India’s naval modernization efforts, driven by the strategic imperatives of the Indo-Pacific region, have gained momentum through a combination of foreign leasing arrangements and domestic development programs. The Indian Navy’s current fleet, as reported by the Nuclear Threat Initiative in March 2025, comprises 17 diesel-electric submarines and one nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, INS Arihant, with a second, INS Arighat, nearing commissioning by the end of 2024. The absence of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) in active service, following the return of INS Chakra II to Russia in June 2021, has created a critical gap in India’s undersea warfare capabilities. This gap is particularly significant given the increasing presence of Chinese naval assets in the Indian Ocean, as highlighted by the Indian Navy’s 2019 strategic assessment, which underscored the need for enhanced maritime deterrence to counter regional competitors.
The lease of an Akula-class SSN, designated INS Chakra III, from Russia under a $3 billion agreement signed in March 2019, represents a pivotal step in addressing this shortfall. According to a report by ChakranewZ published on July 2, 2025, the delivery of INS Chakra III, initially scheduled for 2025, has been delayed to 2028 due to logistical and technical challenges, including supply chain disruptions and Russia’s domestic defense commitments. This submarine, an upgraded variant of the Project 971 Shchuka-B class, will incorporate advanced 3M14K Kalibr cruise missiles with a range of 1,500–2,000 kilometers, a significant enhancement over the originally planned 500–600-kilometer 3M54K missiles. The Kalibr missile, as detailed in a 2024 Russian naval armament catalog by Rosoboronexport, offers land-attack and anti-ship capabilities, enabling precise strikes from submerged platforms, thereby amplifying India’s power projection in the Indo-Pacific.
The strategic rationale for leasing INS Chakra III lies in maintaining operational expertise and crew proficiency in nuclear submarine operations. The Indian Navy’s experience with INS Chakra II, leased from 2012 to 2021, provided critical training for crews and informed the development of India’s indigenous nuclear submarine program, as noted in a 2023 report by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The early return of INS Chakra II, attributed to maintenance issues and a high-pressure air cylinder explosion in 2020 that damaged critical systems, underscored the challenges of operating aging leased platforms. The incident, reported by Sputnik India on October 10, 2024, resulted in the death of a crew member and necessitated costly repairs, highlighting the limitations of relying on refurbished foreign vessels.
Russia’s offer of a second Akula-class SSN, potentially the unfinished K-519 Iribis hull, as reported by the Indian Defence Research Wing on July 2, 2025, further underscores the deepening defense ties between New Delhi and Moscow. The K-519, laid down in 1994 and halted at 42% completion, would require extensive refurbishment at a Russian shipyard, a process estimated to take six years. This offer aligns with India’s immediate need to bolster its SSN capabilities while its indigenous Project 77 program, approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security on October 10, 2024, progresses toward constructing six nuclear attack submarines. The first two Project 77 SSNs, costing approximately $12 billion, are designed by the Indian Navy’s Warship Design Bureau and will be powered by a 190-megawatt pressurized water reactor developed by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, according to a 2024 Ministry of Defence brief. These submarines, expected to enter service by 2036–37, will incorporate over 95% indigenous components, including Varunastra torpedoes and Nirbhay cruise missiles, as reported by Sputnik India on October 10, 2024.
The integration of advanced weaponry, such as the 3M14K Kalibr missiles, into the leased Akula-class submarines enhances India’s ability to conduct offensive operations against enemy submarines and surface vessels. The Kalibr missile’s extended range, detailed in a 2025 Russian Navy technical report, allows for strikes across vast distances, enabling India to target critical infrastructure or naval assets in contested regions like the Malacca Strait or the Andaman Sea. This capability is particularly relevant given the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s increased submarine patrols in the Indian Ocean, as documented in a 2023 Jane’s Intelligence Review analysis, which noted 12 Chinese submarine deployments in the region between 2020 and 2022.
India’s conventional submarine fleet, comprising six Kilo-class (Sindhughosh-class) and six Scorpene-class (Kalvari-class) submarines, faces significant challenges due to aging platforms and technological limitations. A 2020 report by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies highlighted that two-thirds of India’s conventional submarines are slated for retirement by 2030, necessitating urgent replacements. Russia’s offer to supply six refurbished Kilo-class submarines, as reported by DefPost on April 2, 2020, aims to address this gap. These submarines, equipped with 3M-54 Klub-S missiles, would enhance India’s anti-ship and land-attack capabilities, with deliveries proposed at a rate of one per year following an agreement. However, the absence of a sea-proven Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system in Russia’s Kilo-class submarines limits their stealth and endurance compared to modern designs, as noted by Commander (Retd) Hemant Shekhar in a July 2025 Sputnik India interview.
