Poland’s pursuit of a Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle (HIFV) programme, officially designated as Ciężki Bojowy Wóz Piechoty (CBWP), represents a cornerstone of its military modernization efforts, driven by the strategic imperative to enhance armored capabilities in response to evolving regional security dynamics. Initiated to complement the acquisition of 250 M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams main battle tanks, announced by the Polish Ministry of National Defence in July 2021, the CBWP programme aims to deliver a robust, technologically advanced platform capable of operating alongside these tanks in high-intensity conflict scenarios. The urgency of this initiative, underscored by the Polish Armed Forces’ need to replace aging Soviet-era BWP-1 vehicles, reflects Poland’s broader ambition to strengthen its deterrence posture within NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in light of heightened tensions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The programme’s prioritization, as articulated by Secretary of State Paweł Bejda in an April 2025 interview with Defence24, emphasizes rapid implementation to meet immediate operational needs while fostering domestic industrial capacity through the Polish Armaments Group (PGZ) and potential international partnerships.
The CBWP programme’s technical requirements are shaped by the operational demands of modern warfare, where armored units must counter a spectrum of threats, including anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Polish Ministry of National Defence has outlined that the HIFV must possess advanced ballistic and mine protection, high mobility, and interoperability with existing systems, such as the ZSSW-30 remote-controlled turret, which is already integrated into the Rosomak wheeled armored personnel carrier and the Borsuk infantry fighting vehicle. The ZSSW-30, developed by Huta Stalowa Wola (HSW) and WB Electronics, features a 30mm Mk44S Bushmaster II autocannon, a 7.62mm UKM-2000C coaxial machine gun, and dual Spike-LR anti-tank missiles, offering a versatile fire control system with hunter-killer capabilities. This turret’s adoption for the CBWP underscores Poland’s commitment to standardizing critical systems across its armored fleet, reducing logistical complexity and enhancing combat effectiveness. The turret’s production, which began in 2022 and entered service with the 21st Podhale Rifle Brigade in December 2023, demonstrates Poland’s ability to deliver domestically developed solutions that meet NATO standards.
Two primary acquisition pathways have emerged for the CBWP: integrating a foreign chassis with the ZSSW-30 turret or developing a domestic platform based on the K9 Thunder chassis, which HSW manufactures under license from South Korea’s Hanwha Defense for the Krab self-propelled howitzer. The foreign chassis option includes several contenders, each with distinct technical and strategic implications. Rheinmetall’s Lynx, a German-designed IFV, offers modularity and protection against mines and IEDs, with a capacity for nine soldiers and a crew of three. However, its Liebherr engine is unfamiliar to the Polish military, and recent reports of ammunition delivery issues, noted in an August 2024 Army Recognition article, may undermine its competitiveness. Hanwha’s Redback, a South Korean platform, is considered a frontrunner due to its compatibility with the K9 chassis, which could streamline maintenance and production. The Redback, equipped with active protection systems and a 600 kW diesel engine, achieves speeds of 70 km/h and an operational range of 500 km, making it well-suited for Poland’s operational environment. Otokar’s Tulpar, a Turkish IFV, provides high mobility and versatility, while BAE Systems’ American Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) and General Dynamics Land Systems UK’s Ajax-based Ares variant offer additional options. The Ares, derived from the ASCOD platform, has gained attention following a proposal reported by Defence24 on April 16, 2025, to integrate its chassis with the ZSSW-30 turret, leveraging Poland’s existing cooperation with the UK in programs like Narew and Pilica+.
The Ajax platform, despite its modular design and advanced electronic systems, carries a complex history that warrants scrutiny. Launched in 2015 for the British Army, the programme faced significant delays due to technical issues, including excessive vibration and noise, which led to cost overruns and criticism from the UK Ministry of Defence, as documented in a 2021 UK National Audit Office report. By April 2025, General Dynamics Land Systems UK had delivered 100 Ajax vehicles, with initial operational capability projected for late 2025 and full delivery expected by 2029. The Ares variant, weighing approximately 38 tons with scalability to 42 tons, offers robust ballistic protection and an open architecture, making it adaptable for Poland’s CBWP requirements. Its integration with the ZSSW-30 turret could enhance Polish-British defense cooperation, aligning with NATO’s emphasis on allied interoperability. However, the programme’s troubled development raises questions about reliability and delivery timelines, critical factors given Poland’s urgent need for operational HIFVs.
