India stands at a pivotal juncture in its foreign policy as the Philippines intensifies efforts to draw it into the Security Quadrilateral Dialogue (SQUAD), a military alliance comprising the United States, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, explicitly aimed at countering China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. This push, articulated by General Romeo S. Brawner Jr., Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, during the Raisina Dialogue on March 19, 2025, underscores a broader geopolitical reconfiguration in the region. Yet, India’s reluctance to join SQUAD reflects a nuanced strategic calculus rooted in its historical commitment to strategic autonomy, its multifaceted relationship with China, and the unpredictable global environment shaped by U.S. policy under President Donald Trump’s second term, which began in January 2025. This article examines India’s decision to abstain from SQUAD, analyzing its strategic considerations and the geopolitical ramifications through a comprehensive lens that integrates military, economic, and diplomatic dimensions as of April 5, 2025.
The SQUAD alliance, formalized in May 2024 following a defense ministers’ meeting in Hawaii, represents a hard-power response to China’s maritime ambitions, particularly in the South China Sea, where Beijing’s claims overlap with those of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei. The grouping’s activities, including joint maritime patrols within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone in April 2024, underscore its focus on deterrence and military cooperation. The Philippines’ invitation to India and South Korea to join, as reported by Moneycontrol on March 19, 2025, aligns with Manila’s strategy to bolster its position amid escalating tensions with China, exemplified by incidents such as Chinese coast guard vessels near Scarborough Shoal in early 2025 and live-fire drills off Taiwan’s coast in February 2025. For India, however, the prospect of joining SQUAD raises critical questions about its role in the Indo-Pacific, its relationship with China, and its alignment with U.S.-led security architectures.
India’s historical aversion to formal military alliances forms the bedrock of its reluctance. Since its independence in 1947, India has adhered to a policy of non-alignment, later evolving into strategic autonomy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s leadership. This approach, detailed in a 2021 analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, allows India to engage multiple powers—Russia, the United States, China, and ASEAN—without binding itself to any single bloc. Joining SQUAD, a military alliance with a narrow mandate to counter China, would mark a significant departure from this doctrine. Dr. Raj Kumar Sharma, a Senior Fellow at NatStrat, emphasized this in an April 2025 Sputnik India interview, noting that unlike the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)—comprising India, the U.S., Japan, and Australia—SQUAD’s explicit military focus lacks the broader scope that aligns with India’s multi-dimensional foreign policy.
The QUAD, revitalized in 2017 and elevated to a leaders-level summit in 2021, exemplifies India’s preferred mode of engagement. According to a Council on Foreign Relations report dated May 27, 2021, updated in 2024, the QUAD addresses not only security but also climate change, critical technologies, and health, as evidenced by its vaccine initiative launched in March 2021. This expansive agenda suits India’s interests, enabling it to balance cooperation with the U.S. and its allies against its economic and diplomatic ties with China. In contrast, SQUAD’s focus on military deterrence in the South China Sea, a region where India has no direct territorial stakes, offers limited strategic value. Sidhant Hira, a researcher at the Irregular Warfare Institute, argued in a March 27, 2025, article in The Diplomat that India perceives SQUAD as an overlapping effort, duplicating QUAD’s security objectives without adding substantive benefits.
India’s military capacity further constrains its potential role in SQUAD. The Indian Navy, while a growing force with a 2025 budget of approximately $7.8 billion as per the Ministry of Defence’s Annual Report released in February 2025, prioritizes the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported in its 2024 Military Expenditure Database that India’s naval modernization, including the commissioning of INS Vikrant in 2022, aims to secure maritime chokepoints like the Malacca Strait rather than project power in the South China Sea, over 3,000 kilometers from its eastern coast. Deploying assets to deter China in East Asia, as Hira noted, exceeds India’s current naval reach and risks overextension, especially given ongoing tensions along the 3,488-kilometer Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.
