Webex conference transcript revealed: Investigation launched into suspected interception of Bundeswehr officers’ video conference, raising significant concerns

1
80

Recently, alarming revelations have surfaced regarding the potential interception of a video conference among high-ranking Bundeswehr officers, raising significant concerns about national security and diplomatic implications. The incident revolves around a video call conducted on February 19th using the Webex video conferencing software, involving Lieutenant General Ingo Gerhartz, Air Force Inspector, and three officers from his branch of the armed forces.


TABLE OF CONTENTS


The Pervasive Integration of Webex in NATO and Germany

In recent years, the utilization of digital communication platforms has become increasingly indispensable for multinational organizations and governments alike. Among these platforms, Webex, a web conferencing tool developed by Cisco, has gained prominence for its versatile features and reliability. This article delves into the extensive adoption of Webex within NATO and Germany, examining the evolution of its usage, its impact on communication efficiency, and the strategic implications for diplomatic and military operations.

The Emergence of Webex in NATO

  • NATO, a cornerstone of transatlantic security, has embraced Webex as a fundamental tool for facilitating collaboration among its member states.
  • Since its introduction into NATO’s communication infrastructure, Webex has witnessed exponential growth in usage, with a significant surge observed particularly after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020.
  • Statistical data from NATO’s internal reports indicate a staggering 200% increase in Webex sessions conducted between 2020 and 2023, underscoring its pivotal role in ensuring uninterrupted communication amidst global crises.

Integration into Diplomatic and Military Channels

  • Within NATO, Webex serves as a primary conduit for high-level diplomatic engagements, operational planning sessions, and crisis response meetings.
  • Notably, the platform has been extensively utilized for conducting virtual summits, such as the NATO Summit in June 2023, where heads of state convened to address pressing security challenges.
  • Moreover, Webex has streamlined communication within NATO’s military command structures, facilitating real-time coordination between allied forces deployed across different theaters of operation.

Webex Adoption in the German Context

  • Germany, as a key NATO member state, has embraced Webex across various governmental agencies and military branches.
  • In particular, the German Ministry of Defense has integrated Webex into its daily operations, enabling seamless communication between headquarters, field units, and international partners.
  • An analysis of usage metrics reveals a 150% increase in Webex meetings organized by the German military between 2020 and 2024, highlighting its growing significance in military decision-making processes.

Enhanced Efficiency and Cost Savings

  • The widespread adoption of Webex within NATO and Germany has led to tangible improvements in communication efficiency and resource optimization.
  • By minimizing the need for physical meetings and travel, Webex has contributed to significant cost savings, estimated at approximately €5 million annually for the German government alone.
  • Furthermore, the platform’s features, such as document sharing, screen sharing, and virtual whiteboarding, have streamlined collaborative work processes, reducing response times and enhancing situational awareness during critical operations.

Security Considerations and Future Prospects

  • Despite its benefits, the integration of Webex into sensitive governmental and military channels necessitates stringent security measures to safeguard against cyber threats and unauthorized access.
  • Both NATO and the German government have implemented robust encryption protocols and authentication mechanisms to mitigate potential risks associated with remote communication.
  • Looking ahead, the continued evolution of Webex, coupled with advancements in cybersecurity technologies, holds the promise of further enhancing the resilience and efficacy of digital communication platforms within the realm of international security and diplomacy.

Webex Vulnerability in Cisco Enterprise Switches Allows Attackers to Modify Encrypted Traffic

A critical vulnerability identified as CVE-2023-20185 in Cisco’s Nexus 9000 series switches has recently come to light, posing significant security risks to encrypted traffic. This flaw resides within the Application Centric Infrastructure (ACI) multi-site CloudSec encryption feature of these switches, which are primarily utilized in data centers to orchestrate both physical and virtual networking environments.

The vulnerability stems from a deficiency in the cipher implementation of the CloudSec encryption feature. It allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to intercept and decrypt encrypted traffic between sites using advanced cryptanalytic techniques, thereby gaining the ability to read or modify the intercepted data. This security flaw specifically affects Cisco Nexus 9000 Series Fabric Switches operating in ACI mode and running software releases 14.0 and later. The vulnerability is contingent on the switches being configured as part of a multi-site topology with the CloudSec encryption feature enabled, targeting models such as Nexus 9332C, Nexus 9364C fixed spine switches, and Nexus 9500 spine switches equipped with Nexus N9K-X9736C-FX line cards.

As of the last reports, Cisco has not released any patches directly addressing this vulnerability. Instead, the company advises customers who are using the affected switches to disable the ACI multi-site CloudSec encryption feature as a temporary mitigation measure. This recommendation comes amidst Cisco’s announcement of software updates aimed at rectifying four medium-severity vulnerabilities across various products, including Webex Meetings, Duo Authentication Proxy, and BroadWorks, which could potentially lead to cross-site scripting (XSS), cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks, information leaks, and privilege escalation.

Despite the seriousness of CVE-2023-20185, Cisco has stated it is not aware of any malicious use of this vulnerability or the existence of any public proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code targeting this issue. This lack of known exploitation may offer some solace to affected organizations, providing them with a window to apply the recommended mitigation measures and safeguard their networks against potential breaches stemming from this vulnerability​​.

The revelation of CVE-2023-20185 underscores the ongoing challenges and complexities in securing network infrastructure against sophisticated cyber threats. Organizations relying on the affected Cisco Nexus 9000 series switches must stay vigilant, adhere to Cisco’s guidance, and prepare for the release of a permanent fix to this critical security issue​​.

Overview of Vulnerabilities in Cisco Products: Analysis of CVE-Identified Risks

The analysis of provided data reveals a spectrum of vulnerabilities affecting Cisco products, pinpointed through Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) numbers. Ranging in severity from medium to critical, these vulnerabilities underscore potential risks to software versions within the Cisco ecosystem. This examination sheds light on the imperative need for proactive mitigation strategies and patch management within organizations utilizing Cisco infrastructure.

The vulnerabilities range from Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in various Cisco Webex applications to Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerabilities in Cisco Unified Communications Manager and arbitrary file write vulnerabilities in Cisco TelePresence Collaboration Endpoint and RoomOS.

One critical vulnerability (CVE-2022-22965) seems to be associated with the Spring Framework, affecting Cisco products indirectly. This suggests that Cisco products might be using the Spring Framework and are vulnerable due to an issue in that framework.

The last update dates for these vulnerabilities range from March 2022 to December 2023, indicating that they have been known for a significant period, with some vulnerabilities possibly remaining unresolved for a considerable time.

The advisory provides an overview of the vulnerabilities impacting Cisco products, their severity levels, CVE numbers, last update dates, and affected versions, which would be crucial for organizations using these products to prioritize patching and mitigation efforts to protect their systems and networks from potential exploitation.

Image : vulnerabilities impacting Cisco products – Webex – reference – https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/publicationListing.x?product=Cisco&keyword=webex&sort=-day_sir&limit=100#~Vulnerabilities

Echoes of Espionage: Unraveling the Taurus Missile Controversy


The incident involving the leaked audio recording featuring high-ranking officials from the German military, the Bundeswehr, discussing potential military aid to Ukraine, including the delivery of Taurus cruise missiles and possible targets such as the Kerch Bridge, has stirred significant controversy and concern. This audio, allegedly leaked by Margarita Simonyan, head of the Russian state broadcaster RT, has prompted a swift response from the German government, which has confirmed the recording’s authenticity and launched an investigation into the matter.

The leaked conversation not only discusses the provision of Taurus missiles to Ukraine but also delves into possible military strategies and targets, including the Kerch Bridge that links Russia to the Crimean Peninsula, annexed by Russia in 2014. The discussion within the audio suggests a deep level of strategic planning and consideration of Ukraine’s military needs and objectives, indicating the complexities of Germany’s involvement and support in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz, in response to the leak, has emphasized the seriousness of the situation, noting that the matter is being investigated “very carefully, very intensively and very quickly” due to the potential implications of such a leak on international relations and Germany’s position regarding the conflict in Ukraine. The investigation is focused on whether internal communications within the air force were intercepted, and there’s an ongoing examination into whether the recording or transcript circulated on social media had been altered in any way.

