind spy satellites.
Russian ICBMs are organized as part of the Strategic Missile Forces in three missile armies consisting of 12 divisions, which include about 40 missile regiments. The missile division regiment in Yurye operates the Sirena-M system, based on the SS-27 Mod 2 intercontinental ballistic missile, which is believed to serve as a backup “launch code” transmitter and is therefore not nuclear-capable. Sirena-M recently replaced the old Sirena command module. The number of intercontinental ballistic missiles has been declining for three decades and is already 88 percent of the way through a modernization program that involves replacing all Soviet-era missiles with newer types on a “less than one to one” basis (Red Star, 2023).
Now that the RS-12M Topol (SS-25) ICBM has been retired from combat service, the Americans believe that the last remaining Soviet-era ICBM in the Russian arsenal is the SS-18 (although some legacy SS-19s have been adapted as hypersonic glide vehicles “Vanguard”). R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18 Mod 5/6) is a heavy silo-based ICBM with 10 warheads, first deployed in 1988. Its service life is coming to an end; 34 SS-18 missiles, capable of carrying up to 340 warheads, remain in the 13th Missile Division at Dombarovsky and the 62nd Missile Division at Uzhur. FAS experts estimate that the number of warheads on each R-36M2 has been reduced in order for Russia to comply with the new START 3 limit on deployed strategic warheads.
It is known from open sources that the RS-28 Sarmat will be very close to the Voevoda in terms of tactical and technical characteristics. The first modification of the “Satan” R-36M (SS-18 Mod 1) is equipped with a monoblock 15B86 warhead with a yield of 24 megatons with a throw weight of 7 kilograms. The latest monoblock modification of the R-36M2 “Voevoda” (SS-18 Mod 6) has the power and weight of the warhead slightly reduced – to 20 megatons and 6 kilograms, respectively.
In total, according to expert Robert Johnston, during the entire operation of the SS-18, from 20 to 60 monoblock modifications of the rocket were deployed. In the early 1980s, the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces received 4th generation missiles, the most powerful of which were the “heavy” R-36M UTTH (SS-18 Mod 3/4), deployed in highly protected silos 15P718; the Strategic Missile Forces had a total of 308 such missiles. In 1988, re-equipment began with new R-36M2 missiles (SS-18 Mod 5/6) and more advanced 15P718M silos. But by the collapse of the USSR in 1991, they managed to produce only 58 R-36M2 Voevoda missiles and upgrade 58 15P718M silos for them.
The deployment of the Avangard hypersonic units (object 4202, product 15YU71), as well as the heavy Sarmat ICBM, will most likely be limited to 46 units due to the limited number of 15P718M silos. Of the 58 silos, 12 are already occupied by other Avangard launch vehicles – UR-100 N UTTH (SS-19 mod 3/4). The Avangard hypersonic UBB, according to the State Program of Promotion 2018–2027, is in service in two regiments of six missiles each in the 13th Missile Division (Dombarovsky, Yasnaya), a total of 12 carriers in a monoblock version. The carrier of the first “Vanguards” was the UR-100N UTTH (15A35) ICBM. The missiles are deployed not in their own silos 15P716, but in foreign silos 15P718M.
The Avangard hypersonic unit is a fairly large object. Length – 5.4 meters, weight, according to various estimates, from 2,000 to 2,500 kilograms. The UR-100N UTTH can only accommodate one unit, while the Sarmat can accommodate two. Formally, the R-36M2 began to be decommissioned in 2021 in preparation for the adoption of the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (SS-29 Mod 1/2) at the Uzhur missile base (“Red Star”, 2021). Commercial satellite imagery shows that the 302nd Missile Regiment has already been disarmed to modernize the regiment’s silos and launch control center for the new Sarmat ICBMs.
The silo-based ICBMs with six UR-100N UTTH (SS-19) warheads, which entered service in 1980, were previously withdrawn from combat duty, but a small number have been converted and are currently deployed with two regiments of the 13th Missile Division at Dombarovsky as SS-19 Mod 4 with the new Avangard hypersonic glide combat unit. The first regiment, the 621st, completed rearmament in December 2021, and the second regiment, the 368th, reportedly completed rearmament in December 2023 (Red Star, 2023).
However, construction work is still ongoing and the regiment may not yet have reached full combat readiness. The SS-19 Mod 4 is eventually expected to be replaced by the SS-29 Sarmat. RS-12M1 and RS-12M2 “Topol-M” (SS-27 Mod 1) are monoblock intercontinental ballistic missiles that are produced either in mobile (Mod 1) or silo (Mod 2) versions. The SS-27 Mod 1 deployment ended in 2012 with a total of 78 missiles: 60 silo-based missiles in the 60th Missile Division at Tatishchevo and 18 mobile missiles in the 54th Guards Missile Division at Teykovo.
In the second half of the decade, the Topol-M units will be upgraded to the RS-24 Yars (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2023). Replacing the Topol-M monoblock warhead with a Yars equipped with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MRVs) could potentially add several hundred warheads to Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2) is a modified version of the SS-27 Mod 1 that can carry up to four MIRVs. It seems that there are currently several variants of the combat equipment of the Yars ICBM: one, as the FASovites suggest, is equipped with “light warheads” (100-150 kt), and the other version (known as “Yars-S”), as they think, equipped with more powerful warheads of the middle power class (500 kt) for use against highly protected point targets. In an interview with Colonel General Sergei Karakaev in December 2020, the Russian Ministry of Defense television channel stated that about 150 mobile and silo-based Yars were deployed as part of the Strategic Missile Forces (Zvezda, 2020).
According to FAS estimates, by the end of 2023 this number has grown to 204 mobile and silo-based missiles of the Yars ICBM. According to Karakaev, by the end of 2023, the last mobile division, the 7th Missile Division in Vypolzovo, had completed its modernization, meaning that all Russian strategic mobile forces had completed rearmament with the new missiles (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2023).
