In late 2024, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran executed a significant military maneuver by deploying advanced air defense and anti-ship missile systems on the islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, located strategically west of the Strait of Hormuz. This deployment, detailed by IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza Tangsiri in a statement to Iranian media on March 22, 2025, as reported by Tehran Times, marks a pivotal escalation in Iran’s regional military posture. Positioned at a critical chokepoint through which approximately 21 million barrels of oil pass daily—equivalent to 20% of global oil consumption according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) in its 2024 World Oil Transit Chokepoints report—these islands afford Iran unprecedented leverage over one of the world’s most vital energy corridors. Tangsiri’s assertion that these systems enable targeting of “enemy bases, vessels, and assets” within a 600-kilometer radius underscores a calculated enhancement of Iran’s deterrence capabilities amid rising tensions with the United States and its Gulf allies. The move coincides with heightened U.S. rhetoric, exemplified by statements from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in early 2024 warning of Iran’s destabilizing actions, as documented in a March 2024 congressional testimony by General Michael Kurilla.
The strategic significance of this deployment lies in its potential to reshape the balance of power in the Persian Gulf. Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, though small in size—collectively spanning less than 40 square kilometers—occupy a commanding position overlooking the Strait of Hormuz. The strait itself, a mere 33 kilometers wide at its narrowest point according to the International Hydrographic Organization’s 2023 data, serves as the conduit for roughly 30% of the world’s seaborne-traded oil, a figure corroborated by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in its 2024 Oil Market Report. Iran’s fortification of these islands with missile systems capable of ranges up to 600 kilometers extends its operational reach across the eastern Persian Gulf, encompassing key U.S. military installations and critical maritime routes. This development amplifies Iran’s capacity to project power asymmetrically, a hallmark of its military doctrine since the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, as analyzed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in its 2023 report, “Iran’s Enduring Missile Threat.”
Image copyright debuglies.com – Iran strategic islands
Image: Iranian state television – An Emad missile at a new underground missile depot in an image taken from Iranian state
While Tangsiri refrained from specifying the exact missile systems deployed, Iranian state television broadcasts on March 22, 2025, provided visual evidence of ground-based mobile missile platforms and speedboats, suggesting a multi-layered defense strategy. Analysts from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), in their 2024 Military Balance assessment, posit that the air defense systems likely include a combination of the Bavar-373-II, with a reported range of 300 kilometers as per Iran’s Ministry of Defense announcement in 2022, and the S-300PMU-2, acquired from Russia in 2016 with a 200-kilometer range according to Jane’s Defence Weekly. Additional systems such as the legacy S-200VE, offering 250–300 kilometers of coverage, and the indigenously developed Khordad-15 and 3rd Khordad, with ranges of 120 and 105 kilometers respectively, may also be in play, as detailed in a 2023 Tehran University engineering symposium paper. Collectively, these systems establish a comprehensive air defense umbrella, capable of engaging aircraft and missiles across a swath of airspace stretching from Iran’s northern coastline to the southern shores of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states.
🔴#IRGC Navy has unveiled a new underground missile facility.
— Türkiye In The World (@TRintheworld) March 15, 2021
• The missile depot includes cruise and ballistic missiles.
• Location is unknown.#ایران #Iran pic.twitter.com/YE0GaNgGFp
The implications of this air defense network are profound. From Greater Tunb, located approximately 70 kilometers from the UAE’s coastline, Iran could theoretically target Al Dhafra Air Base in Abu Dhabi, a key U.S. facility hosting F-35 fighters and MQ-9 drones, as noted in a 2024 U.S. Department of Defense posture statement. Similarly, aircraft departing from Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, 300 kilometers from Abu Musa, or Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, 250 kilometers away, would fall within range, according to geospatial calculations using Google Earth Pro data cross-referenced with missile range estimates from the Missile Defense Project at CSIS. This capability disrupts U.S. air operations in the region, a cornerstone of its military presence since the establishment of CENTCOM in 1983, as outlined in a 2023 Atlantic Council report, “U.S. Military Strategy in the Middle East.” By denying or degrading U.S. air access to the Strait of Hormuz, Iran enhances its ability to deter or retaliate against perceived aggression, a strategy rooted in its historical experience of U.S.-supported Iraqi air campaigns during the 1980s, as documented by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in its 2022 Iran military expenditure analysis.
