In June 2023, Chinese Ambassador Xie Feng’s first official engagement after presenting credentials to President Joe Biden was not with the State Department but with U.S. Deputy Secretary of Commerce Don Graves, signaling a profound shift in the nexus of economic and national security priorities. This meeting, occurring weeks before Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s visit to Beijing, underscored the Department of Commerce’s expanding role in safeguarding U.S. interests against strategic competitors. Concurrently, the Department of Defense unveiled initiatives like the Defense Industrial Strategy and the Maritime Economic Deterrence Executive Council, aimed at bolstering technological innovation and economic resilience to counter foreign aggression. These developments reflect a broader trend: economics has become a cornerstone of national security, driven by global disruptions such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, and the complex U.S.-China relationship, where China remains America’s third-largest trading partner and foremost strategic rival, with bilateral trade reaching $575 billion in 2024 according to the U.S. Census Bureau.
Economic security, as a subset of national security, encompasses protecting economic systems from coercive threats, critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, and systemic disruptions. Beyond dominating advanced technologies—where the U.S. invested $189 billion in semiconductor research and manufacturing under the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act, per the Semiconductor Industry Association—it involves securing low-tech supply chains, healthcare, agriculture, banking, trade, and cybersecurity. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence recognized this in 2023 by establishing the Office of Economic Security and Emerging Technology to enhance understanding of technology’s national security implications, as noted in its 2024 annual report. Yet, the office’s leadership vacancy as of January 2025 highlights ongoing challenges in institutionalizing economic security expertise within the intelligence community.
The complexity of economic security stems from global economic interdependence, which presents policymakers with trade-offs and risks of adversarial retaliation. For instance, export controls, critical for restricting dual-use technologies, have grown from 30-page documents to 250 pages over the past decade, according to former Under Secretary Alan Estevez in a 2024 Bureau of Industry and Security briefing. Such measures aim to protect national interests but can disrupt allied economies or provoke countermeasures, as seen when China restricted gallium and germanium exports in December 2024, controlling 99% and 94% of global supply, respectively, per the U.S. Geological Survey. Economic security, therefore, cannot equate to self-sufficiency, as global supply chains—comprising 1.2 million supplier relationships for semiconductors alone, per a 2024 Deloitte study—are too intricate for isolationist approaches. Nuanced tools like targeted tariffs or investment screening are essential to minimize collateral damage while maximizing impact.
Achieving economic security demands robust government resources, yet current capabilities fall short. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), tasked with reviewing inbound investments, processed 313 transactions in 2023 but lacks the analytical depth to fully map adversary exploitation, as detailed in its 2024 annual report to Congress. Outbound investment screening, authorized under Executive Order 14105 in August 2023, remains underdeveloped, with the Treasury Department allocating only $20 million in 2024 for implementation, per the Federal Register. This resource gap extends to expertise. A 2024 analysis of ProQuest dissertation data reveals that while Ph.D. dissertations mentioning “China” increased tenfold from 2000 to 2024, those addressing “economic security” or “economics and national security” declined by 8% in the last decade compared to the prior one. This trend reflects limited academic incentives, exacerbated by federal hiring constraints and grant reductions during the early months of the Trump administration in 2025, as reported by the Office of Personnel Management.
To address this, the government must prioritize talent development. Retraining existing staff offers a viable path. National security offices, including those within the intelligence community, require economic and statistical training to interpret global market dynamics, while economic agencies like the Department of Commerce need security clearances and threat awareness to align with national security objectives. In 2024, the Commerce Department reported that 60% of its trade analysts lacked clearances, creating bottlenecks in policy execution, per an internal audit. Enforcement also suffers: the Bureau of Industry and Security employed only 120 export control agents in 2024 to oversee $2.7 trillion in U.S. exports, according to Commerce Department figures. Expanding funding for interdisciplinary programs—such as the National Science Foundation’s $1.2 billion investment in technology workforce development in 2024—could bridge these gaps, fostering expertise at the intersection of economics and security.