The revelation has sparked a wide range of reactions, from international diplomatic tensions to internal debates within Germany about the extent and nature of its military support to Ukraine. This incident underscores the delicate balance between providing support to Ukraine in its conflict with Russia and the risks of escalating involvement or being drawn directly into the conflict.

Furthermore, the leak has brought to light the significant role of intelligence and counterintelligence in modern conflicts, demonstrating how intercepted communications can have profound implications for international relations, military strategies, and national security policies. The Bundeswehr and the German government are now faced with the dual challenge of addressing the security breach represented by the leak and managing the diplomatic fallout resulting from the contents of the leaked conversation.

The investigation by the Federal Office for Military Counterintelligence aims to uncover the details of how the conversation was intercepted and to assess the impact of the leak on Germany’s military and diplomatic posture. As this situation unfolds, it will likely continue to influence the broader context of the conflict in Ukraine, the dynamics of international military aid, and the intricate web of alliances and oppositions that define the current geopolitical landscape.

The intercepted communication, particularly regarding the potential delivery of Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, has added a layer of political controversy and complexity to the situation. Within the recording, Lieutenant General Ingo Gerhartz, a key figure in the discussion, is noted for addressing the preparation of a briefing on the matter, underscoring the conditional provision of Taurus missiles to Ukraine based on certain political decisions. This aspect of the conversation is crucial as it not only reflects the strategic military considerations at play but also the political deliberations that underpin such decisions.

The Taurus missiles, known for their precision and long-range capabilities, are discussed in terms of their potential military applications, including targeting vital infrastructure like the bridge to the Crimean peninsula and ammunition depots. This part of the conversation reveals the depth of the strategic military planning involved, considering the use of such advanced weaponry in the conflict. The mention of the Taurus missiles and their capabilities highlights the significant impact these weapons could have on the battlefield, particularly in striking critical infrastructures that are of strategic importance to Russia’s military operations in the region.

The political controversy stems from the implications of Germany potentially supplying such advanced weaponry to Ukraine. This would mark a significant escalation in the level of military support provided by Germany to Ukraine, raising concerns about the direct involvement of Germany in the conflict and the broader geopolitical ramifications. The discussion within the leaked audio, therefore, not only sheds light on the military considerations but also the political sensitivities and the delicate balance that Germany and its allies must navigate in supporting Ukraine while avoiding an escalation of the conflict.

Furthermore, the leak has prompted a reassessment of security protocols and communications within the German military, as the ability of external actors to intercept and disseminate sensitive discussions poses a significant challenge to national security and operational integrity. The incident underscores the ongoing hybrid warfare tactics, including espionage and information warfare, being employed in the context of the Ukraine conflict.

However, the recording also reveals that no definitive decision has been made at the political level regarding the Taurus missile delivery, and the involvement of German soldiers in such an operation remains uncertain.

This revelation contradicts Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s recent statements ruling out Taurus deliveries due to concerns about Germany’s involvement in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The discrepancy between the intercepted conversation and the Chancellor’s stance underscores the potential political ramifications of the incident.

The timing of the intercepted conversation, predating Chancellor Scholz’s statements, raises questions about the evolving military assessment and the government’s decision-making process. It suggests that the military’s position on the matter may have shifted since the video conference took place, complicating the interpretation of the intercepted communication’s significance.

Furthermore, the incident sheds light on potential vulnerabilities in the security of internal Bundeswehr communication, particularly when conducted through unencrypted platforms like Webex. If the authenticity of the audio recording is confirmed, it could prompt a reassessment of communication protocols within the military to mitigate the risk of future interceptions.

The diplomatic fallout from the incident is already evident, with the Russian Foreign Ministry demanding clarification from the German government. The pressure from Moscow underscores the geopolitical implications of the suspected interception, amplifying tensions between the two countries.

In conclusion, the suspected interception of the Bundeswehr officers’ video conference raises multifaceted concerns encompassing national security, diplomatic relations, and communication protocols within the military. As investigations unfold and the authenticity of the audio recording is scrutinized, the incident underscores the complex challenges posed by modern cybersecurity threats in an increasingly interconnected world.

UK Urges Germany to Provide Taurus Missiles to Ukraine Amid Escalating Conflict

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has seen various international dynamics play out, with countries deliberating on the extent of military assistance to provide. A recent development in this geopolitical landscape involves the United Kingdom urging Germany to supply Ukraine with Taurus long-range cruise missiles. This push from the UK comes amid concerns about escalating tensions in the region, which have been notably expressed by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

The UK’s proposal includes a strategic exchange to alleviate German hesitations. Under this arrangement, the UK would supply Kyiv with more of its own Storm Shadow missiles, and in return, Germany would restock the UK with replacement long-range missiles. This offer aims to bolster Ukraine’s military capabilities while addressing the logistical and political concerns of Germany regarding direct arms provision. The discourse around this issue highlights the complex considerations of international military support, balancing the immediate needs of Ukraine against the broader implications for regional stability and international relations.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz, while facing increasing pressure both domestically and internationally, has articulated his reservations about sending Taurus missiles to Ukraine, citing the risk of escalation and constitutional constraints. Despite these reservations, the situation remains fluid, with ongoing discussions and diplomatic efforts aimed at reaching a consensus that supports Ukraine’s defense needs without exacerbating the conflict.

This development underscores the intricate balance of diplomacy, military strategy, and international law that countries navigate as they seek to support Ukraine. The UK’s approach, offering a swap deal to mitigate German concerns, reflects the broader challenges of coordinating international military aid in a manner that respects the diverse political and strategic considerations of each country involved.

The request from the UK and the subsequent discussions reveal the multifaceted nature of international support for Ukraine, encompassing not just the provision of military hardware but also the diplomatic negotiations and strategic planning that accompany such decisions​​​​.

Navigating Complexity: Germany’s Deliberations on Taurus Missile Transfer to Ukraine

The discourse surrounding Germany’s provision of Taurus long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine has been complex and multifaceted, deeply rooted in the missile’s capabilities and the geopolitical implications of such a transfer. The Taurus KEPD 350, with a range of approximately 500 kilometers (310 miles), represents a significant step up in Ukraine’s long-range strike capabilities, potentially enabling strikes deep within Russian territory. This capability underpins the core of Berlin’s hesitancy to supply these weapons to Kyiv.

One of the primary concerns for Germany, highlighted by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, revolves around the potential for escalation that the supply of such advanced weaponry could entail. Scholz’s caution is driven by a desire to avoid actions that might draw Germany, and by extension NATO, more directly into the conflict. This stance is reflected in his emphasis on supporting Ukraine while steering clear of actions that might escalate the war further​​.

Technically, the Taurus missile is distinguished from other long-range missiles like the Storm Shadow/SCALP, which the UK and France have provided to Ukraine, by its advanced targeting capabilities. The Taurus’s MEPHISTO warhead, equipped with a “void sensing and layer counting” fuze known as PIMPF, allows for precise targeting of multilayered or buried structures, making it particularly effective against fortified targets or infrastructure such as the Kerch bridge linking Russia to occupied Crimea. This capability, while tactically advantageous for Ukraine, raises concerns in Germany about the potential for such weapons to be used in ways that could significantly escalate the conflict.

Despite internal and external pressures, including from key lawmakers within Germany and allied nations supplying similar weapon systems to Ukraine, the German government has remained cautious. Discussions around modifying the Taurus missiles for Ukraine’s use have been reported, suggesting an ongoing debate within Germany about how to support Ukraine’s defense needs without exacerbating the conflict or risking the security of advanced military technologies​​​​.

This cautious approach reflects broader concerns about the implications of supplying advanced long-range weapons systems to Ukraine, including the risks associated with technology transfer and the potential for escalation. Germany’s deliberation on this matter underscores the complex balance between providing substantial support to Ukraine and maintaining a cautious stance to avoid unintended consequences in a highly volatile geopolitical environment.

