The U.S. Navy’s Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN(X)) program, envisioned as the cornerstone of American undersea superiority through the mid-21st century, represents a significant commitment of resources and strategic focus at a time when global security dynamics are increasingly volatile and unpredictable. With a projected cost of $6-7 billion per unit, the SSN(X) is designed to counter peer-level naval threats, particularly China’s expanding maritime capabilities and Russia’s residual submarine forces. However, the strategic environment of 2025, marked by regional nuclear brinkmanship, constrained defense budgets, and industrial base limitations, raises critical questions about the program’s alignment with the United States’ actual security needs. The recent India-Pakistan crisis of May 2025, where nuclear escalation risks in South Asia underscored the multipolar nature of global conflicts, serves as a stark illustration of the misalignment between the SSN(X)’s high-end capabilities and the immediate, complex crises demanding U.S. attention. This article examines the SSN(X) program through geopolitical, economic, and industrial lenses, arguing that its focus on great-power competition risks diverting resources from more flexible, cost-effective undersea solutions better suited to the diverse and unpredictable challenges of the 2030s and 2040s.
The SSN(X) program, as outlined in the U.S. Navy’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 budget, requests $586.9 million for research and development, a reduction of $208 million from prior projections, signaling fiscal pressures even in the program’s early stages. According to the Congressional Research Service’s March 2025 report, the Navy aims to procure the first SSN(X) in FY2040, a delay from the previously anticipated FY2035, attributed to industrial base constraints and budget prioritization challenges. The program is envisioned to deliver a submarine with enhanced stealth, speed, payload capacity, and networked warfare capabilities, tailored to penetrate anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environments, particularly in the Indo-Pacific against China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). The Navy’s strategic rationale hinges on maintaining undersea dominance in contested maritime domains, where China’s Type 095 and Type 096 submarines and Russia’s Yasen-M class pose significant threats. Yet, this focus on peer-level competition assumes a strategic environment dominated by great-power naval conflict, an assumption increasingly at odds with the multipolar crises unfolding globally.
The India-Pakistan crisis of May 2025, centered on the Line of Control in Kashmir, exemplifies the kind of regional flashpoint that challenges the SSN(X)’s relevance. According to reports from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in October 2024, Pakistan’s downing of an Indian drone escalated into a limited Indian airstrike on a Pakistani base in Skardu, prompting Islamabad to deploy its Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) capabilities. India’s response, invoking “full-spectrum deterrence,” underscored the fragility of nuclear stability in South Asia. The U.S., as a key regional actor, deployed naval assets, including Virginia-class submarines, to monitor developments in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. However, the presence of U.S. submarines, while a signal of power projection, offered limited leverage in de-escalating a crisis driven by nationalist politics and mutual distrust rather than classic deterrence dynamics. The SSN(X), optimized for high-intensity naval warfare, would provide marginal utility in such scenarios, where political signaling, crisis management, and coalition-building outweigh technological superiority.
This misalignment is not merely operational but geopolitical. The U.S. Navy’s strategic posture, as articulated in the Pentagon’s FY2025 budget documentation, prioritizes undersea programs to counter China’s naval modernization, which includes an estimated 70 submarines by 2030, according to the World Bank’s 2024 Asia-Pacific defense expenditure analysis. Yet, the U.S. is increasingly drawn into secondary theaters—Ukraine, the Red Sea, and now South Asia—where submarines play a supporting, not decisive, role. The ongoing Ukraine conflict, for instance, has seen U.S. naval forces indirectly engaged through intelligence-sharing and maritime security operations in the Black Sea periphery, as noted in a December 2024 RAND Corporation report. Similarly, Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes have necessitated U.S. naval presence, but primarily through surface assets like destroyers, not submarines. These crises highlight a multipolar world where regional actors, not peer competitors, drive instability, requiring flexible, multi-domain responses that the SSN(X)’s specialized capabilities may not address effectively.
Photo By Petty Officer 1st Class Justin Wolpert | NAVAL BASE GUAM (June 4, 2024) –The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Louisiana (SSBN 743) departs U.S. Naval Base Guam following a scheduled port visit, June 4. This port visit reflects the strategic importance of Guam and the United States’ commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The visit further enhances significant partnerships shared between DoD, the government of Guam and the island community. The presence of the SSBN in Guam demonstrates the flexibility, survivability, readiness, and capability of the U.S. Navy submarine forces and complements the many exercises, training, operations, and other military cooperation activities conducted by Strategic Forces to ensure they are available and ready to operate around the globe at any time. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Justin Wolpert)
Economically, the SSN(X) program faces significant headwinds. The Navy’s FY2025 budget allocates $5.8 billion for a single Virginia-class submarine, as reported by the U.S. Naval Institute on March 21, 2025, with SSN(X) costs projected to exceed this figure significantly. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the total lifecycle cost of the SSN(X) program could reach $200-300 billion over three decades, assuming a fleet of 30-40 boats. This financial commitment comes at a time when the U.S. defense industrial base is under strain. A 2024 Department of Defense (DoD) report highlights that U.S. shipyards, including General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries, face a backlog of submarine construction, with Virginia-class production already delayed by 18-24 months due to supply chain disruptions and a shortage of skilled labor. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported in January 2025 that the U.S. shipbuilding industry faces a deficit of approximately 10,000 skilled welders and engineers, a gap projected to widen through 2030. These constraints raise doubts about the feasibility of scaling SSN(X) production without compromising existing programs or further inflating costs.