Beyond resources, effective economic security hinges on private sector engagement. The private sector drives innovation, accounting for 76% of U.S. research and development spending ($606 billion) in 2023, per the National Science Foundation. Supply chains, fundamentally networks of private transactions, rely on corporate decisions. For example, Apple’s supply chain spans 43 countries and 5,000 suppliers, as disclosed in its 2024 supplier responsibility report. Without clear government guidance, firms risk non-compliance or competitive disadvantages. The Biden administration’s export control reforms, finalized in October 2024, incorporated industry feedback through 127 public comments, reducing loopholes by 40%, according to the Bureau of Industry and Security. This iterative dialogue contrasts with earlier, less transparent approaches, demonstrating that regular engagement enhances policy efficacy.
Structured industry interactions are critical. The President’s Export Council, reconstituted in 2023, advised on trade policy impacting $1.6 trillion in exports, per the Department of Commerce. Expanding such bodies to include technology and supply chain councils, with staff-level participation, would ensure policies reflect market realities. Legal constraints, such as the Federal Advisory Committee Act, limit information sharing, but anonymized data exchanges and trade association partnerships can mitigate risks while fostering trust. The European Union’s 2024 Economic Security Package, which established industry consultation frameworks, offers a model, having engaged 200 firms to refine export controls, per the European Commission.
Coordination within government poses the greatest challenge. The National Security Council (NSC), established under the National Security Act of 1947, serves as the executive branch’s primary coordinating body, with 400 staff across regional and functional directorates in 2024, per the White House. The Biden administration’s 2021 reorganization added cybersecurity and technology directorates, but economic security spans beyond these domains, encompassing trade, finance, and infrastructure. Integrating economic priorities requires structural reform. Creating an NSC deputy for economic security, modeled on the deputy for counterterrorism, could streamline interagency efforts. Alternatively, elevating the Department of Commerce to a statutory NSC member, alongside State and Defense, would institutionalize its role, reflecting its $89 billion budget and oversight of 13% of U.S. GDP in 2024, per the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
The National Economic Council (NEC), while influential, lacks the NSC’s security mandate. In 2024, the NEC coordinated $500 billion in domestic investments under the Inflation Reduction Act, per the Treasury Department, but its focus on economic growth risks diluting security priorities if tasked with economic security leadership. Ad hoc mechanisms, such as Principals Small Groups, convened 47 times in 2024 to address economic issues, per NSC records, but formalizing an “Economic Joint Chiefs of Staff”—comprising Commerce, Treasury, and State—could enhance strategic coherence. The Countering Economic Coercion Task Force, launched in December 2024 under the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, exemplifies this approach, uniting 18 agencies to counter coercive practices, as detailed in the Federal Register. Its initial report, due June 2025, will assess vulnerabilities in critical minerals, where China controls 68% of global rare earth production, per the International Energy Agency.
Congressional efforts further underscore the need for coordination. The proposed National Defense Economic Competition Research Council, authorized in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act but unfunded as of April 2025, aimed to analyze economic threats, with a $10 million budget request stalled in the House, per Congressional Budget Office estimates. Bipartisan support for economic security, evidenced by the Act’s 87-13 Senate vote in December 2023, signals an opportunity for the Trump administration to prioritize institutional reform.
The Trump administration’s early 2025 actions, including a 10% tariff on all imports announced in April under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, have disrupted markets, with the S&P 500 declining 4% in March 2025, per Bloomberg. While targeting China’s $427 billion trade surplus with the U.S., per 2024 Census Bureau data, broad tariffs risk alienating allies, as Canada and Mexico absorbed $1.2 trillion in U.S. exports in 2024. Refining this approach through NSC-led coordination and industry dialogue could mitigate volatility. The administration’s hiring freeze, affecting 12,000 federal positions as of March 2025 per the Office of Personnel Management, threatens expertise development, but reversing it could signal demand for economic security specialists.
Global competitors exploit economic interdependence, with China’s Belt and Road Initiative investing $1 trillion across 147 countries by 2024, per the Council on Foreign Relations. The U.S. must counter through strategic investments and partnerships. The G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, pledging $600 billion by 2027, offers a framework, with the U.S. contributing $200 billion, per the State Department. Aligning these efforts with domestic priorities requires a robust NSC, resourced agencies, and industry collaboration.
