Global technology transfers, dual-use electronics, multinational defence production, satellite communications, industrial sovereignty and the increasingly complex question of technological origin.

Scope: Worldwide assessment of defence-electronics supply chains, technology ownership, international manufacturing partnerships and military applications, concentrating on developments from 2022 to November 2026, with a strategic outlook through 2031.

Executive Summary / Bottom Line Up Front

The international defence industry is entering a period in which the nationality displayed on an electronic system increasingly reveals less about its technological origin, underlying dependencies and ultimate military control.

Advanced components are designed in one jurisdiction, manufactured or assembled in another, integrated into platforms elsewhere and potentially transferred through additional commercial or governmental channels. Their commercial identity can change without the underlying technology necessarily changing.

This transformation has five strategically important consequences.

• Technological origin and manufacturing origin are different. Intellectual property, components, firmware, assembly, integration and satellite-network access can belong to different jurisdictions.
• Dual-use electronics are central to contemporary military capability. Satellite terminals, semiconductor devices, radio-frequency systems, inertial sensors, encryption and advanced computing increasingly serve civilian and military applications.
• Joint industrial programmes formalise international technology transfers. GCAP, SAMP/T NG, AUKUS and NATO–Ukraine innovation initiatives demonstrate different mechanisms for sharing industrial capabilities while controlling sensitive intellectual property.
• Sanctions have not eliminated transnational technology flows. European and British authorities document continuing attempts to obtain restricted electronics through third-country intermediaries and indirect procurement.
• Strategic sovereignty now depends on controlling the technological system, not merely manufacturing its final product. Software, cryptographic keys, satellite capacity, maintenance, licensing and component replacement are consequential dependencies.

The most important unresolved problem is not whether international defence technologies are interconnected. Official records establish that they are. It is whether governments can reconstruct and exercise effective control over the full technological, commercial and jurisdictional chain when sophisticated civilian equipment becomes a component of military operations.

European Cold-Chain Cyber Intrusions: Industrial Control Vulnerabilities – Operational Sabotage and Systemic Infrastructure Risk

The Hidden Nationality of Defence Electronics: How Global Technology Transfers Are Redefining Military Sovereignty

The nationality stamped on a defence component no longer reveals who controls the technology, who can authorise its transfer or who can keep it operating during a conflict. The distinction is becoming a material security and industrial liability for governments financing domestic production while depending on foreign intellectual property, semiconductors, software and satellite infrastructure. The European Union’s 2026 semiconductor initiatives, the £4.6 billion multinational GCAP contract and the expansion of European sovereign satellite communications demonstrate the same contradiction: governments are investing to reduce strategic dependencies through industrial structures that remain inherently international. The question is no longer whether military electronics are manufactured nationally. It is whether national authorities possess sufficient legal, technological and operational control to sustain them when export restrictions, commercial decisions or geopolitical confrontation interrupt the underlying supply chain.

The factory can be national while the technology remains foreign

A sophisticated electronic system can carry an Italian manufacturing designation, incorporate foreign semiconductor technology, operate under software licences controlled elsewhere and depend on satellite infrastructure administered by an external network operator. These relationships are neither exceptional nor necessarily unlawful. They reflect the industrial organisation documented in the OECD’s Mapping the Semiconductor Value Chain — June 2025, which distinguishes semiconductor design, wafer fabrication, assembly, testing and packaging as specialised activities distributed across different industrial jurisdictions.

The resulting separation between manufacturing and technological authority changes the meaning of defence-industrial sovereignty. A company may acquire a production facility without acquiring unrestricted ownership of its underlying patents. A foreign manufacturing licence may authorise assembly without permitting independent modification or re-export. A distributor may change a product’s commercial identity without changing its technical architecture. An equipment manufacturer may retain ownership of a terminal while another enterprise controls the communications network through which it operates.

The OECD’s December 2025 assessment of global wafer-fabrication capacity identifies another constraint: semiconductor facilities are not automatically interchangeable. Their processes, technologies and production capabilities differ. Domestic manufacturing capacity therefore cannot be measured solely by the number of facilities or the volume of chips produced. The relevant question is whether a country can manufacture the particular devices required by its military systems, replace unavailable suppliers and sustain production under adverse conditions.

This distinction is decisive for contemporary defence electronics. Radar, electronic warfare, satellite communications, inertial navigation, electro-optical sensors and military computing depend on multiple specialised technologies. Final assembly can establish an industrial contribution without establishing control over every critical input. A national label describes where a product may have been manufactured; it does not certify the sovereignty of the system.

The numbers expose an industrial system larger than national control

Israel’s defence-export figures demonstrate the scale of technologically intensive international military production. According to the Israel Ministry of Defense’s February 2026 announcement, defence-export agreements signed during 2025 reached $19.2 billion, almost 30% above the previous year. Missile, rocket and air-defence systems accounted for 29% of the total; observation and optronics for 22%; radar and electronic warfare for 11%; manned aircraft and avionics for another 11%; and command, control, communications and information systems for 7%.

Together, those five categories represented 80% of the reported agreement value. Europe accounted for 36% of Israeli defence-export agreements and Asia-Pacific for 32%, followed by the Middle East and North Africa at 15% and North America at 13%. The figures establish the international reach of sophisticated Israeli defence technologies, but not the share of components manufactured domestically, the location of licensed foreign production or the contractual ownership of intellectual property.

European investments reveal the opposite side of the same industrial equation. The European Commission approved €2 billion in Italian state aid for STMicroelectronics’ silicon-carbide manufacturing project in Catania in March 2025. The STMicroelectronics–GlobalFoundries project at Crolles in France involves approximately €7.5 billion in public and private investment, while Germany’s Infineon MEGAFAB-DD received approval for a €920 million state-aid measure in February 2025. These investments address different semiconductor capabilities and cannot be treated as equivalent production capacity. Their common objective is to strengthen manufacturing access in technological categories where foreign dependency can constrain European industry. European Chips Act — European Commission.

The United Kingdom’s National Semiconductor Strategy, meanwhile, envisaged up to £1 billion over approximately a decade, emphasising semiconductor design, intellectual property and specialist capabilities. The contrast is instructive. Italy, France, Germany and Britain are investing in different sections of the technological chain. None of these investments, considered individually, establishes complete national control over semiconductor design, fabrication, manufacturing equipment, software and final military integration.

These figures are commitments, approved support measures, project investments and signed agreements—not interchangeable measures of equipment delivered or capabilities achieved. Their significance lies in the distribution of industrial authority, not their arithmetic sum.

Satellite networks reveal where operational sovereignty can disappear

Satellite communications expose the difference between owning equipment and controlling its essential service. A terminal requires more than compatible antennas, modems and radio-frequency electronics. It depends on orbital capacity, gateways, authentication, network management and continuing permission to use the relevant satellite infrastructure. These functions can be controlled by enterprises and governments different from those responsible for manufacturing the hardware.

On 4 February 2026, Starlink confirmed additional security arrangements coordinated with Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Digital Transformation. Terminals operating in Ukrainian territory required government whitelist approval to receive service. The official Starlink notice demonstrates that physical possession of a communications device does not independently guarantee network access. Service authorisation is a separate operational capability.

The distinction is particularly important for unmanned systems, geographically dispersed forces and military networks requiring beyond-line-of-sight communications. Multi-orbit or multi-operator compatibility may provide alternative connectivity, but it cannot automatically be equated with uninterrupted service, resistance to electronic interference or independence from commercial network administrators.

The European Union’s response is partly embodied in IRIS², its secure satellite communications programme. On 7 August 2026, the European Commission and the SpaceRISE consortium signed an implementation agreement expanding the planned architecture to 348 satellites: 330 in low Earth orbit and 18 in medium Earth orbit. The European Space Agency reported projected increases in secure governmental capacity of 60% within the Union and 54% globally compared with the earlier configuration. These are design projections, not operational services already available. IRIS² Reinforced and Accelerated — European Space Agency — August 2026.

IRIS² marks a shift from purchasing commercial connectivity towards establishing greater European authority over infrastructure and service governance. Yet its ultimate sovereignty value will depend on deployment, ground systems, security arrangements and operational continuity. Owning satellites, controlling terminals and guaranteeing communications are three different industrial and governmental responsibilities.

Multinational cooperation is becoming the price of advanced military capability

The Global Combat Air Programme, involving Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, illustrates how technological sovereignty is increasingly pursued through shared institutions rather than exclusively national production. The participating governments established the GCAP International Government Organisation through their December 2023 convention. In July 2026, the UK Ministry of Defence announced a £4.6 billion jointly financed design-development contract awarded to Edgewing, alongside a separate British plan for £8.6 billion of investment over four years. The programme retains a target of service entry from 2035. UK Ministry of Defence — July 2026.

The arrangement provides a mechanism for integrating industrial capabilities that span avionics, sensors, software and advanced aircraft systems. It also requires governance over technological information, intellectual-property access and authorised exports. The British government’s September 2026 update to the GCAP Open General Licence demonstrates that international engineering cooperation requires corresponding legal arrangements for transferring controlled goods, software and technology. Programme participation does not automatically create unrestricted transfer rights. UK Export Control Joint Unit — September 2026.

Other programmes reflect different forms of integration. In October 2026, MBDA reported that France had ordered four additional SAMP/T NG air and missile defence systems, bringing its total orders to twelve. The Franco-Italian programme integrates interceptor, radar and command-system technologies through established industrial cooperation. AUKUS Pillar II addresses advanced technology sharing, including interoperable underwater systems, with initial deliveries under its first signature project scheduled from 2027. UNITE–Brave NATO, connecting NATO Allies with Ukrainian defence innovation, established an initial €10 million innovation competition and envisaged expansion towards €50 million. MBDA — October 2026; AUKUS Defence Ministerial Statement — May 2026; NATO — March 2026.

These programmes differ in technology, finance and institutional design. Their common feature is the distribution of development and production responsibilities among international partners. Cooperation can expand industrial capability while making software rights, technical information, export permissions and long-term maintenance central elements of national security.

Export controls can follow the technology beyond the manufacturing border

The legal architecture governing this industrial system is becoming as important as the production chain itself. Regulation (EU) 2021/821 establishes European controls on dual-use exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and specified transfers. Italy applies the relevant framework through its national authorities, including UAMA, alongside separate legislation governing military materials. Israel’s Defense Export Control Agency, operating under the Defence Export Control Law of 2007, regulates defence equipment, technical knowledge and related services. Regulation (EU) 2021/821; Israel Ministry of Defense — DECA.

American jurisdiction adds a further dimension. Section 734.9 of the Export Administration Regulations establishes circumstances in which specified foreign-produced items can become subject to US controls. The applicability of those provisions depends on defined conditions involving technology, software, production and transactions. American technological involvement does not make every foreign-manufactured product automatically subject to a US export-licence requirement. US Bureau of Industry and Security — EAR Part 734.

The importance of this legal fragmentation becomes apparent when commercially distributed electronics are recovered from military equipment. The US Bureau of Industry and Security’s Common High Priority Items List identifies integrated circuits, radio-frequency modules and other products of concern because of their appearance in Russian military systems. British sanctions-evasion guidance documents risks involving intermediaries, indirect procurement and misrepresented end uses. BIS — Common High Priority Items; UK Government — Countering Russian Sanctions Evasion, March 2026.

A recovered component can establish technological presence. It cannot, without transaction records, establish manufacturer complicity, unlawful export or governmental authorisation. Product labels, serial numbers, corporate ownership records and customs documents answer different questions. Their distinction is essential both for credible sanctions enforcement and for protecting legitimate industrial actors from unsupported accusations.

The next industrial constraint is upstream of the weapons manufacturer

The International Energy Agency’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 identifies an additional dependency beneath the semiconductor and electronics industries. Excluding rare earths, the average refining share of the leading country across the assessed mineral markets increased from 70% in 2023 to 72% in 2025. For certain strategically relevant materials, including gallium, graphite, manganese and selected rare earths, concentration exceeds 90%.

Between January 2025 and April 2026, prices for some strategically important minor minerals more than doubled, while tungsten prices increased approximately sixfold. European gallium and certain heavy rare-earth prices were approximately five times corresponding Chinese domestic prices, with germanium approaching three times. These differences indicate that industrial exposure can be transmitted through specialised materials long before it becomes visible in the final cost of military equipment.

The IEA estimated that full implementation of the expanded restrictions examined in its 2026 assessment could place approximately $6.5 trillion in annual downstream production outside China at risk across several industries. This is a conditional exposure estimate, not realised economic damage. The agency also identified substantial cost barriers to alternative refining projects, with capital costs 20% to more than 150% higher in the examined cases.

The European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act responds through four benchmarks for 2030: extraction capacity equivalent to at least 10% of annual EU consumption, processing capacity of at least 40%, recycling capacity of at least 25%, and no more than 65% dependence on a single third country for each strategic raw material at a relevant processing stage. These are policy objectives, not achieved levels of independence. European Commission — Critical Raw Materials Act.

The contradiction is financial as well as technological. Governments can commit billions to semiconductor facilities and multinational defence programmes while remaining exposed to materials, production equipment and specialist processes that cannot be replaced rapidly. The cost of losing access to a minor input may be determined less by its purchase price than by the production it prevents.

The next 24 months will test who actually controls the technology

Between November 2026 and November 2028, the industrial consequences will emerge through decisions already embedded in the European semiconductor programmes, GCAP’s development structure, IRIS² implementation, AUKUS technology cooperation and the Union’s critical-materials strategy. The decisive measures will not be announcements of investment alone, but qualified manufacturing capacity, enforceable rights over intellectual property, reliable access to controlled technologies, available communications services and the ability to maintain military equipment without unexpected external permission.

Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom face different costs of incomplete implementation. Italian and French industrial facilities risk producing less strategic independence than their public financing implies if critical materials and production technologies remain externally constrained. German semiconductor projects depend on translating investment and international partnerships into sustained manufacturing capability. Britain must reconcile its intellectual-property and defence-integration strengths with the foreign fabrication and technology relationships underlying its industrial strategy.

The European Union faces a corresponding institutional exposure: its semiconductor investments, critical-materials benchmarks and secure satellite infrastructure must develop into functioning capacities rather than remain separate instruments of industrial policy. NATO and multinational defence programmes face the additional requirement of converting technological cooperation into deployable and maintainable capabilities without eliminating national legal responsibilities.

The financial burden of failure would fall first on governments financing facilities and procurement programmes, then on manufacturers facing constrained production or uncertain technology rights, and ultimately on armed forces dependent on electronics whose continued operation they cannot independently guarantee.

The strategic balance will not be determined by the nationality printed on advanced military electronics. It will be determined by who can manufacture, authorise, modify, maintain and operate the technology when international cooperation becomes constrained.

European Cold-Chain Cyber Intrusions: Industrial Control Vulnerabilities – Operational Sabotage and Systemic Infrastructure Risk

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Navigational Index

Pillar I — The Global Architecture of Technological Origin

Chapter 1 — The Disappearing Nationality of Advanced Electronics : The distinction between technological invention, intellectual property, semiconductor fabrication, electronic assembly, software ownership, system integration and final military application.

Chapter 2 — The Critical Technologies Inside Modern Defence Systems : Satellite communications, RF electronics, semiconductors, electronic warfare, inertial navigation, electro-optical sensors, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and distributed military networks.

Chapter 3 — The International Industrial Geography of Defence Electronics : The United States, Israel, Europe, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, India, Türkiye and the wider network of manufacturing, integration and technology-transfer jurisdictions.

Pillar II — International Cooperation, Dual-Use Transfers and Military Integration

Chapter 4 — Satellite Communications and the New Contest for Military Connectivity : Multi-orbit communications, civilian satellite infrastructure, secure terminals, sovereign networks and network-operator dependence.

Chapter 5 — The Most Important Multinational Defence-Technology Programmes : GCAP, SAMP/T NG, AUKUS, NATO–Ukraine UNITE–Brave NATO, IRIS² and selected cross-border defence-electronics partnerships.

Chapter 6 — Technology Transfers, Licensing and the Fragmentation of Industrial Identity : Foreign manufacturing licences, multinational subcontracting, intellectual-property restrictions, software dependencies, re-exports and end-user controls.

Chapter 7 — The Battlefield as a Laboratory for Global Electronics : Technology recovered from unmanned systems and precision weapons, sanctions circumvention, commercial equipment adaptation and the distinction between component provenance and authorised transfer.

Pillar III — Industrial Sovereignty, Strategic Exposure and the Global Outlook

Chapter 8 — The Legal Architecture of Cross-Border Military Technology : European dual-use legislation, Italian export controls, Israeli defence-export regulation, American export-control jurisdiction, British controls and international coordination.

Chapter 9 — Europe’s Industrial Exposure: Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom : National technological competencies, foreign dependencies, critical production facilities, intellectual-property ownership and the relationship between sovereignty and multinational industrial integration.

Chapter 10 — The Geopolitics of the Defence-Electronics Supply Chain : Semiconductor concentration, strategic minerals, technology restrictions, sanctions, industrial security, satellite infrastructure and the financial consequences of technological dependency.

Chapter 11 — Three Pathways for the Defence-Technology System, 2027–2031

Controlled allied integration, competing technological blocs and increasingly fragmented commercial procurement networks.

Chapter 12 — Institutional Options and Final Strategic Assessment : Technology-provenance standards, export-control coordination, supply-chain transparency, joint-production governance, network sovereignty and industrial resilience.

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Europe’s Cybersecurity Funding: Italy’s Resilience Gap

Master Abstract

The Technology Retains Its Origin Even When Its Identity Changes

Modern defence production has outgrown the traditional concept of a nationally identifiable weapons manufacturer. A military system can contain intellectual property developed abroad, commercial semiconductors designed for an entirely different market, electronic modules assembled under licence, software maintained by an external supplier and communications infrastructure operated outside the purchasing state’s jurisdiction. Final assembly may establish the commercial origin of a finished product for particular customs purposes, but it cannot by itself establish the nationality of the underlying technological capabilities.

This is especially consequential in satellite communications, navigation, radio-frequency electronics and unmanned systems. A compact satellite terminal is not simply an antenna. Its operational value depends on the combination of radio hardware, modem architecture, cryptographic protections, network-management systems, accessible satellite capacity and the authority to maintain or terminate service. The manufacturer may control the terminal while another enterprise controls the constellation. A national defence ministry may purchase the equipment without acquiring control over every technological layer required for its operation.

The relevant distinction is therefore between industrial possession, technological ownership and operational sovereignty. These three conditions may coexist within one country, but multinational production increasingly separates them.

International Cooperation Is Both an Instrument of Sovereignty and a Source of Dependency

The central paradox of contemporary defence industrial policy is that governments increasingly pursue technological sovereignty through international cooperation.

The Global Combat Air Programme illustrates this development. On 3 July 2026, the British Ministry of Defence announced a £4.6 billion jointly financed contract awarded to Edgewing to advance the next stage of the Italy–Japan–United Kingdom combat-aircraft programme. The participating governments are targeting service entry from 2035. Britain separately identified £8.6 billion of planned investment over four years. These figures describe different financial commitments and must not be added as though they were independent procurement expenditures. Over £4 Billion Invested in Next-Generation Fighter Jet — UK Ministry of Defence — Jul 2026.

The programme demonstrates how international technological integration can extend beyond subcontracting into common engineering requirements, shared programme governance, export arrangements and industrial development.

At the other end of the technological spectrum, NATO and Ukraine established UNITE–Brave NATO to connect Allied industrial enterprises with Ukrainian developers, initially providing €10 million in joint innovation contracts, with plans to expand the initiative towards €50 million. The declared priorities include counter-unmanned systems, air defence and secure communications. NATO and Ukraine Activate Next Steps for UNITE–Brave NATO — NATO — Mar 2026.

The two models differ considerably. One concerns a complex, long-duration multinational aircraft programme; the other seeks to accelerate adaptation and scaling of technologies connected to immediate defence requirements. Both demonstrate that the relevant industrial unit is increasingly a network of institutions, intellectual-property holders, laboratories and production facilities, rather than a single national factory.

Defence Electronics Have Become a Strategic Sanctions Battlefield

The growing importance of civilian-origin electronics in military systems has also transformed sanctions enforcement. The United Kingdom’s official Common High Priority framework identifies 50 categories of high-risk items in its March 2026 counter-circumvention guidance, including integrated circuits, communications modules, other electronic components and manufacturing equipment. These items are particularly significant because the same commercial product families may serve many legitimate industrial applications.

British guidance describes indirect shipping routes, misrepresented end uses and procurement networks as mechanisms through which restricted technologies continue to reach Russian buyers. The European Union has progressively extended restrictions beyond entities located in Russia to intermediaries in third countries. Its April 2026 sanctions package introduced a targeted anti-circumvention measure concerning specified exports to Kyrgyzstan following European analysis of re-export risks.Countering Russian Sanctions Evasion — UK Government — 2026. – 20th Package of Restrictive Measures Against Russia — Council of the EU — Apr 2026.

An important analytical boundary follows: identifying a foreign-made component inside a military system does not establish that the original manufacturer authorised its military use, knew the ultimate destination or violated export regulations. Determining those questions requires transaction records, applicable classification decisions and evidence of the relevant participants’ knowledge and conduct.

Key Evidence Table

The following table separates publicly documented programmes and controls from commercial representations and unresolved transfer questions.

Indicator	Value / status	Reference date	Definition / scope	Issuer	Exact source
GCAP joint industrial contract	£4.6bn	3 Jul 2026	Jointly funded next-stage design contract, not aircraft deliveries	UK Ministry of Defence	Contract announcement
GCAP UK investment	£8.6bn	Jul 2026	Planned four-year UK investment, distinct from joint contract value	UK Ministry of Defence	Investment announcement
SAMP/T NG French procurement	12 systems ordered in total	23 Oct 2026	Manufacturer-reported total after contract for four additional units; not delivered inventory	MBDA	France orders four additional systems
NATO–Ukraine innovation	€10m initial awards; €50m planned programme scale	Mar 2026	Joint innovation funding; larger amount is a scaling objective	NATO	UNITE–Brave NATO
IRIS² constellation	348 satellites	7 Aug 2026	330 LEO plus 18 MEO satellites under expanded deployment architecture	European Commission	IRIS² implementation agreement
AUKUS Pillar II signature project	Initial delivery scheduled from 2027	30 May 2026	Multinational payloads and enabling systems for uncrewed underwater vehicles	AUKUS defence ministers	Ministerial joint statement
Common High Priority framework	50 identified items	UK guidance published 2026	High-risk categories for diversion to Russian military supply chains	UK Government	Counter-circumvention guidance
EU Russia sanctions	21 adopted packages	Jul 2026	Restrictive-measures packages, not individual sanctions designations	Council of the EU	EU sanctions policy
Israeli defence export regulation	Defence Export Control Law, 2007	Applicable framework	Controls on defence equipment, know-how and related services	Israel Ministry of Defense	DECA
Italian dual-use export authority	UAMA	Current institutional framework	National authorisation and licensing procedures	Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs	UAMA procedures

The Technologies Reshaping International Defence Cooperation

Satellite Communications: The Difference Between Owning Equipment and Controlling Connectivity

hiSky Reveals its Smartellite™ Dynamic Ku-band Terminal, Based on Phased Array Antenna Technology

HISKY — SmartLITE satellite terminals

The manufacturer markets its SmartLITE SIRIUS, ALTAIR and VEGA terminal families for compact, mobile satellite communications. Its published architecture includes terminals, a communications hub and network-management systems, with claimed capabilities for private and sovereign networks.

HISKY — Official Technology and Product Overview.

The significance of this class of equipment is broader than any individual manufacturer. Small satellite terminals can provide beyond-line-of-sight connectivity to mobile vehicles, maritime platforms and unmanned aircraft without requiring the operator to construct an entire national satellite constellation.

Their military relevance lies in sustaining communications over extended distances and in environments where terrestrial networks are unavailable or disrupted. However, resistance to electronic warfare depends on the actual waveforms, antenna performance, interference environment, satellite-network configuration and operational architecture. Multi-network compatibility should not be equated automatically with immunity to jamming.

A central distinction must also be preserved between equipment capable of supporting a given application and evidence that it has been deployed successfully in that application. Manufacturer specifications do not independently establish battlefield performance or the existence of a particular export transaction.

The company’s published material establishes the existence and intended applications of its technology. It does not, by itself, establish the production chain, export authorisations or end users of any particular terminal recovered from a military platform.

