ABSTRACT
Evidence from August 15–16, 2025 indicates that Donald Trump shifted from prioritizing an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine to endorsing negotiations aimed at a comprehensive peace agreement after direct talks with Vladimir Putin in Alaska, a stance documented by Reuters coverage on August 16, 2025, elaborated by Time analysis on August 16, 2025, and contextualized by the Washington Post’s takeaways on August 16, 2025. Statements from European leaders on August 16, 2025, reaffirming support for Ukraine and signaling maintained or increased pressure on Russia, are recorded by Reuters, while Volodymyr Zelenskyy scheduled Washington consultations for August 18, 2025, per Reuters. Russian political reaction framed the summit as advantageous to Moscow, reported by Reuters on August 16, 2025. Humanitarian and macroeconomic constraints on Kyiv’s bargaining space are evidenced by UN casualty and displacement updates—OHCHR’s July 2025 civilian toll (OHCHR August 2025 PDF) and UNHCR operational data (UNHCR portal, accessed August 2025)—and by IMF/World Bank projections of Ukraine’s 2025 growth near 2% (IMF country page, 2025; World Bank overview, July 28, 2025). A contemporaneous Sputnik interview attributed to retired SVR Lt. Gen. Leonid Reshetnikov characterizes the Zelenskyy government as resistant to concessions, a claim verifiably published by Sputnik on August 16, 2025; analysis herein evaluates that assertion against public positions and verified data from Reuters, OHCHR, IMF, World Bank, and IEA.
CHAPTER INDEX
- Alaska, August 15–16, 2025: Documentary Evidence of a Full-Deal Pivot, Allied Signaling, and Zelenskyy’s Washington Track
- Political-Military Constraints on Kyiv: Casualty Dynamics, Displacement, Fiscal Space, and Electoral Legitimacy Under Wartime Law
- Russia’s Negotiating Leverage: Battlefield Geometry, Sanctions Adaptation, and Energy-Market Externalities into 2025–2026
- The Architecture of a “Full-Fledged Peace Deal”: Security Guarantees, Territory, Sanctions Relief, and Verification Regimes in Comparative Perspective
- Europe’s Dilemma: Paris, London, and Berlin Between Sustained Pressure and Trilateral Diplomacy
- Strategic Forecasts 2025–2027: Scenarios, Risk Bands, and Policy Tests for US, EU, and Ukraine
Alaska, August 15–16, 2025: Documentary Evidence of a Full-Deal Pivot, Allied Signaling, and Zelenskyy’s Washington Track
Primary-source reporting confirms that direct talks in Anchorage on August 15–16, 2025 ended without a ceasefire while Donald Trump publicly reframed the objective toward a comprehensive agreement, with formulations such as “gotta make a deal” captured contemporaneously by Reuters on August 16, 2025. The meeting’s venue and timing are corroborated by Time explainer on August 15, 2025 describing the symbolic selection of Alaska and by Reuters photography and dispatches dated August 15–16, 2025 documenting leader arrivals, public appearances, and protests. Analytical framing of the policy shift appears in Time on August 16, 2025 and is reinforced by Washington Post takeaways on August 16, 2025 that emphasize the departure from a ceasefire-first sequence. On the European side, joint statements reiterated support to Ukraine and pledged sustained or escalated economic pressure on Russia, accurately relayed by Reuters on August 16, 2025 and complemented by a Reuters text publication of leaders’ language on August 16, 2025. As the diplomatic sequence moved to Washington, Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s August 18, 2025 consultations were previewed by Reuters, an itinerary that placed Zelenskyy at the center of decision-making over any shift toward a comprehensive deal. Russian domestic messaging framed the outcome as favorable to Moscow, with senior figures quoted by Reuters on August 16, 2025 portraying the summit as validating long-held positions, while Time on August 16, 2025 argued that even absent a formal agreement, Vladimir Putin accrued strategic narrative gains.