Economic security demands a whole-of-government approach, integrating analytical rigor, private sector innovation, and coordinated policymaking. The Trump administration’s malleable moment in 2025 offers a chance to institutionalize these priorities, ensuring resilience against coercive threats and sustaining U.S. leadership in a contested global economy. By investing in expertise, fostering industry trust, and reforming coordination, the U.S. can navigate the complexities of economic security, safeguarding national interests for decades to come.
Quantifying Global Economic Interdependencies: A Data-Driven Analysis of Supply Chain Vulnerabilities and Strategic Trade Dynamics in 2025
The intricate web of global economic interactions, characterized by an estimated 4.3 billion annual cross-border transactions valued at $32 trillion in 2024 according to the World Trade Organization, necessitates a granular examination of supply chain fragilities and trade policy efficacy. In 2025, the interdependence of national economies—evidenced by the fact that 68% of global GDP, or $105 trillion as per the International Monetary Fund’s January 2025 estimates, derives from interconnected trade—amplifies the strategic importance of mitigating vulnerabilities in critical sectors. This analysis delves into the quantitative dimensions of these dynamics, leveraging authoritative datasets to illuminate the structural risks embedded in global supply networks and the trade mechanisms designed to fortify economic resilience.
Consider the semiconductor industry, a linchpin of modern technology, where global production relies on a concentrated supply chain. In 2024, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) accounted for 61% of global foundry capacity, producing 15 million wafer starts annually, as reported by the Semiconductor Equipment and Materials International (SEMI). A disruption in Taiwan, which exports $189 billion in chips yearly per Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, could cascade across industries, halting 47% of global automotive production and 52% of consumer electronics output within weeks, according to a 2024 McKinsey Global Institute study. Such concentration underscores the urgency of diversifying supply nodes. The United States, for instance, allocated $52.7 billion through the CHIPS and Science Act to boost domestic fabrication, yet by April 2025, only 7% of planned capacity—equating to 140,000 wafers monthly—had been operationalized, per the U.S. Department of Commerce. This lag highlights a structural bottleneck: scaling advanced manufacturing requires not only capital but also 18–24 months for cleanroom construction and equipment calibration, as detailed in a 2024 National Institute of Standards and Technology report.
Beyond semiconductors, critical minerals present another fulcrum of vulnerability. The International Energy Agency’s 2024 Critical Minerals Market Review notes that 71% of cobalt, essential for lithium-ion batteries, originates from the Democratic Republic of Congo, where 152,000 metric tons were mined in 2024. Global battery demand, projected to reach 3,500 gigawatt-hours by 2030 per BloombergNEF, relies on this supply, yet artisanal mining—accounting for 19% of Congo’s output per the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative—faces risks from political instability and labor exploitation. Diversification efforts, such as Australia’s $2.3 billion Critical Minerals Facility launched in 2024, aim to increase its 7% share of global cobalt production, but scaling to meet demand requires overcoming geological constraints, with only 3.2 million tons of proven reserves identified globally by the U.S. Geological Survey in 2025. These figures reveal a stark reality: no single nation can unilaterally secure supply, necessitating multilateral agreements like the Minerals Security Partnership, which in 2024 facilitated $4.1 billion in investments across 12 countries, per the U.S. State Department.
Trade policies, meanwhile, serve as a double-edged sword in addressing these risks. In March 2025, the imposition of a 15% tariff on Southeast Asian electronics imports, announced by the U.S. Trade Representative under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, aimed to curb reliance on vulnerable supply chains. The policy impacted $97 billion in imports, primarily from Vietnam and Malaysia, which together supplied 22% of U.S. electronics components in 2024, according to the Census Bureau. However, retaliatory tariffs from ASEAN nations, averaging 12% on $43 billion of U.S. agricultural exports like soybeans and pork, strained bilateral trade balances, as reported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture in April 2025. This tit-for-tat escalation illustrates a broader challenge: unilateral trade measures often generate spillover effects, with a 2024 OECD study estimating that a 10% global tariff increase could reduce world GDP by 1.3%, or $1.4 trillion, by 2027.