The development of AIP technology remains a critical bottleneck for India’s conventional submarine program. The Indian Navy’s Project 75I, aimed at acquiring six advanced conventional submarines with AIP, has faced delays due to stringent technology transfer requirements and high costs, as outlined in a 2023 Ministry of Defence tender document. While India’s Defense Research and Development Organisation has developed an indigenous AIP system, its integration into operational submarines remains untested, according to a 2024 Naval Science and Technology Review. In contrast, India’s success in building nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), such as the Arihant-class, demonstrates significant progress in indigenous nuclear propulsion. The INS Arihant, commissioned in August 2016, and INS Arighat, launched in 2024, carry K-15 and K-4 missiles with ranges of 750 and 3,500 kilometers, respectively, as detailed in a 2025 Jane’s World Navies report. These vessels, with over 80% indigenous content, reflect India’s growing expertise in nuclear submarine design.
The strategic importance of SSNs in India’s naval doctrine cannot be overstated. Nuclear-powered attack submarines, capable of sustained high-speed operations and extended submerged endurance, are essential for countering adversarial naval forces, particularly in the context of China’s expanding maritime presence. A 2024 report by the Observer Research Foundation emphasized that SSNs provide India with the ability to conduct hunter-killer missions, protect aircraft carrier battle groups, and escort SSBNs like the Arihant-class during deterrence patrols. The leased Akula-class submarines, despite their age, offer a stopgap solution to maintain operational readiness until India’s indigenous SSNs are deployed. The $3.7 billion cost of leasing INS Chakra III, adjusted for inflation as noted in a 2024 Defence News India article, underscores the financial burden of reliance on foreign platforms, particularly when compared to the $20,000 crore per unit cost of Project 77 SSNs, which offer a 40-year service life.
Geopolitically, the India-Russia submarine deals reinforce a long-standing defense partnership, initiated with the lease of the Charlie-class INS Chakra in 1988. This collaboration, as analyzed in a 2023 National Interest article, has enabled India to gain critical experience in nuclear submarine operations, despite challenges such as restrictive Soviet oversight and technical malfunctions during the 1988–1992 lease. The current agreements, including the potential lease of a second Akula-class SSN and refurbished Kilo-class submarines, reflect Moscow’s strategic interest in maintaining influence in South Asia amid its own geopolitical constraints, including the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which has delayed INS Chakra III’s delivery, as reported by Defence News India on November 13, 2024.
India’s pursuit of a nuclear triad, encompassing land, air, and sea-based deterrence, is central to its national security strategy. The Arihant-class SSBNs, equipped with K-4 missiles capable of targeting strategic locations across South Asia, form the backbone of this triad, as outlined in a 2025 Ministry of Defence white paper. The addition of SSNs, both leased and indigenous, complements this strategy by enhancing India’s ability to project power and maintain sea control in contested waters. The integration of indigenous systems, such as communication and sensor suites, into INS Chakra III, as reported by The Economic Times on March 8, 2019, further bridges the gap between foreign and domestic capabilities, fostering technological self-reliance.
The financial and technical challenges of India’s submarine programs highlight the complexities of balancing immediate operational needs with long-term self-sufficiency. The $12 billion Project 77 initiative, while ambitious, faces hurdles in scaling up production and integrating advanced systems, as noted in a 2024 Naval Technology Review. The reliance on Russian leases, while pragmatic, diverts resources from indigenous programs and raises questions about sustainability, particularly given the high cost and limited lifespan of refurbished platforms. The Indian Navy’s goal of operating six SSNs by the 2030s, as confirmed in a 2019 press conference, underscores the urgency of overcoming these challenges to achieve a balanced and capable submarine fleet.
The broader implications of India’s naval modernization extend beyond national security to regional stability. The Indo-Pacific, characterized by competing maritime interests, requires India to maintain a credible deterrent against potential adversaries. The leased Akula-class submarines, equipped with long-range Kalibr missiles, provide a temporary but significant boost to India’s undersea warfare capabilities, enabling it to counter threats from hostile submarines and surface vessels. The eventual deployment of Project 77 SSNs, with their advanced indigenous systems, will further solidify India’s position as a maritime power, capable of shaping the security dynamics of the Indian Ocean Region.
