Military power, jihadist territorial influence, fragmented regional security institutions and the economic consequences of destabilisation, 2026–2031

Scope: An independent assessment of security developments across Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria and the coastal West African states, incorporating the regional security architecture, international involvement, civilian displacement, trade corridors and strategic implications for European governments through 2031.

Executive Summary — Bottom Line Up Front

West Africa faces a multidimensional security crisis in which escalating violence, competing armed authorities, disrupted commercial networks and regional political fragmentation reinforce one another. The strategic problem extends beyond counterterrorism: it concerns the ability of governments to exercise sovereign authority over territory, maintain national economic connectivity and prevent armed organisations from acquiring enduring influence over populations and essential infrastructure.

The latest consolidated security assessment published by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies on 12 August 2026 records 23,872 fatalities associated with militant Islamist violence across Africa during the preceding twelve months, including 9,928 in the Sahel. The Sahel accounts for approximately 42% of this continental total. These are fatalities linked to militant violence, not an independently verified count of people killed directly by insurgents.

The security geography is simultaneously changing. The central Sahel remains the principal concentration of fatalities, while the Lake Chad Basin has experienced a substantial intensification of armed conflict. Reported fatalities associated with militant Islamist violence in Benin and Togo have declined sharply, demonstrating that the regional picture is not one of uniform deterioration.

Humanitarian consequences have reached strategic proportions. UNHCR reported on 21 September 2026 that forced displacement across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger had reached 3.8 million people by 31 July 2026, almost twice the level recorded in 2020.

Political fragmentation now compounds operational risk. The withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from ECOWAS has created a separate regional institutional framework, while negotiations over future relations and practical cooperation continue. The ECOWAS appointment of Lansana Kouyaté as chief negotiator in March 2026 confirms that the regional institutional relationship remains an active diplomatic question.

Principal strategic judgment: The most consequential development is the interaction between insurgent military capabilities, economic coercion and competing systems of political authority. Governments may retain their capitals and principal military installations while losing effective control over trade flows, rural administration and sections of their national territory. Any sustainable improvement will therefore depend on security capabilities, economic access, institutional accountability and regional coordination being assessed together rather than as separate policy objectives.

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West Africa’s Sovereignty Paradox: The Economic Cost of a Fractured Security Order

The governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have separated themselves from West Africa’s principal regional organisation while remaining dependent on the trade corridors, monetary institutions and external markets that sustain their economies. Their withdrawal from ECOWAS on 29 January 2025 changed the region’s political architecture without removing its economic geography. The contradiction now extends from military command to customs procedures, petroleum exports, public finances and European commercial interests. Niger’s reported US$1.89 billion in crude-oil exports during 2025 illustrates what is at stake: political autonomy cannot guarantee access to international markets. Over the next two years, the decisive test will be whether the Alliance of Sahel States can exercise greater political independence without increasing the costs of moving goods, financing government and maintaining security.

Political Separation Has Not Produced Economic Independence

The formal departure of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States created two regional political structures with overlapping economic interests. ECOWAS now comprises 12 members, while the Confederation of Sahel States represents the three departing governments. Yet the withdrawal did not terminate the commercial relationships connecting the Sahelian interior to coastal markets, nor did it remove the three countries from the West African Economic and Monetary Union and its CFA franc monetary framework.

ECOWAS recognised the problem in its January 2025 transitional arrangements. It requested continued recognition of existing identity documents, preservation of visa-free movement and maintenance of qualifying trade under the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme. These measures were designed to prevent political separation from immediately interrupting the movement of people and goods. They also exposed the limits of unilateral sovereignty: governments can change their institutional membership, but commercial networks continue to depend on rules administered across several jurisdictions.

The appointment of Lansana Kouyaté, former Guinean prime minister and former ECOWAS executive secretary, as chief negotiator on 23 March 2026 marked a transition from political rupture toward organised negotiations. The unresolved question is whether those discussions will produce enforceable arrangements governing customs, transit, administrative cooperation and cross-border rights. Until then, commercial operators face a political relationship whose practical rules remain transitional rather than permanently settled.

The Numbers Expose Two Different Sahels

The security and economic figures describe sharply different realities. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies recorded 9,928 fatalities associated with militant Islamist violence in the Sahel during the twelve months ending in mid-2026. Across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, UNHCR reported approximately 3.8 million forcibly displaced people as of 31 July 2026. These are not interchangeable indicators, but together they establish the scale of violence and the pressure on public institutions.

Yet economic activity has not stopped. The World Bank projects 5.0% real GDP growth for Mali in 2026 and estimates 7.0% for Niger, supported partly by petroleum production. Burkina Faso recorded estimated growth of 5.3% in 2025, against 4.8% in 2024. Growth therefore cannot be treated as proof of restored territorial security. Export industries may expand while displaced populations remain unable to return and rural public services remain inaccessible.

The continental comparison reinforces the distinction. The World Bank’s October 2026 outlook projects 4.3% growth for sub-Saharan Africa in 2026, while identifying persistent fiscal constraints and insufficient employment creation. For Sahelian governments, the problem is not simply generating output. It is converting economic growth into predictable revenue, functioning institutions and investment beyond extractive sectors.

Mali’s projected 2026 current-account deficit of 5.2% of GDP illustrates the vulnerability. Gold and emerging lithium production support exports, but higher fuel, freight and construction-material costs continue to affect the external balance. The country can increase mineral production without eliminating the economic consequences of disrupted access to essential imports.

Oil and Mining Turn Infrastructure into Sovereign Exposure

Niger provides the clearest example of how export infrastructure reshapes economic and diplomatic dependence. The Niger–Benin petroleum pipeline, completed in May 2024, expanded the country’s capacity to reach international crude markets. The resulting growth increased the economic importance of an infrastructure system whose operation depends on cross-border arrangements, technical continuity and access to maritime shipping.

World Bank WITS data record US$1.891 billion in Nigerien crude-oil exports during 2025. Italy accounted for approximately US$858.1 million, the Netherlands US$628.0 million, China US$163.4 million, Singapore US$88.9 million, the United Kingdom US$85.4 million and Germany US$67.0 million. Italy and the Netherlands together represented approximately 78.6% of the reported export value.

These figures establish a commercial connection between Niger’s petroleum sector and major European markets. They do not establish equivalent dependence by European refiners, nor identify the final physical destination of every cargo. They nevertheless demonstrate that the consequences of disruption would not be confined to Niger’s domestic economy. Producers, transport operators, purchasers and public authorities are linked through a commercial system extending beyond the AES.

Mali’s gold and lithium sectors present a related problem. Mineral production can generate foreign-exchange earnings and fiscal receipts, but exporting commodities requires transport services, investment, functioning contracts and access to international buyers. Burkina Faso’s mining reforms, including the new Mining Code and formalisation of artisanal and semi-mechanised production, similarly raise the question of whether higher recorded output will generate durable public revenue and employment.

The industrial constraint is therefore not simply the availability of natural resources. It is the reliability of the institutions and infrastructure required to transform those resources into national income. Diversification from gold into lithium or from agriculture into petroleum changes the composition of exports; it does not automatically diversify transport dependencies, financing risks or the sources of fiscal vulnerability.

A New Defence Structure Does Not Resolve the Fiscal Constraint

The AES has moved beyond political declarations toward formal military institution-building. On 10 July 2026, defence ministers meeting in Ouagadougou validated the legal status of the confederation’s Unified Force, according to the Malian government’s announcement of 14 July. The decision established a further institutional basis for cooperation among Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

Legal institutionalisation, however, is different from operational capacity. A common military framework does not establish the availability of trained personnel, interoperable equipment, reliable maintenance or sustainable financing. These capabilities require expenditure beyond the initial acquisition of weapons and vehicles, while national governments remain responsible for essential civilian services and infrastructure.

The fiscal figures impose limits on that ambition. The World Bank projects Mali’s public debt at approximately 39.5% of GDP and its fiscal deficit at 2.8% of GDP in 2026. Niger’s estimated fiscal deficit is 3.4% of GDP, reflecting expenditure requirements that include security, reconstruction and assistance to vulnerable households. These ratios do not determine how much either government can spend on defence, but they define the wider financing environment in which military commitments must be sustained.

External security partnerships offer additional resources without eliminating these constraints. China’s Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan for 2025–2027 announces RMB 360 billion in continent-wide financial support, including RMB 210 billion in credit lines and RMB 80 billion in assistance. Its security commitments include a RMB 1 billion military grant and training for 6,000 military personnel. These are Africa-wide commitments, not confirmed allocations to the AES, and announced funding cannot be equated with completed disbursements.

Russia’s military relationships and Türkiye’s defence-industrial exports provide different forms of support. Their long-term value depends on the availability of technical assistance, spare parts, qualified personnel and operationally sustainable systems. Replacing one supplier with several may increase diplomatic choice while multiplying maintenance standards, contractual obligations and financing requirements. Procurement diversification is not synonymous with defence-industrial autonomy.

Europe Has Commercial Interests but No Single Sahel Policy

European engagement reflects different national calculations rather than a uniform response to the AES. Italy has a documented petroleum-trade relationship with Niger and maintained diplomatic activity in Niamey during 2026. France has pursued a broader reconfiguration of its African partnerships following the reduction of its earlier military role in the central Sahel.

The France–Kenya Africa Forward summit of 11–12 May 2026 generated approximately €23 billion in announced Africa-wide investments, according to the French Foreign Ministry. The figure represents investment announcements, not completed expenditure or financing specifically directed to the three AES states. Its significance lies in France’s attempt to broaden its African relationships through commercial and investment channels.

Germany has articulated a different geographic approach. On 31 August 2026, Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul connected long-term Sahel stabilisation with closer cooperation involving Algeria and Tunisia. The United Kingdom, meanwhile, published Integrated Security Fund programme summaries for 2024–2026 covering Sahelian and wider West African stability activities. These instruments illustrate differing national priorities and legal authorities.

The European Union supplies a further dimension. On 22 April 2026, the European Commission announced €235 million in humanitarian assistance for West and Central Africa, including €75 million for the central Sahel. This allocation cannot replace national security or economic institutions. It addresses immediate civilian needs while European governments pursue their separate diplomatic, commercial and security policies.

The distinction matters for coordination. Italy’s petroleum exposure, France’s investment diplomacy, Germany’s North African relationships, British stability programmes and EU humanitarian financing do not create identical policy incentives. A common European position will remain limited unless governments identify the specific commercial, legal and institutional functions on which cooperation is both necessary and politically feasible.

Regional Cooperation Will Be Judged by Implementation

The World Bank’s April 2026 country partnership frameworks for Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger cover FY2026–FY2031 and establish medium-term programmes involving infrastructure, employment, human capital, agriculture and private-sector development. The Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program’s third phase, covering 2025–2030, adds another framework for evaluating economic resilience through implementation rather than declarations.

These programmes create a test of national administrative capacity. Financing agreements do not guarantee completed infrastructure, operational schools or sustainable employment. Governments must demonstrate that resources reach functioning institutions, while international financial organisations must distinguish commitments from disbursements and measurable results.

The same standard applies to ECOWAS–AES negotiations. Recognition of documents, functioning customs arrangements and practical trade rules could reduce uncertainty without requiring political reintegration. Conversely, agreements lacking administrative implementation would leave the costs of fragmentation largely unchanged.

The N’Djamena Declaration of 15 July 2026 extends the institutional question to water security, food systems and climate resilience. Its proposed Water Compacts could support common investment priorities across national boundaries. Their economic relevance will depend on whether participating governments convert declarations into financed projects with identifiable results.

The Next 24 Months Will Test the Price of Sovereignty

Between October 2026 and October 2028, the decisive measures will be the implementation of ECOWAS–AES arrangements, the continuity of mineral and petroleum exports, the financial sustainability of security commitments and the delivery of public services under existing development programmes.

If negotiations fail to produce workable transit and administrative rules, the costs will fall first on commercial operators, transport companies and landlocked economies dependent on imported goods. If oil and mineral revenues do not translate into reliable public finance, governments will confront competing demands from defence, infrastructure and civilian services. If security cooperation remains concentrated on equipment and formal structures without sustainable institutional capacity, the fiscal burden will persist without corresponding assurance of improved security.

The human cost is already measurable. UNHCR’s July 2026 count of approximately 3.8 million forcibly displaced people across the three AES states indicates the population directly exposed to prolonged disruption. The commercial cost extends beyond the region, as Niger’s US$1.891 billion in reported crude exports during 2025 demonstrates.

The political choice made by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger has increased their formal distance from ECOWAS. The unresolved economic question is whether that distance will also increase the cost of governing. Over the next 12–24 months, the answer will emerge not from declarations of sovereignty, but from customs procedures, functioning export infrastructure, executed budgets and the capacity of public institutions to deliver services. The immediate cost of failure will be paid by Sahelian households and businesses; the wider consequences will reach neighbouring transit states, international investors and European commercial partners.

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Navigational Index

PILLAR I — THE CHANGING CONFLICT SYSTEM

Military geography, armed organisations and territorial authority

• Chapter 1 — The West African Security Landscape in 2026
• Chapter 2 — JNIM, Islamic State Networks and the Evolution of Insurgent Power
• Chapter 3 — Military Capabilities, Command Structures and Operational Constraints
• Chapter 4 — Civilian Security, Political Authority and State Legitimacy

PILLAR II — REGIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND STRATEGIC COMPETITION

Institutions, external powers, economic systems and transnational risks

• Chapter 5 — ECOWAS, the Alliance of Sahel States and Regional Political Fragmentation
• Chapter 6 — Russia, China, Türkiye and the Transformation of Security Partnerships
• Chapter 7 — Trade Corridors, Energy, Mining and the Economics of Insecurity
• Chapter 8 — International Law, Civilian Protection and Humanitarian Stability
• Chapter 9 — European Strategic Exposure: Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the EU

PILLAR III — FUTURE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DECISION OPTIONS

Strategic forecasts, measurable indicators and government response

• Chapter 10 — Regional Scenarios and Conflict Trajectories, 2026–2031
• Chapter 11 — Strategic Warning Indicators and Institutional Vulnerabilities
• Chapter 12 — Government Policy Options and Final Net Assessment

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Master Abstract

West Africa’s security crisis is becoming a contest over political and economic control

The security architecture of West Africa is undergoing a structural realignment in which insurgent networks, national armed forces, transitional military governments, regional institutions and external security partners operate within increasingly divergent political frameworks. The resulting environment cannot adequately be described by the expansion or contraction of terrorist-controlled territory alone. It is defined by the distribution of practical authority: who can guarantee movement along commercial corridors, regulate local markets, protect rural communities, enforce taxation, control essential supplies and impose the political costs of noncompliance.

Recent security data demonstrate the scale of the challenge. The Africa Center’s August 2026 assessment identifies the Sahel as Africa’s most lethal theatre of militant Islamist violence, with almost 10,000 associated fatalities during the preceding reporting year. The Lake Chad Basin recorded a separate increase from 4,153 to 6,643 fatalities, a rise of approximately 60%. These theatres overlap geographically and politically with wider West African security concerns but must not be treated as a single operational conflict or summed indiscriminately across incompatible geographic definitions.

The evidence also identifies significant variation. Benin and Togo recorded notable decreases in militant-linked fatalities, even while the wider security environment remained exposed to cross-border risks. This divergence is strategically important: it shows why policies developed for the central Sahel cannot simply be transferred to coastal states without accounting for differences in institutions, border management, population relations and economic geography.

The conflict increasingly affects national economic sovereignty

A state’s capacity to maintain effective sovereignty depends not only on formal territorial jurisdiction but also on its ability to secure fuel supplies, commercial transport, public infrastructure and access to domestic markets. Armed groups can exploit these dependencies without permanently occupying large cities. When threats to highways, distribution facilities or logistics operators interrupt circulation, the consequences can extend from peripheral conflict zones to national administrative and economic centres.

This dynamic is especially significant for landlocked Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, whose international trade depends on cross-border transport connections. It creates a relationship between security conditions in coastal states and economic resilience in the interior. Disruptions can influence transport costs, availability of imported products, fiscal revenue and the government’s ability to maintain essential services. The magnitude of each effect must be established through corridor-specific evidence rather than presumed from attack frequency.

The World Bank’s 2026 outlook for Mali anticipates economic growth alongside continuing vulnerability to fuel costs, import expenses and disrupted supply chains. This illustrates an important analytical distinction: aggregate growth and deteriorating security can coexist, particularly where extractive sectors sustain measured economic output while households, traders and rural communities experience unequal exposure to insecurity.

Political fragmentation is changing the conditions for regional security cooperation

The relationship between ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States has become a central factor in the region’s security governance. National governments face threats that frequently cross borders, while their formal political obligations and institutional alignments no longer coincide. This divergence creates challenges for intelligence exchange, judicial cooperation, trade facilitation, population movement and coordinated responses to armed violence.

The institutional separation should not automatically be equated with the termination of practical cooperation. ECOWAS appointed a chief negotiator for discussions with the three AES members in March 2026, providing a formal diplomatic channel through which regional arrangements can continue to be addressed. The decisive question is whether these negotiations produce functioning mechanisms for the movement of people, goods and security information, rather than declarations that remain disconnected from implementation.

Over the 2026–2031 horizon, the region’s future security position will be determined less by the number of newly announced military partnerships than by observable outcomes: the security of essential corridors, the protection of civilians, the continuity of public administration, the reduction of armed coercion and the institutional capacity to respond across borders.

Key Evidence Table — Verified Strategic Baseline

The indicators below refer to different statistical universes and reference periods. Fatalities, displacement stocks, forecasts and institutional decisions must be interpreted separately.

Strategic indicator	Verified value or status	Reference period	Issuing authority
Militant Islamist-linked fatalities, Africa	23,872	Twelve months ending mid-2026	Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Militant Islamist-linked fatalities, Sahel	9,928	Twelve months ending mid-2026	Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Sahel share of continental fatalities	42%	Twelve months ending mid-2026	Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Militant Islamist-linked fatalities, Lake Chad Basin	6,643, up from 4,153	Latest annual comparison published August 2026	Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Militant Islamist-linked fatalities, Benin	81, down from 277	Latest annual comparison published August 2026	Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Militant Islamist-linked fatalities, Togo	43, down from 194	Latest annual comparison published August 2026	Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Forcibly displaced population in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger	Approximately 3.8 million	31 July 2026	UNHCR
Mali GDP growth forecast	5.0%	2026 forecast	World Bank
Burkina Faso GDP growth forecast	6.1%, conditional on stated assumptions	2026 forecast	World Bank
ECOWAS–AES institutional negotiations	Chief negotiator appointed	23 March 2026	ECOWAS

Source records

• Mounting Fatalities Linked to Militant Islamist Violence in Africa amid Shifting Tactics — Africa Center for Strategic Studies — Aug 2026
• UNHCR’s Salih Calls for Greater Investment in Protection and Solutions in the Central Sahel — UNHCR — Sep 2026
• Mali — Country Economic and Development Overview — World Bank
• Burkina Faso — Country Economic and Development Overview — World Bank
• ECOWAS Appoints Dr Lansana Kouyaté as Chief Negotiator — ECOWAS — Mar 2026

Comparative Security Dynamics

Selected conflict theatres, twelve months ending mid-2026. Fatalities associated with militant Islamist violence; geographic categories follow the issuing institution.

Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 12 August 2026. The figures include fatalities associated with militant Islamist violence, not solely deaths directly attributed to militant perpetrators.

The comparative distribution confirms that West African insecurity is not contained within the boundaries of the AES countries. The Sahel and Lake Chad theatres together account for a substantial proportion of the continent’s militant-linked fatalities, while their respective conflict systems differ in organisational structure, political context and military geography. Nigeria consequently requires analysis both as a major Lake Chad security actor and as a state exposed to evolving threats in its northwestern regions.

Official continental and theatre breakdown — Africa Center for Strategic Studies — Aug 2026

Competing Strategic Pathways

The current evidence supports three principal trajectories for the regional security environment. These are conditional pathways rather than quantified forecasts, and they are not necessarily mutually exclusive across different countries.

Pathway	Supporting mechanism	Countervailing evidence	Principal indicators
Continued security fragmentation	Persistent insurgent pressure, competing institutional frameworks and uneven civilian protection	Declining militant-linked fatalities in selected coastal states	Corridor disruptions, attacks on government installations, displaced populations
Uneven national stabilisation	Stronger defensive institutions and differentiated country responses	Regional cross-border threats and continuing conflict concentration	Sustained reductions in civilian harm, restoration of transport access, return of public services
Functional regional cooperation	ECOWAS–AES negotiations and shared economic-security interests	Political mistrust, institutional separation and competing national priorities	Operational agreements, functioning liaison mechanisms, documented joint arrangements

The second pathway is particularly important. A deteriorating regional aggregate does not exclude meaningful improvements within individual countries. Conversely, a reduction in annual fatalities is insufficient to establish lasting territorial security without corroborating evidence concerning civilian safety, economic activity and the continuity of state administration.

The principal strategic uncertainty is therefore whether selective improvements can become institutionalised and extended beyond individual national jurisdictions.

Principal Intelligence Gaps and Watch Indicators

Four categories of information will determine whether the assessment should be revised.

Territorial authority and economic access. The relevant evidence is not limited to incidents of armed violence. Changes in the regularity of commercial traffic, access to agricultural markets, fuel distribution and the continuity of civilian administration would provide a more complete picture of the ability of governments to exercise practical authority.

Military institutional performance. Verified information on force readiness, logistics, maintenance, deployment sustainability and civilian protection is required to distinguish equipment procurement from effective operational capability. Announced force structures cannot be assumed to possess their stated operational strength.

Regional institutional implementation. Future ECOWAS–AES agreements should be assessed through their operative provisions, practical application and measurable security or economic effects. Diplomatic engagement alone is not evidence of restored interoperability.

Reliability of reporting. Restrictions on independent reporting and differences between national statistical systems complicate comparisons across Sahelian states. The Africa Center itself cautions that its reported security totals may understate actual violence. Assessments should therefore distinguish changes in observed incidents from changes in reporting coverage.

The June 2026 report of the UN Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, identified as S/2026/537, also provides an institutional reference point for subsequent examination of regional political and security developments.

Reports Submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council in 2026 — United Nations Security Council

Strategic Assessment

The evidence available as of 9 October 2026 supports a central conclusion: West Africa’s security crisis has become a problem of institutional endurance, economic connectivity and contested political authority, rather than merely an accumulation of separate counterterrorism campaigns.