Although all of these divisions are now equipped with newer versions of the missiles, some of the garrisons are not equipped to house all the equipment needed to support the launchers, and their construction continues. To this end, some regiments have been transferred to temporary garrisons, while their permanent or new bases continue to be built up.
In addition to the missiles and silos themselves, the modernization of Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles also involves large-scale modification of external protective barriers, internal roads and support facilities. Each mine complex will also receive a new Dym-2 perimeter defense system, including automatic grenade launchers, small arms, and remote-controlled machine gun installations (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2021; Russia Insight, 2018). Likewise, the launch control centers that control each missile regiment are also receiving significant upgrades.
The next major stage in the modernization of Russian ICBMs will be the long-awaited replacement of the R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18) with the RS-28 Sarmat (SS-29). Ultimately, the Sarmat will also replace the SS-19 Mod 4. After several years of development, production, and technical delays – reportedly related to the “missile command module” – the Sarmat’s first flight test took place in April 2022 (War Bolts, 2022). Initially, it was planned to conduct at least four additional test launches during 2022 to fulfill President Putin’s instructions that the Sarmat would enter combat duty by the end of the year (Interfax, 2022; Kamchatka Info, 2022; TASS, 2021); however, as of late 2023, only one additional test launch has reportedly been conducted, which US officials say “probably failed” (meaning a possible emergency launch) (Liebermann and Bertrand, 2023).
Despite the lack of successful test trials, Russian officials say the Sarmat is close to deployment. In November 2022, the general director of the Makeev Rocket Design Bureau, responsible for the development of Sarmat, stated that the rocket had already entered mass production (Emelyanenkov, 2022). Moreover, in October 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense noted on Telegram that the first launch complexes and the associated command post (RF Ministry of Defense, 2023) were in the “final stages” of construction and installation. In November 2023, TASS reported that the first Sarmat regiment was already on “experimental combat duty” and would officially enter combat duty in December 2023 (TASS, 2023). However, in December 2023, Colonel General Karakaev noted that work on the Sarmat was “almost completed,” pointing out that the first Sarmat regiment had not yet entered combat duty (“Red Star,” 2023).
In addition, satellite images show that work to modernize missile launchers has not yet been completed in the first regiment, the 302nd Missile Regiment in Uzhur, which has been in the process of upgrading its infrastructure to accept new missiles since 2021. Construction of the launch control center and silo (12С) and three other silos (13С, 15С and 17С) continues. The two remaining shafts (16C and 18C) in the regiment have undergone only minor modernization and will take some time to complete if the same comprehensive modernization as the other shafts is planned (Korda and Christensen, 2023).
If the Sarmat replaces all current SS-18s, it will be installed in a total of 46 silos of three regiments at the Dombarovsky missile field and four regiments at the Uzhur missile field (six regiments of six missiles and one regiment of 10 missiles) (Izvestia, 2022).
Some Western media sources have dubbed the Sarmat missile the “Son of Satan”, as it is a development of the SS-18 missile, which the United States and NATO have dubbed “Satan” – presumably to reflect its exceptional destructive ability. Note that the two-block Avangard is only one of the combat equipment options. The standard equipment of the Sarmat ICBM is a classic MIRV with 16 medium-class warheads of 500 kt power or 10 high-class warheads of 2 Mt each.
In November 2022, high-resolution images of the Sarmat’s payload showed that the missile could theoretically carry up to 16 warheads in a two-tier breeding unit with eight warheads on each platform. The operational configuration will likely be closer to the SS-18 payload (up to 10 warheads), plus missile defense capability. It is also possible that a small number of Sarmat ICBMs will be equipped with Avangard guided hypersonic glide warheads, which are currently installed on a limited number of SS-19 Mod 4 ICBMs (UR-100N UTTH) at Dombarovsky.
The Sarmat is believed to have a significantly longer launch range than other Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles. Colonel General Karakaev stated that Sarmat can launch through both the North and South Pole (Lenta, 2023); in 2023, the Russian company that participated in the tests of Sarmat published an environmental study indicating that Russia may be planning to test a missile with a range of almost 15 kilometers (M000ever, 51.4). To test Sarmat and other ICBMs at shorter launch ranges, Russia is building a new test site in Severo-Yeniseisky, a decision announced in December 2023 (M2020ever, 51.4; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2023).
It is possible that the creation of the new test facility was also motivated by the fact that Kazakhstan, where Russia has historically tested its missiles at the Sary-Shagan test site, is a state party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which requires the “elimination or irreversible conversion of all facilities related to nuclear weapons” (United Nations, 2017).
Russia also appears to be in the early stages of developing at least two new ICBM programs, as well as various hypersonic glide vehicles that could be mounted on modified ICBMs. However, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the various purposes and capabilities of these systems.
In December 2021, Karakaev stated that a “new mobile ground-based missile system” was being developed, and in December 2022 noted that the system would have “greater mobility” than Yars, and development would officially begin in 2023 (Red Star, 2021, 2022). In December 2023, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces, General Karakaev, indicated that this system would be focused on stealth and could ultimately replace the RS-24 Yars in the long term (Krasnaya Zvezda, 2023).
It is unclear which system Karakaev is referring to in his annual speech, since there are several possible candidates. It is reported that Russia is developing a new intercontinental ballistic missile “Yars-M”, which will be equipped with a MIRV with guided warheads, similar in design to the “Avangard”, only with smaller weight and dimensions, with thermonuclear charges of a low power class (100-150 kt). This configuration would theoretically provide greater survivability against missile defenses, given that the separation of warheads would occur earlier in the flight.
Although the Yars-M will reportedly share a common launcher and first stage with the Yars and Yars-S, in addition to having a similar designation, the Yars-M missile system is a relatively new delivery system, has a different GRAU index than the Yars and Yars-S missile systems, and its development will likely take time (Kornev, 2023). It is believed that Russia has already conducted a series of test launches of the Yars-M ICBM.
The second ICBM in development is called Osina-RV, which can be launched from both mobile and silo launchers and is reportedly an upgraded version of the Yars-M system (M51.4ever 2023; Ryabkov 2023; War Bolts 2021). Tests of the Osina-RV were to take place during 2021 and 2022; however, it is unclear whether they actually occurred (M51.4ever, 2023).