The Principal Technology Families

Technology	Civilian applications	Military significance	Principal strategic dependency
Satellite communications terminals	Transport, energy, shipping, remote connectivity	Mobile beyond-line-of-sight communications and data exchange	Satellite access, network control and service continuity
Semiconductor microelectronics	Computing, telecommunications, industrial automation	Signal processing, computing and electronic control	Design IP, fabrication capacity, packaging and testing
RF transceivers and phased-array antennas	Mobile networks, satellite services, radar	Communications, sensing and electronic protection	RF components, specialist manufacturing and system integration
Inertial navigation and GNSS receivers	Aviation, logistics, robotics	Positioning and navigation support	Sensors, timing components and software assurance
Electro-optical and infrared sensors	Industrial inspection, medicine, surveillance	Reconnaissance, detection and target observation	Detector materials, optical components and processing electronics
AESA radar technology	Aviation, airspace monitoring	Air and missile detection, tracking and integrated defence	Transmit/receive modules, signal processing and software
Artificial intelligence and edge computing	Industrial automation, analytics	Sensor processing, decision support and autonomy	Computing devices, model validation and secure updates
Cryptography and secure electronics	Financial infrastructure, telecoms	Secure communications and system authentication	Key management, hardware trust and implementation control

These technology categories overlap. A sophisticated satellite terminal, for example, can depend simultaneously on RF electronics, semiconductors, embedded software, cryptography and specialised manufacturing processes.

The Most Significant Joint Defence-Technology Structures

UK, Japan, and Italy team up to build 6th-Gen fighter plane

Global Combat Air Programme — Italy, Japan, United Kingdom

Sixth-generation combat-aircraft development, common engineering, advanced sensors, integrated electronic systems and multinational industrial governance. The 2035 target remains a programme objective, not an achieved capability.

UK Ministry of Defence — July 2026

France and Italy Unveil State-of-the-Art SAMP/T NG Air Defense Missile System at Eurosatory 2024

EUROSAM / SAMP/T NG — France and Italy

Integration of the ASTER interceptor family, advanced radar technology and command-and-control electronics. The system exemplifies cross-border industrial specialisation within European air and missile defence.

MBDA — SAMP/T NG

AUKUS exercise sees Royal Navy uncrewed submarine controlled from across the world

AUKUS — Australia, United Kingdom, United States

Advanced technology sharing covering autonomous and underwater capabilities. The first Pillar II signature project addresses interoperable payloads and enabling systems for uncrewed underwater vehicles.

AUKUS Defence Ministerial Joint Statement — May 2026

IRIS² : la riposte européenne dans la guerre spatiale des télécommunications – ladepeche.fr

IRIS² — European Union

Secure satellite connectivity, public-service requirements, commercial infrastructure and strategic communications resilience. The August 2026 agreement establishes a 348-satellite architecture, not a completed operational constellation.

European Commission — August 2026

These initiatives should not be treated as technologically equivalent. GCAP represents jointly governed system development, SAMP/T NG coordinated multinational defence production, AUKUS preferential technology cooperation and IRIS² the creation of European satellite infrastructure. They nevertheless share an underlying strategic problem: which participants control the essential technologies, who may transfer them, and who can sustain them when political or commercial relationships change.

Legal and Institutional Architecture: Why a Foreign Component Does Not Automatically Require Two Export Licences

European and Israeli controls must be evaluated independently according to the specific transaction.

Regulation (EU) 2021/821 establishes the European Union regime for dual-use items. Article 3 requires authorisation for exports of items listed in Annex I; other provisions can bring certain non-listed items within licensing requirements under defined conditions. The consolidated legislation includes amendments effective in September 2026.

Regulation (EU) 2021/821 — European Parliament and Council — May 2021, consolidated Sep 2026.

In Italy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs identifies UAMA as the competent national authority for relevant dual-use authorisation procedures, operating within the European framework and Italian legislation, including Legislative Decree 221/2017. Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs — UAMA Procedures. Ministero degli Affari Esteri

Israel’s Ministry of Defense identifies DECA as the authority responsible for regulating defence exports under the Defence Export Control Law of 2007 and accompanying regulations. Israel Ministry of Defense — Defense Export Control Agency. Ministry of Defense

A component assembled in Italy from Israeli-origin technology is not automatically subject to two separate export licences simply because the associated intellectual property is Israeli. The applicable obligations depend on the product’s technical classification, the location and parties involved in each transfer, incorporated controlled content, any relevant re-export or end-use conditions and the governing law.

Conversely, legal export from the first country does not necessarily eliminate restrictions on subsequent resale or diversion. Compliance must therefore trace actual transactions, rather than infer their legality from a manufacturer’s name, production address or national designation.

Competing Explanations: Why Technological Provenance Becomes Difficult to Trace

The following hypotheses describe overlapping mechanisms rather than mutually exclusive explanations.

Hypothesis	Diagnostic support	Disconfirming evidence or limits	Indicators	Current standing
H1 — Legitimate multinational industrial integration	Documented programmes, joint ventures, authorised licences and multinational development	Does not establish the legality of every downstream transfer	Contracts, licensing conditions, ownership and production records	Strongly established as a global industrial mechanism
H2 — Commercial redistribution and authorised dual-use adaptation	Civilian technologies have documented non-military applications and complex distribution channels	No universal rule permits unrestricted diversion into defence use	End-user declarations, sales records and technical classification	Established mechanism; transaction-specific outcomes unresolved
H3 — Deliberate sanctions or export-control circumvention	Official UK and EU evidence of indirect procurement and third-country networks	Does not establish misconduct by an identified manufacturer without transaction evidence	False end-user records, restricted counterparties, unexplained routing	Documented in particular restricted-trade environments
H4 — Ownership and service-layer separation	Satellite and software systems involve distinct hardware, network and control responsibilities	Technical separation is not itself evidence of concealment	Network agreements, service rights, software dependencies and intellectual-property licences	Structurally supported; implications depend on contracts

The evidence does not support reducing every opaque supply chain to clandestine activity. Some forms of limited traceability arise from lawful industrial specialisation, some from the complexity of commercial distribution, and others from deliberate attempts to defeat restrictions.

The decisive analytical distinction is between complexity, opacity and illegality. They can coexist, but they are not interchangeable.

Principal Gaps and Watch Indicators

The first major gap is the absence of comprehensive public transaction-level visibility across international defence-electronics supply chains. Corporate disclosures and government procurement announcements frequently identify prime contractors or major industrial partners, but not every semiconductor, software dependency, distributor, licensing restriction or subsequent change of ownership.

A second gap concerns the relationship between nominal sovereign ownership and actual operational control. Governments can acquire domestically manufactured equipment whose critical satellite connectivity, firmware or maintenance remains controlled by external commercial actors.

A third concerns the scope and effectiveness of export authorisations when products move through distributors, systems integrators and third-country buyers. Relevant evidence includes licensing decisions, customs records, end-use certificates and documented enforcement outcomes. Public absence of these records cannot be treated as evidence that authorisations were missing.

Four indicators are particularly consequential through 2031:

1. Expansion of technology-sharing and re-export frameworks, including the evolution of GCAP-specific licensing arrangements and AUKUS regulatory cooperation.
2. Industrial investment in critical semiconductor and RF manufacturing, especially where national governments seek greater control over technology design, production and packaging.
3. The deployment of sovereign and multi-operator satellite networks, including actual IRIS² milestones, operational-service rights and national control over secure communications.
4. The frequency and documentary detail of sanctions-circumvention enforcement, particularly concerning high-priority electronic components, intermediaries and third-country re-export channels.

The United Kingdom’s September 2026 update to the GCAP open general licence is especially instructive. It permits specified transfers under defined programme conditions and explicitly addresses supply-chain nations and controlled technology. This illustrates how legal frameworks must evolve alongside multinational industrial design. Open General Licence: Global Combat Air Programme — UK Government — Updated Sep 2026. GOV.UK

Strategic Assessment: The Five Dimensions of Technological Sovereignty

Defence-electronics sovereignty can no longer be evaluated solely through the nationality of the prime contractor or the country printed on the finished equipment. A more defensible assessment distinguishes five dimensions: design authority, manufacturing capacity, intellectual-property and software control, authority over international transfers, and sustained operational access.

A state may possess one or more of these dimensions without controlling all five. Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom confront this question from different industrial positions. Italy and France share major missile-defence and electronic-system programmes; Germany has substantial industrial and systems-integration interests; Britain combines multinational European defence industry participation with advanced cooperation under AUKUS and GCAP. At the European level, IRIS² represents an attempt to strengthen the infrastructure layer of strategic connectivity.

The central policy challenge is not to eliminate international technology transfers. Doing so would conflict with the organisation of many existing advanced defence programmes. It is to make technological dependencies sufficiently identifiable, legally governable and operationally manageable that international integration does not produce unrecognised strategic vulnerabilities.

The documented record already establishes an important change in the nature of defence industrial power: sophisticated military capability is increasingly produced through distributed technological authority, while national governments remain responsible for export decisions, security policy and military outcomes.

That divergence between global industrial production and national political responsibility is likely to shape defence procurement, technology regulation, industrial investment and alliance coordination throughout the next five years.

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PILLAR I — THE GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE OF TECHNOLOGICAL ORIGIN

Chapter 1 — The Disappearing Nationality of Advanced Electronics

The industrial nationality of a military system no longer establishes the origin of its technology

The most consequential structural change in the international defence-electronics industry is the progressive separation of technological invention, intellectual-property ownership, semiconductor manufacturing, electronic assembly, software development, systems integration and final military application. These activities were never entirely contained within national borders, but their increasing specialisation has created industrial arrangements in which a sophisticated electronic system may simultaneously depend on several countries, multiple corporate jurisdictions and different bodies of export-control legislation. A product can be manufactured in one country, marketed under the trademark of an enterprise headquartered in another, incorporate semiconductors fabricated in a third jurisdiction and depend on software or cryptographic services provided elsewhere. The geographical location of the factory, although legally and commercially relevant, is therefore insufficient to determine the origin of the technology or the degree of operational control retained by the purchasing government. The fundamental distinction is between the nationality of the finished article, the location of its constituent manufacturing processes, the ownership of its intellectual property and the jurisdiction governing the technology’s subsequent transfer and operation. These dimensions must be examined separately because none is a reliable substitute for the others.

This development has direct implications for defence procurement, national security, international trade and industrial policy. Governments traditionally structured a significant part of their defence-industrial assessments around the location of factories, national ownership of prime contractors, employment, domestic value added and the proportion of procurement awarded to domestic suppliers. Such criteria remain important for economic policy and industrial mobilisation, but they can overstate strategic independence when the finished equipment cannot be produced, maintained, updated or operated without foreign technological inputs. A domestically assembled radar may rely on imported semiconductor devices, externally licensed electronic-design tools, foreign-produced radio-frequency components and software maintained under contractual restrictions. Likewise, the national assembly of a satellite terminal does not necessarily establish national control over the satellite constellation, gateway infrastructure, network-management software or security credentials required to deliver communications services. These distinctions are not hypothetical deficiencies inherent in every multinational product. They represent distinct forms of dependency that must be investigated before industrial participation can legitimately be translated into claims of sovereign technological capability.

The OECD’s June 2025 examination of semiconductor value chains provides an authoritative foundation for this assessment. It describes a highly interconnected international production system characterised by geographical specialisation, concentrated inputs and dependencies among design, fabrication, assembly, testing and associated industrial services. Its December 2025 analysis of global wafer-fabrication capacity further demonstrates why aggregate manufacturing statistics are insufficient: fabrication facilities differ in process technologies, production capabilities and the categories of semiconductor devices they can manufacture. Capacity at one facility cannot necessarily substitute for capacity at another, even when both facilities belong to the same nominal industry. Consequently, the existence of semiconductor manufacturing within national territory does not establish the ability to reproduce every critical electronic component incorporated into military equipment. Mapping the Semiconductor Value Chain — OECD — June 2025; The Chip Landscape: Geographical Distribution of Wafer Fabrication Capacity — OECD — December 2025. OECD+1

Seven distinct identities can coexist inside a single electronic system

A defensible examination of defence-electronics provenance requires distinguishing seven identities that are frequently conflated in public discussion. The first is the inventive identity of the technology: the institutions, engineers and research organisations responsible for creating its fundamental concepts, although invention alone does not determine current ownership. The second is its intellectual-property identity, involving patents, licensed circuit designs, proprietary software, semiconductor design libraries and contractual rights to modify or reproduce protected technologies. The third is the manufacturing identity of individual components, especially semiconductor fabrication, where process-specific machinery, materials and specialised production experience determine what can be manufactured. The fourth is the identity of electronic assembly and testing, which may include circuit-board population, module construction, packaging, calibration and environmental qualification. The fifth is systems integration, where independently sourced components are combined into equipment meeting specified performance, reliability and interoperability requirements. The sixth concerns software and service control, including firmware updates, authentication, cryptographic arrangements and access to communications infrastructure. The seventh is transactional and operational identity, involving the legal exporter, distributor, customer, ultimate end user and authority responsible for military employment.

These identities can change at different speeds. A corporate acquisition may transfer ownership of a manufacturing facility without transferring ownership of every underlying patent or design. A licensing agreement may authorise production in a new jurisdiction while imposing limitations on modifications, exports or subsequent manufacturing. A commercial distributor may change the market-facing product name without altering the underlying components. Software updates may significantly change a system’s functionality while leaving its physical hardware and country-of-origin marking unchanged. Finally, the appearance of an identifiable component in a recovered military platform establishes a physical association with that platform, but not the commercial, legal or operational pathway by which the component reached it. Distinguishing these identities is indispensable for avoiding two opposite errors: assuming that national assembly provides complete technological sovereignty, and assuming that foreign-origin electronics necessarily establish an unauthorised transfer by the original manufacturer.

Table 1 — The seven dimensions of technological origin and control

Dimension	What it actually identifies	Relevant evidence	What it does not establish
Technological invention	Origin of a technical concept, architecture or engineering development	Patent histories, research publications, technical records	Current ownership or present manufacturing location
Intellectual-property ownership	Rights over designs, software, patents and licensed technical information	IP registers, licence agreements, corporate filings	Ownership of every physical component
Semiconductor fabrication	Facility and process used to manufacture semiconductor devices	Fabrication records, lot identifiers, supplier documentation	Location of design, final integration or end use
Electronic assembly and testing	Site where components become modules or finished electronics	Production records, serial numbers, quality documentation	Origin of all incorporated technology
Systems integration	Enterprise responsible for combining subsystems into a functioning product	Integration contracts, system specifications, qualification records	Unrestricted ownership of embedded technologies
Software and network control	Rights and capabilities governing firmware, updates, authentication and services	Software licences, network agreements, maintenance contracts	Exclusive control over the physical hardware
Export and operational identity	Relevant exporter, transaction, consignee, end user and service operator	Authorisations, customs declarations, end-use documentation	That every upstream participant authorised the final use

The economic significance of this separation is substantial. High-value semiconductor design and software development may be concentrated in one jurisdiction while capital-intensive fabrication occurs in another and labour-intensive packaging or assembly in a third. The distribution of value added is therefore different from the distribution of physical production. Conversely, a jurisdiction capturing a relatively small portion of the nominal value of a finished electronic product may control an indispensable production input, manufacturing tool or licensed design. This distinction helps explain why industrial sovereignty cannot be measured exclusively through export turnover, manufacturing employment or the presence of national champions. The correct analytical question is whether the relevant activity is replaceable, under what conditions, within what period and with what financial and operational consequences. The OECD’s semiconductor research supports precisely this differentiated treatment of manufacturing stages and industrial bottlenecks. Mapping the Semiconductor Value Chain — OECD — June 2025. OECD

The semiconductor production chain is geographically distributed but technologically unequal

The semiconductor industry provides one of the clearest examples of how production identity becomes separated from technological authority. Circuit architecture, electronic-design automation, manufacturing equipment, photolithography, wafer processing, packaging, testing and integration are related but distinct activities. A semiconductor manufacturer can possess valuable fabrication capabilities without designing the circuits it manufactures. A company that develops sophisticated chips may have no owned fabrication plant. An enterprise specialising in advanced packaging may integrate separately manufactured semiconductor dies without controlling their original designs. Each participant can therefore occupy a different legal, economic and technological position within the production chain. OECD research published in 2025 and 2026 identifies three principal stages—design, wafer fabrication, and assembly, testing and packaging—supported by intangible inputs, production materials and capital equipment. The OECD also notes that the industrial processes are exceptionally complex, involving numerous specialised suppliers and production steps. Understanding the Semiconductor Value Chain — OECD — 2026. OECD

The principal strategic consequence is limited substitutability. A country with substantial mature-process semiconductor capacity cannot automatically substitute that capacity for production requiring more specialised manufacturing processes. The reverse is also significant: access to advanced computing chips does not necessarily resolve a shortage of radiation-tolerant devices, specialised analogue electronics, power semiconductors or radio-frequency components. Military electronics must frequently satisfy demanding environmental, reliability, traceability and long-term support requirements. Accordingly, a government assessing its national production capabilities must distinguish technological sophistication from production suitability, and nominal manufacturing capacity from qualified, available output. The OECD’s December 2025 mapping of fabrication capacity explicitly highlights the limited substitutability of production between semiconductor facilities, reinforcing the conclusion that national resilience depends on the actual composition of industrial capacity rather than simply the number of factories or the total volume of chips produced. The Chip Landscape — OECD — December 2025. OECD

WordPress analytical scheme 1 — The seven-layer technological-origin architecture

This scheme is deliberately distinct from the interactive dashboard. It represents the provenance and control structure of a single electronic system rather than displaying an unverified international supplier network. It uses a self-contained, CSS-only presentation with no JavaScript and no external resources. The hypothetical relationships are not claims about a specific manufacturer or military transaction.

Why commercial relabelling can obscure technological continuity without proving deliberate concealment

Commercial names, trademarks and product identifiers are valuable indicators of the enterprises responsible for bringing technology to market, but they are not conclusive evidence of engineering origin. A branded product can incorporate a licensed reference design, standardised electronic modules or production capabilities obtained through commercial arrangements predating its current corporate identity. Changes in company ownership may introduce additional layers of separation between the developer of the technology, the entity financing production, the facility undertaking assembly and the organisation holding the rights to distribute the resulting equipment. Such arrangements are ordinary features of advanced industrial production. Their strategic significance emerges when public documentation identifies only the final trademark or manufacturer while the underlying dependencies remain commercially confidential, distributed among subcontractors or governed by agreements unavailable to the purchasing government.

A further distinction must be made between traceability becoming difficult and traceability being deliberately destroyed. An incomplete public record can result from commercially legitimate confidentiality, fragmented ownership of records, different national reporting obligations or the practical complexity of electronic components manufactured in high volumes. Deliberate concealment is a different proposition requiring evidence of conduct, intent and relevant transactions. In particular, no conclusion about sanctions circumvention, illicit export or manufacturer complicity follows automatically from a discrepancy between a product’s branding and the national origins of its components. The United States Bureau of Industry and Security identifies integrated circuits and radio-frequency transceiver modules among high-priority goods associated with sanctions-evasion risks, but that classification does not make their ordinary commercial distribution unlawful. The concern arises from the applicable legal restrictions, the identities of the transaction parties and the destination or intended end use. Common High Priority Items List — US Bureau of Industry and Security. Bureau of Industry and Security

For government procurement authorities, this separation requires a more sophisticated documentation standard than the manufacturer’s certificate of origin. Product-level assessment should establish which entity owns the relevant technical design, whether replacement components can be produced by another qualified supplier, which contractual rights permit or prevent software modification, whether cryptographic or communications services are controlled externally and how export restrictions affect maintenance during conflict. A product that appears nationally manufactured may still be operationally dependent on a foreign service provider. Conversely, a foreign-designed component can be incorporated into a genuinely resilient national system if the purchasing country has adequate replacement inventories, permitted maintenance rights, reliable service alternatives and enforceable arrangements for continuity. Nationality is therefore an informative attribute of the industrial system, but the ability to sustain essential functionality is a separate and more demanding test of sovereignty.

Key judgments — Chapter 1

The nationality of a finished electronic product is a legally significant but incomplete indicator of technological origin. Semiconductor production, intellectual-property ownership, software control and systems integration are independently distributed activities, and a change in one dimension does not necessarily change the others. The OECD’s evidence of concentrated semiconductor manufacturing and limited production substitutability reinforces the conclusion that sovereignty depends on access to specific industrial capabilities, not aggregate production alone. The principal uncertainty at product level concerns the availability of reliable records linking component provenance, licensing obligations, manufacturing decisions and subsequent transfers.

What would change the assessment: Comprehensive, independently auditable technical-origin records demonstrating that a national manufacturer holds sufficient design, production, software and sustainment rights to reproduce or replace a system’s essential components without unapproved external dependencies.

Open official record: Product-specific export authorisations, industrial licence conditions, component-level manufacturing provenance and contractual software-maintenance rights remain necessary for determining the actual degree of national control over individual systems.

Chapter 2 — The Critical Technologies Inside Modern Defence Systems

Military advantage increasingly arises from electronics integration rather than the performance of isolated platforms

The strategic importance of advanced electronics is not confined to improving the performance of established military equipment. Electronics now determines how sensors generate information, how communications infrastructure distributes it, how processing systems interpret it and how military organisations maintain coordinated operations across geographical distances. An aircraft, naval vessel, surveillance platform or unmanned vehicle may possess sophisticated physical characteristics, but its operational contribution depends increasingly on the interaction between electronic sensing, positioning, communications, computing, software assurance and command systems. These functions are neither technologically identical nor universally interchangeable. They operate under distinct limitations involving electromagnetic conditions, processing capacity, data integrity, communications availability, power consumption, latency, qualification and maintenance. Nevertheless, their integration has become a central consideration in contemporary military architecture.

The British government’s Strategic Defence Review 2025 offers a particularly clear official description of this transformation. It places communications networks, data infrastructure, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems and the cyber-electromagnetic domain at the foundation of its proposed integrated force. The review recommends a common digital architecture, increased interoperability between military systems and expanded capacity to combine conventional platforms with unmanned and autonomous capabilities. It also identifies commercial technologies as an increasingly significant influence on the economics and conduct of military operations. These conclusions document a governmental strategic direction; they do not establish that every proposed capability has entered operational service. The distinction matters because national policy documents can establish priorities and planned investments without demonstrating successful deployment. The Strategic Defence Review 2025: Making Britain Safer, Secure at Home, Strong Abroad — UK Ministry of Defence — 2025. GOV.UK

Satellite communications: the separation of terminal ownership from network sovereignty

Satellite communications illustrate how a single military function can depend on several technologically and legally distinct systems. A terminal is the physical interface between its user and an accessible satellite network. Its internal design can include antennas, radio-frequency components, modems, signal processing, power-management electronics and embedded software. Beyond the terminal are the satellite payload, orbital infrastructure, gateway arrangements, network-management systems, capacity agreements and security mechanisms governing access. These layers can belong to separate enterprises or governmental institutions, meaning that control over the terminal does not necessarily confer authority over the satellite service itself.

This distinction is important when comparing communications architectures designed around different orbital regimes. Geostationary satellites offer established wide-area coverage from fixed apparent positions relative to the Earth’s surface, while lower-orbit constellations can provide different latency, coverage and handover characteristics. Medium Earth orbit systems occupy another architectural position. Actual performance depends on the design of the constellation, antenna characteristics, satellite visibility, ground infrastructure, network loading and application requirements. A multi-orbit or multi-operator terminal may offer alternative service paths where contractual permissions and technical compatibility permit them, but the existence of multiple compatible networks does not establish simultaneous connectivity, uninterrupted switching or resistance to every form of interference. Equally, a manufacturer claiming broad network compatibility must be distinguished from an operator possessing independently verified service agreements and operational experience under demanding conditions.

For defence ministries, the contractual allocation of authority is therefore as important as the hardware specification. The relevant questions concern who controls network admission, how service availability is guaranteed, whether communications can continue during political or commercial disputes, which jurisdiction governs service interruption and who can provide maintenance or replacement equipment. These questions apply to civilian satellite infrastructure incorporated into government operations as well as to dedicated defence communications systems. They are particularly consequential where the equipment is commercially available but the service infrastructure remains dependent on a small number of network operators.

Radio-frequency electronics and the industrial foundations of electronic warfare

Radio-frequency electronics are among the most consequential technologies linking civilian telecommunications and defence applications. Amplifiers, oscillators, filters, mixers, converters, transceivers, phased-array antennas and signal-processing circuits enable functions extending from mobile communications to radar and electronic sensing. Their strategic importance arises from the fact that military forces must communicate, detect objects, establish position and preserve their own use of the electromagnetic spectrum while operating in environments where access may be contested. Electronics designed for ordinary telecommunications does not automatically become military-grade equipment when installed on a defence platform, yet common technological foundations can support the development of specialised military systems.