Its development will be shaped by three simultaneous processes. The first is the capacity of armed organisations to maintain coercive influence across national boundaries. The second is the ability of governments to provide credible protection while sustaining essential economic and administrative functions. The third is the extent to which divided regional institutions can maintain practical cooperation despite divergent political alignments.

For European governments, the strategic implications encompass regional commercial connectivity, humanitarian stability, international security partnerships and the governance of migration pressures. Italy, France, Germany and the United Kingdom do not have identical legal authorities, historical relationships, operational commitments or economic exposures, and their respective positions require separate evaluation rather than a generic European response.

The next analytical stage must therefore examine how the different armed organisations, state institutions and territorial environments produce distinct security outcomes. Only on that basis can the relative effectiveness of national strategies, external military partnerships and regional governance arrangements be assessed without attributing outcomes to unsupported causal explanations.

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PILLAR I — THE CHANGING CONFLICT SYSTEM

Chapter 1 — The West African Security Landscape in 2026

Strategic Judgment: The Geography of Conflict Is Being Reconfigured by the Loss of Economic and Administrative Control

West Africa’s security environment in October 2026 is characterised by the simultaneous expansion of insurgent operational reach, the deterioration of state control over economically significant territories, and the emergence of increasingly differentiated national security conditions. These developments cannot be adequately assessed through battlefield casualties alone. The decisive question is whether governments retain the ability to regulate economic circulation, guarantee access to rural populations, enforce public administration and maintain sufficient coercive capacity to prevent armed organisations from establishing competing systems of authority.

The scale of violence establishes the urgency of the situation, but its geographic distribution reveals a more complex strategic reality. During the twelve months ending in mid-2026, the Sahel remained Africa’s most lethal theatre of militant Islamist violence, with 9,928 associated fatalities, while the Lake Chad Basin experienced a particularly pronounced escalation. In parallel, the expansion of militant-linked activity into northwestern Nigeria and the continued exposure of coastal border regions indicate that the conflict’s perimeter is becoming less predictable. The relevant security system now extends across interconnected territories whose political jurisdictions, military commands and security institutions operate under different national priorities.

This is particularly consequential for Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Their political and military leaderships have placed national sovereignty at the centre of their security doctrines, yet their ability to exercise sovereignty depends on transport networks, border crossings, local economic intermediaries and public institutions that remain vulnerable to armed coercion. Sovereignty in this environment must therefore be assessed as a practical capacity rather than merely a constitutional attribute.

The United Nations’ July 2026 briefing on regional developments identified terrorist and insurgent attacks, transnational organised crime and interstate tensions as interconnected dimensions of the regional crisis. The UN further warned that armed organisations were increasingly exploiting governance deficiencies, social and economic vulnerabilities and cross-border mobility while employing more sophisticated technologies and coordination practices. The strategic implication is that conventional military geography—defined by bases, administrative boundaries and major cities—no longer captures the full distribution of security power.

Sources: Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, S/2026/537 — United Nations Secretary-General — June 2026; Security Council Briefing on West Africa and the Sahel — UNOWAS — July 2026; Militant Islamist Violence in Africa — Africa Center for Strategic Studies — August 2026.

The Five Principal Geographic Systems of West African Insecurity

The region should be assessed through five interconnected but analytically distinct security systems, each generating different operational requirements and political consequences.

The western and central Malian system encompasses the economic approaches to Bamako, the agricultural and commercial areas of Ségou and Mopti, the western connections through Kayes and the strategic relationships linking southern Mali to neighbouring economies. Its importance arises from the connection between armed pressure in peripheral regions and the continuity of national economic activity. Violence affecting road transport and fuel distribution can generate consequences far beyond the sites of armed engagement.

The clearest institutional evidence emerged from the fuel disruptions in 2025. Addressing the Security Council on 18 November, Secretary-General António Guterres reported that JNIM attacks against fuel-supply corridors had produced shortages affecting markets, basic services, electricity and humanitarian operations. He also reported that hundreds of trucks had subsequently entered Bamako, illustrating that economic interdiction was contested and variable rather than an uninterrupted total blockade.

By 2026, the problem had evolved into a larger question of national resilience. The August security assessment recorded major armed operations affecting Malian urban centres, alongside pressure on strategic infrastructure. This combination distinguishes Mali from conflicts in which violence remains concentrated in isolated frontier districts.

The Liptako-Gourma system, extending across the borders of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, constitutes a separate concentration of insurgent activity, local competition and armed political influence. Its geography facilitates movement between jurisdictions, while the multiplicity of armed actors complicates attribution and operational assessment. In this environment, the same territory can be contested by state forces, al-Qaeda-associated organisations, Islamic State-associated organisations and locally organised armed groups whose relationships change over time.

The Lake Chad Basin system is distinguished by the interaction of north-eastern Nigeria, south-eastern Niger, western Chad and northern Cameroon. Its conflict dynamics are influenced by the geography of the lake and surrounding wetlands, agricultural and fishing economies, displaced populations, and the rivalry between different insurgent organisations. Unlike parts of Mali, where threats to national transport corridors have acquired central strategic importance, the Lake Chad conflict combines territorial contestation with repeated assaults on military positions and coercion directed at civilians and local economic activities.

The northern coastal-border system involves the northern territories of Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire and the wider security concerns of Ghana. Its significance is preventive as well as operational. These states are exposed to armed networks originating or operating across the Sahelian frontier, but their security outcomes differ considerably from those of the central Sahel. The documented decline in fatalities in Benin and Togo during the latest annual reporting period demonstrates why exposure to a cross-border threat must not be confused with inevitable territorial destabilisation.

The northwestern Nigerian system is emerging as an increasingly important interface between Sahelian militant organisations, Nigerian jihadist factions and criminal armed networks. It differs from the Lake Chad Basin in its combination of kidnapping economies, armed banditry, rural insecurity and overlapping organisational allegiances. The strategic concern is not simply that a new theatre has appeared, but that militant organisations may benefit from pre-existing networks of coercion and criminal activity without having to establish their own institutions from the beginning.

Sources: Secretary-General’s Remarks on Regional Counter-Terrorism Cooperation — United Nations — November 2025; Militant Islamist Violence in Africa — Africa Center for Strategic Studies — August 2026.

Comparative Geographic Assessment

Conflict system	Principal territories	Strategic assets exposed	Main security characteristics	Consequence for state authority
Western and central Mali	Kayes, Koulikoro, Ségou, Mopti and approaches to Bamako	National road corridors, fuel distribution, commercial connections and civilian administration	Dispersed attacks, economic interdiction, pressure on strategic centres	National economic activity becomes vulnerable to insecurity beyond contested rural areas
Liptako-Gourma	Border territories of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger	Cross-border routes, pastoral and agricultural economies, state installations	Multiple armed actors, competing spheres of influence and recurrent military engagements	Effective governance becomes fragmented across jurisdictions
Lake Chad Basin	Borno, Yobe, Adamawa and neighbouring border territories	Military installations, fishing and agricultural livelihoods, population centres	Rival insurgent organisations, major military engagements and persistent civilian exposure	Government authority becomes dependent on sustained security and civilian protection
Northern coastal frontier	Northern Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire and adjacent border zones	Border crossings, rural commerce, protected areas and transport connections	Cross-border infiltration, varying national defensive responses	Security resilience differs according to national institutions and local conditions
Northwestern Nigeria	Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara and adjoining areas	Rural communities, regional trade routes and transport networks	Interaction of jihadist networks, armed criminal groups and local conflicts	Criminal and ideological coercion become increasingly difficult to separate

The principal analytical distinction is between territories where armed groups exercise coercive influence through frequent operations and territories where they can routinely determine civilian conduct. Neither attack frequency nor temporary access establishes permanent control. Territorial assessments require evidence of sustained enforcement, the continuity of government services, local economic regulation and the ability of civilians to move without armed permission.

Quantifying the Geographic Transformation

The Africa Center’s August 2026 dataset offers several additional measurements that illuminate developments beyond the aggregate numbers used in the opening dossier.

Measurement	Earlier value	Latest value	Analytical interpretation
Militant Islamist-linked fatalities in northwestern Nigeria	0 in 2024	504 in 2026 reporting period	Emergence of an additional geography of documented militant-linked violence
Northwestern Nigeria, intermediate period	136 in 2025	504 in 2026	Strong acceleration from the preceding reporting period
Benin	277	81	Major reduction in fatalities, without eliminating cross-border exposure
Togo	194	43	Major reduction in fatalities, without proving permanent threat removal
Remote-violence fatalities, Africa	4,221	5,980	Increased importance of air-delivered and other forms of remote violence
Lake Chad Basin battle-related fatalities	Previous-year baseline	Increase of 92%	More intensive military engagements, not necessarily equivalent to insurgent expansion

The first four country-level comparisons should not be used to construct a comprehensive West African fatality total. The northwestern Nigerian series represents a particular subset of militant-linked violence, while the Benin and Togo figures refer to those countries’ reported militant-linked fatalities. The remote-violence statistic is continental, not exclusively West African.

An important further distinction concerns the increase in Lake Chad fatalities. Because the Africa Center attributes much of the rise to intensified military engagements, the higher death toll cannot independently establish that insurgent territorial control increased proportionately. A rising battlefield casualty count can result from offensives by insurgents, offensives by state forces or intensified engagement between both.

Source: Mounting Fatalities Linked to Militant Islamist Violence in Africa amid Shifting Tactics — Africa Center for Strategic Studies — August 2026.

From Territorial Contiguity to Strategic Interdiction

The most important change in the military geography of West Africa is the increasing strategic relevance of controlling economic circulation without necessarily maintaining contiguous territorial occupation.

An armed organisation that can repeatedly disrupt the movement of essential commodities may create national effects through geographically limited operations. Fuel, food and medical supplies depend on transport infrastructure and commercial operators whose decisions are sensitive to attacks, insecurity, delays and the reliability of state protection. Repeated disruption can consequently reduce commercial activity even outside areas directly affected by combat.

This is not equivalent to assuming that armed groups possess uncontested territorial sovereignty. A government may maintain authority over its capital, airports, central institutions and armed forces while experiencing severe constraints in the surrounding economic environment. The difference between formally retaining national territory and reliably exercising public authority over its productive and transport networks is central to understanding the strategic situation.

The Malian case provides documented evidence of this mechanism. UN reporting from November 2025 established that attacks affecting the supply of fuel to Bamako produced shortages with direct civilian and humanitarian consequences. The later expansion of attacks against major Malian targets reinforces the need to evaluate military operations in relation to national economic vulnerability, although the precise effects of each subsequent operation require separate verification.

Source: Secretary-General’s Remarks to the Security Council — United Nations — November 2025.

Key Judgments — Chapter 1

West African insecurity now consists of several connected theatres with materially different organisational, geographic and institutional characteristics. Mali represents the clearest case in which the disruption of economic networks has acquired national strategic significance. The Lake Chad Basin remains a highly lethal theatre of sustained military engagement, while northwestern Nigeria has become an additional area of militant-linked activity interacting with established criminal insecurity.

Benin and Togo demonstrate that regional pressure does not produce identical national trajectories. The effectiveness of defensive measures must therefore be evaluated through country-specific outcomes rather than inferred from the regional aggregate.

The assessment would change materially if successive reporting periods demonstrated sustained restoration of transport access, civilian administration and freedom of movement in presently contested regions, or conversely if armed organisations established enduring economic controls across additional national corridors.

Chapter 2 — JNIM, Islamic State Networks and the Evolution of Insurgent Power

Strategic Judgment: Organisational Cohesion and the Ability to Coordinate Dispersed Operations Are Becoming Critical Differentiators

The insurgent landscape of West Africa is neither organisationally unified nor reducible to a single competition between governments and religious extremist organisations. It comprises several movements with different command structures, territorial concentrations, organisational histories and relationships with civilian populations. The distinction matters because organisations that share broad ideological objectives may compete directly over recruits, revenue and territorial influence.

JNIM, associated with al-Qaeda, occupies a particularly important position in the central Sahel. The organisation’s strategic relevance derives from its capacity to coordinate violence across widely separated areas while sustaining influence through subordinate formations and local relationships. Its expansion has given it a substantial geographic reach, but it has also increased the demands placed on its command systems and the complexity of maintaining organisational discipline.

The Islamic State-associated movement operating in the central Sahel constitutes a distinct competitor. It has retained influence in parts of the Mali–Niger borderlands and has exhibited particularly severe patterns of civilian victimisation. It should not be conflated with Islamic State West Africa Province, whose principal operational geography lies in the Lake Chad Basin.

Boko Haram-linked factions, ISWAP and additional armed networks also operate within different Nigerian security environments. Organisational names, propaganda affiliations and local alliances do not necessarily establish unified command or identical territorial objectives.

The United Nations Monitoring Team’s thirty-eighth report, issued on 10 August 2026 under reference S/2026/651, is a particularly important institutional source for this assessment. Its findings must be understood as information evaluated and reported through the UN sanctions-monitoring process, rather than a comprehensive judicial determination of every attributed act.

Source: Thirty-eighth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2026/651 — United Nations Security Council — August 2026.

JNIM: The Strategic Significance of Coordinated Decentralisation

JNIM’s organisation combines the advantages of a common ideological and strategic identity with the operational flexibility of geographically distributed constituent formations. This arrangement enables the movement to sustain different types of activity across distinct environments, but it should not be interpreted as proof that every subordinate unit operates under continuous central direction.

The most consequential characteristic is its reported ability to coordinate complex operations. Multi-location attacks can impose simultaneous demands on state security institutions, create uncertainty concerning the location of subsequent threats and produce political effects disproportionate to the duration of individual engagements. The organisational achievement lies in coordinating geographically dispersed actions while maintaining a sufficiently coherent operational identity.

The Africa Center’s August 2026 analysis attributes 76% of militant Islamist-linked fatalities in the Sahel to JNIM. This is a measure of fatalities associated with the group in the dataset, not a direct measure of combatant strength, recruitment, occupied territory or the number of attacks independently initiated by its central leadership.

The figure nonetheless demonstrates JNIM’s relative significance within the recorded conflict environment. Combined with documented attacks against strategic infrastructure and major population centres, it supports the judgment that the organisation possesses operational reach extending well beyond isolated rural bases.

Source: Militant Islamist Violence in Africa — Africa Center for Strategic Studies — August 2026.

Islamic State in the Sahel: Geographic Concentration and Civilian Coercion

Islamic State-affiliated forces in the Sahel must be assessed separately from JNIM in terms of geographic concentration, command arrangements and violence against civilian populations.

The August 2026 Africa Center assessment associates the movement commonly described in the dataset as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) with 1,842 fatalities, representing approximately 19% of the Sahel’s militant-linked fatalities during the reporting period. The same assessment identifies the movement’s continued influence in the Ménaka region and records that civilians accounted for approximately 36% of fatalities associated with its violence.

That civilian proportion is analytically significant. It suggests that attacks against noncombatants represent a substantial component of the organisation’s conflict footprint, although the figure alone does not establish the individual operational purpose of every recorded incident.

Violence against civilians may facilitate coercive control in the immediate term but can also undermine local cooperation, provoke resistance and increase the importance of armed protection arrangements. The balance depends on local conditions and should not be assumed to produce identical outcomes in every district.

Source: Sahel Regional Assessment — Africa Center for Strategic Studies — August 2026.

ISWAP and Boko Haram: Competition Within the Lake Chad Security System

The Lake Chad Basin presents a different organisational configuration. ISWAP and Boko Haram-linked organisations remain important armed actors, but their internal structures, patterns of civilian targeting and relations with local communities differ.

The August 2026 dataset records 3,520 fatalities associated with ISWAP, compared with 1,905 in the preceding annual period. Of the latest figure, 2,493 were classified as battle-related fatalities. This distinction is particularly important because it indicates that much of the recorded increase occurred through military engagements rather than being exclusively attributable to attacks against civilians.

Boko Haram-linked organisations display a different pattern in the dataset. Over the preceding five years, fatalities associated with their violence against civilians increased from 188 to 724. The Africa Center attributes 65% of Lake Chad Basin fatalities arising from violence against civilians in the latest reporting year to Boko Haram.

The contrast is not evidence that ISWAP systematically refrains from civilian coercion. Both organisational systems have been associated with violence and exploitation. It does, however, establish that the composition of recorded fatalities differs, which has direct implications for civilian protection, risk assessment and the evaluation of military operations.

Source: Lake Chad Basin Assessment — Africa Center for Strategic Studies — August 2026.

Analytical Comparison of Armed Organisations

Organisation or network	Principal conflict geography	Organisational profile	Documented 2026 indicator	Major analytical distinction
JNIM	Mali, Burkina Faso and adjoining Sahelian territories	Al-Qaeda-associated coalition with geographically distributed formations	Associated with 76% of Sahel militant-linked fatalities	Broad coordination and multi-theatre operational reach
Islamic State in the Sahel / ISGS	Mali–Niger borderlands, particularly the Ménaka-related conflict system	Islamic State-associated movement	1,842 associated fatalities; civilian victims comprise about 36%	Concentrated conflict geography and substantial civilian victimisation
ISWAP	Lake Chad Basin	Islamic State-associated Nigerian and regional insurgent organisation	3,520 associated fatalities; 2,493 battle-related	High intensity of military engagements
Boko Haram-linked factions	Lake Chad Basin and documented activity elsewhere in northern Nigeria	Organisationally fragmented jihadist movement	724 civilian fatalities in the relevant 2026 comparison	Major civilian exposure and factional differentiation
Ansaru and other northwestern Nigerian armed networks	Parts of northwestern Nigeria	Distinct jihadist and criminal organisational environments	No comparable single organisation-wide figure established here	Overlapping militant and criminal activity complicates attribution

The absence of a directly comparable figure for Ansaru is intentional. Northwest Nigeria contains multiple armed organisations whose activities cannot be collapsed into one ideologically uniform insurgent formation.

Organisational Adaptation and Technological Change

Military and organisational adaptation has become an important feature of the security environment, but claims about technological sophistication require careful differentiation. The use of commercial drones, modern communications systems or digital financial instruments does not automatically establish that an armed organisation possesses a fully integrated intelligence, surveillance and precision-strike capability.

The United Nations’ July 2026 regional briefing nevertheless drew attention to the increasing employment of drones, sophisticated communications and cryptocurrencies by armed organisations, alongside cross-border operational coordination.

These developments have implications beyond their immediate tactical applications. Communications technology can reduce coordination costs across dispersed formations; digital media can extend the political impact of attacks; and commercially accessible technological systems may reduce some barriers to operational adaptation. At the same time, there remains a substantial difference between isolated experimentation, recurrent battlefield employment and institutionalised technical competence.

The August 2026 Africa Center report also records a continental increase in fatalities classified as remote violence, from 4,221 to 5,980. It estimates that approximately 80% of remote-violence fatalities arose from airstrikes, while drone-associated fatalities were growing. These figures cover the African conflict dataset and cannot be assigned exclusively to insurgents or to West African operations.

Source: UNOWAS Security Council Briefing — United Nations — July 2026; Africa Center Strategic Violence Assessment — August 2026.

Armed Governance and the Political Economy of Insurgency

The durability of an insurgent organisation depends in part on its capacity to obtain resources and influence civilian conduct. These functions can be exercised through taxation, extortion, control over commerce, intimidation or the imposition of alternative dispute-resolution arrangements.

Such practices need not amount to permanent occupation. A population may remain formally under government jurisdiction while its daily economic choices are constrained by the risk of armed punishment. This creates overlapping systems of authority in which government institutions and armed organisations exercise different forms of influence over the same territory.

The distinction between ideological recruitment and coercive compliance is essential. Civilians who pay levies, restrict commercial activities or avoid cooperation with security forces may do so because of threats rather than political alignment. Counting such behaviour as voluntary insurgent support would produce an unreliable assessment of organisational legitimacy.

In the same way, the extraction of resources cannot automatically be equated with stable governance. A movement may generate revenue through intimidation while lacking the administrative capacity to provide services or sustain predictable public order.

The relevant analytical question is whether coercive institutions become sufficiently regular to influence civilian expectations and behaviour over time.

Key Judgments — Chapter 2

JNIM’s principal documented advantage is the combination of substantial conflict reach and the capacity to conduct geographically dispersed operations. Its position within the Sahelian fatality dataset distinguishes it from competing organisations, although fatality shares must not be converted into unsupported estimates of territorial control.

Islamic State-associated forces in the Sahel remain a distinct and consequential competitor, particularly in eastern Mali and adjoining territories. Their patterns of civilian victimisation require a separate analytical treatment.

Within the Lake Chad Basin, the rising intensity of ISWAP-associated battlefield deaths and Boko Haram’s substantial civilian casualty footprint indicate different but overlapping security problems. Northwestern Nigeria adds a further layer in which criminal and ideological armed activity increasingly intersect.

The assessment would change if official monitoring established a sustained restructuring of these organisations’ command relationships, a durable shift in territorial influence, or independently verified changes in their revenue and recruitment systems.

Chapter 3 — Military Capabilities, Command Structures and Operational Constraints

Strategic Judgment: Force Effectiveness Depends on Integrated Capability Rather Than Platform Acquisition or Nominal Strength

The principal military question facing West African governments is no longer whether their armed forces possess the means to conduct operations against insurgent organisations. It is whether national defence institutions can generate sustained, coordinated and legally accountable military effects across large territories while preserving sufficient capability to defend strategic infrastructure and protect the civilian population.

The distinction is fundamental. A military organisation may possess aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, unmanned systems and substantial numbers of personnel without being able to maintain continuous operational availability. Procurement records establish acquisition; they do not establish technical serviceability, trained crews, secure communications, effective command relationships or sustained mission performance. Equally, a successful engagement may demonstrate tactical competence without proving that the force involved can consolidate territorial gains.

The increasingly complex character of West African violence makes this distinction especially important. Governments face attacks against military positions, politically significant installations, populated areas and economic infrastructure, while armed organisations increasingly exploit dispersed operations and technological adaptation. The military response must therefore be assessed across several distinct functions: operational command, mobility, intelligence integration, logistics, infrastructure security, personnel readiness and civilian-harm mitigation.

At the strategic level, the most serious institutional vulnerability is the possibility that national armed forces become responsible for more security missions than their available capabilities can sustain. The defence of population centres, military facilities, transport corridors and remote communities can produce competing demands on personnel, maintenance budgets and command attention. Those competing missions are not inherently evidence of poor organisation; they become operationally consequential when the armed forces lack the resources and institutional mechanisms needed to manage them simultaneously.