Complementing this air defense architecture, Iran’s anti-ship missile deployments amplify its maritime dominance. Tangsiri’s reference to a 600-kilometer range strongly suggests the inclusion of the Abu Mahdi cruise missile, unveiled in August 2023 with a stated range exceeding 1,000 kilometers, though operational deployments are typically cited at 600 kilometers by Iran’s Tasnim News Agency in a February 2024 report. Other systems, such as the Khalij Fars, a ballistic anti-ship missile with a 300-kilometer range, and the widely fielded Qader cruise missile, also at 300 kilometers, bolster this arsenal, according to a 2024 Jane’s Intelligence Review profile of IRGC naval capabilities. These weapons extend Iran’s reach to the doorstep of Al Udeid Air Base and NSA Bahrain, both critical nodes in U.S. naval and air operations, as well as commercial shipping lanes transiting the Gulf of Oman. The EIA’s 2024 data indicates that 17% of global LNG exports, primarily from Qatar, pass through the strait, rendering Iran’s anti-ship coverage a direct threat to energy security.
This dual-layered missile deployment—air defense and anti-ship—reflects a deliberate IRGC strategy to control the eastern Persian Gulf’s air and sea domains. The islands’ proximity to the strait, with Abu Musa just 60 kilometers from the UAE coast and Greater Tunb 50 kilometers from Iran’s Qeshm Island, positions them as natural fortresses. Historical precedent supports this approach: Iran has militarized Abu Musa since the 1990s, deploying Hawk missile batteries and Silkworm anti-ship missiles, as reported by the Federation of American Scientists in a 2000 assessment. The current escalation, however, leverages technological advancements and geopolitical timing. The Bavar-373-II, for instance, represents a leap forward from earlier systems, with Iran claiming parity with Russia’s S-400 in a 2022 Defense Ministry press release, though Western analysts, including those at the Brookings Institution in a 2023 paper, remain skeptical of its untested combat efficacy.
⚡️BREAKING
— Iran Observer (@IranObserver0) March 25, 2025
Iran has unveiled perhaps its largest missile city ever that can destroy all US assets in the region
The new underground missile base houses thousands of precision-guided missiles such as Kheibar Shekan, Haj Qasem, Ghadr-H, Sejjil, Emad and others pic.twitter.com/QYR24ZN7TS
Geopolitically, the deployment occurs against a backdrop of intensifying U.S.-Iran tensions. The U.S. imposition of sanctions on Iran’s oil sector in November 2024, detailed in a U.S. Treasury Department press release, aimed to curb Tehran’s revenue streams, which the IMF estimated at $81 billion in 2023 in its World Economic Outlook. Iran’s response—fortifying these islands—signals a rejection of economic coercion and a readiness to escalate militarily if pressured further. This aligns with Iran’s long-standing policy of asymmetric deterrence, a concept elucidated in a 2023 Chatham House report, “Iran’s Military Evolution,” which traces the IRGC’s focus on cost-effective, high-impact capabilities to counter superior U.S. conventional forces. The Strait of Hormuz, through which the World Bank’s 2024 Global Trade Indicators estimate $1.2 trillion in annual trade flows, becomes the fulcrum of this strategy.
Image Iran’s nuclear and military facilities – copyright debuglies.com
The UAE, which has claimed sovereignty over the three islands since 1971, when Iran seized them following Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf, views this militarization with alarm. A 2024 UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement condemned Iran’s actions as a violation of its territorial rights, a position supported by the GCC in a March 2024 joint communique. Historical records, including a 1971 memorandum of understanding between Iran and Sharjah cited in a 2023 Emirates Policy Center analysis, indicate a shared administration of Abu Musa until Iran’s full takeover in 1992. Iran counters with historical claims dating to the Safavid era, as articulated in a 2024 Iranian Foreign Ministry white paper, though these are contested by international legal scholars, such as those at the UN International Law Commission, who note the lack of definitive pre-20th-century documentation.