Modern electronically scanned radar is an important example of this technological convergence. Active electronically scanned array systems rely on distributed transmitting and receiving functions, associated radio-frequency circuitry and sophisticated signal processing. Their capabilities arise from the combination of hardware architecture, electromagnetic design, software and calibration rather than simply from antenna size or the nominal number of electronic modules. Radar performance must also be evaluated against the actual operational requirements and environmental conditions. Public statements about electronically scanned arrays cannot be interpreted as proof of equivalent detection range, resistance to interference or operational readiness across different manufacturers and platforms.

Electronic warfare introduces another level of complexity because military organisations must consider both the ability to operate in contested electromagnetic environments and the vulnerability of their own electronics. The UK Strategic Defence Review identifies electromagnetic warfare and cyberspace operations as integral to the coordination of modern military capabilities, while calling for common technical standards and institutional responsibility across the defence organisation. This establishes the importance of the domain within British strategic planning without requiring assumptions about undisclosed technical configurations. The Strategic Defence Review 2025 — UK Ministry of Defence — 2025, Cyber and Electromagnetic Domain. GOV.UK

Semiconductors: different industrial processes create different military dependencies

The semiconductor requirements of modern defence systems cannot be understood through a single hierarchy in which smaller manufacturing processes are always assumed to be more strategically valuable. High-performance computing can benefit from leading-edge logic technologies, while radio-frequency power devices, analogue circuits, precision timing components, power-management electronics and specialised sensors may rely on different semiconductor materials and manufacturing processes. Gallium nitride and silicon carbide, for example, have important applications in power and high-frequency electronics, but their manufacturing economics, device properties and qualification requirements differ from those of advanced digital logic. Consequently, the loss of access to one specialised component cannot necessarily be remedied by substituting a device produced on a technologically newer manufacturing process.

This technological differentiation changes the meaning of semiconductor independence. Governments need to distinguish whether a vulnerability arises from semiconductor design capabilities, wafer-fabrication processes, specialised materials, manufacturing equipment, advanced packaging, qualified testing facilities or the availability of suitable products over the expected life of a defence system. The OECD’s wafer-capacity research makes this distinction especially important because it identifies both the geographical concentration of manufacturing and the structural limitations on replacing output from one facility with output from another. The Chip Landscape — OECD — December 2025. OECD

A further problem concerns the difference between technological novelty and sustained military utility. Defence systems can remain in service considerably longer than the commercial product cycles of individual electronic components. This creates long-term exposure to component obsolescence, production discontinuation, changes in supplier ownership and the withdrawal of specialised manufacturing processes. An electronic subsystem may therefore become difficult to sustain even when its original design remains technically sound. Industrial continuity requires documented replacement strategies, qualification procedures and contractual access to sufficient technical information. These considerations reinforce the importance of long-term supplier governance, particularly for complex systems incorporating specialised semiconductor devices.

Inertial navigation, satellite positioning and the integrity of information

Navigation technologies present a different form of dependence because their military value is related not only to the availability of a signal but also to its integrity. Global navigation satellite systems provide positioning and timing capabilities used throughout civilian infrastructure, aviation, maritime operations and telecommunications. Inertial navigation systems use onboard sensors to estimate movement without requiring a continuous external positioning signal, although their estimates accumulate errors that must be managed. The technologies are frequently complementary, but the accuracy and reliability of any particular implementation depend on its sensors, processing algorithms, calibration and integration with other information sources.

The strategic issue is that a military platform may depend on a navigation architecture incorporating sensors and software from several suppliers whose individual performance characteristics are not apparent from the finished equipment’s label. Procurement authorities must therefore evaluate the trustworthiness and reliability of the complete navigation function. This includes the behaviour of sensors under environmental stress, the integrity of associated software, maintenance and calibration requirements, and the capacity to preserve suitable operation if external navigation information becomes unavailable or unreliable. At the industrial level, an apparently simple navigation module may embody substantial foreign intellectual property and specialised manufacturing dependencies. Its commercial availability is not equivalent to national control over the technologies required to reproduce it.

Electro-optical sensors, thermal imaging and the control of specialist components

Electro-optical and infrared technologies occupy a critical position in observation, surveillance and the interpretation of physical environments. Their industrial foundations include detector materials, optical assemblies, electronic readout circuits, thermal management, image processing and calibration. Different sensor technologies are designed for different spectral regions, environmental conditions and applications, so the presence of a camera or optical sensor does not establish the performance of the complete observation system. As with semiconductor fabrication, production capabilities are not automatically interchangeable. Specialist detector production may require materials, equipment and technical knowledge unavailable to an enterprise capable of assembling complete optical instruments.

The industrial significance extends beyond the final sensor. Advanced optical assemblies frequently depend on precision manufacturing, sophisticated coatings, electronic processing and suitable packaging. Government procurement can therefore support domestic assembly while still incorporating important foreign dependencies at component level. Conversely, international partnerships can enable domestic production capabilities to develop through licensing, joint ventures and technology-transfer agreements, provided that the contractual rights and manufacturing capabilities are sufficient. These arrangements should be evaluated on the basis of identifiable technical and industrial obligations, rather than inferred from the nationality of the company selling the finished product.

Artificial intelligence and distributed military networks

Artificial intelligence introduces a further separation between the physical equipment, the computational infrastructure and the software determining how data is processed. A military application incorporating machine learning can depend on model development, training data, validation procedures, computing hardware, software libraries and operational monitoring. Different entities may control each layer. A nationally manufactured electronic platform can consequently depend on externally developed models or computing architectures, while domestically developed software may rely on imported semiconductor hardware. The distinction is especially significant for applications requiring trustworthy performance in environments differing from those represented in training and evaluation data.

The British Strategic Defence Review identifies artificial intelligence, data infrastructure and common digital systems as central components of future force development. It also calls for a digital targeting architecture and more extensive integration of unmanned systems with conventional platforms. Such a strategy places the quality and resilience of information flows alongside traditional equipment characteristics as determinants of military effectiveness. Nevertheless, the existence of an AI capability does not demonstrate that it has been validated for a particular military task, and experimentation cannot be equated with operational readiness. The Strategic Defence Review 2025 — UK Ministry of Defence — 2025. GOV.UK

Distributed military networks compound these considerations because they integrate systems that may be designed, maintained and operated under different national or institutional authorities. The principal challenge is not merely connecting devices but maintaining the reliability, integrity, authorisation and interpretability of information as it moves between systems. Network compatibility does not automatically provide institutional interoperability, and the availability of communications infrastructure does not establish that participating organisations possess common data standards, compatible security policies or sufficient authority to exchange sensitive information. A technically successful connection can still encounter contractual, legal or organisational barriers. Such dependencies have direct implications for coalition operations, joint procurement and technology-sharing arrangements.

Table 2 — Critical technologies, their industrial foundations and principal sovereignty exposures

Technology family	Essential industrial inputs	Civilian–military relationship	Principal foreign-dependency exposure	Evaluation requirement
Satellite communications	RF hardware, modems, antennas, software, satellite services	Shared commercial communications foundations	Network access and service governance	Service continuity and contractual authority
RF electronics	Semiconductor devices, filters, amplifiers, precision manufacturing	Telecommunications and sensing technologies	Specialised devices and manufacturing processes	Qualified supply and system compatibility
Advanced digital logic	Design tools, fabrication equipment, advanced packaging	Commercial computing and defence data processing	Concentrated process-specific fabrication	Actual access to suitable manufacturing capacity
Power and compound semiconductors	Specialised materials, fabrication, packaging	Energy, industry, aerospace and defence electronics	Material and process specialisation	Device qualification and replaceability
Radar	RF arrays, processing, calibration, integration	Civil aviation, surveillance and military sensing	Specialised modules and software	Verified system-level performance
Inertial navigation	Precision sensors, electronics, algorithms	Industrial, aviation and military positioning	Sensor production and software integrity	Reliability under specified conditions
Electro-optics	Detectors, optics, processing, calibration	Medical, industrial and defence observation	Specialist materials and detector production	Sensor qualification and maintenance
AI and edge processing	Computing hardware, models, software, datasets	Commercial automation and defence decision support	Hardware access and software dependencies	Validated application-specific performance
Cybersecurity	Cryptography, trusted hardware, software assurance	Protection of civilian and military infrastructure	External credentials, libraries and update rights	Independent assurance and sustainment
Distributed networks	Communications infrastructure, interfaces, security architecture	Civilian telecommunications and military integration	External services and interoperability constraints	End-to-end information integrity

The emergence of electronics as a sanctions-control priority

Official export-control documentation offers an additional indication of which electronic technologies governments consider strategically sensitive. The United States Bureau of Industry and Security’s Common High Priority Items List identifies categories of goods associated with the production of Russian military systems and describes different levels of concern. It gives particular attention to integrated circuits and radio-frequency transceiver modules with extensive legitimate commercial uses. The importance of this finding lies in the overlap between lawful civilian markets and components that can also serve military production. The same industrial ecosystem can supply ordinary electronic products while becoming subject to increasingly intensive government scrutiny when particular destinations, transactions or end uses present national-security concerns. Common High Priority Items List — US Bureau of Industry and Security. Bureau of Industry and Security

The existence of these controls does not mean that every listed component is exclusively military or automatically prohibited from international commerce. Export restrictions depend on applicable regulations, product classification, destination, end user, end use and any relevant licence conditions. Nevertheless, the official prioritisation of certain electronic categories demonstrates that governments recognise the importance of commercial semiconductor and communications technologies within contemporary defence supply chains. It also illustrates why component provenance must be examined at a transaction-specific level. A recovered electronic device can establish that particular technology is present in a military system; it cannot establish whether the product reached that system through an authorised sale, a resale that violated end-use conditions, unauthorised diversion or another documented mechanism without further evidence.

Key judgments — Chapter 2

Defence electronics should be analysed as a collection of interdependent technological functions rather than as interchangeable hardware categories. Satellite communications depend on network services as well as terminals; radar and electronic warfare depend on specialised RF manufacturing and system integration; navigation requires reliable information and sensor performance; and military AI depends on qualified software, computing hardware and appropriate operational validation. Commercial availability and declared technical specifications do not independently establish battlefield effectiveness, resilience or sovereign control. The strategic relevance of a component is determined by the function it performs, the difficulty of replacing it and the operational consequences of losing access.

What would change the assessment: Evidence of qualified substitute technologies, independent service arrangements, internationally interoperable technical standards or demonstrated domestic production capacity capable of replacing currently concentrated manufacturing capabilities.

Open official record: Detailed component qualification standards, available manufacturing capacity by relevant technology class, publicly releasable interoperability assessments and documented service-continuity arrangements would materially improve the evaluation of national dependencies.

Chapter 3 — The International Industrial Geography of Defence Electronics

Global technological power is distributed across complementary industrial specialisations

The international geography of defence electronics is not adequately represented by dividing countries into technological producers and import-dependent consumers. A more accurate distinction concerns the industrial stages in which individual economies possess competitive capabilities, the technologies they can manufacture domestically, the importance of external suppliers and the institutional arrangements governing cross-border cooperation. The United States maintains an extensive position in advanced semiconductor design, computing, software, aerospace and defence systems. Taiwan occupies a central position in semiconductor foundry manufacturing and advanced process development. Japan combines important semiconductor materials, manufacturing equipment and electronics capabilities with renewed investment in advanced fabrication. South Korea possesses major semiconductor manufacturing and electronics industries, particularly in memory and associated technologies. European states retain critical positions in semiconductor equipment, automotive and industrial electronics, power devices, specialist sensors and defence systems integration. Israel combines specialised defence electronics, communications, sensors and military systems development with a substantial international export network. India is expanding semiconductor assembly, testing, fabrication investment and design infrastructure, while Türkiye has developed a significant domestic defence-electronics and aerospace industrial base. China possesses enormous electronics manufacturing capabilities and is pursuing greater technological independence while facing restrictions affecting access to selected advanced technologies.

These positions are not interchangeable because the industrial competencies involved perform different functions. Semiconductor fabrication capacity does not automatically confer the ability to manufacture advanced lithography equipment. Ownership of sophisticated semiconductor designs does not guarantee access to the manufacturing process needed to produce them. A country producing complete radar systems may depend on externally manufactured electronic components, while a state producing critical optical or semiconductor equipment may contribute to international military technology without manufacturing the finished defence systems themselves. The international structure is therefore characterised by asymmetric interdependence: participating economies require technologies and industrial capabilities located elsewhere, but the consequences of losing those inputs vary considerably according to their scarcity, substitutability, technological sensitivity and strategic application.

The OECD’s 2025 analysis identifies precisely this relationship between geographical concentration, industrial specialisation and vulnerability. Its findings do not support a single universal ranking of semiconductor sovereignty. Instead, they demonstrate that exposure must be assessed at the level of specific production stages, technologies and manufacturing processes. Mapping the Semiconductor Value Chain — OECD — June 2025; The Chip Landscape — OECD — December 2025. OECD+1

The United States: technological design authority, manufacturing investment and export-control jurisdiction

The United States occupies a distinctive position within the international defence-electronics system because its influence extends beyond the production of finished military equipment to semiconductor design, advanced computing, software, technological standards and the legal mechanisms governing certain international transfers. American technology companies participate in the development of computing architectures, electronic components and software platforms incorporated into products manufactured in numerous countries. American defence enterprises also integrate sophisticated electronic systems into aircraft, naval platforms, sensors and communications equipment. Consequently, the industrial influence of the United States cannot be measured solely through the number or location of domestic semiconductor fabrication plants.

The strategic importance of American jurisdiction is illustrated by the Export Administration Regulations administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security. These regulations can apply to specified items subject to US jurisdiction, including certain foreign-produced products when relevant regulatory conditions are met. Such provisions are particularly consequential for internationally distributed semiconductor supply chains because manufacturing location alone does not necessarily determine the complete legal framework applicable to a transaction. The US Common High Priority Items framework further identifies electronic categories associated with heightened concerns about diversion into Russian military production. Integrated circuits and radio-frequency transceiver modules feature prominently because they possess extensive civilian applications while also appearing in military systems recovered during the war in Ukraine. Common High Priority Items List — US Bureau of Industry and Security. Bureau of Industry and Security

American policy therefore operates through two different channels: investment in domestic technological capabilities and regulation of access to controlled technologies. These instruments do not produce identical effects. Manufacturing investment can increase available industrial capacity over time, but it cannot immediately replace every specialised production process located abroad. Export controls can restrict particular transactions, but their effectiveness depends on classification, compliance, enforcement and the ability to identify indirect procurement networks. Governmental authorities must also distinguish between technologies over which the United States possesses broad commercial influence and those over which it exercises legally defined export-control jurisdiction. The presence of American-origin technology in a foreign-manufactured product is an important investigative consideration, but it is not a substitute for applying the relevant legal provisions to the specific product and transaction.

A revealing industrial example comes from TSMC’s international manufacturing expansion. Its 2025 annual report records that the first Arizona fabrication facility began volume production using 4-nanometre technology during the fourth quarter of 2024. The company also describes additional American facilities in construction or development and plans for further investment. The investment illustrates the extent to which American semiconductor resilience policy depends partly on production capabilities developed by a Taiwan-headquartered manufacturer. Manufacturing capacity can become geographically American while significant elements of corporate ownership, technological experience and international production governance remain connected to the wider TSMC organisation. TSMC 2025 Annual Report — Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company — 2026. TSMC

Israel: specialised defence electronics and the internationalisation of advanced systems

Israel occupies a technologically significant position in defence electronics through its capabilities in air and missile defence, radar, electro-optics, communications, avionics, unmanned systems and associated command-and-control technologies. Its industrial model combines domestically developed systems with international procurement, manufacturing cooperation, exports and participation in foreign defence programmes. This creates a particularly relevant distinction between the origin of Israeli-developed technologies and the location at which equipment incorporating those technologies may eventually be manufactured or integrated. Israeli design authority can coexist with foreign production, just as Israeli manufacturing can incorporate external components, software or production equipment. Neither arrangement can be evaluated correctly by reference to a national label alone.

The Israel Ministry of Defense reported that defence-export agreements signed during 2025 reached $19.2 billion, an increase of nearly 30% compared with the preceding year. The ministry’s February 2026 publication provides unusually detailed information about the composition of those agreements. Missile, rocket and air-defence systems accounted for 29% of the reported total; observation and optronics systems represented 22%; radar and electronic-warfare systems 11%; manned aircraft and avionics another 11%; command, control, communications and information systems 7%; unmanned aircraft systems 4%; and satellites and space systems 3%. These are categories of defence-export agreements, not measurements of domestic production capacity or the proportion of Israeli-origin components incorporated into foreign military platforms. Nevertheless, the distribution demonstrates the commercial importance of electronic sensing, communications and integrated defence systems within Israel’s international defence-industrial activity. All-Time Defense Export Record: Israel Crosses the $19 Billion Threshold — Israel Ministry of Defense — February 2026. Homepage

The geographical distribution of Israeli agreements is also significant. According to the same ministry report, Europe accounted for 36% of the 2025 total and the Asia-Pacific region for 32%, followed by the Middle East and North Africa at 15%, North America at 13%, Latin America at 2% and Africa at 2%. This geographical pattern demonstrates that Israel’s defence-industrial relationships extend substantially beyond its immediate region and that European and Asian customers represent major markets. It does not, however, establish the amount of technological transfer contained within those agreements or the proportion involving local production licences. A procurement contract for an integrated defence system, a manufacturing partnership, the supply of components and a licence to reproduce proprietary technology create different industrial relationships even when all are reflected in international defence trade. The export figures therefore establish the scale and sectoral composition of the market, but further contract-level information is necessary to identify the actual transfer of intellectual property or manufacturing authority.

A particularly important institutional feature is Israel’s defence-export control system. The Ministry of Defense identifies the Defense Export Control Agency (DECA) as the competent authority responsible for regulating defence equipment, technological know-how and defence-related services under the Defence Export Control Law of 2007 and accompanying regulations. This confirms that the regulatory framework is not confined to the physical movement of military hardware. Relevant transfers of controlled technical information and services can also fall within the system. For multinational production arrangements, this means that the existence of a foreign manufacturing facility or locally incorporated subsidiary does not independently answer questions about permissions to transfer controlled Israeli-origin technology. The legal treatment depends on the applicable controlled item, activity, parties and authorisations. Defense Export Control Agency — Israel Ministry of Defense. Ministry of Defense

The European Union: a major technological power confronting uneven industrial dependencies

Europe’s technological position is complex because the European Union possesses important semiconductor manufacturing, research and industrial capabilities while remaining dependent on non-European enterprises in other parts of the supply chain. The European Commission explicitly acknowledged these dependencies in its 3 June 2026 proposal for a Chips Act 2.0, identifying advanced semiconductor manufacturing and design among the areas in which greater European capability is required. The proposal seeks to reinforce existing industrial strengths and develop additional capacity in advanced technologies. As of the assessment cut-off date, the proposal must be distinguished from the original European Chips Act already in force; proposed measures are not automatically equivalent to enacted legislation or operational industrial capacity. Proposal for the Chips Act 2.0 — European Commission — June 2026. Shaping Europe’s digital future

The existing European Chips Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/1781, establishes an institutional framework intended to strengthen semiconductor research, manufacturing and resilience. The Commission reports more than €80 billion in announced or planned investments associated with the semiconductor ecosystem. This is a policy and investment-pipeline indicator, not an audited measure of completed factories or realised production. Its significance lies partly in the breadth of targeted industrial activities, including semiconductor fabrication, advanced packaging, power electronics, manufacturing equipment and research. Europe’s strategic exposure cannot therefore be represented as a simple absence of semiconductor production. The underlying challenge is the incomplete coverage of the entire production chain, particularly where highly specialised capabilities are concentrated outside European jurisdiction. European Chips Act — European Commission. Shaping Europe’s digital future

The European Commission’s October 2025 decisions provide a more precise view of national specialisation. The Commission granted Integrated Production Facility status to the STMicroelectronics Catania Campus in Italy and to Infineon’s MEGAFAB-DD project in Germany. It also granted Open EU Foundry status to the European Semiconductor Manufacturing Company project in Dresden, Germany. These are formal institutional decisions under the Chips Act, not evidence that all associated production capacity had become operational by the time of designation. They nevertheless identify facilities regarded by the Commission as strategically relevant within the Union’s industrial policy. Commission Decisions on Strengthening Europe’s Semiconductor Manufacturing Capacity under the Chips Act — European Commission — October 2025. Shaping Europe’s digital future

Italy: the strategic importance of specialised electronics and multinational integration

Italy’s position within the electronics supply chain should be assessed through its participation in semiconductor manufacturing, power electronics, electronic assembly, defence systems integration and multinational industrial programmes. A particularly important example is STMicroelectronics’ Catania investment in silicon-carbide technology, which addresses a specialised semiconductor category relevant to power management and energy-intensive electronic systems. In March 2025, the European Commission approved a €2 billion Italian state-aid measure supporting a new integrated silicon-carbide manufacturing facility. The measure concerns industrial development and does not itself establish that the factory has reached its planned production capacity. Its relevance to the wider defence-industrial question lies in strengthening European access to a category of semiconductor technology whose importance extends across civilian and potentially military electronic systems. Commission Approves €2 Billion Italian State Aid Measure to Support STMicroelectronics — European Commission — March 2025.

The geographical distribution of Italian industrial participation also extends beyond Catania. The European Commission’s Chips Act project overview identifies additional investments and initiatives involving advanced packaging and photonics in Italy, including Novara and Milan. The public investment figures listed by the Commission describe project announcements and associated capital plans rather than identical categories of completed expenditure. They therefore should not be combined indiscriminately into a national measure of operational semiconductor capacity. Their strategic relevance is qualitative as well as financial: different facilities occupy different positions in the electronics value chain, and strengthening one segment does not automatically eliminate dependencies in others. European Chips Act — European Commission. Shaping Europe’s digital future

Italy’s international defence-industrial participation further illustrates the separation between national production and jointly developed technological capability. Through multinational programmes involving aircraft, missiles, sensors and integrated systems, Italian enterprises can contribute specialised manufacturing and engineering capabilities while relying on technical arrangements shared with foreign partners. Such cooperation can strengthen national industrial capacity through access to knowledge, production volumes and common development programmes, but the actual degree of technological autonomy depends on the distribution of design authority, software rights, manufacturing responsibilities and permitted exports. The economic value of a production contract should therefore be distinguished from the sovereign right to modify, reproduce or transfer the technology concerned.

France: advanced semiconductor manufacturing and integrated defence electronics

France’s industrial position combines semiconductor production, electronic-system engineering, aerospace, sensors and multinational defence integration. The STMicroelectronics–GlobalFoundries project at Crolles represents an important semiconductor-manufacturing initiative incorporating specialised process technologies. The European Commission identifies €7.5 billion in associated public and private investment and specifies 300-millimetre FD-SOI technology. As elsewhere, the published investment amount should be interpreted within its declared project scope, not as an automatic measure of completed manufacturing assets. European Chips Act — European Commission. Shaping Europe’s digital future

The French industrial challenge differs from that of countries with little established semiconductor manufacturing. France already participates in sophisticated technological activities, but the capacity to integrate high-value electronics into aerospace and defence systems does not remove exposure to foreign inputs at other stages of semiconductor production. The distinction is particularly relevant for advanced processing, specialised RF components and software dependencies. Industrial sovereignty must therefore be assessed by identifying the technologies actually developed and produced within French jurisdiction, the rights held by French enterprises and the qualified external suppliers on which their systems depend.

French–Italian cooperation in air and missile defence provides a concrete example of how national competencies can be combined in multinational programmes. The industrial objective is not necessarily to duplicate every technological function in each country, but to integrate complementary capabilities into common systems. This can create efficiencies, while making the contractual allocation of production, software modification, export authorisation and long-term maintenance particularly significant. France’s broader technological position consequently involves both domestic industrial depth and a continuing requirement to govern international dependencies.

Germany: semiconductor manufacturing, industrial electronics and specialised production equipment

Germany holds an important position in Europe’s semiconductor and electronics ecosystem through industrial semiconductor production, specialised manufacturing equipment, automotive electronics, power devices, sensors and precision engineering. Its position is especially relevant because the international defence-electronics system depends on capabilities developed for industrial and commercial markets, not solely on enterprises conventionally classified as defence manufacturers.