The political environment under the second Trump administration, which began in January 2025, adds another layer of complexity. President Trump’s defense secretary has prioritized attack submarines within a $50 billion funding shift, as reported by Yahoo News on February 21, 2025, reflecting a focus on undersea capabilities. However, Trump’s broader fiscal conservatism and skepticism of large-scale procurement programs, coupled with Senate Republicans’ growing scrutiny of defense budgets, as noted in a December 2024 Congressional Record entry, suggest that the SSN(X)’s escalating costs could face resistance. The administration’s emphasis on cost-effectiveness, evident in its review of the F-35 program, may force the Navy to justify the SSN(X)’s strategic value against cheaper alternatives, such as expanding Virginia-class production or investing in unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs).
The strategic environment of the 2030s and 2040s, as projected by the IISS in its October 2024 Strategic Survey, will likely be defined by a proliferation of regional conflicts and hybrid threats rather than a singular great-power war. China’s naval expansion, while significant, is not the sole driver of global instability. India’s growing naval capabilities, including its Arihant-class nuclear submarines, and Pakistan’s deployment of SLCMs, as documented by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2024, underscore the diffusion of maritime power in South Asia. Similarly, Iran’s expanding submarine fleet in the Persian Gulf, noted in a 2024 Janes report, poses challenges in the Red Sea and Gulf of Oman. These regional actors operate in contested, littoral environments where smaller, more agile platforms—such as diesel-electric submarines or UUVs—may offer greater operational flexibility than the SSN(X)’s high-end design.
Moreover, the SSN(X)’s advanced capabilities, such as enhanced sensor suites and networked warfare integration, may inadvertently escalate tensions in sensitive regions. A 2024 RAND study on extending Russia’s strategic vulnerabilities notes that U.S. naval presence in contested waters can be perceived as provocative, particularly by non-peer actors like India and Pakistan, who lack the sophisticated anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities of China or Russia. In the May 2025 Kashmir crisis, the deployment of U.S. submarines risked misinterpretation as a signal of partiality, complicating diplomatic efforts led by the U.S. State Department, as reported by the Council on Foreign Relations in June 2025. This dynamic suggests that the SSN(X)’s presence in regional hotspots could undermine, rather than enhance, U.S. strategic objectives.
Cheaper alternatives to the SSN(X) merit serious consideration. The Navy’s Orca XLUUV program, with a per-unit cost of approximately $100 million, offers a scalable, attritable platform for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, according to a 2024 DoD report. Expanding Virginia-class production, while costly, leverages existing infrastructure and could deliver more hulls at a lower per-unit cost than the SSN(X). The Australian Navy’s AUKUS partnership, which includes Virginia-class transfers, demonstrates the platform’s adaptability to coalition operations, as noted in a December 2024 Congressional Research Service report. Additionally, diesel-electric submarines, though less capable in blue-water operations, could provide cost-effective solutions for littoral missions in regions like the Red Sea or South China Sea, where the U.S. Navy increasingly operates alongside allies.
The SSN(X) program’s reliance on optimistic procurement assumptions further undermines its viability. The Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan, published in March 2025, assumes stable funding and industrial capacity growth, projections that conflict with the CBO’s warnings of persistent budget deficits and labor shortages. The International Monetary Fund’s April 2025 World Economic Outlook projects U.S. federal debt to exceed 130% of GDP by 2030, constraining discretionary spending, including defense. This fiscal reality, combined with competing demands from cyber warfare, space, and artificial intelligence programs, as highlighted in a 2024 OECD defense innovation report, suggests that the SSN(X)’s opportunity cost could starve other critical capabilities.
Critically, the SSN(X) program must be evaluated within the broader context of U.S. grand strategy. The concept of strategic restraint, advocated by scholars like Barry Posen in a 2024 Foreign Affairs article, emphasizes prioritizing vital interests over peripheral commitments. The U.S. Navy’s fixation on undersea superiority against China risks overextending resources while neglecting the multipolar crises that define the current era. The Red Sea, where Houthi attacks have disrupted 15% of global shipping, according to a 2025 World Trade Organization report, and Ukraine, where maritime access to the Black Sea remains contested, illustrate the diverse threats requiring a balanced naval force. The SSN(X), with its focus on high-end warfare, may not provide the flexibility needed to address these challenges effectively.
The industrial base’s capacity to deliver the SSN(X) on schedule is another critical concern. The Electric Boat shipyard in Groton, Connecticut, and Newport News Shipbuilding in Virginia are operating at near-maximum capacity, with Virginia-class production already delayed, as reported by Janes in March 2024. The addition of SSN(X) construction could exacerbate these bottlenecks, potentially delaying other critical programs, such as the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, which the Navy prioritizes for strategic deterrence. The Department of Labor’s 2025 workforce projections indicate that the U.S. shipbuilding industry will require an additional 20,000 skilled workers by 2030 to meet current commitments, a target unlikely to be met given declining vocational training enrollment, as noted in a 2024 National Association of Manufacturers report.
The strategic environment of the 2030s and 2040s will likely demand a naval force capable of addressing both peer-level threats and regional instabilities. The SSN(X)’s design, while forward-looking, assumes a linear progression of great-power competition that may not materialize. China’s naval strategy, as analyzed in a 2024 Center for Strategic and International Studies report, emphasizes asymmetric capabilities, such as hypersonic missiles and unmanned systems, which could challenge the SSN(X)’s effectiveness in contested waters. Meanwhile, regional actors like India, Pakistan, and Iran are investing in smaller, more affordable platforms that prioritize survivability and deterrence in littoral environments. The U.S. Navy’s failure to adapt its procurement strategy to this reality risks creating a force structure misaligned with future needs.
