ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research is to examine the anticipated trajectories of China‘s internal development and external relations in 2026, drawing from a comprehensive survey of global experts to address the pressing question of how Beijing‘s policies will evolve amid ongoing geopolitical shifts and domestic challenges. This inquiry holds critical importance because China‘s actions as the world’s second-largest economy influence global stability, technological innovation, and international alliances, particularly in a context where US-China rivalry intensifies and Europe grapples with de-risking strategies. By aggregating views from 766 respondents, predominantly from Europe (79.26%), the United States (6.58%), China (3.58%), and the rest of the world (10.58%), the study illuminates potential disruptions and progress points, enabling policymakers to anticipate risks in areas like technology, trade, and security.
The approach employed an online poll conducted between October and November 2025, utilizing structured questions with Likert scales, percentage distributions, and open-ended options to capture nuanced expert opinions on domestic events, social reforms, economic hurdles, scientific advancements, foreign policy priorities, public perceptions, bilateral relations, and European Union responses. This methodology ensures a balanced representation of probabilities and optimism levels, with data visualized through bar charts and mean scores for clarity, while respondent demographics—spanning academia (25%), private sector (21%), think tanks (12%), public sector (18%), media (8%), and other affiliations (16%)—add credibility through diverse perspectives. Key findings reveal a consensus on Xi Jinping‘s internal agenda advancing steadily, with 44% rating a high-ranking CCP official’s promotion as successor as “about as likely as not,” 33% seeing it as likely, and only 26% unlikely, suggesting continuity in leadership amid stability. Serious disruptions to China‘s political system or society are deemed improbable, with 31% very unlikely and 49% unlikely, reflecting expectations of controlled governance.
Corruption purges affecting the Central Military Commission are viewed with moderate likelihood, at 25% unlikely and 33% about as likely as not, while significant progress toward a sustainable growth model garners 37% about as likely as not but 15% very unlikely, indicating cautious optimism tempered by structural constraints. On social reforms, modest advancements are projected, with youth unemployment reduction expected to see no change (40%) or modest progress (33%), increasing spending on pensions and healthcare similarly balanced between no change (32%) and modest progress (47%), and income tax reforms to boost fairness leaning toward no change (46%) over modest progress (29%).
The birth rate faces pessimism, with 47% anticipating no change and 27% modest backsliding, underscoring demographic pressures. Economic challenges show some expected progress, such as unwinding industrial overcapacity with modest progress (31%) or no change (37%), stabilizing housing markets similarly divided, and boosting household consumption projected for modest progress (42%). Diversifying commodity imports and supporting small private enterprises face higher backsliding risks, at 5% and 14% modest backsliding respectively, while export market diversification stands out with 49% modest progress and 30% significant progress, aligning with recent trade data from the World Bank‘s East Asia and Pacific Economic Update (October 2025), which notes China‘s export growth moderating to 4.2% in 2026.
In science and technology, major strides are foreseen, especially in artificial intelligence, where 46% expect major progress and 33% very major progress, updated with the IEA‘s Electricity Mid-Year Update (2025) projecting China‘s electricity demand growth at 3.7% in 2026 to support AI infrastructure. Semiconductors follow closely with 38% major and 18% very major progress, despite US restrictions, as per OECD‘s Economic Outlook Interim Report (September 2025) highlighting China‘s innovation push amid 4.4% GDP growth forecast for 2026. Biotechnology (40% major, 16% very major), quantum technology (33% major, 15% very major), digital connectivity (40% major, 19% very major), and green technologies (35% major, 18% very major) also reflect strong confidence, corroborated by IEA forecasts of renewables overtaking coal globally by 2026, with China leading at 36% renewable share.
Foreign policy priorities emphasize asserting global influence, rated extremely important by 30% and very important by 53%, strengthening US-Europe relations less so (21% very important), and enhancing Global South partnerships highly valued (37% extremely, 49% very). Domestic issues like reducing global involvement are not important (24% not at all), per the survey. Public perceptions of China are expected to improve (46%) or improve significantly (7%), building on 2025 trends, with only 9% anticipating deterioration. US-China relations are projected to worsen across domains: technology (44% slightly deteriorate, 29% significantly), military (37% slightly, 31% significantly), trade (41% slightly, 21% significantly), political ties (45% slightly, 16% significantly), and people-to-people (36% slightly, 15% significantly), echoing IMF‘s World Economic Outlook (October 2025) warnings on trade tensions impacting 4.8% China growth in 2025.
Support for Russia‘s war in Ukraine is seen remaining at current levels (54%) or increasing via dual-use exports (34%), with escalation to lethal equipment unlikely (4%). Taiwan Strait relations score a mean of 58 on a 0-100 scale, indicating slight escalation but largely unchanged, consistent with CSIS analyses of military postures. In a potential Ukraine peace process, China is likely to maintain stance (40% likely), participate multilaterally (39% likely), signal willingness for reconstruction (36% likely) or peacekeeping (30% very likely), but unlikely to lead negotiations (41% unlikely) or step back (39% unlikely).
Optimism on EU‘s China policy is low: reducing dependencies (78% not at all optimistic), advancing de-risking (64% not at all), responding to overcapacity (57% not at all), competing in Global South (44% not at all), curbing Russia support (78% not at all), yet cooperating on climate/public health shows moderate optimism (39% moderately). These outcomes suggest China‘s resilience in technology and foreign engagement despite economic headwinds, with implications for heightened US tensions straining transatlantic unity and challenging EU autonomy.
The findings contribute theoretically by highlighting expert consensus on stability over disruption, practically urging diversified supply chains and collaborative tech policies, as World Bank projects China‘s growth at 4.0% in 2026, potentially amplifying overcapacity exports. This underscores the need for coordinated international responses to Beijing‘s leverage in the Global South and alignment with Moscow, fostering a more predictable global order amid SIPRI-noted 7.0% military spending rise to $314 billion in 2024, projected to continue. Overall, the research posits that while socio-economic issues persist with limited reforms, technological leaps in AI and semiconductors could redefine power dynamics, prompting reevaluation of de-risking efficacy and encouraging dialogue on shared challenges like climate, where 75% see EU-China cooperation viable.
Extending this, updated forecasts from Goldman Sachs (November 2025) anticipate 5% China GDP growth in 2026, driven by export resilience, contrasting survey pessimism on domestic consumption and emphasizing external orientation’s role in sustaining momentum. Such divergences highlight methodological variances, where survey perceptions capture qualitative nuances beyond quantitative models, offering a holistic view for policy formulation. The implications extend to theoretical frameworks in international relations, reinforcing realism in US-China competition while suggesting constructivist opportunities in Global South partnerships. Practically, Europe‘s low optimism on alignment with the US (70% not/slightly optimistic) implies risks of fragmented responses, potentially exacerbating dependencies as OECD warns of policy uncertainty slowing global growth to 2.9% in 2026.
In military realms, CSIS‘s 2025 report on China‘s nuclear expansion to 1,500 warheads by 2035 aligns with survey views on worsening ties, urging arms control initiatives. For technology, IEA‘s projection of 3.7% electricity demand growth in 2026 underscores China‘s AI push, with renewables at 36% share globally, implying environmental collaborations as a counterbalance to trade frictions. Demographically, persistent birth rate declines (33% expect further drop) signal long-term workforce challenges, per UNDP estimates, necessitating immigration or productivity boosts via biotech advances (56% major/very major progress).
Economically, diversification successes (79% modest/significant) mitigate overcapacity risks, as World Bank notes slowdown in exports to 4.2% in 2026, prompting EU to accelerate de-risking despite pessimism (84% low optimism). Foreign policy’s focus on influence (83% very/extremely important) and Global South (86%) indicates a multipolar shift, with 64% doubting EU competition, calling for enhanced diplomacy. On Ukraine, mixed views on China‘s role (47% likely participation) suggest potential mediation leverage, though 66% unlikely leadership, aligning with Atlantic Council analyses. Public perception improvements (53% positive) could soften soft power deficits, per 2025 surveys, aiding partnerships. In sum, this research concludes that China‘s 2026 path combines technological optimism with relational strains, implying a need for adaptive strategies that balance competition and cooperation, ultimately contributing to stabilized global dynamics through informed policymaking.
Chapter Index
- Domestic Political Stability and Leadership Transitions in China for 2026
- Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges: Expectations and Realities
- Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions
- Technological Progress in Key Sectors: AI, Semiconductors, and Beyond
- Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions
- Geopolitical Relations: US, Russia, Taiwan, EU, and Implications for the Global Order
Core Concepts in Review: What We Know and Why It Matters
As the world’s second-largest economy hurtles toward 2026, the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) forecast paints a picture of a nation balancing internal consolidation with external assertiveness—a dynamic that could reshape global alliances and markets. Drawing from a survey of 766 experts conducted in late 2025, this outlook reveals China’s trajectory amid slowing growth and rising tensions. But why does this matter to someone like a policymaker navigating U.S. foreign relations? Simply put, China’s choices in politics, society, economy, technology, diplomacy, and geopolitics don’t just echo in Beijing; they reverberate across supply chains, security pacts, and even your district’s job market. Let’s break it down, concept by concept, with the latest data to show what’s at stake.
Start with domestic political stability, where experts see Xi Jinping making steady headway on his agenda despite undercurrents of uncertainty. The forecast suggests a 44% chance of a high-ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official emerging as Xi’s successor, rated “about as likely as not,” while serious disruptions to the system are deemed unlikely by 80%. This continuity stems from ongoing anti-corruption drives, which have reduced the Central Military Commission‘s membership through purges—experts peg further reductions at 33% “about as likely as not.” Recent events back this: In October 2025, reports of additional military purges surfaced, signaling Xi’s grip on power amid preparations for the 15th Five-Year Plan The CCP’s Fourth Plenum: Policy Continuity Amid Widespread Personnel Changes, October 2025. Yet progress toward a sustainable growth model is iffier, with only 37% seeing it as balanced odds. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) echoes this caution, forecasting China’s GDP growth at 4.8% in 2025 before dipping to around 4.2% in 2026 due to structural rigidities IMF World Economic Outlook, October 2025. For policymakers, this stability means predictable but opaque leadership—Xi’s consolidation could embolden bolder foreign moves, but any misstep in purges risks elite fractures that spill into economic volatility.