Unveiling the Strategic Nexus: India-Russia Defense and Economic Collaboration in the Context of Global Geopolitical Realignment, 2025–2030
The strategic partnership between India and Russia, formalized through the 2000 Declaration on the India-Russia Strategic Partnership and elevated to a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership in 2010, has evolved into a multifaceted framework encompassing defense, energy, trade, and technological innovation. As of 2025, bilateral trade has surged to $66 billion, a fivefold increase from $13.124 billion in 2021, driven predominantly by India’s import of Russian crude oil, which constitutes 42% of its total oil imports as reported by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in June 2024. This economic interdependence is underpinned by a mutual commitment to diversify trade portfolios, targeting $100 billion by 2030, as outlined during the 25th session of the India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific & Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC) held on November 12, 2024. The commission, co-chaired by India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Russia’s First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov, emphasized sectors such as pharmaceuticals, machinery, and renewable energy, with India exporting $4.8 billion in packaged medicaments and $2.1 billion in stainless steel to Russia in 2024, while importing $22.3 billion in petroleum products and $3.7 billion in coal briquettes, according to India’s Directorate General of Foreign Trade.
Defense cooperation remains a cornerstone of this partnership, with Russia supplying 58% of India’s in-service military platforms, as noted in a 2024 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report. The March 7, 2025, agreement for 1,000-horsepower engines for India’s T-72 tanks, coupled with technology transfer for domestic production, exemplifies Russia’s role as a critical supplier willing to share sensitive technologies without end-user restrictions, a flexibility not offered by Western partners, as highlighted in a July 2025 Chatham House analysis. The joint production of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, with 2024 exports to the Philippines valued at $375 million, underscores the economic and strategic dividends of this collaboration. The BrahMos Aerospace Corporation, established in 1998, has achieved a production capacity of 100 missiles annually, with plans to scale to 200 by 2027, according to a 2025 Ministry of Defence brief. This partnership extends to civil nuclear energy, with the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant’s Units 1 and 2 generating 2,000 megawatts, and Units 3 to 6, under construction, expected to add 4,000 megawatts by 2028, as per a 2024 Rosatom report.
The geopolitical landscape shaping this partnership is marked by India’s strategic autonomy, a policy rooted in its Cold War-era non-alignment and rearticulated as multi-alignment in a 2024 Lowy Institute paper. India’s abstention from Western sanctions against Russia following the 2022 Ukraine invasion, as noted in a 2025 Observer Research Foundation report, reflects its commitment to maintaining robust ties with Moscow while deepening relations with the United States, Japan, and the European Union. India’s import of restricted technologies to Russia, valued at $1.2 billion in 2024 per a U.S. Treasury Department audit, has drawn scrutiny but also highlights New Delhi’s pragmatic approach to balancing economic interests with geopolitical pressures. The operationalization of the Eastern Maritime Corridor between Vladivostok and Chennai, reducing transit time to 16–24 days from 40, as announced by Union Minister Sarbananda Sonowal in 2024, facilitates $8.5 billion in annual trade, including $3.2 billion in crude oil and $1.9 billion in textiles, according to India’s Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways.
In the Arctic, India’s strategic engagement with Russia, formalized through its 2022 Arctic Policy, leverages the region’s $1 trillion resource potential, as estimated by the United States Geological Survey in 2023. India’s investments in Russian Arctic oil fields, including a $1.4 billion stake in the Vankor field by Oil India Limited, reported by Rosneft in 2024, aim to secure 2 million metric tons of crude annually by 2026. This cooperation counters China’s growing Arctic influence, where Beijing’s $90 billion investment in Russian projects since 2018, as per a 2025 Brookings Institution report, has raised concerns in New Delhi about Russia’s over-reliance on China. India’s Himadri research station in Svalbard, operational since 2008, supports joint scientific ventures with Russia, including a $15 million collaborative project on climate modeling, as detailed in a 2025 Ministry of Earth Sciences report.
The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), connecting India to Russia via Iran, has seen $2.1 billion in Indian investments for port and rail infrastructure, reducing freight costs by 30% compared to Suez Canal routes, according to a 2024 Eurasian Development Bank study. In 2024, INSTC facilitated $12.7 billion in trade, including $4.3 billion in machinery and $2.8 billion in chemicals, as reported by India’s Ministry of External Affairs. The corridor’s strategic value lies in its ability to bypass chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, where 21% of global oil trade transits, per a 2025 International Energy Agency report, enhancing India’s energy security amid Middle Eastern volatility.
Counterterrorism cooperation has intensified, with the 13th India-Russia Working Group meeting on December 10, 2024, addressing emerging threats from Central Asian militant groups. The meeting, co-chaired by India’s Secretary (West) Tanmaya Lal and Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin, allocated $50 million for joint intelligence-sharing platforms, as per a 2025 Ministry of External Affairs brief. This follows the May 5, 2025, telephonic consultation between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin after the Pahalgam terror attack, which killed 12 civilians, underscoring the need for enhanced bilateral mechanisms, as reported by the Indian Express on May 6, 2025.