Russia is also developing another ICBM system called Kedr, which will begin replacing the currently deployed Yars ICBMs in both mobile and silo configurations by 2030 (TASS, 2021). Notably, Kedr is the only new Russian system publicly acknowledged by the commander of US Strategic Command in testimony before Congress in 2022 (Richard, 2022).
Russia also appears to be developing a series of hypersonic glide vehicles to be deployed on new ICBMs, similar to how the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle is currently deployed alongside the legacy SS-19 Mod 4 ICBM. While publicly available Russian industry documents revealed some of their names, including “Gradient-RV” and “Anchar-RV”, the programs remained top secret as of late 2023, and their respective capabilities remained unclear.
In addition to ballistic missiles, Russia is also developing a land-launched intercontinental-range nuclear-armed cruise missile known as the 9M730 Burevestnik (SSC-X-9 Skyfall). In November 2017, a test failure resulted in the missile being lost at sea, requiring significant recovery efforts (Macias, 2018). In August 2019, preparations for a test launch led to an explosion in Nenoksa, which killed five scientists and two military personnel (DiNanno, 2019).
Following an analysis of satellite imagery by New York Times journalists in October 2023 that showed that a new test launch of the Burevestnik was being prepared, President Putin subsequently stated that: “a successful test of the system has been carried out,” although he did not provide any additional details (Melen, 2023; RIA Novosti, 2023). According to Colonel General Karakaev, Russia plans to conduct seven ICBM launches in 2024 (Red Star, 2023).
Submarines and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
The Russian Navy has 12 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of two classes: five Delta IV SSBNs (Project 667BRDM Dolphin) and seven Borei SSBNs (Project 955/A), four of which are improved Borei-A”, Project 955A submarines. The seventh SSBN “Borey-A” – “Emperor Alexander III”, entered service in December 2023.
Each submarine can carry 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and each SLBM can be equipped with MIRVs and carry multiple warheads, for a total of approximately 992 warheads carried by all deployed SLBMs, according to CIA analysts, across 12 submarines. However, not all of these submarines are fully combat-ready, and some missiles are armed with a reduced number of warheads: 3 warheads or 4 on several dozen deployed SLBMs, possibly reducing the number of warheads to ensure that Russia does not exceed the limit of deployed warheads established by the New START treaty.
One or two SSBNs are usually undergoing maintenance, repair or reactor refueling at any given time and are unarmed.
As a result, the total number of warheads in service with Russian SSBNs is likely to be around 640. Five obsolete Russian SSBNs Delta IV (Project 667 BDRM), all built between 1985 and 1992, are part of the Northern fleet and are based in Yagelnaya Bay (Gadzhievo) on the Kola Peninsula. Russia has re-equipped its Delta IVs with new modified SS-N-23 (“Liner”) SLBMs, each of which can carry four warheads (Pavel Podvig, 2011). Typically three or four of the five Delta IVs are operational at any given time, with one or two in various stages of maintenance.
The Soviet/Russian Navy previously had seven Delta IV SSBNs in service, but one of the submarines, Ekaterinburg (K-84), was decommissioned in 2022 after 36 years of service, and the other, Podmoskovye (formerly K-64, now BS-64) – was taken out of service in 1999 for conversion into a “special purpose” submarine (TASS 2016, 2021). In October 2023, one of the five operational Delta IV boats, Tula (K-114), took part in the annual Russian nuclear exercise, launching the Sineva SLBM from the Barents Sea (Russian Federation, 2023).
The Borei SSBN (project 955/A) is armed with 16 SS-N-32 (Bulava) SLBMs, capable of carrying up to six warheads each. It is possible that the missiles’ payload was reduced to four warheads each to comply with the new START limit on deployed strategic warheads. There are currently seven Borei submarines in service, with another five at various stages of construction, for a total of 12 Borei SSBNs planned. It is expected that six Borei SSBNs will ultimately be transferred to the Northern Fleet and six to the Pacific Fleet, replacing all remaining Delta IV SSBNs (TASS, 2020; 2022).
Typically, an average of seven years passes between the laying of each new Borey keel and the delivery of the boat to the Russian Navy, although some ships are delayed. The laying of the sixth submarine, Generalissimo Suvorov, began in December 2014 with possible completion in 2018, but there was also a delay. The Borei-A SSBN was launched in December 2021 and commissioned into the Navy in December 2022, after which the Generalissimo Suvorov was sent to a temporary base in the Northern Fleet. The submarine is reported to have arrived at its permanent home base for the Pacific Fleet in October 2023 (Staalesen, 2023).
The newest Borei class SSBN, the Emperor Alexander III, was launched in December 2022, began sea trials in mid-2023, and in November 2023 conducted a test launch of the Bulava SLBM from the White Sea, in December it was entered into the Pacific Fleet of the Navy (TASS, 2021; 2022; 2023).
A possible concept for the next generation of Russian strategic nuclear submarines, known as Arcturus, was presented at the International Military-Technical Forum Army 2022 and will potentially begin to replace the Borei class ships after approximately 2037 (RIA Novosti, 2023). The Arcturus-class design is expected to be smaller than the current Borei-class and will have fewer missiles on board (RIA Novosti, 2022). It also has the potential to carry an unmanned underwater vehicle, suggesting an expanded role compared to traditional SSBNs (Dempsey, 2022).
In addition to ballistic missiles, the Russian Navy is also developing an intercontinental-range nuclear torpedo with a nuclear warhead called the 2M39 Poseidon. Underwater testing of Poseidon began in December 2018. Specially designed submarines will be armed with super torpedoes, and their delivery to the Navy is planned for 2027 (TASS, 2018). The first of these dedicated submarines, Project 09852 Belgorod (K-329), was launched in April 2019 and delivered to the Russian Navy in July 2022 (Naval News, 2022; Sutton, 2021).