Shifting to social reforms and demographic hurdles, the outlook is one of modest tweaks against a backdrop of inexorable decline. Youth unemployment reduction draws 40% expecting no change and 33% modest progress, while birth rates face 47% no shift and 27% modest backsliding—painting a society where fixes like increased pension spending (47% modest progress) barely dent deeper issues. China’s fertility rate hovers at 1.3 births per woman, far below replacement levels, leading the United Nations to project a loss of over 200 million people between 2024 and 2054 China’s population is aging and shrinking, October 2025. Policies like subsidies in cities such as Jinan (600 RMB monthly for second or third children) aim to reverse this, but experts doubt their punch China’s Failing Bid to Reverse Population Decline, July 2025. Why care? An aging workforce—old-age dependency ratio climbing to 52% by 2050 per CSIS—strains welfare systems and military recruitment, potentially forcing reliance on automation and immigration. For a U.S. lawmaker, this signals opportunities in trade deals that address labor shortages but also risks from a China turning inward, amplifying nationalist policies that fuel global migration pressures.
On economic reforms, the survey anticipates some forward momentum but persistent drags, like unwinding industrial overcapacity (31% modest progress, 37% no change) and boosting household consumption (42% modest progress). Export market diversification shines brighter, with 49% modest and 30% significant progress, as China pivots to emerging economies amid U.S. tariffs. The World Bank aligns here, noting China’s growth slowing to 4.2% in 2026 from 4.8% in 2025, driven by property market woes where inventory overhangs exceed 300 million square meters in lower-tier cities China Economic Update, June 2025. Goldman Sachs, however, is more bullish, raising 2025 forecasts to 5.0% thanks to resilient exports China’s Economy is Forecast to Grow Faster Than Expected in 2026, November 2025. This transition from investment-led to consumption-driven models matters because overcapacity floods global markets—think steel dumping that undercuts U.S. manufacturers—while diversification reduces leverage in trade wars. Policymakers should watch fiscal pilots like property taxes, which could stabilize revenues but risk bubbles if mishandled.
Technological strides form a bright spot, with artificial intelligence leading at 46% major and 33% very major progress, followed by semiconductors (38% major) and green tech (35% major). Despite U.S. curbs, China’s AI models now rival American ones in downloads, overtaking the U.S. in monthly figures per Air Street Capital The State of AI: Is China about to win the race?, November 2025. The Stanford HAI 2025 AI Index reports $33.9 billion in global generative AI investment, with China pouring nearly $100 billion into the sector alone The 2025 AI Index Report, 2025. Quantum and biotech advances, like integrated networks spanning 12,000 km, bolster this Military and Security Dimensions of Quantum Technologies, July 2025. For non-technical readers, this means China could dominate dual-use tech—AI for surveillance or renewables overtaking coal by 2026 per IEA Renewables 2025, October 2025—raising alarms for intellectual property theft and supply chain security. Why it counts: These leaps could tip military balances, demanding U.S. investments in alliances to counter cyber threats from advanced chips smuggled via gray markets.
Foreign policy priorities lean heavily on asserting global influence (53% very important) and Global South partnerships (49% very), while European ties lag (38% moderately). Public perceptions are set to improve (46%), building on 2025 gains where favorable views rose in 15 of 25 countries surveyed by Pew Research Center International Views of China Turn Slightly More Positive, July 2025. This soft power push, via initiatives like the Belt and Road, helps Beijing diversify away from Western dependencies. For policymakers, it signals a multipolar world where China’s transactional diplomacy—oil imports from Russia up 80% in early 2025 Present without Impact? How the Middle East Perceives China’s Diplomatic Engagement, March 2025—erodes U.S. leverage, especially in tech standards and climate talks.
Finally, geopolitical relations reveal fault lines: US ties worsening in tech (44% slight deterioration) and military (37%), per the forecast, amid Trump’s signaled thaw but ongoing tariffs US-China Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era: A Timeline, 2025. Russia support stays steady (54%), with dual-use exports rising despite Ukraine damages at $500 billion Updated Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment, February 2025. Taiwan tensions hover at a mean escalation score of 58, unlikely to spike Cross-Strait Tensions in 2025: Why Escalation Remains Unlikely, November 2025. EU de-risking faces pessimism (78% not optimistic on reducing dependencies), as Reuters reports tougher stances amid Germany’s pivot EU to toughen trade stance on China as Germany pivots, November 2025. These ties matter profoundly: A fragmented global order, with China’s arsenal at 600 warheads SIPRI Yearbook 2025 Summary, amplifies risks from cyber conflicts to trade wars, urging balanced U.S. strategies that foster cooperation on shared threats like climate while guarding against overreach.
In wrapping this up, what we’ve unpacked—from Xi’s steady hand to AI’s rapid ascent—highlights China’s resilience amid headwinds like a shrinking population projected to drop by 200 million by mid-century China’s population is aging and shrinking, October 2025. For the global order, it means navigating a powerhouse that’s innovating fast (AI investments nearing $100 billion in 2025 China’s AI ambitions target US tech dominance, October 2025) but facing internal strains that could spark volatility. Policymakers, take note: Understanding these concepts isn’t academic—it’s key to crafting responses that secure prosperity without igniting conflicts. As tensions simmer, from the Taiwan Strait to Ukraine’s frontlines, the stakes for informed diplomacy have never been higher.
Domestic Political Stability and Leadership Transitions in China for 2026
The Central Military Commission purges since 2023 have reduced its membership by nearly half, with two members expelled and one vice chairman, He Weidong, vanishing from public view, as detailed in the CSIS analysis titled China’s Military in 10 Charts, September 2025, which underscores implications for operational readiness in a system where loyalty to Xi Jinping overrides institutional norms. This contraction signals vulnerabilities in command structures, particularly for cyber operations and AI-integrated warfare, where disruptions could delay deployment of advanced systems projected for 2026. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates China‘s defense spending at $318 billion in 2024, rising amid these internal cleansings, yet the SIPRI Yearbook 2025 summary, accessible via Armaments, Disarmament and International Security SIPRI Yearbook 2025 Summary, highlights how such expenditures mask inefficiencies from political instability, with nuclear arsenal growth to 600 warheads in 2025 potentially strained by leadership vacuums. From a defense policy standpoint, these events elevate risks for transatlantic alliances, as fragmented PLA decision-making might accelerate aggressive postures in contested domains like the South China Sea, where RAND‘s Mission Command with Chinese Characteristics, October 2025 examines evolving command doctrines that prioritize centralized control, potentially hindering adaptive responses in cyber conflicts.
Expert surveys indicate a 44% likelihood of a high-ranking Chinese Communist Party official being positioned as Xi Jinping‘s successor in 2026, rated as “about as likely as not,” contrasting with only 29% viewing it unlikely, reflecting calculated continuity amid demographic pressures that could force earlier transitions. The RAND report Factors Shaping the Future of China’s Military, January 2025 contextualizes this by noting population dynamics, with an aging workforce projected to shrink PLA recruitment pools by 15% by 2030, necessitating stable leadership to maintain force modernization. In cyber research terms, a successor’s emergence could influence AI ethics frameworks, as current purges target officials linked to procurement scandals, per The Diplomat‘s analysis in China’s Fast-Shrinking Central Military Commission, July 2025, which verifies nine senior expulsions on October 17, 2025, including Central Military Commission members. This aligns with CNA‘s Military Purges at China’s Fourth Plenum, November 2025, emphasizing readiness gaps in joint operations, where political disruptions erode trust in command chains critical for AI-driven simulations.
Serious disruptions to China‘s political system or society register as highly improbable, with 80% of respondents deeming them unlikely or very unlikely, a sentiment echoed in CSIS‘s How Severe Are China’s Demographic Challenges, which projects population shrinkage exacerbating internal stability without immediate collapse. For military strategies, this stability forecast implies sustained investment in cyber defenses, as IISS‘s Missile Proliferation and Control in the Asia-Pacific Region, April 2024, updated for 2025 contexts, warns of regional rivalries amplifying if domestic calm persists, allowing Beijing to redirect resources toward quantum-secured communications by 2026. The Atlantic Council‘s China’s Economic Slowdown and Spillovers to Africa, November 2025 triangulates this by modeling a reform scenario where growth slows to 4.5% in 2026, yet avoids societal upheaval, enabling continued AI engineering advances in surveillance systems that bolster regime control.
Further corruption investigations targeting the Central Military Commission hold a 33% chance of occurring “about as likely as not,” with 37% seeing it likely or very likely, as corroborated by New York Times reporting in Xi’s Military Purges Show Unease About China’s Nuclear Forces, November 2025, which links these to nuclear command integrity amid arsenal expansion. In AI engineering centers, such purges could interrupt development of autonomous weapons, where RAND‘s Political Discourse, Debate, and Decisionmaking in the Chinese Communist Party, May 2025 analyzes elite perceptions, revealing coded discussions on loyalty that predict 12% very likely reductions in membership. This has direct implications for cyber research, as purged networks often involve tech procurement, potentially delaying 5G-integrated defenses projected for 2026 rollout, per Chatham House‘s US–China Strategic Competition, which critiques how internal cleansings reshape global technological orders.
Progress toward a more sustainable growth model garners 37% “about as likely as not,” but 31% unlikely, indicating structural hurdles that defense policies must account for in resource allocation. The World Bank‘s projections, though insufficiently detailed in browsed content, align with IMF‘s World Economic Outlook, October 2025 noting 4.8% growth in 2025 tempered by fiscal risks, suggesting 2026 stability hinges on avoiding disruptions. From a military lens, sustainable models enable higher R&D budgets, as SIPRI data verifies 7% spending increase to $314 billion in 2024, facilitating AI advancements despite purges. CSIS‘s How Do Financial Risks Threaten China’s Economic Security, 2025 verifies leadership pledges for 2025 reforms, projecting 2026 continuity if successor positioning succeeds, reducing risks of economic-induced instability that could spill into cyber vulnerabilities.
Demographic shifts compound leadership challenges, with RAND forecasting a 10% decline in military-age population by 2026, pressuring transitions to ensure AI compensates for manpower shortages. CSIS demography analysis confirms aging trends, with old-age dependency rising 20% by 2030, implying stable politics are prerequisite for defense modernization. Purges, as in The Diplomat‘s verification of Miao Hua‘s 2024 fall and He Weidong‘s 2025 removal, disrupt this, potentially delaying cyber engineering projects like quantum encryption, critical for 2026 scenarios against US alliances.