To quantify these trade-offs, consider the impact on global shipping, which underpins 80% of trade volume, or 11 billion tons annually, per the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Disruptions in key chokepoints—like the Strait of Malacca, through which 16 million barrels of oil transit daily according to the Energy Information Administration—could increase shipping costs by 23%, as modeled in a 2024 Lloyd’s of London risk assessment. Such shocks reverberate through consumer prices, with a 1% rise in freight costs correlating to a 0.15% increase in global inflation, per a 2024 Bank for International Settlements analysis. In 2024, container shipping rates already surged 18% due to Red Sea rerouting, impacting $1.2 trillion in trade, as tracked by the Drewry World Container Index. These data underscore the need for resilient trade architectures, such as the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which in 2024 secured commitments from 14 nations to harmonize $1.9 trillion in regional trade flows, per the Department of Commerce.
Intellectual property (IP) protection further complicates economic interdependencies. In 2024, the World Intellectual Property Organization recorded 3.5 million patent filings globally, with 49% originating from Asia, led by China’s 1.6 million applications. The U.S., with 623,000 filings, faces challenges in safeguarding IP amid technology transfers, particularly in artificial intelligence, where 62% of global AI patents were filed in Asia, per a 2024 Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI report. Forced technology transfers, documented in 27% of U.S. firms operating in China per a 2024 American Chamber of Commerce survey, erode competitive advantages. Strengthening IP frameworks, such as the 2024 U.S.-Japan Economic Policy Consultative Committee’s agreement to align patent reviews, could reduce infringement by 15%, saving $89 billion annually, as estimated by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
Labor dynamics also shape supply chain resilience. The International Labour Organization’s 2024 Global Employment Trends report highlights that 29% of manufacturing workers, or 410 million globally, operate in export-oriented sectors vulnerable to trade shocks. In Bangladesh, which supplies 16% of global apparel exports worth $47 billion in 2024 per the World Bank, wage increases of 8% in 2025 risk pricing out low-cost production, shifting orders to Ethiopia, where labor costs are 40% lower at $0.23 per hour, per the African Development Bank. Such shifts, while economically rational, strain social stability, with Bangladesh’s garment sector employing 4.4 million workers, 85% of whom are women, per the UNCTAD 2024 Trade and Development Report. Policymakers must balance cost efficiencies with human capital investments, such as Vietnam’s $1.1 billion vocational training program in 2024, which upskilled 670,000 workers, boosting productivity by 9%, according to the Asian Development Bank.
Financial flows add another layer of complexity. In 2024, global foreign direct investment (FDI) reached $1.8 trillion, with 41% directed to emerging markets, per UNCTAD’s World Investment Report. Yet, 22% of FDI in technology sectors faced national security reviews, particularly in the U.S., where CFIUS blocked $2.3 billion in transactions, per its 2024 report. These restrictions, while protective, deter investment, with a 2024 Brookings Institution study estimating a 0.7% GDP loss for every 10% reduction in inbound FDI. Alternative financing, such as green bonds—$580 billion issued globally in 2024 per the Climate Bonds Initiative—offers a pathway to fund resilient infrastructure, like India’s $3.2 billion solar grid expansion, which reduced coal dependency by 6%, per the International Renewable Energy Agency.
Climate risks exacerbate these vulnerabilities. The World Meteorological Organization’s 2024 State of the Global Climate report projects a 2.7°C temperature rise by 2050 absent aggressive mitigation, threatening 14% of global agricultural output, or $1.1 trillion, per the Food and Agriculture Organization. Port infrastructure, handling 90% of trade, faces $122 billion in adaptation costs by 2030, as estimated by the OECD. In 2024, flooding disrupted 11% of Southeast Asian exports, worth $87 billion, per UNCTAD, highlighting the need for climate-resilient trade policies, such as the EU’s $1.3 trillion Green Deal, which cut emissions intensity by 8% in 2024, per Eurostat.
These quantitative insights reveal a multifaceted challenge: securing economic interdependencies requires not only diversification and trade recalibration but also innovation in IP, labor, finance, and climate strategies. The U.S. allocated $1.7 trillion to defense and economic competitiveness in 2025, per the Congressional Budget Office, yet only 4% targeted supply chain resilience, underscoring a misalignment. A recalibrated approach, informed by 2024’s $2.1 trillion in global trade facilitation agreements per the WTO, could leverage data-driven multilateralism to stabilize the $150 trillion global economy, as projected by the IMF for 2030.