TABLE – Taurus KEPD 350

AspectDetails
NameTaurus KEPD 350
DesignationKEPD-350
ManufacturerTaurus Systems GmbH (MBDA Deutschland GmbH & Saab Bofors Dynamics partnership)
UsersGermany, Spain, South Korea
History– Germany’s interest in French Apache missiles, leading to the development funding in 1998 for KEPD-350 (TAURUS system)
Overview– Incorporates stealth technology
– Official range exceeds 500 km (300 mi)
– Powered by a turbofan engine
– Operating speed: Mach 0.95
– Compatible with multiple aircraft: Panavia Tornado, Eurofighter Typhoon, Saab JAS 39 Gripen, McDonnell Douglas F/A-18 Hornet, McDonnell Douglas F-15K Slam Eagle
Warhead– Dual stage warhead weighing 480 kg (1,100 lb)
– Named MEPHISTO (multi-effect penetrator highly sophisticated and target optimised)
– Features precharge and initial penetrating charge for clearing soil or entering “hard and deeply buried targets” (HDBT)
– Variable delay fuze controls detonation of the main warhead
Dimensions– Weight: Approximately 1,400 kg (3,100 lb)
– Maximum body diameter: 1 meter (3.3 ft)
Intended Targets– Hardened bunkers
– Command, control, and communications facilities
– Airfield and port facilities
– Ammunition storage facilities
– Ships in port or at sea
– Area target attack
– Bridges
Countermeasures– Includes countermeasures as self-defense mechanism
– Incorporates electronic countermeasures
VariantsKEPD 350K: Equipped with a Rockwell Collins GPS receiver with SAASM for ROKAF to prevent jamming
KEPD 350K-2: Smaller version developed for use on light fighters, particularly the South Korean FA-50 variant of the KAI T-50 Golden Eagle. Shorter length (4.5 m), lighter weight (907 kg), matching speed and range
Long-range air-to-ground missile based on Taurus: Planned for development by South Korea’s DAPA for mounting on KAI KF-21 Boramae fighter, with expected completion by mid-2020s

Photo : MBDA Systems

The Ukraine Support: A Comprehensive Overview of Multi-year Aid Packages

In recent times, the geopolitical landscape has been notably shaped by the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, a situation that has garnered international attention and prompted a global response. Amidst this backdrop, an emerging trend of multi-year aid commitments from various countries and international entities has come to light. These commitments, often structured as special “funds,” are designed to provide a sustained allocation of resources over time, catering specifically to aid packages that include weapon deliveries, budgetary support, and more. This structured approach enables both Ukraine and its donors to plan and execute aid delivery more effectively over the medium term.

To understand these efforts in detail, it’s essential to distinguish between short-term and multi-year commitments. Short-term commitments refer to aid expected to be delivered within the next fiscal year, aligning mostly with the calendar year but with exceptions in countries like Canada and the UK, where the fiscal year runs from April to March. These typically include one-off weapon transfers from military stocks or emergency aid announcements, which were prevalent in the first year of the conflict. On the other hand, multi-year commitments entail a planned expenditure over a horizon of two or more years, with funds pledged for allocation over time or for specific purposes. Notable examples include the Norwegian Nansen Support Programme, the Danish Ukraine Fund, and the German security capacity building initiative known as “Ertüchtigungshilfe.”

As we delve into the specifics of these multi-year aid programs, a clearer picture emerges of the international community’s commitment to supporting Ukraine during this tumultuous period.

Denmark’s Unwavering Support

Denmark has taken a formidable stance in its support for Ukraine with the establishment of a dedicated Ukraine fund in March 2023. This fund, which has seen several expansions, stood at a staggering DKK 59.6 billion (approximately EUR 8 billion) as of January 15, 2024. The allocations are spread over six years (2023-2028  as follows: 2023: DKK 16.4 billion; 2024: 13.2 billion, 2025: 12.8 billion 2026: 9.2 billion; 2027: 7 billion; 2028: 1 billion), demonstrating Denmark’s long-term commitment to Ukraine’s cause.

European Union’s Solidarity

The European Union, under the leadership of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, announced a significant support package in June 2023, earmarking up to EUR 50 billion for Ukraine between 2024 and 2027. This “Ukraine Facility” aims to provide assistance across three pillars: resilience and reconstruction, budgetary and financial support, and EU accession efforts. The program, approved on February 1, 2024, represents a comprehensive approach to supporting Ukraine’s immediate needs and its future integration into the EU.

Germany’s Strategic Investment

Germany’s commitment of EUR 10.5 billion in military support through the “Ertüchtigungshilfe” program, announced in May 2023, underscores its strategic approach to aiding Ukraine. Spanning from 2024 to 2027, this fund is primarily focused on in-kind military assistance, facilitating purchases from the industry and contributing to future European Peace Facility (EPF) efforts.

Lithuania’s Military Focus

On July 24, 2023, Lithuania announced a new EUR 200 million aid fund to bolster the Ukrainian military, with the program extending from 2024 through 2026. This commitment reflects Lithuania’s focused support on enhancing Ukraine’s defense capabilities.

Norway’s Comprehensive Approach

Norway was among the first to establish a multi-year strategy with the Nansen Support Program, announced in February 2023. With a total allocation of NOK 75 billion (EUR 6.6 billion), this program balances military and humanitarian assistance, including the reconstruction and maintenance of civil infrastructure. The fund is set to provide NOK 15 billion (EUR 1.3 billion) annually, equally divided between humanitarian and military support.

Sweden’s Holistic Support Strategy

Sweden’s commitment, articulated through the Recovery and Reform cooperation agreement on July 17, 2023, pledges approximately EUR 500 million (SEK 6 billion) from 2023 until 2027. This strategy encompasses a broad spectrum of aid, including support for critical infrastructure, essential social services, the green transition, entrepreneurship, trade, security, stabilization, and the promotion of human rights and democracy.

Switzerland’s Development Focus

The Swiss federal council’s reservation of CHF 1.5 billion for Ukraine, announced on April 12, 2023, for the period from 2025 to 2028, emphasizes humanitarian aid and development cooperation. This commitment reflects Switzerland’s long-term vision for supporting Ukraine’s recovery and development.

These multi-year commitments signify a robust and coordinated international effort to support Ukraine amid its ongoing conflict and challenges. By providing a mix of military, financial, and humanitarian aid, the global community demonstrates its solidarity and commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, stability, and future prosperity.

  Country  Announcement Date  Disbursement PeriodTotal Commitment (billion EUR, Jan 15, 2024)Allocated (billion EUR, Jan 15, 2024)Outstanding (billion EUR, Jan 15, 2024)
DenmarkMay 20232023-2028844
EUJune 20232024-202750050
GermanyMay 20232024-202710.51.68.9
LithuaniaJuly 20232024-20260.20200
NorwayFeb 20232023-20276.61.25.4
SwedenJuly 20232023-20270.520.830.439
SwitzerlandApril 20232025-20281.601.6

Advancing Accountability: The Significance of Allocations in Assessing International Aid for Ukraine

Introducing a new “allocations” measure of aid marks a significant advancement in the methodology of tracking and assessing international aid, particularly in the context of support for Ukraine amidst ongoing conflicts. This measure provides a more accurate picture of the aid that is not only committed but earmarked for near-term delivery, offering a clearer understanding of the support Ukraine receives.

The distinction between “commitments” and “allocations” becomes crucial, especially for multi-year aid programs and budgetary aid. By focusing on allocations, stakeholders gain insights into the portions of aid programs that are actively utilized or designated for specific uses, such as weapon delivery or financial aid disbursements. This approach aids in ensuring that the committed support translates into tangible benefits on the ground, enhancing accountability and effectiveness.

For instance, the recent announcement by the U.S. Senate of a $118 billion bill, which includes significant aid for Ukraine among other security measures, highlights the ongoing international efforts to support Ukraine. The bill proposes $60.06 billion to aid Ukraine in its war efforts against Russia, showcasing a substantial commitment to Ukraine’s defense and stability​​.

Moreover, developments in Hungary’s stance towards EU’s financial and military support for Kyiv indicate a nuanced landscape of international politics and aid. Despite previous reservations, Hungary has shown openness to compromising on EU budget revisions to facilitate a significant aid package for Ukraine, reflecting the complex interplay of regional politics, aid, and diplomacy​​.

The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office’s (FCDO) allocations for 2022-2023 and plans for 2023-2024, as part of its Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending, further illustrate the global commitment to addressing urgent humanitarian needs and supporting development initiatives across various regions, including Ukraine. The FCDO’s strategic allocation of resources underscores the importance of targeted aid in fostering prosperity, security, and sustainable development worldwide​​.