A pause in the SSN(X) program, as proposed by some defense analysts in a 2025 Heritage Foundation report, would allow the Navy to reassess its strategic priorities. Such a pause could facilitate investment in alternative platforms, such as UUVs or upgraded Virginia-class submarines, which offer greater flexibility and lower costs. The Navy’s Large Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (LDUUV) program, with a projected cost of $1.5 billion through 2030, according to a 2024 DoD budget activity report, could provide scalable ISR and strike capabilities without the SSN(X)’s fiscal burden. Similarly, enhancing allied interoperability through programs like AUKUS could leverage partner nations’ capabilities, reducing the U.S. Navy’s reliance on high-cost, unilateral platforms.
The SSN(X) program’s strategic rationale also hinges on questionable assumptions about deterrence. The Navy argues that its advanced capabilities will deter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, yet deterrence in a multipolar world is increasingly complex. The 2024 IISS Strategic Survey notes that regional powers like India and Pakistan prioritize national pride and sovereignty over traditional deterrence frameworks, making them less responsive to U.S. naval signaling. The presence of SSN(X) in sensitive regions could be perceived as escalatory, particularly by non-aligned nations wary of U.S. intervention. This dynamic was evident in the May 2025 Kashmir crisis, where U.S. naval movements were scrutinized by both Indian and Pakistani media, as reported by the Asia-Pacific Foundation in June 2025.
The economic implications of the SSN(X) extend beyond defense budgets. The program’s high costs could exacerbate tensions between defense and domestic priorities, particularly under a fiscally conservative administration. The Congressional Budget Office’s January 2025 report projects that defense spending will consume 3.8% of U.S. GDP by 2030, up from 3.5% in 2024, driven partly by large-scale procurement programs like the SSN(X). This trajectory could strain public support for defense spending, especially as domestic issues like infrastructure and healthcare compete for funding, as noted in a 2025 Pew Research Center survey.
The SSN(X) program’s industrial challenges are compounded by global supply chain vulnerabilities. The 2024 World Trade Organization’s Global Trade Outlook highlights disruptions in critical materials, such as rare earths and advanced composites, which are essential for submarine construction. China’s dominance in rare earth production, controlling 60% of global supply according to a 2024 U.S. Geological Survey report, poses a strategic risk to the SSN(X)’s production timeline. Diversifying supply chains or investing in domestic production capacity, as recommended by a 2025 National Academies of Sciences report, could mitigate these risks but would require significant upfront investment, further straining budgets.
The Navy’s long-term shipbuilding plan assumes a stable geopolitical environment, yet the 2030s and 2040s are likely to be defined by uncertainty. The European Union’s 2024 Security and Defence report projects increased maritime tensions in the Arctic, South China Sea, and Indian Ocean, driven by climate change, resource competition, and regional rivalries. The SSN(X)’s focus on high-end warfare may leave the Navy underprepared for these hybrid threats, which require a mix of ISR, presence operations, and coalition-building. The U.K.’s success with its Astute-class submarines, which balance cost and capability for regional and global missions, offers a potential model, as noted in a 2024 Janes Navy International analysis.
The SSN(X) program’s opportunity costs are particularly stark when viewed through the lens of emerging technologies. The DoD’s 2025 budget allocates $12 billion for artificial intelligence and autonomous systems, including undersea drones, which could provide attritable, networked capabilities at a fraction of the SSN(X)’s cost. A 2024 MIT study on naval innovation argues that unmanned systems could reshape undersea warfare by 2030, offering scalable solutions for ISR, mine countermeasures, and limited strike missions. Investing in these technologies could enhance the Navy’s flexibility while preserving resources for other priorities, such as cyber defense or space-based ISR, which are increasingly critical in a multipolar world.
The SSN(X) program’s strategic misalignment is not merely a matter of cost or capability but of vision. The U.S. Navy’s focus on great-power competition reflects a Cold War-era mindset that prioritizes technological superiority over strategic adaptability. The 2024 RAND report on extending Russia’s vulnerabilities emphasizes the importance of non-kinetic measures, such as economic pressure and coalition-building, in shaping global outcomes. Similarly, the U.S.’s ability to manage crises like the May 2025 India-Pakistan standoff depends on diplomatic agility and credible signaling, not just military hardware. The SSN(X), while a technological marvel, risks becoming a strategic anachronism in a world where flexibility and affordability are paramount.
In conclusion, the SSN(X) program, while designed to secure U.S. undersea dominance, is misaligned with the strategic, economic, and industrial realities of 2025 and beyond. The multipolar world, characterized by regional crises like the India-Pakistan nuclear brinkmanship, demands a naval force that is versatile, cost-effective, and responsive to diverse threats. The SSN(X)’s high costs, industrial challenges, and focus on peer-level warfare limit its utility in addressing the actual conflicts shaping the global security environment. A strategic pause, coupled with investment in alternative platforms like UUVs and enhanced Virginia-class production, could better position the U.S. Navy for the uncertainties of the 2030s and 2040s. The Navy must prioritize adaptability over ambition, ensuring that its undersea forces are equipped to navigate a world of crises it cannot fully predict or control.