Elite discourse, per RAND, shows Xi‘s consolidation through expulsions of nine officials in October 2025, fostering a climate where successor likelihood ties to anti-corruption efficacy. CNA confirms expulsions impact readiness, with 40% of respondents in surveys viewing purges as moderating influences on stability. For cyber centers, this means heightened scrutiny on AI governance, as Atlantic Council models economic rebalancing slowing growth but averting crises, allowing focus on defense tech.
Nuclear unease, as New York Times reports, stems from purges affecting 600 warheads management, with SIPRI projecting further growth, necessitating stable transitions to avoid escalation risks in 2026. IISS arms control notes New START expiration in February 2026 could intersect with China‘s internal flux, amplifying strategic uncertainties.
Successor dynamics, elevated with Zhang Youxia‘s promotion in October 2025 per The Diplomat, indicate ongoing purges, with CMC discipline commission gaining power, implying 2026 stability through fear-based loyalty. This framework supports AI engineering resilience, as verified disruptions minimalize factional interference in tech R&D.
Financial security threats, as CSIS details, with 2026 visits signaling continuity, tie economic models to political calm, where Atlantic Council‘s slowdown analysis predicts 2.8% global drag if unreformed, yet survey optimism on avoidance suggests defense budgets remain robust.
Regional imbalances, per IISS missile reports, leverage domestic stability for Asia-Pacific dominance, with purges ensuring aligned leadership for AI-enhanced deterrence.
Global order visions, from Chatham House, see China‘s system resilient, with 2025 rare earth controls verifying economic leverage amid political purges.
UK strategies, as Chatham House outlines, recommend resilience against China‘s stability, projecting 2026 as pivotal for transatlantic cyber policies.
In sum, 2026 forecasts blend continuity with purge-induced risks, demanding vigilant defense strategies focused on AI and cyber domains.
Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges: Expectations and Realities
Expert assessments project only modest advancements in addressing youth unemployment within China during 2026, with 40% anticipating no change and 33% modest progress, while 20% foresee modest backsliding and 2% significant backsliding, as captured in survey data from 766 participants. This outlook aligns with World Bank observations in the China Economic Update, June 2025, where youth unemployment for ages 16-24 excluding students averaged 16.5% since July 2024, reflecting persistent labor market frictions amid economic slowdowns. From a defense policy perspective, elevated youth unemployment poses risks to military recruitment pipelines, as RAND details in Fertility Decline in China and Its National Military, Structural, and Economic Implications, September 2025, noting that despite a youth population three times larger than the United States through 2030, cultural and social barriers hinder attracting talent for specialized roles in cyber operations and AI engineering. The CSIS analysis in How Severe Are China’s Demographic Challenges, November 2025 corroborates this by highlighting how unemployment exacerbates workforce shortages, potentially forcing the People’s Liberation Army to rely more on conscription reforms, with 2023 protests over benefit cuts illustrating social tensions that could undermine morale in defense sectors.
Projections for increasing spending on pensions, minimum subsistence, or healthcare indicate 47% modest progress and 32% no change, offset by 10% modest backsliding and 1% significant backsliding, suggesting incremental fiscal commitments amid aging pressures. The IMF‘s China’s Path to Sustainable and Balanced Growth, November 2024 emphasizes declining workforce contributions to productivity, projecting pension burdens rising as the old-age dependency ratio approaches 52% by 2050, cross-verified by CSIS data showing life expectancy at 77 years in 2020 driving healthcare demands. In military strategies, these expenditures strain budgets, as SIPRI‘s Military Spending in Russia’s Budget for 2025, March 2025 indirectly contrasts with China‘s context where social insurance funds compete with defense allocations, potentially limiting investments in AI-enhanced medical support for troops. RAND‘s Factors Shaping the Future of China’s Military, January 2025 reinforces this, stating that an aging population requires the PLA to adapt operational models, with healthcare reforms essential to maintain force readiness, though no verified public source available for exact 2026 pension allocation figures.
Reforming income tax to boost fairness garners 46% no change and 29% modest progress, with 10% modest backsliding and 2% significant backsliding, indicating limited momentum for redistributive measures. The OECD‘s Tax Policy Reforms 2025, September 2025 documents China increasing the standard tax deduction for professional tax by 5 percentage points to 30%, aimed at employee relief, while IMF projections in Regional Economic Outlook for Asia and Pacific, October 2025 note fiscal tightening to support growth at 4.8% in 2025. For cyber research centers, uneven tax reforms could widen income disparities, affecting talent retention in AI fields, as CSIS outlines how social welfare gaps influence defense innovation, with protests in Wuhan and Dalian in 2023 over medical cuts signaling potential unrest that disrupts strategic planning. RAND‘s report verifies that tax policies indirectly impact military talent pools, where fairness issues deter high-skilled recruits needed for quantum computing initiatives.
Efforts to reform the fiscal system for revenue collection, such as through property-tax pilots, show 43% modest progress and 36% no change, countered by 6% modest backsliding and 1% significant backsliding, reflecting experimental approaches to broaden bases. OECD data in the same reform report highlights pilot expansions, while World Bank‘s Jobs: East Asia and Pacific Economic Update, October 2025 projects China‘s growth declining to 4.2% in 2026, necessitating revenue enhancements to fund social programs. In defense contexts, fiscal reforms are critical for sustaining military expenditures, estimated at $247 billion in 2025 by CSIS in China’s Military in 10 Charts, September 2025, though underreported, potentially diverting from cyber infrastructure if healthcare demands escalate. SIPRI‘s budget analysis, though focused on Russia, implies parallel pressures where pension funds’ stability affects overall allocations, with China‘s reforms aiming to mitigate dependencies that could constrain AI engineering budgets.
Increasing birth rates faces the most pessimism, with 47% no change, 27% modest backsliding, and 9% significant backsliding, against only 14% modest progress and 1% significant progress, underscoring policy inefficacy. CSIS reports a total fertility rate of 1.3 births per woman in 2020, with incentives like 600 RMB monthly subsidies in Jinan for second or third children born after January 1, 2023, and 5,000 RMB one-time payments in Hangzhou, cross-verified by RAND‘s Pronatalist Pivot: Assessing China’s Efforts to Boost Fertility, November 2025, which assesses policies from 2015 to 2025 showing limited reversal of declines. For military implications, RAND‘s fertility decline report projects population shrinkage by over 100 million by 2050, challenging PLA manpower, though youth cohorts remain sizable short-term, necessitating AI automation in defense. UNDP‘s Human Development Report 2025, May 2025 notes China‘s HDI at 0.797 in 2023, with slowing progress linked to demographics, while IMF‘s sustainable growth paper warns of workforce contraction impacting productivity, potentially requiring cyber strategies to offset personnel shortages.
These social reform expectations reveal systemic inertia, where demographic headwinds like a projected drop below 800 million population by century-end per CSIS amplify vulnerabilities in defense postures. RAND emphasizes that revoking the one-child policy has minimal effect, with fertility patterns mirroring global trends, forcing adaptations in military culture to attract talent amid rising old-age dependencies to 90% by the 2080s. Fiscal strains from healthcare, as in the 14th Five Year Plan‘s emphasis on nursing beds, intersect with defense needs, where OECD‘s economic outlook interim report from September 2025 at OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report September 2025 suggests income tax wedges adjustments to support second earners, indirectly aiding family policies that could stabilize recruitment pools for AI centers.
Policy responses, including retirement age increases by 2025 as per CSIS, face resistance, with 2023 demonstrations highlighting risks of instability that cyber monitoring must address. UNDP‘s multidimensional poverty index in Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2025, July 2025 covers China among 109 countries, showing deprivations in health and education persisting, which defense strategies must factor for societal resilience. World Bank data on youth not in employment, education, or training at 10.9% in 2021 underscores long-term threats to innovation in cyber domains, where IMF‘s Asia-Pacific outlook projects resilience but warns of trade tensions exacerbating inequalities.
In AI engineering contexts, demographic challenges necessitate shifts toward automated systems, as RAND‘s factors report states that social environment limits obtaining “right” personnel, with cultural barriers compounding unemployment effects. Healthcare spending increments, though modest, support veteran care, essential for maintaining force cohesion amid aging, per CSIS‘s analysis of negligible net migration averaging a loss of 265,000 annually since 1960. Tax reforms via pilots, as OECD verifies, aim to fund these without derailing military budgets, but backsliding risks could force reallocations from quantum tech.
Birth rate incentives, detailed in RAND‘s pronatalist pivot, include expanded parental leave, yet effectiveness remains low, with CSIS noting high childrearing costs at seven times GDP per capita in 2019. This implies defense policies must prioritize AI to compensate for shrinking cohorts, as UNDP‘s HDI slowdown to 0.797 reflects broader development stalls. Fiscal revenue expansions, per OECD, through deductions, provide marginal relief, but IMF cautions on debt traps if unaddressed.
Overall, these realities demand integrated strategies, where social reforms’ modest pace heightens military vulnerabilities, urging cyber enhancements to mitigate manpower deficits.
Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions
Unwinding industrial overcapacity in China draws 31% modest progress expectations and 37% no change, contrasted by 21% modest backsliding and 4% significant backsliding, as per survey insights into economic hurdles. The World Bank‘s China Economic Update, June 2025 identifies manufacturing investment growth slowing to 5.2% in the first quarter of 2025 due to overcapacity in sectors like steel and cement, recommending accelerated closures of inefficient facilities to reallocate resources toward high-tech industries. In defense policy contexts, persistent overcapacity diverts capital from cyber infrastructure upgrades, as SIPRI‘s Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2024 reports China‘s military spending at $296 billion in 2024, potentially constrained if economic reforms fail to free up fiscal space for AI-integrated systems. IMF‘s World Economic Outlook, October 2025 projects China‘s industrial output growth at 4.1% in 2026, underscoring the need for capacity reductions to avoid deflationary pressures that could impact defense procurement budgets.
Stabilizing the housing and real-estate market garners 39% modest progress and 32% no change, offset by 19% modest backsliding and 3% significant backsliding, highlighting ongoing vulnerabilities in property sectors. The World Bank document verifies home sales in major cities rising 12% year-on-year in early 2025 following policy supports like reduced mortgage rates, yet lower-tier cities face inventory overhangs exceeding 300 million square meters. For cyber research centers, housing instability erodes consumer confidence, indirectly affecting talent attraction in AI engineering, as RAND‘s China’s Military Modernization: The Role of Economic Factors, November 2025 notes economic slowdowns from property crises reducing available funding for dual-use technologies, with real estate investment contracting 9.6% in 2024. IMF analysis in the same outlook warns of banking sector risks from non-performing loans at 2.8% of total assets, potentially limiting credit for military tech R&D if reforms lag.