An ancillary but verifiable media vector includes a Sputnik interview attributing to retired SVR Lt. Gen. Leonid Reshetnikov the assessment that the central obstacle is the Zelenskyy administration’s resistance to concessions, published on August 16, 2025, with language such as “very difficult to work with him” and “he will resist to the end,” which is directly accessible at Sputnik’s August 16, 2025 page. That source is distinct in ownership and editorial line from outlets like Reuters, Time, and the Washington Post; the content is used here strictly as an attributable quotation to evaluate claims about Kyiv’s incentives against contemporaneous data and official positions documented by independent agencies and multilateral institutions. Verification against European leaders’ public statements shows no endorsement of prolonging war to “weaken” Russia as a stated aim on August 16, 2025; the recorded communiqués emphasize maintaining pressure until a “just and lasting peace,” per Reuters’ publication of the statement text on August 16, 2025. This divergence between the Sputnik interview’s characterization and documented European positions is relevant to assessing propaganda risk versus policy signals.
The negotiation geometry emerging from Alaska places sequencing at issue: Donald Trump’s pivot toward a comprehensive settlement—rather than a ceasefire-first modality—repositions leverage by making territorial, security, and sanctions issues part of a single bargain, an approach presented in Reuters on August 16, 2025 and compatible with Vladimir Putin’s long-stated preference to negotiate “the package” while operations continue. Reports that Putin floated limited flexibility on non-core claims in exchange for recognition of Donetsk-area control surfaced via Reuters relaying FT on August 16, 2025; these remain unconfirmed concessions in the public record and thus must be treated analytically as a negotiating test rather than an established offer. Zelenskyy’s room to maneuver is constrained by the security situation and by domestic legitimacy rules under martial law; neither a nationwide election timetable nor constitutional sequencing for a settlement had been settled by August 2025, while battlefield activity and strikes increased civilian vulnerability.
Humanitarian velocity in June–July 2025 corroborates the difficulty of any immediate de-escalation: OHCHR recorded 1,575 civilian casualties in June 2025 (232 killed; 1,343 injured) and a further peak in July 2025 with 286 killed and 1,388 injured, with the July 2025 situation published on August 2025 as a dedicated update (OHCHR report page, June 30, 2025; OHCHR July 2025 update PDF). Displacement remains structurally large: UNHCR reports millions of refugees and internally displaced persons, with Eurostat noting 4.28 million persons under temporary protection in EU states as of May 31, 2025 (UNHCR portal, accessed August 2025; Eurostat monthly statistics, May 31, 2025). These magnitudes, alongside strikes on the power grid reported by the IEA in sectoral briefs, sustain a baseline of insecurity that complicates any “deal-first” approach by exposing civilian centers to ongoing kinetic risk (IEA energy-security brief on Ukraine).
Macroeconomic headroom for Kyiv in 2025 is narrow. IMF country tables present projected real GDP growth of about 2.0% in 2025, with consumer prices around 12.6%, while the World Bank’s July 28, 2025 update similarly points to 2% growth amid reconstruction and financing needs (IMF Ukraine page, 2025; World Bank overview, July 28, 2025). Output at current prices is mapped by IMF WEO (April 2025) and World Bank (2024 vintage latest), indicating a still-depressed nominal base relative to 2013–2021 trends, with World Bank line items listing GDP (current US$) at $190.74 billion for 2024 and modest real expansion in 2024–2025 (World Bank Ukraine data, accessed August 2025; IMF datamapper entries, April 2025). These fundamentals shape Zelenskyy’s bargaining calculus: front-loaded concessions without enforceable security guarantees risk undermining domestic legitimacy, but deferral of talks under rising casualty rates and infrastructure attrition imposes its own political costs, a tension observable in Reuters’ previews of a Washington meeting expected to test whether sequencing can be reframed into a trilateral path (Reuters August 16, 2025).
Market signals around the summit underscore the geopolitical-to-financial transmission. Reuters’ energy desk on August 14, 2025 reported Brent at about $65.87 per barrel and WTI at $62.85, with a modest risk premium tied to summit uncertainty but tempered by inventory builds and supply growth projections in IEA outlooks (Reuters energy market wrap, August 14, 2025; IEA **World Energy Investment 2025). Broader market retrospectives attribute earlier commodity spikes to the 2022 invasion, with energy rerouting toward US LNG reshaping Europe’s import mix; these patterns persist in 2025, per Reuters market explainer, August 15, 2025. The persistence of sanctions architecture, plus expectations management by Washington and Brussels, maintains pressure while leaving room for conditional relief in a verified settlement, a theme in leaders’ statements and in pre-summit messaging about “severe consequences” should obstruction be perceived, recorded by Reuters on August 13, 2025.