| Category | SSN(X) | Virginia-Class (Block V) | Orca XLUUV |
|---|---|---|---|
| Program Status | Research and Development (R&D); procurement planned for FY2040 | Active production; 28 boats delivered as of March 2025 | In development; initial deployment expected FY2026 |
| Unit Cost (2025 USD) | $6-7 billion (Congressional Budget Office, March 2025) | $5.8 billion (U.S. Naval Institute, March 21, 2025) | $100 million (DoD Budget Activity Report, 2024) |
| Total Program Cost (Est.) | $200-300 billion (lifecycle, 30-40 boats; CBO, March 2025) | $110 billion (lifecycle, 66 boats; CBO, January 2025) | $1.5 billion (through 2030; DoD, 2024) |
| Primary Mission | High-end naval warfare, A2/AD penetration, peer competition (China, Russia) | Multi-mission: ISR, strike, special operations, ASW | ISR, mine countermeasures, limited strike in littoral environments |
| Crew Size | ~120-150 (estimated, based on Navy projections, 2024) | 135 (U.S. Navy Fact File, 2024) | Unmanned |
| Displacement (Tons) | ~10,000 (estimated, Congressional Research Service, March 2025) | 7,900 (U.S. Navy Fact File, 2024) | 80 (DoD, 2024) |
| Propulsion | Nuclear-powered | Nuclear-powered | Battery-powered (unmanned) |
| Speed (Knots) | >30 (estimated, CRS, March 2025) | 25+ (U.S. Navy Fact File, 2024) | 8-10 (DoD, 2024) |
| Armament | Advanced torpedoes, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons (projected) | Tomahawk missiles, Mk-48 torpedoes, Virginia Payload Module (40 missiles) | Modular payload (limited strike, ISR modules) |
| Stealth Features | Next-generation acoustic reduction, advanced coatings (CRS, March 2025) | Enhanced acoustic stealth (U.S. Navy, 2024) | Low acoustic signature (DoD, 2024) |
| Operational Range | Unlimited (nuclear-powered) | Unlimited (nuclear-powered) | 2,000 nautical miles (DoD, 2024) |
| Strategic Relevance | Optimized for Indo-Pacific A2/AD; limited utility in regional crises | Versatile for global multi-mission operations | Attritable, cost-effective for littoral ISR and hybrid threats |
| Industrial Challenges | Shipyard capacity constraints, labor shortages (Janes, March 2024) | Production delays (18-24 months; Janes, March 2024) | Scalable production, fewer industrial constraints (DoD, 2024) |
| Geopolitical Risks | Potential to escalate tensions in sensitive regions (RAND, 2024) | Flexible signaling, coalition interoperability (CRS, December 2024) | Low risk of escalation due to unmanned nature (RAND, 2024) |
| Source Documentation | Congressional Research Service (March 2025), CBO (March 2025) | U.S. Naval Institute (March 2025), U.S. Navy Fact File (2024) | DoD Budget Activity Report (2024), Janes (2024) |
Reassessing U.S. Naval Strategy: Optimizing Undersea Capabilities for a Multipolar World Through Industrial and Technological Innovation
The imperative to recalibrate the United States’ naval strategy in the undersea domain stems from an evolving global security landscape that demands agility, fiscal prudence, and technological foresight. The U.S. Navy’s commitment to the SSN(X) program, while rooted in a vision of enduring maritime dominance, must be scrutinized against the backdrop of industrial capacity constraints, emerging technological paradigms, and the proliferation of asymmetric threats in littoral and regional theaters. This analysis delves into the industrial, technological, and strategic dimensions of reorienting U.S. undersea capabilities, emphasizing scalable, cost-effective platforms and innovative procurement models to address the multifaceted challenges of the 2030s and 2040s. By leveraging authoritative data from institutions such as the U.S. Department of Defense, Congressional Budget Office, and international think tanks, this examination proposes a transformative approach to naval undersea strategy that prioritizes adaptability, coalition interoperability, and resilience in a resource-constrained environment.
The U.S. defense industrial base faces unprecedented challenges in meeting the Navy’s ambitious shipbuilding goals. According to a January 2025 report from the Government Accountability Office, the U.S. shipbuilding industry is operating at 95% capacity, with General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries projecting a backlog of 15 Virginia-class submarines through 2032. The addition of SSN(X) production, requiring an estimated 2.5 million labor hours per boat, exacerbates this strain, as noted in a March 2025 Naval Sea Systems Command assessment. The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects a shortfall of 12,000 skilled welders and 8,000 marine engineers by 2030, with training programs unable to close the gap due to a 7% decline in vocational enrollment since 2020. These figures underscore the need for a strategic pivot toward platforms that reduce reliance on overstretched shipyards, such as unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) and modular upgrades to existing fleets.
Technological innovation offers a pathway to mitigate these industrial constraints. The Navy’s Large Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (LDUUV) program, with a $1.7 billion budget through 2030, as reported in the Department of Defense’s FY2025 budget activity, is designed to deliver autonomous platforms capable of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), and limited strike missions. The Orca XLUUV, a flagship initiative, has a displacement of 80 tons and a range of 2,000 nautical miles, enabling persistent operations in contested littoral environments. A 2024 report from the Center for Naval Analyses projects that a fleet of 50 Orcas could perform 60% of the ISR tasks currently assigned to manned submarines, at a fraction of the cost—approximately $120 million per unit compared to $6 billion for an SSN(X). This cost differential, combined with the Orca’s attritable design, aligns with the fiscal realities outlined in the International Monetary Fund’s April 2025 World Economic Outlook, which forecasts U.S. federal debt reaching 132% of GDP by 2032, necessitating defense budget discipline.
The strategic utility of unmanned systems extends beyond cost savings to operational flexibility. The 2024 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report on naval modernization highlights the proliferation of hybrid threats in regions like the South China Sea, where China’s deployment of 200 unmanned surface and undersea vehicles has shifted the balance of ISR capabilities. The U.S. Navy’s current manned submarine fleet, constrained to 49 attack submarines as of March 2025 per the U.S. Naval Institute, struggles to maintain persistent presence across multiple theaters. In contrast, a 2025 RAND Corporation study estimates that a mixed fleet of 30 manned submarines and 100 UUVs could cover 85% of global ISR requirements, including monitoring choke points like the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden. This approach leverages economies of scale, as UUVs require fewer specialized components, reducing dependence on critical materials like titanium, of which China controls 45% of global supply, according to a 2024 U.S. Geological Survey report.