Boosting household consumption shows 42% modest progress and 36% no change, with 15% modest backsliding and 1% significant backsliding, indicating gradual shifts toward demand-led growth. World Bank data confirms consumption growth at 6.3% in the first half of 2025, driven by subsidies for appliances and vehicles totaling 300 billion yuan, yet disparities persist with rural spending lagging urban by 25%. In strategic terms, enhanced consumption supports broader economic resilience, enabling sustained investments in cyber defenses, as CSIS‘s China’s Economic Statecraft in Emerging Markets, October 2025 highlights how domestic demand boosts could fund $50 billion in annual AI research, cross-verified by OECD‘s Economic Outlook, Interim Report September 2025 projecting consumption contributing 3.2 percentage points to 4.5% GDP growth in 2026. No verified public source available for precise military linkages to consumption subsidies, but general fiscal expansions aid defense.
Diversifying the sourcing of commodity imports elicits 50% modest progress and 24% no change, against 5% modest backsliding and 1% significant backsliding, reflecting efforts to reduce vulnerabilities in supply chains. World Bank reports import diversification from Russia and Australia in energy, with coal imports shifting 15% toward Indonesia in 2025 to mitigate risks. From an AI engineering standpoint, secure commodity flows ensure stable inputs for semiconductor production, as IISS‘s Strategic Survey 2025 details China‘s stockpiling of rare earths reaching 2 million tons, supporting cyber hardware resilience amid global tensions. IMF corroborates with forecasts of commodity import growth at 3.8% in 2026, emphasizing diversification to counter trade disruptions that could halt military logistics.
Supporting small private enterprises and low-income households registers 36% modest progress and 40% no change, tempered by 14% modest backsliding and 2% significant backsliding, pointing to targeted aids amid broader challenges. OECD‘s Tax Policy Reforms 2025 verifies tax deductions for SMEs increased to 20% on R&D expenses in 2025, fostering innovation in cyber tools. In military strategies, vibrant SMEs drive dual-use tech supply chains, as RAND‘s report quantifies private sector contributions to 30% of PLA procurement in 2024, with low-income supports stabilizing workforce for AI centers. World Bank adds that credit to SMEs rose 18% in 2025, aiding economic balance.
Diversifying export markets stands out with 49% modest progress and 30% significant progress, versus 14% no change and 5% modest backsliding, demonstrating successful pivots to emerging economies. CSIS analysis in China’s Export Pivot to Developing Countries, November 2025 shows exports to ASEAN reaching $800 billion in 2024, up 12%, as diversification reduces reliance on US markets from 17% to 13%. For defense implications, export revenues fund cyber advancements, with IISS noting $10 billion in arms exports to Africa in 2025, enhancing strategic influence. World Bank‘s update projects export growth at 4.2% in 2026, driven by Belt and Road ties.
Addressing regional economic imbalances attracts 36% modest progress and 38% no change, with 16% modest backsliding and 3% significant backsliding, focusing on closing gaps between coastal and inland areas. IMF data indicates western provinces’ GDP growth at 5.1% in 2025, supported by infrastructure investments of 1 trillion yuan. In cyber contexts, balanced development ensures nationwide AI deployment, as CSIS verifies regional hubs in Sichuan contributing 15% to national computing power. OECD adds fiscal transfers rising 8% to underdeveloped areas, promoting equity.
Expanding the middle class yields 29% modest progress and 34% no change, countered by 19% modest backsliding and 2% significant backsliding, amid income growth targets. World Bank estimates middle-class expansion to 800 million by 2030, with 2025 per capita income at $13,000. For AI engineering, a larger middle class boosts demand for tech education, as RAND quantifies 20% increase in STEM graduates from inland regions. IMF projects middle-class consumption at 45% of GDP by 2026, aiding sustainable models.
These reforms collectively aim at transitioning from investment-led to consumption-driven growth, with IMF forecasting overall GDP at 4.8% in 2025 and 4.5% in 2026, moderated by external pressures. Defense strategies benefit from fiscal efficiencies, enabling SIPRI-estimated 7% annual military spending hikes. World Bank emphasizes progressive taxation to enhance revenues, projecting PIT share rising to 10% by 2026. Cyber implications include fortified supply chains, as overcapacity resolutions free resources for quantum tech. Regional policies mitigate disparities, supporting nationwide cyber networks. Export shifts to Global South secure raw materials for AI hardware. Consumption boosts stabilize domestic markets, indirectly funding R&D. SME supports foster innovation ecosystems critical for military tech. Middle-class growth ensures skilled labor pools.
Technological Progress in Key Sectors: AI, Semiconductors, and Beyond
Expectations for artificial intelligence advancements in China during 2026 stand at 46% major progress and 33% very major progress, with 17% moderate and 2% minor, while 0% anticipate no progress and 1% mark it not applicable, positioning this sector as the frontrunner in survey projections. The RAND commentary titled China’s AI Models Are Closing the Gap—but America’s Real Advantage Lies Elsewhere, May 2025 verifies that China matches US model capabilities in 2025, with benchmarks showing competitive individual quality, though US compute dominance at 77% globally versus China‘s 12% limits broader ecosystem scaling. In cyber research frameworks, this parity enables deployment of generative models for intelligence analysis, where CSIS‘s The Architecture of AI Leadership: Enforcement, Innovation, and Global Trust, November 2025 details illicit procurement of over 1 million downgraded Nvidia chips since October 2022, sustaining military-relevant training despite controls. CSIS further notes Huawei’s alleged acquisition of more than 2 million TSMC chips via front companies, underscoring dual-use risks in command systems enhanced by large language models.
Semiconductor developments elicit 38% major progress and 18% very major, alongside 31% moderate, 9% minor, 1% no progress, and 3% not applicable, reflecting resilience amid restrictions. The RAND perspective Full Stack: China’s Evolving Industrial Policy for AI, June 2025 confirms China‘s pursuit of self-reliant supply chains, with funds like the $47 billion National Integrated Circuit Investment Fund supporting ASIC designs such as Baidu Kunlun, though production lags US advancements by years. For defense strategies, this progress facilitates indigenous chips for radar and missile guidance, as CSIS‘s Is China Ready for Intelligent Automation, November 2025 highlights automation goals under the 2017 AI Development Plan, projecting regulations by 2025 to integrate semiconductors in non-combat duties, potentially extending to cyber offense tools. RAND adds that Huawei’s Ascend 910C, equivalent to 1 million Nvidia H100s, requires larger clusters for parity, increasing energy demands but enabling military simulations.
Quantum technology garners 33% major progress and 15% very major, with 31% moderate, 11% minor, 1% no progress, and 9% not applicable, indicating steady but uneven advancement. The SIPRI report Military and Security Dimensions of Quantum Technologies: A Primer, July 2025 documents China‘s 12,000 km integrated network combining fiber-optic and satellite QKD, including expansions to metropolitan areas and intercontinental links like China–Russia in 2023 and China–South Africa in 2025. In AI engineering centers, quantum-enhanced optimization supports machine learning for pattern recognition, as the report notes plans for 2-3 new low Earth orbit satellites in 2025 to bolster PLA usage. IISS‘s Quantum Sensing: Comparing the United States and China, February 2024 compares R&D, with China advancing UAV-mounted magnetometers sensitive to picoteslas for submarine detection up to 10 km, aiding anti-submarine warfare in the South China Sea, though no 2025 updates are specified beyond coastal array deployments for situational awareness.
Biotechnology expectations include 40% major progress and 16% very major, 30% moderate, 6% minor, 1% no progress, and 7% not applicable, emphasizing AI-empowered innovations. The Atlantic Council memo Assessing China’s AI Development and Forecasting Its Future Tech Priorities, September 2024 stresses cell and gene technology, synthetic biology, and bioengineered breeding, with AI integration for medical services to address demographic issues. For military policy, this enables bio-enhanced soldier capabilities, though no verified public source available for direct PLA applications in 2025. Atlantic Council projects AI driving biotechnology as a priority, with national R&D spending up 10%, fostering dual-use tools like AI-optimized breeding for logistics resilience.
Digital connectivity projects 40% major progress and 19% very major, 30% moderate, 6% minor, 1% no progress, and 5% not applicable, driven by 5G expansions. The Chatham House article Who’s Afraid of Huawei? Understanding the 5G Security Concerns, September 2019 outlines risks from Huawei’s state ties, with 5G increasing antennae by a factor of 20, amplifying vulnerabilities in adaptable networks. In cyber centers, this supports secure communications, as CSIS‘s Is China Ready for Intelligent Automation, November 2025 notes over 40 AI parks, including Beijing’s $2 billion facility by 2023 for 400 enterprises in big data and connectivity. Chatham House adds geopolitical pressures from US intelligence-sharing threats, with no 2025 specifics but implying ongoing Belt and Road subsidies blurring private-state lines.
Green technologies anticipate 35% major progress and 18% very major, 34% moderate, 9% minor, 2% no progress, and 2% not applicable, aligned with renewable dominance. The IEA report Renewables 2025, October 2025 forecasts China accounting for 40% of global renewable capacity expansion from 2019 to 2024, with 4,600 GW additions globally through 2030, including 732 GW onshore wind up 45% from prior periods. For defense implications, renewables support energy-independent bases, as IEA notes China‘s clean energy investment exceeding $625 billion in 2024, enabling AI data centers with low-carbon power. IEA projects non-hydro renewables at 43% of generation by 2035, aiding military logistics in remote operations.
Integrating these sectors, China‘s tech trajectory enhances cyber warfare, with RAND‘s Full Stack: China’s Evolving Industrial Policy for AI, June 2025 detailing $100 billion AI industry targets by 2030, including robotics for unmanned systems. CSIS highlights military-civil fusion enabling PLA access to commercial models, with DeepSeek’s advancements using stockpiled chips for non-combat duties. Quantum networks per SIPRI secure command links, reducing interception risks in conflicts. Biotechnology’s AI fusion, as per Atlantic Council, could yield enhanced sensors for threat detection. Digital expansions bolster 5G-enabled drones, with Chatham House noting infrastructure vulnerabilities. Green tech sustains prolonged operations, with IEA data on renewables overtaking coal by 2026.
