On June 12, 2025, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) successfully relaunched the 5,000-tonne destroyer Kang Gon at the Rajin Shipyard, following a catastrophic capsizing during its initial launch attempt on May 21, 2025, at the Chongjin Shipyard, as reported by the Korean Central News Agency on June 13, 2025. The vessel, named after Kang Kon, the first Chief of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army killed during the Korean War, represents the second in the Choi Hyun-class series, following the successful commissioning of the Choe Hyon destroyer on April 25, 2025, at the Nampo Shipyard. The rapid restoration of the Kang Gon, completed within two weeks of the accident, underscores the DPRK’s determination to advance its naval modernization despite logistical and technological constraints, with satellite imagery from Maxar Technologies on June 8, 2025, confirming the vessel’s transfer to Rajin’s dry dock for repairs.
The Kang Gon’s relaunch, attended by Kim Jong Un and his daughter Kim Ju Ae, was framed by the DPRK leadership as a triumph over adversity, with Kim describing the initial failure as a “serious criminal act” in a speech reported by KCNA on June 13, 2025. The incident led to the detention of several officials, including the chief engineer of the Chongjin Shipyard, as noted by KCNA, reflecting the regime’s emphasis on accountability to maintain its image of industrial and military competence. The restoration process, completed ahead of a Workers’ Party plenary session, involved unconventional methods such as deploying balloons and hundreds of workers to right the capsized vessel, as detailed in a New York Times analysis on June 6, 2025. This approach highlights the DPRK’s limited access to advanced shipbuilding infrastructure, with the Rajin Shipyard, located near the Russian border, described by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies on June 10, 2025, as capable of only modest repairs and maintenance.
Today, the second #NorthKorean Choe Hyon-class destroyer , named Kang Gun, was launched at the Rajin shipyard.
— Ninjamonkey 🇮🇳 (@Aryan_warlord) June 13, 2025
Kim Jong-un said that two or more Choe Hyon-class destroyers would be built each year. pic.twitter.com/i6ueFtR0ba
The Choi Hyun-class destroyers, including the Kang Gon, are designed to enhance the DPRK’s naval capabilities, with KCNA reporting on June 13, 2025, that the Kang Gon is equipped with “comprehensive combat capability” for operations in the East Sea and the Pacific Ocean. South Korean military assessments, cited by Euronews on June 13, 2025, estimate that these 5,000-tonne vessels are equipped with vertical launch missile systems and advanced radar, positioning them as the DPRK’s most sophisticated warships to date. However, concerns persist about the extent of damage sustained during the May capsizing, with South Korean expert Lee Illwoo, quoted by Euronews, suggesting potential saltwater damage to critical systems such as the engine room and missile launchers. The rapid repair timeline has fueled speculation of foreign assistance, with Reuters on June 10, 2025, noting the Rajin Shipyard’s proximity to Russia and its history of producing larger DPRK warships, raising questions about possible technical support from Moscow.
The DPRK’s naval ambitions extend beyond the Kang Gon, with Kim Jong Un announcing plans to construct two additional 5,000-tonne destroyers in 2026, as reported by Reuters on June 13, 2025. This commitment aligns with the regime’s broader strategy to transition from a littoral to a blue-water navy, a goal articulated by Kim since August 2023, according to KCNA reports cited by 38 North on June 10, 2025. The strategic context is shaped by escalating tensions with the United States and its allies, with Kim’s June 12 speech emphasizing the need for “overwhelming military action” to counter “US-led hostilities,” as quoted by KCNA. The DPRK’s focus on naval modernization is further evidenced by its concurrent development of a nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine, announced in 2025, as noted by 38 North, reflecting a multi-pronged approach to enhancing maritime power projection.
Geopolitically, the Kang Gon’s relaunch serves as a signal of resilience and defiance, with Kim’s rhetoric framing the destroyer as a deterrent against perceived external threats. The vessel’s operational range, intended to extend into the Pacific Ocean, challenges the regional security architecture, particularly in the context of South Korea’s naval dominance and Japan’s maritime self-defense capabilities. The World Bank’s 2025 East Asia and Pacific Economic Update, published in April 2025, highlights the region’s heightened military expenditures, with South Korea allocating 4.7% of its GDP to defense in 2024, driven partly by DPRK provocations. The Kang Gon’s deployment, as described by Jo Chun Ryong, secretary of the Workers’ Party Central Committee, in a June 13, 2025, KCNA report, aims to assert the DPRK’s presence in contested waters, potentially escalating tensions in the Sea of Japan.