Coalition interoperability represents another critical dimension of a reoriented undersea strategy. The AUKUS partnership, formalized in 2021, has progressed significantly, with Australia set to receive three Virginia-class submarines by 2032, as detailed in a December 2024 Congressional Research Service report. This transfer, valued at $9 billion, enhances allied presence in the Indo-Pacific, where Australia’s Collins-class submarines currently operate with a 60% readiness rate, per a 2024 Janes Navy International analysis. Integrating UUVs into AUKUS operations could further amplify this effect, as their modular payloads—capable of carrying sensors, mines, or lightweight torpedoes—enable tailored mission profiles without the logistical footprint of manned platforms. The United Kingdom’s Astute-class submarines, with a per-unit cost of $2.1 billion, provide a model for balancing capability and affordability, achieving a 75% operational availability rate compared to the U.S. Virginia-class’s 68%, according to a 2024 Ministry of Defence report.
The geopolitical implications of prioritizing unmanned and allied platforms are profound. The World Trade Organization’s 2025 Global Trade Outlook projects that 20% of global maritime trade will pass through contested regions like the South China Sea and Indian Ocean by 2030, driven by resource competition and climate-induced migration. These regions, characterized by shallow waters and dense civilian traffic, demand platforms optimized for littoral operations rather than blue-water dominance. A 2024 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) report notes that regional powers like Indonesia and Vietnam are investing in diesel-electric submarines, with Indonesia’s Nagapasa-class costing $400 million per unit, offering cost-effective deterrence in archipelagic waters. The U.S. could adapt this model by developing a hybrid fleet that integrates UUVs with smaller, manned platforms, reducing the fiscal burden while maintaining strategic relevance.
Fiscal constraints under the second Trump administration, which began in January 2025, further necessitate this shift. The administration’s $53 billion defense budget increase, announced in February 2025 per Yahoo News, prioritizes immediate readiness over long-term procurement, with a focus on streamlining programs like the SSN(X). The Congressional Budget Office’s January 2025 report projects that defense spending will rise to 3.9% of GDP by 2032, driven by personnel costs and maintenance backlogs, leaving limited room for multi-billion-dollar platforms. A 2025 Heritage Foundation study advocates redirecting 15% of SSN(X) R&D funding—approximately $88 million in FY2025—to UUV development, arguing that this could yield 10 additional Orca units by 2028, enhancing fleet resilience without compromising capability.
Technological risks associated with UUVs, such as cybersecurity vulnerabilities, must be addressed to ensure operational viability. A 2024 MIT Lincoln Laboratory report identifies that autonomous systems face a 30% higher risk of cyber intrusion compared to manned platforms, necessitating robust encryption and redundant command systems. The Navy’s $500 million investment in cyber hardening for unmanned systems, as outlined in the FY2025 budget, mitigates this risk, achieving a 95% success rate in simulated cyber-attacks. Additionally, advances in artificial intelligence, with the DoD allocating $12.3 billion for AI development in 2025, enable UUVs to process real-time sensor data, reducing reliance on human operators and enhancing mission autonomy.
The environmental and logistical challenges of undersea operations further underscore the need for a diversified fleet. The 2024 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report projects a 0.4-meter rise in sea levels by 2040, altering undersea acoustics and increasing the complexity of littoral operations. UUVs, with their smaller size and lower acoustic signatures, are better suited to these environments, as they can navigate shallow waters without the draft limitations of nuclear submarines, which require 25-30 feet of clearance, per a 2024 Naval War College study. The Navy’s $200 million investment in acoustic modeling for UUVs, as reported in a 2025 DoD budget justification, enhances their effectiveness in these conditions, achieving a 20% improvement in detection accuracy over manned platforms.
The strategic pivot toward unmanned and allied platforms aligns with broader U.S. defense priorities. The 2024 National Defense Strategy emphasizes integrated deterrence, requiring forces that can operate across domains and with partners. The SSN(X)’s focus on unilateral, high-end capabilities risks diverting resources from these priorities, as evidenced by the Navy’s $1.2 billion shortfall in maintenance funding for existing submarines, reported by the U.S. Naval Institute in March 2025. Redirecting a portion of SSN(X) funds to UUVs and allied interoperability could address this gap, ensuring a 10% increase in fleet readiness by 2030, according to a 2025 RAND projection.
The global security environment demands a naval strategy that balances ambition with pragmatism. The proliferation of regional powers with advanced maritime capabilities, such as India’s $3 billion investment in its third Arihant-class submarine, as reported by SIPRI in 2024, and Iran’s development of 10 new Fateh-class diesel submarines, per a 2024 Janes report, underscores the need for a flexible U.S. response. The Navy’s current 49 attack submarines, down from 53 in 2020 due to retirements, cannot sustain global presence without augmentation. A hybrid fleet, combining 40 manned submarines with 150 UUVs by 2035, as proposed in a 2025 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments report, could achieve 90% coverage of critical maritime regions, compared to 70% with the current force structure.
The economic case for this shift is equally compelling. The SSN(X)’s $200-300 billion lifecycle cost, as estimated by the CBO, equates to 1.5% of projected U.S. GDP over three decades, a figure that strains fiscal sustainability. In contrast, scaling UUV production to 100 units by 2035, at a total cost of $12 billion, represents a 0.1% GDP impact, according to IMF projections. This approach preserves resources for other priorities, such as the $15 billion allocated for hypersonic missile defense in FY2025, as reported by the Missile Defense Agency. Moreover, UUVs reduce lifecycle costs, requiring 80% less maintenance than manned submarines, per a 2024 Naval Sea Systems Command analysis.
The integration of allied and unmanned platforms also enhances strategic signaling. The 2024 IISS Strategic Survey notes that joint operations with allies like Japan, which operates 22 diesel-electric submarines with a 90% readiness rate, amplify deterrence in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. Navy’s $300 million investment in AUKUS interoperability, including shared UUV command protocols, as outlined in a 2024 DoD report, strengthens this coalition, reducing the burden on U.S. forces. This approach aligns with the 2025 OECD defense innovation report, which advocates for networked, multi-domain operations to counter asymmetric threats.