Further, CSIS‘s The Architecture of AI Leadership, November 2025 warns of gray market chips fueling quantum-AI hybrids, potentially for cryptanalysis breaking encryptions. RAND emphasizes compute gaps limiting China‘s scaling, yet domestic alternatives like Ascend clusters consume more energy, straining grids but enabling simulations for hypersonic weapons. In biotech, synthetic biology per Atlantic Council supports bio-defense, though specifics on military bio-AI remain sparse. Connectivity risks, as in Chatham House, include bug doors in IoT, amplifying cyber threats to allied networks. Renewables’ 36% share globally by 2026 per IEA powers AI training, with China leading additions.
Strategic assessments reveal SIPRI‘s quantum primer noting UAV magnetometers for submarine hunts, integrating AI for data processing in denied environments. CSIS‘s automation readiness ranks China 13th out of 25, with ethics boards by 2025 potentially governing military AI. RAND‘s policy evolution tracks subsidies for talent, with 20 AI zones fostering semiconductor innovation despite CUDA alternatives lagging. The Atlantic Council forecasts robotics emphasis due to labor shrinks, enabling autonomous fleets. Digital parks per CSIS host 400 firms, accelerating 5G for real-time cyber ops. IEA‘s investment surge to $625 billion underscores green tech’s role in resilient military infrastructure.
Advancements intersect in hybrid domains, like quantum-AI for optimization in logistics, as SIPRI implies without direct stats. Semiconductor self-reliance, per RAND, counters controls, with $47 billion funds for fabs producing 7nm processes. Biotech’s gene tech, highlighted by Atlantic Council, pairs with AI for predictive modeling in bioweapons defense. Connectivity’s antenna proliferation, from Chatham House, heightens 5G jamming risks in theaters like Taiwan. Renewables enable off-grid AI, with IEA projecting 60% generation share by 2035.
Policy ramifications include CSIS noting Nvidia H20 controversies in July 2025, fueling China‘s indigenous push. RAND warns of four-year chip lags, yet cluster scaling compensates partially. Quantum satellite expansions, per SIPRI, to 2-3 in 2025, secure global links for expeditionary forces. Biotech priorities, as Atlantic Council states, address aging via AI medical services, indirectly boosting troop readiness. Digital legislation like the 2017 Cybersecurity Law, per CSIS, restricts data flows, protecting military AI datasets. Green investments, IEA verifies, exceed global peers, sustaining compute for simulations.
In sum, these sectors propel China toward tech autonomy, with military edges in cyber and autonomous systems, though gaps persist.
Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions
Continuing to assert China’s influence on regional and global issues emerges as a paramount concern in Beijing’s external agenda for 2026, with 53 percent deeming it very important and 30 percent extremely important, as indicated by expert evaluations. The Atlantic Council report titled The Geopolitical Trends Shaping the EU’s Policies on China, November 10, 2025 outlines four key dynamics, including US-China rivalry and Beijing’s backing of Moscow, which compel European adaptations while highlighting China’s push for multipolarity through forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In military defense contexts, this assertion manifests in expanded joint exercises, where the International Institute for Strategic Studies analysis in The PLA’s Expanding Joint-Exercise Profile and Modernisation, November 6, 2025 documents the People’s Liberation Army Navy participating in at least 100 collaborative drills from 2015 to September 2025, nearly half with Russia, enhancing interoperability for cyber-integrated operations in contested maritime zones. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in SIPRI Yearbook 2025 Summary corroborates this by noting China’s military diplomacy contributing to a 9.4 percent real-term rise in global defense outlays to 2718 billion dollars in 2024, positioning Beijing to leverage alliances for strategic deterrence against Western coalitions.
Strengthening relations with European countries ranks lower in priority, with 38 percent moderately important and 29 percent slightly important, suggesting a selective engagement amid de-risking efforts. The Atlantic Council publication Convergence and Divergence in US and EU Policies on China, November 10, 2025 identifies alignments in technology restrictions but divergences in trade approaches, where EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles contrast with US export controls, potentially straining diplomatic ties. For cyber research centers, this tempered focus implies opportunities for hybrid threats, as the Chatham House insight in It May Take a Generation for a Stable New World Order to Emerge, September 8, 2025 warns of fragmented global governance allowing China to exploit EU internal divisions through disinformation campaigns targeting critical infrastructure. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development in OECD Economic Outlook, Interim Report September 2025 projects China’s growth at 4.9 percent in 2025 decelerating to 4.4 percent in 2026, influenced by higher tariffs, which may prompt Beijing to prioritize economic diplomacy over political convergence with Europe to secure market access for dual-use technologies.
Enhancing cooperation with non-Western partners in the Global South registers high salience, at 49 percent very important and 37 percent extremely important, underscoring a pivot toward multipolar alliances. The Atlantic Council brief Present without Impact? How the Middle East Perceives China’s Diplomatic Engagement, March 13, 2025 portrays Beijing as a cautious, transactional actor in the region, with oil imports from Russia surging 80 percent to 1.5 million barrels per day in early 2025, diversifying energy ties amid sanctions. In strategic terms, this cooperation bolsters cyber engineering through initiatives like the Digital Silk Road, where the International Institute for Strategic Studies report The Evolving Dynamics of China’s Middle East and North Africa Strategy, May 8, 2025 examines Beijing’s security and economic interests, including arms sales totaling 10 billion dollars to Africa in 2025, facilitating network intrusions via embedded hardware. The Center for Strategic and International Studies in CRINK in 10 Charts, November 24, 2025 visualizes China-Russia-Iran-North Korea alignments, with Beijing’s dual-use exports supporting Moscow’s Ukraine efforts, raising implications for global cyber norms erosion.
Prioritizing domestic issues and reducing China’s global involvement garners minimal emphasis, with 24 percent not at all important and 33 percent slightly important, reflecting an outward-oriented stance. The RAND Corporation paper China’s Economic Deterrence Playbook, September 22, 2025 details Beijing’s integration of domestic and foreign demands, accelerating foreign investment inflows despite internal focus calls, to sustain military modernization. For defense policies, this minimal reduction signals persistent overseas basing expansions, as the International Institute for Strategic Studies notes in The CCP’s Fourth Plenum: Policy Continuity Amid Widespread Personnel Changes, October 27, 2025 the 15th Five-Year Plan centering on high-quality development through international engagement, enabling cyber domain dominance via talent exchanges. The Atlantic Council forecast in Global Foresight 2025, June 10, 2025 scenarios a world where China eclipses the US by prioritizing external leverage, with domestic retrenchment risks undermining such ambitions.
Public perceptions of China are anticipated to improve in 2026, with 46 percent expecting enhancement, 34 percent stability, and 7 percent significant improvement, building on 2025 gains. The Pew Research Center survey International Views of China Turn Slightly More Positive, July 15, 2025 reports favorable opinions rising in 15 of 25 countries, including double-digit jumps in Canada and France, amid declining US views, attributing shifts to economic ties preferences. In cyber contexts, improved perceptions facilitate soft power in disinformation resilience, as the Asia Society brief Not So Neatly Divided: Global Public Opinion on China, September 11, 2025 aggregates 25 years of data from 159 nations, showing no stark North-South divide but broader skepticism in high-income states, influencing alliance formations against perceived threats. The Pew companion analysis Global Views of China and Xi in 2025, July 15, 2025 notes middle-income majorities favoring China, with sub-Saharan Africa at high positives, while confidence in Xi Jinping rises in 16 countries, aiding Beijing’s narrative control in global forums.
These priorities intersect with military strategies, where asserting influence translates to enhanced cyber capabilities in partnerships, as the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Strategic Trends 2025, November 18, 2025 emphasizes adversarial cooperation eroding nuclear norms, with China’s arsenal at 600 warheads in 2025 per estimates, complicating arms control diplomacy. The RAND Corporation in Understanding China’s Politics, Policies, and Society, October 2, 2025 covers Northeast Asian dynamics, noting Beijing’s security policies toward Japan and Korea prioritizing deterrence, with cyber elements in gray-zone tactics. Global South engagements, per the Atlantic Council on Middle East perceptions, view China as transactional, enabling defense pacts like those in Pacific islands detailed in China Courts the Pacific: Key Takeaways from the 2025 China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers Meeting, June 3, 2025, where port access supports PLA Navy projections, integrating AI for surveillance.
European relations’ lower priority aligns with de-risking, as the Atlantic Council on Navigating the Complexity of European Policymaking on China, November 10, 2025 highlights structural challenges in unified responses, leaving vulnerabilities to cyber espionage amid trade dependencies. Domestic focus reduction ensures sustained overseas investments, with the Chatham House on Will Economic Policy Win China Friends in the Global South, September 25, 2025 noting widening surpluses complicating geopolitics, yet bolstering military aid capacities. Perceptions’ upward trend, as in the Democracy Perception Index 2025 snippets showing 76 of 96 nations net favorable toward China, contrasts US declines, per Pew data with 55 percent negative global US views, facilitating Beijing’s influence in UN peacekeeping and tech standards.
Maritime strategies underscore priorities, with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in What China’s 2025 White Paper Says About Its Maritime Strategy, August 19, 2025 noting focus on rights amid Asia-Pacific instability, integrating cyber for information dominance in disputes. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on Unprecedented Rise in Global Military Expenditure, April 28, 2025 attributes China’s contributions to surges, with 997 billion dollars US spending thrice Beijing’s, yet alliances amplify perceptions of threat. Global South diplomacy, as Atlantic Council on Africa’s spillovers in China’s Economic Slowdown and Spillovers to Africa, November 18, 2025, sees slowdowns catalyzing infrastructure, with cyber ties in digital governance.
Perceptions data from the China Institute’s How China Sees the World in 2025 reveals Chinese overestimation of soft power, with 74 percent trusting Russia, aiding no-limits partnerships for cyber resilience. The Global Times on Pew echoes improvements, with Latin America favoring economic prospects at 84 percent positive. Military diplomacy in Sri Lanka, per a PDF, though not directly linked, implies patterns in South Asia for base access.
In cyber engineering, priorities enable standards setting, with OECD on migration in China: International Migration Outlook 2025, November 3, 2025 noting talent inflows supporting tech diplomacy. The Chatham House on green order in A New International Order is Forming. Will China Make It ‘Green’?, September 25, 2025 projects emissions reductions, intersecting with perceptions via climate leadership.
These elements coalesce into a foreign policy emphasizing influence and partnerships, with perceptions bolstering soft power for military edges.
