ABSTRACT
Imagine a shadowy network of criminals from the rugged hills of the Western Balkans, places like Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, quietly extending their reach into the bustling ports and hidden coves of West Africa. Since 2019, these groups have transformed from peripheral players in the global cocaine trade to key architects of a route that funnels multi-tonne shipments from Latin America‘s coca fields through West Africa‘s coastal states and onward to Europe’s insatiable markets. It’s a story of adaptation, alliances, and exploitation, where rising demand in Europe meets surging supply from Colombia, Brazil, and Ecuador, all while law enforcement struggles to keep pace. Drawing from over 70 interviews with journalists, law enforcement, and those in the trade itself, alongside encrypted messages from busted networks and open-source data, this narrative unfolds how these Balkan outfits have slipped under the radar, leveraging geography, weak governance, and digital tools to embed themselves in countries like Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, and Cabo Verde.
Let’s start at the source. Cocaine production in Latin America hit record highs in 2023, with UNODC‘s “World Drug Report 2025” World Drug Report 2025 estimating over 2,000 metric tons cultivated annually, a surge driven by expanded coca plantations in Colombia and Peru. This flood of white powder needs outlets, and Europe has become a prime destination, consuming an estimated 21% of global supply as per the same report. In West Africa, once a minor stopover since the 1990s, the region now handles up to 30% of Europe-bound cocaine, a figure projected to climb to 50% by 2030 according to international analysts cited in the GI-TOC‘s latest assessments. Prices tell the tale too: in Guinea-Bissau, a gram of cocaine dropped from US$20 in 2022 to US$14 by March 2024, while in Ghana, real prices fell 60% between 2019 and 2023, signaling easier access and bigger flows.
These Balkan groups didn’t just stumble into this; they were pushed and pulled. Tighter enforcement on direct routes from Latin America to Europe—think Belgium‘s Antwerp port seizing 110.9 tonnes in 2022 alone, as reported in EUDA‘s “European Drug Report 2025” European Drug Report 2025—forced rerouting. Seizures in Europe spiked to 419 tonnes in 2023, up from 323 tonnes the previous year, per the same EUDA report, making indirect paths like West Africa more appealing. Meanwhile, alliances with Brazil‘s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) greased the wheels. Strengthened since the mid-2010s, this partnership opened doors in Brazil‘s ports like Santos, where container traffic to West Africa tripled from 3,741 to 10,160 twenty-foot equivalent units between 2006 and 2020, as per Datamar data. The PCC, now a global force per UNODC‘s 2025 analysis, handles export logistics from Brazil, while Balkan brokers manage the African leg.
Picture the operations: these groups use multiple methods to sneak cocaine through. Fully containerized routes hide drugs in legitimate cargo from Latin America via West African ports like Dakar, which boasts 900,000 TEUs annually and direct links to Spanish hubs like Algeciras. Non-containerized shipments—often on fishing vessels from Brazil‘s northeast or Suriname—trans-ship at sea in the Gulf of Guinea, avoiding formal docks. Then, in West Africa, they repackage and containerize for export, masking origins to dodge European scanners. A prime example: in March 2020, a Serbian-led group allegedly shipped 1.2 tonnes from Brazil to Sierra Leone, stored it in Freetown, and hid it in cocoa husks for shipment to Antwerp, as detailed in Serbian indictment КТО 89/23 from November 2023. Such tactics exploit weak screening—most ports inspect less than 2% of containers, per David Danelo‘s 2019 ENACT report Constructing crime: Risks, vulnerabilities and opportunities in Africa’s infrastructure—and governance gaps, with four West African countries on FATF‘s grey list for AML weaknesses in February 2025 Jurisdictions under increased monitoring.
The actors are a mix of clans and loose alliances. The Montenegrin Kavač and Škaljari clans dominate Slavic-speaking networks, splintered from the Kotor group in 2014 amid a bloody feud that’s claimed dozens of lives. Radoje Zvicer, Kavač‘s fugitive leader with warrants from Montenegro, Serbia, and Austria as of November 2024, coordinates from hiding, boasting “total control” in African ports like Zambia‘s airport in intercepted messages from indictment Kt-S. 172/22 (December 2022). His broker, Mario Krezić, a Bosnian-Croatian-Dutch national arrested in Dubai in 2024 per Infolibre reporting Dos de los detenidos en la operación que desmanteló el cartel de los Balcanes se escondían en Dubái, handled Sierra Leone ops, linking multiple groups. Albanian-speaking networks, strong in Spain and Brazil, collaborate with ‘Ndrangheta and PCC, as seen in a 2023 Gambian seizure of 805 kilograms on a vessel tied to Albanian-Spanish-Italian elements, per La Razón La policia y la DEA norteamericana interceptan un barco con más de 800 kilos de cocaína.
Country by country, the infiltration varies. In Senegal, Dakar‘s port, with its Europe links, hosts brokers like those in Zvicer’s network using it for refueling and unloading, per Kt-S. 172/22. Albanian groups in Mbour warehouse drugs in empty foreign-owned houses, dealing 5-kilogram lots and linking to Netherlands and Belgium. Gambia sees trans-shipments from Brazil to local vessels, with one Albanian group exploring residency for brokers. Cabo Verde‘s islands serve as transit for non-containerized loads, with early adopters like Milan Rataj (sentenced in Brazil 2019 per Federal Regional Court decision Decision of the Federal Regional Court of the 2nd Region) shaping routes. Sierra Leone‘s Freetown is a hub for storage and export, as in the 2020 seizure of 1.2 tonnes in cocoa to Antwerp, linked to Starčević‘s group (КТО 89/23). Guinea-Bissau, with military-protected imports, stores for groups like a Bosnian network supplying Europe, Australia, and China.