Sources in the Russian defense department reported that the “first batch” of Poseidon torpedoes have been produced and delivered to the Belgorod submarine (TASS, 2023). Belgorod test-fired Poseidon torpedoes in January 2023, and additional reports suggested that another test could take place in June 2023 (Cook, 2023; Sciutto, 2022; Sutton, 2023; TASS, 2023). Belgorod will be Russia’s largest submarine and will reportedly be able to carry up to six Poseidon torpedoes, each of which will be equipped with a high-yield warhead, expected to be 24 megatons. The submarine was allegedly observed operating in the Barents Sea during September 2022 (Sutton, 2022), although it is unlikely, according to US experts, that the Poseidon is already operational.
Subsequent submarines armed with Poseidon torpedoes will be of a new class (Project 09851 Khabarovsk), the first of which was supposed to be delivered in the fall of 2021, but it appears that this has been delayed and may still be in its final stages construction at the factory. Shipyard “Sevmash” (Starchak, 2023; TASS, 2021; 2023). It is reported that Khabarovsk will also be able to carry up to six Poseidon torpedoes (TASS, 2020). By 2027, it is planned to transfer another submarine to the Russian Navy; in total, there will be at least three submarines of Project 09851 of the Khabarovsk type (TASS, 2023). It is reported that by 2025, the naval base in Kamchatka will be modernized and will ultimately become the base for Belgorod and Khabarovsk (TASS, 2023). Modernization of the nuclear warhead storage facility is also underway.
Over the years, there have been occasional reports of Russian submarines patrolling off the coast of the United States and the Mediterranean Sea (Brügen, 2023). UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace said in April 2023 that the UK was also tracking Russian submarines “in the North Atlantic, the Irish Sea and the North Sea, taking strange routes they would not normally take” (Cook, 2023).
Strategic Bombers
Russia has two types of heavy bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons: the Tu-160 (“Blackjack”) and the Tu-95MS (“Bear-N”). FAS estimates there are approximately 67 bombers in the active arsenal, of which only 58 are considered deployed under the New START treaty, reflecting an increase of three in the number of deployed bombers since our previous update in early 2023. The new number was determined by cross-referencing satellite imagery of various strategic bomber locations and maintenance facilities through 2023.
However, this assessment carries significant uncertainty after unconfirmed open-source reports suggest that Russia may have changed the unique identification numbers (UIDs) that were used to identify each strategic bomber under the New START treaty (Pavel Podvig, 2023). Both types of bombers can carry the AS-15 Kent (X-55) nuclear air-launched cruise missile, and upgraded versions are equipped with the new AS-23B (X-102) nuclear cruise missile. It is believed that several versions of the Tu-95 have been adopted over the years: the obsolete versions of the Tu-95 MS 6 and Tu-95 MS 16 and the modernized version of the Tu-95 MSM. The 1991 START Treaty differentiated the two legacy variants, given their different missile capacities: the Tu-95 MS 6 can carry up to six missiles internally, and the Tu-95 MS 16 can carry up to six missiles internally and up to 10 missiles on the wing pylons, for a total of 16 missiles.
It is possible, but not confirmed, that the MC 16 version at some point lost its external hardpoints, effectively becoming the MC 6 variant. The hardpoints are being restored as part of the Tu-95 MSM modernization program, under which older Tu-95s are equipped with external transport capability eight AS-23B missiles, which is a maximum of 14 missiles per aircraft, including six AS-15 missiles in the bomb bay. Tu-160s are also being upgraded to carry up to 12 AS-23B (X-102) missiles. The AS-23B, added as part of the bomber’s modernization, will eventually replace the AS-15 (X-55/555).
During North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s visit to the Russian Knevichi airfield in September 2023, the commander of Russia’s Long-Range Aviation demonstrated a Tu-160 aircraft supposedly equipped with new Kh-BD cruise missiles, which could be built on the existing Kh-101. The commander said the new missile has a range of more than 6,500 kilometers, potentially indicating a nuclear role given that nuclear warheads weigh much less than heavy conventional munitions, allowing the missile to be equipped with additional internal fuel tanks. The Russian Defense Minister added that the Tu-160 will be able to carry 12 missiles, although some experts doubt this claim (Cook, 2023 ; TASS, 2023). It is also unclear whether the new missile has been deployed as of late 2023 or is still undergoing testing.
It is unknown how many nuclear weapons are assigned to heavy bombers. Each Tu-160 aircraft can carry up to 40 tons of ammunition, including 12 air-launched cruise missiles, while the Tu-95 MS can carry between six and 14 cruise missiles depending on configuration. Collectively, the bombers could potentially carry more than 650 weapons, but FAS experts estimate that only the weapons of deployed bombers exist, for a total of about 580 nuclear weapons. Of these, about 200 can be stored at Engels airbase in the Saratov region and Ukrainka airbase in the Amur region; the rest are assumed to be in the central repository.
Modernization of the nuclear weapons storage bunker at Engels Air Base continued throughout 2022. It is unclear whether the Tu-160 has a secondary mission of delivering free-fall nuclear bombs to targets, but the old and slow Tu-95 bomber is unlikely to stand much of a chance against modern air defense systems and is not rated as a carrier of free-fall nuclear bombs.
Russian Aerospace Forces use Tu-160 and Tu-95 bombers in combat operations in the Northern Military District in Ukraine. After the Ukrainian airstrike drones at Engels Air Force Base in December 2022, Russian officials reported that two aircraft were damaged, one of which was a Tu-95 MS bomber (Kramer, Schwirtz, and Santora, 2022; Christensen, Korda, and Reynolds, 2023; Röpke, 2022). Russia has historically stationed all of its strategic bombers at Engels Air Base and Ukrainka Air Base, but satellite imagery shows that Russia began deploying some of its bombers to Belaya Air Base in the Irkutsk region as early as October 2022 and to Olenya Air Base in the Murmansk region as early as August 2022. This circumstance is likely intended to reduce the number of bombers operating from Engels Air Base, where they are currently vulnerable to attacks by Ukrainian drones. Confirming this assessment, the number of strategic bombers stationed at Belaya Air Base has increased after December 2022. The bombers, stationed at Olenya airbase, are located less than 20 kilometers from the Olenegorsk-2 nuclear warhead storage facility.