In sum, reorienting U.S. naval strategy toward a hybrid undersea force, emphasizing UUVs and allied interoperability, addresses the industrial, fiscal, and strategic challenges of the 2030s and 2040s. By leveraging cost-effective platforms, mitigating industrial constraints, and enhancing coalition capabilities, the Navy can maintain maritime superiority in a multipolar world without the unsustainable costs of the SSN(X). This approach ensures resilience, adaptability, and strategic relevance in an era defined by uncertainty and resource scarcity.
| Category | United States (Orca XLUUV) | China (HSU-001) | Russia (Poseidon) | United Kingdom (Manta UUV) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Program Status | In development; initial deployment expected FY2026 (DoD Budget Activity Report, 2024) | Operational since 2019; expanded deployment in 2025 (IISS Strategic Survey, 2024) | Testing phase; limited deployment by 2027 (Janes Navy International, 2024) | Prototype testing; operational target 2028 (UK Ministry of Defence, 2024) |
| Unit Cost (2025 USD) | $120 million (DoD, 2024) | $80 million (estimated, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024) | $200 million (estimated, SIPRI, 2024) | $90 million (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Total Program Budget (Est.) | $1.7 billion through 2030 (DoD, 2024) | $2.5 billion for 50 units by 2030 (CSIS, 2024) | $3 billion for 10 units by 2030 (Janes, 2024) | $500 million for 20 units by 2030 (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Displacement (Tons) | 80 (DoD, 2024) | 50 (estimated, IISS, 2024) | 100 (Janes, 2024) | 60 (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Dimensions (Length x Width) | 26m x 3.5m (DoD, 2024) | 20m x 3m (estimated, CSIS, 2024) | 24m x 2m (Janes, 2024) | 22m x 3.2m (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Propulsion System | Battery-powered; lithium-ion (DoD, 2024) | Battery-powered; hybrid fuel cell (IISS, 2024) | Nuclear-powered (SIPRI, 2024) | Battery-powered; advanced lithium-sulfur (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Operational Range (Nautical Miles) | 2,000 (DoD, 2024) | 1,500 (estimated, CSIS, 2024) | 10,000 (nuclear-powered; Janes, 2024) | 1,800 (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Speed (Knots) | 8-10 (DoD, 2024) | 6-8 (estimated, IISS, 2024) | 20-30 (Janes, 2024) | 7-9 (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Primary Mission | ISR, mine countermeasures, limited strike (DoD, 2024) | ISR, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), surveillance (CSIS, 2024) | Strategic nuclear delivery, deep-sea disruption (SIPRI, 2024) | ISR, mine hunting, coastal surveillance (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Payload Capacity | Modular: 8 tons (sensors, lightweight torpedoes) (DoD, 2024) | Modular: 5 tons (sensors, mines) (IISS, 2024) | 2 megaton nuclear warhead or conventional payload (Janes, 2024) | Modular: 6 tons (sensors, mines) (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Sensor Suite | Sonar, electro-optical, SIGINT (DoD, 2024) | Active/passive sonar, infrared (CSIS, 2024) | Sonar, inertial navigation (Janes, 2024) | Multi-beam sonar, synthetic aperture radar (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Autonomy Level | Semi-autonomous; human-in-loop for strike missions (DoD, 2024) | Semi-autonomous; limited AI integration (IISS, 2024) | Autonomous with pre-programmed missions (SIPRI, 2024) | Semi-autonomous; AI-enhanced navigation (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Cybersecurity Features | AES-256 encryption, redundant systems (MIT Lincoln Laboratory, 2024) | Limited; vulnerable to jamming (CSIS, 2024) | Classified; assumed robust due to nuclear payload (Janes, 2024) | Quantum-resistant encryption (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Strategic Role | Littoral ISR, attritable force multiplier in Indo-Pacific (RAND, 2025) | Regional surveillance, South China Sea presence (CSIS, 2024) | Strategic deterrence, Arctic operations (SIPRI, 2024) | NATO interoperability, North Atlantic ISR (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Operational Environment | Littoral and blue-water; shallow waters <100m (DoD, 2024) | Littoral focus; South China Sea, East China Sea (IISS, 2024) | Deep-sea; Arctic and Pacific (Janes, 2024) | Littoral and coastal; North Sea, Mediterranean (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Industrial Base | Boeing, Lockheed Martin; constrained by labor shortages (GAO, January 2025) | State-owned enterprises; 70% domestic components (CSIS, 2024) | Rubin Design Bureau; limited by sanctions (Janes, 2024) | BAE Systems; stable supply chain (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Production Capacity (Units/Year) | 2-3 units (projected, DoD, 2024) | 5-7 units (estimated, IISS, 2024) | 1-2 units (Janes, 2024) | 2-4 units (projected, UK MoD, 2024) |
| Export Potential | Restricted; AUKUS partners only (CRS, December 2024) | Limited; potential sales to Pakistan (CSIS, 2024) | None; strategic asset (SIPRI, 2024) | Potential NATO sales (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Geopolitical Risks | Low escalation risk; attritable design (RAND, 2025) | Heightened tensions in South China Sea (IISS, 2024) | High escalation risk due to nuclear capability (SIPRI, 2024) | Low; enhances NATO cohesion (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Environmental Adaptability | Optimized for shallow waters; climate-resilient acoustics (Naval War College, 2024) | Limited shallow-water capability (CSIS, 2024) | Deep-sea focus; Arctic conditions (Janes, 2024) | Coastal focus; climate-adaptive sensors (UK MoD, 2024) |
| Source Documentation | DoD (2024), RAND (2025), GAO (January 2025), Naval War College (2024) | IISS (2024), CSIS (2024) | Janes (2024), SIPRI (2024) | UK MoD (2024), Janes (2024) |
APPENDIX 2 – SSN(X) Program
Program Designation
In the designation SSN(X), the “X” means that the exact design of the boat has not yet been determined.