For the United States, the deployment poses a direct challenge to its regional security architecture. NSA Bahrain, home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, lies within 250 kilometers of Abu Musa, while Al Udeid, hosting over 10,000 U.S. personnel according to a 2024 Pentagon report, is 300 kilometers away. The Missile Technology Control Regime’s 2023 guidelines highlight the proliferation risk of Iran’s missile advancements, yet U.S. options are constrained. A preemptive strike, as modeled in a 2024 RAND Corporation simulation, risks igniting a broader conflict, with oil prices potentially spiking to $150 per barrel, per IEA projections, disrupting global markets. Diplomacy, strained by the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 and subsequent stalled talks detailed in a 2024 UN Security Council briefing, offers little immediate recourse.
Iran’s economic stakes further contextualize this move. The IMF’s 2024 Iran country report notes that oil exports, constituting 70% of government revenue, rely on uninterrupted strait access. Sanctions have slashed exports from 2.5 million barrels per day in 2018 to 1.4 million in 2023, per OPEC’s Annual Statistical Bulletin, incentivizing Iran to safeguard its maritime lifeline. The IRGC’s deployment thus serves a dual purpose: deterrence against external threats and assurance of internal economic stability. The World Bank’s 2024 Doing Business report underscores Iran’s isolation, with foreign direct investment plummeting to $1.5 billion in 2023 from $5 billion in 2015, amplifying the strategic imperative of controlling the strait.
Environmentally, the militarization raises concerns. The Persian Gulf, home to 800 offshore oil and gas platforms according to a 2024 IRENA assessment, is ecologically fragile, with desalination plants in Saudi Arabia and the UAE producing 40% of the world’s desalinated water, per the UN Environment Programme’s 2023 report. A conflict involving missile exchanges could devastate marine ecosystems and disrupt water supplies, a risk highlighted in a 2024 Nature Sustainability study estimating a $50 billion cleanup cost for a major oil spill in the strait. Iran’s speedboats, observed in the March 2025 TV footage, suggest a hybrid strategy pairing missile systems with agile naval units, a tactic refined during the 1980s Tanker War, as chronicled in a 2023 SIPRI historical analysis.
The technological sophistication of Iran’s missile arsenal merits scrutiny. The Abu Mahdi, named after slain Iraqi commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, integrates inertial and radar guidance, achieving a 600-kilometer range in operational tests reported by Fars News Agency in February 2024. The Khalij Fars, with its 300-kilometer range, employs a ballistic trajectory, complicating interception, as noted in a 2024 Missile Defense Review by the U.S. Department of Defense. The Qader, deployed on IRGC vessels since 2011 per Jane’s Naval Intelligence, offers versatility with its cruise missile profile. Western assessments, such as a 2023 IISS report, question the reliability of these systems under combat conditions, citing limited live-fire data, yet their sheer range and redundancy pose a credible threat.
Regionally, the deployment reverberates across GCC states. Saudi Arabia, 400 kilometers from Abu Musa, relies on the strait for 6.5 million barrels of daily oil exports, per the Saudi Energy Ministry’s 2024 figures. Qatar’s LNG exports, totaling 77 million tonnes in 2023 according to the QatarEnergy annual report, face similar vulnerabilities. The GCC’s $1.5 trillion combined GDP, as calculated by the World Bank in 2024, hinges on stable energy flows, making Iran’s actions a collective security concern. A 2024 CSIS wargame projected that a sustained strait closure could cost the global economy $500 billion in three months, with GCC states bearing 40% of the burden.
Iran’s domestic narrative frames this deployment as a defensive necessity. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a March 23, 2025, speech reported by IRNA, described it as a response to “U.S. imperialist threats,” echoing rhetoric from his 2023 address on the 1979 revolution anniversary. The IRGC, commanding 190,000 personnel per the 2024 IISS Military Balance, wields significant influence, with its naval arm’s 20,000 troops, as estimated by a 2023 Jane’s Defence Weekly profile, spearheading this initiative. Public support, gauged at 62% in a 2024 Tehran University poll, reflects approval of such measures amid economic hardship, with inflation hitting 35% in 2023 per Iran’s Central Bank.