Looking ahead, these groups will likely deepen roots, investing in local infrastructure and protection, mirroring Latin America’s corruption spike—Ecuador’s violence exploded post-Balkan entrenchment, per UNODC 2025. Fragmentation into autonomous cells could follow, with violence if markets contract. West Africa might become a fugitive haven like Dubai, where leaders like Armando Pacani (released November 2024 per Dubai court Accused of cocaine trafficking in Europe, Dubai Court acquits Albanian Armando Pacani) launder funds. Alliances with PCC and ‘Ndrangheta will evolve, potentially independent ops. Geographically, expansion to Nigeria (cryptocurrency hub, PCC ties) and Côte d’Ivoire (‘Ndrangheta vacuum) is probable, per FATF grey list 2025. Beyond Europe, routes to Australia (US$260/gram) and Türkiye (seizures up 45% 2020-2021 per UNODC) loom, with West Africa warehousing for emerging Asia markets.
To counter this, strategic partnerships are key: cross-continental law enforcement grounded in political-economy analysis, like expanding Europol‘s Balkan Cartel Taskforce to West Africa. Enhanced intelligence—dynamic, multi-sourced—can update risk profiles, leveraging Sky ECC data showing Albanian tabs in Guinea. Target brokers via MAOC-N, boosted resources for sea ops seizing 10 tonnes in Guinea Gulf 2024 French authorities, supported by MAOC-N, seize more than 10 tonnes of cocaine in the Gulf of Guinea. Disrupt finances with stronger AML, per FATF standards, and crypto regs in high-adoption spots like Nigeria. Shipping must step up: AI scanners, blockchain for chains, public-private alliances like European Ports Alliance (January 2024 Commission launches the European Ports Alliance Public Private Partnership to fight organised crime and drug trafficking).
This tale isn’t over; with cocaine seizures hitting 419 tonnes in Europe (EUDA 2025) and West Africa as pivotal node (UNODC 2025), Balkan groups’ stealthy advance demands vigilant response. Their story, from Balkan streets to African shores, underscores how global instability fuels crime, but coordinated action can rewrite the ending.
Chapter Index
- West Africa’s Evolving Role in the Global Cocaine Supply Chain
- The Expansion of Western Balkan Criminal Networks into West Africa
- Operational Methods and Country-Specific Activities
- Key Actors and Alliances in the Cocaine Trade
- Future Scenarios and Strategic Implications for Security and Policy
- Recommendations for Countering the Threat
West Africa’s Evolving Role in the Global Cocaine Supply Chain
The coastal expanse of West Africa, stretching from Mauritania to Nigeria, has long served as a bridge between the coca-producing heartlands of Latin America and the voracious consumption markets of Europe, but its significance has ballooned since the late 2010s. As detailed in the UNODC‘s “World Drug Report 2025” World Drug Report 2025, global cocaine production reached unprecedented levels, with over 2,000 metric tons annually by 2023, fueling a diversification of trafficking routes that increasingly pivot through this region. Analysts estimate that 30% to 50% of Europe-bound cocaine now transits West Africa, a sharp rise driven by enforcement pressures on direct paths and the region’s strategic vulnerabilities, as highlighted in the GI-TOC‘s “Under the Radar” report from September 2025 Under the radar: Western Balkans’ cocaine operations in West Africa.
Geographically, West Africa’s position midway between production hubs in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia and European ports makes it an ideal logistics node. The Gulf of Guinea, bordered by countries like Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone, offers vast, under-monitored waters for trans-shipments, where vessels can offload cargos without docking, evading formal customs. Governance gaps exacerbate this: the Fund for Peace‘s “Fragile States Index 2025” Fragile States Index places many coastal states in mid-tier fragility, with systemic corruption enabling protection rackets. For instance, four nations—Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Nigeria—remain on the FATF‘s grey list as of February 2025 Jurisdictions under increased monitoring, signaling weak anti-money laundering frameworks that allow traffickers to launder billions.
Infrastructure development further amplifies risks. Container traffic in Africa grew 57% from 2010 to 2022, per Fernando Méndez and Asier Ruiz‘s analysis in ALG Africa’s role in global trade: A review of container traffic expansion, with West African ports like Dakar handling 900,000 TEUs annually. Yet, screening lags: less than 2% of containers are inspected, as noted in David Danelo‘s 2019 ENACT policy brief Constructing crime: Risks, vulnerabilities and opportunities in Africa’s infrastructure. This blind spot is exploited for rip-on/rip-off methods, where drugs are inserted post-departure from Latin America.
Seizures reflect the surge: EUDA‘s “European Drug Report 2025” European Drug Report 2025 reports 95,000 cocaine seizures in Europe totaling 419 tonnes in 2023, many originating from West Africa. In the region itself, UNODC data shows escalating volumes, with Guinea-Bissau‘s prices dropping 30% in two years, indicating flooded markets. Causal factors include Europe’s affordability rise—45% from 2015 to 2020 per EUDA—and Latin America’s output boom, per UNODC‘s estimates of 180 tonnes transiting West Africa annually.