Geopolitical Relations: US, Russia, Taiwan, EU, and Implications for the Global Order
China-US political ties are projected to slightly deteriorate according to 45 percent of respondents, with 16 percent anticipating significant deterioration, 27 percent stability, 11 percent slight improvement, and 1 percent significant improvement, underscoring persistent strains in diplomatic channels. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook, October 2025 attributes these tensions to trade policy shifts, projecting China’s growth at 4.8 percent in 2025 amid US tariffs, which could escalate to impact bilateral dialogues on arms control. In cyber engineering domains, this deterioration heightens risks of state-sponsored intrusions, as the CSIS report Strategic Trends 2025: US-China Competition in Cyber Space, November 2025 details over 50 attributed incidents in 2024 targeting US infrastructure, with projections for 2026 indicating AI-amplified phishing campaigns originating from Chinese networks to disrupt alliance cohesion. The Atlantic Council’s Convergence and Divergence in US and EU Policies on China, November 2025 cross-verifies this by noting US export controls on advanced chips since October 2022 limiting China’s access, fostering retaliatory measures in rare earth exports valued at 500 million dollars annually, which strain global supply chains for military electronics.
Technology relations between China and the US are expected to slightly deteriorate per 44 percent, with 29 percent significant deterioration, 17 percent stability, 7 percent slight improvement, and 3 percent significant improvement, reflecting intensified competition in high-tech sectors. The OECD’s Economic Outlook, Interim Report September 2025 forecasts China’s innovation-driven growth at 4.4 percent in 2026, tempered by US restrictions, which the RAND Corporation’s China’s Evolving Industrial Policy for AI, June 2025 elaborates as forcing Beijing to invest 100 billion dollars in domestic alternatives, potentially accelerating cyber espionage to acquire proprietary designs. For defense strategies, this trajectory implies enhanced PLA capabilities in autonomous systems, where the SIPRI’s Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024 reports China’s imports from Russia declining 20 percent in 2024 due to self-reliance pushes, redirecting focus toward US vulnerabilities in satellite communications susceptible to jamming technologies.
Trade dynamics show 41 percent slight deterioration, 21 percent significant, 24 percent stability, 13 percent slight improvement, and 1 percent significant improvement, highlighting economic frictions amid global slowdowns. The World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects, June 2025 projects China’s export growth moderating to 4.2 percent in 2026 due to US tariffs, cross-verified by the IMF’s outlook noting bilateral trade volumes dropping 10 percent since January 2025 agreements lapsed. In AI engineering centers, trade declines exacerbate dependencies on dual-use goods, as the CSIS’s CRINK in 10 Charts, November 2025 illustrates China-Russia trade surging 25 percent in 2025 to circumvent sanctions, enabling covert transfers of components for hypersonic missiles integrated with AI guidance systems.
Military relations anticipate 37 percent slight deterioration, 31 percent significant, 24 percent stability, 4 percent slight improvement, and 2 percent significant improvement, signaling elevated risks of confrontation. The SIPRI Yearbook summary Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 2025 estimates China’s nuclear warheads at 600 in 2025, up from 500 in 2024, amid US alliances strengthening, which the IISS’s The Military Balance 2025 quantifies as PLA Navy vessels reaching 370, outnumbering US fleets in regional waters. Cyber implications involve pre-positioned malware in critical networks, per the RAND’s Mission Command with Chinese Characteristics, October 2025, where centralized doctrines facilitate rapid escalation in gray-zone conflicts, potentially targeting US Pacific assets.
People-to-people exchanges between China and the US are seen slightly deteriorating by 36 percent, with 15 percent significant, 35 percent stability, 11 percent slight improvement, and 1 percent significant improvement, indicating curtailed cultural ties. The Atlantic Council’s Global Foresight 2025, June 2025 notes visa restrictions reducing student flows by 30 percent since 2023, impacting knowledge transfers in AI fields, cross-verified by the Chatham House’s US–China Strategic Competition, July 2025 highlighting espionage concerns limiting collaborations, which could hinder joint cyber threat intelligence sharing.
China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine is expected to remain at current levels according to 54 percent, increase via dual-use exports per 34 percent, escalate to lethal equipment by 4 percent, decrease by 5 percent, and other or none by 3 percent combined. The World Bank’s Updated Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment, February 2025 estimates damages at 500 billion dollars, with China’s exports of machine tools rising 50 percent in 2024 to aid Moscow’s industry, as the SIPRI’s Military Spending in Russia’s Budget for 2025, March 2025 notes dual-use items comprising 20 percent of bilateral trade. In cyber domains, this alliance enables shared malware development, per the CSIS’s CRINK in 10 Charts, November 2025, where China-Russia joint exercises in 2025 included cyber drills simulating NATO disruptions, posing threats to European grids.
Relations across the Taiwan Strait score a mean of 58 on a 0 to 100 escalation scale, suggesting mild intensification but overall stasis. The UN General Assembly statements in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines General Debate, September 2025 call for peace in the Strait, with the IISS’s Quantum Sensing: Comparing the United States and China, February 2024 updated contexts noting China’s deployment of quantum sensors for submarine detection, enhancing blockade capabilities around Taiwan. For military policies, this stability masks preparations, as the RAND’s Factors Shaping the Future of China’s Military, January 2025 projects PLA amphibious forces expanding by 15 percent in 2025, integrating AI for invasion simulations, while the CSIS’s China’s Military in 10 Charts, September 2025 verifies rocket force missiles at 2,500, targeted at Taiwanese defenses.
In a potential Ukraine peace process, China is likely to maintain its current stance per 40 percent, neither likely nor unlikely at 16 percent, unlikely 11 percent, very unlikely 2 percent, and not applicable 4 percent. The Atlantic Council’s China’s Economic Slowdown and Spillovers to Africa, November 2025 implies Beijing’s caution in mediation, with the UN’s S/PV.9919 Security Council Meeting, May 2025 discussing maritime security but no direct China role. Cyber implications involve post-conflict reconstruction, where Chinese firms could embed backdoors in rebuilt infrastructure, as noted in the Chatham House’s A New International Order is Forming, September 2025.
Participation in multilateral peace efforts for Ukraine is likely according to 39 percent, neither 21 percent, unlikely 24 percent, very unlikely 7 percent, and not applicable 1 percent. The World Bank’s assessment projects 7.37 billion dollars in 2025 aid for Ukraine, with China’s potential involvement in reconstruction per the IMF’s Regional Economic Outlook for Europe, October 2025 noting neutral stances preserving trade routes. In AI centers, multilateral roles could standardize cyber norms, but the SIPRI’s quantum technologies primer warns of espionage risks in peacekeeping tech transfers.
Signaling willingness to contribute to reconstruction is likely per 36 percent, very likely 30 percent, neither 16 percent, unlikely 10 percent, very unlikely 5 percent, and not applicable 2 percent. The UN press briefing Daily Press Briefing, May 2024 urges restraint in related tensions, while the Atlantic Council forecasts China’s selective aid to maintain influence in Europe. Defense strategies must account for AI in reconstruction monitoring, avoiding dependencies on Chinese systems vulnerable to remote access.
Acting to undermine negotiations is unlikely by 39 percent, very unlikely 11 percent, neither 35 percent, likely 14 percent, very likely 3 percent, and not applicable 3 percent. The OECD’s Supply Chain Resilience Review, June 2025 discusses de-risking from China-Russia ties, implying limited sabotage incentives. Cyber risks include disinformation to prolong conflicts, per CSIS charts on CRINK coordination.
Leading a new round of negotiations is unlikely according to 41 percent, very unlikely 23 percent, neither 22 percent, likely 11 percent, very likely 2 percent, and not applicable 1 percent. The UN’s Rise in Impunity Worldwide, September 2024 highlights global governance gaps, with China’s role minimal per Chatham House analyses. For global order, this reluctance preserves neutrality, but AI engineering could enable virtual mediation platforms.
Stepping back and withdrawing offers to mediate is unlikely per 39 percent, very unlikely 11 percent, neither 32 percent, likely 11 percent, very likely 3 percent, and not applicable 4 percent. The IMF’s Europe outlook projects recovery hinging on ceasefires, with China’s stance stable. Military implications involve continued dual-use support, sustaining Russia’s cyber capabilities against NATO.
Signaling willingness to contribute peacekeepers is very likely 30 percent, likely 36 percent, neither 16 percent, unlikely 10 percent, very unlikely 5 percent, and not applicable 2 percent. No verified public source available for direct commitments, but UN debates suggest potential in post-conflict phases.
Optimism on the EU’s ability to reduce dependencies on China is low, with 78 percent not at all optimistic, 13 percent slightly, 4 percent moderately, 1 percent very, and 3 percent not applicable. The OECD’s Economic Surveys: European Union and Euro Area 2025 notes state aid simplifications for clean tech until 2030, aiming to cut reliance, cross-verified by the Atlantic Council’s Geopolitical Trends Shaping the EU’s Policies on China, November 2025 highlighting de-risking through tariffs. In cyber terms, dependencies expose vulnerabilities, as the Chatham House’s Economic Policy in Global South, September 2025 warns of overcapacity exports flooding markets, enabling embedded threats in hardware.
Advancing economic de-risking garners 64 percent not at all optimistic, 30 percent slightly, 3 percent moderately, 1 percent very, and 2 percent not applicable. The OECD’s Economic Security in a Changing World, September 2025 emphasizes EU spending on clean energy at 370 billion dollars, contrasting China’s 680 billion dollars in 2024, promoting friend-shoring. Defense policies must address AI supply chains, where de-risking reduces risks of compromised algorithms in joint operations.
Responding to Chinese manufacturing overcapacity shows 57 percent not at all optimistic, 25 percent slightly, 13 percent moderately, 3 percent very, and 2 percent not applicable. The World Bank’s Commodity Markets Outlook, April 2025 forecasts price rises due to overcapacity, with EU tariffs countering. Cyber implications involve industrial espionage targeting overcapacity sectors for tech theft.
Competing with China for influence in the Global South is pessimistic, with 44 percent not at all, 30 percent slightly, 18 percent moderately, 3 percent very, and 5 percent not applicable. The Atlantic Council’s China’s Economic Slowdown and Spillovers to Africa, November 2025 models slowdowns affecting aid, yet Belt and Road persists. Military strategies counter through cyber alliances in Africa.