It is reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense is considering the possibility of stationing a new Tu-160 regiment at Ukrainka Air Base to carry out missions in the Far Eastern region (Kretsul and Leonova, 2023). On December 14, 2023, Tu-95 MS bombers conducted a joint strategic air patrol with Chinese H-6 bombers over the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea – the second such exercise in 2023 (Mahadzir, 2023). A small number of Tu-160s occasionally carry out patrols in the Arctic and Far East from Ugolny airfield near Anadyr, most recently in September 2023.
In addition to upgrading existing strategic bombers, Russia is also producing new Tu-160 bombers and appears to be planning to build up to 50 new aircraft. There is considerable confusion in the designations of the various modernized models: Tu-160M, Tu-160M1, and Tu-160M2. It appears that all modernized Tu-160s fall under the designation Tu-160M, with the suffixes M1 and M2 denoting successive stages of modernization.
The first phase reportedly includes a new NK-32-02 engine, which is expected to increase the aircraft’s flight range by approximately 1,000 kilometers (TASS, 2017), as well as a new autopilot system and the removal of obsolete components. The stage includes a new radar, cockpit, communications, and avionics (TASS, 2020). Some Tu-160s are being reproduced and modernized using completely new airframes.
The first flight of the Tu-160M with the old engine took place in February 2020, and the first flight of the aircraft with the new generation engine was carried out in November 2020. United Aircraft Corporation refused to show photos of the November test flight due to secrecy, choosing instead to combine its announcement with photos of an older version of the aircraft (United Aircraft Corporation, 2020).
The second Tu-160M, converted from the older Tu-160, began ground tests at the Gorbunov plant in December 2020 and flight tests in January 2022 (Ignatieva, 2023; TASS, 2020). The first newly manufactured Tu-160M bomber made its first flight in January 2022 (UAC, 2022). The Russian state technology corporation Rostec announced in July 2023 that the aircraft had entered joint testing between the Ministry of Defense and the United Aircraft Corporation. It is reported that the second newly built Tu-160M has been sent to the flight test station, and the third is under construction (TASS, 2023). Flight testing of the Tu-160M is expected to last up to three years, indicating a potential entry into combat service around 2025 (Starchak, 2023).
The delays associated with the Tu-160M program were so serious that the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade filed a lawsuit against the aircraft manufacturer (Interfax, 2022). It is possible that the ultimate goal of 50 new Tu-160M bombers may not be achieved, but if it does, it will likely lead to the retirement of most, if not all, of the remaining Tu-95MS that are expected to be written off and will retire until 2035.
Meanwhile, the Tu-160 modernization program is only a temporary bridge to the next generation bomber; the program is called PAK DA; the development of the bomber has been underway for several years. It was announced that the subsonic aircraft will have reduced radar signature and will be able to carry long-range cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles (Tsukanov, 2023). In 2013, the Russian government signed a contract with the Tupolev company for the construction of the PAK DA at the Kazan Aviation Plant.
It is reported that research and development work on the PAK DA has been completed, and the aircraft is expected to be equipped with some of the systems from the Tu-160M (TASS, 2019). Construction of the first aircraft’s cabin began in the spring of 2020, with final assembly postponed from 2021 to 2023 before flight testing (TASS, 2020, 2021). In December 2023, Rostec announced that specialists had completed the development of a test base and stands for the PAK DA (TASS, 2023).
State flight tests (which are usually carried out after flight tests by the aircraft manufacturer) of the PAK DA are scheduled for February 2026, the start of serial production is expected in 2027, and serial production in 2028 or 2029 (Izvestia, 2020; TASS, 2019). However, it is unclear whether the Russian aviation industry has sufficient capacity to develop and produce two strategic bombers simultaneously, suggesting that this development schedule could face delays.
Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons
Russia is updating many of its non-strategic nuclear weapons and introducing new types of nuclear warheads. These efforts are less clear and comprehensive than the strategic force modernization plan, but also include phasing out Soviet-era weapons and replacing them with newer, but likely fewer, weapons. Following the release of the Trump administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, defense sources circulated inaccurate and exaggerated information in Washington attributing nuclear capabilities to several Russian systems that were either decommissioned or were not actually nuclear.
Moreover, although the Nuclear Posture Review asserted that Russia had increased its non-strategic nuclear weapons over the previous decade, their arsenal had actually declined significantly—by about one-third—over that period (Christensen, 2019). Also, although the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stated that Russia has “up to 2,000” non-strategic nuclear weapons (DOD officials have often stated that it has more than 2,000), as in the US Department of Defense’s Global Threat Assessment in 2021 and in the State Department’s 2021 New START treaty.
The implementation report stated that Russia likely possesses “approximately 1,000 to 2,000 non-strategic nuclear warheads” (US Defense Intelligence Agency, 2021; US Department of State, 2021), although the State Department’s 2023 compliance report it was noted that this estimate also “includes warheads awaiting dismantlement” (US Department of State, 2023).
The range reflects varying assessments by the U.S. intelligence community, with the military generally using the higher number to assess the threat. In early 2022, rumors emerged that some in the intelligence community believed that the number of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons could increase significantly—potentially doubling—by 2030 (Bender, 2022; Christensen, 2022). The Americans have not yet seen evidence of such an increase, but have instead lowered the estimate to about 1,000 non-strategic nuclear warheads. These warheads are designed to be delivered by air, sea, land, and various defense forces. While there are many rumors about increased arsenals and additional nuclear systems, there is little reliable public information.