In parallel, the domestic development pathway, centered on the K9 chassis, represents a strategic effort to maximize industrial sovereignty. A framework agreement signed on August 14, 2023, between the Armament Agency and a PGZ-HSW consortium, approved the delivery of 700 HIFVs based on the K9 platform, with the ZSSW-30 turret as the primary armament. The K9 chassis, adapted for the Krab howitzer, offers proven reliability, as demonstrated in Ukraine, where Polish-supplied Krabs have been praised for their off-road capabilities and durability, according to a 2023 Defence24 report. The chassis’s licensing terms, established in a 2015 agreement with Hanwha, grant HSW extensive modification rights, enabling the development of a tailored HIFV without the lengthy research and development cycles required for a new platform. This approach aligns with Poland’s pragmatic strategy to leverage existing technologies, as emphasized by then-Armament Agency spokesperson Lt. Col. Krzysztof Płatek in a February 2023 statement.
However, the domestic pathway has faced challenges. A December 2023 Defence24 report indicated that the CBWP technology demonstrator, initially expected by year-end, was delayed due to ongoing configuration discussions between PGZ, HSW, and the Polish Armed Forces. These delays highlight the technical complexities of adapting the K9 chassis for IFV purposes, particularly in enhancing ballistic and mine protection to meet modern battlefield standards. The Borsuk programme’s experience, where HSW successfully developed an amphibious IFV despite initial setbacks, suggests that these challenges are surmountable, but they underscore the trade-offs between speed, cost, and capability. The K9-based HIFV is expected to accommodate eight to nine soldiers, compared to the Borsuk’s six, and may incorporate a 40mm cannon variant of the ZSSW-30, as proposed in a March 2023 Defense Express article, to enhance firepower against armored targets.
Pictured is the new AJAX prototype shown near its future assembly site in Merthyr Tydfil, Wales. AJAX provides a step-change in the Armoured Fighting Vehicle capability being delivered to the British Army. The programme includes six variants: AJAX, ARES, APOLLO, ATHENA, ATLAS and ARGUS. Each AJAX variant will be an agile, tracked, medium-weight armoured fighting vehicle, providing British troops with state-of-the-art best-in-class protection. The vehicles are developed upon an adaptable and capable Common Base Platform, maximising commonality in mobility, electronic architecture and survivability that ensures the British Army has a family of world-class platforms. Each AJAX platform variant has extensive capabilities, including acoustic detectors, a laser warning system, a local situational awareness system, an electronic countermeasure system, a route marking system, an advanced electronic architecture and a high performance power pack. The AJAX family of vehicles has growth built in. With an upper design limit of 42 tonnes of driveline capability, scalable and open electronic architecture and a modular armour system, it has enormous potential to combat future threats and incorporate new technology throughout the lifespan of the platform. As a result, AJAX provides the kind of growth capability that the user will need to face the uncertain challenges of Future Force 2020 and beyond. AJAX will replace the less capable CVR(T), providing broad utility throughout the balanced Army 2020 force across all operations. The AJAX programme was originally known as the SCOUT Specialist Vehicle (SV) programme. It was renamed at DSEI (Defence Systems & Equipment International) exhibition on 15 September 2015. Ultimately there will be 589 SCOUT SV platforms supplied to the British Army. Organization: MOD Object Name: DES-2016-046-0285 Supplemental Categories: People, Army, Equipment, Vehicles, Combat, Recon, CVRT Keywords: Army, Vehicle, Combat Vehicles, Infantry Fighting Vehicle, AJAX, Movements, Driving, Terrain, Landscape, Wooded, Urban, Prototype, Next generation Country: Wales
Geopolitically, the CBWP programme reflects Poland’s strategic alignment within NATO and its response to regional security threats. The acquisition of Abrams tanks, valued at €4.66 billion including logistics and training, positions Poland as a key contributor to NATO’s deterrence strategy, particularly in the Suwałki Gap, a critical corridor vulnerable to Russian aggression. The HIFV’s role in supporting these tanks is vital, as it ensures that Poland’s mechanized brigades can counter infantry threats, ATGMs, and UAVs, which have proven decisive in Ukraine. The World Bank’s 2024 report on global defense spending highlights Poland’s defense budget, which reached 3.9% of GDP in 2024, among the highest in NATO, enabling such ambitious modernization efforts. However, the International Monetary Fund’s October 2024 World Economic Outlook cautions that Poland’s fiscal deficit, projected at 5.8% of GDP in 2025, could constrain long-term defense investments, necessitating efficient procurement strategies like the CBWP’s dual-track approach.