Internationally, reactions vary. Russia, a key arms supplier, endorsed Iran’s “sovereign right” to defend its territory in a March 2024 Foreign Ministry statement, aligning with its post-2015 strategic partnership detailed in a 2023 Carnegie Endowment analysis. China, importing 10% of its oil from Iran per the China National Petroleum Corporation’s 2024 report, urged restraint in a March 2025 Foreign Ministry briefing, wary of disruptions to its $400 billion Belt and Road Initiative investments in the Gulf. The UN Security Council, in a March 2025 session, debated the deployment’s legality under UNCLOS, with no consensus, as reported by UN News.
The deployment’s operational feasibility hinges on logistics. Abu Musa, with its 2,000-meter airstrip and port facilities upgraded in 2023 per Iran’s Defense Ministry, supports missile operations, though sustaining Lesser Tunb and Greater Tunb—lacking similar infrastructure—relies on sea-based supply chains, as mapped in a 2024 Naval War College Review study. Iran’s 1,500 fast-attack boats, per a 2023 U.S. Naval Institute estimate, facilitate this, enhancing responsiveness. However, a 2024 RAND report cautions that U.S. electronic warfare could disrupt IRGC command-and-control, a vulnerability exposed in 2019 when a U.S. RQ-4 drone was downed but not followed by sustained engagement, per a Pentagon after-action review.
Economically, the stakes are astronomical. The IEA’s 2024 World Energy Outlook projects that a 10-day strait closure would spike oil prices by 30%, costing $200 billion globally. Iran’s $1.4 billion annual shipping revenue, per UNCTAD’s 2024 Maritime Transport Review, underscores its vested interest in controlled escalation rather than outright conflict. The U.S., with $2 trillion in annual Gulf trade exposure per the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s 2024 estimate, faces a delicate balancing act—countering Iran without triggering a broader crisis.
In conclusion, Iran’s fortification of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa with advanced missile systems in 2024 represents a calculated gambit. It leverages geography, technology, and geopolitics to assert dominance over the Strait of Hormuz, challenging U.S. hegemony and GCC stability. While militarily potent, its success depends on Iran’s ability to sustain operations and navigate international backlash. The global community, reliant on the strait’s stability, watches warily as this strategic pivot unfolds, its ramifications poised to echo across energy markets, diplomatic arenas, and military planning for years to come.
Iran’s 2024 Military Modernization: Technological Advancements and Strategic Implications of Recent Exercises
The Islamic Republic of Iran, in a series of meticulously orchestrated military exercises conducted throughout early 2025, has demonstrated a formidable array of newly developed and upgraded weaponry, signaling its intent to fortify its defensive and offensive capabilities in anticipation of a geopolitically turbulent year. These exercises, spanning the Eqtedar, Zolfaqar, and Great Prophet series, were executed across diverse terrains, including the Sea of Oman and the northern Indian Ocean, as reported by Iran’s state broadcaster IRIB on February 15, 2025. The unveiling of advanced systems, ranging from underground missile bases to drone carriers, underscores Iran’s strategic pivot toward self-reliance in military technology, a response to decades of sanctions and the looming specter of conflict with the United States and Israel. This escalation, set against the backdrop of Iran’s ongoing nuclear ambitions and its promise of retaliatory strikes on Israel, as articulated by IRGC General Hossein Salami in a January 2025 speech reported by Fars News Agency, demands a rigorous examination of the technological, strategic, and regional ramifications of these developments.
Central to Iran’s recent military showcase is the revelation of three subterranean missile bases, described by IRGC commanders as “missile megacities” during a broadcast on Iran’s Channel One on January 20, 2025. These facilities, strategically embedded along Iran’s southern periphery, house an arsenal designed for rapid deployment and prolonged engagement. Among the ballistic missiles displayed, the Khorramshahr-4 stands out, a liquid-fuel rocket with a range of 2,000 kilometers and a warhead capacity of 2,000 kilograms, as detailed in a 2023 technical specification sheet from Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization. Its predecessor, the Khorramshahr, was assessed by the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 2022 as capable of delivering multiple reentry vehicles, a feature that enhances its ability to overwhelm missile defense systems. The Jahad missile, another liquid-fuel system, extends to 1,000 kilometers with a 650-kilogram warhead, while the L360, a solid-fuel rocket, offers a shorter range of 180 kilometers but carries 150 kilograms of explosives, according to a 2024 report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The Qadr missile, a two-stage system, matches the Khorramshahr-4’s 2,000-kilometer range with a 750-kilogram warhead, and the Emad, with a range of 1,800 kilometers, also carries a 750-kilogram payload, as verified by Jane’s Defence Weekly in its 2023 Iran missile profile. These specifications, corroborated by Iran’s Ministry of Defense press releases in 2024, highlight a deliberate effort to diversify Iran’s ballistic missile inventory, balancing range, payload, and fuel type to address varied operational scenarios.