Military Performance Indicators: What the Public Record Can and Cannot Establish

The public record contains considerably more information about equipment purchases and announced operations than about the operational readiness of national forces. This imbalance makes it necessary to distinguish observable outputs from military capabilities that cannot be independently confirmed.

Capability dimension	What official evidence can establish	What it cannot establish alone	Decision-relevant measurement
Personnel	Authorised establishment, recruitment announcements, officially reported deployments	Number of personnel available, trained and medically fit for each mission	Verified deployable strength and sustainable rotation capacity
Aircraft and unmanned systems	Procurement, delivery, official inventories, announced operations	Fleet readiness, endurance, availability of qualified operators	Mission-capable assets and sustained operational availability
Armoured and tactical vehicles	Equipment acquired and nominal fleet composition	Serviceability, spare-parts availability, endurance under field conditions	Operational fleet availability by mission
Intelligence systems	Institutions established, equipment delivered, cooperation agreements	Quality of analysis, speed of dissemination, reliability of collected information	Validated warning and response performance
Logistics	Budget allocations, facilities, transport equipment and supply agreements	Ability to sustain dispersed units during prolonged operations	Supply continuity, maintenance recovery and medical evacuation capacity
Command and control	Formal command organisation and authorised responsibilities	Practical interoperability, delegation quality and effectiveness under pressure	Verified joint-exercise and operational performance
Territorial security	Bases, patrols, operations and official claims of control	Continuous civilian freedom of movement and effective public administration	Persistence of protection and functioning civilian institutions
Civilian protection	Legal obligations, directives, reported investigations	Compliance during every operation or absence of unlawful conduct	Independently documented harm, accountability and remedy

This framework prevents one of the most consequential errors in defence analysis: converting a government’s stated military capacity into an assumed ability to exercise it.

It also changes the interpretation of defence expenditure. Spending on aircraft or other major platforms is only part of military capability. Training, technical personnel, maintenance facilities, transport support, communications, medical provision and institutional oversight determine whether procurement produces enduring operational value.

These dependencies are relevant to every West African military institution, although their actual severity must be established separately for each country.

Mali: The Military Burden of Defending a National Economic System

Mali presents an especially demanding combination of geographic scale, dispersed conflict, critical transport dependencies and threats extending toward strategically significant national installations.

The government’s military challenge is not limited to defending particular cities or defeating armed formations in individual engagements. It must also preserve the connection between its principal administrative centres and the economic networks that sustain them. In practical terms, transport corridors acquire military importance because their disruption affects fuel distribution, commerce, public services and the movement of essential supplies.

The November 2025 United Nations assessment of JNIM’s fuel-supply disruptions demonstrated this connection. The Secretary-General reported that attacks against supply movements had created shortages severe enough to affect humanitarian activities. Such effects broaden the range of infrastructure requiring protection and increase the costs of maintaining national security.

Major armed attacks against Malian targets during 2026 further demonstrate the need to distinguish control over principal military facilities from control over the wider security environment. The August 2026 Africa Center assessment records large-scale operations affecting Bamako and other Malian cities in April. The same publication also identifies the loss of Kidal to separatist forces during the period, demonstrating the continued importance of distinguishing jihadist organisations from other armed political actors.

The operational consequence is the simultaneous existence of several different security requirements: defending national command facilities, maintaining access to economic infrastructure, protecting civilian settlements, supporting remote formations and responding to attacks across distant regions. These missions may compete for personnel and resources even when each is individually necessary.

From an institutional perspective, the key issue is whether Mali’s command arrangements permit the effective allocation of limited operational resources between these competing responsibilities. Public reporting on attacks and procurement does not by itself provide the information needed to evaluate this capability conclusively.

Sources: United Nations Secretary-General’s Security Council Remarks — November 2025; Africa Center Sahel Security Assessment — August 2026.

Burkina Faso: Territorial Dispersion and the Requirement for Sustainable Security Presence

Burkina Faso presents a different operational problem. Its security environment is shaped by dispersed rural insecurity, the exposure of civilian settlements and the need to maintain credible protection across multiple contested localities.

This creates a tension between the visible deployment of government forces and the continuity of their operational effects. A security position may protect a limited locality while leaving nearby communities dependent on the timing and reliability of future assistance. The existence of defensive installations does not establish that surrounding transport links, agricultural activities or public services are secure.

The expansion of national military and auxiliary security arrangements therefore raises questions concerning command relationships, training standards, personnel accountability and institutional integration. Auxiliary forces may increase the geographic reach of national security systems, but their contribution must be evaluated against the quality of supervision and the risks associated with uneven training and disciplinary controls.

The relevant outcome is not the number of personnel mobilised. It is the extent to which civilians receive reliable protection without suffering abuses or coercion from forces claiming to defend them.

A government that expands its local security presence while failing to maintain effective oversight risks introducing additional sources of insecurity. Conversely, locally informed and accountable security institutions may improve civilian confidence and access to information when they operate within a functioning system of public authority.

This is particularly important where conflicts involve local disputes over land, economic access or communal security. Military institutions may influence the immediate balance of armed coercion without possessing either the authority or institutional capacity to resolve the underlying disputes.

Niger: Multiple Security Frontiers and the Allocation of Defensive Resources

Niger’s operational environment differs from Mali and Burkina Faso because security demands arise across several geographically separated conflict systems.

The western regions connect to the Liptako-Gourma security environment and the competition involving JNIM and Islamic State-associated organisations. The southeastern frontier connects Niger to the Lake Chad Basin and its distinct insurgent formations. Other border regions introduce additional security responsibilities involving cross-border movement and national territorial surveillance.

These differentiated theatres impose separate requirements on national military planning. An effective response in one region does not establish that the state possesses comparable capabilities elsewhere, particularly when operating conditions, adversaries and local populations differ.

The January 2026 attack against Niamey’s airport, recorded in the Africa Center assessment, demonstrates the importance of securing strategically significant installations beyond the principal rural conflict zones. It should not, however, be interpreted as evidence that the attacking organisation exercised territorial control over the capital.

The more consequential institutional question concerns the capacity to preserve national defensive readiness while maintaining sufficient operational resources across geographically separated security responsibilities.

Source: Africa Center Strategic Assessment of Militant Islamist Violence — August 2026.

Nigeria: A High-Intensity Counterinsurgency Environment with Expanding Security Demands

Nigeria’s military security environment cannot be accurately assessed as a single counterinsurgency theatre.

The Lake Chad Basin remains a major area of conflict involving ISWAP and Boko Haram-linked organisations. At the same time, militant-linked violence in northwestern Nigeria has become more prominent, intersecting with existing criminal violence and local insecurity. These threats impose different demands on military command, intelligence institutions and civilian law-enforcement agencies.

The latest annual Africa Center assessment records a 92% increase in battle-related fatalities in the Lake Chad Basin. The organisation attributes much of the overall escalation to intensified military engagements, including operations by Nigerian and other regional armed forces.

This is a significant interpretative point. An increase in battlefield fatalities can coexist with successful offensives against insurgent forces, setbacks suffered by government units or intensified competition between armed organisations. Without additional operational evidence, it cannot be treated as a direct measure of military failure.

Nigeria also presents the challenge of maintaining a distinction between responsibilities properly assigned to armed forces and those belonging to police or other civilian security organisations. Where the military assumes extensive routine internal-security functions, the allocation of trained personnel and specialised resources becomes a critical institutional question.

The issue is not whether soldiers should ever participate in domestic security operations. It is whether the legal framework, command organisation and available resources permit military forces to fulfil such responsibilities without undermining their other missions.

Sources: Lake Chad Basin Security Assessment — Africa Center for Strategic Studies — August 2026; Activities of UNOWAS, S/2026/537 — United Nations — June 2026.

Coastal States: Why Military Resilience Must Be Measured Differently

The experience of Benin and Togo provides an important counterweight to analyses that presume a uniform deterioration throughout West Africa.

Both countries experienced substantial reductions in reported fatalities associated with militant Islamist violence during the latest annual reporting period. The figures declined from 277 to 81 in Benin and from 194 to 43 in Togo.

The Africa Center associates these reductions in part with stabilisation efforts. Nevertheless, causal attribution requires caution. Annual changes may reflect adjustments in insurgent priorities, changes in state security activity, reporting conditions or other local factors.

The central question is whether the lower level of fatalities corresponds to improvements in freedom of movement, civilian confidence, border security and the ability of national institutions to operate consistently in previously exposed areas.

A coastal state with fewer fatalities may still face a persistent threat requiring surveillance, security-sector cooperation and resilient local administration. The absence of major attacks during a particular period cannot independently demonstrate that armed organisations have lost their capacity to operate.

Source: Africa Center Strategic Assessment — August 2026.

Command Architecture and Institutional Readiness

A professional assessment of West African military capabilities must distinguish five levels of institutional performance.

The first is formal authority: the legal and organisational system assigning responsibility to military commands and civilian authorities.

The second is resource availability: personnel, equipment, communications, maintenance and financial resources that can be allocated to authorised missions.

The third is operational integration: the ability of different units and institutions to cooperate within defined command relationships.

The fourth is sustained performance: the ability to continue operating after initial deployments and engagements, including through personnel rotation, equipment maintenance and replacement of essential supplies.

The fifth is accountable effect: the extent to which military activity produces improved security while complying with applicable legal obligations and protecting civilians.

These five levels are not interchangeable. The successful completion of a military operation establishes that particular forces achieved a defined result under particular conditions. It does not establish the wider readiness of the armed forces, their capacity to sustain the same activity or the political durability of the result.

WordPress Analytical Component — Military Capability and Outcome Dependencies

The following HTML is an individual explanatory scheme, not a separate chapter page or a substitute for the report. It is designed to sit immediately after the command-architecture analysis. It uses a three-dimensional visual treatment without inventing scores, country rankings or capability measurements.

Institutional Comparison — Military Challenges by Country

State	Dominant security-management challenge	Capability requiring verification	Strategic consequence
Mali	Simultaneous defence of national centres, dispersed regions and economic corridors	Joint command effectiveness and sustained protection of critical supply networks	Economic security becomes inseparable from national defence
Burkina Faso	Protection of dispersed communities across contested rural territories	Sustainable local security presence and accountability of auxiliary forces	Public authority depends on continuous civilian protection
Niger	Management of geographically separated conflict theatres	Resource allocation, installation security and regional coordination	Multiple frontiers create competing readiness requirements
Nigeria	High-intensity Lake Chad operations alongside increasing northwestern threats	Force availability, military–police task allocation and joint operational performance	National security responsibilities become increasingly differentiated
Benin	Border security and preservation of recent improvements	Persistence of reduced violence and effective local institutional presence	Preventive security remains a central requirement
Togo	Containment of cross-border pressure in northern regions	Continued protection, intelligence cooperation and civilian confidence	Reduced fatalities create an opportunity for institutional consolidation
Côte d’Ivoire	Maintaining resilience along northern approaches	Border-management effectiveness and continuity of civilian administration	Preservation of economic and political stability
Ghana	Prevention of spillover into northern communities	Early warning, lawful intelligence coordination and cross-border cooperation	Protection of existing institutional resilience

This comparison identifies questions requiring evaluation rather than asserting unsupported equivalence between national military capabilities.

Key Judgments — Chapter 3

West African military performance must be evaluated through operational availability, institutional integration and sustained civilian security, not through announced procurement or force strength alone.

The major military environments impose different capability demands. Mali faces pressure on nationally significant economic and security assets; Burkina Faso requires the sustained protection of dispersed communities; Niger operates across several separate conflict geographies; and Nigeria combines intensive Lake Chad military operations with emerging threats elsewhere.

The observed improvements in Benin and Togo demonstrate the importance of examining defensive performance at national and local levels. They do not establish that the underlying regional threats have disappeared.

The assessment would change if authoritative readiness reporting, independent civilian-security measurements and documented operational reviews demonstrated persistent changes in national military performance rather than isolated battlefield successes.

Chapter 4 — Civilian Security, Political Authority and State Legitimacy

Strategic Judgment: The Durability of State Authority Depends on the Protection of Civilian Life and the Continuity of Public Institutions

The civilian dimension of the West African conflict is not simply a consequence of military insecurity. It constitutes an independent factor determining the distribution of political authority, the effectiveness of national institutions and the capacity of governments to maintain relationships with populations in contested territories.

Armed conflict affects the civilian environment through several interconnected processes. Direct violence causes death, injury and displacement. Threats against communities alter patterns of settlement and economic activity. Restrictions on transport and commerce undermine household livelihoods. Interruptions to education and healthcare weaken essential public institutions. Armed groups may then exploit these disruptions to impose obligations, obtain resources or influence civilian behaviour.

The resulting insecurity can continue even when major military engagements decline. A district may experience relatively few recorded attacks while remaining affected by intimidation, restrictions on movement, declining access to services or the absence of effective judicial protection. Conversely, an increase in recorded engagements may coincide with efforts by government forces to restore access to contested territory.

For this reason, the measurement of security must extend beyond combat statistics. The decisive political question is whether individuals can exercise their rights, maintain their livelihoods and access public services without being subject to systematic armed coercion.

Forced Displacement as an Indicator of Territorial Insecurity

Forced displacement provides one of the clearest indicators of the humanitarian consequences of West African armed conflict, although it cannot be reduced to a simple proxy for changes in battlefield control.

On 21 September 2026, UNHCR reported that the number of forcibly displaced people across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger had reached approximately 3.8 million as of 31 July 2026, nearly twice the level recorded in 2020.

The agency identified insecurity as the principal driver of displacement and stressed that the consequences increasingly extended beyond the borders of the three countries.

The movement of displaced populations has several institutional implications. Receiving communities require additional housing, healthcare, education, water and sanitation services. Local authorities must respond to changing demographic conditions while maintaining social cohesion and managing pressure on public finances.

Displacement can also change local political relationships. The departure of residents may weaken existing economic networks and community institutions, while prolonged displacement can make eventual return dependent on more than the cessation of immediate violence. Property disputes, access to livelihoods, restoration of essential services and personal security become relevant conditions for sustainable return.

Source: UNHCR High Commissioner Calls for Investment in Protection and Solutions in the Central Sahel — UNHCR — September 2026.

Displacement Statistics: Geographic and Temporal Comparability

The UNHCR regional operational portal contains more recent figures covering several countries across the wider Sahelian displacement system. These should not be confused with the 3.8 million figure reported specifically for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

The portal’s September 2026 update identifies a regional population of concern exceeding five million people. Its broader statistical coverage includes Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania and several population categories, including refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees.

The distinction is substantive. These categories differ in legal status and statistical definition, while national components may refer to different collection dates. The portal also notes that some figures are estimates derived from government reporting rather than individually verified registrations.

The table below preserves these distinctions.

Population or indicator	Recorded figure	Geographic coverage	Statistical reference
Forcibly displaced people	Approximately 3.8 million	Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger	UNHCR, 31 July 2026
Regional population of concern	5,085,231	Central Sahel, Chad and Mauritania	UNHCR portal, 30 September 2026
Internally displaced persons recorded in the regional portal	3,245,039	Countries covered by the UNHCR regional dataset	Portal aggregate, 30 September 2026
Refugees and asylum-seekers recorded in the portal	3,287,067	Portal-defined regional reporting population	30 September 2026
Refugees and asylum-seekers recorded in Niger	502,536	Niger	30 September 2026
Refugees and asylum-seekers recorded in Mali	191,237	Mali	31 July 2026
Refugees and asylum-seekers recorded in Mauritania	964,344	Mauritania	31 August 2026

These figures are not additive. In particular, the regional categories must not be summed to produce a total because the portal’s reporting populations, definitions and component reference dates are not uniform. The internally displaced persons aggregate includes older underlying national observations, including a Burkina Faso figure dated March 2023. Accordingly, the regional total should not be described as a fully contemporaneous census of people displaced in September 2026.

Source: Sahel Crisis Regional Operational Data Portal — UNHCR — September 2026.

The Erosion of Education as an Instrument of Long-Term Destabilisation

The effects of prolonged insecurity on education are among the most serious institutional consequences of the conflict.

In September 2025, UNICEF and the Norwegian Refugee Council reported that more than 14,800 schools had closed because of violence and insecurity across West and Central Africa. The closures affected an estimated three million children across the 24-country reporting area.

The report indicated that the number of closures had almost doubled since 2019. Within the central Sahel, school closures increased from 8,222 to 8,452 over the preceding reporting period.

These numbers require precise interpretation. The regional total covers West and Central Africa rather than the central Sahel alone. The central Sahel figure represents a geographically narrower subset. Neither should be presented as a new October 2026 school-closure count without an updated equivalent dataset.

Education disruption has consequences that extend beyond immediate humanitarian need. Persistent closure of schools can undermine future labour-market participation, weaken literacy and professional training pipelines, and reduce the ability of public institutions to maintain long-term relationships with communities.

Girls face additional risks where interrupted education interacts with early marriage, unequal household responsibilities and reduced access to safe schooling. UNICEF specifically identifies the unequal consequences of prolonged school closures for adolescent girls.

The resulting effects may persist well beyond the duration of a particular insurgent campaign. Where children lose several years of education, the restoration of school buildings alone is insufficient to reverse the accumulated learning and social consequences.

Source: Education Under Crisis: School Closures Nearly Double in Five Years in West and Central Africa — UNICEF — September 2025.

Quantitative Assessment of the Education Crisis

Indicator	Earlier measurement	Latest comparable published measurement	Geographic definition
Schools closed due to insecurity	Fewer than 8,000 in 2019	More than 14,800 in 2025	West and Central Africa
Children affected by school closures	—	Approximately 3 million in 2025	West and Central Africa
Central Sahel school closures	8,222	8,452	Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger
Change in central Sahel closures	—	Increase of 230 schools	Change between the two cited observations
School closures in northwestern and southwestern Cameroon	Approximately 6,973	Approximately 2,463	Cameroon conflict-affected regions

The Cameroon series is included to demonstrate that regional education indicators do not move uniformly. The underlying crises differ from the central Sahel insurgencies, and the Cameroon numbers must not be used as evidence of improved security conditions in Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger.

The absence of a later verified central Sahel school-closure series prevents a definitive statement about the direction of school closures between the September 2025 report and October 2026.

Civilian Protection and the Distribution of Political Authority

Political authority within a conflict-affected territory may be exercised by actors that do not possess formal constitutional legitimacy. Armed organisations can influence civilian decisions by imposing costs for disobedience, restricting commercial transactions or threatening individuals who cooperate with state institutions.

This distinction between formal authority and practical coercive influence is fundamental.

A government may retain legal jurisdiction over an area while being unable to guarantee the security of those who cooperate with its administrative or judicial institutions. Residents may then adjust their behaviour according to the power of the armed organisation most capable of imposing immediate punishment.

Such compliance cannot automatically be treated as ideological endorsement or popular legitimacy. The distinction matters because a population’s apparent accommodation with an armed actor may be the outcome of coercion, fear or the absence of viable alternatives.

The restoration of state authority consequently requires more than a visible military presence. It involves the ability to apply law predictably, protect individuals against retaliation, resolve disputes and maintain functioning institutions.

This interpretation also clarifies why civilian protection and operational effectiveness cannot be assessed independently. Security operations that increase immediate military pressure but expose communities to additional reprisals may undermine some of their intended political effects. Likewise, administrative initiatives undertaken without adequate security protection may place participating civilians at greater risk.

Violence Against Civilians and the Attribution Problem

The civilian consequences of the conflict must be assessed across all relevant categories of armed actors rather than through insurgent violence alone.

The Africa Center’s August 2026 dataset indicates that civilian fatalities form a substantial share of violence associated with Islamic State forces in the Sahel, particularly in Niger. It also draws attention to civilian fatalities associated with state and state-aligned military operations in Mali and Burkina Faso.

These findings require careful attribution. Fatalities associated with military operations, alleged unlawful killings, civilian deaths caused by indiscriminate attacks and deaths arising from direct targeting are not automatically interchangeable categories.

Any legal assessment must distinguish the existence of civilian casualties from a determination that a particular act violated international humanitarian law. The latter depends on the applicable rules and the specific facts of the incident.

Nevertheless, the strategic consequences of civilian victimisation do not depend entirely on the completion of judicial proceedings. Repeated reports of civilian harm may weaken confidence in security institutions, discourage cooperation and intensify local grievances.

Civilian security must therefore be treated as an independently measurable outcome, not merely as an additional consideration within the evaluation of military engagements.

Source: Africa Center for Strategic Studies — Militant Islamist Violence Assessment — August 2026.

Civilian Economic Security and the Limits of Coercive Administration

Insecurity also affects civilian life through the disruption of agricultural production, pastoral activity, local commerce and transport.

These economic systems are especially important in rural areas, where access to land, seasonal migration routes, livestock markets and small-scale trade can determine household survival.

Armed organisations may impose payments or restrictions on these activities, while governments may adopt emergency measures intended to reduce the movement of resources available to insurgent networks.

Both forms of intervention can alter civilian economic behaviour. The relevant policy distinction concerns legality, proportionality, accountability and the availability of mechanisms to protect livelihoods.

Measures that reduce access to essential goods or prevent civilians from sustaining basic economic activity can generate consequences extending beyond their immediate security objectives. Where household livelihoods deteriorate and public institutions cannot provide effective alternatives, the economic consequences can weaken confidence in the state.

This produces an institutional challenge rather than a purely military one. Restoring lawful economic activity requires access to markets, credible administration and protection against coercive extraction. These functions cannot be provided by armed deployment alone.

Measuring State Legitimacy Without Invented Scores

State legitimacy is often discussed as though it were a single measurable variable. In the context of West African insecurity, such an approach risks obscuring important distinctions.

Formal constitutional authority, public confidence, administrative performance, security effectiveness and compliance with legal obligations are separate dimensions. They may be related, but none can be substituted automatically for another.

A defensible institutional assessment should examine observable indicators instead of assigning arbitrary national legitimacy scores.