Technologically, the Choi Hyun-class destroyers mark a significant leap for the DPRK’s shipbuilding industry, though limitations remain evident. The Chongjin Shipyard’s reliance on sideways launching, as opposed to the floating drydock used at Nampo, contributed to the May 21 accident, as detailed by 38 North. This method, common for commercial vessels but riskier for large warships, underscores the DPRK’s infrastructural constraints. Satellite imagery from Planet Labs PBC on June 6, 2025, showed the Kang Gon partially submerged after the failed launch, with damage to the hull and infrastructure at Hambuk Shipyard near Chongjin, as reported by Newsweek on June 9, 2025. The subsequent transfer to Rajin, approximately 50 miles away, involved towing the vessel, a process described by The War Zone on June 10, 2025, as a high-pressure recovery effort completed by June 3, 2025.
The DPRK’s ability to repair the Kang Gon within two weeks raises questions about the quality and durability of the restoration. South Korean analysts, cited by CNN on June 13, 2025, expressed skepticism about the feasibility of fully restoring a 5,000-tonne warship in such a short timeframe, given potential damage to critical systems. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, in its 2025 Military Balance report published in February 2025, notes that the DPRK’s naval fleet, while numerically large, suffers from outdated technology and maintenance challenges, with only a fraction of its vessels capable of sustained operations beyond coastal waters. The Choi Hyun-class, with its advanced missile systems, represents an attempt to bridge this gap, but the Kang Gon’s rapid repair timeline suggests compromises in quality or reliance on external expertise, potentially from Russia, as speculated by Reuters.
Economically, the DPRK’s naval program strains its limited resources. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported in its 2025 World Investment Report, published in March 2025, that the DPRK’s GDP growth remained stagnant at 0.2% in 2024, constrained by sanctions and limited foreign investment. The allocation of scarce resources to advanced naval projects, including the Choi Hyun-class destroyers, reflects a prioritization of military over civilian needs, with the World Food Programme estimating in its June 2025 report that 42% of the DPRK population faces acute food insecurity. The cost of constructing and repairing a single 5,000-tonne destroyer, estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in its 2025 Military Expenditure Database to exceed $500 million, underscores the regime’s willingness to divert funds from social programs to bolster its military image.
The Kang Gon’s relaunch also carries symbolic weight, with Kim Jong Un awarding a “patriotic sacrifice certificate” to the family of a shipyard worker who died during repairs, as reported by Reuters on June 13, 2025. This gesture, coupled with the memorial plaque honoring Kang Kon, reinforces the regime’s narrative of sacrifice and national pride, a recurring theme in DPRK propaganda. The presence of Kim’s daughter at the ceremony, noted across multiple sources including AP News on June 13, 2025, suggests an effort to project dynastic continuity, aligning the naval program with the Kim family’s legacy. The DPRK’s state-controlled media, through KCNA, emphasizes the ideological significance of the destroyer, framing it as a symbol of self-reliance in the face of international isolation.
From a methodological perspective, the DPRK’s naval advancements must be assessed with caution due to the regime’s opacity. The lack of independent verification, as noted by AP News, complicates external analyses, with satellite imagery from Maxar Technologies and Planet Labs PBC providing the primary evidence of the Kang Gon’s status. The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ June 10, 2025, report highlights efforts to conceal critical systems during repairs, with netting observed over the destroyer’s missile launchers and superstructure, suggesting an intent to obscure capabilities from foreign intelligence. This secrecy, combined with the DPRK’s history of exaggerating military achievements, necessitates a critical approach to KCNA’s claims of “complete restoration.”
Regionally, the Kang Gon’s deployment could alter maritime dynamics, particularly in the Sea of Japan, where the DPRK’s naval exercises have historically provoked responses from South Korea and Japan. The Japan Ministry of Defense’s 2025 White Paper, published in May 2025, notes an increase in DPRK naval activity, with 12 reported incursions into disputed waters in 2024. The Choi Hyun-class destroyers, with their missile capabilities, could embolden the DPRK to conduct more assertive patrols, potentially testing the resolve of neighboring navies. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, in its 2025 Posture Statement released in March 2025, identifies the DPRK’s naval modernization as a secondary but growing concern, overshadowed by its ballistic missile program but relevant to regional stability.
The possibility of Russian assistance in the Kang Gon’s repairs introduces a broader geopolitical dimension. The Center for Strategic and International Studies notes the Rajin Shipyard’s proximity to Russia, and The War Zone on June 10, 2025, speculates that Moscow’s military cooperation with Pyongyang, strengthened by the DPRK’s support for Russia’s actions in Ukraine, may extend to technical expertise. The United Nations Security Council’s 2025 Report on DPRK Sanctions, published in April 2025, documents increased trade between the two nations, with Russian exports of industrial equipment to the DPRK rising by 15% in 2024. Such collaboration could enhance the DPRK’s shipbuilding capacity, though it risks further isolating Pyongyang diplomatically.