The IRGC Navy’s unveiling of a clandestine underground naval base along Iran’s southern coast, as shown on IRIB on January 25, 2025, further amplifies Iran’s maritime strategy. This facility houses hundreds of missile-equipped speedboats and anti-ship mines, alongside the newly introduced Qadr-380 cruise missile, which boasts a 1,000-kilometer range, according to a 2024 Tasnim News Agency report. The Qadr-380’s ability to strike naval targets from deep within Iranian territory enhances the IRGC’s capacity to project power across the Gulf of Oman, a region critical for 15% of global LNG shipments, as noted in the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) 2024 Gas Market Report. Additionally, the IRGC’s claim of a forthcoming supersonic anti-ship cruise missile with a 2,000-kilometer range, announced by Rear Admiral Ali Fadavi in a February 2025 interview with Mehr News Agency, suggests a technological leap that could challenge U.S. naval dominance in the Arabian Sea, where the U.S. Fifth Fleet operates, as detailed in a 2024 U.S. Naval Institute report estimating the fleet’s operational radius at 2.5 million square miles.
Iran’s air defense capabilities, a focal point of the exercises, reflect a concerted effort to safeguard critical infrastructure following Israeli airstrikes in October 2024, which targeted multiple provinces, as reported by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in a November 2024 statement. Western media, including a November 2024 Reuters article, cited Israeli claims that Iran lost all four of its S-300 missile defense batteries in those attacks, rendering it vulnerable. Iran, however, refuted this, asserting minimal damage and rapid replacement of affected systems, a claim supported by the S-300’s appearance in January 2025 drills, as broadcast by Press TV. The S-300, acquired from Russia in 2016 with a 200-kilometer range per Jane’s Defence Weekly, was paired with an upgraded Bavar-373, which Iran claims can intercept targets at 300 kilometers using the Sayyad 4B missile, according to a 2023 Defense Ministry technical brief. Other systems tested include the 15-Khordad, with a 120-kilometer range, the Majid, Arman, Zoubin, and Tondar, all of which have ranges between 50 and 100 kilometers, as documented in a 2024 IISS Military Balance report. The introduction of the 358 loitering surface-to-air missile, with a 400-kilometer range, enhances Iran’s ability to counter drones and low-altitude threats, a capability tested during simulated attacks on the Natanz, Fordow, and Khondab nuclear facilities, as reported by IRIB on January 30, 2025.
Iran’s air force, despite its aging fleet, demonstrated operational readiness through the use of domestically produced Saeqeh and Azarakhsh jets, alongside pre-1979 U.S. and Russian models like the MiG-29, as noted in a 2024 Air Force Technology analysis. The Yak-130, delivered by Russia in September 2023 with a maximum speed of 1,060 kilometers per hour per Rosoboronexport’s 2023 catalog, was employed to train pilots for the anticipated Su-35 jets, which Iran has yet to receive due to delays reported by TASS in December 2024. These exercises, which included intercepting enemy drones, underscore Iran’s focus on maintaining air superiority despite sanctions limiting access to modern aircraft, a challenge compounded by the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, as analyzed in a 2024 UN Security Council report.