Institutional dimension	Observable indicator	Evidence required	Interpretation
Civilian safety	Verified killings, injuries, abductions and exposure to threats	Incident records with credible attribution	Direct civilian-security conditions
Territorial accessibility	Regular civilian movement and access to local communities	Transport, humanitarian and local-administration records	Practical reach of public authority
Justice	Functioning courts, dispute-resolution access and implementation of decisions	Judicial and administrative reporting	Availability of lawful public remedies
Education	School accessibility, functioning classes and teacher presence	Education ministry and UNICEF data	Continuity of an essential public service
Healthcare	Functioning health facilities and access to essential treatment	Health-system and humanitarian records	Capacity to protect public welfare
Economic activity	Market operation, agricultural access and lawful movement of goods	Official economic and local market data	Economic functioning under state institutions
Accountability	Investigations, disciplinary proceedings and remedies for violations	Judicial, parliamentary and oversight records	Responsiveness of institutions to misconduct
Displacement and return	New displacement, voluntary return and sustainability of reintegration	UNHCR, IOM and national records	Population stability and conditions for safe return

The analytical value of this approach lies in its ability to reveal conflicting trends. A locality may exhibit improved security-force presence but continued school closure, while another may experience reduced attack frequency without a corresponding restoration of judicial or healthcare services.

These distinctions should remain visible rather than be compressed into a composite numerical index unsupported by comparable official data.

State Authority and Civilian Security: A Structural Interpretation

The relationship between civilian protection and durable state authority operates through several mutually dependent institutional functions.

The initial requirement is physical safety: people must be able to live, travel and conduct lawful activities without systematic violence or intimidation.

Physical safety permits the functioning of public institutions, including schools, healthcare facilities, courts and administrative services. Their continuity in turn reduces the need for civilians to rely on non-state coercive organisations for access to basic resources or dispute resolution.

Institutional continuity can also strengthen public confidence and improve the quality of information available to government authorities. However, these effects are conditional. The conduct of state forces, the accessibility of public services and the treatment of local populations can reinforce or undermine the relationship.

This process should not be described as an automatic progression. A secure district may still suffer corruption, weak administration or unresolved communal disputes. Equally, the restoration of selected services cannot compensate indefinitely for the absence of physical protection.

The strategic importance of civilian security lies precisely in this interdependence. Military capacity creates some of the conditions under which public authority can function, but public authority acquires durability through repeated and credible institutional performance.

A Comparative Civilian-Security Assessment

Country or conflict area	Principal documented civilian exposure	Institutional priority	Principal measurement limitation
Mali	Displacement, disrupted transport, fuel shortages and interruption of essential services	Civilian access and continuity of public administration	Incomplete and unevenly accessible territorial reporting
Burkina Faso	Conflict-related displacement and loss of access to local services	Protection of communities and sustainable service access	Older underlying observations in some displacement series
Niger	Conflict-related displacement and civilian exposure in several frontier regions	Protection, administrative continuity and cross-border humanitarian access	Different geographic and temporal coverage among datasets
Northeastern Nigeria	Civilian harm and disruption associated with the Lake Chad insurgencies	Protection, civilian recovery and continuity of local institutions	Multiple armed actors and overlapping security incidents
Northwestern Nigeria	Kidnapping, rural insecurity and increasing militant-linked violence	Lawful civilian protection and restoration of local economic security	Difficult separation of criminal and jihadist incidents
Northern Benin and Togo	Continued exposure to cross-border threats despite declining fatalities	Consolidation of security improvements and public confidence	Fatality reductions do not measure every form of coercion
Northern Côte d’Ivoire	Potential exposure to cross-border instability	Preventive security and institutional continuity	National aggregate measures may conceal localised threats

The Strategic Significance of Generational Damage

The cumulative effects of conflict on education, economic participation and population displacement create risks that extend far beyond the current military campaigns.

Large-scale disruption of schooling affects the future supply of skilled labour and the capacity of public institutions to recruit qualified personnel. Prolonged displacement may alter local demographics, weaken existing social networks and complicate access to land and property. Repeated economic disruption can erode household savings and reduce the capacity of communities to recover from subsequent shocks.

These effects are not uniform and cannot be translated into numerical forecasts without suitable longitudinal data. Their strategic relevance, however, is clear: the deterioration of human capital and public-service capacity can outlast the immediate security conditions that originally caused it.

Consequently, the restoration of civilian institutions should be considered part of national security resilience rather than a distinct humanitarian activity whose strategic relevance begins only after military operations end.

Key Judgments — Chapter 4

The civilian consequences of West African insecurity have reached a scale that directly affects the sustainability of national institutions. Forced displacement, school closures and disruption of essential economic activity are not incidental outcomes; they influence the ability of governments to maintain public authority and preserve the institutional foundations of long-term security.

Official figures demonstrate the magnitude of these pressures, but their statistical universes must remain distinct. UNHCR’s displacement figures, UNICEF’s education estimates and conflict-fatality datasets measure different populations and phenomena and cannot be combined into a single numerical security index without defensible methods.

The central political distinction is between formal state sovereignty and the practical ability to protect populations, guarantee lawful economic activity and maintain accessible public institutions. Armed organisations can exercise coercive influence without possessing recognised political authority, while a government can retain constitutional jurisdiction without guaranteeing effective security throughout its territory.

The assessment would change materially if verified longitudinal data demonstrated sustained improvements in civilian protection, school reopening, voluntary and safe return of displaced populations, functioning local administration and access to basic services across currently contested territories.

Pillar I — Integrated Net Assessment

The four chapters establish a differentiated picture of West Africa’s conflict system as of 9 October 2026.

The region is experiencing a changing geography of insecurity in which some armed organisations demonstrate substantial operational reach, while national governments confront increasingly complex military, economic and institutional responsibilities. The conflict is not uniform: the intensity of the Lake Chad Basin, the coercive pressure affecting Malian economic networks, the different security challenges of Burkina Faso and Niger, and the comparatively improved fatality trends in Benin and Togo cannot be reduced to one regional trajectory.

JNIM occupies a dominant position in the recorded Sahelian militant-linked fatality dataset, while Islamic State-associated organisations and Boko Haram-linked networks demonstrate distinct patterns of violence, geographic concentration and civilian exposure. These differences require separate organisational assessments and caution against treating the various movements as elements of a single unified insurgency.

Military effectiveness remains inseparable from institutional performance. The availability of weapons systems and personnel is relevant, but the public record supports no automatic inference from procurement or nominal force strength to readiness, sustained territorial security or effective civilian protection.

The civilian environment ultimately determines whether security effects can become politically durable. Millions of displaced persons, widespread education disruption and the deterioration of economic access demonstrate the extent to which prolonged conflict can undermine the institutions through which states exercise practical authority.

The governing judgment of Pillar I is that the future balance of power in West Africa will depend not solely on armed organisations’ ability to conduct violence, but on the relative capacity of states and non-state actors to shape civilian security, economic access and the everyday exercise of authority.

This judgment provides the analytical basis for Pillar II, which will examine regional institutions, external security partnerships, economic infrastructure and the strategic consequences for European governments. These questions require a separate institutional and geopolitical assessment rather than repetition of the military and civilian findings developed here.

Principal official and institutional records for Pillar I

• Thirty-eighth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, S/2026/651 — United Nations Security Council — August 2026
• Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel, S/2026/537 — United Nations Secretary-General — June 2026
• Security Council Briefing on West Africa and the Sahel — UNOWAS — July 2026
• Mounting Fatalities Linked to Militant Islamist Violence in Africa amid Shifting Tactics — Africa Center for Strategic Studies — August 2026
• UNHCR High Commissioner Calls for Investment in Protection and Solutions in the Central Sahel — UNHCR — September 2026
• Sahel Crisis Regional Operational Data Portal — UNHCR — September 2026
• Education Under Crisis: School Closures Nearly Double in Five Years in West and Central Africa — UNICEF — September 2025

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PILLAR II — REGIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND STRATEGIC COMPETITION

Chapter 5 — ECOWAS, the Alliance of Sahel States and Regional Political Fragmentation

Strategic Judgment: West Africa Is Developing Two Competing Political Architectures Without Ending Their Economic Interdependence

The institutional restructuring of West Africa has reached a stage at which the distinction between political sovereignty and economic interdependence has become one of the principal determinants of regional stability. The formal withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from the Economic Community of West African States has produced a new configuration of regional governance, but it has not eliminated the practical relationships through which people, commodities, financial transactions and security interests connect the Sahelian interior to the Atlantic economies.

This divergence constitutes the fundamental strategic challenge of the post-withdrawal period. The three governments have sought to consolidate their autonomy through the Confederation of Sahel States, commonly identified by its French acronym AES. ECOWAS, meanwhile, has maintained mechanisms intended to prevent institutional separation from becoming an immediate rupture of regional trade and population mobility. The result is neither complete disengagement nor functioning reintegration, but a transitional arrangement in which political membership, economic rights and security cooperation are increasingly governed through different institutional channels.

The official date of withdrawal was 29 January 2025, following the notification and withdrawal procedures under Article 91 of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty. ECOWAS confirmed the effective departure of all three states in a statement published on 30 January 2025. Crucially, that statement also requested that existing ECOWAS passports and identity cards from the departing countries continue to be recognised, that goods and services continue to receive treatment under the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme, and that citizens continue to benefit from visa-free movement, residence and establishment arrangements until further notice.

These transitional provisions are of greater strategic importance than their administrative appearance suggests. They demonstrate that ECOWAS recognised the potential economic and social costs of an abrupt institutional rupture and sought to preserve essential regional functions while the future relationship remained under negotiation. They do not, however, constitute a permanent settlement of the legal and economic consequences of withdrawal.

The appointment of former Guinean prime minister and former ECOWAS executive secretary Lansana Kouyaté as chief negotiator on 23 March 2026 confirms that the relationship has entered a more formal negotiating phase. His mandate concerns reconciliation of regional interests and the advancement of ECOWAS priorities in discussions with the AES countries. The appointment establishes a diplomatic mechanism, not an agreement on the final status of the three states.

Sources: ECOWAS Press Statement on the Withdrawal of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger — ECOWAS — January 2025; ECOWAS Appoints Lansana Kouyaté as Chief Negotiator — ECOWAS — March 2026.

The Legal and Institutional Consequences of Withdrawal

The withdrawal process must be distinguished from the termination of every legal relationship previously established within the ECOWAS system. Membership, treaty obligations, transitional arrangements, commercial rights and separate subregional agreements do not necessarily terminate according to identical legal rules.

The Revised ECOWAS Treaty provides the principal legal framework for withdrawal from the organisation. Its implementation raises questions concerning institutional representation, participation in ECOWAS programmes, acquired rights, financial obligations and the continuing application of agreements involving states that remain economically interconnected.

ECOWAS identified five principal areas requiring negotiated treatment at its extraordinary Council of Ministers session in Accra in April 2025: legal and institutional adjustments; market access and economic integration; peace and security cooperation; sectoral development programmes; and human development, including education and health. This categorisation is significant because it establishes that the institutional consequences extend far beyond diplomatic representation.

The future framework could preserve selected economic and administrative functions while leaving political membership suspended or terminated. Alternatively, agreements could become more fragmented, requiring separate arrangements for trade, transit, security cooperation and population movement. Neither outcome can be treated as established without the relevant operative instruments.

The distinction between ECOWAS and the West African Economic and Monetary Union, WAEMU/UEMOA, is also essential. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger share the West African CFA franc through the monetary institutions of the regional currency union. Their withdrawal from ECOWAS does not, by itself, establish withdrawal from WAEMU or termination of their participation in the common monetary framework. Treating the two organisations as legally interchangeable would produce a materially incorrect account of their monetary sovereignty and external financial relationships.

Sources: ECOWAS Extraordinary Council of Ministers on Withdrawal Arrangements — ECOWAS — April 2025; ECOWAS Official Withdrawal Statement — January 2025.

Institutional Comparison: ECOWAS and the AES

Institutional characteristic	ECOWAS	Confederation of Sahel States (AES)	Strategic consequence
Institutional foundations	Treaty-based regional economic and political organisation	Confederation established by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger	Different sources of legal authority
Membership after January 2025	12 member states	3 member states	Divergent regional representation
Principal political framework	ECOWAS Revised Treaty and implementing instruments	AES founding and confederal instruments	Distinct institutional obligations
Security cooperation	Regional peace and security mechanisms, including the ECOWAS Standby Force architecture	Defence cooperation and a developing unified force	Separate command and planning arrangements
Economic integration	ECOWAS trade and free-movement instruments	Confederation-level coordination; continued external economic dependencies	Transitional rights require negotiation
Monetary arrangements	Member states operate under different monetary systems	Three members remain within WAEMU and the CFA franc framework	Political separation does not equal monetary separation
Diplomatic relations	Negotiating future relations with AES states	Negotiating relations with ECOWAS	Institutional separation remains subject to diplomatic management
External partnerships	Broad relationships with African and international institutions	Sovereignty-centred arrangements with selected external partners	More differentiated diplomatic alignment

The table establishes institutional differences, not a ranking of effectiveness. Neither a larger membership nor a more integrated political declaration proves superior practical security performance.

The AES Unified Force: From Political Commitment to Legal Institutionalisation

A significant development occurred in July 2026, when the defence ministers of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger met in Ouagadougou to review and validate the legal status of the AES Unified Force.

According to the Malian government’s announcement published on 14 July 2026, the meeting took place on 10 July under the chairmanship of Burkina Faso’s defence minister, Major General Célestin Simporé. The participating delegations validated the legal status of the unified force and adopted directives for the confederation’s second year.

The Malian government described the legal framework as intended to facilitate cross-border operations and reduce administrative obstacles to coordinated military activity.

This constitutes an identifiable stage of institutional development. It should not, however, be confused with independently verified proof of a fully operational integrated army. A legal status can define authority and responsibilities without establishing that participating national formations have achieved common logistics, interoperable communications, unified operational planning or enduring readiness.

The substantive test will therefore concern the implementation of the legal framework: the allocation of command authority, financing responsibilities, accountability procedures, national contingents and the relationship between confederal military institutions and the existing armed forces of the three states.

Source: Confédération de l’Alliance des États du Sahel: Le statut juridique de la Force unifiée validé à Ouagadougou — Gouvernement du Mali — July 2026.

The Sovereignty Paradox: Political Autonomy and Economic Dependence

The three AES states face a structural contradiction common to landlocked economies: political institutions can pursue greater autonomy while their economic systems remain dependent on infrastructure located outside national territory.

Commercial access to Atlantic ports, international shipping, imported fuel, industrial equipment, fertilisers, pharmaceuticals and other essential goods requires cross-border arrangements. Even where governments diversify their diplomatic partners, they cannot eliminate the geographic significance of neighbouring transit states.

This produces an important distinction between three forms of sovereignty.

Constitutional sovereignty concerns the legal authority of the state and its recognised institutions.

Strategic sovereignty concerns the capacity to make and implement security and foreign-policy decisions without unacceptable external constraints.

Economic sovereignty concerns the practical ability to finance government functions, access essential markets and maintain national economic activity.

These dimensions may develop at different speeds. A government may increase its freedom to select security partners while remaining exposed to transport disruptions, commodity-price movements and regional financial conditions. Equally, a country may preserve monetary and commercial integration without accepting the political authority of a particular regional institution.

The future of the AES should consequently be evaluated through its actual capacity to reconcile these dimensions rather than through public declarations of sovereignty alone.

The Strategic Negotiation Agenda for 2026–2031

Negotiation area	Concrete issue	Existing documentary baseline	Consequence of an unresolved dispute
Movement of people	Recognition of identity documents, residence and establishment	ECOWAS transitional continuation arrangements	Legal uncertainty for cross-border populations
Trade	Treatment of qualifying goods under regional liberalisation rules	Temporary continuity requested by ECOWAS	Administrative friction and higher transaction costs
Transit	Customs cooperation and treatment of international commercial traffic	Dependence on bilateral and regional arrangements	Risk of transport delays and commercial disputes
Security	Information exchange and cross-border cooperation	Separate ECOWAS and AES institutional frameworks	Weaker coordination against transnational threats
Institutional obligations	Personnel, property, programmes and outstanding commitments	ECOWAS negotiation framework	Disputes over acquired rights and responsibilities
Human development	Education, health and cross-border public programmes	Identified in ECOWAS contingency discussions	Discontinuity of services and funding
Diplomatic representation	Relations between ECOWAS and AES institutions	Chief negotiator appointed March 2026	Prolonged institutional uncertainty

The most consequential outcome would be an arrangement capable of maintaining civilian economic activity and practical security cooperation without requiring either side to resolve every disagreement concerning political legitimacy or regional institutional design.

Key Judgments — Chapter 5

The institutional separation of ECOWAS and the AES is a verified political fact, but the final legal and economic relationship remains subject to negotiation. The preservation of selected movement and trade arrangements reflects mutual economic dependencies that cannot be eliminated through political withdrawal alone.

The July 2026 validation of the AES Unified Force’s legal status indicates progress in confederal defence institution-building. It does not independently establish operational effectiveness.

The principal strategic indicator for the next five years will be whether the two regional systems achieve practical compatibility in trade, transit and security cooperation while maintaining their separate political identities.

Chapter 6 — Russia, China, Türkiye and the Transformation of Security Partnerships

Strategic Judgment: External Competition Is Shifting from Exclusive Security Relationships to Overlapping Systems of Military, Technological and Economic Dependence

External involvement in West African security has entered a more fragmented and competitive phase. The declining political acceptability of certain Western military partnerships within the central Sahel has created opportunities for alternative security relationships, particularly with Russia. China operates through a broader combination of economic, technological and institutional engagement, while Türkiye has expanded its profile through defence-industrial relationships and diplomatic cooperation.

These actors should not be treated as a coordinated strategic bloc. Their commercial interests, forms of political influence, defence-industrial capabilities and relationships with African governments differ substantially.

The more consequential transformation concerns the conditions under which national governments obtain external support. Security cooperation increasingly involves decisions about equipment supply, technical maintenance, training, financing, data systems, industrial participation and political backing. These relationships can provide governments with additional choices, but also create new forms of dependence whose consequences become visible over the operational lifetime of military and technological systems.

The selection of an external partner is therefore not a one-time procurement decision. It can determine long-term access to spare parts, technical documentation, software updates, maintenance personnel, munitions, training and financing. In sensitive defence sectors, these dependencies may constrain future policy options even where the initial agreement is presented as an assertion of strategic independence.

Russia: Security Influence and the Political Economy of Military Assistance

Russia’s position in the central Sahel has been strengthened by the political realignment of military-led governments and the departure or reduction of several Western military arrangements. Russian involvement has combined bilateral military relations with the activities of Russian-linked armed personnel and the subsequent development of arrangements associated with Africa Corps.

The distinction between historical Wagner operations and later Russian state-linked structures matters. They differ in formal organisational positioning, command relationships and the extent to which public Russian institutions acknowledge responsibility. It would be analytically incorrect to assume that all personnel, contracts or activities attributed to these formations possess an identical legal status.

Russian security relationships must also be separated into several categories: training and technical assistance, equipment provision, operational support, diplomatic backing and possible commercial arrangements. Evidence establishing one category does not automatically establish another.

The August 2026 security environment illustrates the limits of assessing these relationships through political access alone. Russian involvement may strengthen particular government capabilities or provide political reassurance, but the presence of Russian personnel does not independently establish that insurgent organisations have lost operational reach or that civilian security has improved.

A second dimension concerns control over strategic narratives. Russian foreign-policy positioning has frequently emphasised sovereignty and criticism of Western intervention. These messages may resonate with governments seeking alternatives to earlier partnerships, but their political effectiveness must be distinguished from measurable military outcomes.

A third dimension concerns commercial exposure. Any claim that a Russian security relationship is financed by rights to mineral resources, concessions or state assets requires the relevant contracts, corporate disclosures or official decisions. Such arrangements cannot be assumed merely from the coexistence of Russian security activity and the presence of valuable natural resources.

China’s Security and Development Model: The 2025–2027 FOCAC Framework

China’s relationship with African states is more explicitly structured through continent-wide programmes that combine development finance, industrial cooperation, technology and security initiatives.

The most important current institutional document is the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2025–2027), adopted in September 2024.

The plan contains unusually specific commitments. China announced RMB 360 billion in financial support over the three-year period, consisting of RMB 210 billion in credit lines, RMB 80 billion in various forms of assistance and at least RMB 70 billion of investment by Chinese companies.

The security component includes a stated RMB 1 billion military grant, the training of 6,000 military personnel, invitations for 500 young African military officers and training for 1,000 police and law-enforcement officers. The plan also addresses counterterrorism cooperation, maritime security, demining and the protection of Chinese projects and personnel.

These commitments are Africa-wide, not allocations specifically earmarked for Mali, Burkina Faso or Niger. They also represent an agreed programme and announced financial framework, not independently verified evidence that every amount has been disbursed or every training activity completed.

Source: Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Beijing Action Plan (2025–2027) — Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China — September 2024.

China’s Official Commitments: Financial and Security Breakdown

Commitment	Announced amount or quantity	Period	Geographic scope	Documentary status
Total financial support	RMB 360 billion	2025–2027	Africa-wide	Announced FOCAC framework
Credit lines	RMB 210 billion	2025–2027	Africa-wide	Announced component
Various forms of assistance	RMB 80 billion	2025–2027	Africa-wide	Announced component
Chinese corporate investment	At least RMB 70 billion	2025–2027	Africa-wide	Announced investment expectation
Military grant	RMB 1 billion	Action-plan period	Africa-wide	Security commitment
Military personnel training	6,000 personnel	Action-plan period	Africa-wide	Training commitment
Young military officer visits	500 officers	Action-plan period	Africa-wide	Programme commitment
Police and law-enforcement training	1,000 officers	Action-plan period	Africa-wide	Training commitment

This framework makes China a significant potential supplier of institutional capabilities, but it must be interpreted through implementation records. Announced training places are not equivalent to completed programmes, and credit lines should not be described as grants or expenditure already incurred.

The security significance extends beyond weapons. Police training, communications infrastructure, surveillance technology and project protection may affect the relationship between civilian security institutions and national defence organisations. These systems can offer useful capabilities while raising questions about data governance, procurement transparency, interoperability and civil liberties.

Türkiye: Defence-Industrial Cooperation and the Importance of Lifecycle Dependence

Türkiye represents a different model of external engagement, with a particularly visible role in defence-industrial cooperation and the international market for unmanned aircraft and associated military systems.

The strategic significance of Turkish defence exports lies not only in acquisition costs but in the wider system required to operate exported equipment. Aircraft, sensors, ground-control systems, communications, maintenance and operator training form an integrated capability. The acquisition of a platform does not establish that the receiving country can maintain its intended operational tempo or independently support the system over time.

Turkish systems may offer governments an alternative to traditional Western, Russian or Chinese suppliers. That diversification can improve procurement flexibility, but genuine autonomy depends on the availability of technical support, replacement components, qualified personnel and predictable contractual arrangements.