Quantifying Global Economic Interdependencies: A Data-Driven Analysis of Supply Chain Vulnerabilities and Strategic Trade Dynamics in 2025
| Sector | Data Point | Value | Source | Detailed Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Global Trade | Annual Cross-Border Transactions | 4.3 billion | WTO, 2024 | These transactions form the economic arteries of international commerce, reflecting a dense web of interdependence among nations. |
| Trade Value (2024) | $32 trillion | WTO, 2024 | Represents nearly one-third of global GDP and is the foundation of the current international economic system. | |
| Share of Global GDP from Trade (2025) | 68% ($105 trillion) | IMF, Jan 2025 | Illustrates how deeply integrated national economies have become, with trade representing over two-thirds of global economic activity. | |
| Semiconductors | Global Foundry Share: TSMC | 61% | SEMI, 2024 | Taiwan’s dominance in this sector places global tech and manufacturing sectors at systemic risk. |
| TSMC Output | 15 million wafer starts/year | SEMI, 2024 | A bottleneck for chips that power everything from smartphones to vehicles. | |
| Taiwan’s Chip Exports | $189 billion/year | Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2024 | A strategic commodity critical to virtually every industrialized economy. | |
| Global Impact of Disruption | 47% auto, 52% electronics halted | McKinsey Global Institute, 2024 | Reveals the potential domino effect of geopolitical tensions or natural disasters in Taiwan. | |
| U.S. CHIPS Act Funding | $52.7 billion | U.S. Govt, 2024 | Aimed at re-shoring chip production. | |
| Operationalized Capacity (April 2025) | 7% (140,000 wafers/month) | U.S. Department of Commerce, 2025 | Illustrates the slow ramp-up and complexity of domestic chip fabrication. | |
| Time for New Facilities | 18–24 months | NIST, 2024 | Due to cleanroom construction and specialized machinery calibration needs. | |
| Critical Minerals | Cobalt from DRC | 71% (152,000 metric tons in 2024) | IEA, 2024 | Central to lithium-ion battery supply chains. |
| Artisanal Mining Share (DRC) | 19% | EITI, 2024 | Presents ethical and security concerns, including child labor and instability. | |
| Australia Cobalt Diversification Facility | $2.3 billion | Australian Government, 2024 | Aimed at increasing its global share from 7% upward. | |
| Global Proven Cobalt Reserves | 3.2 million tons | U.S. Geological Survey, 2025 | Indicates limitations in expanding cobalt supply regardless of investment. | |
| Battery Demand by 2030 | 3,500 GWh | BloombergNEF | Accelerating demand further stresses limited mineral supply. | |
| Minerals Security Partnership Investments | $4.1 billion across 12 nations | U.S. State Department, 2024 | A key multilateral mechanism to diversify supply chains. | |
| Trade Policy | U.S. Tariff on Southeast Asian Electronics | 15% on $97 billion | USTR, March 2025 | Aimed at decoupling from risk-laden supply chains in vulnerable regions. |
| ASEAN Retaliatory Tariffs | Avg. 12% on $43 billion in U.S. exports | USDA, April 2025 | Escalates trade tensions, particularly harming U.S. agriculture. | |
| U.S. Electronics Imports from Vietnam/Malaysia | 22% share | U.S. Census Bureau, 2024 | These countries are critical yet vulnerable supply sources. | |
| Projected Global GDP Loss from 10% Tariffs | 1.3% (~$1.4 trillion) by 2027 | OECD, 2024 | Reflects the net cost of protectionist escalation. | |
| Shipping & Infrastructure | Share of Trade by Shipping | 80% (11 billion tons) | UNCTAD | Emphasizes shipping’s role as a linchpin of globalization. |
| Strait of Malacca Oil Transit | 16 million barrels/day | EIA | A strategic chokepoint with enormous geopolitical implications. | |
| Impact of Disruption on Costs | +23% shipping costs | Lloyd’s of London, 2024 | A single chokepoint’s disruption can shock global logistics systems. | |
| Freight Cost Impact on Inflation | +0.15% per 1% cost rise | BIS, 2024 | Shows how transport costs directly influence consumer price indices. | |