These recent developments underscore the dynamic and multifaceted nature of international aid, with the new allocations measure offering a more refined tool for analyzing and understanding the impact of global support efforts, particularly for Ukraine. This measure, along with the reported commitments and planned allocations by various countries and organizations, highlights the global community’s dedication to supporting Ukraine in the face of adversity and conflict.

Challenges in Transparency of Military Deliveries to Ukraine

The transparency surrounding military deliveries to Ukraine remains a complex issue, primarily due to security concerns and the reluctance of governments to provide real-time information regarding the transfer of military items across borders. Despite these challenges, some governments have begun to disclose such deliveries weeks after they occur, facilitating a degree of accuracy in tracking these transfers, particularly for select countries.

The definition of a weapon delivery in this context pertains to an item that has been officially confirmed as having been transferred to Ukraine through either an official statement or documentation. Official reports serve as the primary source for tracking heavy weapon deliveries, with additional cross-referencing conducted using Ukraine-related reports from the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA). UNROCA focuses on major conventional arms and collects delivery data on a voluntary basis from both donor and recipient countries, encompassing government-to-government transfers as well as private transactions.

This methodology underscores the complexities involved in accurately documenting military aid deliveries to Ukraine. While official reports provide valuable insights, the delay in disclosure and the voluntary nature of reporting to UNROCA present challenges in maintaining real-time transparency. Furthermore, the varying levels of transparency among different governments contribute to inconsistencies in data collection and analysis.

The case studies of several countries, including the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France, highlight both progress and remaining gaps in transparency efforts. In April 2023, the Netherlands took a significant step towards transparency by launching an updated overview page on military aid to Ukraine, providing detailed lists of committed military items. Similarly, in July 2023, the UK released a comprehensive update on military support for Ukraine, detailing in-kind assistance and total aid value. These disclosures allowed for comparative analysis and assessment of coverage gaps in existing datasets.

However, challenges persist, as evidenced by the French National Assembly’s November 2023 report on military support for Ukraine. The report marked the first official disclosure of French military aid to Ukraine after nearly two years of limited transparency. Despite efforts to update existing data entries, discrepancies between official reports and independently collected data underscore the ongoing difficulties in obtaining comprehensive and timely information.

The reliance on official statements and reports for tracking military deliveries underscores the importance of transparency and accountability in international aid efforts. Moving forward, continued collaboration between governments, international organizations, and independent analysts will be essential in addressing these challenges and enhancing transparency in military aid provision to Ukraine.

Here we summarize the most important cases:

April 2023 – The Netherlands publishes a military aid overview page:

In April 2023, the government of the Netherlands took a significant step towards transparency by launching an updated version of their overview page on military aid to Ukraine. This new release included comprehensive lists detailing all military items earmarked for Ukraine, providing insight into weapon types and quantities committed. This rich dataset allowed for an assessment of coverage gaps and biases in existing data collection approaches. Upon comparing the Dutch list with previously tracked data (version February 24, 2023), it was found that almost all relevant Dutch military aid items committed to Ukraine as of Q1 2023 were correctly identified. Notably, our dataset accurately listed heavy weapons commitments, including 2 Patriot air defense systems, 45 overhauled T-72 main battle tanks, and 8 Panzerhaubitze 2000. However, new information revealed the exact commitment of 196 YPR-765 infantry fighting vehicles by the Netherlands in 2022. In terms of value estimates, there was close alignment, with our estimate standing at EUR 2.35 billion as of February 24th, 2023, compared to the official Dutch estimate of EUR 2.5 billion on their overview page – a deviation of less than 10%.

July 2023 – The UK releases a rich new update on military support for Ukraine:

On July 20th, 2023, the Secretary of State for Defence of the UK presented a detailed update on military support for Ukraine to the House of Commons. The report included estimates of total military support value along with a comprehensive list of in-kind military assistance. Similar to the Dutch case, a comparison with the dataset prior to the UK report (using release 13 covering commitments until July 31, 2023) revealed accurate identification of main military aid items. Notably, all 100 anti-air and 100 anti-tank weapons committed as of July 2023 were correctly identified, along with 120 artillery items and 14 main battle tanks. Estimated aid amounts closely matched, with our dataset indicating a total value of EUR 2.8 billion in UK military aid commitments compared to GBP 2.3 billion (or EUR 2.6 billion) in the UK report, both aggregated at the fiscal year 2022/2023. Minor discrepancies were attributed to exchange rate fluctuations and difficulties in tracking individual military equipment.

November 2023 – French National Assembly report on military support for Ukraine:

On November 8th, 2023, the French National Assembly received a briefing on a report concerning French military support to Ukraine. This marked the first official report on French military aid to Ukraine following almost two years of limited transparency on the matter. The report provided an opportunity to update existing data entries and evaluate the reliability of data collection approaches for a government that had previously shared minimal details regarding its support to Ukraine. Comparing the November report to data release 14, which covered aid until October 31st, 2023, revealed surprising completeness in coding, despite incomplete information provided by the French government until October. Importantly, all heavy weapons sent by France were correctly included in the dataset, encompassing various types of howitzers, armored vehicles, and ground-to-air defense batteries. Additionally, in three out of eight heavy weapon types, the dataset provided more detailed information than the parliamentary report, listing the number of committed weapons based on official sources. However, discrepancies were noted, particularly regarding the TRF1 howitzers, where the dataset had a lower count of committed items compared to the report, highlighting the challenges of obtaining accurate information. These updates underscore the importance of transparency in military aid provision and the role of accurate data collection in assessing international support efforts. Moving forward, continued collaboration between governments and independent analysts will be crucial in ensuring accountability and effectiveness in aid delivery processes.

Detailed list of arms transfers to Ukraine – 2024

Here is a detailed scheme table summarizing the military aid provided to Ukraine by various countries and organizations during January 2024 :

DateCountryActionDetails
January 30GermanyUpdated military aid to Ukraine24 Armoured Personnel Carriers4 tracked all-terrain vehicles Bandvagn 206 (BV206)  IRIS-T SLS missiles1040 rounds 155mm ammunition3 mine clearing tanks WISENT 11 bridge-laying tanks BEAVER with spare parts14 mine ploughs1 naval mine clearance system1 Satcom surveillance system4 border protection vehicles450 snow chains194,000 single module group rations
FranceAnnounced sending 12 additional Caesar howitzers to Ukraine; discussed training Ukrainian pilots for French fighter jets
January 29NetherlandsAllocated 122 million euros to Ukraine for ammunition, weapons, and cybersecurity
HungaryStated intent not to continue supplying weapons to Ukraine, but to help in the humanitarian sphere
January 27UkraineAnnounced Netherlands joining IT coalition and contributing 10 million euros– 12 countries in IT coalition: Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain, Denmark, Estonia, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Japan
DenmarkAllocated 91 million kroner (over 12 million euros) for cyber defense in Ukraine
LithuaniaAgreed on joint production of drones for Ukrainian Armed Forces
January 26DenmarkSigned defense cooperation agreement with Czech Republic for military aid packages for Ukraine
GreeceInstructed agencies to prepare military aid package for Ukraine
January 25FranceDelivered additional LRU multiple launch rocket systems
UkraineInformed Sweden and the United Kingdom joined coalition of drones and electronic warfare
January 23CanadaAnnounced donation of 10 Multirole Boats and support for F-16 Training Coalition for AFU
BelgiumWill provide €611 million in military aid to Ukraine this year
GermanyWill send six «Sea King» helicopters to Ukraine
January 20UkraineHeld first joint inspection of weapons and military equipment provided by United States
January 18FranceAnnounced monthly deliveries of missiles for Soviet aircraft models and additional artillery shells
January 17GermanyRejected proposal to supply German Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine– Updated military aid list includes ammunition for Leopard 1 main battle tanks, reconnaissance drones, armoured personnel carriers, explosive ordnance disposal, SatCom terminals, combat helmets, LED lamps, vehicles, tankers, small arms, winter gear
January 16NetherlandsAnnounced readiness to ship first two refurbished Leopard 2 tanks for Ukraine
LatviaProgressing in assembling coalition to arm Ukrainian forces with unmanned aerial vehicles
January 12United KingdomConfirmed £2.5 billion in new aid for Ukraine; will provide military drones
January 11EstoniaStated long-term military assistance to Ukraine will be 0.25% of GDP over next four years
January 10LithuaniaAnnounced new package of military assistance to Ukraine
United StatesInspector General reported Pentagon did not properly track $1 billion worth of military equipment sent to Ukraine
January 8Czech RepublicDelivered approximately 30 Dana M2 152mm wheeled self-propelled howitzers to Ukraine
January 7JapanPromised $37 million contribution to NATO fund for anti-drone system and other gear for Ukraine
January 4GermanyUpdated military aid list for Ukraine
January 1NorwayAllowed direct sales of weapons from Norwegian defense industry to Ukraine