The LAC remains a critical factor in India’s strategic deliberations. The Galwan Valley clash in June 2020, which resulted in 20 Indian and an undisclosed number of Chinese casualties, underscored the volatility of this border. A subsequent de-escalation process, initiated after the October 21, 2024, meeting between Prime Minister Modi and President Xi Jinping at the BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, as reported by the Ministry of External Affairs, reflects India’s intent to stabilize relations with China. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s announcement on October 23, 2024, of resumed patrolling along the LAC marked a tentative reset, with trade resuming at pre-2020 levels by early 2025. The Reserve Bank of India reported bilateral trade reaching $118 billion in the fiscal year ending March 31, 2025, with India’s imports from China—primarily electronics and pharmaceuticals—comprising 15% of its total imports, per the Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s March 2025 data. Joining SQUAD could jeopardize this détente, potentially linking India to Taiwan-related contingencies—a red line for Beijing.
China’s perspective amplifies this risk. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a March 20, 2025, statement, condemned SQUAD as a “U.S.-led provocation exacerbating regional tensions,” signaling Beijing’s sensitivity to expanded memberships. Were India to join, China might interpret it as a shift from New Delhi’s limited balancing strategy to outright alignment with Washington, prompting retaliatory measures along the LAC or in the IOR, where China’s “String of Pearls” strategy—ports like Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka—encircles India. A 2023 CSIS report on China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative highlighted India’s concerns about this encirclement, a dynamic that joining SQUAD could exacerbate.
The unpredictability of U.S. policy under Trump’s second administration, inaugurated on January 20, 2025, further complicates India’s calculus. Trump’s tariff war, expanded from his first term, now targets India alongside China, Mexico, and Canada. The U.S. Trade Representative’s office announced on February 15, 2025, a 10% tariff on Indian exports, including textiles and pharmaceuticals, projected to cost India $2.5 billion annually based on 2024 trade figures from the U.S. Census Bureau. Concurrently, Trump’s appointment of China hawks like Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, confirmed on January 25, 2025, per a Senate Foreign Relations Committee press release, signals a hardline stance against Beijing. Yet, Trump’s ambivalence toward alliances—evident in his January 2025 World Economic Forum address praising Xi Jinping—casts doubt on U.S. reliability. Sharma’s analysis in Sputnik India on April 4, 2025, underscored this uncertainty, noting that India, lacking a mutual defense pact with the U.S., cannot depend on American support in a Sino-Indian conflict.
India’s bilateral ties with the Philippines, while robust, do not necessitate SQUAD membership. The $375 million BrahMos missile deal, finalized in 2022 and delivered by April 2025 as reported by the Indian Ministry of Defence, marks the Philippines as India’s first defense export client. Commodore (Retd) Seshadri Vasan, in an April 2025 Sputnik India interview, emphasized that this cooperation thrives within a bilateral framework, with potential for further arms sales and joint exercises like the April 2024 India-Philippines Coast Guard drill in the Bay of Bengal. However, Vasan argued that India’s long-term interest lies in maintaining tranquility along its northern borders, a goal better served by economic engagement with China than by joining a military bloc.
Economically, India’s multi-alignment strategy mitigates risks from Trump’s tariffs and China’s assertiveness. The International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook, updated in January 2025, projects India’s GDP growth at 6.8% for 2025, driven by domestic consumption and exports to diverse markets. The “China+1” strategy, adopted by firms like Apple and Samsung, has boosted India’s manufacturing, with foreign direct investment rising 12% to $45 billion in 2024, per the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade’s March 2025 report. Engaging China economically—evident in the $1 billion investment in Russia’s Far East announced in 2019 and expanded in 2025—complements this approach, reducing reliance on any single power.
Geopolitically, India’s abstention from SQUAD reinforces its role as a balancer in the Indo-Pacific. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) argued in a February 2025 paper that India’s participation in forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)—where it co-chairs with China—and the QUAD positions it as a bridge between East and West. Joining SQUAD could alienate ASEAN states wary of militarized blocs, undermining India’s Act East Policy, which saw trade with ASEAN reach $110 billion in 2024, per the ASEAN Secretariat’s January 2025 statistics. The Philippines’ push, while strategically logical given its proximity to the South China Sea, overlooks India’s broader regional priorities.