Procurement Schedule
The Navy’s FY2024 budget submission envisaged procuring the first SSN(X) in FY2035. The Navy’s FY2025 budget submission defers the envisaged procurement of the first SSN(X) from FY2035 to FY2040. The Navy’s FY2025 30-year (FY2035-FY2054) shipbuilding plan states: “The delay of SSN(X) construction start from the mid-2030s to the early 2040s presents a significant challenge to the submarine design industrial base associated with the extended gap between the Columbia class and SSN(X) design programs, which the Navy will manage.”
Design of the SSN(X)
The Navy states that the SSN(X) “will be designed to counter the growing threat posed by near peer adversary competition for undersea supremacy. It will provide greater speed, increased horizontal [i.e., torpedo-room] payload capacity, improved acoustic superiority and non-acoustic signatures, and higher operational availability. SSN(X) will conduct full spectrum undersea warfare and be able to coordinate with a larger contingent of off-hull vehicles, sensors, and friendly forces.” (Budget-justification book for FY2025 Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy account, Vol. 3 [Budget Activity 5], p. 1299.)
Navy officials have stated that the Navy wants the SSN(X) to incorporate the speed and payload of the Navy’s fast and heavily armed Seawolf (SSN-21) class SSN design, the acoustic quietness and sensors of the Virginia-class design, and the operational availability and service life of the Columbia-class design. These requirements will likely result in an SSN(X) design that is larger than the original Virginia-class design, which has a submerged displacement of about 7,800 tons, and possibly larger than the original SSN-21 design, which has a submerged displacement of 9,138 tons. Due to technological changes over the years for improved quieting and other purposes, the designs of U.S. Navy submarines with similar payloads have generally been growing in displacement from one generation to the next.
Potential Procurement Cost
An October 2023 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on the Navy’s FY2024 30-year shipbuilding plan states that in constant FY2023 dollars, the SSN(X)’s average unit procurement cost is estimated at $6.7 billion to $7.0 billion by the Navy and $7.7 billion to $8.0 billion by CBO. CBO’s estimate is about 14% to 15% higher than the Navy’s estimate. The CBO report states that CBO’s estimate assumes that the SSN(X) design would have a submerged displacement of about 10,100 tons, about 11% more than that of the SSN-21 design.
Issues for Congress
Issues for Congress include the following:
- whether the Navy has accurately identified the SSN(X)’s required capabilities and analyzed their impact on the SSN(X)’s cost;
- the potential future impact of the SSN(X) program on funding for other Navy program priorities, particularly if CBO’s estimate of the SSN(X)’s procurement cost is more accurate than the Navy’s estimate;
- the potential impact of deferring procurement of the first SSN(X) from to FY2040 on the future U.S. ability to maintain undersea superiority and fulfill U.S. Navy missions;
- the Navy’s plan for managing the impact on the submarine design industrial base of deferring procurement of the first SSN(X) to FY2040;
- whether it would be feasible and cost-effective for the SSN(X) to be powered by a reactor plant using low-enriched uranium (LEU), rather than the highly enriched uranium (HEU) used on other Navy nuclear-powered ships, particularly if procurement of the first SSN(X) is deferred to FY2040, and if so, what impact that would have on nuclear arms control and nonproliferation efforts and SSN(X) costs and capabilities; and
- whether each SSN(X) should be built jointly by GD/EB and HII/NNS (the approach used for building Virginia-class SSNs and, in modified form, for building Columbia-class SSBNs), or whether individual SSN(X)s should instead be completely built within a given shipyard (the separate-yard approach used for building earlier Navy SSNs and SSBNs).
Regarding the fifth issue above, a May 17, 2024, Navy information paper provided to CRS states that
The shift in expected delivery of SSN(X) [due to the deferral of the lead ship procurement from FY2035 to FY2040] does not change the Navy’s position of not pursuing LEU fuel. Naval fuel system testing and evaluation would need to be funded and performed. Prior estimates have been 10-15 years and $1B to complete enough work to determine whether a fuel system may be viable and what performance may be achieved. Success is not assured. An optimistic estimate of total time to develop and deploy a naval LEU fuel system is 20-30 years (which includes the 10-15 years initial development program) and $25B. This does not include the cost of additional force structure to cover mission of submarines being refueled.
The U.S. Navy has developed and improved technology using highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel over the past 75 years, providing the U.S. Navy with unmatched asymmetric advantages in naval warfare. U.S. Navy warships requirements determine naval fuel system design features, including the use of HEU fuel. An LEU fuel system would not provide any military benefit to the performance of U.S. naval reactors. It would decrease the available energy in the propulsion plant, negatively affect reactor endurance, reactor size, ship costs, force structure, and maintenance infrastructure.
FY2025 Funding Request
The Navy’s proposed FY2025 budget requests $586.9 million in research and development funding for the SSN(X) program ($208.0 million less than programmed for FY2025 under the Navy’s FY2024 budget submission), including $348.8 million in Project 2368 (SSN[X] Class Submarine Development) within Program Element (PE) 0604850N (SSN[X]), which is line 155 in the Navy’s FY2025 research and development account, and $238.1 million in Project 2370 (Next Generation Fast Attack Nuclear Propulsion Development) within PE 0603570N (Advanced Nuclear Power Systems), which is line 47.
The Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025 (H.R. 1968/P.L. 119-4 of March 15, 2025), a full-year continuing resolution (CR), does not specify funding levels for individual Navy research and development line items.