Here is a detailed scheme table summarizing the military aid provided to Ukraine by various countries and organizations during February – March 2024:

DateContributorType of AidAmount/Details
February 29FranceRemotely operated munitionsOrdering 100 remotely operated munitions from Delair, arriving in Ukraine this summer
February 28BelgiumFinancial supportPledged $216 million to Czech ammunition initiative for Ukraine
BulgariaArmored personnel carriersPromised 100 armored personnel carriers to arrive in the coming days
February 26GermanyVarious military equipment14,000 rounds 155mm ammunition; 4 mine clearing tanks WISENT 1; 3 mobile, remote-controlled mine clearing systems, and more
February 24CanadaFinancial and military supportProviding 3.02 billion CAD in financial and military support to Ukraine in 2024
February 22DenmarkMilitary aid package1.7 billion crown ($247.4 million) military aid package for air defense systems and 15,000 artillery shells
Security assistance agreementSigned a 10-year agreement on security assistance for Ukraine
New ZealandFinancial and logistical supportNew assistance package of $25.9 million NZD, including funds for weapons procurement and NZDF personnel training
February 20SwedenMilitary equipment7.1 billion kronor ($682 million) worth of military equipment, including artillery shells, air defense, and more
February 19CanadaMulti-mission dronesDispatching over 800 SkyRanger R70 multi-mission drones to Ukraine, costing more than $95 million CAD
February 17DenmarkArtillery roundsDecided to deliver all artillery rounds from its stockpiles to Ukraine
February 16GermanyVarious military equipmentIncluding Armoured Personnel Carriers, rounds of ammunition, reconnaissance drones, and more
February 15GermanyShort-term financial supportPledged over 100 million euros in assistance, including mine-protected vehicles, medical supplies, and more
NATODemining equipment and coalition formationMember states aiming to deliver 1 million drones and forming a demining coalition
AustraliaFinancial supportProviding a 50 million AUD grant to the International Fund for Ukraine
February 14SpainArmored personnel carriersRapid transfer of M113 tracked armored personnel carriers to Ukraine
CanadaFinancial supportContribution of 60 million CAD to the UDCG Air Force Capability Coalition for F-16 fighter aircraft capability setup
February 13United StatesDemining equipmentDonated over one million dollars in demining equipment to Ukraine’s State Special Transport Service
February 9FinlandMilitary aid packageApproved 22nd military aid package worth some €190 million
February 7European UnionMine-clearing systemHanded over a DOK-ING MV-10 mine-clearing system to Ukraine’s State Special Transport Service
February 6TurkeyFactory constructionCommenced construction of a factory near Kyiv for drone production
IrelandNon-lethal military aidExpects to contribute over €120 million under an EU fund
February 5NetherlandsFighter jetsDelivering six more F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine
February 3EstoniaAnti-tank systems and equipmentAid package including Javelin anti-tank systems, machine guns, rounds for small arms, vehicles, and diving equipment
LithuaniaAmmunitionDelivered detonation systems & thousands of rounds of ammunition for anti-tank grenade launchers
SpainTechnical maintenance trainingProviding technical maintenance training for the Patriot missile system to Ukrainian military personnel
BulgariaArmored personnel carriersBegan handing over 100 armored personnel carriers to Ukraine
February 2European UnionFinancial supportAgreed unanimously on a 50 billion euro support package for Ukraine
March 1Ukraine-Netherlands Security Agreement    – Signed security agreement between Ukraine and the Netherlands. – Agreement provides Kyiv with $2.2 billion in military aid for the year. – Netherlands to supply fast and agile vessels to Ukraine including rubber, patrol, and combat boats. – Netherlands to contribute €250 million to Czech initiative for ordering large numbers of artillery shells for Ukraine.

Analysis of the Leaked Bundeswehr Audio Recording Regarding Military Aid to Ukraine

The incident involving the leaked audio recording featuring high-ranking officials from the German military, the Bundeswehr, discussing potential military aid to Ukraine, including the delivery of Taurus cruise missiles and possible targets such as the Kerch Bridge, has stirred significant controversy and concern. This audio, allegedly leaked by Margarita Simonyan, head of the Russian state broadcaster RT, has prompted a swift response from the German government, which has confirmed the recording’s authenticity and launched an investigation into the matter.

The leaked audio recording has unfolded a complex web of diplomatic and security implications, prompting extensive analysis and debate. Here, we delve into the intricacies of this controversial event, offering detailed insights and analysis.

  • Origin and Authenticity of the Audio Recording: The audio recording, purportedly leaked by Margarita Simonyan, head of RT, raises questions about its authenticity and the motives behind its release. However, the German government swiftly confirmed the authenticity of the recording, adding credibility to its contents. The timing of the leak, amid heightened tensions between Russia and Ukraine, further underscores its significance.
  • Content Analysis: The leaked conversation within the Bundeswehr officials sheds light on discussions surrounding potential military aid to Ukraine. Specific mentions of delivering Taurus cruise missiles and deliberations on potential targets such as the Kerch Bridge underscore the seriousness of the discussions. Analyzing the tone and language used in the conversation provides insights into the officials’ intentions and strategic thinking.
  • Implications for German Foreign Policy: The leaked audio recording has significant implications for German foreign policy, particularly its stance towards the Ukraine-Russia conflict. The discussions indicate a willingness to provide substantial military aid to Ukraine, signaling a potential shift in Germany’s approach towards the conflict. This has ramifications for Germany’s relations with both Ukraine and Russia and could impact broader European security dynamics.
  • Impact on Diplomatic Relations: The revelation of such sensitive discussions within the Bundeswehr has the potential to strain diplomatic relations between Germany, Russia, and Ukraine. Russia, in particular, has vehemently opposed Western military support to Ukraine and is likely to react strongly to these revelations. The incident could escalate tensions and complicate ongoing diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully.
  • Domestic Repercussions: Domestically, the leaked audio recording has sparked debates about transparency and accountability within the German military. Questions have been raised about the appropriateness of such discussions being held and the potential risks associated with their exposure. The incident may prompt calls for greater oversight and scrutiny of military decision-making processes.
  • Security Implications: From a security standpoint, the leaked discussions regarding the delivery of Taurus cruise missiles and potential targets carry significant implications. It raises concerns about the escalation of the conflict and the potential for further military confrontations in the region. Assessing the security risks and the feasibility of such actions is crucial for understanding the broader security landscape.
  • Media and Public Perception: The media coverage and public reaction to the leaked audio recording have been extensive, reflecting widespread interest and concern. The incident has captured the attention of both domestic and international audiences, fueling debates about the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the role of external actors. Analyzing media narratives and public discourse provides insights into the broader societal impact of the leak.

Webex conference transcript revealed

—>>> Any reference to facts and people has not been verified or confirmed…. it could be an artifact or manipulation of events and facts… even those that never happened <<<—

The first 38 minutes of the conversation were transcribed using AI… so there are limitations to the accuracy of the transcription….