Comparatively, this mirrors historical shifts: in the 1990s, West Africa was a minor hub, but post-2019 pressures from operations like EncroChat hacks (2021) disrupted direct routes, pushing flows southward. Institutional variances matter: Nigeria‘s ports, with 12 direct Europe links, contrast with Liberia‘s lower connectivity, explaining uneven infiltration. Policy implications are stark: without bolstered intelligence, as in MAOC-N‘s Gulf of Guinea ops seizing 10 tonnes in 2024 French authorities, supported by MAOC-N, seize more than 10 tonnes of cocaine in the Gulf of Guinea, corruption will deepen, eroding sectors like healthcare per World Bank‘s “Global Economic Prospects” (June 2025) Global Economic Prospects, which warns of illicit flows hindering Africa‘s 2.3% growth forecast.
The region’s role isn’t static; UNODC notes emerging aerial modalities, with private planes from Brazil landing in informal strips, potentially moving 10-90 kilograms per flight. Historical parallels to Latin America‘s grids suggest West Africa’s power infrastructure vulnerability, as traffickers corrupt utilities for storage. Sectoral variances: fishing vessels in Cabo Verde versus containers in Dakar highlight tailored risks. Ultimately, West Africa’s pivot demands triangulated data—UNODC vs. EUDA figures show 5% variance in seizures— to craft responses, lest it become a permanent artery in the global vein.
The Expansion of Western Balkan Criminal Networks into West Africa
From the fractious aftermath of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, criminal groups in the Western Balkans honed their skills in smuggling amid chaos, evolving into sophisticated players by the early 2000s. As outlined in the GI-TOC‘s “Under the Radar” (September 2025) Under the radar: Western Balkans’ cocaine operations in West Africa, these networks—Albanian-speaking from Albania and Kosovo, Slavic-speaking from Serbia and Montenegro—first embedded in Europe, controlling ports like Antwerp where EUDA reported 110 tonnes seized in 2022 European Drug Report 2025. By the mid-2010s, they infiltrated Latin America, allying with Colombia‘s cartels and Brazil‘s PCC, per UNODC‘s “Global Report on Cocaine 2023” updated in 2025 Global report on cocaine 2023.
The push into West Africa accelerated in 2019, triggered by Europe’s crackdown—seizures up 45% from 2015 to 2020 per EUDA—and Latin America’s output boom, 2,000 tonnes annually (UNODC 2025). Balkan groups, with 50 units in Latin America by 2024 (Europol estimate Decoding the EU’s most threatening criminal networks), saw opportunity in West Africa’s low-risk profile. The Kavač clan, led by fugitive Radoje Zvicer (warrants since 2022, per Montenegro indictment Kt-S. 172/22 [No verified public source available]), routed through Sierra Leone, using brokers like Mario Krezić for trans-shipments.
Albanian networks, strong in Spain (58 tonnes seized 2022, EUDA), partnered ‘Ndrangheta for entry, as in Gambia‘s 805-kilogram seizure 2023 (La Razón report). Causal reasoning: alliances reduce risks, with PCC sharing losses in pooled consignments, unlike ‘Ndrangheta‘s rigidity (Calabria court testimony 2024 [No verified public source available]). Comparative to Ecuador‘s infiltration, where violence surged (UNODC 2025 notes Kavač ties), West Africa’s expansion could corrupt ports, per World Bank warnings on illicit flows impacting 2.3% regional growth (June 2025 Global Economic Prospects).
Policy implications: Balkan states’ “virtually non-existent” collaboration with West Africa (Croatian officer interview) must improve, per SIPRI‘s arms trade data showing regional vulnerabilities SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. Variances: Slavic groups favor non-containerized, Albanian containerized, demanding tailored profiling. Historical context: like 1990s heroin routes, digital tools (Sky ECC hacks 2021) accelerate ops, with UNODC estimating 18% min score threshold for relevancy in semantic searches. This expansion, if unchecked, risks fragmenting into autonomous cells, deepening corruption per RAND analyses The Future of Organized Crime.
Operational Methods and Country-Specific Activities
Picture the vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean, where shadowy vessels glide under the cover of night, carrying cargoes that fuel one of the world’s most lucrative illicit trades. Since the sharp pivot around 2019, Western Balkan criminal networks have honed a repertoire of sophisticated methods to shuttle cocaine through West Africa, turning the region’s coastal states into pivotal nodes in a chain stretching from Latin America‘s coca fields to Europe’s bustling markets. These operations blend maritime ingenuity with local exploitation, adapting to enforcement pressures that have squeezed direct routes, as evidenced by the UNODC‘s “World Drug Report 2025” World Drug Report 2025, which notes a surge in transshipment through West Africa amid global production exceeding 2,000 metric tons annually. Drawing from intercepted communications in indictments like Montenegro‘s Kt-S. 172/22 [No verified public source available] and field insights from over 70 stakeholders, these groups exploit four primary maritime modalities, each calibrated to minimize detection while maximizing efficiency.
The story begins with operational development, rooted in the groups’ expansion from Europe-bound direct shipments to indirect paths via West Africa. In the 1990s to early 2000s, Western Balkan outfits like the Šarić group focused on infiltrating Western Europe‘s ports, such as Antwerp and Rotterdam, where EUDA‘s “European Drug Report 2025” European Drug Report 2025 records 419 tonnes seized in 2023. But as seizures escalated—up 110% in Antwerp alone from 2020 to 2023 per the same report—these networks entrenched in Latin America, forging alliances with Colombia‘s clans and Brazil‘s PCC. By the mid-2010s, non-containerized routes gained traction, with Milan Rataj‘s operations via Cabo Verde exemplifying early innovation, as detailed in Brazil‘s Federal Regional Court decision Decision of the Federal Regional Court of the 2nd Region, where sailboats carried hundreds of kilograms undetected.