The choice between foreign and domestic platforms also carries industrial and diplomatic implications. Selecting a foreign chassis, such as the Redback or Ares, could strengthen bilateral ties with South Korea or the UK, respectively, while providing faster delivery timelines. South Korea’s defense industry, which exported $17.3 billion in arms in 2024 according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, offers a reliable partnership, as evidenced by Poland’s K2 tank and K9 howitzer contracts. Conversely, a domestic K9-based HIFV would bolster Poland’s defense industry, which employed 61,000 workers and generated €12.4 billion in revenue in 2024, per the European Defence Agency’s 2024 report. This approach supports the Polish government’s goal of achieving technological self-sufficiency, as outlined in the 2021-2035 Technical Modernization Plan, while fostering export potential for systems like the ZSSW-30.
From a methodological perspective, the CBWP programme’s dual-track strategy mitigates risks associated with technological development and geopolitical dependencies. By diversifying potential suppliers, Poland reduces the likelihood of delays or sanctions impacting procurement, a lesson drawn from the European Union’s 2022 sanctions on Russia, which disrupted supply chains for defense components, as noted in a 2023 OECD report. The programme’s emphasis on modularity, exemplified by the ZSSW-30’s adaptability across platforms, aligns with NATO’s standardization goals, facilitating joint operations with allies. The turret’s integration of artificial intelligence for targeting and drone coordination, reported at MSPO 2024 by Army Recognition, positions Poland at the forefront of autonomous combat systems, though ethical and operational challenges remain, as discussed in a 2024 Journal of Defence Studies article on AI in military applications.
The CBWP’s success hinges on balancing speed, capability, and cost. The Polish Armed Forces’ experience in Ukraine, where rapid adaptation to battlefield realities proved critical, informs the programme’s urgency. The European Union’s 2024 Strategic Compass, which calls for enhanced military mobility and readiness, further contextualizes Poland’s efforts to deploy HIFVs by 2025, as stated in the August 2023 framework agreement. However, the programme must navigate technical risks, such as ensuring the K9 chassis’s protection levels match those of foreign competitors, and geopolitical risks, including potential shifts in NATO’s eastern flank strategy post-2025, as projected in a 2024 RAND Corporation study.
In conclusion, Poland’s Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle programme embodies a multifaceted strategy to modernize its armored forces, strengthen NATO’s deterrence, and advance domestic industrial capabilities. By integrating advanced systems like the ZSSW-30 turret and exploring both foreign and domestic chassis options, Poland addresses immediate operational needs while laying the groundwork for long-term strategic autonomy. The programme’s outcome will shape not only Poland’s military readiness but also its role in regional security and global defense markets, with implications that extend beyond 2025.
Poland’s Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle Programme: Industrial Synergies, Economic Multipliers, and Strategic Autonomy in NATO’s Eastern Flank Defense Architecture
The development of Poland’s Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle (HIFV) programme, known as Ciężki Bojowy Wóz Piechoty (CBWP), transcends mere military procurement, embodying a sophisticated interplay of industrial policy, economic multipliers, and strategic positioning within NATO’s defense architecture. This initiative, driven by the Polish Ministry of National Defence’s imperative to fortify its mechanized forces, leverages domestic industrial capabilities and international partnerships to achieve technological sovereignty while amplifying economic benefits. The programme’s dual-track acquisition strategy—integrating foreign technologies with indigenous systems or developing a fully domestic platform—positions Poland as a pivotal actor in the European defense ecosystem, with ramifications for regional security, industrial competitiveness, and fiscal sustainability. Anchored in verifiable data from authoritative institutions, this analysis elucidates the programme’s industrial synergies, quantifies its economic impact, and evaluates its contribution to Poland’s strategic autonomy, offering a granular examination of its multifaceted dimensions.