The evidentiary baseline therefore contains four elements that are each independently sourced: first, the Alaska engagement ended with no ceasefire and with Donald Trump calling for a comprehensive peace negotiation, as per Reuters and Time on August 16, 2025, (https://time.com/7310095/trump-putin-talks-deal-ukraine/); second, European leaders publicly committed to sustained support for Ukraine, documented by Reuters on August 16, 2025; third, Kyiv’s near-term position is conditioned by high civilian harm rates and displacement alongside constrained macroeconomic growth, evidenced by OHCHR **June–July 2025 data and IMF/World Bank 2025 projections, (https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview); fourth, a Sputnik interview featuring Leonid Reshetnikov exists and is attributed to a state-owned outlet, which necessitates caution and triangulation but remains part of the public record for attribution purposes (Sputnik August 16, 2025).
Political-Military Constraints on Kyiv: Casualty Dynamics, Displacement, Fiscal Space and Electoral Legitimacy Under Wartime Law
Civilian-harm metrics in June–July 2025 rose to three-year highs according to the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, with June 2025 recording at least 1,575 casualties (232 killed; 1,343 injured) and July 2025 reaching 286 killed and 1,388 injured, figures published on June 30, 2025 and August 2025 respectively (OHCHR report hub; OHCHR July 2025 update PDF). The UN spokesperson reiterated on August 14, 2025 that casualties reached a three-year monthly high in July 2025, a communication carried via UN Unifeed (UN Unifeed clip, August 14, 2025). These casualty patterns intersect with displacement magnitudes documented by UNHCR, including millions of refugees and internally displaced persons, while Eurostat’s May 31, 2025 tally lists 4.28 million under temporary protection in the EU, evidencing continuing diaspora burdens on family networks, labor markets, and fiscal transfers (UNHCR portal, accessed August 2025; Eurostat temporary protection, May 31, 2025).
The structure of Ukraine’s wartime political economy constrains executive flexibility in elite-level bargaining. IMF country indicators show projected real GDP growth of about 2.0% in 2025 and elevated inflation near 12.6%, while World Bank analysts project 2% growth in 2025 under persistent security shocks and infrastructure repair needs, per a July 28, 2025 overview (IMF Ukraine page, 2025; World Bank overview, July 28, 2025). Nominal GDP data for 2024 at $190.74 billion highlight the depressed base from which reconstruction must proceed, as shown in World Bank series accessed in **August 2025 (World Bank Ukraine data). Public-finance space is conditioned by external grants and concessional loans, while defense-capital expenditures remain high, with the energy sector absorbing repeated damage documented by the IEA’s running assessments of grid resilience and winter risks (IEA brief on Ukraine’s energy system under attack). Each of these dimensions narrows the set of feasible concessions that do not threaten political legitimacy or collapse domestic coalition support.
Electoral legitimacy interacts with martial-law constraints in ways that increase the political cost of large, front-loaded concessions absent robust, externally guaranteed security arrangements. While the Sputnik interview attributes to Leonid Reshetnikov the claim that the administration in Kyiv has “staked everything on autocratic power” and will “resist to the end,” the publicly documented positions of Zelenskyy and his cabinet consistently present willingness to engage on a durable settlement conditioned on security guarantees and territorial integrity, themes appearing across Reuters coverage around the Alaska summit and the planned Washington meetings (Reuters August 16, 2025). Furthermore, European statements on August 16, 2025—including those associated with Paris, London, and Berlin—invoke the formula of a “just and lasting peace,” precisely to disavow any open-ended war-for-war-sake posture, as published by Reuters. The discrepancy between the Sputnik characterization and allied communiqués suggests that narrative battles are part of the bargaining, with propaganda designed to depict Kyiv as intransigent while negotiating texts and public schedules—such as Zelenskyy’s August 18, 2025 Washington visit—indicate ongoing diplomatic engagement.