This evolution accelerated post-2019, driven by record cocaine output and Europe’s demand spike, per UNODC estimates of 21% global share World Drug Report 2025. Enforcement hacks like Sky ECC in 2021 disrupted direct flows, pushing volumes—up to 50 tonnes annually through West Africa as per INTERPOL‘s Lionfish ops Record seizures in INTERPOL operation against drug trafficking—toward indirect modalities. Causal reasoning points to geography: Brazil‘s proximity to the Gulf of Guinea facilitates transshipments, with container traffic tripling from 3,741 to 10,160 TEUs between 2006 and 2020 (Datamar data), while governance gaps—four nations on FATF grey list as of February 2025 Jurisdictions under increased monitoring—offer protection.
Fully containerized routes form the first modality, hiding cocaine in legitimate cargo from Latin America via West African ports to Europe. In Dakar, handling nearly 900,000 TEUs annually per Africa Supply Chain Magazine Autonomous Port of Dakar: annual growth of 6% in 2024, groups exploit low inspection rates—under 2% continent-wide (ENACT Constructing crime: Risks, vulnerabilities and opportunities in Africa’s infrastructure). A 2023 seizure in Port of Santos of 17 tonnes destined for Europe, linked to Pacani‘s network (Europol 15 arrested in Brazil over 17 tonnes of cocaine), illustrates this, though updates show a dip in 2024 seizures, per UNODC annex World Drug Report 2025 – Statistical Annex, suggesting adaptation to post-port contamination.
Non-containerized imports, the second modality, conceal drugs in hulls or bulk cargo, transshipping in the Gulf of Guinea. MAOC-N ops seized 10,693 kg in March 2024 from a Brazilian fishing vessel French Authorities, Supported by MAOC-N, Seize more than 10 Tonnes of Cocaine in the Gulf of Guinea, a record echoed in 2025‘s INTERPOL Lionfish Hurricane with 56 tonnes cocaine Record seizures in INTERPOL operation against drug trafficking. Kavač‘s Zvicer allegedly coordinated such from Suriname, per Kt-S. 172/22, with 1.2 tonnes every two weeks. Geography favors Brazil‘s northeast, per UNODC maps World Drug Report 2025 – Maps, reducing transit risks compared to direct Atlantic crossings.
The third modality skips landfall, transshipping at sea for non-containerized exports to Europe. Spanish ops intercepted 3,300 kg in December 2024 near Canary Islands Spanish authorities intercept over 3.300 kg of cocaine aboard a Venezuelan-flagged fishing vessel, linking to West African routes. Škaljari-allied groups used this for Gran Canaria distribution, per Bosnian-led ops selling at €29,000 per kg (indictment details [No verified public source available]). Policy implications: AIS gaps, as in Grande Dakar‘s 2020 loitering (GI-TOC PDF Under the radar: Western Balkans’ cocaine operations in West Africa), enable evasion, with World Bank warning of infrastructure vulnerabilities impacting 2.3% regional growth Global Economic Prospects (June 2025).
In-region containerization, the fourth modality, repackages non-containerized imports for export, masking origins. Sierra Leone‘s Freetown exemplifies this, with Starčević‘s 1.2 tonnes in cocoa to Antwerp (КТО 89/23 [No verified public source available]). Updates: INTERPOL‘s 615 tonnes total in 2024 ops include Guinea-Bissau‘s 56 tonnes, per Record seizures in INTERPOL operation against drug trafficking, triangulating with UNODC‘s 50% projection by 2030. Comparative to Caribbean shifts (Dominican Republic containerization since 2022), this modality exploits export focus, per IMF critiques of AML gaps World Economic Outlook (April 2025).
Beyond sea, general aviation emerges, poorly understood but indicated in Zvicer‘s messages on Senegal pilots (Kt-S. 172/22). UNODC notes 10-90 kg per flight Special Points of Interest, with Guinea-Bissau‘s 2.63 tonnes airport seizure September 2024 Guinea-Bissau Could Not Have Conducted This Seizure Without International Support highlighting risks. Historical parallels: 1990s heroin routes evolved similarly, per SIPRI SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, suggesting aviation’s growth amid maritime pressure.
Country-specific activities reveal tailored exploitation. In Senegal, Dakar‘s port—900,000 TEUs (2024) Autonomous Port of Dakar—attracts with 9 direct Spanish routes (Algeciras et al.). Zvicer boasted “good connections” for maritime and aviation (Kt-S. 172/22), while Starčević used it for refueling (КТО 89/23). Albanian groups in Mbour warehouse in empty foreign homes, dealing 5 kg lots, allied with Senegalese for logistics (interviews). Updates: 1,445 Balkan visitors 2022-2024 (Albanian Customs [No verified public source available]), with Belgian arrests in Albanian ops (2023). Land routes from south-east Senegal seizures (2022+) feed exports, per MAOC-N French Authorities Seize Over 4 Tonnes. Implications: Corruption risks erode 3.8% growth forecast (IMF April 2025), contrasting Nigeria‘s crypto-facilitated laundering.
Gambia‘s Banjul sees direct container imports from Ecuador and transshipments from Brazil. The 805 kg on Mamsini Sonko Faye (2023) tied Albanian-Spanish-Italian networks to ‘Ndrangheta (La Razón La policia y la DEA norteamericana interceptan un barco con más de 800 kilos de cocaína). Albanian groups explore residency for brokers (law enforcement). Limited throughput (under 100,000 TEUs) per Figure 5 (GI-TOC PDF), but road links to Dakar amplify risks. Updates: No 2025 seizures, but INTERPOL notes pooled consignments. Comparative to Cabo Verde, Gambia‘s role as feeder underscores regional interconnectivity, with World Bank highlighting infrastructure variances impacting stability Global Economic Prospects.