Country-specific quantities, delivery dates and contractual values require official procurement or manufacturer evidence. Publicly observed use of a particular platform does not establish the complete contract value or disclose financing, spare-parts provisions and long-term maintenance obligations.

The broader strategic implication is that defence-industrial relationships increasingly shape diplomatic relations. Countries purchasing sophisticated military systems may develop long-term cooperation with the supplying state through training, technical exchange and support agreements, even without establishing formal military alliances.

Comparative External-Partner Analysis

Strategic dimension	Russia	China	Türkiye
Principal engagement model	State security relationships and military assistance	Integrated economic, technological and institutional cooperation	Defence-industrial exports and bilateral cooperation
Primary institutional channel	Government-to-government defence relations and Russian-linked security structures	FOCAC, bilateral state agreements and commercial institutions	Bilateral government relationships and defence manufacturers
Key defence contribution	Military personnel, technical assistance and equipment relationships	Equipment, training, law enforcement and wider technological cooperation	Unmanned systems and associated military capabilities
Economic dimension	Bilateral commercial relationships requiring contract-level verification	Credit, assistance, investment and infrastructure cooperation	Commercial exports and related industrial relationships
Principal dependency risk	Personnel, equipment support and political alignment	Financing, technology standards and data-system dependence	Platform support, maintenance and technical continuity
Principal verification requirement	Formal legal responsibility, contracts and operational outcomes	Disbursements, delivered capabilities and project-level results	Contract awards, deliveries, support arrangements and availability
Strategic limitation	Political access does not establish successful stabilisation	Africa-wide commitments cannot be assigned automatically to Sahel states	Equipment ownership does not establish sustained operational performance

Security Partnerships as Long-Term Strategic Commitments

The proliferation of external partnerships creates opportunities for governments to reduce dependence on a single supplier. Yet diversification itself can produce new difficulties.

Armed forces operating equipment from multiple countries may face differing maintenance arrangements, communications standards, ammunition requirements, procurement procedures and technical training systems. Such complexity can increase financial and organisational burdens even if individual procurement choices are economically attractive.

Foreign assistance can also shape the distribution of institutional authority within receiving states. Training programmes may strengthen particular departments; equipment supplied to intelligence or police institutions can alter their responsibilities; and operational support agreements may create long-term requirements for foreign specialists.

These effects should be assessed through transparent legal and contractual arrangements, not presumed from geopolitical affiliation.

The critical strategic distinction is between supplier diversification and capability sovereignty. A diversified procurement portfolio may improve political choice, but sustainable capability requires maintenance, financing, trained personnel, lawful oversight and access to the technical systems necessary for independent operation.

Key Judgments — Chapter 6

Russia, China and Türkiye represent different models of engagement rather than a unified alternative security architecture. Russian relations are especially consequential for the military-led governments of the central Sahel; China offers a broader framework combining finance, training and technology; Türkiye’s defence-industrial relationships have implications extending over the lifecycle of military equipment.

The most substantial verified quantitative framework is China’s FOCAC Action Plan for 2025–2027. Its financial and security commitments must be treated as Africa-wide announced programmes until country-level implementation is independently established.

The long-term strategic issue is the balance between diversification of suppliers and the creation of new financial, technical and political dependencies. The number of external partners cannot itself measure the security capacity or sovereign autonomy of recipient states.

Chapter 7 — Trade Corridors, Energy, Mining and the Economics of Insecurity

Strategic Judgment: West African Economic Sovereignty Is Increasingly Determined by Export Infrastructure, Mineral Revenues and the Security of Cross-Border Supply Chains

The economic consequences of West African instability extend beyond the destruction and immediate disruption associated with armed conflict. They concern the ability of governments to finance national institutions, maintain access to international markets, attract investment and secure the infrastructure through which natural resources are converted into fiscal revenue.

For the three AES economies, the structural challenge is particularly acute because each depends on external connections for important categories of international trade. Mali’s export economy is highly concentrated in gold, with lithium becoming more prominent. Burkina Faso relies on agriculture, services and mining, while Niger’s economic transformation has been increasingly influenced by oil production and exports.

These sectors are exposed to different forms of risk. Mines can continue producing despite insecurity elsewhere in the country, although transport, labour, finance and regulatory uncertainty may affect their operations. Oil production depends on specialised infrastructure and export arrangements. Agricultural livelihoods are sensitive to the availability of land, fertiliser, transport and market access.

The resulting relationship between economic performance and national security is neither uniform nor linear. A country may record substantial GDP growth while suffering severe insecurity in particular regions. Equally, a fall in commodity exports may result from prices, production volumes, regulatory disputes or security disruption, and should not automatically be attributed to insurgent activity.

Official World Bank data published during 2026 illustrate this divergence. Mali’s economy is projected to grow by 5.0% in 2026, supported by mining and services, while Niger’s growth is estimated at 7.0%, driven in part by oil production. Burkina Faso’s economy expanded by an estimated 5.3% in 2025, compared with 4.8% in 2024. These figures establish continuing economic activity despite insecurity, but not the distribution of gains across households or regions.

Sources: Mali Country Economic Overview — World Bank — 2026; Niger Country Economic Overview — World Bank — 2026; Burkina Faso Economic Update — World Bank — June 2026.

Comparative Economic Baseline

Indicator	Mali	Burkina Faso	Niger
Latest verified real GDP growth figure	4.1% in 2025	5.3% in 2025	7.0% estimated for 2026
2026 growth outlook	5.0% projected	Positive outlook, subject to current official forecast vintage	7.0% estimated
Major export or growth sectors	Gold, emerging lithium, agriculture and services	Gold, agriculture, services and mining	Oil, agriculture, mining and investment
Structural vulnerability	Export concentration and trade-corridor dependence	Rural livelihoods, security conditions and mining-sector governance	Oil-export infrastructure, fiscal constraints and climate exposure
Critical external dependency	Regional transport and imported fuel	Regional trade connections and specialised imports	Oil-export infrastructure and external transport
Fiscal transmission	Mining revenues and customs-linked economic activity	Mineral revenues, taxation and sectoral formalisation	Petroleum revenues, security expenditure and external finance
Main analytical caution	Growth does not establish territorial economic normalisation	Growth can coexist with substantial regional disparities	Oil-led expansion can mask weaknesses elsewhere

The different reference years are intentional. The table records verified official values and does not treat a 2025 observation as a 2026 forecast.

Mali: Gold, Lithium and the Increasing Cost of Commercial Access

Mali’s economy demonstrates how export concentration and insecurity can coexist with positive national growth.

The World Bank identifies gold as the principal export commodity and lithium as an increasingly important contributor to the country’s export structure. It projects growth of 5.0% in 2026 and an average of approximately 5.3% over 2027–2028, supported by mineral production, services and agricultural recovery.

At the same time, the Bank projects a current-account deficit of 5.2% of GDP in 2026, reflecting the interaction of weaker cotton exports and higher expenditure on fuel, freight and construction materials. Inflation is projected to exceed the WAEMU 3% ceiling, partly because of higher fuel and agricultural-input costs related to supply-chain disruption.

These figures reveal a dual economic reality. The mining sector may support export revenues and aggregate growth while higher import costs transmit instability into domestic markets. When fuel and freight costs rise, the burden can reach sectors unrelated to mining, including agricultural production, transport services and household consumption.

This distinction is central to evaluating economic resilience. A favourable export commodity price may strengthen fiscal receipts without compensating all households or enterprises for disruptions to transport and essential imports.

The expansion of lithium production introduces a second strategic dimension. Lithium-related investment may diversify exports beyond gold, but diversification among mineral commodities does not necessarily produce broad economic diversification. Both gold and lithium rely on specialised capital, international buyers, transport links and regulatory arrangements.

Mali’s long-term economic resilience will therefore depend on whether export revenues support productive investment and public services rather than merely increasing the contribution of extractive industries to GDP.

Source: Mali Country Economic Overview and Outlook — World Bank — 2026.

Burkina Faso: Mining-Sector Growth and the Problem of Broad-Based Development

Burkina Faso’s June 2026 Economic Update provides an important counterexample to the assumption that insecurity necessarily produces continuous economic contraction.

The World Bank estimates that real GDP growth increased from 4.8% in 2024 to 5.3% in 2025, while real GDP growth per capita increased from 2.5% to 3.0%.

The Bank attributes this performance to several factors, including favourable agricultural conditions, the government’s agropastoral and fisheries initiatives, resilient services and the mining sector. It also identifies the formalisation of artisanal and semi-mechanised mining and the entry into force of the new Mining Code as relevant developments.

These changes have implications for fiscal capacity and resource governance. Formalisation can potentially improve the state’s visibility over production and commercial transactions, but increased formal registration does not itself establish improved environmental compliance, public accountability or distribution of economic benefits.

The principal structural question is whether mining revenues can help finance productive employment, infrastructure and essential public institutions. The World Bank explicitly identifies job creation and broader economic opportunity as necessary if aggregate growth is to produce durable improvements in living standards.

This is particularly relevant where insecurity affects labour mobility, agricultural markets and access to remote communities. Extractive output can increase while conflict-affected households experience a deterioration in economic security.

Source: Burkina Faso: World Bank Calls for Economic Resilience to Become a Sustainable Drive of Jobs and Opportunity — World Bank — June 2026.

Niger: Oil Exports Are Transforming the Country’s Economic Geography

Niger’s increasing petroleum production represents one of the most consequential economic changes in the central Sahel.

The completion of the Niger–Benin export pipeline in May 2024 increased the oil sector’s significance for exports, economic growth and government revenue. The infrastructure also created a major strategic dependence on the continuity of cross-border pipeline operations and access to international shipping.

The World Bank’s latest country overview estimates Niger’s real GDP growth at 7.0% in 2026, equivalent to approximately 3.1% per capita, with oil production among the principal contributors. Inflation is estimated at −1.9%, while the fiscal deficit is expected to reach 3.4% of GDP as spending increases on security, post-flood reconstruction and support for vulnerable households.

The Bank projects average annual growth of approximately 6.4% over 2027–2028, supported by sustained oil production and activity in other sectors. These estimates establish a positive macroeconomic trajectory but remain subject to security conditions, commodity markets, fiscal management and climate shocks.

The crucial economic distinction is between creating an export route and guaranteeing its continuous availability. Pipeline infrastructure is capital-intensive and geographically fixed. Its economic value depends on sustained operations, contractual performance, maintenance and secure access to maritime export markets.

Sources: Niger Country Economic Overview — World Bank — 2026; Niger Macroeconomic Outlook — World Bank — 2025.

Nigerien Crude Oil: Documented International Trade Exposure in 2025

World Bank WITS data based on international merchandise-trade reporting provide a particularly important quantitative basis for assessing Niger’s changing commercial relationships.

For 2025, the database records approximately US$1.891 billion of Nigerien crude-oil exports, classified under HS code 2709. Italy appears as the largest reported partner in the available country breakdown, with approximately US$858.1 million, followed by the Netherlands at approximately US$628.0 million.

These values represent reported merchandise exports, not Nigerien government revenue, corporate profit, confirmed refinery receipts or direct evidence of the final physical destination of each cargo. They should also not be conflated with ownership of the export pipeline or production infrastructure.

Reported partner	2025 export value, US$ million	Reported quantity, thousand tonnes
Italy	858.1	1,841.4
Netherlands	628.0	1,384.8
China	163.4	287.8
Singapore	88.9	144.6
United Kingdom	85.4	144.1
Germany	67.0	142.1
World total	1,890.8	3,944.9

The partner entries shown sum approximately to the reported world total, subject to rounding.

Italy’s reported share is approximately 45.4% by export value, while the Netherlands accounts for approximately 33.2%. Taken together, the two countries represent approximately 78.6% of the reported 2025 crude-export value.

This concentration creates a concrete European commercial connection to Niger’s petroleum sector. It does not establish equivalent dependence by the Italian or Dutch economies on Nigerien crude, because the importer’s exposure must be evaluated relative to total national crude imports, refining configurations and available alternative suppliers.

Source: Niger: Crude Petroleum Exports by Destination, 2025, HS 2709 — World Bank WITS / UN Comtrade.

WordPress Component — Niger’s Crude-Oil Export Concentration

This self-contained component is intended for insertion immediately after the 2025 crude-export table. Its dimensional styling is purely visual: bar lengths represent the reported values without perspective distortion, while the panels use depth effects. No external JavaScript libraries are required.

Nigeria: A Larger Economic System with Different Security Transmission Mechanisms

Nigeria requires separate treatment because its economic scale, fiscal structure and global petroleum-market connections differ markedly from those of the three AES states.

The World Bank’s Nigeria Development Update released on 8 October 2026 reports that real GDP grew by 4.2% during the first half of 2026, compared with 3.9% in the corresponding period of 2025 and 3.5% in 2024.

The Bank also records an increase in the current-account surplus from US$8.6 billion, equivalent to 6.7% of GDP, in the first half of 2025 to US$12 billion, or 7.1% of GDP, in the first half of 2026.

The increase was supported partly by higher international oil prices linked to developments in the Middle East. This creates a different exposure profile from that of the landlocked AES economies: Nigeria may benefit from higher petroleum export receipts even as energy-price developments and domestic fiscal conditions generate significant distributional effects.

Nigeria’s national economic performance must therefore be distinguished from insecurity in particular states. The existence of national growth and an improved external balance does not prove that conflict-affected communities have recovered, while regional insecurity does not necessarily imply a deterioration in every national macroeconomic indicator.

Source: From Higher Revenues to Better Lives: Strengthening State Spending for Growth, Jobs, and Services — World Bank — October 2026.

Economic Exposure Matrix: From Production to Public Revenue

Economic system	Principal asset	Main source of strategic exposure	Potential transmission into public finances	Essential evidence for quantification
Mali gold	Mining output and export channels	Commodity prices, production, fiscal arrangements and transport	Royalties, taxation and foreign-exchange earnings	Production, realised prices and audited public revenues
Mali lithium	Emerging mineral production	Project commissioning, contracts and export logistics	New mineral revenue and investment	Project-level filings and national export statistics
Burkina Faso gold	Industrial and formalising artisanal production	Security, regulation, production and market access	Tax receipts and mining-related public revenue	Government production and budget records
Niger crude oil	Production infrastructure and Niger–Benin export system	Pipeline continuity, price and export-market conditions	Petroleum-related revenue and external accounts	Export volumes, fiscal receipts and contractual terms
Nigerian petroleum	Oil and gas production and export systems	Global prices, production and fiscal management	Export earnings and federal and state revenues	Official production, budget and trade statistics
Sahelian agriculture	Cultivation, livestock and market access	Climate conditions, insecurity and transport costs	Rural incomes, food prices and indirect taxation	Agricultural production and market-price series
Coastal logistics	Maritime gateways and inland transit connections	Port efficiency, trade flows and hinterland security	Port income, customs and associated services	Port-authority data and customs statistics

Key Judgments — Chapter 7

The available economic evidence rejects the assumption that insecurity necessarily produces negative national GDP growth. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have all exhibited or are projected to exhibit positive economic performance, although the drivers and reference periods differ.

The growth of Niger’s oil exports has created substantial documented commercial links with Italy, the Netherlands and other international partners. These flows are relevant to European commercial exposure but must not be interpreted as proof of equivalent import dependence.

Mining, petroleum and agriculture transmit insecurity through different mechanisms. Their contribution to national economic resilience depends on the continuity of production, the ability to reach markets and the conversion of economic activity into sustainable public revenue.

The principal economic risk is not simply a decline in output. It is the concentration of public finances and external earnings in sectors whose operation depends on specialised infrastructure, commercial access and regulatory predictability.

Chapter 8 — International Law, Civilian Protection and Humanitarian Stability

Strategic Judgment: Changing Security Partnerships and Regional Institutions Do Not Diminish the Legal Obligations Governing Armed Conflict

The restructuring of West Africa’s security relationships creates complex questions of domestic authority, international responsibility and the legal status of external military involvement. However, changes in political alignment, the withdrawal of foreign forces or the establishment of new regional defence institutions do not suspend the application of international humanitarian law.

The principal legal distinction is between the sovereign right of a state to maintain security and the limits governing the methods through which that objective may be pursued. Governments retain authority to confront organised armed violence, subject to domestic law and applicable international obligations. Non-state armed groups are also bound by relevant rules of international humanitarian law when the conditions for their application are met.

The conflict classification is central. Many of the hostilities involving state forces and sufficiently organised non-state armed groups in West Africa are analysed through the framework of non-international armed conflict. Nevertheless, a legal classification cannot be assigned automatically to every incident occurring within a conflict-affected country. The intensity of hostilities, the organisation of the parties and the particular relationships between them must be assessed.

The existence of cross-border operations or foreign military assistance does not, by itself, determine that an entire regional conflict has become international in legal character. Different legal classifications may apply to different relationships and hostilities within the same broader security environment.

The International Committee of the Red Cross identifies Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions as a fundamental minimum applicable to non-international armed conflicts. It requires humane treatment of persons not actively participating in hostilities, including those who have laid down their arms or have been placed hors de combat.

Sources: Geneva Convention IV, Article 3 — International Committee of the Red Cross Treaty Database; ICRC Commentary on Common Article 3 — International Committee of the Red Cross — 2020.

Sovereignty and the Law Governing Internal Armed Conflict

Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions contains an explicit provision protecting state sovereignty from an interpretation that would authorise external intervention.

Article 3 provides that nothing in the Protocol may be invoked to affect the sovereignty of a state or the responsibility of its government to maintain or restore law and order by legitimate means, or to defend national unity and territorial integrity.

It also prevents the Protocol from being invoked as a justification for intervention in the internal or external affairs of the state concerned.

This provision is particularly relevant to disputes concerning humanitarian obligations and national sovereignty. Compliance with international humanitarian law does not imply recognition of an armed organisation as a legitimate government, and protection of civilians does not remove the state’s lawful authority to conduct security operations.

Equally, reliance on sovereignty does not exempt state authorities from obligations concerning humane treatment, protection of civilians and lawful conduct during hostilities.

Source: Protocol Additional II to the Geneva Conventions, Article 3 — ICRC Treaty Database.

The Status of External Military Personnel

Foreign military involvement raises legal questions that cannot be resolved simply by identifying the nationality or commercial description of the personnel concerned.

At least four different arrangements must be distinguished: foreign state armed forces operating with host-state consent; personnel deployed under bilateral military-cooperation agreements; private military or security contractors; and armed formations whose relationship with a foreign state requires further legal and factual examination.

The legal consequences depend on the nature of the activities, command relationships, applicable agreements and degree of state involvement.

The existence of a bilateral invitation may be relevant to the legality of foreign military presence under the law governing the use of force, but it does not determine the lawfulness of every military operation subsequently conducted. Nor does it automatically resolve questions of responsibility for violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law.

Responsibility may involve several distinct legal analyses, including the conduct of a state’s organs, the circumstances in which actions are attributable to a state, and the responsibility of individuals for crimes within the jurisdiction of a competent tribunal.

No conclusion about the international legal responsibility of a particular foreign government should be drawn solely from the presence of foreign personnel or from allegations that have not been evaluated against applicable attribution standards.

Legal Responsibility and Evidentiary Requirements

Legal question	Applicable analytical framework	Required evidence	Unacceptable inference
Is a non-international armed conflict occurring?	Organisation and intensity criteria	Evidence about parties, command structures and hostilities	Every violent incident is automatically part of an armed conflict
What rules protect civilians?	Common Article 3, applicable additional treaty provisions and customary IHL	Applicable legal instruments and circumstances of the operation	Civilian protection ceases because the adversary is a terrorist organisation
Is a particular attack unlawful?	Distinction, proportionality and precautions where applicable	Target, anticipated military advantage, expected civilian harm and available information	Civilian casualties alone establish illegality
Is conduct attributable to a foreign state?	International rules of state responsibility	Organ status, instructions, direction or control, as legally relevant	Nationality or political association proves attribution
Is an individual criminally responsible?	Applicable international or domestic criminal law	Conduct, mental elements, jurisdiction and admissible evidence	Organisational membership alone proves responsibility for a particular crime
Does host-state consent authorise foreign presence?	Applicable law on intervention and consent	Valid consent and scope of the authorisation	Consent automatically legalises every operation
Does withdrawal from ECOWAS alter treaty obligations?	Applicable treaty and withdrawal rules	Relevant treaty provisions and subsequent agreements	Regional withdrawal terminates all international obligations

The purpose of this distinction is not to minimise potential violations. It is to prevent legal conclusions from exceeding the evidentiary record and to preserve the difference between allegations, institutional findings and binding judgments.

The Legal Protection of Civilian Economic Activity

The civilian economy is protected through several relevant rules of international humanitarian law, although the precise application depends on the classification of the conflict and the circumstances of particular operations.

Civilian objects are protected against direct attack unless they qualify as military objectives under the applicable rules. The protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population is particularly relevant where armed organisations disrupt agricultural production, food distribution or access to essential resources.

The legal assessment of transport infrastructure requires attention to its actual use, the circumstances of an attack and the rules governing targeting and civilian harm. A road, fuel installation or commercial vehicle does not automatically become a lawful military objective merely because it contributes to the wider economy of a conflict-affected state.

Where infrastructure serves both military and civilian functions, the analysis may be especially complex. Military relevance does not eliminate the obligations to distinguish lawful objectives from civilian objects and to respect the applicable rules of proportionality and precautions.

The ICRC’s comprehensive introduction to international humanitarian law explains the importance of these principles in both international and non-international armed conflicts, while recognising differences in their treaty foundations.

Source: International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive Introduction — International Committee of the Red Cross — 2019.

Sanctions: The Difference Between International and Autonomous Legal Regimes

The legal treatment of sanctions is another area in which institutional changes have significant consequences.

The United Nations Security Council sanctions regime established by Resolution 2374 concerning Mali was not renewed in August 2023. The relevant travel-ban and asset-freeze measures expired on 31 August 2023.

The United Nations Secretariat confirmed the non-renewal and the removal of the relevant individuals from the associated Security Council sanctions list in September 2023.

This historical development is important because it prevents the obsolete regime from being described as an active UN sanctions framework in October 2026.

However, the termination of that particular sanctions regime does not imply that every actor previously associated with Mali is free of all possible restrictions. Separate UN sanctions regimes, national legislation, autonomous sanctions systems and financial-compliance obligations may remain relevant, depending on the person, entity, conduct and jurisdiction concerned.