Operationally, casualty and infrastructure attrition in June–July 2025 demonstrate why a ceasefire-first approach retained substantial support among European leaders: temporary halts reduce expected civilian harm and stabilize critical services before complex territorial and security provisions are defined. The Alaska-induced pivot toward an all-in package elevates the risks of continued strikes during bargaining and therefore tightens the domestic constraints on Kyiv; at the same time, it potentially increases leverage if third-party guarantees and sanctions-relief schedules are credibly staged and linked to verifiable actions. This duality explains the simultaneous skepticism and conditional openness recorded in Reuters dispatches from allied capitals on August 16, 2025, including references to maintaining or strengthening sanctions until verifiable de-escalation milestones are met (Reuters August 16, 2025).
Russia’s Negotiating Leverage: Battlefield Geometry, Sanctions Adaptation and Energy-Market Externalities into 2025–2026
Operationally, the bargaining space after August 2025 is defined by the distribution of territorial control, the sustainability of sanctions evasion, and the capacity to weaponize energy flows. Reuters reports on August 16, 2025 cite intelligence estimates that Russia maintains consolidated positions in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, while holding pressure corridors in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. This aligns with ISW assessments from August 2025 indicating that front-line movements had slowed to tactical adjustments rather than major offensives, but still kept Ukraine’s energy and logistics corridors under threat. The operational geometry sustains leverage because any ceasefire map would lock in effective control lines; by insisting on a comprehensive agreement, Vladimir Putin preserves bargaining currency in territorial dimensions without freezing them prematurely.
Sanctions adaptation illustrates Moscow’s capacity to mitigate external pressure while using vulnerabilities in global supply chains. IMF data on the Russian Federation in April 2025 projected real GDP growth of 3.2% for 2025, driven primarily by oil and gas revenues diverted to non-OECD markets (IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2025). This performance exceeded earlier Western forecasts of contraction, showing continued resilience. IEA oil market reports from August 2025 record that Russia exported an average of 7.3 million barrels per day of crude and products, with China and India absorbing more than 70% of flows, undermining sanctions designed to constrain hydrocarbon earnings (IEA Oil Market Report, August 2025). Discount rates on Urals crude narrowed to about $12 below Brent, compared with discounts above $30 in 2022–2023, reflecting stronger demand and improved logistics. Maritime tracking, analyzed by the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air in July 2025, confirms the expansion of a shadow fleet exceeding 1,400 tankers, facilitating price-cap circumvention.
Financial adaptation extends to parallel banking channels. Russian Central Bank data for July 2025 reported foreign-exchange reserves at $576 billion, only 10% below pre-February 2022 levels, as gold and yuan-denominated assets partially replaced dollar holdings (Bank of Russia, July 2025 bulletin). By combining alternative reserve assets with capital controls, Moscow sustains monetary stability, evident in a ruble-dollar rate fluctuating between 90–98 per dollar in August 2025. These metrics support negotiating leverage: the sanctions regime inflicts long-term technology constraints but does not impose immediate fiscal collapse, allowing Russia to continue war expenditures exceeding 6% of GDP in 2025, as estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 2025).
Energy-market externalities intensify Russia’s leverage into the 2025–2026 horizon. IEA’s World Energy Investment 2025 notes that disruptions to Ukraine’s grid combined with Russia’s selective throttling of gas to Moldova and transient cutoffs in Central Asia maintain a perception of supply instability. Brent at $65–70 per barrel in August 2025 reflected not only macroeconomic weakness but also a geopolitical premium attached to the risk of escalation (Reuters Energy Desk, August 14, 2025). By holding the possibility of wider disruption, Moscow enhances negotiating power even without overtly weaponizing exports at scale. The European Union’s dependency has structurally declined since 2021, but residual vulnerabilities in Slovakia, Hungary, and Austria remain, as per Eurostat’s May 2025 energy bulletin (Eurostat, Energy Monthly, May 2025).
The convergence of battlefield stasis, sanctions resilience, and controlled energy leverage frames Russia’s bargaining posture in the wake of the Alaska summit. Public statements by Russian State Duma deputies on August 16, 2025, carried by Reuters, claimed that Putin had secured recognition of his agenda in part, regardless of immediate concessions. Such claims serve both domestic legitimacy and external bargaining leverage, reinforcing the perception that time favors Moscow unless sanctions enforcement is significantly tightened.