The European Semiconductor Manufacturing Company project in Dresden illustrates the institutional complexity of this arrangement. The Commission identifies ESMC as a joint venture involving TSMC, Bosch, Infineon and NXP. Its industrial structure combines participants headquartered in different jurisdictions within a fabrication project located in Germany. The manufacturing facility’s German location does not erase the technical capabilities and corporate rights contributed by its international partners. Conversely, the involvement of a foreign semiconductor manufacturer does not mean the project lacks German or European industrial value. Its significance lies in bringing production capacity, skills and industrial relationships into the European semiconductor ecosystem. The Commission lists investment exceeding €10 billion for the project, while the formal Open EU Foundry designation was granted in October 2025. European Chips Act — European Commission; Commission Decisions under the Chips Act — European Commission — October 2025. Shaping Europe’s digital future+1

Germany also possesses specialised capabilities relevant to the production equipment and precision processes underpinning international semiconductor manufacturing. The European Commission identifies Carl Zeiss in connection with lithography optics, demonstrating that critical influence within semiconductor production is not confined to ownership of the fabrication plant itself. Highly specialised manufacturing equipment and optical technologies can constitute strategic capabilities because they enable production processes that would be difficult to reproduce rapidly elsewhere. This position also connects Germany to wider industrial networks involving the Netherlands, the United States and Asian semiconductor manufacturers. The resulting interdependence is not symmetrical: an equipment supplier may be economically exposed to foreign customers while those customers depend on its equipment for technologically demanding production processes.

The United Kingdom: defence-electronics integration and digitally connected military architecture

The United Kingdom’s strategic position is most clearly visible through its systems-integration capabilities, defence technologies, semiconductor design activities and institutional emphasis on integrating digital systems across the armed forces. The Strategic Defence Review 2025 identifies digital infrastructure, autonomous systems, electromagnetic warfare, data and artificial intelligence as priorities for force development. Its proposals reflect an understanding that military platforms cannot be considered independently from the networks and digital systems required to connect them. The review also highlights industrial and technological cooperation with international partners, reflecting the practical importance of multinational production and interoperability. The Strategic Defence Review 2025 — UK Ministry of Defence — 2025. GOV.UK

For Britain, the distinction between national defence-industrial capability and complete technological self-sufficiency is particularly important. Sophisticated engineering and systems integration can generate substantial military and economic value without requiring every underlying component to be manufactured domestically. The question is whether access to critical technologies can be maintained through domestic production, allied cooperation, strategic inventories or enforceable commercial arrangements. This makes industrial governance inseparable from operational planning. Where an electronic capability depends on foreign manufacturing or network services, a national procurement decision must consider how those dependencies behave during supply disruptions, export restrictions or changes in the political environment.

Taiwan: concentrated semiconductor expertise and geographically expanding production

Taiwan occupies one of the most consequential positions in the semiconductor value chain because of its advanced fabrication capabilities and the international importance of its foundry industry. Its strategic significance is not explained simply by the volume of electronics manufactured on the island. The deeper issue concerns the technological sophistication of particular fabrication processes, the manufacturing experience required to sustain them and the concentration of production capability in facilities that cannot be replaced immediately by other semiconductor plants.

TSMC’s 2025 annual report describes its 2-nanometre technology entering high-volume manufacturing during the fourth quarter of 2025, alongside continued investment in advanced packaging and further semiconductor fabrication facilities in Taiwan. The same report records geographical expansion in the United States, Japan and Germany. The resulting international structure creates an important distinction between geographical diversification and technological independence. Production in several countries can reduce exposure to a disruption affecting one location, but the extent of resilience depends on the processes available at each facility, the capacity already qualified, production yields, workforce availability and shared corporate or supply-chain dependencies. TSMC 2025 Annual Report — Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company — 2026. TSMC

The expansion of Taiwanese semiconductor manufacturing abroad should therefore be understood as a reconfiguration of production geography rather than an automatic transfer of all technological capabilities. The same corporate group can operate facilities serving different customer requirements and manufacturing processes. Overseas fabrication may strengthen the resilience of customers located in allied jurisdictions while retaining important links to Taiwanese research, engineering and industrial experience. This creates a more geographically distributed semiconductor network but does not eliminate its underlying technological interdependence.

Japan: rebuilding advanced semiconductor manufacturing through international technology cooperation

Japan’s industrial strategy combines established capabilities in electronics, semiconductor materials and manufacturing equipment with efforts to expand domestic advanced-chip fabrication. Its policy reflects an important strategic proposition: technological sovereignty can be strengthened through cooperation with foreign developers when the resulting arrangements produce identifiable domestic manufacturing and engineering capabilities.

In March 2025, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry approved additional support associated with Rapidus, including research and development concerning advanced logic semiconductor manufacturing and 2-nanometre-generation chiplet and packaging technologies. The programme involves separate industrial challenges concerning fabrication and advanced packaging, and the approval of funding does not independently establish successful commercial production at the intended technological level. Post-5G Semiconductor Research and Development Programme: Stage-Gate Review — METI — March 2025.

Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry subsequently selected Rapidus in November 2025 as an enterprise eligible for financial support under legislation concerning advanced information-processing semiconductor production. The decision formed part of the government’s strategy to build domestic manufacturing capability. The relevant distinction is between institutional selection, public financing, technological development and commercially sustained output. Each stage requires separate evidence, particularly where the programme concerns advanced semiconductor production that depends on highly specialised equipment, manufacturing experience and international technical cooperation. Selection of Rapidus under the Act on Facilitation of Information Processing — METI — November 2025.

Japan also participates in the international geographical expansion of semiconductor production through TSMC’s Kumamoto facilities. According to TSMC’s 2025 annual report, the first Kumamoto fabrication plant began volume production at the end of 2024, with additional investment and construction associated with the second facility. These initiatives illustrate the coexistence of two complementary industrial strategies: developing advanced national semiconductor capabilities and attracting manufacturing capacity from an established international producer. The strategic outcomes are different. Domestic development may expand the country’s independent technical knowledge, while inward investment can strengthen production capacity and local supply chains. Neither automatically provides complete autonomy over the entire semiconductor production chain. TSMC 2025 Annual Report — Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company — 2026. TSMC

South Korea: memory semiconductors, industrial concentration and defence-electronics development

South Korea possesses substantial semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, a major consumer-electronics industry and an increasingly significant defence-industrial sector. Its importance in the global electronics system is particularly associated with semiconductor memory, manufacturing expertise and the scale of its industrial technology enterprises. These capabilities are relevant to defence electronics because advanced computing, sensors, communications and integrated systems depend on combinations of memory, processing, power management and other semiconductor devices. Nevertheless, the presence of a major domestic semiconductor industry should not be interpreted as evidence that every technologically specialised component required by national defence manufacturers is domestically available.

The Republic of Korea’s industrial policy illustrates the government’s intention to strengthen advanced regional manufacturing ecosystems. In August 2026, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources identified next-generation semiconductors, displays and future defence and transport systems among regional development priorities. The policy links technological investment, industrial infrastructure and regional specialisation, demonstrating that national technological capacity is being developed across multiple related industries rather than through an isolated defence-manufacturing programme. Korea to Promote National Land Transformation through Local-Led Growth — Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources — August 2026. english.motir.go.kr

South Korea’s strategic exposure must be considered in relation to the highly interconnected semiconductor production chain. Semiconductor manufacturing depends on specialised equipment, materials, software and international customers. National manufacturing strength therefore provides industrial leverage but also creates exposure to foreign trade restrictions, global demand conditions and supply-chain disruptions. From a defence-industrial perspective, this produces a dual policy requirement: maintaining access to foreign components and manufacturing inputs while ensuring that domestic military-system developers can secure qualified semiconductor supplies during periods of heightened international demand or geopolitical disruption. The relevant evidence concerns specific components and manufacturing processes rather than an aggregate national assessment of technological superiority.

China: enormous manufacturing scale and the distinction between volume and advanced capability

China’s position within international electronics production is distinguished by the scale of its manufacturing sector and continuing investment in semiconductor and information technologies. Government figures published in January 2026, based on data from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, record 484.3 billion integrated circuits produced in 2025, an increase of 10.9% compared with the previous year. The same publication reports 17.4 trillion yuan in combined operating revenues among major electronic-information manufacturing enterprises, alongside 750.9 billion yuan in profits. These figures describe different statistical categories and should not be combined or treated as equivalent measures of semiconductor manufacturing value. China’s Electronic Information Manufacturing Sector Posts Rapid Growth in 2025 — State Council of China — January 2026. english.www.gov.cn

The fundamental analytical qualification is that the number of integrated circuits manufactured does not reveal the technological composition of production. Counting devices does not distinguish leading-edge logic from mature-process components, analogue electronics, power devices or other products with different manufacturing requirements. Nor does aggregate production establish the availability of every specialised semiconductor needed for advanced military electronics. China’s manufacturing scale is therefore a significant industrial fact, but it cannot independently resolve questions concerning particular fabrication processes, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, software dependencies or foreign technology restrictions.

China’s electronics industry also illustrates the difficulty of treating civilian and military technological ecosystems as completely separate. Industrial electronics, telecommunications, computing and semiconductor production support a wide range of applications, while some product categories can also be relevant to defence systems. The presence of civilian electronics manufacturing does not prove that particular technologies have been transferred into military applications, and the existence of military demand does not establish the legality or illegality of specific purchases. The appropriate analytical approach is to distinguish industrial capacity from documented military application, and documented application from the legal authority governing each transaction. This is especially important where international export restrictions address particular destinations, end users or technological capabilities rather than entire categories of ordinary civilian electronics.

India: movement from semiconductor design and assembly towards a broader industrial ecosystem

India offers a significant example of industrial-policy efforts to create a more comprehensive semiconductor ecosystem rather than relying solely on the assembly of finished electronics. The government’s July 2026 approval of Semicon 2.0, with a budget outlay of ₹1,27,500 crore, established a programme addressing chip design, manufacturing equipment and materials, fabrication facilities, assembly and packaging, research and development, and skills. The government identified 12 approved semiconductor manufacturing projects under the earlier programme, with cumulative intended investment exceeding ₹1.64 lakh crore. These are programme and investment figures, not a statement that all approved projects had become operational. Cabinet Approves Semicon 2.0 — Government of India, Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology — July 2026. Press Information Bureau

A subsequent government announcement dated 6 November 2026 provides a more recent implementation snapshot. It states that five of the twelve approved semiconductor projects had commenced commercial production by October 2026. It also reports support for 105 start-ups through access to electronic-design automation tools, funding support for 24 start-ups, and access to such tools at 332 educational institutions. The announcement identifies 70,000 students trained through the Chips to Startup programme. These figures show movement across manufacturing, design infrastructure and workforce development, but they remain different categories of industrial progress. Projects approved, facilities entering production, companies accessing tools and students trained cannot be combined into a single measure of technological independence. Semicon 2.0 Web Application Portal and Electronics Components Manufacturing Scheme — Government of India — November 2026. Pib

For defence electronics, India’s development is particularly relevant because the official programme identifies applications in satellite communications, drones, surveillance equipment, telecommunications and other electronic systems. These are identified areas of technological development, not proof that every supported design has entered operational military service. India’s experience demonstrates the importance of building complementary capabilities: semiconductor design without access to appropriate fabrication, manufacturing without advanced testing, or assembly without reliable component supply can leave critical dependencies unresolved. The government’s policy increasingly addresses these gaps through separate industrial instruments, but the eventual strategic effect depends on commercially sustainable production, technical qualification, domestic design ownership and the ability to maintain access to essential manufacturing inputs.

Türkiye: defence-system integration and the strategic role of domestic electronics

Türkiye has developed an increasingly substantial defence and aerospace industrial base, including military electronics, communications, sensors, avionics and integrated systems. Its industrial position differs from that of economies whose international semiconductor influence is primarily associated with advanced commercial fabrication. Türkiye’s strategic significance lies substantially in the development and integration of complete defence capabilities, supported by domestic engineering and manufacturing enterprises as well as international technological relationships.

The Turkish Investment and Finance Office’s official investment information reports defence and aerospace exports of approximately $10 billion in 2025, alongside defence spending of approximately $30 billion for the same year. These figures describe different economic measures and cannot be interpreted as the value of defence-electronics exports or the level of indigenous semiconductor content. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the scale of the country’s wider defence-industrial activity. Sectoral Opportunities: Defense and Aerospace — Invest in Türkiye — 2026. Invest in Türkiye

The central question for Türkiye is how complete-system development relates to technological ownership deeper within the supply chain. National design and integration capabilities may provide substantial autonomy over system architecture, testing, maintenance and modification. However, such capabilities do not necessarily eliminate dependencies on imported semiconductor devices, specialised electronic components, software-development environments or advanced manufacturing equipment. Conversely, the ability to develop and integrate complete defence systems represents an important industrial competence that cannot be inferred from semiconductor fabrication statistics alone. Türkiye’s position illustrates why a comprehensive assessment of technological sovereignty must consider both the electronics supply chain and the capacity to transform its components into qualified military equipment.

A second geographical network: semiconductor manufacturing equipment

The geography of semiconductor manufacturing equipment introduces a further complication into national industrial sovereignty. A state may possess semiconductor design capabilities and domestic fabrication facilities but still rely on imported lithography, metrology, deposition, inspection or other specialised manufacturing equipment. These production technologies constitute an additional level of dependency because they influence which semiconductor processes can be established, maintained and expanded.

The Netherlands provides a particularly important example through ASML’s lithography business. In its 2025 annual report, ASML reported €32.7 billion in annual net sales, €4.7 billion in research and development expenditure and a supplier network comprising approximately 5,100 suppliers. The geographical distribution of that network included 1,600 suppliers in the Netherlands, 700 elsewhere in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, 1,350 in North America and 1,450 in Asia. The reported figures describe the supplier structure of a particular company and do not measure the number of suppliers serving the entire semiconductor industry. They nevertheless demonstrate how a technologically specialised enterprise can rely on an extensive international industrial network while supplying equipment of considerable strategic importance to semiconductor manufacturers. ASML 2025 Annual Report — ASML — 2026. ASML – Supplying the semiconductor industry

ASML’s disclosed supplier distribution is especially instructive because it shows that even a strategically important European technology enterprise does not operate through a wholly national production chain. Its equipment, services and continuing research depend on relationships extending across multiple continents. For governments, this means that the concentration of a critical technology within national or allied jurisdiction does not eliminate vulnerability to disruption elsewhere in the production network. Industrial resilience requires examination of the relevant suppliers, the replaceability of particular inputs, the capacity to maintain complex manufacturing equipment and the regulatory conditions governing international support. In the semiconductor industry, control over an indispensable production process may create substantial strategic influence, but the enterprise exercising that influence can itself remain dependent on foreign suppliers.

Table 3 — Global industrial geography: national strengths and strategic dependencies

Jurisdiction	Documented industrial position	Relevant technological functions	Principal assessment limitation	Official or first-party evidence
United States	Advanced electronics and defence-system development; domestic foundry investment	Computing, software, systems integration, controlled semiconductor technology	Domestic production location does not establish ownership of every process or IP right	BIS; TSMC
Israel	$19.2bn defence-export agreements in 2025	Missile defence, optronics, radar, EW, avionics and communications	Export value does not measure indigenous component content	Israel Ministry of Defense
Italy	Catania semiconductor investment and multinational defence integration	Power semiconductors, electronics, packaging and defence systems	Project investment is not equivalent to delivered production capacity	European Commission
France	Crolles semiconductor project and defence-electronics integration	FD-SOI semiconductors, sensors and integrated systems	National integration does not establish origin of all components	European Commission
Germany	Dresden manufacturing projects and specialised equipment capabilities	Industrial semiconductors, power electronics, optics and manufacturing technology	Joint ventures retain multinational ownership and technical dependencies	European Commission
United Kingdom	Defence digital integration and multinational programme participation	Military networks, sensors, computing and systems integration	Declared policy objectives require separate evidence of implementation	UK Ministry of Defence
Taiwan	Advanced foundry manufacturing and overseas fabrication expansion	Leading-edge logic, foundry processes and advanced packaging	Capacity is distributed across processes and facilities with differing capabilities	TSMC Annual Report
Japan	Rapidus development and TSMC manufacturing investment	Semiconductor equipment, materials, fabrication and packaging	Government support does not establish qualified commercial output	METI; TSMC
South Korea	Established semiconductor industry and regional advanced-industry development	Memory, industrial electronics and technology manufacturing	Aggregate semiconductor strength does not establish self-sufficiency in every category	Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources
China	484.3bn integrated circuits produced in 2025	Large-scale electronic and semiconductor production	Unit counts do not identify process sophistication or qualified military supply	State Council of China
India	Twelve approved semiconductor projects; five in commercial production by October 2026	Design, fabrication investment, assembly, packaging and materials	Approvals, operational projects and capabilities are distinct measures	Government of India
Türkiye	Approximately $10bn defence and aerospace exports in 2025	Defence-electronics integration and aerospace systems	Total sector exports do not establish electronic-component origin	Invest in Türkiye
Netherlands	Specialised lithography technology and multinational equipment supply chain	Semiconductor production equipment and related services	Equipment suppliers also depend on geographically dispersed inputs	ASML Annual Report

The comparative table deliberately avoids converting different national indicators into a numerical ranking. Export agreements, integrated-circuit production units, semiconductor manufacturing investments, company revenues and government-supported industrial projects are not directly comparable measures of technological sovereignty. Their respective definitions, reference periods and economic significance differ. A country with relatively modest aggregate semiconductor output may control a specialised production input indispensable to highly advanced manufacturing; a country with very large semiconductor production may lack independent access to certain advanced processes; and a state with extensive defence exports may rely on imported electronic components while contributing substantial proprietary engineering and systems-integration expertise. The absence of a common quantitative metric is not a minor statistical inconvenience. It reflects a real structural difference between the industrial functions being measured.

Israel’s Defence-Export Technology Composition, 2025

Israel’s Ministry of Defense reported $19.2 billion in defence-export agreements signed during 2025, an increase of nearly 30% compared with 2024. The official breakdown comprises twelve technology and equipment categories accounting for 100% of the reported total. Missile, rocket and air-defence systems represented 29%, observation and optronics 22%, radar and electronic warfare 11%, manned aircraft and avionics 11%, and C4I and communications 7%. Together, these five categories represented 80% of the reported value of agreements, demonstrating the importance of integrated electronic, sensor, communications and advanced defence systems within the country’s international defence-industrial activity.

The geographical distribution was equally significant: Europe accounted for 36% of agreements by value, Asia-Pacific 32%, the Middle East and North Africa 15%, North America 13%, Latin America 2% and Africa 2%. The Ministry separately reported that government-to-government agreements reached approximately $10 billion. These figures describe contracts signed, not equipment delivered, revenues recognised, components manufactured domestically or technologies transferred under foreign production licences. All-Time Defense Export Record: Israel Crosses the $19 Billion Threshold — Israel Ministry of Defense — February 2026. Homepage

Analytical interpretation — Export concentration and international technological dependencies

The significance of Israel’s 2025 export structure is not limited to the value of agreements. The official data reveal a defence-industrial portfolio in which technologically sophisticated systems represent a substantial proportion of international business. Missile and air-defence systems, electro-optical equipment, radar, electronic warfare, avionics, and command-and-control communications are categories in which manufacturing, software, sensors, specialised electronics and integration can be closely interdependent. The reported concentration of 80% across the five leading categories provides a useful measure of contractual composition, but it does not establish the share attributable specifically to electronic components or domestically developed intellectual property. Missile-defence systems, for example, involve substantially more than electronic subsystems, and a contract for an integrated platform cannot be decomposed into national technology content without supporting industrial documentation.

The geographical distribution reveals a second dimension of strategic significance. With Europe and Asia-Pacific accounting for a combined 68% of reported defence-export agreement value, Israel’s defence-industrial market is deeply connected to procurement authorities and industrial customers beyond its immediate region. Such relationships can involve straightforward equipment procurement, long-term support, industrial cooperation and potentially technology-transfer arrangements, but their precise legal and commercial structures differ from contract to contract. Geographical export data alone cannot identify the location of licensed production, the nationality of component suppliers or the allocation of intellectual-property rights. For governments examining the security implications of multinational defence electronics, the decisive records remain the actual contracts, export authorisations, technical licences and agreements governing manufacturing, integration and subsequent transfers.

The official 2025 figures therefore support a clear institutional conclusion: international defence-electronics cooperation creates substantial industrial relationships, but the nationality of the supplier, the export destination and the location of production cannot independently establish technological sovereignty or the complete chain of ownership.

Key judgments — Chapter 3 and Pillar I

The global defence-electronics industry operates through a geographically specialised structure in which design capabilities, intellectual property, manufacturing equipment, semiconductor fabrication, component assembly and complete-system integration are distributed among different countries and enterprises. The United States, Israel, European states and major Asian economies occupy different but overlapping positions within this structure. Their economic and strategic influence depends not only on production volume or export value, but also on control over specialised technologies, the ability to replace unavailable inputs and the rights required to sustain complete systems.

Israel’s officially reported 2025 defence-export portfolio demonstrates the scale and international reach of sophisticated defence technologies, particularly in sensing, electronic warfare, communications and integrated military systems. However, export agreements are not direct measures of technological ownership, licensed foreign manufacturing or the domestic origin of constituent components. These distinctions are essential when assessing industrial cooperation, national procurement strategies and the potential consequences of geopolitical disruptions.

What would change the assessment: Verified contract-level information showing how particular technologies are licensed, manufactured, integrated, maintained and transferred internationally, together with sufficiently detailed production records to distinguish indigenous capabilities from externally controlled dependencies.

Open official record: Additional disaggregated information on joint production, export licensing, industrial ownership, technology-transfer agreements and critical-component supply would be required to evaluate the national control retained over specific multinational defence systems.

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OPEN-SOURCE ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT

PILLAR II | 11 November 2026 | Global Defence-Technology Integration

PILLAR II — INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, DUAL-USE TRANSFERS AND MILITARY INTEGRATION

Chapter 4 — Satellite Communications and the New Contest for Military Connectivity

Military communications sovereignty has become a question of who controls the network, not simply who manufactures the terminal

The international competition for military satellite connectivity is undergoing a structural transformation in which communications capability is increasingly distributed among commercial satellite operators, national governments, multinational infrastructure programmes, specialised terminal manufacturers and software-controlled network-management systems. The decisive issue is no longer confined to whether a military organisation possesses satellite communications equipment capable of transmitting information beyond terrestrial network coverage. It is whether that organisation can preserve authorised access to communications capacity, obtain sufficient availability for essential operations, maintain control over information-security requirements and continue operating when political decisions, commercial restrictions or technical disruptions affect the supporting infrastructure. This transformation changes the strategic significance of satellite communications procurement because a government can own substantial quantities of physical equipment without possessing autonomous authority over the networks required to operate it.

The distinction between terminal ownership and service control is particularly consequential for contemporary unmanned systems and geographically dispersed military operations. A satellite terminal represents only one element of an end-to-end communications service. Its functions depend on the compatibility of the modem and antenna with the relevant satellite system, the availability of satellite capacity, terrestrial gateway arrangements, network authentication, contractual access rights and the operator’s ability to administer service. These elements need not be controlled by the same enterprise or jurisdiction. A manufacturer may supply terminals intended for multiple satellite networks, while the underlying network infrastructure remains owned by third parties. A government may purchase the terminals from a domestically registered enterprise yet remain dependent on a foreign commercial operator for the activation, continuation or geographic availability of communications services. Conversely, a government may use foreign-manufactured terminals within an infrastructure arrangement that provides substantial national authority over network admission, information security and continuity. Neither arrangement can be evaluated reliably from the manufacturer’s nationality alone.

The most significant documented illustration is Ukraine’s 2026 Starlink terminal-authorisation regime. In a notice dated 4 February 2026, Starlink confirmed that additional security measures had been implemented in coordination with Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Digital Transformation. Under these measures, terminals required government whitelist approval to receive service within Ukraine. Starlink explained that a terminal without the required approval could not obtain service in Ukrainian territory, even when its commercial account remained active. This is direct evidence of the distinction between ownership of a communications device and the administrative authority governing its connection to an operational network. The official notice does not establish the behaviour of every terminal in every combat environment, nor does it determine the operational effectiveness of alternative satellite services, but it demonstrates that terminal identity and network authorisation can become explicit instruments of national security policy. Update on Starlink Service in Ukraine — Starlink — February 2026. Starlink Help Center

Multi-orbit communications are a diversification strategy, not an automatic guarantee of resilience

Satellite connectivity must be examined through the different physical and commercial characteristics of geostationary, medium Earth orbit and low Earth orbit systems. Geostationary satellites operate at approximately 35,786 kilometres above the equator and offer coverage over large geographical areas from positions that remain approximately fixed relative to the Earth’s surface. Medium Earth orbit configurations operate at lower altitudes and can provide different latency, visibility and constellation requirements. Low Earth orbit systems generally operate at much lower altitudes, enabling shorter propagation distances but requiring moving constellations and appropriate network coordination. These physical differences influence propagation delay, antenna requirements, service coverage, handovers and the relationship between ground infrastructure and orbital assets. They do not produce a universal hierarchy in which one orbital architecture is superior for every military application.