This estimate—and the categories of Russian weapons that have been described in the Nuclear Notebook for years—are consistent with estimates contained in a 2023 State Department report to Congress, which states: “Its estimated stockpile is approximately 1,000 to
2,000 NSNW warheads.” includes warheads for air-to-surface missiles, gravity charges, depth charges, torpedoes, anti-aircraft, anti-ship, anti-submarine, anti-missile systems, and nuclear mines, as well as nuclear warheads for the Russian dual-use land-based missile system SS-26 Iskander (US Department of State, 2023)
This assessment, however, raises questions about the US government’s assumptions and rules for counting Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons. Most of these systems are dual-efficiency, meaning that not all platforms can be assigned nuclear missions, and not all operations are nuclear. Moreover, even if Russia may increase the category of dual-use launchers, this does not necessarily mean that the number of nuclear warheads classified in this category will also increase. Finally, many delivery platforms are in various stages of overhaul and will not be able to launch nuclear weapons at any given time.
Despite uncertainty regarding the exact number, the Russian military continues to assign a significant role to non-strategic nuclear weapons for use by naval forces, tactical air forces, air and missile defense forces, and short-range ballistic missiles. Part of the rationale for the Russian military’s reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons is that these weapons are capable of countering superior conventional forces of NATO, especially the United States.
Following Russia’s significant conventional losses in the Ukraine war, the relative importance of non-strategic nuclear weapons is likely to be further enhanced or even increased. Russia also appears to be motivated by a desire to counter China’s large and increasingly capable conventional forces, as well as the fact that having a significant arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons helps Moscow maintain overall nuclear parity with the combined nuclear forces of the United States, Britain, and France.
Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons are assumed to be in storage and not co-located with launchers, and therefore are not formally considered “deployed”; however, many regional storage facilities are located relatively close to their launch garrisons and, in practice, warheads can be transferred to their launch sites at short notice.
Non-strategic Sea-based Nuclear Weapons
The largest user of “non-strategic nuclear weapons” in the Russian military is the Navy, which FAS experts estimate has 784 nuclear warheads for sea-launched cruise missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-submarine missiles, torpedoes, and depth charges. These weapons can be used by submarines, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and naval aircraft. The actual number of sea-launched non-strategic nuclear weapons may be lower than this estimate because not all ships with dual-use weapons systems can be equipped with nuclear warheads.
The Navy’s major modernization programs are focused on the next class of nuclear attack submarines, known in Russia as Project 885/M or Yasen-M. The program has progressed very slowly and has been delayed for years, partly due to technical shortcomings of the vessels themselves. Russia currently has four Yasen submarines – Severodvinsk, Kazan, Novosibirsk and Krasnoyarsk – after a fourth submarine entered service in December 2023.
Another five Yasen-M nuclear-armed submarines (SSBNs) – Arkhangelsk, Perm, Ulyanovsk, Voronezh and Vladivostok – are at various stages of construction. The next boat, Arkhangelsk, laid down in 2015, was taken out of the Sevmash construction shop in November 2023 to prepare for launching and sea trials (Kornev, 2024; RIA Novosti, 2015). The remaining four boats were laid down in 2016, 2017, and 2020, respectively (TASS, 2016, 2020). Russia is reported to be considering the possibility of building three additional Yasen-M SSGNs, although this has not yet been officially confirmed (Kornev, 2023; TASS, 2023).
It was announced that the first Yasen submarine was 12 meters longer than the improved Yasen-M submarine and could therefore carry 40 Kalibr missiles—eight more than its successors (Gadi, 2018). Yasen-M boats are also known to have advanced reactors and sonar systems that could enhance their ability to evade detection (Kaushal, 2021). The Yasen submarines will replace Soviet-era attack submarines. In addition to the 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missiles, Yasen-class submarines will also be able to carry the SS-N-26 Strobil (3M-55 Onyx) anti-ship cruise missile, according to the US Air Force National Aviation and Space Intelligence Center. its “nuclear capability” includes SS-N-16 (“Wind”) nuclear anti-submarine missiles, as well as nuclear torpedoes (US Air Force, 2020).
In addition, in 2021 and 2022, Severodvinsk successfully test-launched 3M-22 Zircon (SS-N-33) hypersonic missiles from surface and submerged positions – the first tests of the new system from a submarine (TASS, 2021, 2023). According to the Russian military, Yasen-M submarines can launch salvos of several different types of missiles using upgraded UKSK-M “universal launchers” that can accommodate multiple systems (Interfax, 2021; TASS, 2021).
Other upgrades to naval non-strategic nuclear platforms include upgrades to the Sierra class (Project 945), Oscar II class (Project 949A), and Shark class (Project 971). While the conventional version of the Kalibr is used on a wide range of submarines and ships, the nuclear version has likely replaced the SS-N-21 Sampson (3M-10) nuclear cruise missile on some attack submarines.
There are also suggestions that Russia may consider building a new type of cruise missile submarine based on the Borei SSBN project, which will be called Borei-K. The Borei-K could potentially carry nuclear-tipped cruise missiles instead of ballistic missiles and, if approved, would be scheduled for delivery after 2027 (TASS, 2019). However, given that Yasen-M submarines are also capable of carrying cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, the need for a new type of SSGN may not arise.
In addition to attack submarines, many surface ships and naval aircraft carry dual-use weapons systems. The most important types are the 3M-14 “Caliber” (SS-N-30A) land attack cruise missile with a range of 2,500 kilometers and the 3M-55 “Oniks” (SS-N-26) anti-ship cruise missile, which are entering service with the new Russian surface ships and old ships are being re-equipped for them.
Non-strategic Air-launched Nuclear Weapons
According to FAS experts, the Russian Air Force will be allocated about 334 units of non-strategic warheads for delivery by Tu-22 M3 (Backfire) medium-range bombers, Su-24 M (Fencer-D) fighter-bombers, and Su-34 M (“Fullback”) fighter-bombers. Other aircraft, such as the Su-30SM, can also be dual-purpose. The Tu-22M3 can carry air-launched cruise missiles Kh-22 (AS-4 “Kitchen”), which are being replaced by a modernized version – the Kh-32. The Tu-22M3 is being upgraded to the new Tu-22M3M, which reportedly contains 80 percent all-new avionics, shares a communications suite with the new Su-57 fighter, and made its first flight in December 2018 (TASS, 2020; United Aircraft Corporation, 2018).