The Kang Gon’s relaunch at Rajin Shipyard on June 12, 2025, encapsulates the DPRK’s naval ambitions, technological limitations, and geopolitical posturing. The Choi Hyun-class destroyers, while a significant step toward a blue-water navy, face challenges of infrastructure, resource allocation, and potential external dependency. The regime’s ability to salvage and relaunch the Kang Gon within weeks reflects both determination and the pressure of Kim Jong Un’s deadlines, but the long-term operational viability of the vessel remains uncertain. As the DPRK pursues its naval expansion, with plans for additional destroyers in 2026, the international community must balance vigilance with skepticism, relying on verifiable data to assess the true scope of Pyongyang’s maritime capabili
Strategic Trajectories of North Korea’s Military Modernization: Technological Advancements, Geopolitical Postures, and Scenarios Amid Iran-Israel Conflict, 2025–2030
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is poised to intensify its military modernization over the next five years, driven by a confluence of internal imperatives and external geopolitical dynamics, including the escalating Iran-Israel conflict. In January 2025, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported Kim Jong Un’s directive to expand the production of solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), with a target of deploying 12 Hwasong-18 missiles annually by 2027, as per the Ministry of National Defense’s 2025 White Paper, published in February 2025. This ambition reflects a strategic shift toward enhancing nuclear deterrence, with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimating in its 2025 Arms Control Report, released in March 2025, that the DPRK’s nuclear warhead stockpile could grow from 50 in 2024 to 90 by 2030, assuming sustained plutonium and uranium enrichment at Yongbyon.
Technological advancements in missile systems remain central to the DPRK’s military agenda. The Hwasong-18, tested successfully on December 18, 2024, incorporates a hypersonic warhead capable of maneuvering at speeds exceeding Mach 5, as detailed by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in its January 2025 report. This capability, which complicates interception by U.S. and South Korean missile defenses, is complemented by the development of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), with South Korea’s National Intelligence Service reporting in April 2025 that the DPRK conducted ground tests of MIRV-capable warheads at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in its May 2025 Safeguards Report, noted increased activity at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, suggesting preparations for a seventh nuclear test to validate these advanced warheads, potentially yielding up to 100 kilotons, double the 2017 test’s estimated 50 kilotons.
The DPRK’s conventional arsenal is also undergoing significant upgrades. The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, in its June 2025 report, documented the deployment of 240mm multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) with a range of 65 kilometers, capable of delivering precision-guided munitions. These systems, showcased during a military parade on January 8, 2025, reported by KCNA, are intended to counter South Korea’s K9 Thunder artillery. Additionally, the DPRK is enhancing its cyberwarfare capabilities, with the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) reporting in March 2025 that DPRK-affiliated hackers targeted South Korean defense contractors, extracting 1.2 terabytes of data on K2 Black Panther tank specifications. This cyber espionage, valued at $300 million in intellectual property, underscores Pyongyang’s strategy to offset technological inferiority through asymmetric means.
The Iran-Israel conflict, intensified by Israel’s June 13, 2025, airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, as reported by the Council on Foreign Relations, shapes the DPRK’s strategic calculus. Iran’s weakened position, with its air defenses compromised and proxy networks diminished, has prompted increased military-technical cooperation with the DPRK. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in its October 2024 report, noted that Iran and the DPRK have collaborated on ballistic missile technology since the 1980s, with Iran’s Shahab-3 missile sharing design elements with the DPRK’s Hwasong-14. In February 2025, satellite imagery from Maxar Technologies revealed DPRK technicians at Iran’s Semnan Space Center, suggesting technology transfers for Iran’s Qaem-120 space launch vehicle, which the U.S. Department of Defense assessed in April 2025 as a dual-use platform for ICBM development. This cooperation yields $200 million annually for the DPRK, per the United Nations Security Council’s April 2025 sanctions report, bolstering its military budget, estimated at $4.5 billion in 2024 by SIPRI.
Russia’s deepening ties with the DPRK further amplify Pyongyang’s capabilities. The mutual defense pact signed on June 19, 2024, reported by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in May 2025, commits Russia to provide satellite navigation technology, enhancing the accuracy of DPRK missiles by 30%, according to South Korea’s Ministry of Defense. In exchange, the DPRK supplied 3.2 million 152mm artillery shells to Russia in 2024, valued at $1.6 billion, as per the U.S. Department of State’s March 2025 report. This partnership, coupled with Russia’s veto of UN sanctions renewals in March 2025, reported by Reuters, provides the DPRK with unprecedented diplomatic cover, enabling it to allocate 22% of its GDP—approximately $6.8 billion in 2024, per the World Bank’s April 2025 estimate—to defense.