Sources: Non-renewal of Measures Imposed by Security Council Resolution 2374 concerning Mali — United Nations Secretary-General — September 2023; Terminated Sanctions Regimes — United Nations Security Council.

Humanitarian Needs and the Growing Financing Gap

Humanitarian stability has become a major element of the regional strategic environment because the scale of need substantially exceeds the resources available for comprehensive response.

In May 2026, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs published an assessment of humanitarian requirements covering Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Niger, Cameroon’s Far North and the Nigerian states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe.

The assessment estimated that 24.3 million people would require humanitarian assistance and protection during 2026. Humanitarian partners planned to reach 15.3 million people, but financial constraints forced a narrower operational focus on 8.3 million people with the most urgent needs.

These figures represent three different planning categories: people requiring assistance, people originally targeted by the response and those subsequently prioritised under resource constraints. They must not be conflated with a single measure of displaced persons or beneficiaries already reached.

Source: Sahel: OCHA Warns of Worsening Humanitarian Needs in 2026 — UNOWAS / OCHA — May 2026.

Humanitarian Response Coverage

Planning indicator	Population
People requiring humanitarian assistance and protection	24.3 million
Original humanitarian response target	15.3 million
Most urgent needs prioritised under funding constraints	8.3 million
Difference between total need and original target	9.0 million
Difference between original target and urgent priority group	7.0 million
Share of total need represented by original target	Approximately 63.0%
Share of total need represented by urgent priority group	Approximately 34.2%

The final four rows are arithmetic comparisons derived from OCHA’s published planning figures. They do not measure the number of people actually assisted.

This distinction matters for policy. A formally announced response plan is not equivalent to a fully financed operation, and available funding does not establish successful humanitarian access to every intended beneficiary.

Humanitarian Access as an Institutional and Legal Problem

The delivery of humanitarian assistance depends on security, administrative authorisations, logistics, financing and the conduct of all relevant armed actors.

In contested areas, humanitarian organisations may face restrictions imposed by national authorities, direct threats from armed groups, insecurity affecting transport or constraints arising from sanctions and counterterrorism-compliance systems.

These obstacles do not all share the same legal character. Some may arise from legitimate regulatory responsibilities; others may involve unlawful interference, threats or attacks. Their consequences for civilian populations must be evaluated according to the particular circumstances.

The operational problem becomes more serious when humanitarian access is treated solely as a logistical question. Access may also depend on predictable legal procedures, appropriate protection of humanitarian personnel and effective communication between institutions.

The relevant policy objective is therefore to preserve the lawful delivery of impartial humanitarian assistance while ensuring that applicable security and financial-control obligations are implemented consistently with humanitarian protections.

Key Judgments — Chapter 8

The institutional reorganisation of West Africa has not displaced the rules of international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflict. Sovereignty, foreign military consent and national counterterrorism policies must be distinguished from the legal obligations governing particular military operations.

The protection of civilian economic infrastructure, the status of external military personnel and the attribution of alleged violations require incident-specific and legally grounded analysis.

Humanitarian requirements in 2026 are substantially greater than the populations initially targeted for assistance and those prioritised under funding constraints. This creates a strategic financing problem as well as an immediate humanitarian challenge.

A durable regional response will require legal compliance, humanitarian access and independent accountability mechanisms to operate alongside security and economic institutions rather than as subordinate considerations.

Chapter 9 — European Strategic Exposure: Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the EU

Strategic Judgment: Europe’s Sahel Policy Is No Longer a Unified Military Engagement but a Differentiated Combination of Energy Interests, Diplomacy, Humanitarian Finance and Regional Security Cooperation

The restructuring of West African security has altered the strategic environment facing European governments. France’s reduced military presence in the central Sahel, the development of alternative security partnerships by the AES states and the increasing significance of energy and mineral supply chains have created a situation in which European influence can no longer be measured primarily through troop deployments or historical bilateral relationships.

The European position is differentiated. Italy’s exposure includes concrete petroleum-trade relationships and continuing diplomatic links with Niger. France faces the broader consequences of a major restructuring of its political and military relationships in Francophone Africa. Germany increasingly identifies the stability of the Sahel as connected to cooperation with North African states. The United Kingdom maintains security and stability programmes through its own governmental financing and institutional arrangements. The European Union combines humanitarian assistance, diplomatic engagement and wider instruments of economic and regulatory cooperation.

These interests overlap, but they are not identical. European coordination must therefore begin with an accurate account of the authority, resources and strategic priorities of each actor rather than the assumption that a single policy instrument can serve every objective.

Italy: Nigerien Petroleum, Diplomatic Continuity and Mediterranean Security

Italy’s connection to West African security has acquired an additional economic dimension through Niger’s emergence as a significant crude-oil exporter.

The World Bank WITS dataset records approximately US$858.1 million of Nigerien crude-oil exports to Italy during 2025, making Italy the largest reported partner in that commodity’s country breakdown. The reported quantity was approximately 1.84 million tonnes.

These figures establish a measurable commercial relationship. They do not demonstrate that Italian refiners are dependent on Nigerien crude or that the entire recorded trade volume was physically processed in Italy. Such conclusions would require corresponding Italian import data, refinery-level information and shipping records.

Nevertheless, the existence of this trade flow changes the strategic assessment. Developments affecting Niger’s petroleum production, export infrastructure or cross-border commercial relations may have consequences for companies and counterparties involved in the crude supply chain.

Italy also maintains a direct diplomatic presence in Niger. On 31 May 2026, the Italian embassy in Niamey held a Republic Day event attended by representatives of the Nigerien government, local authorities, diplomatic missions and civil society. The embassy’s communication referred to continuing cooperation in sectors including agriculture, healthcare and enterprise activity.

This confirms that diplomatic and civilian-sector relations continue despite the wider political restructuring of the region. It does not, by itself, establish the current operational status of every Italian military-cooperation programme, which must be verified through the relevant parliamentary and defence documents.

Sources: Niger Crude Petroleum Exports by Partner, 2025 — World Bank WITS / UN Comtrade; Celebrazione dell’80º Anniversario della Repubblica Italiana in Niger — Ambasciata d’Italia a Niamey — June 2026.

Italy’s second strategic interest concerns the relationship between developments in West Africa and the wider Mediterranean security system. Instability can influence trade, transnational criminal activity, humanitarian requirements and population movements through routes involving North Africa.

These relationships should not be reduced to the assumption that every deterioration in Sahelian security produces a proportional increase in arrivals on Italian territory. Migration patterns depend on multiple political, economic and legal conditions, including transit-country policies, border enforcement, family networks and the circumstances of displaced populations.

The Italian policy challenge is consequently multidimensional: preserving bilateral diplomatic access, evaluating commercial exposure, supporting lawful regional stabilisation and maintaining cooperation with North African partners.

France: From Military Centrality to a Reconfigured African Partnership

France faces a different strategic challenge because the restructuring of Sahelian security directly affects the historical architecture through which Paris exercised influence in Francophone West Africa.

The reduction of French military engagement in several Sahelian states has required a broader reassessment of defence relationships, diplomatic access and the instruments through which France can support regional security objectives.

By 2026, French policy documents increasingly emphasise partnerships, investment and cooperation beyond the traditional security framework.

The Africa Forward summit held in Nairobi on 11–12 May 2026, co-organised by France and Kenya, represented a prominent example of this approach. The French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs reported approximately €23 billion of investments announced in connection with the summit.

That figure should be interpreted precisely. Announced investments are not the same as completed capital expenditure, and the summit’s commitments concern wider African economic relations rather than funding specifically allocated to the Sahel.

The summit nevertheless demonstrates a strategic effort to broaden the institutional basis of France’s African relationships toward business, innovation, investment and mutually negotiated partnerships.

Source: Africa Forward: A Summit for Renewed Partnerships between African Countries and France — France Diplomatie — May 2026.

The French position also includes continuing engagement with coastal West African states. The French Foreign Ministry’s country information, updated in September 2026, confirms that Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot visited Togo on 23–24 April 2026, with discussions addressing the Sahel and cooperation in healthcare, agriculture, digital technology and other sectors.

This illustrates a shift in geographic emphasis. Engagement with coastal states can provide diplomatic access to the wider regional crisis even where relations with the AES governments remain more difficult.

The significant analytical question is whether France can sustain effective relationships through civilian and economic institutions without recreating the political tensions associated with previous military arrangements.

Source: Togo: Political and Economic Relations — France Diplomatie — September 2026.

Germany: Sahel Stability Through North African Partnerships

Germany’s current position illustrates an increasingly important geographic interpretation of Sahelian security.

On 31 August 2026, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul explicitly connected the long-term stabilisation of the Sahel with cooperation involving Algeria and Tunisia. His official statement before travelling to those countries emphasised the importance of closer relations with North Africa for German and European security.

This is strategically significant because it identifies North African states as relevant partners in the management of security risks originating farther south.

Germany’s interests extend beyond direct military engagement. They include regional diplomacy, economic cooperation, humanitarian assistance, development financing and the broader stability of Europe’s southern neighbourhood.

The German approach also raises questions about the relationship between development assistance and government security policies. Programmes intended to strengthen public institutions must operate within political environments in which constitutional governance, military authority and the protection of civil liberties may be contested.

The central policy challenge is how to sustain useful engagement with local populations and institutions without treating national governments as interchangeable with the populations they govern.

Source: Statement by Foreign Minister Wadephul Prior to His Departure for Tunisia and Algeria — German Federal Foreign Office — August 2026.

United Kingdom: Security Assistance and Regional Stability Financing

The United Kingdom’s engagement should be assessed through its own governmental programmes rather than assumed to mirror the former French military architecture.

On 26 February 2026, the UK government published a collection of Integrated Security Fund programme summaries for Africa covering 2024–2026. The published material includes separate entries for the Sahel, West Africa and Nigerian stability programmes.

These documents confirm the existence of programme-level governmental engagement, but the published collection also states that details of certain activities are withheld for security reasons or to protect beneficiaries and partner institutions.

This creates an important limit on open-source assessment. Publicly available programme summaries may establish policy objectives, geographical scope and published financing, but they cannot provide a complete account of sensitive activities.

The British position is therefore best understood through several distinct functions: security cooperation, support for stability-related institutions, humanitarian and development engagement, and diplomatic relationships with African governments.

The actual outcomes of these programmes require evidence separate from the existence of the funding instruments. An allocation or project description does not independently demonstrate that the intended security or institutional result has been achieved.

Source: Integrated Security Fund: Africa Programme Summaries 2024 to 2026 — UK Government — February 2026.

European Union: Humanitarian Financing and Regional Policy Instruments

The European Union possesses a different institutional profile from its member states because it combines supranational financing, regulatory instruments, diplomatic coordination and selected security-policy capabilities.

The most substantial current quantitative evidence concerns humanitarian assistance.

On 22 April 2026, the European Commission announced €235 million in humanitarian assistance for West and Central Africa, including €75 million earmarked for the central Sahel.

The central Sahel allocation was intended to support emergency protection, food assistance, healthcare, nutrition, education in emergencies, shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene.

The Commission stated that more than 12.4 million people required assistance within the relevant central Sahel operational area. This figure has a different geographic and planning definition from the OCHA regional estimate of 24.3 million people examined in Chapter 8 and must not be treated as a contradictory measurement of the same population.

The EU funding announcement provides evidence of a continuing humanitarian commitment despite political tensions affecting relations with individual governments.

Source: EU Announces €235 Million in Humanitarian Aid for West and Central Africa — European Commission, DG ECHO — April 2026.

European Commission Humanitarian Funding Breakdown

Funding item	Announced amount	Geographic scope	Status
Overall humanitarian allocation	€235 million	West and Central Africa	Announced April 2026
Central Sahel allocation	€75 million	Central Sahel operational area	Component of overall allocation
Balance allocated outside this specific central Sahel component	€160 million	Other parts of the announced regional assistance package	Calculated difference
Central Sahel share of announced package	Approximately 31.9%	Share of €235 million package	Calculated percentage

The €75 million component must not be added to the €235 million overall figure. It is already included within it. Nor should the calculation of the remaining €160 million be interpreted as an allocation to any single country or programme.

European Strategic Exposure: Five Institutional Profiles

Dimension	Italy	France	Germany	United Kingdom	European Union
Principal verified 2026 engagement	Diplomatic relations with Niger; documented petroleum-trade exposure	Africa Forward and renewed coastal diplomacy	Diplomatic coordination with North African partners	Integrated Security Fund programmes	Humanitarian assistance and institutional diplomacy
Quantified relevant evidence	US$858.1m in reported 2025 Nigerien crude exports to Italy	€23bn of Africa-wide investment announcements	No comparable Sahel-specific amount established in this assessment	Programme collection published, without a common comparable total	€235m regional humanitarian announcement, including €75m central Sahel
Primary strategic concern	Energy supply-chain exposure and Mediterranean security	Long-term African partnerships and regional political access	Sahel–North Africa security relationships	Stability, security cooperation and programme performance	Humanitarian needs, regulatory coherence and regional stability
Principal policy instrument	Bilateral diplomacy and national programmes	Bilateral diplomacy, economic partnerships and development instruments	Diplomacy, development and European cooperation	National security and stability financing	EU budget instruments, humanitarian finance and common policies
Key constraint	Need to distinguish trade value from actual supply dependence	Legacy political tensions and differentiated bilateral relations	Limited direct control over Sahelian political outcomes	Incomplete public visibility of sensitive programmes	Differences in member-state priorities and implementing capacities
Required evidence for further assessment	Italian customs data, contracts and official mission authorisations	Country-level investment execution and bilateral agreements	Programme-level financing and implementation records	Individual ISF programme budgets and evaluations	Disbursements, programme results and legal mandates

The European Energy Connection: Implications of Niger’s 2025 Export Pattern

The Nigerien petroleum data provide a concrete basis for comparing European exposure.

Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany all appear among the reported destinations of Niger’s crude exports in 2025.

European partner	Reported 2025 value	Reported crude quantity
Italy	US$858.1 million	1.841 million tonnes
Netherlands	US$628.0 million	1.385 million tonnes
United Kingdom	US$85.4 million	0.144 million tonnes
Germany	US$67.0 million	0.142 million tonnes
Total, four reported European partners	US$1,638.1 million	3.513 million tonnes

This aggregate represents approximately 86.6% of Niger’s reported crude-export value in 2025. It is a calculation based on the published partner entries, not a measure of the European Union’s share of supply, because the United Kingdom is not an EU member and reported trading partners do not necessarily identify final consumption locations.

The comparison demonstrates why European security analysis should include commercial records rather than relying only on military deployments or humanitarian expenditure.

An economic relationship does not automatically produce a common foreign-policy position. However, documented commercial flows establish that developments in West African infrastructure and trade governance can have consequences for European counterparties.

Source: Niger Crude Petroleum Exports by Country, 2025 — World Bank WITS / UN Comtrade.

Strategic Policy Choices for European Governments

European governments face several choices that can be evaluated without assuming that the most interventionist option will produce the greatest security benefit.

The first is whether to maintain practical diplomatic relations with AES governments even where disagreements concerning political governance and security partnerships persist. Diplomatic engagement can preserve channels for consular matters, humanitarian access and economic questions, but may generate political controversy if it is interpreted as unconditional endorsement of a government’s conduct.

The second concerns cooperation with coastal states. Such engagement may support the resilience of important regional economic and administrative systems, provided it responds to the needs and priorities of the governments concerned. Its effectiveness must be evaluated through specific agreements and measurable results rather than the number of diplomatic initiatives announced.

The third involves commercial and infrastructure resilience. The Nigerien petroleum example demonstrates that European companies and governments have reason to evaluate exposure through actual commodity flows, contract conditions and transport dependencies.

The fourth concerns humanitarian funding. Increasing or protecting assistance can mitigate severe civilian consequences, but the availability of financing must be accompanied by lawful and practical access to affected populations.

The fifth concerns regional diplomacy. ECOWAS–AES negotiations create an institutional channel whose outcomes could affect trade, population mobility and security cooperation. European support for constructive arrangements must respect the authority of African governments and regional institutions to determine their own agreements.

European Decision Matrix

Policy option	Competent authority	Intended effect	Principal burden	Time-to-effect	Reversibility	Principal downside
Maintain bilateral diplomatic engagement	National foreign ministries	Preserve communication and practical cooperation	Diplomatic resources and political management	Immediate engagement; outcomes depend on negotiations	Generally high	Perceived political legitimisation
Support ECOWAS–AES technical agreements	African institutions, with external support where requested	Reduce economic and administrative friction	Negotiation and implementation capacity	Medium term	Depends on treaty commitments	Agreements may remain unimplemented
Strengthen coastal-state institutional resilience	Partner governments and authorised funding institutions	Improve preventive capacities and continuity of public services	Finance, training and oversight	Medium to long term	Varies by instrument	Resource diversion or weak implementation
Improve commercial supply-chain resilience	Companies, regulators and relevant governments	Reduce exposure to transport or production disruption	Investment and operational adjustment	Medium term	Usually partial	Higher commercial costs
Maintain humanitarian financing	EU and national budget authorities	Support vulnerable populations	Budget allocations and access arrangements	Near term where access exists	Funding can be adjusted, but humanitarian withdrawal has consequences	Unmet needs if coverage remains insufficient
Expand verified institutional transparency	National governments, parliaments and oversight bodies	Improve scrutiny of public commitments and results	Reporting and audit capacity	Medium term	High	Disclosure may be constrained by legitimate security concerns

The authority column distinguishes national, supranational and African institutional responsibilities. None of these policy options can lawfully be implemented by an external government without regard to the applicable authorisations and sovereignty of the states concerned.

Key Judgments — Chapter 9

Italy, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the European Union possess materially different strategic relationships with West Africa. Their interests overlap in regional stability but diverge in economic exposure, historical commitments, institutional capabilities and policy instruments.

Italy’s documented relationship with Nigerien petroleum exports creates a concrete commercial dimension that merits specific attention. France’s 2026 African diplomacy indicates an effort to broaden partnerships beyond military relationships. Germany has explicitly connected Sahel stability with cooperation through North Africa, while the United Kingdom maintains identifiable stability and security programmes. The European Union remains a significant humanitarian-financing actor.

The most effective basis for European coordination is therefore not institutional uniformity but complementarity: diplomatic access, commercial knowledge, humanitarian finance, legal compliance and support for practical African regional arrangements.

PILLAR II — INTEGRATED STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

The evidence developed across Chapters 5–9 supports a significant conclusion: the strategic future of West Africa will be shaped by the relationship between newly differentiated political institutions and economic systems that remain deeply interconnected across national borders.

The withdrawal of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from ECOWAS has produced a new regional configuration. Yet the continuation of selected trade and free-movement arrangements demonstrates that formal political separation cannot eliminate geographic and economic interdependence. The emergence of the AES Unified Force’s legal framework represents institutional development, but its practical effectiveness remains a question of implementation rather than declaration.

External competition increasingly concerns long-term relationships in military technology, financing, training and critical infrastructure. Russia, China and Türkiye provide different forms of engagement, each with its own dependencies and limitations. The diversification of partnerships may increase the choices available to Sahelian governments, but it does not automatically create independent operational or technological capabilities.

The region’s economic prospects likewise resist simple interpretation. World Bank assessments show positive growth in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger despite severe security pressures. Niger’s petroleum exports illustrate how new infrastructure can transform national economic opportunities while creating exposure to fixed transport systems and international commodity markets. Documented trade relationships with European countries demonstrate that these changes matter beyond Africa.

International legal obligations provide an additional foundation that cannot be subordinated to changing geopolitical alignments. State sovereignty, foreign military cooperation and regional institutional autonomy coexist with binding obligations concerning armed conflict and civilian protection.

For Europe, the relevant strategic response must reflect the different responsibilities of national governments, the European Union and African institutions. Policy coherence does not require identical national interests; it requires that humanitarian commitments, commercial exposure, security cooperation and diplomatic engagement be grounded in accurate evidence and lawful authority.

Final strategic judgment: West Africa is not moving toward a simple replacement of one external sphere of influence by another. It is developing a more complex system of competing regional institutions, diversified foreign partnerships and persistent economic interdependence. The principal measure of future sovereignty will be the capacity of governments to convert political autonomy and external cooperation into functioning institutions, reliable economic access and legally accountable public authority.

Pillar III should consequently examine how these institutional and economic relationships may develop between 2026 and 2031, identifying measurable warning indicators, alternative strategic pathways and government decision options without assigning unsupported probabilities or assuming that existing political alignments will remain unchanged.

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PILLAR III — FUTURE SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND DECISION OPTIONS

Chapter 10 — Regional Scenarios and Conflict Trajectories, 2026–2031

Strategic Judgment: The Most Consequential Risk Is the Institutionalisation of Fragmented Sovereignty

The principal question for West Africa between 2026 and 2031 is whether the region’s increasingly differentiated security and political institutions can produce a sustainable territorial order, or whether existing fragmentation will evolve into a durable system of competing authorities and recurrent economic disruption.

The future security environment should not be assessed through a simple choice between military victory and insurgent expansion. Both categories conceal important intermediate outcomes. A government may preserve its central institutions and continue to generate economic growth while exercising uneven authority in peripheral territories. An insurgent organisation may increase its capacity to interrupt economic activity without acquiring the administrative institutions necessary to govern major population centres. Regional governments may also maintain conflicting political positions while cooperating on selected questions of trade, public health or humanitarian access.

These possibilities matter because the 2026 starting position is characterised by considerable institutional asymmetry. ECOWAS and the Alliance of Sahel States remain politically distinct. Sahelian governments have diversified their external partnerships, but military cooperation, economic development and humanitarian responses continue to depend on institutions operating across national boundaries.

The strategic future is therefore likely to be differentiated by geography, institutional capacity and economic structure rather than determined by one uniform regional trend. This is an analytical judgment, not a statistically estimated probability.

The latest official and institutional evidence establishes several conditions relevant to the forecasting exercise. The 12 August 2026 continental security assessment recorded 9,928 fatalities linked to militant Islamist violence in the Sahel during the preceding reporting year and identified increasing geographical reach in parts of northwestern Nigeria. In contrast, reported fatalities in Benin and Togo declined substantially during the same comparison period. These different trajectories establish that regional deterioration and country-level stabilisation can occur simultaneously.

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies’ August 2026 assessment provides the relevant conflict baseline. The World Bank’s October 2026 Africa Economic Update projects economic growth of 4.3% for sub-Saharan Africa in 2026, demonstrating that positive macroeconomic performance can coexist with persistent regional insecurity.