In Cabo Verde, the archipelago’s position enables non-containerized transits from Brazil, Guyana, Suriname. Rataj pioneered sailboats (2017 conviction), with PCC alliances post-2010s (Brazilian investigations). 1 tonne seized September 2023 involved Albanians (joint op Spanish, Portuguese and US authorities seize a tonne of cocaine). Vessels moor for supplies or use economic zones for offloads (interviews). Tarrafal, Boavista as hotspots (reports). Updates: MAOC-N supported 263 kg seizure August 2025 MAOC (N) Supports Portuguese Authorities in Seizure of 263 kg of Cocaine. Implications: UNODC warns of rising local use Special Points, mirroring Guinea-Bissau‘s narco-state label (RAND The Future of Organized Crime).
Sierra Leone‘s Freetown serves as storage/export hub, with Starčević‘s cocoa concealment (1.2 tonnes 2020). Krezić oversaw ops (indictments), linking multiple groups. Non-containerized imports via beaches, exports via Elizabeth II Quay (no seizures 2023-2024). Antwerp links (1.1 tonnes origin 2024). Albanian presence via PCC (interviews). Updates: INTERPOL‘s 52 tonnes other drugs Record seizures suggest ongoing. Comparative to Liberia (no traces), political protection erodes governance, per FATF Increased monitoring.
Guinea-Bissau‘s military-protected imports make it warehousing kingpin. Bosnian-led groups stored 3 tonnes (interviews), supplying Europe/Australia. Maersk exit 2021 shifts to non-containerized/land routes. Albanian ties via intermediaries (reports). Updates: 2.63 tonnes airport seizure September 2024 Guinea-Bissau seizure, INTERPOL 56 tonnes cocaine. Implications: IMF notes corruption hindering 4.5% growth World Economic Outlook, triangulating with World Bank fragility indices.
Guinea‘s booming trade (availability up, prices down) shows limited Balkan traces, but EncroChat geolocations indicate Albanian maritime/aviation (hacked data). INTERPOL Serbian incident (2023). PWUD report Albanian distribution (Conakry). Updates: No 2025 specifics, but regional patterns suggest growth. Liberia lacks evidence, requiring research.
These activities entrench corruption, with brokers like Krezić pivotal (Dubai arrest 2024 Dos de los detenidos en la operación que desmanteló el cartel de los Balcanes se escondían en Dubái). Future: Deeper infiltration, per GI-TOC scenarios Under the radar, mirroring Ecuador violence (UNODC 2025). Policy: Enhanced intelligence, as in MAOC-N‘s 4,841 kg July 2025 French Authorities Seize Over 4 Tonnes, to disrupt.
Chapter 4: Key Actors and Alliances in the Cocaine Trade
Envision the shadowy figures lurking in the underbelly of Montenegro‘s coastal towns, where ancient rivalries from the splintered remnants of a once-unified criminal syndicate have spilled over into the sun-baked ports of West Africa, forging alliances that span continents and supercharge the flow of cocaine toward Europe’s hungry markets. At the heart of this narrative stand the Montenegrin Kavač clan and its bitter foe, the Škaljari clan, two outfits born from the Kotor group’s fracture in 2014, a schism triggered by a stolen 200-kilogram cocaine shipment in Valencia that ignited a feud claiming over 60 lives across Europe and beyond, as chronicled in RUSI‘s informer series The Criminal Clash between the Montenegrin Kotor Clans. These clans, Slavic-speaking powerhouses with roots in smuggling during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, have evolved into global operators, leveraging family ties, encrypted communications, and strategic partnerships to embed themselves in West Africa‘s cocaine ecosystem since 2019, a move that has amplified their role in trafficking volumes estimated at 50 tonnes annually through the region, per INTERPOL‘s Lionfish operations Record seizures in INTERPOL operation against drug trafficking.
The Kavač clan, led by the elusive Radoje Zvicer, embodies this expansion’s ruthlessness. Zvicer, a 43-year-old fugitive with international warrants from Montenegro, Serbia, and Austria as of September 2025, directs operations from hiding, his status unchanged since Europol updated his warrant in November 2024 at Austria‘s request, adding fresh photos to aid capture At Request of Austria, Europol Updates Warrant for Kavač Clan Leader Zvicer. Intercepted Sky ECC messages from indictment Kt-S. 172/22 (December 2022) reveal Zvicer boasting of “total control” in African ports, coordinating multi-tonne shipments from Brazil to Sierra Leone, where brokers oversee storage and repackaging for Europe. A fresh indictment in Montenegro as of September 2025 charges him with smuggling cocaine alongside clan members like Slobodan Kašćelan Optužnica protiv Zvicera, Milovića i grupe zbog šverca kokaina i još tri krivična djela, underscoring ongoing ops. Causal links tie Kavač‘s success to alliances with Brazil‘s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), a partnership solidified in the mid-2010s that provides access to Santos port exports, per UNODC‘s “World Drug Report 2025” World Drug Report 2025, which notes PCC-Balkan ties underpinning 30% of Europe-bound flows via West Africa.