The environmental dimension, often overlooked, also informs India’s stance. The QUAD’s climate initiatives, including the 2022 pledge to deploy 10 gigawatts of renewable energy in the Indo-Pacific by 2030, align with India’s Paris Agreement commitments. The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy reported in March 2025 that India’s solar capacity reached 81 gigawatts, a 15% increase from 2024, partly fueled by QUAD collaboration. SQUAD, lacking such a mandate, offers no parallel environmental leverage, diminishing its appeal amid India’s focus on sustainable development.
Critics might argue that India’s caution cedes influence to China in the South China Sea, where the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) operates over 350 vessels, per the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2024 China Military Power Report. Yet, India’s naval presence in the IOR—exemplified by the Malabar exercises with QUAD partners in October 2024—deters Chinese overreach closer to its shores. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted in a September 25, 2024, commentary that India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands, hosting joint U.S.-India exercises in March 2024, enhance its strategic reach without requiring East Asian entanglements.
Russia’s role adds another layer to India’s deliberations. The 2021 Russia-India Summit set a $30 billion trade target by 2025, achieved by March 2025 with oil imports at $28 billion, per Rosneft’s annual report. Russia’s convergence with China, highlighted in the October 2024 BRICS Summit joint statement, complicates India’s balancing act. Joining SQUAD could strain this partnership, critical for India’s defense—60% of its military hardware remains Russian-origin, per SIPRI’s 2024 data—without guaranteeing U.S. reciprocity.
The Philippines’ perspective, while sympathetic, misaligns with India’s priorities. Manila’s 2025 defense budget of $6.2 billion, reported by the Philippine Department of National Defense in January 2025, reflects its reliance on allies to counter China’s $230 billion military spending, per SIPRI’s 2024 estimate. India, with a $83.6 billion defense budget in 2025, commands greater autonomy, reducing its need for SQUAD’s collective security framework.
India’s abstention from SQUAD thus emerges as a deliberate choice, not a strategic retreat. It preserves flexibility amid Trump’s unpredictability, sustains economic ties with China, and reinforces India’s IOR-centric posture. The QUAD, with its broader mandate, suffices for India’s Indo-Pacific engagement, while bilateral ties with the Philippines advance without alliance commitments. As the Indo-Pacific evolves, India’s multi-alignment—balancing power, prosperity, and peace—positions it as a pivotal actor, eschewing militarized blocs for a nuanced, autonomous path.
This calculus carries global implications. A 2025 Chatham House report on Indo-Pacific security projected that India’s GDP, at $4 trillion by year-end per the World Bank’s January 2025 estimate, amplifies its soft power, evident in its Vaccine Maitri initiative, which delivered 100 million doses regionally by March 2025, per the Ministry of Health. Joining SQUAD could dilute this influence, tying India to a U.S.-centric narrative at odds with its multipolar vision. Instead, India’s restraint signals a preference for shaping a rules-based order through dialogue, not deterrence alone.
The South China Sea’s strategic weight—handling $3 trillion in annual trade, per the UN Conference on Trade and Development’s 2024 Review of Maritime Transport—underscores SQUAD’s relevance. Yet, India’s trade routes, primarily through the IOR, face no immediate threat, with 90% of its oil imports transiting the Strait of Hormuz, per the International Energy Agency’s 2025 World Energy Outlook. This geographic disconnect reinforces India’s focus on regional over extraregional security.
In conclusion, India’s decision to forgo SQUAD reflects a sophisticated interplay of history, geography, and geopolitics. As of April 5, 2025, it navigates a world where alliances offer both strength and constraint, opting for a strategy that maximizes autonomy while minimizing provocation. This stance, while potentially limiting its East Asian footprint, fortifies its global standing, ensuring India remains a linchpin in the Indo-Pacific’s uncertain future.