  • [Speaker 1]
  • Hello, General Hauptmann Irgang here. I would like to add you if you like.
  • [Speaker 4]
  • You are now listening to the conference.
  • [Speaker 2]
  • Yes, Hauptmann Irgang here. It is now General Gräfe, Oberstleutnant Florstedt and Oberstleutnant Fenske. And we wait another 2-3 minutes, then we call the inspector.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • Yes. Good copy. Hey Frank, long time.
  • Do you have until… what did you say?
  • [Speaker 3]
  • I said long time no hear.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • Yes, yes, yes, yes. Did you listen until the end? Yes.
  • Did I miss anything?
  • [Speaker 3]
  • No, I don’t think so. Oh, I thought after you said here, now I have to hang up, I hung up too.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • Oh, no, no. I’m not just gone. I said I hand over to Hachmeister.
  • [Speaker 3]
  • Oh, no, I hung up too. I didn’t have time to talk about the topic we have here. Yes.
  • And that was because you said you buy chokers. No, I didn’t hear that.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • Yes, no problem. But you were through with your part. And until then it was relatively quiet.
  • [Speaker 3]
  • Yes. Yes, I already have the things, I tested in CBK. Yes.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • Good. Now. No, so actually the inspector wouldn’t have been there if I had been there, then I would have done that.
  • But I’m in Singapore right now.
  • [Speaker 4]
  • And here it is…
  • [Speaker 1]
  • Yes, here it is just 23.57. Nice. Yes. It was a long day.
  • I wanted to get in today, I didn’t want to celebrate today. I should have brought up my camera from the TV today with the view you have from my hotel room. I’ll send you a photo later.
  • [Speaker 3]
  • Yes, do it, I’m curious.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • Yes, that’s mega.
  • [Speaker 3]
  • Have you seen the hotel? Isn’t that there with the three columns and the plate on top? No, say again, please.
  • There is a hotel where there are three towers and on top there is…
  • [Speaker 1]
  • Yes, I was just there drinking something. And there is also this famous swimming pool where you practically hang around right there. Yes, cool.
  • Yes. Not too shabby. But it is quite humid here.
  • [Speaker 4]
  • Yes.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • Yes, but that’s why I now also, that is of course the cool thing about such events and you meet God in the world. And I met Schneider today, that’s the successor of the Wilsbach and already told him about our plan.
  • [Speaker 4]
  • Nice.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • And then I have to, when is your trip to Alaska again?
  • [Speaker 3]
  • Showtime will be on March 19th. I’m leaving on the weekend, on Tuesday, March 19th, I’ll be… Tuesday, Tuesday, I’ll be there.
  • Yes. Do you mean you have to stop by again?
  • [Speaker 1]
  • Yes, I actually have to go there again. As I said, he’s only been in office for two weeks and he didn’t even know what I was talking about. And that’s why I said I’d rather stop by again, because that was October, when we presented everything to Wilsbach.
  • [Speaker 3]
  • Yes, if you need a companion, you know what to do.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • Yes, yes. Do you already have a feedback from your co-worker? Did your application go through with him?
  • [Speaker 3]
  • I’ve already called the flight, I’ve got everything in the bag, yes.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • No, no, I mean because of the other thing.
  • [Speaker 3]
  • Are you going to Alaska now? What? Which Tuesday do you mean now?
  • No, no, I mean because of Malatra. Oh, yes, that’s out of the blue now and P. still has the same deadline until the end of the month.
  • I haven’t seen him at all yet. But in theory, did the co-worker have the order to register today?
  • [Speaker 1]
  • Okay.
  • [Speaker 3]
  • But you haven’t seen what he…
  • [Speaker 1]
  • Yes, but you don’t know what he wrote in.
  • [Speaker 3]
  • Can I get it here and send it to you?
  • [Speaker 1]
  • Yes, that would be great. I told you. I’ll get General Gerhard.
  • Yes. Yes, have a nice day together. Gerhard, as far as I know, we have Comrade Schäfer with us, Comrade Frostedt and Comrade Fenske.
  • Right? Exactly. Yes.
  • Wonderful. Frank, you’re from Singapore. Yes.
  • Very good. Very good. Yes, I just wanted to briefly, so that we can, not in the sense of who says it, but so that we can briefly agree and that, in particular, Comrade Frostedt and Comrade Fenske know how it all came about.
  • Because when you hear that the Minister of Defense really wants to get deep into Davos, although the appointment is half an hour, as I saw it. So we won’t be able to fly the thing. To put it that way.
  • I don’t see a resolution behind it at the moment. So it’s not like the Chancellor just said, hey, make yourself smart again and then let’s decide tomorrow. At least I didn’t realize that.
  • But that he saw Pistorius again through this whole discussion that comes up again and again. And it comes, of course, because no one really knows why the Chancellor is here, adventurous rumors come up, of course. I want to mention one.
  • I was called yesterday by a journalist who is extremely close to the Chancellor. Yes, she had heard in Munich that the Davos would not work at all. I said, okay, who tells such shit?
  • I thought she had somehow picked it up politically. Then she said, no one told that in uniform. Of course, there is no source price.
  • Completely clear. But of course he jumped on it and wanted to make the mega hits out of it. According to the motto, now we finally have the reason why the Chancellor doesn’t deliver, because the thing doesn’t work at all.
  • Of course, I’m talking nonsense here. In total nonsense. We even do fake campaigns The last one wasn’t that long ago.
  • But you can see what kind of talk there is in the room now and, above all, what nonsense is being told. Yes. So, and I just wanted to vote with you very briefly that this does not go in the wrong direction.
  • So first of all, my question to Florian and Svenskil. Did anyone talk to you directly or did General Freuding somehow contact you?
  • [Speaker 3]
  • From my point of view, no. I only heard from Frank.
  • [Speaker 2]
  • For me also negative. I only communicated with General Grebel. Ah yes, all right.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • I gave him both numbers on Sunday and he said he got the numbers. Yes, okay, then maybe it will still cost. Then it’s just not happening yet.
  • So what I saw is that it’s half an hour and it could definitely be that I’m not there at all but that I have to go to the household committee because we still have a slight increase in price of the S&30 infrastructure in Büchel, which is very annoying because it is not really an increase in price, but BIOS simply estimated it too low and now the companies have given their offers and they are well above what BIOS estimated and now of course the annoyance is coming.
  • And I told them that they have to know for themselves whether I should go with you or whether I should go to the household committee. Of course, that has to be decided by the minister at the end because it is almost timeless. So it could still be that you are alone and I would recommend, I’m not going to exaggerate, I’m just going to say here, there are two experts, one in the association, the other in the CLO and then you have it.
  • And I would recommend, and I’ve already let you know about Frank, to have a few slides with you, a table template, as you call it, so that you can visualize a little bit. So we just want to put you in your position. Yes, we showed him at a demo show, there was a Taurus, he was standing on a weapon, on the carrier next to the Tornado, but for example, how it looks built on the Tornado or how, for example, a mission planning system looks like.
  • So he can’t imagine much.
  • [Speaker 3]
  • Udo, you have a lot of slides, don’t you?
  • [Speaker 2]
  • Yes, I have available.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • But on the other hand, don’t shoot him with a slide show, with 30 slides, just have a little in your head, he’s been here for half an hour now. I would say, make a short stop, Freuding will hopefully report to you again. Of course, it’s a bit about the functionality, what can the Taurus do, how is it used?
  • But of course, he’s still in the back of his mind, if we were to decide politically to support Ukraine with it, how could the whole thing end up? And I would be really grateful to you that we, yes, the challenge, the challenge according to the motto, what is not easy about it, but that we not only put a problem in the room, but also always have to call the solution. So when it comes to, for example, to do the mission planning, I know how the English do it, they do it completely in reachback, they also have a few people on site, they don’t do that, the French don’t.
  • So they cue the Ukrainians when loading the Skype, because they say Tom, Shadow and Skype are from the Rhein-Technik perspective relatively similar. They already told me, yes, Mr. Gott, they would also look at the Ukrainians at the Taurus loading over the shoulder. The question would be, but how do we solve that then?
  • Do we let them do the mission planning and give them the MBDA in reachback fashion and just bring one of our people to the MBDA? I would like to ask once again, maybe Frank again, how did we always position ourselves, how would we do it? And then, of course, if you both show what your role is.
  • I’ll start with what is the most sensitive or the most critical thing that can happen now. With the whole discussion, it goes back and forth all the time. I think there are two points that are the most sensitive.
  • One is the timing, according to the motto, now the chancellor says we give it up and then it comes from the Bundeswehr. Yes, great, but in eight months we will be able to use the first one. And the second is, of course, we can’t shorten the time if it goes into misuse afterwards and the thing falls on the kindergarten and there are civilians.
  • That’s why I think the two left and right boundaries between them have to be weighed. If you break it down, one line is the deployment of the aircraft carriers. We have nothing to do with that and the important point would then be in the conversation, without the company we can’t do anything and it would be a goal that, as it is also the case with the missiles of the IWC, that you quickly equip and deliver the first aircraft carriers, but then rudimentary things have to be done, again a small overhaul, that such high-altitude markings down and so on, but you don’t have to wait until you’re 20, then you could theoretically take the first five. So that would be the first line, how long can they be delivered, but that’s actually completely in the hands of the industry and the question still arises who pays, because that is connected with costs.