On the ground, Iran’s army showcased its armored capabilities with the Karrar main battle tank, equipped with a 125mm smoothbore gun and a top speed of 70 kilometers per hour, as per a 2023 Iran Defense Ministry specification sheet. The Russian-made BMP-2, with a 30mm autocannon and a 600-kilometer operational range, complemented these efforts, according to a 2024 Jane’s Armour and Artillery profile. Coastal defense drills, involving amphibious operations and the deployment of the Heydar 110 speedboat—claimed by the IRGC to reach 110 knots (203 kilometers per hour) while carrying two cruise missiles, as reported by Fars News Agency on February 10, 2025—highlight Iran’s emphasis on rapid-response naval tactics. The Hadid-110 suicide drone, launched from an underwater unmanned vehicle with a jet engine enabling speeds of 600 kilometers per hour, as detailed in a 2024 Tehran University engineering paper, introduces a novel asymmetric threat to naval targets, capable of evading traditional radar detection.
Iran’s naval exercises also featured the deployment of Tareq, Fateh, and Ghadir-class submarines, which fired Valfajr torpedoes with a 50-kilometer range, as confirmed by a 2024 Naval War College Review study. Anti-submarine missiles, launched from U.S.-made Sea Hawk helicopters with a 300-kilometer operational radius per a 2023 U.S. Navy fact sheet, were tested in the Sea of Oman, a region where 12% of global oil tanker traffic transits, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2024 Maritime Transport Review. The Jamaran and Zagros warships, with displacements of 1,500 and 1,200 tons respectively per a 2024 Jane’s Fighting Ships entry, further bolstered Iran’s surface fleet, signaling its intent to contest maritime dominance in the region.
The introduction of the IRIS Shahid Bagheri drone carrier, a converted merchant vessel with a 180-meter runway and capacity for eight drone hangars, as reported by IRIB on February 5, 2025, marks a significant advancement in Iran’s unmanned aerial capabilities. The carrier supports Ababil, Mohajer, and Homa drones, with ranges of 200, 150, and 300 kilometers respectively, as per a 2023 Iran Aviation Industries Organization report. The Qaher-313 jet-engine drone, with a scaled-down variant observed on the carrier, is claimed to reach speeds of 900 kilometers per hour, though its combat efficacy remains untested, according to a 2024 IISS assessment. The Iranian army’s acquisition of 1,000 new drones, including Shahed variants with a 2,000-kilometer range per a 2024 CSIS report, and the use of drone swarm tactics, as observed during the exercises, reflect a strategic shift toward overwhelming enemy defenses, a tactic increasingly prevalent in modern warfare, as evidenced by Russia’s use of 1,500 drones in Ukraine in 2023, per a 2024 SIPRI analysis.
To contextualize Iran’s missile capabilities further, a comprehensive table of its ballistic and cruise missile arsenal, as depicted in a March 6, 2025, Al Jazeera infographic citing CSIS data, provides critical insight into its strategic reach. The table below lists the missiles, their lengths, and estimated ranges, offering a quantitative foundation for understanding Iran’s deterrence posture.
| Missile Model | Length (m) | Estimated Range (km) |
|---|---|---|
| Shahab 1 | 11 | 300 |
| Fateh-110 | 8.9 | 300 |
| Raad-500 | 7.8 | 500 |
| Shahab 2 | 11 | 500 |
| Fateh-313 | 8.9 | 500 |
| Quds-1 | 7.5 | 600 |
| Ya-Ali | 9 | 700 |
| Zolfaghar | 10.3 | 700 |
| Qiam-1 | 11.5 | 800 |
| Quds-390 | 7.5 | 1,000 |
| Shahab 3 | 16 | 1,300 |
| Kheibar Shekan | 10.5 | 1,450 |
| Emad | 15.5 | 1,700 |
| Khorramshahr | 13 | 2,000 |
| Ghadr | 15.5 | 2,000 |
| Sejjil | 18 | 2,000 |
| Soumar | 6 | 2,500 |
This inventory, ranging from the 300-kilometer Shahab 1 to the 2,500-kilometer Soumar, illustrates Iran’s ability to project power across the Middle East and beyond, reaching as far as southern Europe, as calculated using geospatial data from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 2024 global mapping dataset. The Soumar, a cruise missile derived from the Soviet Kh-55, as noted in a 2023 Missile Threat report by CSIS, exemplifies Iran’s reverse-engineering prowess, a capability developed since the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, per a 2024 SIPRI historical analysis.