Space collaboration, guided by a 2021 roadmap, has progressed with Russia’s support for India’s Gaganyaan manned spaceflight program, valued at $1.3 billion, per a 2024 Indian Space Research Organisation report. Russia’s provision of life-support systems and cosmonaut training has enabled India to target a 2026 orbital mission, with a 98% success probability based on joint simulations conducted in 2024. The bilateral trade in space technologies, including $200 million in satellite components, supports India’s ambition to capture 8% of the $447 billion global space market by 2030, as forecasted by a 2025 Ernst & Young analysis.
The financial architecture of India-Russia trade has adapted to global sanctions, with a rupee-ruble exchange system facilitating $10.2 billion in transactions in 2024, per the Reserve Bank of India. The adoption of RuPay and MIR cards, piloted in March 2022, processed $1.8 billion in cross-border payments by June 2025, according to the Bank of Russia. This system mitigates the impact of Russia’s exclusion from SWIFT, which affected 70% of its banking transactions, as noted in a 2024 Bank for International Settlements report. India’s proposal for a special economic zone for Russian companies, valued at $5 billion, aims to attract $3.2 billion in Russian investments in electronics and $1.5 billion in pharmaceuticals by 2028, per a 2025 Confederation of Indian Industry projection.
Geopolitically, India’s role in BRICS, expanded in 2024 to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE, positions it as a counterbalance to China’s influence. The 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan, attended by Modi and Putin, allocated $1.5 billion for joint development projects, including $600 million for renewable energy in India, as per a 2024 BRICS communique. India’s strategic autonomy within BRICS, advocating for a multipolar world order, aligns with Russia’s vision, as articulated in a 2025 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report, fostering $2.3 billion in joint ventures in AI and biotechnology by 2027.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict poses challenges to this partnership, with India’s neutral stance drawing $500 million in U.S. sanctions on 19 Indian entities in 2024, per a U.S. Treasury Department report. However, India’s $66 billion trade with Russia, including $45 billion in energy imports, underscores its economic resilience, as reported by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry Subjects: The strategic partnership between India and Russia, formalized through the 2000 Declaration on the India-Russia Strategic Partnership and elevated to a Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership in 2010, has evolved into a multifaceted framework encompassing defense, energy, trade, and technological innovation. As of 2025, bilateral trade has surged to $66 billion, a fivefold increase from $13.124 billion in 2021, driven predominantly by India’s import of Russian crude oil, which constitutes 42% of its total oil imports as reported by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in June 2024.
This economic interdependence is underpinned by a mutual commitment to diversify trade portfolios, targeting $100 billion by 2030, as outlined during the 25th session of the India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific & Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC) held on November 12, 2024. The commission, co-chaired by India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Russia’s First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov, emphasized sectors such as pharmaceuticals, machinery, and renewable energy, with India exporting $4.8 billion in packaged medicaments and $2.1 billion in stainless steel to Russia in 2024, while importing $22.3 billion in petroleum products and $3.7 billion in coal briquettes, according to India’s Directorate General of Foreign Trade.
Defense cooperation remains a cornerstone of this partnership, with Russia supplying 58% of India’s in-service military platforms, as noted in a 2024 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report. The March 7, 2025, agreement for 1,000-horsepower engines for India’s T-72 tanks, coupled with technology transfer for domestic production, exemplifies Russia’s role as a critical supplier willing to share sensitive technologies without end-user restrictions, a flexibility not offered by Western partners, as highlighted in a July 2025 Chatham House analysis. The joint production of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, with 2024 exports to the Philippines valued at $375 million, underscores the economic and strategic dividends of this collaboration. The BrahMos Aerospace Corporation, established in 1998, has achieved a production capacity of 100 missiles annually, with plans to scale to 200 by 2027, according to a 2025 Ministry of Defence brief. This partnership extends to civil nuclear energy, with the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant’s Units 1 and 2 generating 2,000 megawatts, and Units 3 to 6, under construction, expected to add 4,000 megawatts by 2028, as per a 2024 Rosatom report.
The geopolitical landscape shaping this partnership is marked by India’s strategic autonomy, a policy rooted in its Cold War-era non-alignment and rearticulated as multi-alignment in a 2024 Lowy Institute paper. India’s abstention from Western sanctions against Russia following the 2022 Ukraine invasion, as noted in a 2025 Observer Research Foundation report, reflects its commitment to maintaining robust ties with Moscow while deepening relations with the United States, Japan, and the European Union. India’s import of restricted technologies to Russia, valued at $1.2 billion in 2024 per a U.S. Treasury Department audit, has drawn scrutiny but also highlights New Delhi’s pragmatic approach to balancing economic interests with geopolitical pressures. The operationalization of the Eastern Maritime Corridor between Vladivostok and Chennai, reducing transit time to 16–24 days from 40, as announced by Union Minister Sarbananda Sonowal in 2024, facilitates $8.5 billion in annual trade, including $3.2 billion in crude oil and $1.9 billion in textiles, according to India’s Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways.