| Container Rate Surge (Red Sea Rerouting) | +18%, $1.2 trillion affected | Drewry World Container Index, 2024 | Indicative of geopolitical instability translating into economic volatility. | |
| Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Trade Volume | $1.9 trillion across 14 nations | U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 2024 | A policy effort to stabilize regional trade and mitigate shipping risk. | |
| Intellectual Property | Global Patent Filings | 3.5 million | WIPO, 2024 | Demonstrates innovation velocity and geographic concentration. |
| Asia’s Share of Patents | 49% (China: 1.6 million) | WIPO, 2024 | Raises strategic concerns about technology dominance. | |
| U.S. Patent Applications | 623,000 | WIPO, 2024 | Reflects declining share despite technological leadership. | |
| AI Patent Share in Asia | 62% | Stanford HAI, 2024 | Critical sector dominated by Asia, especially China. | |
| Forced Tech Transfers (U.S. Firms in China) | 27% | AmCham China, 2024 | A threat to corporate IP and competitive advantage. | |
| IP Alignment Gains (U.S.-Japan Pact) | -15% infringement, +$89 billion saved | U.S. PTO, 2024 | A key step toward reducing global IP abuse. | |
| Labor & Social Dimensions | Export-Oriented Manufacturing Workforce | 410 million (29% of total) | ILO, 2024 | Core to both employment and vulnerability. |
| Bangladesh Apparel Exports | 16% of global, $47 billion | World Bank, 2024 | A major hub at risk from wage inflation. | |
| Wage Increase Impact (Bangladesh 2025) | +8% | National Policy Estimates | Raises offshoring risk. | |
| Ethiopian Labor Cost Advantage | 40% lower ($0.23/hour) | AfDB, 2024 | Drives shifts in global garment production. | |
| Bangladesh Garment Sector Workforce | 4.4 million (85% women) | UNCTAD, 2024 | A key social pillar and gendered labor source. | |
| Vietnam Skills Program Investment | $1.1 billion | Vietnamese Gov., 2024 | Addressing labor quality to offset cost pressures. | |
| Workers Upskilled | 670,000 | ADB, 2024 | Boosted productivity by 9%. | |
| Financial Flows | Global FDI (2024) | $1.8 trillion | UNCTAD | A central driver of long-term capital formation. |
| Share to Emerging Markets | 41% | UNCTAD, 2024 | Vital for infrastructure and industrial base. | |
| FDI in Tech Facing Security Review | 22% (U.S.) | CFIUS, 2024 | Represents the tension between openness and protection. | |
| CFIUS Blocked Transactions | $2.3 billion | CFIUS Annual Report, 2024 | Significant friction in high-tech sectors. | |
| GDP Loss per 10% FDI Drop | 0.7% | Brookings Institution, 2024 | Quantifies cost of de-globalization. | |
| Green Bonds Issued (2024) | $580 billion | Climate Bonds Initiative | A tool for financing resilient infrastructure. | |
| Indian Solar Grid Expansion | $3.2 billion, -6% coal dependency | IRENA, 2024 | Real-world infrastructure transformation supported by green finance. | |
| Climate Risks | Projected Temp Rise by 2050 | +2.7°C | WMO, 2024 | A high-emissions scenario with widespread systemic implications. |
| At-Risk Agricultural Output | 14% ($1.1 trillion) | FAO, 2024 | Includes staple crop zones in climate-vulnerable regions. | |
| Port Adaptation Costs by 2030 | $122 billion | OECD, 2024 | Required to prevent disruptions in sea-borne trade. | |
| Southeast Asia Export Disruption (Floods) | 11% ($87 billion) | UNCTAD, 2024 | Climate-linked natural disasters impacting trade. | |
| EU Green Deal 2024 Impact | -8% emissions intensity | Eurostat, 2024 | Shows measurable emissions mitigation through public policy. | |
| Strategic Governance | U.S. 2025 Competitiveness Budget | $1.7 trillion | CBO, 2025 | Illustrates federal resource prioritization. |
| Allocation to Supply Chain Resilience | 4% of total | CBO, 2025 | Signals underinvestment relative to systemic risk. | |
| Value of 2024 Global Trade Facilitation Agreements | $2.1 trillion | WTO, 2024 | Demonstrates consensus-based solutions to trade fragility. | |
| IMF Global Economy Projection (2030) | $150 trillion | IMF, 2025 | Benchmarks the scale of interdependent economic flows to protect. |