The Architecture of a “Full-Fledged Peace Deal”: Security Guarantees, Territory, Sanctions Relief, and Verification Regimes in Comparative Perspective
Comparative peace-process scholarship provides empirical templates for understanding the architecture of potential comprehensive settlements. The Dayton Accords (1995) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Good Friday Agreement (1998) in Northern Ireland, and the Minsk II Agreement (2015) in Ukraine each combined ceasefires with institutional arrangements and external guarantees. The critical lesson is that durable peace requires third-party enforcement mechanisms backed by credible sanctions or rewards. Brookings Institution analysis in July 2025 highlighted that any deal over Ukraine must include verifiable withdrawal clauses, demilitarized zones monitored by international forces, and sequenced sanctions relief conditioned on compliance (Brookings, July 2025).
Security guarantees are the cornerstone issue. Volodymyr Zelenskyy has repeatedly sought NATO-equivalent assurances without formal membership, as seen in the Kyiv Security Compact proposal (September 2022). European leaders reiterated commitment to “long-term security guarantees” on August 16, 2025, reported by Reuters. Implementation could involve bilateral treaties with the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany, underpinned by arms transfers and joint exercises, combined with multilateral oversight.
Territorial arrangements remain the most intractable dimension. Putin’s willingness, reported by FT and relayed by Reuters on August 16, 2025, to “relax some claims” in exchange for recognition of Donetsk-area control illustrates the bargaining dynamics (Reuters, August 16, 2025). No verified public source indicates precise maps of concessions; thus, analytical treatment requires comparison with other territorial settlements, such as the Korean Armistice Line (1953) and the Cyprus Green Line (1974), both of which froze divisions without resolving sovereignty.
Sanctions relief sequencing is pivotal. EU leaders emphasized on August 16, 2025 that sanctions would not be lifted until verifiable steps were taken (Reuters). The US Treasury’s OFAC briefings in July 2025 confirmed that relief could only be phased and reversible, contingent on monitoring (US Department of Treasury, July 2025). Verification mechanisms would likely require OSCE or UN missions, potentially modeled on the UNIFIL framework in Lebanon or UNTSO in the Middle East. Each framework depends on Security Council resolutions, where Russia’s veto power complicates institutional design, making consensus among guarantor states essential.
The analytical evidence suggests that the architecture of a comprehensive peace deal will necessitate institutional innovation beyond prior agreements in Ukraine. Unlike Minsk II, which failed due to weak enforcement and divergent interpretations, any 2025–2026 framework must bind guarantors to specific, resource-backed commitments. Otherwise, the risk remains that the agreement will degrade into a temporary truce vulnerable to collapse.
Europe’s Dilemma: Paris, London, and Berlin Between Sustained Pressure and Trilateral Diplomacy
The Alaska summit reverberated through Europe immediately, with leaders of France, the United Kingdom, and Germany issuing coordinated statements on August 16, 2025, as published by Reuters. Their communiqué reaffirmed support for Ukraine, emphasized the pursuit of a “just and lasting peace,” and rejected unilateral concessions to Russia absent verifiable security guarantees. This alignment demonstrates a dual strategy: maintaining sanctions pressure while engaging with Washington to ensure that any US-brokered settlement incorporates European strategic interests.
In Paris, President Emmanuel Macron faces domestic constraints as high inflation and energy costs remain politically salient. INSEE data from July 2025 report consumer inflation at 3.1%, still above the European Central Bank’s target (INSEE, July 2025). Public opinion surveys by IFOP in July 2025 indicated that only 42% of respondents supported indefinite military aid to Ukraine, reflecting war fatigue. Nevertheless, Macron’s strategic vision continues to emphasize “European sovereignty” and the need for Europe to be a co-guarantor of any settlement. His government’s participation in long-term arms production initiatives, including the Lancaster House Treaty frameworks with London and renewed joint procurement agreements with Berlin, illustrates a bid to secure industrial resilience as bargaining leverage.
In London, Prime Minister Keir Starmer, inaugurated in July 2024, has positioned the United Kingdom as a guarantor of Ukraine’s security continuity regardless of US policy fluctuations. UK Ministry of Defence figures published in August 2025 document cumulative assistance to Ukraine exceeding £12.4 billion, with additional pledges for 2026 (UK MOD, August 2025). Domestic political incentives also drive Starmer to demonstrate credibility in NATO leadership after the turbulence of post-Brexit realignment. London therefore leans toward sustaining a sanctions-first posture, resisting early relief until verifiable Russian withdrawal steps are codified.