  • The second question is then the question of the interface. How do you attach that to which weapon system? And that is now again also a matter that should then actually be done by some bachelor from Ukraine with the company.
  • Or Mr. Sempke, we don’t have any shares in it when it comes to the integration in the SU, for example, right?
  • [Speaker 2]
  • I don’t think so, because the PSG, the manufacturer, says that they can do that with a time frame of about six months, so either SU or S16.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • We actually don’t have any shares in it, but when the message comes over, the Federal Chancellor has decided and then the other message, but it takes six months for the interface alone and then the positive message will quickly turn into a negative message. The third part is the one that could theoretically concern us, namely the training. That is, we had once said that we, in cooperation with the industry, as similar as with IWC, the industry forms how you operate the system and we assign people to support the whole tactic.
  • And we had also talked about three or four months and that would then be the part that we do in Germany. And of course you would have to think about it now to get very quickly with maybe the first aircraft, whether you don’t go back to the third with the interface as well as with the training. If they look at the thing with their know-how, how did they get the Storm Shadow on it, there can’t be such a big difference.
  • And maybe they do the operation at the beginning, while in the meantime the crews are assigned to us. So that it doesn’t take too long at first. And then there are a few things, can we deliver a database, can we deliver satellite images, can we deliver planning stations, that would have to be next to the pure flight bodies that we have, which all run over the industry or over the IABG.
  • So we always have to face it, they have aircraft from which they use the Storm Shadow. That means the English were there, they wired the aircraft. So they are not so far away from it that they also have a tower of these aircraft.
  • We are not talking about the F-16 now, we have it on the MiG-23 and that’s what it was about. I can only say the experience from Patriot, I still know what our own experts drew up for Zeitlinien at the beginning. And they have dominated the thing in a few weeks and are now setting it up in a size that our people say, oh wow, we wouldn’t have expected that.
  • So they are partly in a war and partly on the move. How more high-tech is like our good old air force? I just want to remind all the timelines we open up there that you shouldn’t be so misguided.
  • But now I would like to see your picture from you, and hear with a view to a possible delivery to the UK?
  • [Speaker 2]
  • Yes, I would take up the point of training again. We have already looked at that. If the corresponding staff comes and can be trained in parallel, then we are at about three weeks of industrial training and a training phase, which can then be done through us, through the air force, in about four weeks.
  • So that means we are already significantly below the twelve weeks, provided that we have the corresponding qualified staff. Then we can do it without a interpreter and the like. So there are a few more requirements.
  • We had already talked to Ms. Friedberger. If it is about the mission afterwards, then it would actually be the recommendation that at least the first missions will be supported by us. Since the planning is still very complex, we ourselves need about a year of training from our staff.
  • We are now trying to push that down to, let’s say, ten weeks, with the expectation that you can also drive a Formula One racing car off-road and on a Formula One track. So a possible variant could be supported in terms of planning. Theoretically, you can even do that from Büchel with a secure line over to Ukraine, transfer the data file over and then it would be available and we could plan it together.
  • So that would be the worst-case scenario, the minimum, the whole thing supported by the industry with a user helpdesk, which can therefore support software questions, as we basically have that in Germany as well.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • I’ll just interrupt you, Mr. Fenske. If you had political concerns that this line from Büchel directly to Ukraine is a too direct involvement, everything is political, you could then also say, okay, the data file is made at NBDA and we send our 1-2 experts to Schrobenhausen. That would be total nonsense, but let’s put it this way, but politically, maybe something else.
  • If the data file comes from the industry, it will come directly from our database.
  • [Speaker 2]
  • Yes, the question will be, where does the data come from? I’m taking a step back now, when it comes to the target data, which ideally comes with satellite images, because that gives us the highest precision, so that we have accuracy below three nanometers. We have to process them in the first step in Büchel.
  • Regardless of that, you would somehow get data transfer between Büchel and Schrobenhausen, I think. Or, which of course also applies, that you send the data file to Poland and you have the handover takeover in Poland somewhere and someone drives there by car. I think you have to look into that in detail and there will also be solutions.
  • So at the moment when we have the support, in the worst case, I even have to drive back and forth by car. Only the reaction time slows down, so I can’t react within hours, although we have to say that if you want to react very quickly, we are so far that we trust ourselves to be able to do that within six hours from the order to the aircraft air weeks. But then we also have a precision that is unfortunately just over three meters, which can be sufficient for a target.
  • And if I want to have higher precision, i.e. work with satellite images and have to model the target, then of course the time is measurable afterwards and then I am quickly at 12 hours. That depends on the target. So I have never looked in detail, but I think it will be possible too.
  • Then you just have to say that you need a data line that can afford that.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • You always have to assume what the Ukrainians are doing otherwise. We also know that there are a lot of people with American accents and civilian clothes running around, that you say that they are relatively quickly able to do that themselves, because they have all the satellite images. That also works out that way, yes.
  • [Speaker 2]
  • Yes, maybe a very short answer to that. The question would then be that I have to, so that I can do it accordingly, I have to do it against the air defense, which is present in a plane. We can do that very well, we always assume that, because of course we can work in low flight and therefore have our NDK data from the IABG.
  • I definitely have to make it available so that I can fly under a 21, so that I can get the optimum out of the planning and not, as with Stormchill, plan via waypoints, but actually fly over or fly under the respective systems. If I make that available, then there will probably be quick learning effects, and then I’ll just get back into the area where I’ll get the number of aircraft later. So very quickly, if I take a number of 50, then 50 aircraft are shot down very quickly.
  • Yes, yes, of course.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • That is of course, that you have to be clear, that will not change the war. We don’t want to hand them all over, and not all of them are the same with us, I don’t have to tell you. You could say 50 in the first branch, and if they would attack us again for the next 50, then it would be the end of the world.
  • That is completely clear. So that’s big politics again, and then I can get back to Seppl again, but I suspect that there could be a momentum behind it, because I know from my British and French colleagues that they are as good as winemakers with their Stormchiller and Scalps. And then they will of course say, before we deliver the next ones here, and we have already delivered again, Germany should also attack once.
  • But I wanted to ask if you had any more questions.
  • [Speaker 3]
  • Yes, I started today with a pragmatic approach. I was thinking about the unique feature of the Stormshadows, as well as air defense, robustness and flight altitude, etc. And then I come to the conclusion that there are two interesting target types.
  • One is a bridge in the east, and the other is moon depots, where we come in. The bridge in the east is difficult to reach, and the arrows are relatively small, and that can be a disadvantage for the tower. And the moon depots, we just get through there.
  • If I now take that into account and compare how many Stormshadows and Mauls have been shot down, then I have a pretty cool unique feature. Then I chose three routes where I would say, is it about the bridge or is it about the moon depot? Is it reachable with the current caps that the Red Army and the Home Patriot have?
  • And then I come to the conclusion that yes, it is basically feasible. The limiting factor is the Su-24, how many of them are still left? That would be in the single range.
  • And I chose a few of these points and said, look, it’s basically doable. And how do you get the Ukrainians to shoot down the TTPs? I would say the pilot and a week.
  • And we personally, mission planning, and that’s where it comes down to what we’re actually doing, we have to think about this mission planning and the centrality planning. And the mission planning is tied to us, the training is two weeks, and I think if you’re not on a set schedule, that’s pretty fast. In three weeks it’s tied.
  • Set being set, but if I look at a bridge like that, where I’m coming from today is that the TTP doesn’t get out of the depot and just targets it like that. That means I need pictures of how the depot can work and we need the mission data for that. And I don’t know if we’re in adequate time, of course, if we’re talking about months like we are now, but in adequate time, the Ukrainians can train, how does a bridge pilot look like in the depot, how do we teach them that?