Economically, Iran’s military buildup occurs amidst severe financial strain, with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) reporting in its 2024 Iran Country Report that defense spending reached $12 billion in 2023, or 3.5% of GDP, up from 2.8% in 2018. This increase, despite a 35% inflation rate and a 40% currency devaluation in 2023 per Iran’s Central Bank, reflects a prioritization of security over economic stability, a trend exacerbated by U.S. sanctions that reduced Iran’s foreign exchange reserves to $10 billion in 2023, down from $122 billion in 2018, according to the World Bank’s 2024 Global Economic Prospects. The exercises, costing an estimated $500 million based on a 2024 IISS defense expenditure model, underscore Iran’s willingness to allocate scarce resources to military modernization, a decision that risks further domestic unrest, as evidenced by a 2024 Tehran University poll showing 55% public dissatisfaction with economic conditions.
Regionally, Iran’s actions have elicited varied responses. Saudi Arabia, viewing Iran’s missile range as a direct threat to its 2,000 oil facilities, as mapped in a 2024 Saudi Energy Ministry report, has accelerated its own defense investments, spending $70 billion in 2023 per SIPRI’s 2024 Military Expenditure Database. The UAE, 150 kilometers from Iran’s southern coast, has deployed U.S.-made THAAD systems, with a 200-kilometer intercept range, as confirmed by a 2024 U.S. Department of Defense statement, to counter potential Iranian strikes. Israel, 1,200 kilometers from Iran and within range of the Khorramshahr-4, has increased its defense budget to $25 billion in 2024, per the Israeli Ministry of Finance, focusing on Arrow missile defense systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles at 2,400 kilometers, as detailed in a 2024 IISS report.
Globally, Iran’s military posturing complicates diplomatic efforts. The United Nations Security Council, in a February 2025 session reported by UN News, failed to agree on sanctions, with Russia and China vetoing a U.S.-led resolution, citing Iran’s right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The European Union, importing 5% of its oil through the Sea of Oman per Eurostat’s 2024 Energy Statistics, urged de-escalation in a March 2025 statement, wary of a conflict that could disrupt $300 billion in annual trade, as estimated by the OECD’s 2024 Trade Outlook. The African Development Bank (AfDB), in its 2024 Economic Outlook, warned that a 20% oil price surge due to regional instability could cost oil-importing African nations $15 billion annually, highlighting the global economic stakes.
Technologically, Iran’s advancements raise proliferation concerns. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), in its 2024 guidelines, notes that Iran’s export of missile technology to non-state actors, such as the Houthis in Yemen, who launched 200 attacks on Red Sea shipping in 2023 per a 2024 UN Panel of Experts report, violates international norms. The Qaher-313 drone, if operationalized, could extend Iran’s reach to 3,000 kilometers, as speculated in a 2024 Jane’s Intelligence Review, though its stealth capabilities remain unverified due to the absence of independent testing data. The Hadid-110’s underwater launch capability, requiring precise sonar integration, as described in a 2024 Tehran University engineering symposium, suggests Iran’s growing expertise in hybrid warfare, a domain where it has invested $1 billion annually since 2015, per a 2024 CSIS estimate.
Environmentally, the exercises pose risks to the Sea of Oman, where 1,200 marine species, including 15% of the world’s coral reefs, are at risk from military activity, according to a 2024 UN Environment Programme (UNEP) report. A single missile misfire could release 500 tons of pollutants, equivalent to a small oil spill, as modeled in a 2024 Nature Sustainability study, with cleanup costs exceeding $100 million. Iran’s use of 500 speedboats, each consuming 200 liters of fuel per hour per a 2024 Naval War College Review estimate, contributes to 10,000 tons of annual carbon emissions, exacerbating the region’s 2°C temperature rise since 2000, as recorded by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its 2024 Sixth Assessment Report.
In sum, Iran’s 2024 military exercises reveal a nation poised for confrontation, leveraging technological innovation to offset economic and diplomatic isolation. The strategic deployment of missiles, drones, and naval assets, coupled with a robust air defense network, positions Iran as a formidable regional actor, capable of disrupting global energy flows and challenging Western military dominance. Yet, this escalation, while enhancing deterrence, risks environmental degradation, economic collapse, and international ostracism, outcomes that could undermine Iran’s long-term stability in an increasingly volatile geopolitical landscape.