Neither dataset establishes the probability of any particular political or military outcome by 2031. Their importance lies in identifying the conditions from which alternative trajectories may develop.

The Forecasting Baseline: Five Structural Variables

A defensible five-year assessment must distinguish variables that can change relatively quickly from institutional characteristics that generally evolve more gradually.

The first variable is the distribution of coercive authority. This concerns the capacity of state and non-state actors to influence civilian movement, public administration and economic activity. Changes may occur through military operations, local political arrangements or deteriorating access to previously functioning institutions.

The second is regional institutional compatibility. ECOWAS and the AES do not need to restore a common political identity to reach practical agreements on trade, transit or other shared interests. Conversely, prolonged institutional disagreements could impose additional economic and administrative costs even in the absence of direct confrontation between member governments.

The third is fiscal resilience. Governments facing significant security responsibilities must also finance essential public functions, infrastructure and economic development. Changes in export revenue, borrowing conditions and the cost of imported commodities can constrain these functions even where national GDP continues to increase.

The fourth is civilian institutional continuity. Population displacement, interrupted education, weak healthcare and the deterioration of local administration can create lasting consequences beyond the immediate period of military insecurity. The restoration of services may therefore progress at a different pace from improvements in military conditions.

The fifth is external-partner dependence. Foreign military equipment, training, financing and technical assistance may provide useful resources, but their contribution to sovereign capability depends on implementation, institutional integration and long-term sustainability.

The interaction among these variables determines the strategic significance of future developments. A deterioration in one dimension need not cause simultaneous deterioration across all others; the relationships must be tested through specific evidence and observable mechanisms.

The 2026 Starting Position

Strategic variable	Verified starting evidence	Principal constraint	Implication for 2026–2031
Conflict intensity	9,928 militant-linked fatalities in the Sahel over the latest annual period	Restrictions on reporting and differences in attribution	Trends require comparable consecutive observations
Regional political institutions	AES states formally outside ECOWAS	Future legal and economic arrangements remain under negotiation	Institutional compatibility is a significant policy variable
Diplomatic negotiations	ECOWAS appointed Lansana Kouyaté chief negotiator in March 2026	Appointment does not establish agreement	Implementation of negotiated arrangements is a key signpost
Macroeconomic environment	Sub-Saharan African growth projected at 4.3% for 2026	Uneven country performance and limited fiscal capacity	Growth and security outcomes must be evaluated separately
Sahel development framework	New World Bank country partnership frameworks for 2026–2031	Financing, implementation and security constraints	A measurable medium-term institutional programme exists
Civilian protection	Approximately 3.8 million forcibly displaced people across Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger at 31 July 2026	Access, protection and financing constraints	Sustainable return and protection remain long-term tests
Social protection	Third phase of the Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program covers 2025–2030	National implementation capacity and fiscal sustainability	Resilience programmes can be evaluated over several years

Sources: ECOWAS Appointment of Chief Negotiator — March 2026; World Bank Sahel Country Partnership Frameworks, 2026–2031 — April 2026; Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program — World Bank — May 2026; UNHCR Central Sahel Displacement Assessment — September 2026.

Scenario A — Persistent Fragmentation and Uneven National Stabilisation

Under this pathway, the region continues to experience recurrent violence and differentiated territorial security without a decisive consolidation of either state or insurgent authority across the wider conflict system.

National governments retain their central institutions, armed forces and principal sources of public revenue. Some territories experience improvements in security, while other areas remain exposed to organised violence and the disruption of economic activity.

ECOWAS and the AES maintain their separate political identities, although limited technical cooperation remains possible. External military and economic partnerships continue, but no common regional security architecture emerges with sufficient authority and institutional capacity to address the principal cross-border problems comprehensively.

This pathway is consistent with several observed features of the October 2026 baseline: persistent high-intensity conflict in parts of the central Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, contrasting improvements in selected coastal states, and ongoing ECOWAS–AES negotiations.

Its distinctive feature is the coexistence of continuity and instability. It does not require the collapse of national governments or the permanent territorial expansion of insurgent organisations. Instead, insecurity remains embedded within national political and economic systems.

The long-term consequences would include continued expenditure on security, uneven access to investment, pressure on civilian institutions and a recurring need for emergency humanitarian support. Economic growth could remain positive, particularly where export sectors perform strongly, without ensuring comparable improvements in conflict-affected communities.

Indicators supporting this pathway would include persistent violence in several theatres without sustained expansion toward new national centres; repeated but geographically limited interruptions to commercial activity; slow implementation of regional agreements; and stable or improving national GDP alongside continued displacement.

Evidence weakening this pathway would include sustained and geographically broad restoration of public services and civilian access, or conversely a major institutional rupture that fundamentally changes the regional political and economic system.

Scenario B — Functional Regional Cooperation Without Political Reintegration

A second pathway would involve substantial improvement in practical cooperation between regional institutions while ECOWAS and the AES retain separate political identities.

This scenario does not depend on the three AES governments returning to ECOWAS. Instead, it requires agreements that preserve essential cross-border functions under mutually acceptable legal arrangements.

The March 2026 appointment of an ECOWAS chief negotiator provides an existing institutional basis for such a development, although no successful negotiated outcome should be presumed.

The most consequential potential agreements would concern customs administration, recognition of documentation, transport access, implementation of existing commercial rights and specified forms of information exchange consistent with national law.

The economic mechanism is relatively direct. Predictable border procedures and functioning trade arrangements reduce uncertainty for commercial operators. Improved administrative cooperation may also facilitate humanitarian access and the operation of cross-border public programmes.

Security benefits are less automatic. Economic cooperation does not independently establish operational interoperability among military forces, and diplomatic relations may improve without producing shared command arrangements.

This pathway would therefore represent functional accommodation, not necessarily political reconciliation.

Its sustainability would depend on whether governments regard the benefits of cooperation as greater than the political costs associated with engagement across institutional boundaries.

Scenario C — Coordinated Institutional Recovery and Expanded Civilian Security

A third pathway would involve sustained improvement in security outcomes accompanied by greater continuity of civilian administration, essential public services and economic activity.

Such a development would require more than decreases in reported fatalities. It would entail measurable improvements in civilian mobility, humanitarian access, school functioning, economic participation and the capacity of public institutions to operate outside principal urban centres.

The World Bank’s new 2026–2031 country partnership frameworks for Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger provide an existing development platform relevant to this trajectory.

Announced in April 2026, these frameworks seek to strengthen employment, human capital, infrastructure and agricultural productivity through the complementary financing and implementation capabilities of the International Development Association, International Finance Corporation and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.

Their importance for forecasting is institutional rather than rhetorical. They create a defined programme period within which investment commitments, implementation, output and outcomes can be compared.

The May 2026 launch of the third phase of the Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program supplies another medium-term mechanism. Covering 2025–2030, it aims to extend adaptive social protection and economic resilience across Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal.

The success of these programmes would not, by itself, establish security stabilisation. Nevertheless, demonstrable improvements in essential services and economic resilience could support a wider recovery where conditions permit lawful and sustained institutional activity.

Sources: World Bank Country Partnership Frameworks for the Sahel — April 2026; World Bank Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program — May 2026.

Scenario D — Strategic Escalation and Wider Regional Economic Disruption

The fourth pathway is a materially adverse development in which violence increasingly affects economically significant infrastructure, regional commerce and the institutions responsible for maintaining basic public functions.

This scenario does not necessarily require insurgent occupation of major capitals. Its effects could emerge through repeated disruption to trade, rising commercial risk, declining fiscal flexibility and substantial interruptions to civilian services.

The relevant mechanism would be a combination of security deterioration and economic transmission. When access to infrastructure becomes unreliable, economic agents may reduce activity or require higher compensation for risk. Government resources may then be diverted toward emergency measures, while the demand for humanitarian assistance increases.

A second risk concerns relations among states. If political fragmentation leads to restrictions on transit, financial cooperation or administrative movement, economic stress could arise from institutional decisions as well as armed violence.

A third concerns concurrent shocks. Adverse agricultural conditions, weaker commodity revenues or tighter external financing could magnify the consequences of insecurity.

The World Bank’s October 2026 regional assessment identifies rising inflationary pressures, global uncertainty, fiscal constraints and insufficient employment creation as relevant continental challenges. These do not establish that a wider Sahelian crisis will occur, but they define potential amplifiers should regional security conditions deteriorate.

Source: Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa Gains Momentum Despite Global Uncertainty — World Bank — October 2026.

Comparative Scenario Matrix, 2026–2031

Scenario	Core political condition	Economic trajectory	Security condition	Principal observable confirmation	Strategic consequence
A — Persistent fragmentation	Separate institutions and limited functional accommodation	Aggregate growth with uneven regional distribution	Recurrent, geographically differentiated insecurity	Continued violence without decisive institutional change	Prolonged fiscal and social pressure
B — Functional cooperation	Technical agreements across institutional boundaries	Reduced administrative friction and improved predictability	Selective cooperation without unified security architecture	Implemented transit, trade and administrative agreements	Greater regional resilience without political reintegration
C — Institutional recovery	Stronger delivery by national and regional institutions	More inclusive growth and improved essential services	Sustained gains in civilian security	Verified restoration of services, mobility and local administration	Improved conditions for durable stabilisation
D — Strategic escalation	Increased fragmentation or weakened state performance	Major interruptions to commerce and public finance	Wider disruption and increased civilian exposure	Recurrent infrastructure interruptions and deteriorating civilian indicators	Intensified regional and international crisis-management requirements

These scenarios describe conditional pathways, not mutually exclusive outcomes for the entire region. Different states may follow different trajectories simultaneously, and a country may move from one pathway to another during the forecasting period. Consequently, assigning four probabilities that sum to 100% would imply a degree of exclusivity and statistical support that the evidence does not provide.

Country-Specific Outlook, 2026–2031

Country or group	Decisive future variable	Potential positive development	Principal downside pathway	Record required to change the assessment
Mali	Continuity of economic access and public administration	Sustained restoration of commercial connectivity	Extended interruption of critical economic functions	Corridor operations, official economic series and service-access data
Burkina Faso	Institutional effectiveness beyond central urban areas	Improved civilian security accompanying economic development	Localised security deterioration despite aggregate growth	Administrative access, education, protection and sectoral statistics
Niger	Reliability of oil-linked growth and infrastructure	Conversion of export growth into fiscal and social resilience	Infrastructure disruption and fiscal constraints	Official petroleum, budget and social-outcome data
Nigeria	Management of distinct security theatres	Reduced civilian harm and sustained economic activity	Expansion of overlapping militant and criminal insecurity	Geographically disaggregated security and public-service series
Benin and Togo	Persistence of security improvements	Durable containment and functioning border communities	Renewed cross-border insecurity	Multi-year comparable incident and civilian-access data
ECOWAS–AES relationship	Implementation of negotiated arrangements	Functional cooperation with separate political institutions	Prolonged uncertainty affecting regional movement and trade	Signed agreements, implementation decisions and customs records
External partners	Sustainability and transparency of support	More effective institutional capabilities	New technical or financial dependencies	Contracts, audits and operational programme evaluations

Forecasting Discipline: Why Unsupported Probability Estimates Would Mislead Decision-Makers

Forecasting security outcomes is not equivalent to assigning plausible-looking percentages to competing scenarios.

An explicit numerical probability requires a defined outcome, a specified horizon and a defensible estimation procedure. A probability that regional violence will increase, for example, has little analytical meaning unless the metric, geographic coverage, reference period and treatment of reporting changes are defined.

The existing official record supports scenario construction and qualitative assessments of relevant mechanisms. It does not provide a validated statistical model capable of estimating the probability of each broad political pathway by 2031.

The appropriate approach is therefore to maintain an evidence-based scenario system in which developments are evaluated against observable signposts.

A future quantitative model could be constructed for narrower outcomes, such as year-on-year changes in recorded fatalities within a specified dataset or changes in official trade volumes. Such an exercise would require sufficiently complete historical observations, explicit treatment of data revisions and tests of model performance outside the estimation period.

It would not be scientifically defensible to use a Monte Carlo simulation to manufacture quantitative certainty about political transitions, institutional cooperation or territorial control without credible distributions and a reproducible causal framework.

Key Judgments — Chapter 10

West Africa’s future security environment is best understood through geographically differentiated pathways rather than a single regional forecast.

Institutional fragmentation can persist alongside national economic growth and selective improvements in civilian security. Functional cooperation between ECOWAS and the AES is possible without political reintegration, while sustained institutional recovery requires measurable improvements in public administration and civilian welfare.

The most serious adverse pathway would involve the interaction of security deterioration, critical economic disruption and reduced public-sector capacity.

The strategic assessment should be revised when observable indicators establish durable changes in these underlying conditions, not simply because new political declarations or military procurement announcements alter the public narrative.

Chapter 11 — Strategic Warning Indicators and Institutional Vulnerabilities

Strategic Judgment: Effective Early Warning Requires Measuring Changes in State Performance, Not Merely Counting Armed Incidents

West Africa requires a warning architecture capable of identifying strategic deterioration before it appears in annual fatality totals or produces a major institutional crisis. The decisive requirement is to detect changes in the functioning of political authority, economic systems and civilian institutions, and to distinguish these changes from normal variation, incomplete reporting or short-lived events.

Conventional security reporting frequently emphasises attacks, casualties, weapons seizures and major military engagements. These variables are indispensable for understanding violence, but they are insufficient for evaluating the resilience of national institutions or anticipating the wider political consequences of insecurity.

A warning system should therefore integrate information from official statistical agencies, customs administrations, ministries responsible for infrastructure and public services, national budget authorities, regional institutions and competent international organisations. Information from security agencies should be combined with non-military evidence rather than treated as the sole determinant of regional stability.

The institutional challenge is substantial. Relevant information is often produced by organisations with different mandates, statistical definitions and reporting schedules. Even where data exist, their usefulness for strategic warning depends on comparability and timely interpretation.

The objective is not to create a single numerical index claiming to measure the security of West Africa. It is to establish a multi-domain warning system that identifies which conditions are deteriorating, which institutions possess the authority to respond and which developments would require changes in national or regional policy.

The Difference Between Indicators, Signposts and Decision Thresholds

Three categories must be distinguished.

An indicator is an observable variable relevant to a strategic judgment. Examples include monthly export volumes, the proportion of operational schools or the number of people newly displaced during a defined period.

A signpost is a development indicating that a particular strategic pathway is becoming more or less consistent with observed conditions. The signature and implementation of an ECOWAS–AES technical agreement, for example, would be relevant to the functional-cooperation scenario described in Chapter 10.

A decision threshold defines when an authorised institution should review, modify or initiate a policy response. Such thresholds can be procedural rather than statistical. A documented interruption of essential public services, for example, may warrant review by the responsible civilian authority even when the precise number of affected people has not yet been established.

These distinctions prevent arbitrary scoring. A warning system should not equate a diplomatic appointment with an implemented agreement, nor treat a temporary reduction in violence as confirmation of territorial stabilisation.

Establishing the Reference Dataset

The first requirement is a consistent record of the period against which future developments will be assessed.

For conflict-related indicators, the August 2026 Africa Center publication provides an identifiable reporting vintage. Any subsequent comparison must preserve its geographic definitions, actor categories, event classifications and reporting period.

The report itself notes that increasing restrictions on reporting in parts of the central Sahel may affect observed totals. This means that an apparent decline in violence cannot automatically be interpreted as genuine improvement without considering changes in data coverage.

For institutional variables, the appointment of an ECOWAS chief negotiator in March 2026 establishes a specific diplomatic milestone. It provides evidence that a negotiating mechanism exists, but not that negotiations have produced binding or implemented arrangements.

For economic variables, the latest World Bank forecasts and national statistical releases provide reference observations. Their revision dates are important because subsequent changes may reflect revised historical estimates rather than changes occurring after October 2026.

For development outcomes, the World Bank’s 2026–2031 country partnership frameworks provide a medium-term policy structure with stated objectives involving employment, infrastructure, human capital and economic resilience.

Together, these sources support a warning system based on observable institutional and economic conditions rather than speculative intelligence scores.

Sources: Africa Center Conflict Assessment — August 2026; ECOWAS Chief Negotiator Appointment — March 2026; World Bank Country Partnership Frameworks for the Central Sahel, FY2026–FY2031.

Strategic Warning Matrix: Conflict, Territory and Civilian Security

Warning domain	Indicator	Required measurement	Warning condition	Verification authority
Armed violence	Fatalities associated with defined conflict actors	Monthly or quarterly totals using consistent actor and event classifications	Sustained deterioration across comparable periods	Conflict dataset issuer, corroborated by official records
Geographic expansion	Newly affected administrative districts	Geocoded incident records with verified administrative boundaries	Recurrent violence in areas previously outside the observed conflict footprint	National authorities and competent conflict-monitoring institutions
Civilian protection	Documented civilian deaths and serious injuries	Incident-level attribution and reporting period	Increasing civilian harm not explained by reporting expansion	National judicial authorities and competent international monitors
Forced displacement	Newly displaced people	Monthly flows, differentiated from total displaced population	Sustained new displacement or significant secondary displacement	UNHCR, IOM and national institutions
Public administration	Operational status of local government services	Functioning offices and actual service availability	Repeated interruption of essential civilian functions	Relevant national ministries
School access	Proportion of schools functioning	Schools open and operational divided by the defined school universe	Decline in functioning schools or prolonged interruption	Education ministries and UNICEF
Healthcare access	Availability of essential medical services	Operational facilities and service coverage	Sustained deterioration in access to essential healthcare	Health ministries and WHO
Humanitarian access	Population reachable under applicable arrangements	Verified operational access and delivery records	Persistent inability to reach priority populations	OCHA and humanitarian organisations

The matrix establishes the data requirements and warning conditions but does not assign arbitrary numerical thresholds. A defensible numerical threshold requires historical observations, reporting intervals and an understanding of normal variation within the relevant geographic area.

Economic Early Warning: Identifying Systemic Vulnerability

Economic deterioration may precede or follow major changes in the security environment. It may also result from unrelated developments, including commodity-price changes, monetary conditions and climate shocks.

The warning architecture must consequently distinguish changes in production from changes in transport, commercial pricing and public revenue.

An increase in the international price of crude oil may improve petroleum export receipts even when physical export volumes decline. Similarly, higher gold prices may sustain national export earnings while mining output stagnates.

This distinction is particularly important for economic systems concentrated in a limited number of export commodities.

The relevant government question is not merely whether GDP remains positive. It is whether the state possesses sufficient predictable resources to maintain essential functions, finance contractual obligations and absorb adverse shocks.

Economic and Fiscal Warning Matrix

Economic variable	Required series	Potential warning signal	Necessary qualification	Competent source
Real GDP growth	National accounts, constant prices	Persistent downward revisions or sectoral contraction	Revisions may reflect methodology rather than new deterioration	National statistics office, World Bank, IMF
Petroleum exports	Physical volume and export value	Declining output or repeated interruption of exports	Separate price effects from volume effects	Customs, petroleum authorities
Gold and mineral exports	Output, prices and customs value	Production losses or declining fiscal contribution	Prices may offset changes in output	Mining ministries, customs and central banks
Food inflation	National and regional consumer-price series	Persistent acceleration affecting essential goods	Compare with wider inflation and seasonal patterns	National statistics offices, WAEMU institutions
Fuel availability	Imports, distribution and official market indicators	Recurrent shortages or abnormal distribution restrictions	Identify commercial, fiscal and security causes	Energy ministries and relevant regulators
Fiscal balance	Revenue, expenditure and financing	Widening deficit associated with reduced fiscal flexibility	Separate budget plans from executed outlays	Finance ministries and IMF
Public debt	Debt stock, service obligations and maturity profile	Rising refinancing pressure or arrears	Distinguish external and domestic obligations	Debt offices, IMF and World Bank
Commercial transit	Customs clearance, transport volumes and transit times	Sustained delays or lower corridor throughput	Separate security events from regulatory and infrastructure causes	Customs and transport administrations
Private investment	Actual investment and executed projects	Sustained cancellation or delay of productive investment	Announcements are not capital expenditure	Investment agencies, audited company filings

A particularly important warning condition is the simultaneous deterioration of several variables that are normally evaluated separately. Declining commercial transit, increasing essential-goods prices and falling fiscal revenue may together indicate a more serious disruption than any individual observation suggests.

However, simultaneity does not prove causation. The responsible analysts must establish whether the variables are linked by a credible economic mechanism.

Building a Composite Assessment Without Artificial Numerical Scores

A multi-domain warning system can be analytically integrated without assigning each country a numerical risk score.

The appropriate approach is to examine the concurrence of adverse developments and the institutional consequences arising from them.

A single temporary interruption of commercial activity may justify local administrative attention. Repeated interruption combined with deteriorating essential services and rising displacement would warrant a broader national review.

An additional deterioration in fiscal performance could justify examination of the government’s capacity to maintain routine expenditure and support affected populations.

Such a system would distinguish three categories of institutional concern.

Routine monitoring applies where observations remain within established variation and no consequential disruption has been documented.

Focused review applies where credible evidence identifies a material change in one or more important functions, requiring verification and assessment by the competent institution.

Strategic escalation applies where several consequential functions are simultaneously impaired or an event creates an immediate threat to critical civilian systems, requiring coordinated consideration by authorised national and regional bodies.

These categories define procedural responses. They are not claims that a particular country currently occupies a quantified risk level.

WordPress Analytical Component — Strategic Warning Architecture

The following component is an optional, self-contained HTML scheme for insertion after this section. It represents the relationship between evidence, institutional interpretation and authorised decisions. It does not invent risk scores or probabilities.

Institutional Vulnerabilities: The Governance of Information

A warning system can fail even when data collection is extensive.

One vulnerability concerns institutional fragmentation. Ministries and agencies may maintain separate records that cannot be easily compared. Security institutions may use classifications that differ from those employed by civilian statistical authorities.

A second concerns data timeliness. Annual reports can provide valuable historical comparisons but may not support decisions requiring near-term information. Conversely, rapidly updated operational reporting may be incomplete or later revised.

A third involves restricted information access. Security concerns may justify limiting the circulation of certain operational details, but excessive restrictions can make it difficult for civilian institutions to evaluate national conditions accurately.

A fourth is source dependence. Reports that reproduce one underlying dataset should not be treated as independent corroboration merely because they appear under different institutional names.

A fifth concerns political incentives. Governments, armed organisations and external partners may have different reasons to emphasise particular outcomes. Official status establishes the origin of a statement, not its independence from the interests of the issuing institution.