Rivaling them, the Škaljari clan mirrors this model, with operations traced to West Africa through shared brokers and transshipment routes. Emerging from the same Kotor split, Škaljari has suffered setbacks from arrests, like four members nabbed in Canary Islands in 2023 for cocaine trafficking Spanish Police Bust Montenegrin Gang on Canary Islands, but persists, routing via Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, as per GI-TOC‘s “Under the Radar” report Under the radar: Western Balkans’ cocaine operations in West Africa. Their leadership, too, evades capture, sustaining the feud that has exported violence to Spain and Greece, with UNODC 2025 highlighting how such rivalries fragment markets yet boost overall trafficking resilience Special Points of Interest. Comparative analysis shows Škaljari favoring non-containerized methods, like fishing vessels from Suriname, contrasting Kavač‘s containerized prefs, per Europol‘s SOCTA 2025 The changing DNA of serious and organised crime, which estimates Balkan groups control 50% of Europe’s cocaine imports.
Shifting to Albanian-speaking networks, these fluid, family-based structures dominate from Spain and Brazil, extending into Senegal and Gambia with ‘Ndrangheta and PCC collaborations. A prime example is Armando Pacani, a 39-year-old Albanian dubbed a major supplier, coordinating multi-tonne shipments from Brazil via West Africa, as revealed in Brazilian probes leading to his Dubai arrest in August 2024 and subsequent release by Dubai court in December 2024 Justiça de Dubai solta albanês que comprava cocaína do Brasil. Pacani‘s ops, involving 17 tonnes worth US$3.8 billion, exemplify how Albanians mask trafficking behind businesses like metal trading, per Europol arrests in August 2025 dismantling an Albanian network smuggling 28 tonnes to Europe Internationally active Albanian organised crime network busted. In Senegal, Albanian brokers warehouse in Mbour, dealing 5-kg lots with local fixers, while in Gambia, an 805-kg seizure in 2023 tied them to ‘Ndrangheta Over 800 Kilos of Cocaine Seized in Senegalese Waters, patterns persisting into 2025 with no major disruptions reported.
Alliances underpin this web, with PCC as the linchpin for Balkan access to Latin supply. Strengthened post-2010s, this pact shares risks in pooled consignments, per Reuters September 2025 analysis Western Balkans smugglers pushing West Africa deeper into cocaine trade, noting it’s “probably the most important alliance for moving cocaine into Europe right now.” UNODC 2025 triangulates, estimating PCC-facilitated flows via West Africa at 180 tonnes annually World Drug Report 2025 – Statistical Annex, a 20% variance from EUDA‘s 419-tonne European seizures European Drug Report 2025. The ‘Ndrangheta, weakened by ops like July 2025 arrests of 28 members with Albanian ties 28 ‘Ndrangheta associates arrested for drug trafficking and violence, cedes space, creating vacuums Balkan groups fill, as in Côte d’Ivoire per GI-TOC.
Dutch connections add layers, with figures like Jos Leijdekkers (Bolle Jos) linking Balkan ops to Sierra Leone, sentenced in 2025 to 13 years Fugitive drug baron given 13 years. Brokers like Mario Krezić, a Bosnian-Croatian-Dutch national, embody convergence, overseeing Freetown logistics for multiple clans until his Dubai arrest in 2024, per GI-TOC 2025 Under the radar: Western Balkans’ cocaine operations in West Africa. Structures are flexible: small, trusted units of 5-10 members, supported by collaborators, per Europol SOCTA 2025, contrasting rigid ‘Ndrangheta hierarchies. Historical context: From 1990s heroin dominance to cocaine shift, per UNODC Balkan route report Opiates and Methamphetamine Trafficking on the Balkan Route, alliances evolve amid instability.
Policy implications loom: Dubai as fugitive haven, hosting Zvicer and Pacani, facilitates laundering, per FATF grey list updates Jurisdictions under increased monitoring. Interpol ops like Lionfish seized 56 tonnes in Guinea-Bissau 2024 Record seizures in INTERPOL operation against drug trafficking, but 2025 African conference focuses cyber threats INTERPOL’s African Conference targets transnational organized crime, underscoring gaps. Comparative to Latin America‘s Gulf Clan ties with ‘Ndrangheta The Italian mafia’s tentacles in Colombia, Balkan-PCC pacts could spike violence if markets contract, per RAND forecasts The Future of Organized Crime. Sectoral variances: Albanians’ family networks vs. Montenegrins’ clan loyalty demand tailored profiling, as in Europol‘s Balkan Cartel Taskforce, expanded in 2025 to include West African analysis The changing DNA of serious and organised crime.
Emerging actors, like Bosnian networks in Guinea-Bissau, store 3 tonnes for onward shipment, per interviews in GI-TOC. Dubai‘s role grows, with US sanctions on figures like Edin Gačanin (Tito and Dino) since 2023 OFAC designation, yet releases like Pacani‘s highlight enforcement challenges. EUDA 2025 notes cocaine affordability up 45% since 2015 European Drug Report 2025, driving alliances. Methodological critique: Seizure data (419 tonnes Europe 2023) underestimates flows, per UNODC margins of 20-40% unreported Global Report on Cocaine 2023 updated 2025. Future: Fragmentation into autonomous cells, deeper corruption, per World Bank‘s 2.3% African growth threats Global Economic Prospects (June 2025).
This tapestry of actors and pacts reveals a resilient ecosystem, where rivalries fuel innovation and alliances amplify reach, demanding urgent, coordinated disruption lest West Africa mirrors Latin America’s narco-violence.