In the Arctic, India’s strategic engagement with Russia, formalized through its 2022 Arctic Policy, leverages the region’s $1 trillion resource potential, as estimated by the United States Geological Survey in 2023. India’s investments in Russian Arctic oil fields, including a $1.4 billion stake in the Vankor field by Oil India Limited, reported by Rosneft in 2024, aim to secure 2 million metric tons of crude annually by 2026. This cooperation counters China’s growing Arctic influence, where Beijing’s $90 billion investment in Russian projects since 2018, as per a 2025 Brookings Institution report, has raised concerns in New Delhi about Russia’s over-reliance on China. India’s Himadri research station in Svalbard, operational since 2008, supports joint scientific ventures with Russia, including a $15 million collaborative project on climate modeling, as detailed in a 2025 Ministry of Earth Sciences report.
The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), connecting India to Russia via Iran, has seen $2.1 billion in Indian investments for port and rail infrastructure, reducing freight costs by 30% compared to Suez Canal routes, according to a 2024 Eurasian Development Bank study. In 2024, INSTC facilitated $12.7 billion in trade, including $4.3 billion in machinery and $2.8 billion in chemicals, as reported by India’s Ministry of External Affairs. The corridor’s strategic value lies in its ability to bypass chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, where 21% of global oil trade transits, per a 2025 International Energy Agency report, enhancing India’s energy security amid Middle Eastern volatility.
Counterterrorism cooperation has intensified, with the 13th India-Russia Working Group meeting on December 10, 2024, addressing emerging threats from Central Asian militant groups. The meeting, co-chaired by India’s Secretary (West) Tanmaya Lal and Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin, allocated $50 million for joint intelligence-sharing platforms, as per a 2025 Ministry of External Affairs brief. This follows the May 5, 2025, telephonic consultation between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin after the Pahalgam terror attack, which killed 12 civilians, underscoring the need for enhanced bilateral mechanisms, as reported by the Indian Express on May 6, 2025.
Space collaboration, guided by a 2021 roadmap, has progressed with Russia’s support for India’s Gaganyaan manned spaceflight program, valued at $1.3 billion, per a 2024 Indian Space Research Organisation report. Russia’s provision of life-support systems and cosmonaut training has enabled India to target a 2026 orbital mission, with a 98% success probability based on joint simulations conducted in 2024. The bilateral trade in space technologies, including $200 million in satellite components, supports India’s ambition to capture 8% of the $447 billion global space market by 2030, as forecasted by a 2025 Ernst & Young analysis.
The financial architecture of India-Russia trade has adapted to global sanctions, with a rupee-ruble exchange system facilitating $10.2 billion in transactions in 2024, per the Reserve Bank of India. The adoption of RuPay and MIR cards, piloted in March 2022, processed $1.8 billion in cross-border payments by June 2025, according to the Bank of Russia. This system mitigates the impact of Russia’s exclusion from SWIFT, which affected 70% of its banking transactions, as noted in a 2024 Bank for International Settlements report. India’s proposal for a special economic zone for Russian companies, valued at $5 billion, aims to attract $3.2 billion in Russian investments in electronics and $1.5 billion in pharmaceuticals by 2028, per a 2025 Confederation of Indian Industry projection.
Geopolitically, India’s role in BRICS, expanded in 2024 to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE, positions it as a counterbalance to China’s influence. The 2024 BRICS Summit in Kazan, attended by Modi and Putin, allocated $1.5 billion for joint development projects, including $600 million for renewable energy in India, as per a 2024 BRICS communique. India’s strategic autonomy within BRICS, advocating for a multipolar world order, aligns with Russia’s vision, as articulated in a 2025 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report, fostering $2.3 billion in joint ventures in AI and biotechnology by 2027.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict poses challenges to this partnership, with India’s neutral stance drawing $500 million in U.S. sanctions on 19 Indian entities in 2024, per a U.S. Treasury Department report. However, India’s $66 billion trade with Russia, including $45 billion in energy imports, underscores its economic resilience, as reported by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 2024. The partnership’s future hinges on India’s ability to diversify its defense and energy dependencies while leveraging Russia’s technological and resource support, ensuring a balanced approach in a multipolar world order.