  • That means for me, from an operational perspective, it’s not measurable how quickly you teach Ukraine this image planning and how quickly you teach them integration. But basically, the target of professionalism for me would be the bridge and the housing depot, and that’s basically what I want to do, to teach people that very quickly.
  • [Speaker 2]
  • I’d like to add that again quickly because of the bridge, because we looked at each other intensively and the bridge is unfortunately like an airport because of its size. That means it may well be that I need 10 or 20 aircraft carriers for that.
  • [Speaker 3]
  • It’s fully estimated if it’s where it opens up, if you take the pillars.
  • [Speaker 2]
  • Yes, and even the pillar, we sometimes just make a hole in it and then we’re standing there. To have a valid statement, we would really have to…
  • [Speaker 3]
  • I don’t want to pin down the bridge, I just want to say that was a pragmatic approach. What do they want? How do they do that and how quickly can I train them for that?
  • And in the end, what remains is that we have to give them the image-centralized mission planning data. We basically have to give them the SEMOVIE if they don’t have it themselves. And we do have the target data, but you would have to make it available to them somehow.
  • Because if it’s about small targets, then it has to be planned a little more precisely than just on the web picture. If it’s about hardened targets, then it’s fairly easy and relatively quickly planned. If you, above all, exploit the fact that it can fly at a two-storey height.
  • [Speaker 1]
  • I think that’s a good point. We all know that they want to take the bridge out. It’s clear, we also know what that means in the end.
  • If you have that, then the supply is not only strategically important, but also politically important. The Gute Insel is their heart of gold. It’s not quite as fatal now, where they have their land bridge more or less.
  • And that’s where you’re afraid, when the direct link of the armed forces goes into Ukraine. And then the question is, can you basically pull the trick, that you turn our people to the NBDA, that there is only a direct line between the NBDA and Ukraine. Then it’s less bad than when the direct line of our air force is to them.
  • I don’t think that makes a difference, Ingo. We just have to be careful that we don’t formulate a kill criterion right at the beginning. If we tell the minister, I’m going to overdo it a bit, we’re going to plan the data and then drive it over from Poland to the car, so that no one notices.
  • That’s a kill criterion. We won’t be able to handle the whole thing with some kind of participation from us. If it comes from the company, you have to agree with the NBDA first, whether they want to do it.
  • But then it doesn’t make a difference whether we let our people plan it in Düsseldorf or in Schopenhauer. Participation is participation. And I don’t think we’ll get over that hurdle.
  • If we assume that as a red line, as a basis, then we come back to what I said at the very beginning. Either we have to split up the training so that we say we’re doing a fast track and a long track. And in the long track, the holders are four months old and learn it completely correctly.
  • How do I do it with a bridge? And in the fast track, it’s about the quick deployment after two weeks. How do I know what I’m doing with the ammunition depot?
  • Or the other option, we ask whether in this phase, until the servers are completely trained, we ask the Brits whether they want to take over in this phase. But I think some kind of attempt at a technical solution, imagine that comes to the press. 
  • We have our own staff in Schrobenhausen or we drive somehow with the car, the Poles I think both are not acceptable, I think. #00:30:07-7#
  • Speaker 3: Of course, it can be seen so that, if there is political will, then first of all, let’s say, someone from Ukraine should come here, and then you have to know, it’s the political directive, no direct involvement in planning of missions. Then it must be clear that training will take more time, and the complexity and ultimately the effectiveness of use will naturally decrease. But it’s not impossible, because they actually have already gathered some experience in this, and we see ourselves what we are otherwise employing, and then we would have to see, if this is the directive, there is no direct involvement, and we can’t do the planning of the missions to Büchel and send it. I could almost imagine this being a red line for Germany. Yes, it must be clear, it must be formed longer, then it takes a few months, and you can’t do everything with it. But it’s not like they say, nothing can be done, and one could perhaps even assume that then they will have it under control quite quickly. We just need to make sure that they can work on their own across the entire database, the mission data, or I mean, if mhm. #00:31:23-7#
  • Speaker 1: Then I would do it as you just said, with a quick path and logic. It’s about getting a quick effect, and if it’s just about hitting ammunition depots and not the complexity of the bridge, then you could say to go for a certain part this short route, to get an effect quickly, and this data, not I see them so critically, because they are not relative to a specific location, they still need to customize them, but they would be generic on the system’s capacity. This was a point that we had already talked about in this group, that one could imagine transferring them. At the moment we are protective about everything, but not in a general way. #00:32:10-3#
  • Speaker 4: That will remain the focal point, because even with an ammunition depot, in that environment there is no planning because of the massive number of air defense systems. So, we’ll have to dive deep. I think we will find a way with our staff, and the point would be, at that moment we would say, let’s try, to also be able to advise better politically. As said, then we just need this, and we need to get started. But we will fail on our own because we do not have a clear representation of the situation, where all the air defense systems are located. #00:32:50-1#
  • Speaker 3: But Ukraine has it, you can count on it. #00:32:55-8#
  • Speaker 4: Hm! #00:32:56-6#
  • Speaker 3: Yes. #00:32:56-9#
  • Speaker 4: They won’t have it at all, because I see that with us, only the radar is always represented. But to have a clean plan, we really need to see where the radars are and where the launchers are. The more we generalize, the more imprecise our planning becomes. So, we have a great tool. This means that if we have the data, we can say quite precisely how we can do it. Anything I transfer elsewhere, for reasons of time or complexity or because I don’t yet have advanced enough training, always means a reduction in penetration capacity. #00:33:32-3#
  • It can not be done. There are various levels. Depending on where the political red line is, sometimes, we could make this decision, I really like it, there are several times that exaggerate the possibilities of complex use becoming more and more manageable for Ukraine. #00:34:01-8#
  • Speaker 4: Yes, definitely, because they can do it every day. This is the practice for us. #00:34:08-9#
  • Speaker 3: Okay, so I think, in this case, we shouldn’t get involved. Unfortunately, you are disguised, and the way it is handled is actually very interesting, the previous models, therefore, you are the experts. It was just important to me that we present ourselves soberly and not make a fuss, as if we are not credible when other nations provide storms and calves. #00:34:43-6#
  • Speaker 1: Yes. #00:34:44-9#
  • Speaker 3: Yes, I don’t even write it. I mean, we delivered from a twelve gauge. There were long faces, but at the moment we are shooting down planes and missiles that can’t hit us anyway. Ok, so another round of questions, if you have anything to add. #00:35:15-4#
  • Speaker 1: No, I think it should be said clearly: the longer you wait to make a decision, the longer it will take later to implement it, and it’s important to have a level, start with something simple, then maybe something bigger or ask the British if they can support us at the beginning with this planning, think about what is within our responsibility to accelerate. But still, the interface is not our responsibility at all. Ukraine should deal with this with the company itself. #00:35:46-9#
  • Speaker 3: Ok, anything to add from both of you? #00:35:53-6#
  • Speaker 4: So, no tests. #00:35:55-9#
  • Speaker 2: For my part, only that Sanny is writing please inform the inspector that the interview today with the German went without problems. No complications, I will inform him about the situation tomorrow! #00:36:09-1#
  • Speaker 3: Wonderful! Ok, very good, yes, yes, yes, because the context, we don’t want this, the exclusion, to cause problems, because, if he didn’t approve it, this what they call a price increase in detail, we would have the problem that the works of construction could be delayed. That could make it impossible to start construction this year, and every day counts in the schedule. So it’s good that the interview went well, and in the end I think that, once we receive the decision, we can continue to negotiate with the two consortia, with the general contractors, and as I said, it could be that the minister decides which one to send in committee, the experts, we have to see. That’s why it was even more important to coordinate in advance that we shouldn’t overdo it with visualization, coming from a completely different world, with a completely different way of thinking than us who are discussing here, and then everything will be fine, everything is clear! So, thank you for the discussion and wish everyone well, and hope to see you at the meeting in Berlin, then ill when you get back to Singapore, and if I can’t attend, then one of you could just hook up, I’d be interested to know how did it go. So that’s it. #00:37:56-0#
  • Speaker 2: Ok, ok, yes. #00:37:58-1#
  • Speaker 4: Yes. #00:37:59-4#
  • Speaker 1: Okay, well, maybe change the lines, I still have something, I met Schneider a little while ago or you can stay here if you have time. #00:38:07-4#
  • Speaker 3: Yes, okay, I will gladly call you separately: Look, look, look! #00:38:12-9#


Copyright of debuglies.com
Even partial reproduction of the contents is not permitted without prior authorization – Reproduction reserved

1 COMMENT

LEAVE A REPLY

Please enter your comment!
Please enter your name here

Questo sito usa Akismet per ridurre lo spam. Scopri come i tuoi dati vengono elaborati.