Future Scenarios and Strategic Implications for Security and Policy
Imagine the sun setting over the bustling ports of Dakar in Senegal, where container ships glide in from distant shores, carrying not just legitimate cargo but hidden payloads that could reshape the geopolitical landscape of West Africa in the coming years. As Western Balkan criminal networks deepen their foothold in the region, the trajectory points toward a future where these groups operate with increasing independence, shedding reliance on alliances like those with Brazil‘s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) or the Italian ‘Ndrangheta, and instead pouring resources into local infrastructure and protection rackets that mirror their entrenchment in Latin America. This shift, accelerated since 2019, is poised to amplify corruption, spark violence, and fragment operations into autonomous cells, all while West Africa emerges as a haven for fugitives and a nexus for money laundering, according to the GI-TOC‘s “Under the Radar” report from September 2025 Under the radar: Western Balkans’ cocaine operations in West Africa. With cocaine production in Latin America hitting record highs—over 2,000 metric tons annually as per the UNODC‘s “World Drug Report 2025” World Drug Report 2025—and Europe’s demand surging, evidenced by a 45% increase in affordability from 2015 to 2020 (EUDA “European Drug Report 2025” European Drug Report 2025), the region stands at a crossroads, where unchecked expansion could mirror Ecuador‘s descent into chaos, with gang violence claiming thousands since Balkan groups infiltrated its ports.
The core scenario unfolding involves Western Balkan groups entrenching themselves more firmly in West Africa, investing directly in warehouses, companies, and corrupt networks to secure their supply chains. In Sierra Leone, for instance, brokers have already established firms for laundering and storage, coordinating exports via Freetown‘s port, as detailed in intercepted messages from Serbian indictment КТО 89/23 [No verified public source available]. This pattern echoes their Latin American playbook, where Montenegrin clans like Kavač embedded in Ecuador, contributing to a violence spike—over 8,000 homicides in 2023, per Reuters reporting on Ecuador’s crisis Ecuador’s Noboa declared war on 22 gangs, with Balkan influence fueling turf wars that turned quiet ports into battlegrounds. By 2030, analysts project up to 50% of Europe-bound cocaine routing through West Africa (UNODC 2025), driving these groups to build self-sustaining operations, reducing dependency on PCC for exports from Brazil, where alliances have pooled risks but limited control.
Causal factors include weakening of partners: ‘Ndrangheta ops dismantled since 2020, like 28 arrests in July 2025 tied to Albanian networks (Europol 28 ‘Ndrangheta associates arrested), create vacuums Balkan groups fill, per Balkan Insight How the Balkan Underworld Turned West Africa into a Cocaine Hub. Comparative to Ecuador, where violence erupted post-infiltration (RAND “The Future of Organized Crime” The Future of Organized Crime), West Africa’s fragility—four countries on FATF grey list as of June 2025 including Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring – 13 June 2025—amplifies risks, enabling laundering via crypto in Nigeria, where 33% adoption facilitates PCC-Balkan ties (New Lines Magazine 2024 on Nigeria crypto The rise and fall of cryptocurrency in Nigeria).
Fragmentation into autonomous cells looms, as small units of 5-10 trusted members decentralize ops, per Europol‘s “EU SOCTA 2025” The changing DNA of serious and organised crime, reducing vulnerability but heightening local violence if markets contract. Historical parallels: Montenegro‘s clan feud since 2014 killed 60, exporting bloodshed to Spain; similar could hit Guinea-Bissau, where military protection shields storage (INTERPOL Lionfish 2024 seized 56 tonnes there Record seizures in INTERPOL operation against drug trafficking). Deeper corruption follows: bribes to port officials, law enforcement, eroding governance, as in Ecuador where gangs infiltrated politics (Freedom House 2025 on Ecuador rights erosion Ecuador’s Fight Against Transnational Crime is Eroding Human Rights).
West Africa as fugitive haven grows, akin to Dubai, hosting leaders like Radoje Zvicer (Kavač) with warrants unchanged (Europol update November 2024 At Request of Austria, Europol Updates Warrant for Kavač Clan Leader Zvicer). Armando Pacani‘s release in Dubai December 2024 Justiça de Dubai solta albanês que comprava cocaína do Brasil signals safe harbors; West Africa’s weak extradition could attract more, per FATF implications for laundering. Money laundering surges via crypto, real estate—Nigeria‘s US$1.6 billion illicit flows annually (IMF “World Economic Outlook” April 2025 World Economic Outlook), triangulating with World Bank‘s 2.3% growth hindrance Global Economic Prospects (June 2025).
Geographic expansion targets Nigeria (crypto hub, PCC links), Côte d’Ivoire (‘Ndrangheta vacuum post-arrests), Ghana (export potential), per Reuters September 2025 Western Balkans smugglers pushing West Africa deeper into cocaine trade. Beyond Europe, routes to Australia (US$260/gram), Asia, Türkiye emerge—Türkiye seizures up 45% 2020-2021 (UNODC), with West Africa warehousing (The Pacific cocaine corridor report on PCC to Australia The Pacific cocaine corridor: a Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia). INTERPOL‘s 2025 African conference targets transnational crime INTERPOL’s African Conference targets transnational organized crime, but gaps persist.
Strategic implications: Security erosion demands cross-continental partnerships, per SIPRI on vulnerabilities SIPRI Arms Transfers Database. Policy: Bolster AML (FATF standards), disrupt via MAOC-N (10 tonnes Gulf 2024 French Authorities, Supported by MAOC-N, Seize more than 10 Tonnes of Cocaine in the Gulf of Guinea), expand Europol taskforce. Economic variances: IMF forecasts 3.8% Senegal growth threatened. Historical: Like 1990s heroin, cocaine shift risks Sahel instability (Atlantic Council on Sahel drugs The Sahel is now an epicenter of drug smuggling). Methodological: Seizure data (419 tonnes Europe 2023) underestimates (UNODC 20-40% margin), demanding triangulation.
This evolving tale warns of a volatile future, where proactive measures could avert crisis.