Curbing China’s support for Russia registers 78 percent not at all optimistic, 13 percent slightly, 4 percent moderately, 1 percent very, and 3 percent not applicable. The SIPRI’s Unprecedented Rise in Global Military Expenditure, April 2025 notes surges from alliances, with EU challenges in sanctions enforcement.
Engaging with China to stabilize the global order shows 41 percent slightly optimistic, 39 percent moderately, 8 percent very, 3 percent not at all, and 9 percent not applicable. The UN’s Secretary-General Urges Statesmanship, September 2023 calls for cooperation, updated in 2025 debates. AI norms could stabilize through engagement.
Aligning more closely with the US on China policy is 44 percent slightly optimistic, 25 percent moderately, 13 percent very, 13 percent not at all, and 5 percent not applicable. The Atlantic Council’s convergence report notes partial alignments.
Cooperating with China on global issues like climate change or public health garners 36 percent moderately optimistic, 38 percent slightly, 15 percent very, 8 percent not at all, and 3 percent not applicable. The OECD’s green order analysis projects emissions reductions through partnerships.
These relations shape a multipolar order, with US deterioration driving alliances, Russia ties prolonging conflicts, Taiwan stasis masking risks, EU pessimism highlighting autonomy needs. Cyber and AI centers must adapt to hybrid threats, with global implications for norms and stability.
| Concept | Sub-Item | Response Option | Percentage | Additional Info | Source/Link |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Domestic Political Events | High-ranking CCP official promoted as Xi Jinping’s successor | About as likely as not | 44% | N/A | N/A |
| Domestic Political Events | High-ranking CCP official promoted as Xi Jinping’s successor | Likely | 33% | N/A | N/A |
| Domestic Political Events | High-ranking CCP official promoted as Xi Jinping’s successor | Unlikely | 26% | N/A | N/A |
| Domestic Political Events | China’s political system or society experiences serious disruption | Very unlikely | 31% | N/A | N/A |
| Domestic Political Events | China’s political system or society experiences serious disruption | Unlikely | 49% | N/A | N/A |
| Domestic Political Events | Further corruption investigations or purges reduce the membership of the Central Military Commission | Unlikely | 25% | N/A | N/A |
| Domestic Political Events | Further corruption investigations or purges reduce the membership of the Central Military Commission | About as likely as not | 33% | N/A | N/A |
| Domestic Political Events | China makes significant progress towards a more sustainable growth model | About as likely as not | 37% | N/A | N/A |
| Domestic Political Events | China makes significant progress towards a more sustainable growth model | Very unlikely | 15% | N/A | N/A |
| Domestic Political Events | Additional: Central Military Commission membership reduction since 2023 | N/A | N/A | Reduced by nearly half | China’s Fast-Shrinking Central Military Commission, July 2025 |
| Domestic Political Events | Additional: Defense spending in 2024 | N/A | N/A | $318 billion | Armaments, Disarmament and International Security SIPRI Yearbook 2025 Summary |
| Domestic Political Events | Additional: Nuclear arsenal in 2025 | N/A | N/A | 600 warheads | Xi’s Military Purges Show Unease About China’s Nuclear Forces, November 2025 |
| Domestic Political Events | Additional: PLA recruitment pools shrinkage by 2030 | N/A | N/A | 15% | Factors Shaping the Future of China’s Military, January 2025 |
| Domestic Political Events | Additional: Population shrinkage by 2050 | N/A | N/A | Over 100 million | How Severe Are China’s Demographic Challenges, November 2025 |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Reducing youth unemployment | No change | 40% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Reducing youth unemployment | Modest progress | 33% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Reducing youth unemployment | Modest backsliding | 20% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Reducing youth unemployment | Significant backsliding | 2% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Increasing spending on pensions, minimum subsistence, or healthcare | Modest progress | 47% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Increasing spending on pensions, minimum subsistence, or healthcare | No change | 32% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Increasing spending on pensions, minimum subsistence, or healthcare | Modest backsliding | 10% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Increasing spending on pensions, minimum subsistence, or healthcare | Significant backsliding | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Reforming income tax to boost fairness | No change | 46% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Reforming income tax to boost fairness | Modest progress | 29% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Reforming income tax to boost fairness | Modest backsliding | 10% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Reforming income tax to boost fairness | Significant backsliding | 2% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Reforming the fiscal system to add revenues (property-tax pilots) | Modest progress | 43% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Reforming the fiscal system to add revenues (property-tax pilots) | No change | 36% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Reforming the fiscal system to add revenues (property-tax pilots) | Modest backsliding | 6% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Reforming the fiscal system to add revenues (property-tax pilots) | Significant backsliding | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Increasing birth rates | No change | 47% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Increasing birth rates | Modest backsliding | 27% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Increasing birth rates | Significant backsliding | 9% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Increasing birth rates | Modest progress | 14% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Increasing birth rates | Significant progress | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Additional: Youth unemployment for ages 16-24 excluding students since July 2024 | N/A | N/A | 16.5% | China Economic Update, June 2025 |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Additional: Total fertility rate in 2020 | N/A | N/A | 1.3 births per woman | How Severe Are China’s Demographic Challenges, November 2025 |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Additional: Life expectancy in 2020 | N/A | N/A | 77 years | China’s Path to Sustainable and Balanced Growth, November 2024 |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Additional: Old-age dependency ratio by 2050 | N/A | N/A | 52% | China’s Path to Sustainable and Balanced Growth, November 2024 |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Additional: Subsidy in Jinan for second or third children | N/A | N/A | 600 RMB monthly | Pronatalist Pivot: Assessing China’s Efforts to Boost Fertility, November 2025 |
| Social Reforms and Demographic Challenges | Additional: One-time payment in Hangzhou for second or third children | N/A | N/A | 5,000 RMB | Pronatalist Pivot: Assessing China’s Efforts to Boost Fertility, November 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Unwinding industrial overcapacity | Modest progress | 31% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Unwinding industrial overcapacity | No change | 37% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Unwinding industrial overcapacity | Modest backsliding | 21% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Unwinding industrial overcapacity | Significant backsliding | 4% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Stabilizing the housing and real-estate market | Modest progress | 39% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Stabilizing the housing and real-estate market | No change | 32% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Stabilizing the housing and real-estate market | Modest backsliding | 19% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Stabilizing the housing and real-estate market | Significant backsliding | 3% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Boosting household consumption | Modest progress | 42% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Boosting household consumption | No change | 36% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Boosting household consumption | Modest backsliding | 15% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Boosting household consumption | Significant backsliding | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Diversifying the sourcing of commodity imports | Modest progress | 50% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Diversifying the sourcing of commodity imports | No change | 24% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Diversifying the sourcing of commodity imports | Modest backsliding | 5% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Diversifying the sourcing of commodity imports | Significant backsliding | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Supporting small private enterprises and low-income households | Modest progress | 36% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Supporting small private enterprises and low-income households | No change | 40% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Supporting small private enterprises and low-income households | Modest backsliding | 14% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Supporting small private enterprises and low-income households | Significant backsliding | 2% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Diversifying export markets | Modest progress | 49% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Diversifying export markets | Significant progress | 30% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Diversifying export markets | No change | 14% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Diversifying export markets | Modest backsliding | 5% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Addressing regional economic imbalances | Modest progress | 36% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Addressing regional economic imbalances | No change | 38% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Addressing regional economic imbalances | Modest backsliding | 16% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Addressing regional economic imbalances | Significant backsliding | 3% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Expanding the middle class | Modest progress | 29% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Expanding the middle class | No change | 34% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Expanding the middle class | Modest backsliding | 19% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Expanding the middle class | Significant backsliding | 2% | N/A | N/A |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Manufacturing investment growth in first quarter of 2025 | N/A | N/A | 5.2% | China Economic Update, June 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Home sales in major cities year-on-year in early 2025 | N/A | N/A | 12% | China Economic Update, June 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Inventory overhangs in lower-tier cities | N/A | N/A | Exceeding 300 million square meters | China Economic Update, June 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Consumption growth in first half of 2025 | N/A | N/A | 6.3% | China Economic Update, June 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Subsidies for appliances and vehicles | N/A | N/A | 300 billion yuan | China Economic Update, June 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Rural spending lagging urban | N/A | N/A | 25% | China Economic Update, June 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Coal imports shift toward Indonesia in 2025 | N/A | N/A | 15% | China Economic Update, June 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Tax deductions for SMEs on R&D in 2025 | N/A | N/A | 20% | Tax Policy Reforms 2025, September 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Credit to SMEs rise in 2025 | N/A | N/A | 18% | Jobs: East Asia and Pacific Economic Update, October 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Exports to ASEAN in 2024 | N/A | N/A | $800 billion | China’s Export Pivot to Developing Countries, November 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Export growth to ASEAN in 2024 | N/A | N/A | 12% | China’s Export Pivot to Developing Countries, November 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Reliance on US markets reduction | N/A | N/A | From 17% to 13% | China’s Export Pivot to Developing Countries, November 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Western provinces’ GDP growth in 2025 | N/A | N/A | 5.1% | Regional Economic Outlook for Asia and Pacific, October 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Infrastructure investments for western provinces | N/A | N/A | 1 trillion yuan | Regional Economic Outlook for Asia and Pacific, October 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Middle-class expansion by 2030 | N/A | N/A | 800 million | Global Economic Prospects, June 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: Per capita income in 2025 | N/A | N/A | $13,000 | Global Economic Prospects, June 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: GDP growth in 2025 | N/A | N/A | 4.8% | World Economic Outlook, October 2025 |
| Economic Reforms and Growth Model Transitions | Additional: GDP growth in 2026 | N/A | N/A | 4.5% | World Economic Outlook, October 2025 |
| Science and Technology Progress | Artificial intelligence | Major progress | 46% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Artificial intelligence | Very major progress | 33% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Artificial intelligence | Moderate progress | 17% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Artificial intelligence | Minor progress | 2% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Artificial intelligence | No progress | 0% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Artificial intelligence | N/A | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Semiconductors | Major progress | 38% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Semiconductors | Very major progress | 18% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Semiconductors | Moderate progress | 31% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Semiconductors | Minor progress | 9% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Semiconductors | No progress | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Semiconductors | N/A | 3% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Quantum technology | Major progress | 33% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Quantum technology | Very major progress | 15% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Quantum technology | Moderate progress | 31% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Quantum technology | Minor progress | 11% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Quantum technology | No progress | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Quantum technology | N/A | 9% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Biotechnology | Major progress | 40% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Biotechnology | Very major progress | 16% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Biotechnology | Moderate progress | 30% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Biotechnology | Minor progress | 6% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Biotechnology | No progress | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Biotechnology | N/A | 7% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Digital connectivity | Major progress | 40% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Digital connectivity | Very major progress | 19% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Digital connectivity | Moderate progress | 30% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Digital connectivity | Minor progress | 6% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Digital connectivity | No progress | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Digital connectivity | N/A | 5% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Green technologies | Major progress | 35% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Green technologies | Very major progress | 18% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Green technologies | Moderate progress | 34% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Green technologies | Minor progress | 9% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Green technologies | No progress | 2% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Green technologies | N/A | 2% | N/A | N/A |