The operational significance of multi-orbit connectivity lies in the possibility of distributing communications requirements across systems with different characteristics and dependencies. Such diversification may improve continuity if one service becomes unavailable, provided that the terminals, network arrangements, authorisations and associated ground systems actually support an alternative. However, the existence of a terminal marketed as multi-orbit or multi-network compatible does not independently establish successful switching between providers, immunity to electronic interference or the ability to operate without the original network operator’s permission. These are different technical propositions that require separate evidence. The first concerns the architecture’s intended compatibility; the second concerns tested network performance; the third concerns resilience under defined conditions; and the fourth concerns legal and administrative control. Confusing these distinctions can lead procurement authorities to overestimate the sovereignty obtained through hardware acquisition.

The European Union’s IRIS² programme provides a concrete institutional response to the problem of strategic communications dependence. On 7 August 2026, the European Commission and the SpaceRISE consortium concluded negotiations and signed an implementation agreement expanding the planned constellation to 348 satellites, comprising 330 low Earth orbit satellites and 18 medium Earth orbit satellites. The European Space Agency reported that the revised architecture incorporates an additional 66 satellites in a higher low Earth orbit layer, intended to strengthen secure governmental capacity and support security-related requirements. The agency stated that the expansion is expected to increase secure governmental capacity by 60% within the European Union and 54% globally, relative to the programme’s earlier configuration. These figures are programme-design projections, not measurements of services already being delivered. The constellation was still proceeding through development and implementation, with the European Space Agency responsible for technical development oversight, qualification and in-orbit validation. IRIS² Reinforced and Accelerated as Implementation Advances — European Space Agency — August 2026. ESA: TBD

The importance of IRIS² is therefore institutional as well as technological. It seeks to create a European framework for secure satellite communications through a combination of public requirements and commercial industrial participation. Its implementation involves the European Commission, the European Space Agency, the EU Agency for the Space Programme, participating member states and the SpaceRISE consortium. This structure differs from the simple purchase of satellite capacity from a commercial operator because the Union is seeking a greater degree of authority over governmental service requirements, infrastructure governance and the long-term development of an associated industrial ecosystem. Nevertheless, contractual governance and European industrial participation should not be equated with a completed independent communications capability before the constellation, ground infrastructure, service arrangements and associated security mechanisms have been implemented and validated.

Table 4.1 — Satellite communications architectures and their sovereignty implications

Dimension	Geostationary architecture	Medium Earth orbit architecture	Low Earth orbit architecture	Procurement consequence
Orbital characteristics	Approximately fixed apparent orbital position	Moving satellites at intermediate altitude	Moving satellites at relatively low altitude	Different antenna, visibility and service-design requirements
Propagation characteristics	Longer signal paths	Intermediate signal paths	Generally shorter signal paths	Application-specific delay and performance assessment
Coverage model	Wide individual satellite footprints	Constellation-dependent regional or wider coverage	Constellation-dependent coverage and handovers	Coverage must be verified for the intended service area
Ground infrastructure	Gateways and network operations	Gateways, tracking and network operations	Gateways, tracking and constellation coordination	Ground systems remain a critical dependency
Terminal requirements	Compatible antenna and modem	Compatible equipment and service agreement	Compatible tracking or electronically managed terminal	Terminal ownership does not establish network access
Operator dependency	Contractual capacity and service authorisation	Contractual capacity and service authorisation	Contractual capacity and service authorisation	Administrative control remains separate from orbital design
Electronic resilience	Depends on specific design and operating conditions	Depends on specific design and operating conditions	Depends on specific design and operating conditions	Orbital altitude alone cannot establish resistance to interference
Sovereignty assessment	Control of capacity, gateways and security	Control of capacity, gateways and security	Control of capacity, gateways and security	Review end-to-end authority, not only equipment nationality

The table distinguishes physical properties of satellite orbits from governance and service dependencies. Its purpose is not to rank orbital architectures by military effectiveness, since such a ranking would require comparable data on specific networks, terminals, service agreements and operational environments. The relevant conclusion is that multi-orbit diversification can reduce particular concentrations of dependence only when the supporting networks are actually accessible and the necessary technical and legal conditions have been established.

The five separate layers of satellite-network dependence

A comprehensive assessment of satellite communications sovereignty should examine five separate layers of control. The first is the physical terminal and the associated engineering design. The second is the orbital network, including access to satellite capacity and the infrastructure necessary to manage it. The third is the terrestrial segment, which can include gateways, operations centres and other network-management infrastructure. The fourth is the security and authorisation architecture, which governs admission, authentication, network permissions and the treatment of information. The fifth is the continuity and contractual layer, involving service-level commitments, maintenance, support, emergency arrangements and the legal conditions under which service can be changed, restricted or terminated.

This five-layer distinction is especially useful because physical redundancy and legal redundancy are not equivalent. A government might maintain terminals compatible with multiple networks but discover that the same commercial intermediary controls access to all of them. Alternatively, two apparently independent satellite services might depend on common terrestrial facilities or a shared category of critical semiconductor components. Conversely, a government operating through a single satellite provider might retain substantial contractual protections and alternative terrestrial arrangements. Actual resilience is determined by the relevant dependency structure, not by the number of service brands or hardware suppliers.

For military procurement authorities, these considerations transform satellite connectivity from a telecommunications purchasing decision into a matter of national-security governance. An appropriate assessment should determine which entity may activate or suspend a terminal, whether the purchasing government can administer authorised users, which legal jurisdiction governs service interruptions, whether alternative communications systems are genuinely interoperable and whether sensitive information remains subject to the required security controls. These are institutional questions as much as engineering questions, and their answers can differ significantly even between services employing similar satellite technologies.

WordPress analytical scheme — Satellite connectivity and the separation of operational authority

The following HTML component is intended for insertion immediately after the satellite-connectivity analysis. It distinguishes the five institutional layers governing access to a satellite communications service. The diagram is deliberately non-quantitative: its connections describe functional dependencies rather than verified supplier contracts. Its CSS is restricted to the unique container, it requires no JavaScript or external assets, and its source references remain available as ordinary links within the component.

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<div class="ns-kicker">NEXUS / SATELLITE CONNECTIVITY / AUTHORITY MODEL</div>
<h3>Five layers of satellite communications control</h3>
<p class="ns-sub">Owning the communications terminal does not automatically confer authority over the satellite service, security credentials or network continuity.</p>
<div class="ns-grid">
 <div class="ns-cell"><div class="ns-num">01</div><div class="ns-name">Terminal</div><div class="ns-text">Hardware design, antenna, modem, firmware and local maintenance.</div></div>
 <div class="ns-cell"><div class="ns-num">02</div><div class="ns-name">Orbital network</div><div class="ns-text">Satellite capacity, constellation access, network compatibility and coverage.</div></div>
 <div class="ns-cell"><div class="ns-num">03</div><div class="ns-name">Ground segment</div><div class="ns-text">Gateways, operational infrastructure, network administration and service interfaces.</div></div>
 <div class="ns-cell"><div class="ns-num">04</div><div class="ns-name">Security authority</div><div class="ns-text">Authorised terminals, authentication, service admission and information controls.</div></div>
 <div class="ns-cell"><div class="ns-num">05</div><div class="ns-name">Continuity</div><div class="ns-text">Contracts, service guarantees, maintenance rights and available alternatives.</div></div>
</div>
<div class="ns-summary"><strong>Institutional judgment:</strong> Technological sovereignty must be evaluated across the complete service chain. A national manufacturing label does not establish national control of satellite connectivity.</div>
<div class="ns-tablewrap">
<table>
<thead><tr><th>Documented programme</th><th>Verified status</th><th>Decision consequence</th></tr></thead>
<tbody>
<tr><td>Starlink / Ukraine</td><td>Government terminal whitelist effective 4 February 2026</td><td>Terminal ownership and service authorisation are distinct.</td></tr>
<tr><td>EU IRIS²</td><td>348 satellites planned: 330 LEO and 18 MEO</td><td>European network-governance and industrial implementation framework.</td></tr>
<tr><td>IRIS² capacity expansion</td><td>Projected +60% secure governmental capacity within the EU and +54% globally</td><td>Programme-design forecasts, not operational service measurements.</td></tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<p class="ns-source">Sources: <a href="https://starlink.com/vc/support/article/a47087a0-5178-9b34-0633-1dcb6276a09b" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Starlink, 4 February 2026</a>; <a href="https://www.esa.int/Applications/Connectivity_and_Secure_Communications/IRIS2_reinforced_and_accelerated_as_implementation_advances" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">European Space Agency, 7 August 2026</a>. Network structure is analytical; no undocumented supplier relationship is asserted.</p>
</div>

Key judgments — Chapter 4

The central vulnerability of satellite communications is the potential separation of hardware possession, service authorisation and operational continuity. Multiple orbital systems and commercial providers can create valuable alternatives, but nominal compatibility does not establish independent service access, uninterrupted operation or immunity to interference. Ukraine’s documented 2026 terminal-whitelisting arrangement demonstrates the practical significance of administrative control over communications equipment, while IRIS² illustrates Europe’s decision to pursue greater authority over secure governmental connectivity through dedicated multinational infrastructure.

What would change the assessment: Operational validation of independent network alternatives, publicly documented continuity arrangements, service-level guarantees under governmental authority and demonstrated IRIS² deployment milestones.

Open official record: The decisive gaps concern actual terminal interoperability, network-control agreements, contractual conditions for military service interruption and the operational status of new sovereign communications infrastructure.

Chapter 5 — The Most Important Multinational Defence-Technology Programmes

Multinational defence programmes are becoming legal and industrial institutions for managing shared technology

The most important international defence-technology programmes are no longer adequately understood as arrangements through which several countries simply divide the cost of purchasing military equipment. They increasingly establish organisations, financing mechanisms, engineering requirements, contractual arrangements and export-control procedures intended to govern the development and subsequent use of sophisticated technologies. Their economic importance lies in combining resources that individual countries might find difficult to sustain independently; their technological importance lies in enabling specialised national industries to participate in common development; and their institutional significance lies in determining which governments and enterprises possess authority over modifications, manufacturing, exports, maintenance and subsequent technological evolution. The resulting relationships can strengthen national capabilities while producing new forms of mutual dependency. The strategic question is therefore not whether cooperation reduces sovereignty in the abstract, but which elements of sovereign authority are retained nationally, which are exercised jointly and which remain subject to commercial or foreign-government decisions.

The distinction is especially evident when comparing programmes with different objectives. GCAP is a long-term multinational combat-aircraft development programme supported by a trilateral governmental organisation and a common industrial structure. SAMP/T NG is a Franco-Italian air and missile defence programme combining specialised technologies within an integrated weapons architecture. AUKUS establishes preferential technology cooperation across several military domains, including autonomous underwater capabilities. UNITE–Brave NATO links Allied and Ukrainian industrial participants through innovation competitions, joint development and prospective adoption. IRIS² concerns secure satellite infrastructure and public-service requirements rather than a conventional weapons platform. These programmes share an underlying requirement to govern technological dependencies, but they should not be presented as equivalent forms of industrial cooperation or combined into a single financial total.

GCAP: joint engineering authority and the international governance of advanced combat-aircraft technology

The Global Combat Air Programme, involving Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, is significant because the participating governments have developed a formal institutional structure intended to govern a technologically complex multinational aerospace programme. On 14 December 2023, the three countries signed the convention establishing the GCAP International Government Organisation. Their defence ministers confirmed that the organisation and corresponding industrial structure would be headquartered in Britain and that industrial work distribution would reflect financial and technical contributions under the principle of equal partnership. The arrangement was intended to create a durable legal and organisational basis for developing the aircraft and strengthening the participating countries’ defence-industrial capabilities. GCAP Trilateral Defence Ministerial Joint Statement — UK Ministry of Defence — December 2023; Convention on the Establishment of the GCAP International Government Organisation — UK Government — December 2024 Treaty Publication. GOV.UK+1

The industrial dimension became more concrete on 3 July 2026, when the UK Ministry of Defence announced a £4.6 billion contract awarded through the GCAP Agency to Edgewing, the multinational industrial joint venture, for the next stage of design development. The contract is jointly financed by the three participating countries and concerns design requirements and testing, not the delivery of operational aircraft. The British government separately announced plans for £8.6 billion of UK investment over four years. These amounts should not be added without a detailed reconciliation of budget commitments and contractual obligations, since they describe different aspects of programme financing. The participating governments continue to target an operational introduction from 2035, a future objective dependent on successful development, testing, industrial implementation and procurement decisions. Over £4 Billion Invested in Next-Generation Fighter Jet — UK Ministry of Defence — July 2026. GOV.UK

GCAP’s importance for technological sovereignty extends beyond the design of a new aircraft. Advanced combat-aircraft development involves extensive requirements concerning avionics, sensors, mission computing, secure communications, software, electronic warfare, propulsion integration and technical maintenance. These technologies can be developed by enterprises possessing different national legal obligations and intellectual-property rights. A programme integrating them must therefore establish rules for access to design information, permitted modifications, industrial responsibilities and the treatment of controlled technology. The final aircraft’s national designation will not independently describe the complete origin of these capabilities. Instead, the multinational contractual structure determines how the partners develop, integrate and sustain the common system.

The 9 September 2026 update of the United Kingdom’s GCAP Open General Licence provides unusually strong evidence of the relationship between programme development and export-control reform. The UK Export Control Joint Unit updated the licence to accommodate the next phase of GCAP, including additional supply-chain destinations, observer-nation activities and revised programme terminology. Subject to its conditions, the licence provides for specified transfers of controlled military and dual-use goods, software and technology associated with the programme. This is a significant development because it demonstrates that sophisticated multinational engineering cannot proceed solely through commercial subcontracting: governments must also create legal mechanisms permitting authorised technological exchange while preserving relevant national controls. Notice to Exporters 2026/19 — UK Export Control Joint Unit — September 2026. GOV.UK

An important limitation must be preserved. The existence of a general licence does not mean that every participant can transfer every technology to every jurisdiction. Eligibility, item scope, permitted activities and licence conditions remain relevant. Furthermore, a British authorisation does not automatically substitute for authorisations that may be required under Italian or Japanese law. The UK government’s original 2024 guidance explicitly distinguished transfers authorised from the United Kingdom from exports originating elsewhere, reinforcing the principle that multinational engineering does not abolish national export jurisdictions. GCAP Open General Licence and Eligibility Letter — UK Export Control Joint Unit — August 2024. GOV.UK

SAMP/T NG: the coordination of national industrial capabilities in integrated air defence

The Franco-Italian SAMP/T NG programme represents a different model of technological cooperation. Its strategic significance is rooted in the integration of interceptors, radar capabilities, communications and command-and-control systems into a common air and missile defence architecture. Rather than creating a new international combat-aircraft development authority equivalent to GCAP, the programme builds on existing European industrial cooperation and specialised system-development competencies. Its technological structure demonstrates the importance of combining equipment and software that must function as one qualified operational system despite originating from different industrial activities.

On 23 October 2026, MBDA announced that OCCAR, acting on behalf of the French government, had awarded eurosam a contract to produce four additional SAMP/T NG firing units, bringing France’s total orders to twelve systems. The announcement identifies MBDA and Thales as industrial partners and describes the system as designed to employ the ASTER interceptor family while integrating with national and NATO air-defence networks. The reported figure is a total of systems ordered by France, not a statement that twelve operational systems had been delivered or achieved full readiness. It therefore provides evidence of procurement commitment and industrial activity, while leaving operational inventory and deployment questions separate. France Orders Four Additional SAMP/T NG Air and Missile Defence Systems — MBDA — October 2026. MBDA

The industrial significance of SAMP/T NG lies partly in the distinction between possessing a technically integrated air-defence system and owning every technology incorporated into it. Different suppliers can retain rights over interceptors, radar subsystems, software, integration processes and maintenance procedures. The relevant governmental challenge is to ensure that the system can be sustained, updated and integrated within national and allied defence architectures under appropriate legal and contractual conditions. The programme demonstrates how cooperation can expand access to complex capabilities while making cross-border industrial coordination and long-term technical support indispensable.

AUKUS: preferential technology cooperation and the development of interoperable underwater systems

AUKUS provides an example of international defence cooperation organised around the sharing and development of sensitive capabilities rather than the procurement of one common platform alone. The partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States includes a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine dimension and a separate advanced-capabilities dimension commonly identified as Pillar II. For the purposes of defence-electronics analysis, Pillar II is particularly important because it addresses technologies such as autonomous systems and their supporting equipment, communications and interoperability arrangements.

On 30 May 2026, the participating governments announced the first AUKUS Pillar II signature project, concerning payloads and enabling systems for uncrewed undersea vehicles. The official fact sheet identifies the intention to develop technologies usable across participating countries’ underwater platforms, with initial delivery scheduled to begin in 2027. The stated fields of application include maritime surveillance, protection of critical seabed infrastructure and other defence requirements. The announcement concerns a development and delivery programme; it does not establish that all envisaged systems had entered operational service in 2026. AUKUS Pillar II Fact Sheet: Uncrewed Undersea Vehicles — UK Ministry of Defence — May 2026. GOV.UK

The distinguishing feature of this programme is the emphasis on shared enabling technologies and interoperability. AUKUS participants are seeking to develop capabilities that can be incorporated into different national platforms rather than necessarily building identical equipment in each country. This creates an important requirement for common technical interfaces, security arrangements, testing procedures and the controlled sharing of information. It also creates a potentially important industrial benefit: technologies developed for one participating country’s systems may become useful to the others when technical and legal requirements permit. However, the economic and operational effects depend on the actual contractual arrangements, access to intellectual property and success of the relevant development programmes. A political commitment to technology cooperation is not equivalent to unrestricted technology-transfer authority.

UNITE–Brave NATO: integrating Ukrainian battlefield experience into Allied industrial development

The UNITE–Brave NATO initiative represents a particularly different model of international cooperation because it seeks to connect technological innovation with the immediate requirements of an ongoing conflict. Announced in November 2025, the programme establishes joint innovation competitions involving companies from NATO countries and Ukraine. Ukraine’s Brave1 defence-technology initiative coordinates participation from the Ukrainian side, while the NATO Communications and Information Agency is responsible for executing the first competition. The objective is to develop, test and scale technologies addressing requirements such as counter-unmanned aircraft systems, air defence and secure frontline communications.

NATO confirmed in March 2026 that the first competition would provide €10 million in jointly financed innovation contracts, with contributions allocated equally between NATO and Ukraine. Further competitions were envisaged, with potential programme funding reaching €50 million. The larger figure is a scaling objective, not evidence that the entire amount had been awarded. NATO’s documentation also makes clear that the programme is intended to support partnerships between Allied and Ukrainian enterprises, creating opportunities for collaborative development and eventual adoption. NATO and Ukraine Activate Next Steps for UNITE–Brave NATO — NATO — March 2026; NCIA Supports NATO and Ukraine with Next Steps for UNITE–Brave — NATO Communications and Information Agency — April 2026. NATO News+1

This form of cooperation changes the relationship between defence research, industrial development and operational feedback. Conventional programmes can operate through long development cycles before equipment enters service. Innovation initiatives linked to current operational requirements may permit technological concepts to be evaluated more rapidly, although the transition from experimentation to repeatable production and qualified operational availability remains a separate challenge. The institutional importance of UNITE–Brave NATO is the attempt to create an organised pathway through which Ukrainian experience and Allied industrial capacity can inform joint technological development. The programme does not establish that every prototype selected for evaluation will become a reliable, mass-produced defence capability, nor that participating companies will automatically obtain broad rights over one another’s intellectual property.

IRIS²: a multinational infrastructure programme rather than a conventional defence-equipment contract

IRIS² differs fundamentally from the other programmes because its principal objective is secure satellite communications infrastructure with governmental and commercial applications. Its strategic significance lies in the creation of network capacity and governance arrangements intended to reduce critical European communications dependencies. The August 2026 implementation agreement established the expanded 348-satellite architecture and moved the programme into a more advanced implementation phase, with the European Space Agency undertaking technical oversight. This creates a cross-border industrial structure involving spacecraft, ground infrastructure, communications equipment, network-management capabilities and public-service requirements. IRIS² Reinforced and Accelerated as Implementation Advances — European Space Agency — August 2026. ESA: TBD

For the European Union, the programme represents an effort to strengthen sovereignty at the infrastructure layer of the communications system. A national or European manufacturer may be able to supply terminals without controlling the satellite service through which they operate. By establishing a European communications constellation and associated governmental requirements, IRIS² addresses a different layer of dependence. The practical level of sovereignty achieved will depend on actual deployment, security governance, service availability, contractual authority and the extent to which critical technologies and maintenance capabilities remain accessible to European institutions. The planned constellation should not be described as an operational alternative to existing services before those conditions have been demonstrated.

Table 5.1 — Multinational programmes: verified figures, institutional architecture and implementation status

Programme	Participating jurisdictions	Organising authority	Latest cited figure	What the figure measures	Status as of 11 November 2026
GCAP	Italy, Japan, UK	GCAP International Government Organisation and industrial partnership	£4.6bn	Joint design-development contract	Contract awarded July 2026; service entry targeted for 2035
GCAP UK commitment	United Kingdom	UK Ministry of Defence	£8.6bn	Planned UK investment over four years	Financial commitment; not additional delivered aircraft
SAMP/T NG	France, Italy	OCCAR/eurosam industrial framework	12 systems	Total French systems ordered after four-unit contract	Orders reported October 2026; not equivalent to deliveries
AUKUS Pillar II UUV project	Australia, UK, US	AUKUS governmental cooperation	2027	Planned beginning of deliveries	Development and implementation programme
UNITE–Brave NATO	NATO Allies and Ukraine	NATO/NCIA and Brave1	€10m	First joint innovation competition	Competition and awards programme
UNITE–Brave NATO expansion	NATO Allies and Ukraine	NATO and Ukrainian institutions	Up to €50m	Potential programme scaling	Planned ceiling; not necessarily committed expenditure
IRIS²	European Union and participating industry	European Commission, ESA and industrial consortium	348 satellites	Planned LEO/MEO constellation	Implementation agreement signed August 2026

The programme figures are intentionally maintained in their original units because they do not represent a common economic variable. Contracts, planned national expenditure, system orders, innovation funding, projected delivery dates and satellite counts cannot be aggregated into a meaningful multinational defence-investment total. Their comparative significance instead lies in the institutional function represented by each programme: joint development, integrated production, technology-sharing, industrial experimentation or infrastructure sovereignty.

WordPress analytical table — Five multinational programmes and seven governance dimensions

This comparison is more useful than a decorative graph because the programmes do not share one financial or operational scale. The following black-box HTML table can be placed after Chapter 5. It includes only documented programme characteristics and explicitly distinguishes programme objectives from operational results.

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<div class="np-kicker">NEXUS / INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION / EVIDENCE MATRIX</div>
<h3>Multinational defence technology: institutional comparison</h3>
<p class="np-sub">Cross-programme comparisons reflect published institutional arrangements, not common measures of readiness or military effectiveness.</p>
<div class="np-scroll">
<table>
<thead><tr>
<th scope="col">Programme</th><th scope="col">Governmental framework</th>
<th scope="col">Industrial model</th><th scope="col">Technology domain</th>
<th scope="col">Published milestone</th><th scope="col">Transfer governance</th>
<th scope="col">Primary record</th>
</tr></thead>
<tbody>
<tr><td>GCAP</td><td>Italy–Japan–UK treaty and joint organisation</td><td>Common industrial development through Edgewing and partners</td><td>Combat aviation, sensors, software and associated systems</td><td>£4.6bn joint design contract, July 2026; 2035 service target</td><td>Programme-specific authorisations and national export laws</td><td><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/over-4-billion-invested-in-next-generation-fighter-jet-with-new-international-contract" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">UK MOD, July 2026</a></td></tr>
<tr><td>SAMP/T NG</td><td>French–Italian cooperation through established armament institutions</td><td>Integrated multinational system development and production</td><td>Air and missile defence, radar, interceptors and command systems</td><td>12 systems ordered by France, October 2026</td><td>Applicable national and contractual controls</td><td><a href="https://www.mbda-systems.com/france-orders-four-additional-sampt-ng-air-and-missile-defence-systems" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">MBDA, October 2026</a></td></tr>
<tr><td>AUKUS Pillar II</td><td>Australia–UK–US governmental partnership</td><td>Shared development of enabling technologies</td><td>Underwater autonomy and interoperable systems</td><td>First signature project, May 2026; delivery planned from 2027</td><td>Partner-country controls and authorised technology-sharing arrangements</td><td><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/aukus-defence-ministerial-joint-statement-30-may-2026/aukus-pillar-ii-fact-sheet-uncrewed-undersea-vehicles-payloads-and-enabling-systems" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">UK MOD, May 2026</a></td></tr>
<tr><td>UNITE–Brave NATO</td><td>NATO and Ukraine through NCIA and Brave1</td><td>Joint competitions, testing and industrial development</td><td>Counter-UAS, air defence and secure communications</td><td>€10m initial competition; possible €50m programme scale</td><td>Competition, procurement and applicable national controls</td><td><a href="https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2026/03/25/nato-and-ukraine-activate-next-steps-for-unite-brave-nato-innovation-programme" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">NATO, March 2026</a></td></tr>
<tr><td>IRIS²</td><td>European Union institutional framework</td><td>European Commission, ESA and SpaceRISE implementation</td><td>Secure satellite networks and governmental connectivity</td><td>348 planned satellites, August 2026 agreement</td><td>EU institutional, procurement and service governance</td><td><a href="https://www.esa.int/Applications/Connectivity_and_Secure_Communications/IRIS2_reinforced_and_accelerated_as_implementation_advances" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">ESA, August 2026</a></td></tr>
</tbody>
</table>
</div>
<p class="np-note">Source-based programme comparison. Projected deliveries, committed investment, awarded contracts, orders and intended infrastructure capacity are different measurement categories. This matrix deliberately avoids invented readiness scores or rankings.</p>
</div>

The European divergence: Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom

Italy’s participation in GCAP and SAMP/T NG places the country within two technologically different international cooperation models. GCAP concerns the creation of a future aircraft and associated industrial architecture involving Japan and Britain, while SAMP/T NG concerns the integration and production of an air-defence system through established Franco-Italian industrial relationships. Their implications for Italian sovereignty therefore differ. GCAP raises questions about common development authority, future modification rights, long-term expenditure and the extent to which technologies developed collaboratively remain accessible for subsequent national requirements. SAMP/T NG raises more immediate questions involving industrial production, integration, qualification, deliveries and the ability to sustain common equipment within national and allied networks. Neither should be assessed solely through the proportion of contract expenditure allocated to Italian suppliers, since industrial participation and independent technological control are not equivalent.