These vulnerabilities make documentary discipline a substantive part of strategic warning rather than an administrative afterthought.

Regional Cooperation Indicators

The ECOWAS–AES relationship requires a distinct monitoring framework because diplomatic activity can precede implementation by a substantial period.

Institutional stage	Observable event	Evidentiary significance	What remains unresolved
Appointment	Named negotiator with official mandate	Negotiation mechanism exists	No substantive agreement established
Negotiation	Official meetings and documented agendas	Issues under discussion identified	Agreement and implementation remain uncertain
Agreement	Signed instrument with defined responsibilities	Legal or political commitment established	Domestic implementation may still be required
Ratification or adoption	Completion of applicable national procedures	Domestic legal status clarified	Administrative execution may remain incomplete
Implementation	Published rules, administrative decisions and functioning procedures	Agreement begins to produce operational effects	Durability and outcomes require monitoring
Evaluation	Official audit or joint review	Evidence of performance becomes available	Findings may require policy revision

The distinction between these stages should apply consistently to defence cooperation, trade arrangements, social programmes and regional institutions.

Monitoring External Security and Development Partnerships

External commitments present their own warning and accountability requirements.

A financing agreement may provide resources without establishing that funds have been disbursed. Equipment delivery may occur without confirming operational availability. Training may be completed without producing an institutional capability that can be sustained independently.

The World Bank’s new country partnership frameworks illustrate a more structured development-monitoring model because they establish medium-term objectives and institutional responsibilities. Their country-specific results matrices and implementation records offer a more defensible basis for evaluating performance than public announcements alone.

The relevant monitoring system should distinguish committed finance, actual disbursements, completed activities and independently assessable outcomes.

Source: Mali Country Partnership Framework, FY2026–FY2031: Supporting Documents and Results Matrix — World Bank — March 2026.

Institutional Accountability Matrix

Commitment type	Evidence of intention	Evidence of execution	Evidence of outcome
Military cooperation	Signed agreement and official programme	Completed deliveries or training	Verified institutional capability
Development investment	Approved project and financing agreement	Disbursement and completed works	Functioning infrastructure and measured service improvements
Trade cooperation	Signed protocol	Implemented customs and transit procedures	Recorded trade facilitation and reduced administrative friction
Humanitarian financing	Budget allocation or grant commitment	Disbursement to implementing organisations	Verified assistance delivered to eligible populations
Public administration	Reform law or government decision	Operational institutions and personnel	Improved access, continuity and accountability
Regional security cooperation	Joint declaration or legal instrument	Documented coordination arrangements	Verified results within the authorised mandate

This framework is relevant to governments, multilateral institutions and external partners alike. It prevents the repeated transformation of announced inputs into unsupported claims of strategic success.

Decision Thresholds for Government Review

For practical use, the warning architecture can adopt procedural triggers while avoiding unsupported quantitative thresholds.

A monthly technical review should occur when a data provider publishes a consequential revision, when essential services are interrupted or when reliable reporting identifies new geographic exposure. The review would determine whether the development is local, temporary or part of a wider pattern.

A quarterly strategic review should examine the concurrence of developments across security, public finance, population movements and regional institutional relations. This frequency is a proposed management cadence, not an existing binding international requirement.

An immediate authorised review would be appropriate following a major documented threat to essential civilian infrastructure, a significant breakdown of regional economic arrangements or another event with direct consequences for protected populations.

A semiannual policy review should assess whether programmes and agreements are producing their intended results, using actual expenditure and outcome information.

These reviews should generate recorded decisions, assigned responsibilities and follow-up verification rather than merely restating the security situation.

Key Judgments — Chapter 11

The central warning requirement is to identify changes in institutional functioning before they become systemic crises. Conflict statistics remain necessary but must be interpreted alongside economic, administrative and civilian indicators.

Warning systems should preserve the distinction between raw observations, verified analysis and decisions authorised by competent institutions. Numerical thresholds are useful only when supported by historical data and clear definitions.

The effectiveness of regional monitoring will depend on source comparability, transparent revisions, access to relevant information and the ability of civilian and security institutions to act within their respective legal mandates.

The most consequential signposts for 2026–2031 will concern regional agreements actually implemented, the continuity of essential economic systems, sustained civilian security and demonstrable outcomes from national and international development programmes.

Chapter 12 — Government Policy Options and Final Net Assessment

Strategic Judgment: A Sustainable Security Architecture Must Protect National Sovereignty While Making Cross-Border Economic and Institutional Cooperation Operationally Viable

West Africa’s governments face a strategic decision that cannot be resolved through military procurement, diplomatic realignment or economic growth considered separately. The fundamental policy challenge is to construct institutions capable of maintaining public authority and civilian protection while preserving the commercial and financial relationships necessary for national economic functioning.

The regional environment does not support a single institutional solution. The AES governments and ECOWAS operate within different political frameworks, national defence capabilities vary, and external partners possess distinct legal mandates and strategic interests. At the same time, landlocked economies remain connected to coastal markets, international financial institutions and infrastructure systems that cross national boundaries.

The most defensible policy approach is therefore based on functional cooperation under differentiated political authority. This does not require the restoration of a previous regional order or the assumption that every government will adopt identical foreign-policy priorities. It requires agreement on specific functions whose interruption would impose substantial costs on civilian populations and national economies.

The April 2026 World Bank partnership frameworks illustrate one existing institutional opportunity. They cover Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger over FY2026–FY2031 and are designed to support job creation, human capital, infrastructure, agricultural productivity and private-sector development. The inclusion of Chad is noteworthy: although it is not an AES member, its economic and security circumstances justify inclusion in a broader Sahel development framework.

The frameworks combine the instruments of IDA, IFC and MIGA, potentially linking public investment, private-sector financing and investment guarantees. The strategic relevance is that economic resilience can be pursued through authorised national programmes and cross-border projects without first resolving every political dispute between regional organisations.

The challenge is implementation. Approved programmes do not automatically produce functioning infrastructure or sustainable employment, and investment outcomes depend on institutional performance and financing conditions.

Source: Sahel: New Country Partnership Frameworks for Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger, FY2026–FY2031 — World Bank — April 2026.

Policy Option I — Negotiate Functional Compatibility Between ECOWAS and the AES

The first policy option is the creation of specific agreements addressing shared economic and administrative requirements without making political reintegration a prerequisite.

The legal authority lies primarily with the participating governments and competent regional institutions. ECOWAS can negotiate within its governing instruments, while AES governments must approve commitments through the procedures applicable to their own institutions.

The most useful immediate subjects would concern commercial transit, customs administration, the treatment of recognised documents and the continuation of essential cross-border public functions.

The principal benefit would be a reduction in institutional uncertainty. Commercial operators and civilians would gain clearer information concerning applicable rules, while governments would retain the ability to regulate their borders and economic activities according to lawful agreements.

The implementation burden would involve technical negotiation, drafting, administrative coordination and the adaptation of relevant procedures. The likely time-to-effect would vary: diplomatic and administrative clarifications could be issued comparatively quickly, whereas comprehensive agreements requiring new systems or national legal measures would take longer.

Such arrangements would generally be reversible according to their governing provisions, although abrupt suspension could impose significant commercial and humanitarian costs.

The principal downside is that technical cooperation may be politically interpreted as recognition or endorsement of positions that remain contested. The response should be to define the scope of each agreement precisely and preserve the distinction between practical cooperation and broader political reconciliation.

Policy Option II — Establish Protected Economic-Continuity Programmes

The second option concerns the continuity of essential civilian economic systems.

For landlocked economies, uninterrupted access to lawful trade can have consequences for public finances, essential imports and household welfare. National governments should therefore evaluate critical economic dependencies through infrastructure and transport authorities, customs institutions, finance ministries and competent civilian agencies.

The relevant measures would be administrative and economic rather than the publication of operationally sensitive military plans. They could include clearer transit procedures, better commercial reporting, improved infrastructure maintenance and contingency arrangements for essential civilian supply.

The expected benefit is greater economic resilience in the event of disruption. Such programmes would also improve the information available to governments when assessing the economic consequences of insecurity.

The principal implementation burden would involve investment, administration and coordination across jurisdictions. Physical infrastructure requires longer periods than regulatory changes; commercial contingency arrangements may be introduced more quickly where existing legal authority permits.

The option is partly reversible, although infrastructure expenditure creates long-lived financial commitments.

Its principal risk is misallocation of scarce resources toward projects that are politically visible but economically ineffective. Project selection must therefore be supported by traffic data, maintenance requirements, cost-benefit analysis and transparent procurement.

Policy Option III — Link Security-Sector Assistance to Demonstrable Institutional Capability

The third option concerns the design of national and external security assistance.

Military cooperation should be assessed through the capabilities it produces, rather than the nominal value of delivered equipment or the number of training activities announced.

National governments and authorised defence institutions retain responsibility for defining operational requirements and evaluating performance. External partners may provide finance, equipment and technical assistance within the limits of applicable agreements and law.

The most useful evaluation criteria include serviceability, sustainable maintenance, personnel qualifications, lawful command arrangements and the ability of the receiving institution to operate the supported capability over time.

The expected effect is to reduce the gap between procurement expenditure and actual operational availability. Implementation requires contractual transparency, technical evaluation, trained personnel and reliable funding for maintenance.

The time-to-effect depends on the complexity of the system and the institutional starting position. Some administrative reforms may be achievable relatively quickly; developing a sustainable maintenance and training ecosystem is a multi-year task.

Equipment acquisitions can be modified or discontinued, but contractual obligations and technical dependence may limit reversibility.

The principal downside is the possibility of reinforcing coercive institutions without adequate civilian oversight. Security assistance should therefore be accompanied by appropriate accountability and legal-compliance arrangements.

Policy Option IV — Strengthen Local Public Institutions as a Security-Resilience Measure

The fourth option concerns public administration, education, healthcare, local economic activity and social protection.

The primary authority belongs to national and local civilian institutions. International organisations may provide financing and technical support under agreed programmes, but should not substitute their own priorities for lawful national responsibilities.

The World Bank’s 2026–2031 country partnership frameworks and the third phase of the Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program provide relevant programme structures.

Their policy value lies in combining economic resilience with institutional capacity. Functional schools, healthcare facilities, agricultural services and social protection systems can reduce vulnerability to shocks while supporting the continuity of civilian authority.

Implementation requires trained personnel, operating budgets, local administrative capacity and appropriate arrangements for access and accountability.

The time-to-effect varies considerably. Emergency financial support may produce near-term benefits, while improvements in education, productive employment and institutional capacity require sustained investment.

The principal risk is that resources reach institutions unable to deliver the intended services or that interventions are concentrated in accessible areas while more vulnerable populations remain excluded.

Evaluation must therefore distinguish funds committed, activities completed and outcomes achieved.

Source: Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program: Third Phase, 2025–2030 — World Bank — May 2026.

Policy Option V — Establish an Auditable Regional Strategic-Monitoring Mechanism

The fifth option is the creation or strengthening of an authorised mechanism capable of integrating economic, institutional and civilian-security information.

Such a mechanism should not require the establishment of a new supranational intelligence authority or the unrestricted exchange of sensitive operational information.

Instead, participating institutions could agree on a limited body of indicators, harmonised statistical definitions and procedures for reviewing material changes.

The expected benefit would be earlier recognition of systemic deterioration and more consistent assessment of programme outcomes.

The implementation burden would involve data agreements, competent personnel, secure information management and sustained institutional cooperation.

The principal risk is that shared information could be misused, politicised or interpreted without adequate regard to methodological limitations. Governance safeguards should therefore address confidentiality, lawful processing, attribution, corrections and institutional responsibility.

A monitoring mechanism should not claim authority to direct national military operations or alter treaty obligations unless such authority is lawfully conferred.

Comparative Government Decision Matrix

Policy option	Principal authority	Intended effect	Implementation burden	Indicative time-to-effect	Reversibility	Principal risk
ECOWAS–AES functional agreements	Member governments and competent regional bodies	Maintain practical regional cooperation	Negotiation, legal drafting and administration	Months for limited measures; longer for comprehensive agreements	Subject to legal commitments	Political disagreement or non-implementation
Economic-continuity programmes	National economic, customs and infrastructure authorities	Improve resilience of essential commercial systems	Infrastructure investment, administration and intergovernmental coordination	Months to years	Partial	Inefficient spending or unequal commercial benefits
Capability-based security assistance	National defence authorities and authorised partners	Improve sustainable institutional performance	Training, maintenance, contracting and oversight	Varies by system; often multi-year	Limited by contracts and technical dependence	Reinforcement of poorly accountable institutions
Civilian institutional recovery	National and local civilian authorities	Improve essential services and economic resilience	Personnel, operating finance and sustained investment	Immediate for some support; years for structural outcomes	Partial	Weak implementation and exclusion of vulnerable populations
Auditable strategic monitoring	Competent national and regional institutions	Improve warning and policy evaluation	Data coordination and analytical capacity	Months for initial systems; continuing thereafter	Generally high	Politicisation and misuse of information

The indicated implementation periods are planning ranges, not verified schedules for existing government programmes.

Prioritisation: The Difference Between Urgency and Feasibility

Government decisions must distinguish urgent needs from actions that can realistically be implemented within the existing legal and institutional framework.

An immediate humanitarian requirement may justify rapid mobilisation of available resources, but it does not eliminate restrictions on access or the need for appropriate protection arrangements.

A proposed infrastructure project may possess high strategic value yet require several years of financing, procurement and construction. Such a project should not be presented as an immediate solution to an acute supply interruption.

Likewise, a diplomatic agreement may be comparatively inexpensive to negotiate but ineffective unless administrative authorities implement its provisions.

The appropriate prioritisation criteria are therefore the magnitude of the problem, the competence of the responsible institution, expected civilian and economic benefits, implementation feasibility, time-to-effect and principal downside.

These considerations provide a more defensible basis for public decisions than symbolic rankings of policy options.

National Implementation Responsibilities

Jurisdiction	Principal responsible institutions	Immediate policy focus	Medium-term evaluation requirement
Mali	National executive, finance, infrastructure and civilian ministries	Economic continuity and functioning public institutions	Verified service delivery and fiscal resilience
Burkina Faso	National executive and relevant civilian and security institutions	Sustainable public-service access and economic opportunity	Outcomes under national and international programmes
Niger	National economic, petroleum, finance and public-service authorities	Export-system resilience and effective fiscal management	Petroleum revenue, public investment and civilian outcomes
Nigeria	Federal and state institutions within their respective legal competences	Differentiated regional security and civilian recovery	Geographically disaggregated service and economic performance
ECOWAS	Competent political and administrative organs	Negotiated regional compatibility	Implemented agreements and measurable effects
AES	Competent confederal and national institutions	Institutional implementation and lawful regional cooperation	Performance against adopted mandates
European governments	National governments and parliaments	Diplomatic, economic and authorised cooperation	Audited expenditure and programme results
European Union	EU institutions within their treaty competences	Humanitarian support and regional policy coherence	Financing execution and evaluated outcomes
International financial institutions	Governing bodies and country programme teams	Investment, resilience and institutional development	Verified results against approved frameworks

Financing the Future Security Architecture

Financing determines whether institutional commitments can be maintained beyond their initial announcement.

The central Sahel faces a dual demand for public resources. Governments must respond to current security and humanitarian conditions while maintaining investment in the infrastructure and human capital needed for longer-term economic resilience.

This creates a fiscal allocation problem. Expenditure on urgent needs can be necessary but may reduce resources available for investment, while postponement of essential public services can increase future social and economic costs.

The World Bank’s 2026 country assessments illustrate the constraints.

For Mali, the Bank projects a fiscal deficit of approximately 2.8% of GDP in 2026, alongside a current-account deficit of 5.2% and public debt equivalent to approximately 39.5% of GDP. Security expenditure is one of the factors influencing public spending.

For Niger, the Bank estimates a fiscal deficit of approximately 3.4% of GDP in 2026, with security, reconstruction and support for vulnerable households among the contributing expenditure requirements.

For Burkina Faso, the Bank projects growth of 6.1% in 2026 conditional on improvements in security, favourable rainfall and political stability. These conditions make clear that economic forecasts are not unconditional financing guarantees.

The figures are not direct measures of available security funding. They describe broader macroeconomic circumstances within which governments must finance their responsibilities.

Sources: Mali Economic Overview — World Bank — 2026; Niger Economic Overview — World Bank — 2026; Burkina Faso Economic Overview — World Bank — 2026.

Country Partnership Frameworks as Implementation Instruments

The FY2026–FY2031 partnership frameworks offer a more concrete basis for assessing future development than broad declarations of international support.

They identify common areas of intervention but preserve country-specific priorities.

For Mali, the framework emphasises human capital, agriculture, energy and private-sector development. For Burkina Faso, it emphasises employment, inclusion, energy access and agricultural productivity. Niger’s framework focuses on essential infrastructure, energy, human capital and resilience. Chad’s framework concentrates on private-sector employment, food security and the foundations of economic development.

These differences are important because the countries face related but not identical institutional and economic challenges.

Country	Official framework period	Principal strategic priorities	Relevant implementation evidence
Mali	FY2026–FY2031	Human capital, agriculture, energy and private-sector investment	Approved projects, financing and results framework
Burkina Faso	FY2026–FY2031	Employment, inclusion, energy access and agricultural productivity	Programme results and verified service outcomes
Niger	FY2026–FY2031	Infrastructure, energy, human capital and economic resilience	Investment execution and development indicators
Chad	FY2026–FY2031	Jobs, human capital, energy and food security	Approved investments and country programme evaluations

Sources: Mali Country Partnership Framework; Burkina Faso Country Partnership Framework; Niger Country Partnership Framework; Chad Country Partnership Framework.

Water Security and Cross-Border Economic Resilience

Water management constitutes an additional area in which national security, agricultural development and regional cooperation intersect.

On 15 July 2026, governments and participating institutions adopted the N’Djamena Declaration, which calls for investment in water systems, food production, climate resilience and regional cooperation.

The declaration encourages countries and transboundary basin organisations to develop Water Compacts defining investment priorities, financing requirements, implementation arrangements and monitoring mechanisms.

Its importance for West Africa lies in the potential to address economic and environmental vulnerabilities through common infrastructure and policy instruments.

Water-related cooperation may produce benefits even where participating states maintain different political or security alignments. However, the declaration is an expression of commitments and proposed implementation mechanisms; it is not proof that the anticipated investments have been financed or completed.

The appropriate policy test concerns whether the declaration leads to adopted national programmes, funded investments and measurable improvements in water access and agricultural productivity.

Source: N’Djamena Declaration: Making Water Work for People, Food Systems, Planet and Prosperity in Africa — World Bank — July 2026.

The 2031 Policy Horizon: What Would Constitute Meaningful Improvement?

A defensible definition of success in 2031 should not depend on the claim that every armed organisation has disappeared or that all regional political disagreements have been resolved.

Meaningful improvement would require several observable changes.

National institutions would need to demonstrate greater continuity in areas presently affected by insecurity. Essential public services would need to reach a larger proportion of the populations for which governments are responsible. Economic infrastructure would need to operate with improved reliability, and the benefits of investment would need to extend beyond narrow export sectors.

Regional institutions would need to manage practical cooperation even where political differences persist. Agreements would need to be implemented through functioning administrative mechanisms rather than remain limited to summit declarations.

External partnerships would need to demonstrate sustainable capabilities and verifiable outcomes, rather than merely the delivery of equipment or announcement of financing.

Finally, improvements would need to be measured against consistent records of civilian security, displacement, public-service access and economic functioning.

The strategic objective is thus not a return to an idealised institutional arrangement, but the establishment of a more reliable relationship between legal authority, effective administration and the protection of civilian life.

Final Net Assessment — West Africa, 2026–2031

The completed assessment identifies West Africa as a region in which the distribution of security power, economic opportunity and institutional authority is undergoing a structural transformation.

The central Sahel’s political reorganisation has produced a new confederal framework without eliminating the commercial and financial interdependence connecting its member states to neighbouring economies. Regional diplomacy is consequently focused not only on sovereignty and political representation but also on the preservation of essential functions across institutional boundaries.

External engagement has diversified, giving governments additional choices but creating new questions about operational sustainability, technical dependence, financing and accountability. The long-term effect of these relationships cannot be established through diplomatic access or procurement announcements alone.

The economic evidence is particularly consequential. Positive national growth can coexist with severe insecurity, and commodity exports can support government revenue while large sections of the population remain exposed to poverty and inadequate services. Economic resilience must therefore be evaluated through fiscal performance, diversification, infrastructure continuity and measurable civilian outcomes.

The regional humanitarian situation imposes further constraints on future policy. Displacement and interrupted public services can weaken long-term institutional capacity, while insufficient financing may prevent humanitarian and development programmes from reaching their intended populations.

The scenarios examined for 2026–2031 demonstrate that regional outcomes are unlikely to be uniform. Persistent fragmentation, functional cooperation, institutional recovery and strategic escalation represent plausible conditional pathways whose relative relevance must be evaluated through future evidence.

The most significant policy opportunity lies in preserving practical cooperation while recognising the differentiated political authority of national and regional institutions. Neither the restoration of an earlier regional order nor the complete separation of existing systems can be assumed to provide a comprehensive solution.

The principal strategic conclusion is that West Africa’s future security will depend on the measurable capacity of governments and regional institutions to maintain civilian protection, economic continuity, lawful public authority and effective cross-border cooperation.

This conclusion does not diminish the importance of military capabilities. It places them within the wider institutional framework necessary for their results to endure.

The success of future policy should consequently be judged through demonstrable changes in public institutions, economic resilience and civilian security—not the frequency of military operations, the number of external partnerships or the political prominence of newly established regional organisations.

Final Decision Priorities, 2026–2031

Strategic priority	Required institutional achievement	Verification standard
Regional compatibility	Implemented ECOWAS–AES technical arrangements	Published agreements and functioning administrative procedures
Economic resilience	More reliable essential infrastructure and access to trade	Official infrastructure, customs and economic records
Security-sector capability	Sustainable and accountable operational performance	Authorised institutional reviews and verified results
Civilian protection	Improved safety and access to public institutions	Credible civilian-security and service-delivery datasets
Development implementation	Conversion of financing into measurable outcomes	Audited expenditure and programme results
External-partner accountability	Transparent and sustainable cooperation	Official agreements, delivery records and oversight
Strategic warning	Consistent monitoring of consequential institutional changes	Comparable data and documented decision procedures

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