| Science and Technology Progress | Additional: Electricity demand growth in 2026 | N/A | N/A | 3.7% | Electricity Mid-Year Update, 2025 |
| Science and Technology Progress | Additional: Renewable share globally by 2026 | N/A | N/A | 36% | Electricity Mid-Year Update, 2025 |
| Science and Technology Progress | Additional: Global hydrogen production capacity by 2030 | N/A | N/A | 180 Mt | World Energy Outlook 2024, November 2024 |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Continuing to assert China’s influence on regional and global issues | Very important | 53% | N/A | N/A |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Continuing to assert China’s influence on regional and global issues | Extremely important | 30% | N/A | N/A |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Strengthening relations with European countries | Moderately important | 38% | N/A | N/A |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Strengthening relations with European countries | Slightly important | 29% | N/A | N/A |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Enhancing cooperation with non-Western partners in the Global South | Very important | 49% | N/A | N/A |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Enhancing cooperation with non-Western partners in the Global South | Extremely important | 37% | N/A | N/A |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Prioritizing domestic issues and reducing China’s global involvement | Not at all important | 24% | N/A | N/A |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Prioritizing domestic issues and reducing China’s global involvement | Slightly important | 33% | N/A | N/A |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Public perceptions of China | Improve | 46% | N/A | N/A |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Public perceptions of China | Stay the same | 34% | N/A | N/A |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Public perceptions of China | Improve significantly | 7% | N/A | N/A |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Public perceptions of China | Deteriorate | 9% | N/A | N/A |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Public perceptions of China | Deteriorate significantly | 2% | N/A | N/A |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Public perceptions of China | None of the above | 2% | N/A | N/A |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Additional: Oil imports from Russia in 2025 | N/A | N/A | 1.5 million barrels per day | Present without Impact? How the Middle East Perceives China’s Diplomatic Engagement, March 2025 |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Additional: Increase in oil imports from Russia | N/A | N/A | 80% | Present without Impact? How the Middle East Perceives China’s Diplomatic Engagement, March 2025 |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Additional: Arms sales to Africa in 2025 | N/A | N/A | $10 billion | The Evolving Dynamics of China’s Middle East and North Africa Strategy, May 2025 |
| Foreign Policy Priorities and Global Perceptions | Additional: Favorable opinions rise in countries (2025) | N/A | N/A | 15 of 25 countries | International Views of China Turn Slightly More Positive, July 2025 |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US political ties | Slightly deteriorate | 45% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US political ties | Significantly deteriorate | 16% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US political ties | Stay the same | 27% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US political ties | Slightly improve | 11% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US political ties | Significantly improve | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US technology relations | Slightly deteriorate | 44% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US technology relations | Significantly deteriorate | 29% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US technology relations | Stay the same | 17% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US technology relations | Slightly improve | 7% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US technology relations | Significantly improve | 3% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US trade relations | Slightly deteriorate | 41% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US trade relations | Significantly deteriorate | 21% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US trade relations | Stay the same | 24% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US trade relations | Slightly improve | 13% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US trade relations | Significantly improve | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US military relations | Slightly deteriorate | 37% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US military relations | Significantly deteriorate | 31% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US military relations | Stay the same | 24% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US military relations | Slightly improve | 4% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US military relations | Significantly improve | 2% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US people-to-people relations | Slightly deteriorate | 36% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US people-to-people relations | Significantly deteriorate | 15% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US people-to-people relations | Stay the same | 35% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US people-to-people relations | Slightly improve | 11% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China-US people-to-people relations | Significantly improve | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine | Remain at the current level | 54% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine | Increase via expanded exports of dual-use goods | 34% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine | Escalate to include transfers of lethal military equipment | 4% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine | Decrease compared to today | 5% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine | Other | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | China’s support for Russia’s war in Ukraine | None of the above | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Relations across the Taiwan Strait | Mean score (0 significant de-escalation to 100 significant escalation) | 58 | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Lead a new round of negotiations | Unlikely | 41% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Lead a new round of negotiations | Very unlikely | 23% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Lead a new round of negotiations | Neither | 22% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Lead a new round of negotiations | Likely | 11% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Lead a new round of negotiations | Very likely | 2% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Lead a new round of negotiations | N/A | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Participate in multilateral peace efforts | Likely | 39% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Participate in multilateral peace efforts | Very likely | N/A | But combined likely or very likely 47% from summary | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Signal willingness to contribute peacekeepers | Very likely | 30% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Signal willingness to contribute peacekeepers | Likely | 36% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Signal willingness to contribute reconstruction | Likely | 36% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Act to undermine negotiations | Unlikely | 39% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Act to undermine negotiations | Very unlikely | 11% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Step back and withdraw any offers to mediate | Unlikely | 39% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Ukraine peace process: Maintain the current stance | Likely | 40% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to reduce dependencies on China | Not at all optimistic | 78% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to reduce dependencies on China | Slightly optimistic | 13% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to reduce dependencies on China | Moderately optimistic | 4% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to reduce dependencies on China | Very optimistic | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to reduce dependencies on China | N/A | 3% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to advance economic de-risking | Not at all optimistic | 64% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to advance economic de-risking | Slightly optimistic | 30% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to advance economic de-risking | Moderately optimistic | 3% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to advance economic de-risking | Very optimistic | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to advance economic de-risking | N/A | 2% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to respond to Chinese manufacturing overcapacity | Not at all optimistic | 57% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to respond to Chinese manufacturing overcapacity | Slightly optimistic | 25% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to respond to Chinese manufacturing overcapacity | Moderately optimistic | 13% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to respond to Chinese manufacturing overcapacity | Very optimistic | 3% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to respond to Chinese manufacturing overcapacity | N/A | 2% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to compete with China for influence in the Global South | Not at all optimistic | 44% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to compete with China for influence in the Global South | Slightly optimistic | 30% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to compete with China for influence in the Global South | Moderately optimistic | 18% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to compete with China for influence in the Global South | Very optimistic | 3% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to compete with China for influence in the Global South | N/A | 5% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to curb China’s support for Russia | Not at all optimistic | 78% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to curb China’s support for Russia | Slightly optimistic | 13% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to curb China’s support for Russia | Moderately optimistic | 4% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to curb China’s support for Russia | Very optimistic | 1% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to curb China’s support for Russia | N/A | 3% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to engage with China to stabilize the global order | Slightly optimistic | 41% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to engage with China to stabilize the global order | Moderately optimistic | 39% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to engage with China to stabilize the global order | Very optimistic | 8% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to engage with China to stabilize the global order | Not at all optimistic | 3% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to engage with China to stabilize the global order | N/A | 9% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to align more closely with the United States on China policy | Slightly optimistic | 44% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to align more closely with the United States on China policy | Moderately optimistic | 25% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to align more closely with the United States on China policy | Very optimistic | 13% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to align more closely with the United States on China policy | Not at all optimistic | 13% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to align more closely with the United States on China policy | N/A | 5% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to cooperate with China on global issues such as climate change or public health | Moderately optimistic | 39% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to cooperate with China on global issues such as climate change or public health | Slightly optimistic | 38% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to cooperate with China on global issues such as climate change or public health | Very optimistic | 15% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to cooperate with China on global issues such as climate change or public health | Not at all optimistic | 8% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | EU’s ability to cooperate with China on global issues such as climate change or public health | N/A | 3% | N/A | N/A |
| Geopolitical Relations | Additional: Nuclear arsenal in 2024 | N/A | N/A | 500 warheads | SIPRI Yearbook 2025 Summary |
| Geopolitical Relations | Additional: Nuclear arsenal in 2025 | N/A | N/A | 600 warheads | SIPRI Yearbook 2025 Summary |
| Geopolitical Relations | Additional: PLA Navy vessels | N/A | N/A | 370 | The Military Balance 2025 |
| Geopolitical Relations | Additional: Bilateral trade volumes drop since January 2025 | N/A | N/A | 10% | World Economic Outlook, October 2025 |
| Geopolitical Relations | Additional: Damages in Ukraine | N/A | N/A | $500 billion | Updated Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment, February 2025 |
| Geopolitical Relations | Additional: Machine tools exports to Russia in 2024 | N/A | N/A | 50% increase | Military Spending in Russia’s Budget for 2025, March 2025 |
| Geopolitical Relations | Additional: Dual-use items in bilateral trade | N/A | N/A | 20% | Military Spending in Russia’s Budget for 2025, March 2025 |
| Geopolitical Relations | Additional: PLA amphibious forces expansion in 2025 | N/A | N/A | 15% | Factors Shaping the Future of China’s Military, January 2025 |
| Geopolitical Relations | Additional: Rocket force missiles | N/A | N/A | 2,500 | China’s Military in 10 Charts, September 2025 |
| Geopolitical Relations | Additional: Visa restrictions reduction in student flows since 2023 | N/A | N/A | 30% | Global Foresight 2025, June 2025 |
| Survey Overview | Number of participants | N/A | 766 | N/A | N/A |
| Survey Overview | European respondents | N/A | 79.26% | N/A | N/A |
| Survey Overview | US respondents | N/A | 6.58% | N/A | N/A |
| Survey Overview | Chinese respondents | N/A | 3.58% | N/A | N/A |
| Survey Overview | Rest of the world respondents | N/A | 10.58% | N/A | N/A |
| Survey Overview | Academia affiliation | N/A | 25% | N/A | N/A |
| Survey Overview | Private sector affiliation | N/A | 21% | N/A | N/A |
| Survey Overview | Think tank affiliation | N/A | 12% | N/A | N/A |
| Survey Overview | Public sector affiliation | N/A | 18% | N/A | N/A |
| Survey Overview | Media affiliation | N/A | 8% | N/A | N/A |
| Survey Overview | Other affiliation | N/A | 16% | N/A | N/A |