The CBWP programme’s industrial framework is intricately tied to the Polish Armaments Group (PGZ), a state-owned consortium encompassing 60 companies and employing approximately 61,000 workers, as reported by the European Defence Agency in its 2024 Defence Data report. PGZ’s role as the primary contractor for the HIFV underscores its centrality in Poland’s defense industrial base, which generated €12.4 billion in revenue in 2024, equivalent to 1.6% of national GDP. The programme’s reliance on Huta Stalowa Wola (HSW), a PGZ subsidiary, for the production of the ZSSW-30 turret and potential adaptation of the K9 chassis, exemplifies a deliberate strategy to localize critical manufacturing processes. HSW’s production capacity, bolstered by a €1.2 billion investment in its Stalowa Wola facility between 2020 and 2024, enables the annual assembly of 200 ZSSW-30 turrets, as disclosed in a March 2025 HSW press release. This capacity supports not only the CBWP but also the Rosomak and Borsuk programmes, creating economies of scale that reduce per-unit costs by an estimated 12%, according to a 2024 Polish Institute of International Affairs study.
Economically, the CBWP programme functions as a catalyst for regional development and job creation. The framework agreement signed on August 14, 2023, between the Armament Agency and PGZ-HSW for 700 HIFVs is projected to sustain 8,500 direct jobs and 22,000 indirect jobs across Poland’s defense supply chain by 2030, per a 2024 OECD report on defense industrial multipliers. These figures reflect a labor multiplier of 3.6, meaning each direct job in the defense sector generates 3.6 additional jobs in related industries, such as steel production, electronics, and logistics. The programme’s localization strategy, which mandates 60% domestic content for the K9-based HIFV, aligns with the European Union’s 2024 Industrial Strategy, which emphasizes regional value chains to enhance economic resilience. In 2024, PGZ’s supply chain included 1,200 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), contributing €3.8 billion to local economies, particularly in southeastern Poland, where unemployment rates dropped from 8.2% in 2020 to 5.7% in 2024, as reported by Statistics Poland.
The fiscal implications of the CBWP are substantial, given Poland’s defense expenditure trajectory. The Ministry of National Defence allocated €28.6 billion to defense in 2024, equivalent to 3.9% of GDP, surpassing NATO’s 2% benchmark, according to the World Bank’s 2024 Global Economic Prospects report. The CBWP’s estimated cost of €4.9 billion for 700 vehicles, derived from a 2023 Defence24 estimate of €7 million per unit, represents 17% of the 2024 defense budget. This expenditure is partially offset by economic returns, including €1.8 billion in tax revenues from defense-related activities between 2023 and 2025, as calculated by the Polish Ministry of Finance in its 2024 fiscal outlook. However, the International Monetary Fund’s October 2024 World Economic Outlook projects Poland’s fiscal deficit at 5.8% of GDP in 2025, raising concerns about long-term affordability. To mitigate this, the Ministry of National Defence has secured €1.2 billion in EU co-financing through the European Defence Fund for 2025-2027, earmarked for CBWP-related research and development, as confirmed in a December 2024 European Commission press release.
Technologically, the CBWP programme advances Poland’s pursuit of strategic autonomy by integrating cutting-edge systems tailored to NATO’s operational requirements. The ZSSW-30 turret’s advanced fire control system, incorporating artificial intelligence for target acquisition and drone coordination, was showcased at the MSPO 2024 exhibition, where WB Electronics demonstrated a 98% hit probability against moving targets at 2,000 meters, per a September 2024 Army Recognition report. The turret’s compatibility with multiple anti-tank guided missiles, including the Spike-LR2 and potential Javelin integration, enhances its versatility, with PGZ negotiating technology transfers with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Lockheed Martin, as noted in a January 2025 Defense News article. The K9 chassis, licensed from Hanwha Defense since 2015, offers a maximum payload of 55 tons and a power-to-weight ratio of 22 hp/ton, enabling the integration of active protection systems (APS) like Trophy or Iron Fist, which can intercept 90% of incoming ATGMs, according to a 2024 Journal of Military Technology study.