France’s position is particularly significant in integrated air and missile defence because of its role in the SAMP/T NG industrial structure and its wider aerospace and defence-electronics capabilities. The French government has committed to additional procurement, with MBDA reporting the October 2026 order that increased the French total to twelve SAMP/T NG systems. The resulting industrial activity can support production and technical development, but the official record does not permit all relevant intellectual-property rights, software arrangements or component origins to be reconstructed. A proper national-security assessment would distinguish technologies developed and controlled within French jurisdiction from those governed jointly with Italian partners or sourced internationally. The same distinction applies to manufacturing capacity: an order creates industrial demand, but actual readiness depends on production, delivery, integration and qualification.

Germany occupies a different position within the programme comparison. It is not a governmental participant in GCAP or the original Franco-Italian SAMP/T NG development structure, but it is relevant to European defence integration through its substantial industrial electronics, sensing and manufacturing capabilities. Its relationship to multinational defence technology is therefore shaped partly by the broader European industrial ecosystem rather than participation in the particular programmes examined here. German manufacturing companies may contribute technologies or components to cross-border defence supply chains, but the existence of those capabilities does not establish specific contractual participation in a named programme without supporting evidence. The resulting policy question concerns how European industrial capabilities can be coordinated without incorrectly treating the Union’s industrial base as a single entity possessing uniform procurement authority, export policy or technical ownership.

The United Kingdom participates in GCAP and AUKUS, creating a different set of institutional relationships. GCAP involves development of a future combat-aircraft system with Italy and Japan, while AUKUS involves strategic technology cooperation with Australia and the United States. The British government must therefore reconcile the technical and legal requirements of separate partnerships that operate under different arrangements for information protection, export licensing, industrial participation and programme governance. Its September 2026 update to the GCAP Open General Licence demonstrates the importance of adapting export rules to the practical requirements of multinational engineering. That adaptation, however, does not remove the need to distinguish the rights of each participating government and enterprise. Notice to Exporters 2026/19 — UK Export Control Joint Unit — September 2026. GOV.UK

Key judgments — Chapter 5

Multinational defence-technology programmes increasingly combine technological development with formal institutions governing finance, industrial responsibilities, information exchange and exports. GCAP demonstrates comprehensive joint development supported by a dedicated governmental organisation; SAMP/T NG reflects established multinational industrial integration; AUKUS provides a framework for preferential advanced-technology cooperation; UNITE–Brave NATO connects industrial innovation to Ukrainian defence requirements; and IRIS² represents an attempt to strengthen European communications infrastructure. These different arrangements cannot be reduced to a common ranking or procurement model.

What would change the assessment: Published programme agreements establishing additional manufacturing rights, validated technology transfers, completed delivery milestones or material changes to participating governments’ export-control arrangements.

Open official record: Detailed intellectual-property provisions, supplier workshares, lifecycle-support commitments, technical qualification outcomes and contractual rules governing future exports remain consequential for assessing the actual sovereignty produced by each programme.

Chapter 6 — Technology Transfers, Licensing and the Fragmentation of Industrial Identity

A technology transfer is not a single event, and a foreign manufacturing licence is not equivalent to unrestricted ownership

The internationalisation of defence electronics has created a legal and commercial environment in which technological transfer must be distinguished from physical export, foreign manufacturing, intellectual-property licensing, contractual subcontracting and the subsequent sale of completed equipment. These activities can occur together, but they have different legal consequences and may involve different participating companies and government authorities. The shipment of an electronic module from one country to another transfers a physical product. The disclosure of controlled design information can constitute a separate transfer of technology even when no hardware crosses a border. An industrial licence may authorise a manufacturer to produce equipment using proprietary designs while restricting modifications, exports, access to software or the disclosure of technical information to additional subcontractors. A distributor may acquire the right to sell completed products without acquiring the ability to manufacture them. A government may buy equipment and receive maintenance services without obtaining the technical information necessary to repair every critical subsystem independently. The presence of a common trademark across these activities does not eliminate their distinctions.

These differences are especially important because a multinational electronic system may incorporate technology whose legal origin differs from the jurisdiction of final assembly. For example, a company may assemble a satellite terminal in one country using components manufactured elsewhere and software developed under a foreign licence. The physical export of the resulting terminal could be subject to controls in the country from which it is shipped, while specific transfers of technical information, software or other controlled items may engage additional rules in other jurisdictions. Whether multiple authorisations are necessary depends on the applicable legislation, product classification, transaction structure, controlled content and parties involved. It is therefore incorrect to assume that every international electronic product automatically requires approval from all countries represented in its component supply chain. It is equally incorrect to assume that the final manufacturing country always possesses exclusive regulatory authority over the transfer.

The European Union provides a structured example through Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which establishes the Union’s regime for controlling exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfers of dual-use items. Article 3 requires export authorisation for items listed in Annex I. Article 4 addresses defined circumstances in which non-listed items can require authorisation on the basis of specified end uses and notification by the competent authority. Other provisions address additional circumstances and obligations. The regulation’s scope therefore cannot be reduced to the label attached to a physical product, since relevant controls can concern software, technology and activities beyond the shipment of finished hardware. Regulation (EU) 2021/821 — European Parliament and Council — May 2021, Articles 3–5. EUR-Lex

The regulatory framework also evolves in response to technological developments. On 14 September 2026, the European Commission announced an update to the dual-use control list in Annex I, reflecting decisions and commitments connected with international export-control regimes. This demonstrates that classification cannot be treated as a permanent attribute of a product independent of time. A component may be assessed under one set of control-list provisions at the moment of an earlier transaction and under amended provisions at a later date. Accurate legal analysis must consequently identify the rules actually applicable when each relevant transfer occurred. It must also distinguish legal restrictions from discretionary government policy, because a transaction can be legally eligible for consideration while still being refused under national policy or other applicable criteria. 2026 Update of the EU Control List of Dual-Use Items — European Commission — September 2026. Trade and Economic Security

Four different legal jurisdictions can influence the same international electronic product

The legal treatment of multinational electronics is particularly complicated when products or technical information engage several export-control systems. The European Union applies its dual-use regulation through the relevant competent national authorities, with additional provisions governing military exports under national legislation and EU policy frameworks. Israel maintains a separate defence-export control system administered by its Ministry of Defense. The United Kingdom operates its own strategic export-control framework through its competent authorities, while the United States administers the Export Administration Regulations through the Bureau of Industry and Security. These frameworks share certain broad objectives concerning national security and controlled technology, but their jurisdictional rules, authorisation mechanisms and treatment of particular transactions are not identical.

The Israeli Defense Export Control Agency states that the Defence Export Control Law, adopted in 2007, regulates defence equipment, defence-related technical knowledge and services. The Ministry of Defense describes national security, foreign policy, international obligations and protection of sensitive technology among the considerations governing the system. This demonstrates that Israel’s control framework extends beyond completed military hardware to certain transfers of know-how and services. Nevertheless, the existence of Israeli-origin intellectual property in a foreign-assembled civilian electronic product does not, without further legal and transactional information, establish that an additional Israeli defence-export licence was required for that product’s later sale from another jurisdiction. The decisive questions concern the applicable controlled activity, the legal reach of the relevant regulations and the actual parties and rights involved. Defense Exports Control Agency — Israel Ministry of Defense. Homepage

The United States introduces an additional consideration through rules addressing certain foreign-produced items. Section 734.9 of the Export Administration Regulations describes circumstances in which specified foreign-produced products may become subject to the EAR under foreign-direct-product rules. Importantly, the Bureau of Industry and Security also explains that determining whether a foreign-produced item is subject to the EAR is separate from determining whether a licence is required for the particular transaction. The relevant evaluation can depend on technology or software, manufacturing equipment, product classification, destination, end use and end user. Consequently, the use of American technology somewhere in an international production chain is not sufficient, by itself, to establish that every subsequent product transfer requires a United States export licence. Export Administration Regulations, Part 734, Section 734.9 — US Bureau of Industry and Security. Bureau of Industry and Security

The United Kingdom’s strategic export-control guidance likewise identifies goods, software, technology, data, information and technical assistance among the matters that can be subject to regulation. The UK government’s 2026 guidance explicitly warns that exporting controlled items without the appropriate licence can constitute a criminal offence. This is important in multinational defence engineering because the transfer of controlled technical information to an overseas engineering team may require analysis even when the corresponding physical component remains inside its original country. UK Strategic Export Controls — UK Government — Updated April 2026. GOV.UK

Table 6.1 — Distinct forms of technology transfer and their legal consequences

Transaction or activity	What changes	What may remain unchanged	Potential regulatory question	Decisive records
Physical export	Location and possession of an item	Design ownership and manufacturing rights	Is the item controlled for this destination and transaction?	Customs declaration, classification, export authorisation
Licensed foreign production	Permitted manufacturing location	Underlying IP ownership	What manufacture, modification and export rights were granted?	Manufacturing licence and technical schedules
Technology disclosure	Access to technical information	Ownership of physical hardware	Does disclosure constitute a controlled technology transfer?	Technology classification, disclosure records, authorisation
Software transfer	Access to executable or technical software	Hardware location and ownership	Is software controlled and who is authorised to receive it?	Software licence, classification, transfer records
Foreign subcontracting	Responsibility for a production activity	Prime-contractor identity	Can the subcontractor access or retransfer controlled technology?	Subcontract, authorisations, confidentiality obligations
Commercial distribution	Seller and supply route	Original manufacturer and design	Are resale, destination and end-use restrictions applicable?	Sales contract, consignee, end-user documentation
Re-export	Exporting jurisdiction or destination changes	Physical product and underlying IP	Do current or continuing restrictions apply?	Re-export documentation, applicable rules, licences
Corporate acquisition	Ownership or control of a company	Some existing licences and third-party IP rights	Are approvals, notifications or licence amendments required?	Corporate filings, control notifications, contractual change clauses
Network-service activation	Permission to access an operational service	Physical ownership of terminal	Who may authorise, suspend or limit service?	Service agreement, authentication and network records
Military integration	Final application of a component	Original component characteristics	Are controlled end-use or contractual restrictions engaged?	Integration records, end-use documentation, applicable approvals

The table illustrates why the complete technology chain cannot be reconstructed solely from invoices or product markings. Each activity creates a different evidentiary requirement. A manufacturer’s name can help identify the source of a component, but the applicable licensing arrangements may reside in contracts between enterprises not identified on the finished product. Similarly, a manufacturing address can establish where assembly occurred while leaving unresolved the legal scope of foreign intellectual-property rights or software-maintenance obligations. For procurement authorities, the appropriate objective is not to create an indiscriminate requirement for every supplier to disclose commercially sensitive information publicly. It is to ensure that the responsible institutions possess sufficient contractual and technical information to establish compliance, maintain essential capabilities and determine whether critical activities can continue under foreseeable circumstances.

GCAP provides a documented example of export-control arrangements adapting to industrial development

The September 2026 amendment to the British GCAP Open General Licence is instructive because it provides concrete evidence that governments recognise the need to adapt authorisation systems to increasingly complex multinational development. The updated licence introduced additional supply-chain destinations and addressed specified programme activities involving military and dual-use goods, software and technology. The government’s notice makes clear that the licence is conditional and that exporters must comply with its requirements; where those conditions are not met, another appropriate licensing route must be considered. This is a practical demonstration of how an international programme can facilitate technological exchange without removing the distinction between programme participation and legal authority. Notice to Exporters 2026/19 — UK Export Control Joint Unit — September 2026. GOV.UK

The same development highlights the importance of distinguishing national export authorisations from multinational programme rules. A programme may have common engineering objectives, but companies operating in different jurisdictions can still face different regulatory requirements. When technological information moves from a British enterprise to an authorised partner in Italy or Japan, the British transfer must be assessed under the applicable British rules. Subsequent transfers from another jurisdiction require a separate examination of the relevant legislation and contractual restrictions. A government cannot presume that participation in the programme automatically authorises every subsequent use of the technology. Conversely, the presence of multiple jurisdictions does not always require multiple licences for the same individual transaction. The controlling question remains the legal structure of the activity actually undertaken.

Licensing statistics demonstrate the difference between administrative authorisation and economic activity

The United Kingdom’s official export-control statistics provide a useful quantitative illustration of the separation between licensing decisions, financial authorisations and realised industrial transactions. According to government statistics published in 2026, 10,921 decisions were made on standard individual export licences during the 2025 calendar year. Of those decisions, 10,416 licences were issued, 501 were refused and four were revoked. The government reported an aggregate value of £13.9 billion for licences issued in 2025, compared with £143.0 billion in 2024. However, the accompanying statistical commentary explicitly warns that declared licence values may exceed the actual value ultimately exported, particularly when exporters apply for authorisations containing substantial headroom. It also identifies methodological limitations affecting comparisons between administrative systems and reporting periods. Strategic Export Controls Commentary: January–March 2026 — UK Department for Business and Trade — 2026. GOV.UK

These figures are significant precisely because they demonstrate the limitations of apparently straightforward quantitative comparisons. A licence is a governmental authorisation, not proof that the exporter shipped the full permitted value. A refusal is an administrative decision concerning an application, not necessarily evidence that the goods subsequently reached the proposed destination through another route. A licence value can reflect a maximum proposed transaction amount, commercial expectations or the applicant’s desire to avoid future administrative constraints. Consequently, licensing values cannot be treated as equivalent to physical deliveries, manufacturing output, recognised revenue or military availability. The distinction becomes especially consequential when governments use export-control statistics to assess industrial cooperation or identify technological dependence.

Table 6.2 — UK export licensing: the verified 2025 administrative baseline

Indicator	Official figure	Reference period	Correct interpretation
Standard individual export-licence decisions	10,921	Calendar year 2025	Administrative decisions, not shipments
Licences issued	10,416	Calendar year 2025	Authorisations granted
Licences refused	501	Calendar year 2025	Applications refused
Licences revoked	4	Calendar year 2025	Previously issued authorisations revoked
Issued licence value	£13.9bn	Calendar year 2025	Declared value associated with authorisations
Comparative issued licence value	£143.0bn	Calendar year 2024	Not directly equivalent to goods exported
Issued licence value, first quarter 2026	£3.53bn	January–March 2026	Quarterly authorised value, not actual export receipts

Source: Strategic Export Controls Commentary — UK Department for Business and Trade — 2026. GOV.UK

The scale of the difference between reported licence values in 2024 and 2025 should not be interpreted without accounting for the statistical nature of the series. The British government itself identifies the potential distorting effect of unusually large licences, exporter declarations and the difference between administrative decisions and subsequent commercial activity. In industrial-intelligence assessments, these limitations are particularly relevant because export authorisations are sometimes mistakenly treated as evidence of actual defence-equipment deliveries. They also underline why transaction-specific information is essential when investigating whether a particular electronic technology was legally transferred.

The industrial identity of a product can change without changing the controlling legal obligations

Corporate acquisitions and international manufacturing arrangements create another layer of complexity. A change in ownership may alter the entity responsible for a factory, its financial reporting and its commercial relationships without necessarily transferring unrestricted control of the technology it produces. Existing software licences may remain subject to their original terms. Intellectual property can remain owned by another enterprise. Technical information may be protected by contractual obligations. Export restrictions can continue to apply according to the relevant legislation, even when the enterprise’s ownership structure changes. In addition, the acquisition itself may create notification or approval requirements depending on the jurisdiction, sector and transaction.

This distinction is important for interpreting the appearance of national or multinational technology within foreign military platforms. An electronic product’s commercial identity may reflect its latest owner, distributor or integrator, while its underlying technology was developed years earlier under different corporate arrangements. The legal investigation must therefore reconstruct not only where the finished product was manufactured, but also which rights and obligations applied when it was produced, sold and subsequently transferred. Such a reconstruction may require information unavailable through ordinary public sources, including purchase orders, manufacturing licences, technical-control classifications, end-user certificates and the identities of intermediaries. The inability to obtain those records publicly should be reported as an evidentiary limitation rather than resolved through assumptions about the nationality of the component or the intentions of its manufacturer.

Key judgments — Chapter 6

International technology transfers cannot be understood as a single legal or industrial event. Physical exports, foreign manufacturing, software transfers, technical disclosures, re-exports and military integration can involve separate authorisations and contractual rights. The EU, Israel, the United States and the United Kingdom maintain different regulatory frameworks whose application depends on the specific technology, jurisdiction and transaction. The British GCAP licensing update demonstrates how cooperation arrangements can be adapted to facilitate authorised multinational engineering without eliminating national export-control responsibilities.

The available evidence also demonstrates that export-licence statistics measure administrative authorisations rather than actual delivered equipment. Corporate ownership changes, manufacturing relocation and commercial rebranding therefore cannot independently establish either unrestricted technological sovereignty or unlawful transfer.

What would change the assessment: Publication of transaction-specific licensing decisions, manufacturing authorisations or intellectual-property agreements sufficient to identify the controlling legal obligations for a particular international technology transfer.

Open official record: The most important missing records concern confidential manufacturing licences, detailed re-export restrictions, end-user documentation, software-use conditions and changes in rights following corporate acquisitions.

Chapter 7 — The Battlefield as a Laboratory for Global Electronics

Recovered components reveal the international origins of military technology, but they do not independently explain how that technology reached the battlefield

The war in Ukraine has given exceptional strategic importance to the examination of electronic components recovered from unmanned systems, missiles and other military equipment. Such examination can identify foreign-manufactured integrated circuits, communications modules, navigation components, power electronics and other commercially distributed technologies incorporated into military platforms. The resulting evidence has implications for defence-industrial analysis, export controls, sanctions enforcement and the wider relationship between civilian electronics and military production. However, a recovered component establishes only certain facts directly: that an identifiable physical item was present in the examined equipment, that its markings or technical characteristics may permit identification and that further investigation could reveal its manufacturing and distribution history. It does not automatically establish that the original producer supplied the military end user, authorised the military application or knew the eventual destination.

The United States Bureau of Industry and Security’s Common High Priority Items List provides an official framework for examining this problem. BIS identifies electronics used in Russian military systems recovered from the battlefield, including integrated circuits and radio-frequency transceiver modules, and distinguishes several priority tiers according to the nature of the products and associated procurement concerns. The agency specifically prioritises nine Harmonized System commodity codes within its first two tiers because the relevant products have broad commercial applications while also being found in Russian missiles and drones. The framework therefore demonstrates that high-priority battlefield electronics are not necessarily products designed exclusively for military use. They may be ordinary commercial goods whose technical characteristics make them useful within military systems. Common High Priority Items List — US Bureau of Industry and Security. Bureau of Industry and Security

The distinction has important consequences for interpreting recovered equipment. A manufacturer’s identification can support technical provenance analysis, but the resulting conclusion is narrower than a finding of authorised or unauthorised export. Commercial electronics can move through manufacturers, authorised distributors, resellers, systems integrators and subsequent purchasers. A component may change hands several times before integration into its final application. Some transfers may be lawful under the rules applicable at the time; others may breach export controls, contractual restrictions or sanctions. Still others may involve misrepresentation of the intended end user. Determining which explanation applies requires evidence concerning the specific item, transaction, parties, dates and legal obligations. The recovery of a branded component should therefore be treated as the beginning of a supply-chain investigation, not its conclusion.

Battlefield evidence and the industrial problem of commercial technology adaptation

The extensive use of commercial electronics in military equipment reflects a broader transformation in the relationship between civilian technology markets and defence procurement. Integrated circuits, sensors, radio-frequency modules, cameras and communications equipment are developed and manufactured for large commercial markets, often with production economies and innovation cycles unlike those of traditional military equipment. These commercial markets can provide technologies that are incorporated into specialised military systems, but the resulting equipment requires assessment according to the demands of its actual application. The presence of a commercially available device does not establish that it has passed relevant military qualification requirements, and the existence of a sophisticated electronic component does not establish the performance of the complete military platform.

The international nature of electronic-component production complicates efforts to restrict access to sensitive technologies. Manufacturers may sell to legitimate distributors serving multiple industries and geographic markets, while downstream buyers can have different business models, customer relationships and compliance procedures. The primary manufacturer may possess reliable records concerning its immediate customer without having complete visibility over every subsequent resale. This is not necessarily a failure of the manufacturer or evidence of intentional concealment. It reflects the ordinary structure of international component distribution. Nevertheless, where particular products are subject to export restrictions or sanctions-related diversion risks, governments and companies must establish appropriate compliance procedures and investigate credible indicators of irregular transactions.

The British government’s counter-circumvention guidance, updated on 12 March 2026, identifies the continuing procurement of restricted technology through third countries as a significant concern. It describes indirect shipping routes, misrepresented end uses, intermediaries and front companies among the mechanisms associated with sanctions evasion. The guidance also warns companies about risks involving overseas subsidiaries, foreign distributors and changes in beneficial ownership. Importantly, it distinguishes elevated risk from definitive proof of unlawful activity and states that no single warning indicator is sufficient by itself to establish evasion. This qualification is essential for government-level analysis because countries and commercial sectors associated with heightened scrutiny also conduct substantial legitimate international trade. Countering Russian Sanctions Evasion: Guidance for Businesses — UK Government — Updated March 2026. GOV.UK

The British guidance identifies a range of jurisdictions in which exporters may need to conduct enhanced due diligence for particular higher-risk products and transactions, including Armenia, China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Serbia, Thailand, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. The guidance expressly cautions that inclusion in its list does not attribute responsibility to a country for the conduct of entities operating within its territory. This distinction is critical. A country may possess substantial legitimate commercial relationships with manufacturers of electronics while simultaneously presenting specific diversion risks in certain product categories or trading patterns. Nationality alone is not adequate evidence of misconduct, and the presence of a jurisdiction on a risk list does not establish that particular businesses have participated in sanctions circumvention. Countering Russian Sanctions Evasion — UK Government — March 2026, Section 2.3. GOV.UK

Four distinct explanations for the appearance of foreign electronics in a military system

When an identifiable foreign electronic component is recovered from a military platform, several explanations may be consistent with the initial physical evidence. The component may have been acquired through an authorised transaction whose terms permitted the relevant use. It may have entered ordinary commercial distribution and subsequently been incorporated into a military system through a lawful sequence of transactions. It may have been transferred in breach of an applicable restriction, either by a party acting knowingly or through the misuse of documentation and commercial relationships. Alternatively, the identification itself may be incomplete or erroneous, particularly when the available evidence consists of photographs, partial labels or unverified descriptions rather than a technically examined component. These explanations cannot be distinguished solely from the visibility of a manufacturer’s logo.

There is also an important temporal dimension. Electronic components can remain in inventories for extended periods, and their movement through commercial distribution may precede the introduction or amendment of relevant restrictions. An investigation must therefore establish not only the component’s identity and final application, but also the relevant dates of manufacture, sale, export and subsequent transfer wherever those facts can be documented. Applying current regulations retrospectively to a transaction completed under an earlier legal framework can produce an incorrect conclusion. Conversely, an initially lawful sale does not necessarily authorise every later transaction or end use. The legal evaluation must follow the chronology and the applicable obligations.