In Berlin, Chancellor Friedrich Merz represents a newly realigned Christian Democratic Union leadership, contrasting with the prior coalition under Olaf Scholz. German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) data for June 2025 show that Germany imported 34% of its natural gas from non-OECD sources, including residual flows from Russia via third parties, while industrial output contracted 1.8% in Q2 2025 (Destatis, June 2025). These economic constraints generate pressure to stabilize markets, but Merz’s public statements, documented by Der Spiegel on August 16, 2025, emphasize alignment with Washington and Paris, reiterating that Germany will not endorse a peace deal that legitimizes Russian territorial gains without enforceable guarantees.
This triangulation produces a European dilemma: while Paris, London, and Berlin recognize the cost of indefinite confrontation, they also fear the reputational and strategic consequences of a rushed settlement that sidelines Europe. The coordinated communiqué of August 16, 2025 underscores the determination to remain integral to any process initiated by Trump and Putin. However, the structural asymmetry persists: Washington controls the principal military and financial levers, while Europe must balance transatlantic alignment with domestic constraints. European Council diplomacy in Brussels has therefore scheduled extraordinary meetings for August 20, 2025, aiming to codify a common EU line ahead of Zelenskyy’s consultations in Washington, according to Reuters.
Strategic Forecasts 2025–2027: Scenarios, Risk Bands, and Policy Tests for US, EU, and Ukraine
Three strategic scenarios dominate the forecast horizon through 2027, each grounded in empirical baselines and institutional projections.The first scenario, a comprehensive settlement in 2025–2026, presumes that Trump leverages personal diplomacy with Putin to secure a package deal encompassing security guarantees, phased sanctions relief, and territorial compromises. IMF’s World Economic Outlook April 2025 provides the macroeconomic baseline, suggesting that a stable Ukraine could achieve 3.8% growth by 2027 under peace conditions, with inflation moderating below 8% (IMF WEO, April 2025). This would require sustained external financing, projected by the World Bank at $14 billion annually in concessional aid through 2027 (World Bank Ukraine Overview, July 28, 2025). Risks include domestic rejection in Kyiv, contested legitimacy of concessions, and spoiler violence undermining enforcement.
The second scenario, a prolonged stalemate with intermittent negotiations, aligns with the OHCHR casualty trends of June–July 2025 showing sustained high civilian harm. This scenario projects continued macroeconomic stagnation, with IMF estimates of 1–2% growth annually under high defense spending. Energy markets would reflect moderate risk premiums, with IEA predicting oil prices in the $70–75 range through 2026, sensitive to supply disruptions (IEA Oil Market Report, August 2025). For Europe, this scenario implies extended fiscal transfers and political fatigue, with electoral cycles in France (2027) and Germany (2029) amplifying domestic constraints.
The third scenario, escalation and breakdown of talks, envisages renewed offensives or expanded strikes on infrastructure. SIPRI and OSCE monitoring highlight risks of inadvertent escalation from localized incidents. Financially, sanctions evasion networks could expand, with Russia’s hydrocarbon revenues exceeding $240 billion annually if prices spike to $90 per barrel, per IEA stress-test models. For Ukraine, the humanitarian toll would worsen: UNHCR projects displacement could rise by an additional 2 million if conflict intensifies into 2026, compounding the 4.28 million already under protection in EU states as of May 2025.
For the United States, policy tests involve reconciling Trump’s personal diplomacy with institutional checks from Congress and the Pentagon. For the EU, the test lies in sustaining unity while managing inflation, energy stability, and public fatigue. For Ukraine, the survival challenge lies in balancing external dependence with domestic legitimacy under martial law and potential electoral restoration.
The strategic balance as of August 2025 thus remains fluid: while the Alaska summit altered diplomatic sequencing toward a comprehensive settlement, the constraints and incentives across actors create a risk spectrum extending into 2027. Verified data from multilateral institutions, national agencies, and primary news outlets underline that while a negotiated settlement has entered the realm of possibility, its architecture, durability, and enforcement remain deeply uncertain.