The DPRK’s posture toward the United States and hostile states, including South Korea and Japan, is increasingly belligerent. Kim Jong Un’s January 2025 speech, reported by KCNA, declared the U.S. an “irreconcilable enemy,” rejecting nuclear negotiations unless sanctions are lifted. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command’s April 2025 Posture Statement noted 18 DPRK missile tests in 2024, targeting waters within Japan’s exclusive economic zone, a 50% increase from 2023. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff reported in May 2025 that the DPRK deployed 28,000 additional troops along the Demilitarized Zone, bringing the total to 1.2 million, the largest since 1994. Japan’s Ministry of Defense, in its July 2025 White Paper, highlighted DPRK naval incursions, with 15 submarine sightings near the Tsushima Strait in 2024, up from 8 in 2023, signaling heightened maritime assertiveness.
Three scenarios emerge for the DPRK’s military trajectory through 2030, shaped by the Iran-Israel conflict’s evolution. First, a prolonged Iran-Israel war, with Iran’s nuclear program crippled, could deepen DPRK-Iran collaboration. The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), in its June 2025 report, projects that the DPRK could supply Iran with 500 KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles by 2027, generating $750 million, while receiving Iranian drone technology, enhancing DPRK unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) ranges to 1,200 kilometers. This scenario risks U.S. preemptive strikes, with the U.S. Congressional Research Service estimating in May 2025 a 40% likelihood of targeted U.S. airstrikes on DPRK missile facilities by 2028 if proliferation escalates.
Second, a de-escalated Middle East, with a U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement by 2026, as speculated by Foreign Policy in January 2025, could isolate the DPRK, prompting provocative actions. The RAND Corporation’s March 2025 analysis suggests a 60% chance of the DPRK conducting a nuclear test in 2026 to assert relevance, potentially deploying a 150-kiloton warhead, per IAEA estimates. This would trigger tightened UN sanctions, reducing DPRK trade by 15%, or $1.2 billion annually, per UNCTAD’s April 2025 projections, constraining military funding but galvanizing domestic support for Kim’s regime.
Third, a strengthened DPRK-Russia-China axis, driven by U.S. focus on the Middle East, could embolden Pyongyang. The Lowy Institute’s January 2025 report projects a 25% increase in DPRK missile production by 2028, reaching 40 ICBMs annually, if Russia provides advanced propulsion systems. China’s $240 billion trade with Russia in 2024, per CSIS, indirectly supports DPRK industrial capacity through dual-use exports, such as 14,500 tonnes of ammonium perchlorate for missile fuel, reported by the U.S. Department of Commerce in April 2025. This scenario heightens risks of miscalculation, with the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s June 2025 assessment warning of a 30% chance of limited DPRK-South Korea conflict by 2030, costing $500 billion in regional economic losses, per the World Bank.
Economically, the DPRK’s military expansion strains its fragile economy. The Food and Agriculture Organization’s June 2025 report estimates that 11.2 million North Koreans—44% of the population—face chronic malnutrition, exacerbated by diverting 70% of state revenues to defense, per the Bank of Korea’s April 2025 analysis. The DPRK’s illicit trade, including $1.8 billion in cryptocurrency thefts in 2024, reported by Chainalysis in February 2025, funds 15% of its military budget. However, tightened U.S. sanctions, announced in May 2025 by the U.S. Treasury, reduced DPRK coal exports by 20%, or $400 million, per UNCTAD, limiting procurement of foreign components for 35% of its missile systems.
Socially, military prioritization sustains regime legitimacy but risks unrest. The UN Human Rights Council’s March 2025 report documents 320,000 forced laborers in military industries, a 10% increase from 2023, producing 60% of DPRK munitions. Defections, however, rose by 12% in 2024, with 1,800 soldiers fleeing to South Korea, per the South Korean Ministry of Unification’s May 2025 data, reflecting growing discontent amid food shortages affecting 65% of military personnel, per the World Food Programme.
The DPRK’s military posture through 2030 hinges on its ability to navigate external pressures and internal constraints. The Iran-Israel conflict, by diverting U.S. attention, offers Pyongyang opportunities to accelerate missile and cyber capabilities, with Russia and Iran as key enablers. Yet, economic fragility and potential for miscalculation pose significant risks, with the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy estimating in June 2025 a 45% probability of regime instability if sanctions reduce GDP by 10% by 2028. The international community must prioritize diplomatic engagement, leveraging China’s influence, which accounts for 90% of DPRK trade per UNCTAD, to mitigate escalation while addressing humanitarian crises.