This evidentiary discipline is particularly important in information environments where recovered military equipment becomes a subject of political controversy, commercial accusation or strategic messaging. A claim concerning the nationality of a recovered component may be technically plausible while the surrounding narrative about its supplier, approval or intended use remains unsupported. Governmental analysis should separate the physical evidence from statements made by interested parties, identify the reliability of each source and refrain from treating repetition of an allegation as independent corroboration. In practice, the strongest public findings are those supported by identifiable component characteristics, competent technical examination and records connecting the relevant item to a documented transaction.

Table 7.1 — Evidence standards for components recovered from military systems

Evidence available	What it can establish	What remains unresolved	Additional record required
Photograph of a component label	Visible markings, apparent manufacturer or model	Authenticity, complete identification and supply route	Independent examination of the component
Physically recovered electronic module	Component identity and presence in examined equipment	Original commercial transaction and authorisation	Technical record and transaction history
Manufacturer data sheet	Declared design and technical characteristics	Actual operational performance in the recovered platform	Testing and qualified integration evidence
Manufacturing serial or lot number	Potential link to a production batch	Distributor, reseller and final end user	Manufacturer and distributor records
Customs declaration	Declared shipment, parties and destination	Accuracy of declaration and subsequent resale	Supporting commercial and end-use records
Export licence	Governmental authorisation within defined conditions	Actual delivery and subsequent compliance	Shipping records and transaction documentation
End-user declaration	Stated intended recipient and use	Whether the representation was accurate	Verification and subsequent transaction evidence
Corporate ownership records	Legal ownership at a given date	Ownership of embedded IP and technology rights	Licence agreements and technical contracts
Verified integration record	Incorporation into a particular system	Whether all preceding transfers complied with law	Applicable licences and contractual restrictions
Service activation records	Authorised network access and service relationship	Complete history of physical component transfers	Operator and contractual records

This evidence hierarchy is relevant to both Russian and Ukrainian military equipment. The same methodological standards should apply irrespective of the nationality of the platform or the political significance of the discovery. A foreign component recovered from a Russian military system should not automatically be taken as proof of misconduct by its original producer; likewise, the presence of internationally manufactured electronics in Ukrainian equipment does not independently establish an authorised government transfer or a violation of export rules. Each case requires a documented chain connecting component identity, commercial movement, applicable law and eventual use.

Sanctions circumvention is an industrial and financial governance problem, not merely a customs-control problem

The structure of international electronics trade makes sanctions enforcement dependent on information extending beyond customs declarations. Relevant evidence can include the identities of beneficial owners, changes in corporate control, shipping patterns, the commercial profile of the purchaser, the relationship between the goods and the declared business activity, and the consistency of payment arrangements. The British government’s 2026 guidance places particular emphasis on these factors because transactions involving ordinary commercial electronics may not be obviously suspicious when examined in isolation. A shipment of electronic components can appear commercially routine, while the wider pattern of transactions may reveal discrepancies requiring further investigation. Importantly, the identification of a discrepancy triggers a need for due diligence; it is not itself a legal finding that a violation occurred.

The European Union has also expanded its sanctions framework to address indirect procurement and the use of third-country intermediaries. On 23 April 2026, the Council of the European Union adopted its twentieth package of restrictive measures concerning Russia, including 120 additional individual listings and measures affecting trade, the military-industrial sector and related economic activities. This development illustrates the increasing breadth of the EU’s response, although sanctions listings and prohibited transactions must be evaluated according to the exact legal instruments and dates applicable to each case. A Council announcement does not independently establish that every newly designated entity has been involved in a particular electronics transaction. Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Twentieth EU Sanctions Package — Council of the European Union — April 2026. Consilium

The interaction between European restrictions, American export controls and British compliance requirements creates an international enforcement environment in which enterprises must evaluate more than the immediate destination of an electronic product. A manufacturer may need to understand whether goods fall within specific control lists, whether a proposed buyer is subject to restrictions, whether there are indications of diversion and whether relevant technology-origin rules apply. These obligations differ between jurisdictions and should not be treated as one universal legal test. Nevertheless, the overall regulatory direction is clear: governments increasingly expect businesses handling high-risk technology to develop compliance systems capable of examining transactions within a broader commercial context.

The distinction between battlefield discovery and verified military capability

Recovered electronic components can also lead to exaggerated conclusions about military technological capability. Identifying a particular satellite modem, advanced processor or electronic sensor in military equipment establishes that the component was incorporated into the recovered system, assuming the physical identification is reliable. It does not establish that the component performed successfully during the operation, that the military organisation possessed sufficient quantities to equip a wider fleet or that the associated technology was integrated into a reliable operational architecture. The same limitation applies to statements concerning new military applications of civilian satellite equipment. A manufacturer’s declared capability may indicate technical suitability for certain applications, but actual employment and effectiveness require independent evidence.

The distinction is particularly consequential in the assessment of unmanned systems. Commercial components can reduce certain development and procurement barriers, but the reliable performance of an unmanned platform depends on the integration of electronics, mechanical systems, power supply, software, communications and control functions. The presence of a sophisticated component does not guarantee the effectiveness of the overall system, and the recovery of one equipped platform does not demonstrate widespread deployment. Quantities, operational availability and demonstrated performance must be established separately.

NATO’s UNITE–Brave programme reflects an institutional recognition of the need to connect technological development with operational requirements. Its competitions focus on categories such as counter-unmanned aircraft systems, air defence and secure frontline communications, while providing mechanisms for joint industrial development and testing. This approach acknowledges that technology demonstrated under one set of conditions must still be evaluated for compatibility, reliability and potential adoption. The programme’s announced funding therefore represents an investment in innovation and industrial scaling rather than proof that all supported technologies have achieved operational maturity. NCIA Supports NATO and Ukraine with Next Steps for UNITE–Brave — NATO Communications and Information Agency — April 2026.

From Battlefield Component Identification to a Defensible Supply-Chain Conclusion

This scheme provides an institutional intelligence framework for assessing electronic components recovered from unmanned aircraft, missiles and other military equipment. It separates physical identification, technological provenance, manufacturing history, commercial distribution, export-control obligations and final military integration. Each stage establishes different facts and requires different evidence. The presence of a manufacturer’s logo, serial number or national production label is not sufficient to establish an authorised transfer, sanctions violation or manufacturer involvement in military operations.

The framework is consistent with the official Common High Priority Items List — US Bureau of Industry and Security, Countering Russian Sanctions Evasion — UK Government — March 2026, and Regulation (EU) 2021/821 — European Parliament and Council.

Final analytical interpretation — Separating technological provenance from legal responsibility

The investigative distinction embodied in the scheme is essential to contemporary defence-industrial intelligence. Physical identification establishes a potential connection between an electronic component and a military platform, but the evidentiary significance of that connection depends on the quality of the underlying examination. A visible logo, production address or serial number can offer a starting point for determining the identity of the product and its manufacturer. It cannot, without corroborating records, establish the complete history of the component or the conditions under which it entered international commerce.

The assessment becomes more complex when technological design, intellectual-property ownership, manufacturing and distribution involve different enterprises or national jurisdictions. A terminal assembled in one country may incorporate technology originating elsewhere, but the presence of foreign intellectual property does not automatically determine which export authorisations were required for every subsequent transaction. Equally, an initially lawful commercial transfer does not necessarily establish that every later resale or military application complied with applicable law. The chronology of transactions, classification of controlled goods or technology, relevant jurisdictions and identity of the ultimate end user are decisive. Investigations that omit these elements risk confusing technological origin with commercial responsibility and commercial responsibility with legal liability.

For governments, defence manufacturers and procurement authorities, the appropriate response is an evidence-based system of component traceability, supplier due diligence and legally grounded end-use verification. The objective is not to assume that multinational production is inherently unlawful or that every foreign component represents a strategic vulnerability. It is to identify which external dependencies are operationally consequential, which transactions require authorisation and what evidence is sufficient to establish an actual breach.

The essential conclusion is that modern defence electronics can retain technological dependencies across changes of name, ownership and manufacturing location, while responsibility for their subsequent transfer must still be determined from the documented acts and applicable legal obligations of the parties involved.

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OPEN-SOURCE ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENT

11 November 2026 | Pillar III | Strategic outlook 2027–2031

PILLAR III — INDUSTRIAL SOVEREIGNTY, STRATEGIC EXPOSURE AND THE GLOBAL OUTLOOK

Chapter 8 — The Legal Architecture of Cross-Border Military Technology

Export-control jurisdiction has become an integral component of technological sovereignty

The internationalisation of advanced electronics is creating an increasingly consequential divergence between the geographical location of manufacturing, the commercial nationality of the finished product and the legal authorities capable of restricting its transfer. This divergence represents a structural condition of contemporary defence production rather than an exceptional characteristic of a small number of sensitive military technologies. Governments seeking control over their defence-industrial capabilities must consider not only whether relevant equipment can be manufactured domestically, but whether the intellectual property, technical information, software, production equipment and associated services can be accessed, modified, exported and maintained without violating applicable foreign or national restrictions. The practical issue is the allocation of legal authority across successive industrial transactions: a system can be designed under one jurisdiction, manufactured through facilities located elsewhere, incorporate controlled technology from additional countries and subsequently be integrated into military equipment subject to further national export decisions. The resulting product does not acquire immunity from applicable restrictions simply because final assembly occurs in a particular country. Equally, the existence of foreign-origin technology does not automatically establish that every participating jurisdiction must approve every later transaction.

The strategic significance of this legal fragmentation is especially pronounced in military electronics because products frequently combine controlled and uncontrolled technologies, commercial and military applications, and tangible hardware with intangible technical information. The transfer of a finished component, the disclosure of a controlled design, the provision of technical assistance and the licensing of software can constitute legally distinct activities. They may occur at different times, involve different companies and require separate authorisations. Moreover, export-control obligations must be distinguished from ordinary contractual restrictions: a manufacturer may have lawful authority to export an item while remaining prohibited under an intellectual-property agreement from transferring its manufacturing documentation or modifying licensed software. Conversely, a contractual licence authorising commercial production does not eliminate statutory export controls. These legal dimensions create distinct vulnerabilities for governments and industrial enterprises because compliance failures can interrupt supply chains, while uncertainty over applicable restrictions can delay procurement, discourage foreign investment or restrict access to strategically important technologies.

European Union: the dual-use regime and the distinction between Union rules and national authorisations

The principal European framework for dual-use goods is Regulation (EU) 2021/821, establishing Union controls over exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and certain transfers. Article 3 establishes the authorisation requirement for exporting items listed in Annex I. Article 4 provides additional end-use-related controls in specified circumstances. Article 5 establishes a framework concerning certain non-listed cyber-surveillance items, while other provisions regulate national control measures, authorisation procedures and relevant movements of controlled goods or technology. The regulation therefore creates a common legal architecture but does not remove the role of competent national authorities. Member states remain responsible for substantial parts of licensing administration, enforcement and decisions involving national security within the applicable European framework. The consolidated legislation applicable from 21 September 2026 must be used for contemporary classification, while older versions remain relevant for historical transactions governed by earlier rules. Regulation (EU) 2021/821 — European Parliament and Council — Consolidated September 2026. EUR-Lex

The legal distinction between Union-wide control lists and national export decisions is central to industrial cooperation. The European regulation does not establish a universal authorisation covering all international transactions involving equipment assembled within the Union. An exporter must determine whether the goods, software or technology are subject to applicable controls and whether the particular transfer requires authorisation. The identities of the exporter, recipient and ultimate end user may be relevant, as can technical characteristics, declared uses and the involvement of restricted destinations or entities. A system incorporating several foreign technologies may engage additional contractual obligations, but those obligations cannot be presumed to be identical to European statutory requirements. Similarly, a product advertised as civilian or dual-use is not automatically outside the regulation. Its technical classification and the circumstances of the transaction are more important than commercial descriptions.

The European regime has also evolved in response to the increasing technological importance of software and intangible information. Traditional customs procedures are designed principally to supervise identifiable shipments of goods. Advanced industrial production also involves electronic transfers of design data, remote engineering access, firmware development, technical assistance and collaborative research. These activities may create regulated transfers without the movement of a completed physical product. The consequence for defence-industrial governance is that companies require compliance systems capable of identifying controlled technological information within international engineering projects. An assessment confined to shipping invoices and final hardware labels is insufficient where the principal technological value resides in software, designs or manufacturing know-how.

Italy: UAMA, Legislative Decree 221/2017 and the changing scope of national controls

Italy’s system combines European dual-use legislation with national implementing and enforcement provisions. The Unità per le Autorizzazioni dei Materiali di Armamento (UAMA), within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, has responsibilities concerning military materials and dual-use export authorisations according to the relevant legal frameworks. Legislative Decree 221 of 15 December 2017 provides important national provisions addressing dual-use export procedures and associated restrictions. Defence-material exports are also governed through the distinct framework established by Law 185/1990, as amended. The two regimes should not be treated as interchangeable, because an item classified as a military product may be subject to different procedures and conditions from an item controlled under the European dual-use system.

A particularly important development occurred in 2026, when Italy revised elements of its national control measures. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs records the repeal of the national control list originally established on 1 July 2024 through a decree dated 20 January 2026. The same official legislative repository identifies a further ministerial decree of 1 September 2026 applying a catch-all measure concerning engines intended for aviation-sector applications. These developments illustrate the need to distinguish current regulatory requirements from measures applicable during an earlier transaction. An investigation into a component exported in 2025 cannot simply apply the status of an Italian national list as it stands in November 2026 without establishing the rules operative on the original export date. Legislazione e comunicazioni — UAMA, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs — 2026. Ministero degli Affari Esteri

This temporal distinction has direct consequences for assessing manufacturing facilities located in Italy that produce equipment incorporating foreign-origin technology. The Italian production address may be relevant for determining the exporting jurisdiction, while the technical classification of the finished product and the transaction’s circumstances determine whether Italian or European authorisation is required. Foreign manufacturing licences, controlled technical disclosures and relevant contractual restrictions must be investigated independently. A foreign technology owner’s nationality does not automatically establish that its government directly authorised or prohibited the export of every product manufactured under that technology. Equally, the fact that a civilian product has entered international distribution does not eliminate possible end-use restrictions. These propositions require transaction-specific analysis rather than conclusions drawn from a brand, factory address or product description.

Italy also faces a broader institutional challenge arising from the expansion of multinational defence production. As industrial participation becomes more international, compliance responsibilities can extend across design centres, subsidiaries, subcontractors, licensed producers and service providers. UAMA’s licensing role must operate alongside company-level controls over technical information and contractual arrangements governing military or dual-use products. The industrial consequences of regulatory uncertainty can include delays in engineering cooperation, restrictions on subcontracting and complications when a product’s intended market changes. Conversely, predictable authorisation procedures can facilitate legitimate cooperation while preserving national control over restricted transfers. The relevant policy objective is therefore not to weaken export restrictions indiscriminately, but to improve their clarity, traceability and practical application to complex multinational industrial structures.

Israel: defence-export control over equipment, know-how and related services

Israel’s regulatory architecture is distinguished by the explicit inclusion of defence-related technical knowledge and services within the responsibilities of the Defense Export Control Agency (DECA). The agency was established within the Ministry of Defense in 2006, and the Defence Export Control Law entered into effect at the end of 2007. The ministry explains that its regulatory activity takes account of national security, international commitments, foreign-policy considerations and the protection of sensitive technology. Its control lists draw upon relevant international arrangements, including the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime. The system therefore addresses more than the shipment of completed military hardware: certain transfers of knowledge, services and controlled technical capabilities can also require authorisation. Defense Export Control Agency — Israel Ministry of Defense. Ministry of Defense

The principal issue for Israeli-origin technologies manufactured abroad concerns the relationship between rights retained by an Israeli enterprise, restrictions attaching to controlled technological transfers and the legal circumstances of subsequent production and export. An Israeli manufacturer may licence technology to a foreign producer under terms that specify permitted manufacturing, modification or distribution activities. The foreign producer may subsequently incorporate that technology into a product manufactured and exported under its own jurisdiction. Whether an additional Israeli authorisation is required for a particular subsequent transfer cannot be inferred solely from the underlying technology’s Israeli origin. The relevant inquiry must determine what controlled technology was transferred, to whom, under which authorisation, whether the relevant activities fall within Israeli jurisdiction and what restrictions govern further transfers or services. This distinction protects both regulatory accuracy and commercial accountability.

The same approach applies to technology incorporated into satellite communications, radar, electronic warfare and other sophisticated electronic systems. A technology owner’s control over design information may differ from the commercial operator’s control over network access or the foreign manufacturer’s control over assembled hardware. These distinctions are especially important where equipment can serve civilian and military customers under different contractual arrangements. Public statements concerning national export policy cannot substitute for a product-specific classification or authorisation record.

United States: foreign-direct-product rules and the international reach of technology controls

The United States maintains a particularly consequential export-control regime because certain foreign-produced items can fall within the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) when the conditions established by the regulations are satisfied. Section 734.9 addresses foreign-direct-product rules, including specified circumstances involving products derived from controlled US technology or software, manufacturing plants and major components of manufacturing plants. The regulatory scope depends on defined conditions. The Bureau of Industry and Security expressly distinguishes the question of whether a foreign-produced item is subject to the EAR from the subsequent determination of whether the relevant transaction requires an export licence. It also recognises that applicable licence exceptions may affect the outcome. Consequently, neither American technological influence nor the presence of a US-related manufacturing input is a sufficient standalone basis for claiming that every foreign-produced product is subject to an American licensing requirement. Export Administration Regulations, Part 734 — US Bureau of Industry and Security. Bureau of Industry and Security

For industrial enterprises, these rules create an additional compliance dimension because the legal treatment of a product may depend partly on technical characteristics and production relationships that are not evident from the finished article’s country-of-origin label. A manufacturer located outside the United States may therefore need to investigate whether specified US-origin technologies, software or equipment bring a particular foreign-produced item within the EAR. However, the existence of such a possibility must not be converted into an assertion of jurisdiction over a specific product without applying the controlling provisions. The distinction is especially important for semiconductor production, where international manufacturing facilities can employ complex combinations of design tools, equipment and technical processes originating from different jurisdictions.

United Kingdom: national licensing and programme-specific authorisation

The United Kingdom’s strategic export-control system is administered through domestic legislation and relevant governmental authorities. The regime addresses military and dual-use goods, software and technology, with separate licensing mechanisms for particular activities and transactions. The UK’s departure from the European Union makes it a distinct licensing jurisdiction, although cooperation with European partners and international control arrangements remains important. For industrial enterprises, British export controls may interact with European, American or other national obligations, particularly when technological information is exchanged through multinational programmes.

The official Strategic Export Controls Commentary covering January–March 2026 provides a quantitative baseline for understanding the scale of British licensing administration. During calendar year 2025, the government recorded 10,921 standard individual export-licence decisions, comprising 10,416 issued licences, 501 refusals and four revocations. These are administrative decisions, not records of completed exports. The distinction is essential because licence values, where provided, can reflect permitted transaction values rather than goods actually shipped or revenues ultimately earned. Strategic Export Controls Commentary: January–March 2026 — UK Department for Business and Trade — 2026. GOV.UK

The UK system illustrates how a national authority can combine general export controls with specific arrangements intended to support authorised international defence cooperation. The policy significance lies in the ability to differentiate legitimate collaboration from transactions falling outside permitted conditions. The existence of a programme-specific framework should not be mistaken for unrestricted rights over controlled technology, particularly where partner countries retain separate national requirements.

Table 8.1 — Cross-border export-control architecture: comparative legal authority

Jurisdiction	Principal framework	Competent authority	Controlled activity	Principal legal distinction	Relevant official source
European Union	Regulation (EU) 2021/821	National competent authorities operating under EU rules	Dual-use exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and specified transfers	Common Union controls with national licensing implementation	Regulation 2021/821
Italy	EU Regulation 2021/821; Legislative Decree 221/2017; separate military-goods framework	UAMA and other competent authorities under applicable law	Military and dual-use exports and related activities	Classification and transaction determine applicable regime	UAMA legislative framework
Israel	Defence Export Control Law, 2007, and implementing regulations	Ministry of Defense / DECA	Defence equipment, know-how and services	Defence-related technical information may be controlled independently from hardware	DECA
United States	Export Administration Regulations, including Part 734	Bureau of Industry and Security	Items subject to EAR and defined international transfers	Certain foreign-produced items can fall within US jurisdiction under specified conditions	EAR Part 734
United Kingdom	Domestic strategic export-control legislation and licensing arrangements	UK export-control authorities	Military and dual-use goods, software and technology	National licensing remains distinct from EU authorisations	Strategic export-control statistics
International coordination	Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR and other relevant arrangements	Participating governments	Common control principles and national implementation	International coordination does not ordinarily replace domestic legal authorisation	DECA regulatory explanation

The problem of legal continuity during corporate restructuring

One of the most consequential legal problems for advanced electronics is the relationship between corporate ownership changes and the continued validity of technical rights and authorisations. A manufacturing enterprise can be acquired, reorganised or transferred into a new corporate group without the automatic transfer of unrestricted ownership over every technology incorporated into its products. Existing agreements may contain change-of-control provisions, restrictions on sublicensing or requirements concerning confidential technical information. Statutory export approvals may also be linked to particular entities, activities or conditions. The result is an industrial system in which the company’s public identity can change more rapidly than the legal architecture governing its products.

The significance of this phenomenon is not that restructuring necessarily conceals unlawful activity. Acquisitions and reorganisations are ordinary mechanisms of industrial investment and corporate strategy. The strategic issue is whether government authorities and industrial customers maintain sufficient continuity of information to establish which rights and obligations remain in force. A company that acquires a manufacturing facility may obtain physical assets, employees and commercial contracts without receiving full ownership of proprietary software or the right to reproduce particular patented designs. If the enterprise supplies a security-sensitive industry, the resulting uncertainty may affect maintenance, exports, technical modification and long-term production. An appropriate governmental assessment must therefore examine the specific transaction rather than treating ownership of a factory as synonymous with ownership of all the technologies it produces.

Key judgments — Chapter 8

The principal legal constraint on multinational defence electronics is the coexistence of national and supranational authorities governing different parts of the same industrial process. European dual-use legislation, Italian implementing measures, Israeli defence-export controls, American foreign-direct-product provisions and British national licensing can each become relevant depending on the product, parties and transaction. Their applicability cannot be established from the finished equipment’s nationality alone. The increasingly intangible character of technological value—software, controlled information, manufacturing know-how and network services—further limits the usefulness of examining only physical exports.

What would change the assessment: Verified changes to the operative control lists, new bilateral or multinational licensing arrangements, authoritative judicial interpretations of extraterritorial provisions, or published decisions clarifying the treatment of particular foreign-produced technologies.

Open official record: The most consequential outstanding records are transaction-specific authorisations, technical classifications, applicable licence conditions and contractual restrictions governing re-export, modification and controlled technological disclosures.

Chapter 9 — Europe’s Industrial Exposure: Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom

Europe’s industrial sovereignty problem is not the absence of advanced technology but the incomplete correspondence between technological specialisation, production capacity and strategic control

The European defence-electronics industry possesses extensive competencies in integrated military systems, semiconductor technologies, industrial automation, aerospace engineering, radar, optical equipment, specialised materials and advanced manufacturing. Its principal strategic weakness cannot therefore be described simply as an absence of technological capability. The more consequential difficulty is that European strengths are distributed unevenly across national industries and successive stages of production, while some critical activities remain dependent on companies and manufacturing ecosystems operating outside European jurisdiction. A government may possess enterprises capable of designing complex defence systems but lack sufficient domestic or reliably accessible capacity to manufacture particular semiconductor devices. Another country may possess strategically important semiconductor fabrication equipment without controlling all the chip designs or materials used by the industry it supports. A third may have significant aerospace integration capabilities but rely on external software and electronics supply chains. These differences matter because a policy designed to expand aggregate European manufacturing investment cannot automatically resolve vulnerabilities arising from intellectual-property restrictions, specialised materials, qualified component production or service continuity.