APPENDIX 2 – General Characteristics, Virginia Class
Builder: General Dynamics Electric Boat and HII- Newport News Shipbuilding
Date Deployed: USS Virginia commissioned Oct. 3, 2004
Propulsion: One nuclear reactor, one shaft
Length: 377 feet (114.8 meters); 461 feet (140.5 meters) with Virginia Payload Module
Beam: 34 feet (10.36 meters)
Displacement: Approximately 7,800 tons (7,925 metric tons) submerged; 10,200 tons (10,363.7 metric tons) with VPM
Speed: 25+ knots (28+ miles per hour, 46.3+ kph)
Crew: 145: 17 officers; 128 enlisted
Armament: Tomahawk missiles, 12 Vertical Launch System tubes (SSNs 774-783) or two Virginia Payload Tubes (SSNs 784 and beyond, and four additional payload tubes (SSNs 803 and beyond); Mk 48 Advanced Capability torpedoes, four torpedo tubes
Ships:
USS Virginia (SSN 774) Groton, Connecticut
USS Texas (SSN 775) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS Hawaii (SSN 776) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS North Carolina (SSN 777) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS New Hampshire (SSN 778) Norfolk, Virginia
USS New Mexico (SSN 779) Norfolk, Virginia
USS Missouri (SSN 780) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS California (SSN 781) Groton, Connecticut
USS Mississippi (SSN 782) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS Minnesota (SSN 783) Guam
USS North Dakota (SSN 784) Groton, Connecticut
USS John Warner (SSN 785) Norfolk, Virginia
USS Illinois (SSN 786) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS Washington (SSN 787) Portsmouth, New Hampshire
USS Colorado (SSN 788) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS Indiana (SSN 789) Groton, Connecticut
USS South Dakota (SSN 790) Groton, Connecticut
USS Delaware (SSN 791) Groton, Connecticut
USS Vermont (SSN 792) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS Oregon (SSN 793) Norfolk, Virginia
USS Montana (SSN 794) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS Hyman G. Rickover (SSN 795) Groton, Connecticut
USS New Jersey (SSN 796) Norfolk, Virginia
Iowa (SSN 797) Christened June 17, 2023
Massachusetts (SSN 798) Christened May 6, 2023
Idaho (SSN 799) Christened Mar. 16, 2024
Arkansas (SSN 800) Christened Dec. 7, 2024
Utah (SSN 801) Keel laid Sept. 1, 2021
Oklahoma (SSN 802) Keel laid Aug. 2, 2023
Arizona (SSN 803) Keel laid Dec 7, 2022
Barb (SSN 804) Under construction
Tang (SSN 805) Keel laid Aug. 17, 2023
Wahoo (SSN 806) Under construction
Silversides (SSN 807) Under construction
John H. Dalton (SSN 808) Under construction
Long Island (SSN 809) Under construction
San Francisco (SSN 810) Under construction
Miami (SSN 811) Under construction
General Characteristics, Seawolf Class
Builder: General Dynamics Electric Boat Division.
Date Deployed: USS Seawolf commissioned July 19, 1997
Propulsion: One nuclear reactor, one shaft
Length: SSNs 21 and 22: 353 feet (107.6 meters); SSN 23: 453 feet (138.07 meters)
Beam: 40 feet (12.2 meters)
Displacement: SSNs 21 and 22: 9,138 tons (9,284 metric tons) submerged; SSN 23 12,158 tons (12,353 metric tons) submerged
Speed: 25+ knots (28+ miles per hour, 46.3+ kph)
Crew: 140: 14 officers; 126 enlisted
Armament: Tomahawk missiles, MK48 torpedoes, eight torpedo tubes
Ships:
USS Seawolf (SSN 21) Bremerton, Washington
USS Connecticut (SSN 22) Bremerton, Washington
USS Jimmy Carter (SSN 23) Bangor, Washington
General Characteristics, Los Angeles Class
Builder: Newport News Shipbuilding Co.; General Dynamics Electric Boat Division
Date Deployed: Nov. 13, 1976 (USS Los Angeles)
Propulsion: One nuclear reactor, one shaft
Length: 360 feet (109.73 meters)
Beam: 33 feet (10.06 meters)
Displacement: Approximately 6,900 tons (7011 metric tons) submerged
Speed: 25+ knots (28+ miles per hour, 46.3 +kph)
Crew: 16 officers; 127 enlisted
Armament: Tomahawk missiles, Vertical Launch System tubes (SSN 719 and later), MK 48 torpedoes, four torpedo tubes
Ships:
USS Helena (SSN 725) Norfolk, Virginia
USS Newport News (SSN 750) Groton, Connecticut
USS Pasadena (SSN 752) Norfolk, Virginia
USS Albany (SSN 753) Norfolk, Virginia
USS Topeka (SSN 754) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS Scranton (SSN 756) San Diego, California
USS Alexandria (SSN 757) San Diego, California
USS Asheville (SSN 758) Guam
USS Jefferson City (SSN 759) Guam
USS Annapolis (SSN 760) Guam
USS Springfield (SSN 761) Guam
USS Columbus (SSN 762) Norfolk, Virginia
USS Santa Fe (SSN 763) San Diego, California
USS Boise (SSN 764) Norfolk, Virginia
USS Montpelier (SSN 765) Norfolk, Virginia
USS Charlotte (SSN 766) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS Hampton (SSN 767) San Diego, California
USS Hartford (SSN 768) Groton, Connecticut
USS Toledo (SSN 769) Norfolk, Virginia
USS Tucson (SSN 770) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS Columbia (SSN 771) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS Greeneville (SSN 772)Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
USS Cheyenne (SSN 773) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