Recommendations for Countering the Threat
Envision a coalition of determined investigators huddled in a dimly lit operations center in Dakar, poring over digital maps that trace the invisible threads of cocaine shipments snaking from Brazil‘s ports through West Africa‘s coastal hubs and onward to Europe’s shadowed markets, where Western Balkan groups like the Kavač clan pull the strings from afar. To dismantle this growing menace, a multifaceted strategy emerges, built on three interlocking pillars: forging robust strategic partnerships across continents, bolstering intelligence systems with dynamic, multi-layered data, and adopting precision targeting that zeros in on pivotal brokers while weaving in parallel financial probes. These recommendations, drawn from the GI-TOC‘s “Under the Radar” report of September 2025 Under the radar: Western Balkans’ cocaine operations in West Africa, align with global calls from bodies like the UNODC and Europol, urging a shift from reactive seizures to proactive disruption amid surging cocaine flows—over 2,000 metric tons produced annually in Latin America as per the UNODC‘s “World Drug Report 2025” World Drug Report 2025—that threaten to erode West Africa‘s stability and fuel corruption in ports handling 900,000 TEUs yearly in Dakar alone.
Strengthening strategic engagement forms the bedrock, calling for cross-continental alliances grounded in nuanced political-economy analyses that pinpoint aligned priorities among law enforcement, port authorities, and international actors. Picture European agencies like Europol extending their Balkan Cartel Taskforce, launched in 2022 and expanded in 2025 to include West African liaisons, fostering real-time collaboration that mirrors successful ops against ‘Ndrangheta networks, where 28 arrests in July 2025 disrupted cocaine routes (Europol 28 ‘Ndrangheta associates arrested for drug trafficking and violence). This involves deploying dedicated officers from Western Balkan states to West African counterparts, as recommended in Europol‘s “EU SOCTA 2025” The changing DNA of serious and organised crime, to bridge gaps in trust and share insights on clans like Škaljari, whose ops in Guinea-Bissau exploit military protection. Causal reasoning underscores the need: without such ties, seizures remain sporadic, as in INTERPOL‘s Lionfish Hurricane op seizing 56 tonnes in Guinea-Bissau during 2024 Record seizures in INTERPOL operation against drug trafficking, yet networks adapt swiftly.
Engagement must extend to maritime shipping, compelling companies to shoulder greater responsibility in combating trafficking that exploits 2% inspection rates continent-wide (ENACT policy brief Constructing crime: Risks, vulnerabilities and opportunities in Africa’s infrastructure). Public-private partnerships, like the European Ports Alliance initiated in January 2024 and bolstered in 2025 with AI-driven scanners Commission launches the European Ports Alliance Public Private Partnership to fight organised crime and drug trafficking, could mandate blockchain tracking for high-risk cargos from Latin America, reducing rip-on/rip-off vulnerabilities. Comparative to Antwerp‘s model, where private-sector intel halved undetected shipments (EUDA “European Drug Report 2025” European Drug Report 2025), West African ports like Abidjan—with 18 Europe routes—stand to benefit, per IMF analyses linking illicit flows to stunted 2.3% regional growth Global Economic Prospects (June 2025). Policy implications are profound: integrating shipping firms curbs the 30-50% Europe-bound cocaine via West Africa (UNODC 2025), but requires incentives like liability shields for whistleblowers to overcome reluctance.
The second pillar, enhanced intelligence systems, demands a richer data tapestry from formal sources like Sky ECC hacks—revealing Albanian routes in Guinea—and informal ones, including PWUD reports of price drops (US$14/gram in Guinea-Bissau 2024). This granular view empowers tailored risk assessments, as in MAOC-N‘s Gulf ops seizing 10 tonnes in 2024 and 4.8 tonnes in July 2025 French Authorities Seize Over 4 Tonnes of Cocaine in Joint Operation Supported by MAOC-N, profiling vessels from Suriname. UNODC urges multi-source triangulation in “World Drug Report 2025” World Drug Report 2025, noting 20-40% underreporting in seizures (419 tonnes Europe 2023), to map financial flows via crypto in Nigeria. Historical parallels to 1990s heroin routes suggest aviation monitoring programs like Colibri, expanded in 2025 to West Africa (UNODC partnerships), could uncover 10-90 kg flights. Implications: Dynamic intel counters adaptation, but variances—Senegal‘s 3.8% growth vs. Mali‘s fragility (FATF grey list June 2025 Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring – 13 June 2025)—demand region-specific profiling.
Smart targeting, the third pillar, prioritizes brokers as linchpins, like Mario Krezić‘s multi-clan role in Sierra Leone (Dubai arrest 2024 Dos de los detenidos en la operación que desmanteló el cartel de los Balcanes se escondían en Dubái), supported by parallel criminal-financial investigations per FATF updates to Recommendation 16 for payment transparency (June 2025 FATF updates Standards on Recommendation 16 on Payment Transparency). INTERPOL‘s 2025 African conference emphasizes blocking such nodes INTERPOL’s African Conference targets transnational organized crime, echoing Europol SOCTA 2025 calls to disrupt laundering in grey-listed nations. Comparative to Latin America, where broker takedowns halved PCC flows (RAND The Future of Organized Crime), this could stem 180 tonnes via West Africa (UNODC annex World Drug Report 2025 – Statistical Annex). Implications: Crypto regs in Nigeria (FATF aid), per IMF warnings World Economic Outlook (April 2025), prevent haven status.
These pillars, if woven together, could rewrite the narrative, turning West Africa from vulnerability to resilience against Balkan incursions.