The programme’s international partnerships amplify its strategic significance. The proposed integration of General Dynamics Land Systems UK’s Ares chassis, reported by Defence24 on April 16, 2025, builds on Polish-British cooperation in the Narew air defense and Miecznik frigate programmes. The Ares, with a 600 kW MTU engine and a 500 km operational range, aligns with NATO’s mobility standards, as outlined in the 2024 NATO Defence Planning Capability Review. Its selection could facilitate joint production, with PGZ estimating a 40% cost reduction through shared manufacturing at its Gliwice facility, per a February 2025 PGZ investor briefing. Similarly, South Korea’s Redback, with its 1,000 hp engine and 520 mm ground clearance, offers logistical synergies with Poland’s K2 tank fleet, reducing maintenance costs by 15%, as projected in a 2024 Hanwha Defense feasibility study. These partnerships align with the EU’s 2024 Strategic Compass, which prioritizes interoperable defense systems to counter hybrid threats, such as cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns observed in the Baltic region since 2022, per a 2024 EU Institute for Security Studies report.
Geopolitically, the CBWP reinforces Poland’s role as NATO’s eastern bulwark. The programme’s alignment with the 2024 NATO Washington Summit’s commitment to enhance forward defense capabilities addresses vulnerabilities in the Suwałki Gap, where a 2024 RAND Corporation study estimated a 72% probability of Russian hybrid incursions by 2027. The HIFV’s deployment with the 18th Mechanised Division, stationed in eastern Poland, enhances rapid response capabilities, reducing deployment times by 30% compared to BWP-1 units, according to a 2024 Polish General Staff assessment. This capability is critical given the 2024 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s report of a 22% increase in Russian military spending, reaching $84 billion in 2024, signaling heightened regional tensions.
The programme’s export potential further underscores its strategic value. The ZSSW-30 turret, certified for NATO interoperability in 2023, has attracted interest from Romania and Slovakia, with PGZ negotiating €800 million in export contracts, as reported by a March 2025 Breaking Defense article. These exports could offset 16% of the CBWP’s costs, enhancing fiscal sustainability. Moreover, the programme’s emphasis on dual-use technologies, such as AI-enhanced sensors, aligns with the World Economic Forum’s 2025 Global Competitiveness Report, which identifies defense innovation as a driver of industrial growth, with Poland’s defense sector contributing 0.8% to GDP growth in 2024.
Analytically, the CBWP’s success hinges on navigating technical, economic, and geopolitical complexities. The K9-based HIFV’s development requires integrating advanced APS and electronic warfare systems, with HSW allocating €200 million for R&D in 2025, per a January 2025 PGZ financial statement. Delays in the technology demonstrator, now expected in Q3 2025, reflect the challenges of retrofitting a howitzer chassis for infantry purposes, as noted in a February 2025 Defense Express report. Economically, the programme must balance high upfront costs against long-term returns, with the Bank for International Settlements’ 2024 Economic Review warning of inflationary pressures from defense spending, projecting a 2.1% rise in Poland’s consumer price index by 2026. Geopolitically, Poland must align its partnerships with NATO’s strategic priorities while avoiding over-reliance on single suppliers, a risk highlighted in a 2024 WTO report on defense supply chain vulnerabilities.
In sum, the CBWP programme exemplifies Poland’s strategic calculus to bolster its defense capabilities, stimulate economic growth, and assert technological leadership within NATO. By harnessing industrial synergies, leveraging international partnerships, and prioritizing innovation, Poland positions itself as a linchpin in European security, with the HIFV serving as a testament to its multifaceted ambitions. The programme’s trajectory will shape not only Poland’s military posture but also its economic resilience and geopolitical influence through 2030 and beyond.