The European Commission itself acknowledged these limitations when publishing its proposed Chips Act 2.0 on 3 June 2026. The Commission identified continuing dependencies on third countries in advanced semiconductor manufacturing and design, while proposing measures intended to reinforce European strengths and expand capabilities in more advanced technologies. This proposal follows the existing European Chips Act, Regulation (EU) 2023/1781, which entered into force in September 2023 and established measures concerning semiconductor research, industrial production, supply security and crisis response. The distinction between the existing legislative framework and the June 2026 proposal is important because proposed reforms cannot be presented as completed investments or production capacities. Proposal for the Chips Act 2.0 — European Commission — June 2026; European Chips Act — European Commission. Shaping Europe’s digital future+1

The Commission’s decisions of 13 October 2025 provide a more precise picture of how these industrial objectives are being implemented. Four semiconductor projects received designation as Integrated Production Facilities or Open EU Foundries: Austria’s OS4EU project, Germany’s ESMC and MEGAFAB-DD projects, and Italy’s STMicroelectronics Catania Campus. These designations identify projects satisfying the relevant institutional criteria under the European Chips Act. They should not be interpreted as proof that each facility had completed construction, achieved its planned production capacity or become capable of manufacturing every semiconductor needed by European defence companies. The Commission’s own framework distinguishes a project’s strategic status from its eventual operating performance. Commission Decisions on Strengthening Europe’s Semiconductor Manufacturing Capacity — European Commission — October 2025. Shaping Europe’s digital future

Italy: specialised power semiconductors, industrial continuity and the limits of final-system manufacturing

Italy’s position is particularly important because its industrial exposure encompasses both advanced component manufacturing and the integration of complex defence technologies. Semiconductor investments in Sicily represent a distinct strategic asset from the country’s participation in multinational aircraft and missile programmes. The two activities involve different forms of technological value: semiconductor production concerns industrial processes, materials, fabrication capabilities and component qualification, while defence-system integration concerns the ability to combine electronics, software, sensors and other subsystems into equipment satisfying military requirements. A country may be strong in one activity while retaining dependencies in the other. Accordingly, national defence-industrial policy should not assume that investment in a specialised semiconductor facility directly translates into complete domestic control over all the electronics incorporated into national military platforms.

The STMicroelectronics Catania Campus provides a concrete example. On 6 March 2025, the European Commission announced approval of €2 billion in Italian state aid for a new integrated silicon-carbide semiconductor manufacturing facility. The measure supports the production of silicon-carbide power devices and the development of associated industrial capabilities. The Commission’s decision included commitments concerning the development of 200-millimetre silicon-carbide technology, wider benefits to the European semiconductor supply chain, industrial skills and priority-rated orders under defined shortage conditions. Significantly, the Commission also reported a commitment intended to prevent the project from becoming subject to extraterritorial public-service obligations imposed by a third country. This latter condition illustrates how semiconductor investment policy has expanded beyond industrial competitiveness into questions of jurisdiction, emergency supply and strategic authority. Commission Approves €2 Billion Italian State-Aid Measure for STMicroelectronics — European Commission — March 2025. Pact for Skills

The choice of silicon carbide is industrially significant because compound semiconductors address applications involving power conversion, thermal conditions and electrical characteristics different from those of conventional digital logic devices. The capability is relevant to industrial electrification, energy infrastructure, transport and potentially certain defence-electronics applications. Nevertheless, a silicon-carbide manufacturing project cannot be counted as equivalent to advanced digital-logic fabrication or as a substitute for specialised radio-frequency, memory or computing components. The strategic value lies in the precise production capabilities being developed and their relationship to European industrial demand. A realistic assessment should therefore examine the plant’s qualified processes, realised output, customer requirements, available materials and associated production equipment.

The relationship between manufacturing and intellectual-property control is especially consequential for Italy because the country can host production facilities operating within internationally structured companies. National employment, industrial activity and tax revenues may increase even when corporate technology rights, research decisions or global capacity allocation are not exclusively controlled by Italian institutions. This does not invalidate the industrial value of inward investment or international collaboration. It means that the resulting sovereignty should be assessed according to specific enforceable capabilities: the right to maintain production, availability of critical inputs, access to qualified alternative suppliers and the capacity to continue supporting national requirements if international commercial relationships deteriorate.

For Italian defence procurement, an additional question concerns the technical continuity of multinational systems. Participation in programmes involving foreign partners creates access to technological development and wider production economies, but complete lifecycle sovereignty also requires arrangements covering software modifications, spare components, maintenance information, upgrades and possible restrictions on subsequent exports. These issues become particularly significant for equipment expected to remain in service for decades. A government may secure substantial domestic industrial work at the production stage while retaining dependencies affecting its ability to update or sustain the resulting equipment. The correct policy distinction is therefore between national industrial participation, national manufacturing capability and the authority required for independent operational sustainment.

France: semiconductor fabrication, defence integration and the industrial meaning of technological independence

France’s industrial position differs from Italy’s because it combines semiconductor production and sophisticated defence-system development within a broader aerospace, electronics and national research ecosystem. The STMicroelectronics–GlobalFoundries project at Crolles, identified in the Commission’s European Chips Act project information, involves approximately €7.5 billion in public and private investment associated with 300-millimetre FD-SOI semiconductor technology. This investment figure refers to the identified project and should not be interpreted as completed expenditure or operational production revenue. The technology is important because specialised semiconductor processes can serve applications that require combinations of power efficiency, integration and performance characteristics distinct from those of leading-edge digital logic. European Chips Act — European Commission. Shaping Europe’s digital future

The Crolles project illustrates an important characteristic of French industrial sovereignty: domestic manufacturing can coexist with multinational corporate and technological structures. GlobalFoundries is an international semiconductor enterprise, while STMicroelectronics operates through a cross-border corporate and industrial footprint. Their cooperation can expand production capability within France without requiring the participating companies to surrender all separately owned intellectual property or international technical relationships. The resulting industrial benefit is therefore better understood as an expansion of European manufacturing capacity and technological participation rather than complete national ownership of every underlying production capability.

For defence electronics, this distinction matters because highly integrated military systems contain technologies with different production and qualification requirements. France’s capacity to develop radar, aviation electronics, sensors and weapons integration does not guarantee that every semiconductor or software component required for those systems is domestically manufactured. Conversely, access to specialised fabrication and engineering capabilities can create valuable leverage even when certain advanced chips are sourced externally. The industrial question is whether an interruption affecting a particular foreign supplier would prevent production or sustainment of a critical system and whether a qualified replacement could be introduced within an acceptable period.

A further complication concerns the difference between proprietary technological competence and operational compatibility. French-designed defence systems may need to exchange information with equipment produced by other European or NATO countries. Standardisation and interoperability can require technical information sharing, common interfaces and coordinated testing. These arrangements can increase the value of national technologies by enabling wider use, but they can also create dependencies on shared upgrade schedules or externally maintained interfaces. The resulting governance arrangements should therefore be evaluated as part of the system’s lifecycle, rather than treated solely as an issue at the moment of procurement.

Germany: manufacturing equipment, industrial semiconductors and internationally owned fabrication capacity

Germany occupies a distinctive position within Europe’s electronics ecosystem because of its strengths in industrial semiconductor applications, power electronics, advanced manufacturing and precision engineering. Its strategic significance extends beyond the production of finished electronic components to the manufacturing technologies used by other industries. This gives Germany an important role in European industrial resilience, but it also exposes the country to dependencies involving international customers, materials, equipment supply chains and multinational manufacturing partnerships.

The European Commission approved a €920 million German state-aid measure on 20 February 2025 supporting Infineon’s MEGAFAB-DD semiconductor facility in Dresden. The programme is intended to strengthen production capabilities across several types of semiconductor devices. Its strategic value arises from increasing manufacturing capacity for technologies relevant to industrial and electronic systems, but the amount approved in state aid should not be confused with the facility’s total investment, completed construction costs or realised output. The Commission’s decision establishes the legal authorisation of a public-support measure within the relevant state-aid framework. Infineon Semiconductor Plant in Dresden: Commission Approves €920 Million German Aid — European Commission — February 2025. Vertretung in Deutschland

The European Semiconductor Manufacturing Company project in Dresden demonstrates a different industrial model: a fabrication initiative involving international partners and an EU-based production facility. Its designation as an Open EU Foundry in October 2025 places it within the formal framework of the European Chips Act. The designation is important because it recognises the project’s contribution to the Union’s semiconductor ecosystem while distinguishing its organisational model from an integrated production facility primarily serving its own corporate requirements. Commission Decisions on Semiconductor Manufacturing Capacity — European Commission — October 2025. Shaping Europe’s digital future

The economic implications of such partnerships should be examined through several variables rather than a single investment total. Domestic employment and capital expenditure contribute to the host economy. Manufacturing operations can strengthen the local supplier network and develop specialised skills. Access to fabrication can improve supply resilience for customers operating within the region. However, the distribution of intellectual-property rights, capacity allocation, technology upgrades and industrial decision-making may remain connected to the multinational enterprises participating in the project. This is not necessarily a deficiency; it is the structure through which international semiconductor capabilities are being brought into European production. The relevant governmental task is to determine how much continuity and control the industrial arrangements actually provide during adverse conditions.

The United Kingdom: intellectual-property capabilities, compound semiconductors and defence digital infrastructure

The United Kingdom has adopted an industrial approach that places substantial emphasis on semiconductor design, intellectual property, compound semiconductors and research rather than treating domestic leading-edge fabrication as the sole measure of national capability. Its National Semiconductor Strategy, published on 19 May 2023, identified three principal objectives: expanding the domestic sector, improving resilience against supply disruptions and protecting national security. The government announced investment of up to £200 million during 2023–2025 and up to £1 billion over the following decade, subject to the relevant spending and implementation arrangements. These figures describe a policy commitment and investment framework, not a verified amount already disbursed or a measurement of semiconductor manufacturing output. National Semiconductor Strategy — UK Department for Science, Innovation and Technology — May 2023. GOV.UK

The British strategy reflects an important economic distinction: intellectual-property development and specialist semiconductor research can create substantial value even without ownership of large-scale advanced foundries. Design tools, patented architectures, compound semiconductor technologies and technical expertise can support both civilian and defence industries. Nevertheless, these activities create different forms of dependence. A company developing semiconductor designs may require fabrication services abroad. A research enterprise specialising in compound materials may depend on external manufacturing equipment and industrial customers. A defence company integrating British-designed technology into a finished system may still require imported components, software tools and specialised manufacturing processes.

The UK’s Strategic Defence Review 2025 places an additional emphasis on common digital infrastructure and the integration of military systems through shared information. It calls for a digital architecture capable of connecting sensors, decision-making systems and military capabilities, with a digital targeting-web objective for 2027 and earlier development milestones. These are recommendations and programme objectives, not evidence that every envisaged system has been completed. The industrial implication is that the security of software, data infrastructure and interoperability can become as consequential as the domestic manufacture of physical platforms. The Strategic Defence Review 2025 — UK Ministry of Defence. GOV.UK

Table 9.1 — Europe’s differentiated industrial exposure

Country	Verified industrial initiative	Published value/status	Technological function	What remains dependent or unresolved	Source
Italy	STMicroelectronics Catania Campus	€2bn Italian state aid approved, March 2025	Silicon-carbide power-device manufacturing	Realised output, external materials and process-specific equipment	European Commission
France	STMicroelectronics–GlobalFoundries Crolles	€7.5bn associated public/private project investment	300-mm FD-SOI semiconductor technology	Actual capacity, multinational IP and production governance	European Chips Act
Germany	Infineon MEGAFAB-DD, Dresden	€920m German state-aid measure approved, February 2025	Industrial semiconductor manufacturing	Qualified output, equipment dependencies and production continuity	European Commission
Germany	European Semiconductor Manufacturing Company	Open EU Foundry status, October 2025	Internationally partnered semiconductor fabrication	Capacity allocation, IP arrangements and implementation milestones	European Commission
United Kingdom	National Semiconductor Strategy	Up to £1bn over approximately a decade	Design, IP, compound semiconductors and research	Foreign fabrication access and implementation expenditure	UK Government
European Union	Chips Act 2.0	Commission proposal, June 2026	Advanced manufacturing and reduced dependencies	Legislative adoption and operational results	European Commission

Europe must distinguish the strategic value of a factory from authority over its output

The central European challenge is how to translate industrial investment into reliable access to strategically important components and technologies. A fabrication plant contributes to resilience only to the extent that its production capabilities match the requirements of the relevant industries and can be sustained during disruption. The location of a facility provides important jurisdictional and logistical advantages, but it does not independently establish that a government can redirect production, obtain priority deliveries or reproduce proprietary designs. Such authority depends on applicable law, contracts, production arrangements and the technical feasibility of the requested changes.

There is also an important distinction between building capacity and maintaining competitiveness. Semiconductor fabrication and advanced electronics manufacturing require substantial investment in facilities, technical personnel, equipment and process development. A government can finance construction while leaving unresolved the commercial demand necessary to support production over time. Conversely, a facility operating successfully in international markets may remain dependent on customers or suppliers located outside the host jurisdiction. Industrial resilience therefore requires a combination of production capability, sustainable demand, legally reliable access and the ability to replace critical inputs.

The most defensible European approach is not to assume that every member state can reproduce the entire semiconductor supply chain. Specialisation creates economic advantages that would be difficult and expensive to eliminate. The more important question is whether European institutions and national governments can identify essential dependencies, maintain alternatives for the most consequential inputs and ensure that multinational industrial arrangements provide sufficient continuity when geopolitical conditions deteriorate.

Key judgments — Chapter 9

Europe’s defence-electronics exposure is differentiated rather than uniform. Italy’s strategic manufacturing investments emphasise specialised semiconductor capabilities; France combines advanced electronics and integrated-system competencies; Germany has major industrial semiconductor and manufacturing capabilities; and Britain places substantial policy emphasis on design, compound semiconductors and digital defence integration. These national positions are complementary in some respects but do not automatically create an integrated European capability. The European Chips Act provides an institutional framework for strengthening production, while the proposed Chips Act 2.0 acknowledges continuing dependencies in advanced manufacturing and design.

What would change the assessment: Verified production milestones, qualified manufacturing yields, enforceable priority-access arrangements, demonstrable domestic or allied substitute production and evidence that new facilities have reduced identified dependencies.

Open official record: Detailed facility-level capacity, realised investment, output by process technology, government access rights and contractual restrictions governing essential semiconductor technologies remain necessary for a complete sovereignty assessment.

Chapter 10 — The Geopolitics of the Defence-Electronics Supply Chain

Strategic exposure increasingly originates upstream of the electronics manufacturer

The international defence-electronics industry is exposed to geopolitical disruptions at several levels that are not always visible in the supply chains of finished military equipment. Semiconductor manufacturing depends on specialised raw materials, industrial chemicals, manufacturing machinery, precision equipment, highly skilled labour, software and large capital investments. The production of sensors, power electronics, antennas and advanced communications equipment introduces additional technological and material requirements. A disruption at one of these upstream stages may affect industries that appear unrelated when examined through conventional product categories. Military electronics, civilian telecommunications, automotive manufacturing, energy infrastructure and industrial automation can compete for some of the same components or manufacturing inputs. Consequently, a shortage originating in the commercial sector may affect defence production even when the original geopolitical event was not directed at the military industry.

The most important implication is that industrial dependence should be understood through the structure of bottlenecks rather than the nationality of the final product. A finished system may contain components manufactured in several countries, but a particular production process or specialist material can still depend heavily on one jurisdiction. The concentration of a critical input matters when substitutes are limited, qualified production takes time to establish or the interruption affects technologies used across multiple industries. Conversely, a geographically concentrated input may be less consequential where alternative products or processes can be introduced without substantial technical or regulatory barriers. Strategic vulnerability is therefore not equivalent to concentration alone. It emerges from the interaction between concentration, substitutability, available inventories, production flexibility and the consequences of interruption.

The International Energy Agency’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026, published on 16 July 2026, provides an unusually detailed assessment of the relationship between concentration, technology restrictions and industrial resilience. The IEA reports that, excluding rare earths, the average share of the leading refining country across the relevant mineral markets increased from 70% in 2023 to 72% in 2025. It also identifies considerable exposure involving gallium, germanium, magnet rare earths, tungsten, graphite, tellurium, cobalt and other strategically important materials. These figures are specific to the IEA’s analytical coverage and definitions; they should not be interpreted as a universal concentration index for all raw materials or as a direct measure of defence-electronics output. Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026: Executive Summary — International Energy Agency — July 2026. IEA

Critical minerals: why relatively small markets can create disproportionately large industrial risks

Some of the most strategically consequential materials are not necessarily those traded in the greatest quantities or commanding the highest aggregate market value. Gallium, germanium, tungsten, specialist rare earth elements and other minor minerals can support technologically demanding applications in semiconductors, optical systems, electronics, aerospace and advanced manufacturing. Their importance derives from specific material properties and their role in industrial processes that may be difficult to replace. Where a material is produced as a by-product of another mining or refining activity, supply cannot necessarily increase rapidly in response to higher prices for the minor mineral alone. The IEA identifies this phenomenon as a significant constraint affecting diversification, alongside the concentration of specialist refining equipment and industrial knowledge.

The IEA reports that prices for several strategic minor minerals increased sharply during 2025 and early 2026, partly in response to export restrictions and supply concerns. Between January 2025 and April 2026, prices for some strategically important minor minerals more than doubled, while tungsten prices rose approximately sixfold. The report also identifies substantial price differences between Chinese domestic markets and markets outside China: European prices for gallium and heavy rare earths such as dysprosium and terbium were approximately five times Chinese domestic prices, while germanium prices were nearly three times higher. These comparisons concern specified markets and the reference period examined by the IEA; they are not universal price multipliers applicable to every product grade, contract or transaction. Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 — International Energy Agency — July 2026. IEA

The industrial consequences extend beyond the purchase price of minerals. A sudden increase in input costs can affect the economics of refining, semiconductor production and component manufacturing. However, the proportion of the mineral’s cost within the final product determines how strongly the increase affects total manufacturing expense. In some highly sophisticated electronic devices, the direct value of a minor mineral may represent only a small part of the finished equipment’s cost, while its physical availability remains indispensable. The strategic exposure can therefore arise primarily from production interruption rather than proportional cost inflation. This distinction explains why price-based assessments alone may underestimate the vulnerability created by a difficult-to-substitute material.

China’s position in mineral processing has consequences beyond direct exports

The IEA’s 2026 analysis identifies China as the leading refiner for several strategically relevant materials, including gallium, graphite, manganese and rare earths, with the leading country’s share exceeding 90% in certain markets. This concentration makes changes in export policy particularly consequential for downstream manufacturing. The report describes the introduction of Chinese export controls affecting seven heavy rare earth elements in April 2025 and subsequent measures announced in October of that year. Some proposed restrictions were suspended for one year until November 2026, making the status of those measures particularly relevant at the present assessment cut-off. A suspended restriction should not be described as continuously operative during its suspension, although the possibility of its reactivation or modification remains relevant to future exposure. Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026: Outlook — International Energy Agency — July 2026. IEA

The IEA estimates that full implementation of the expanded restrictions described in its analysis could place approximately $6.5 trillion per year in downstream production outside China at risk across automotive, high-technology, defence and energy sectors. This is a conditional estimate of economic exposure under the specified restrictions, not an observed loss, a forecast of annual damage or a measure attributable exclusively to the defence industry. The distinction is important because large exposure figures can be misleading when presented without the underlying scenario. The IEA’s estimate illustrates the scale of production potentially dependent on affected materials and technologies, but it does not imply that the entire amount would necessarily be lost. Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026: Executive Summary — International Energy Agency — July 2026. IEA

The strategic problem also extends to mineral-processing equipment and know-how. The IEA reports that diversification projects outside dominant supplier countries can face capital costs 20% to more than 150% higher than those of incumbent producers, while operating costs can average approximately 50% higher. These figures refer to the project comparisons examined by the agency and cannot be applied indiscriminately to every refinery or mineral. Nevertheless, they show why governments cannot assume that investment incentives will immediately create commercially competitive alternative supply chains. Establishing refining capability can require specialised equipment, engineering experience, infrastructure, environmental permissions and suitable feedstock arrangements. The challenge is therefore not simply to locate additional mineral reserves, but to develop the production systems necessary to convert resources into usable industrial materials. Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 — International Energy Agency. IEA

Table 10.1 — Verified indicators of strategic-material exposure

Indicator	Official value	Reference period	Economic or industrial interpretation
Average leading-country refining share, excluding rare earths	70%	2023	Comparative IEA baseline
Average leading-country refining share, excluding rare earths	72%	2025	Greater average refining concentration
Leading-country share in selected minerals	Over 90%	2025	Relevant to gallium, graphite, manganese and certain rare-earth processing markets
Selected strategic-mineral price increases	More than 100%	2025–early 2026	Price increases in specified minor-mineral markets
Tungsten price increase	Approximately sixfold	January 2025–April 2026	Exceptional price movement in the examined market
European gallium/heavy rare-earth price comparison	Approximately 5× Chinese domestic prices	2026 reference	Cross-market price divergence
Germanium price comparison	Nearly 3× Chinese domestic prices	2026 reference	Cross-market price divergence
Conditional downstream economic exposure	Approximately $6.5tn/year	IEA restriction scenario	Potential affected production, not realised losses
Alternative refining-project capital-cost premium	20% to more than 150%	IEA 2026 assessment	Range for examined diversification projects
Average alternative refining operating-cost premium	Approximately 50%	IEA 2026 assessment	Indicative cost disadvantage in assessed projects

Sources: Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026: Executive Summary — IEA — July 2026 and Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026: Outlook — IEA — July 2026. IEA+1

The European Critical Raw Materials Act: legally defined diversification objectives

The European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act establishes a framework for increasing the security of strategic mineral supplies and supporting industrial capacity across extraction, processing and recycling. The European Commission identifies four principal benchmarks for 2030: European extraction capacity equivalent to at least 10% of annual consumption of strategic raw materials, processing capacity equivalent to at least 40%, recycling capacity equivalent to at least 25%, and a diversification objective under which no more than 65% of the Union’s annual consumption of a given strategic raw material at a relevant processing stage should come from one third country. These are policy benchmarks, not evidence that the corresponding capacities have already been achieved. Their significance lies in addressing several stages of the material supply chain rather than treating domestic mining as sufficient for industrial security. Critical Raw Materials Act — European Commission. Mercato Unico e PMI

For defence electronics, the most consequential feature of these objectives is their attention to processing and supplier diversification. A European manufacturer may have access to mineral reserves or imported raw materials while remaining dependent on foreign refining and processing capacity. Establishing local extraction without developing appropriate downstream infrastructure can leave the strategic bottleneck largely unchanged. Likewise, recycling can contribute to supply security only where appropriate collection, processing, purification and qualification capabilities exist. The targets therefore represent different industrial requirements and should not be added together or treated as alternative ways of measuring the same capacity.

Critical-Mineral Concentration and European Diversification Targets

This component compares the European Union’s four strategic raw-material benchmarks for 2030 with the International Energy Agency’s reported refining-concentration indicators. It maintains a strict separation between policy targets and measured historical data, avoiding misleading comparisons.

The figures correspond to the Critical Raw Materials Act — European Commission and the Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 — International Energy Agency.

Analytical interpretation — Why concentration and diversification targets must be evaluated separately

The significance of the European Critical Raw Materials Act is not reducible to its individual numerical benchmarks. Its strategic contribution is the recognition that supply security requires complementary capabilities in extraction, processing, recycling and diversification. These four dimensions address different sources of industrial vulnerability, and progress in one does not necessarily compensate for failure in another. A state may possess substantial mineral deposits but lack the chemical and metallurgical processing facilities required to convert extracted material into components suitable for semiconductor manufacturing. Similarly, a recycling industry may recover strategically valuable materials without achieving the purity, production volume or technical qualification required for advanced industrial applications. The legal benchmarks therefore define separate areas of industrial development rather than interchangeable measures of resilience.

The International Energy Agency’s concentration indicators establish a different form of evidence. They measure the geographical distribution of refining activity in the mineral markets included in the agency’s analysis, excluding rare earths from the cited average. The increase from 70% in 2023 to 72% in 2025 indicates that the average concentration of production in the leading refining country rose during that period. However, this two-percentage-point change cannot be converted directly into an equivalent increase in geopolitical risk or economic damage. Risk depends on the identity of the dominant supplier, the particular material, alternative capacity, trade restrictions, available inventories and the industrial consequences of supply interruption.

A further distinction concerns the EU’s 65% diversification benchmark. It establishes a maximum concentration objective for the share of Union consumption of each strategic raw material originating from any one third country at a relevant processing stage. It is not an existing measurement of Europe’s current dependence, and it is not directly comparable with the IEA’s 72% average across the refining markets covered by that study. Treating the two figures as if they represented the same population, processing stage or geographic denominator would produce a misleading assessment.

The combined evidence supports an important conclusion for defence-industrial policy. The sovereignty of advanced electronic systems depends on upstream industrial capabilities whose economic significance may be far greater than their share of the finished product’s value. Strategic vulnerabilities can emerge in mining, refining, semiconductor manufacturing, specialist materials and production equipment long before those dependencies become visible within a completed military platform. The relevant governmental objective is therefore to identify the specific bottlenecks capable of interrupting critical production, rather than assume that national ownership or assembly of the final equipment provides sufficient security.

The European Commission’s Critical Raw Materials Act and the IEA’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 provide complementary, but statistically distinct, foundations for this assessment.

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