The second prototype of the upgraded Tu-22M3M made its first flight in March 2020 and has since conducted four more flight tests, one of which tested the stability of the aircraft at supersonic speeds (TASS, 2020). The Tu-22M3M – in addition to the Tu-160M and future PAK DA strategic bombers – will eventually be equipped with the new Kh-95 hypersonic missile, a prototype of which has reportedly already been tested (RIA Novosti, 2021).
During the SVO, Russia carried out conventional strikes using Tu-22M3 medium-range bombers. Following a Ukrainian drone strike on Soltsy airbase in August 2023, which destroyed one Tu-22M3, Russia relocated the remaining Backfires at the base to Olenya airbase on the Kola Peninsula (Baker, 2023; Nilsen, 2023). A total of four aviation regiments are currently equipped with the new Su-34, replacing the Su-24M, and by January 2023 (Scramble, 2023) a total of more than 145 aircraft have been delivered. The Russian Air Force lost several Su-34s in the Northern Military District.
Russia purchased an additional 76 modernized Su-34M units with improved avionics, and the Russian Aerospace Forces also received several batches during 2023, most recently at the end of November (Global Arms Trade Analysis Center, 2023; TASS, 2023). During a visit to the manufacturing plant in October 2023, Defense Minister Shoigu ordered an increase in production and repair of the Su-34 (TASS, 2023).
Russia has also developed a new long-range, dual-use air-launched ballistic missile system known as the 9-A-7760 Kinzhal. The missile, identical to the SS-26 ground-launched short-range ballistic missile used in the Iskander complex, is believed to have a range of up to 2,000 kilometers when launched from a specially modified MiG-31K (Foxhound), and when launched from a Tu-22M3 bomber – up to 3,000 kilometers (range – combined – aircraft combat radius plus missile launch range).
According to Russian media, the Tu-22M3M will be able to carry up to three Daggers (RIA Novosti, 2018), although this remains to be seen. The MiG-31IK cannot simultaneously carry the Kinzhal and its traditional air-to-air missiles and therefore must be deployed together with fighter aircraft – the Su-30SM and Su-35 (TASS, 2018). In December 2021, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that in 2021, “a separate aviation regiment has been formed, armed with MiG-31K aircraft with the Kinzhal hypersonic missile” (RF, 2021), apparently in the Northern Fleet area on the Kola Peninsula. It is reported that by 2024 plans are being developed to equip the Western and Central Military Districts with Kinzhal missiles (Izvestia, 2021; TASS, 2021).
The “Dagger” was used several times in the North Military District in Ukraine (TASS, 2022). In February 2023, President Putin announced that Russia would accelerate the mass production of Daggers (TASS, 2023). In addition, the Russian Aerospace Forces reportedly received the first batch of Su-57 fighters (PAK FA) at the end of 2020, with deliveries continuing until 2023 (TASS, 2020; United Aircraft Corporation, 2022). It is not yet clear whether the aircraft is in full combat readiness. Delivery of 22 aircraft is planned by the end of 2024, and the full contract is expected to include 76 aircraft for delivery by the end of 2028 for three regiments (Suciu, 2021; TASS, 2020).
The US Department of Defense states that the Su-57 is capable of carrying nuclear weapons (US Department of Defense, 2018). It is reported that they will also be equipped with hypersonic “missiles with characteristics similar to those of the Kinzhal” (TASS, 2018).
Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons on Anti-ship Missiles and Air Defense and Missile Defense Missiles
Estimates of warhead stocks for Russian anti-aircraft missiles are highly uncertain for US analysts for obvious reasons. Russian officials said more than a decade ago that about 40 percent of the country’s stockpile of nuclear air defense warheads remained in Russia’s nuclear arsenals as of 1991.
Alexey Arbatov, then a member of the Russian State Duma Committee on Defense, wrote in 1999 that the 1991 arsenal included 3,000 air defense warheads (Arbatov, 1999). Many of these were likely from retired systems. US intelligence officials estimated that the number had dropped to about 2,500 by the late 1980s (Cochrane, 1989), in which case the 1991 stockpile may have been closer to 1,500 air defense warheads.
In 1992, Russia planned to eliminate half of its air defense nuclear warheads, but in 2007, Russian officials stated that 60 percent had been eliminated (Pravda, 2007). If these official figures are accurate, the number of nuclear warheads for Russian air defense forces in 2007 could have been between 800 and 1,200, a number that has likely declined since then.
Since 2018, US agencies have repeatedly stated that Russia continues to possess nuclear warheads for defensive missile weapons. According to a 2023 State Department assessment, Russia uses non-strategic nuclear warheads for “anti-aircraft” and “missile defense systems” (U.S. Department of State, 2023).
Coastal defense systems using the 3M-55 (SS-N-26) anti-ship missile can also be dual-purpose. TK3 warheads have been prepared for the 55M-26 (SS-N-60) anti-ship missiles. Back in Soviet times, in the early 1980s, a special warhead TK60 was created with a power of 10 kt, the weight of the SBC was 90 kg, it was originally intended for the supersonic missile cruiser 3M80 “Moskit” (SS-N-22).
The carriers of nuclear missile defense munitions include the A-135 missile defense system deployed around Moscow, equipped with 68 53T6 Gazelle interceptor missiles with nuclear warheads. The system is being upgraded to the A-235 level with the Nudol anti-missile and anti-satellite interceptor, which is expected to enter service by the end of 2025 (TASS, 2021). It is possible that the A-235 system will not be equipped with nuclear warheads and will instead rely on conventional warheads or kinetic destruction technology (Red Star, 2017).
Dual-use air defense systems include the mobile S-300 (SA-20) and S-400 (SA-21), which are designed for air defense (and some – missile defense) theater defense. Sources in the US government privately indicate that Russia has nuclear warheads for both systems – 250 RA 52 warheads with a yield of 1 kt for missiles from the obsolete 5V55 to the more modern 48N6E S-300/400 air defense systems, these warheads are also suitable for the latest Long-range missiles 40N6.
American experts believe that not all air defense units perform a nuclear role, but only individual units tasked with protecting particularly important facilities. The S-300 and S-400 systems are widely used in the Northern Military District for air defense (TASS, 2023). Taking these developments into account, American analysts estimate that today the air defense forces have at their disposal 250 nuclear warheads, as well as about 95 TA 11 10 kt warheads for the 53T6 Gazelle interceptor missiles of the Moscow A-135 missile defense system, bringing the total stockpile of warheads for missile defense systems to and PR is about 345 warheads.
However, Hans Christensen’s team believes that this estimate, due to limited transparency and credibility of sources, has significant uncertainty and low confidence in its accuracy.
Non-strategic Land-based Nuclear Weapons
Dual-use ground-based systems include the 9K720 Iskander short-range ballistic missile (SS-26) and 9M729 ground-launched cruise missiles (SSC-8). It is possible, but not confirmed, that the 9M728 (SSC-7) ground-launched short-range cruise missile is also dual-purpose. Mobile launcher 9P78-1 of the Iskander-M complex, equipped with two 9M723 ballistic missiles. SS-26 (Iskander) with a range of 500 kilometers (the actual range is 627 km, obtained in test launches at the Kapustin Yar training ground) has now completely replaced the SS-21 in at least 12 brigades: four in the Western Military District; two in the Southern Military District; two in the Central Military District and at least four in the Eastern Military District. Construction is ongoing at some bases, and not all have missile storage facilities.
Each brigade initially had 12 launchers with two missiles each mobile launcher, for a total of 24 missiles, but sources in the Russian Ministry of Defense said that each brigade will receive an additional division so that each brigade in the future will have 16 launchers with 32 missiles (Izvestia, 2019). FAS experts estimate that there are 75 short-range ballistic missile warheads. According to unconfirmed reports, the ground-launched cruise missile SSC-7 (9M728 or R-500) may also have nuclear capability.
Mobile launcher 9P78-1 of the Iskander-M complex, equipped with two canisters with 9M728 missile launcher. The 9M723 ballistic missile of the Iskander complex can be equipped with three types of nuclear warheads: 9N39 with an AA-60 nuclear warhead with a variable power of 10–100 kt, 9N64 with an AA-86 nuclear warhead with a variable power of 5–50 kt, 9N64 with an AA-92 nuclear warhead with a variable power of 100–200 kt. All three UBCs have the same weight – 480 kg. Previously, these SBCs could be equipped with the retired 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab A) tactical missile systems.
The Iskander 9M728 and 9M729 cruise missiles can be equipped with TK-66-02 nuclear warheads with a yield of 200 kt and TK-66-05 with a yield of 250 kt. Both have the same weight – 140 kg. In February 2023, the Belarusian military announced that it was autonomously operating Russian-supplied nuclear-capable SS-26 Iskander missile systems in the context of a military air defense in Ukraine, and later that month they were seen training at a base near Osipovichi (Kristensen, 2023; Reuter, 2023).
Russia is also upgrading a weapons depot near Osipovichi (Belarus), which could potentially serve as a storage site for tactical nuclear weapons that could be carried by Russian-supplied Iskanders (Christensen, 2023). The United States and NATO have accused Russia of developing, testing and deploying a dual-use ground-launched cruise missile, designated the 9M729 (SSC-8), with a range of approximately 2 kilometers – in violation of current regulations – the defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (State Department USA, 500).
The first two 9M729 battalions were deployed in late 2017, and US intelligence sources indicated in December 2018 that Russia had deployed four battalions in the Western, Southern, Central and Eastern military districts with nearly 100 missiles (including spares) (U.S. Department of State, 2019). According to American experts, four Iskander divisions are deployed at bases in Elansky, Kapustin Yar (probably already transferred to a permanent base, possibly in the Far East), Mozdok and Shuya.
It is unknown whether Russia has added KR 9M729 battalions beyond the four reported in December 2018. There has been no public confirmation of this, but in February 2019, just weeks after Russia acknowledged the existence of the 9M729 missile system but said its range was legal, the press service of Russia’s Western Military District reported that it had conducted “electronic launches” of the 9M279 missile system. in the Leningrad region (RIA Novosti, 2019).
This could potentially indicate that the 9M729 missile launchers were assigned to the fifth brigade (26th missile brigade near Luga, approximately 125 km south of St. Petersburg) or that the launchers were sent there for the duration of the exercise.
Previously, each Iskander brigade included three divisions, each of which was supposed to have four launchers; however, in 2019, Russian officials indicated that each Iskander brigade would be equipped with a fourth division, increasing the number of launchers per brigade (Izvestia, 2019). Potentially, it is possible that this fourth division in some brigades will be 9M729s (which will therefore be deployed alongside other Iskander variants). Although it remains unconfirmed, the Americans suggest a total of five 9M729 battalions, each equipped with four launchers. Since each launcher appears to be equipped with four missiles, this means a total of 80 missiles per battalion (possibly 160 if each battalion has one spare missile for reloading). However, American experts admit that each launcher can be equipped with only one nuclear warhead (the rest with conventional warheads), a total of 20 warheads in five divisions. The status of the KR 9M729 is unclear to them, since there have been very few reports about this missile over the past couple of years.
In summary, the Russian nuclear arsenal in 2024 is marked by significant modernization and development efforts across its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. Despite the inherent uncertainties and discrepancies in publicly available data, expert analyses indicate that Russia maintains a robust and diversified nuclear force, comprising various delivery systems including ICBMs, SLBMs, strategic bombers, and non-strategic weapons. The ongoing upgrades and new developments, such as the RS-28 Sarmat ICBM, Borei-class SSBNs, and the Poseidon nuclear torpedo, underscore Russia’s commitment to enhancing its nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, the evolving geopolitical landscape and military engagements, particularly in Ukraine, have influenced Russia’s strategic priorities and reliance on its nuclear arsenal. As Russia continues to advance its nuclear technologies and infrastructure, the global security environment remains dynamic and complex, necessitating ongoing monitoring and analysis by the international community.